Date of Original Version



Conference Proceeding

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Abstract or Description

We present a technique for reducing a normal-form (aka. (bi)matrix) game, O, to a smaller normal-form game, R, for the purpose of computing a Nash equilibrium. This is done by computing a Nash equilibrium for a subcomponent, G, of O for which a certain condition holds. We also show that
such a subcomponent G on which to apply the technique can be found in polynomial time (if it exists), by showing that the condition that G needs to satisfy can be modeled as a Horn satis¯ability problem. We show that the technique does not extend to computing Pareto-optimal or welfare maximizing equilibria. We present a class of games, which we call ALAGIU (Any Lower Action Gives Identical Utility) games, for which recursive application of (special cases of) the technique is su±cient for ¯nding a Nash equilibrium in linear time. Finally, we discuss using the technique to compute approximate Nash equilibria.



Published In

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS)..