Audit Games

Date of Original Version



Conference Proceeding

Rights Management

Copyright © 2013 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence

Abstract or Description

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that effi- ciently computes the solution.



Published In

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013, 41-47.