Date of Original Version

1-2005

Type

Conference Proceeding

Abstract or Description

Cross-realm authentication is a useful and interesting component of Kerberos aimed at enabling secure access to services astride organizational boundaries. We present a formalization of Kerberos 5 cross-realm authentication in MSR, a specification language based on multiset rewriting. We also adapt the Dolev-Yao intruder model to the cross-realm setting and prove an important property for a critical field in a cross-realm ticket. Finally, we document several failures of authentication and confidentiality in the presence of compromised intermediate realms. Although the current Kerberos specifications disclaim responsibility for these vulnerabilities, the associated security implications must be highlighted for system administrators to decide whether to adopt this technology and to aid designers with future development.

DOI

10.1145/1045405.1045408

Comments

"© ACM, 2005. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security, http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1045405.1045408

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