Date of Original Version

6-2014

Type

Conference Proceeding

Rights Management

© ACM, 2014. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published at http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2600057.2602835

Abstract or Description

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, focusing on a recently-introduced notion of fairness called maximin share guarantee: Each player’s value for his allocation should be at least as high as what he can guarantee by dividing the items into as many bundles as there are players and receiving his least desirable bundle. Assuming additive valuation functions, we show that such allocations may not exist, but allocations guaranteeing each player 2/3 of the above value always exist, and can be computed in polynomial time when the number of players is constant. These theoretical results have direct practical implications.

DOI

10.1145/2600057.2602835

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Published In

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014, 675-692.