Date of Original Version
2-2005
Type
Article
Abstract or Table of Contents
When formalizing security protocols, di erent speci cation languages support very di erent reasoning methodologies, whose results are not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, establishing clear mappings among di erent frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits various methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practical results of one system into another. In this paper, we examine the relationship between two general veri cation frameworks: multiset rewriting (MSR) and a process algebra (PA) inspired to CCS and the -calculus. Although de ning a simple and general bijection between MSR and PA appears dicult, we show that the sublanguages needed to specify cryptographic protocols admit an e ective translation that is not only tracepreserving, but also induces a correspondence relation between the two languages. In particular, the correspondence sketched in this paper permits transferring several important trace-based properties such as secrecy and many forms of authentication.
Comments
Appears in Journal of Computer Security, vol. 13(1) (Roberto Gorrieri, editor), pp. 3-47, IOS Press, February 2005.