Date of Original Version

1-1-2015

Type

Article

PubMed ID

26348617

Rights Management

© 2015 Kane, Zollman. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

Abstract or Description

The handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the "hybrid equilibrium," to the handicap principle. We utilize computer simulations to compare these two theories as they are instantiated in Maynard Smith's Sir Philip Sidney game. We conclude that, when both types of communication are possible, evolution is unlikely to lead to handicap signaling and is far more likely to result in the partially honest signaling predicted by hybrid equilibrium theory.

DOI

10.1371/journal.pone.0137271

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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Published In

PLoS One, 10, 9, 0137271-0137271.