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*A Silvia, Paolo,
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Abstract

This dissertation seeks to examine three well-known problems in three different areas of financial economics: The effects of regulation on the financial sector; the provision of incentives to limit free-riding in teams; and the lack of empirical support for the consumption-based asset pricing model.

In the first essay, I address the current debate on the costs and benefits of financial regulation, and I show that financial regulation can increase bank shareholder value by reducing shareholder monitoring costs. I use a regression discontinuity design to study the effect of an unexpected decrease in small-bank reporting requirements to the Federal Reserve. Using the reporting change as a negative shock to regulatory monitoring by the Fed, I find that reduced Fed monitoring leads to a 1% loss in Tobin's q and a 7% loss in equity market-to-book. I show that these losses come from increased internal monitoring expenditures, managerial rents, and monitoring conflicts between shareholders. My results are among the first to quantify the shareholder value of monitoring.

In the second essay (with Benjamin Tengelsen and Ariel Zetlin-Jones), we re-examine the importance of separation between ownership and labor in team production models that feature free riding. In such models, conventional wisdom suggests an outsider is needed to administer incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. We analyze the ability of insiders to administer such incentive schemes in a repeated team production model with free riding when they lack commitment. Specifically, we augment a standard, repeated team production model by endowing insiders with the ability to impose group punishments which occur after team outcomes are observed but before the subsequent round of production. We extend techniques from [Abreu \(1986\)](#) to characterize the entire set of perfect-public equilibrium payoffs and find that insiders are capable of enforcing welfare enhancing group punishments when they are sufficiently patient.

In the third essay, I re-examine an important prediction of asset pricing theory which has historically found little support in the data—that expected consumption growth and equity returns should be correlated. I first show empirically that advertising growth is a good proxy for expected consumption growth, as it predicts both consumption growth and equity returns in aggregate post-war US data.

To shed light on the link between advertising growth, expected consumption, and expected returns, I then build and calibrate a dynamic model of goods market frictions where firms invest in advertising to build their customer capital (as in [Gourio and Rudanko \(2014\)](#)). Within the model, I show that the severity of goods market frictions is a key element to replicate the predictability patterns I observe in the data.

Contents

Acknowledgments	i
Abstract	iii
1 The Value of Regulators as Monitors: Evidence from Banking	1
1.1 Introduction	2
1.2 Institutional Background and Motivating Theory	6
1.2.1 Institutional Background	6
1.2.2 Predictions from Agency Theory	7
1.3 Empirical Setting	11
1.3.1 Data Sources and Measurement	11
1.3.2 Estimation Strategy and Identification	15
1.4 The Value of Regulatory Monitoring	18
1.4.1 Main Results	18
1.4.2 Robustness, Placebo, and Falsification Tests	21
1.5 How does Regulatory Monitoring Benefit Shareholders?	23
1.5.1 Bank Value, Monitoring Expenditure, and Managerial Rents	23
1.5.2 Regulatory Monitoring and Shareholder Free-Riding	30
1.6 Discussion and Tests of Alternative Hypotheses	32
1.7 Conclusion	35

2	Group Punishments without Commitment	37
2.1	Introduction	38
2.2	A Generalized Model of Repeated Team Production	42
2.2.1	Stage Game	42
2.2.2	Infinitely-Repeated Game	46
2.3	An Application: Repeated Oligopoly with a Principal	57
2.3.1	Stage Game	57
2.3.2	Infinitely-Repeated Game	59
2.3.3	Substitutability and Price Externalities	62
2.4	Conclusion	65
3	Advertising, Consumption, and Asset Prices	67
3.1	Introduction	68
3.2	Aggregate Advertising Expenditures and Equity Returns	71
3.2.1	Consumption Growth and Excess Returns Predictability	72
3.2.2	Robustness	78
3.3	Model	83
3.3.1	Firm Problem and Return on Equity	86
3.3.2	Household Problem	89
3.3.3	Equilibrium	90
3.4	Results	91
3.4.1	Calibration and Computation	91
3.4.2	Simulated Moments and Predictability	92
3.4.3	The Quantitative Impact of Goods Market Frictions	93
3.5	Conclusion	96

A Appendix to Chapter 1	99
A.1 Solving for the Optimal Contract	100
A.2 Additional Results: Bank Value	101
A.3 Additional Results: Management Monitoring	106
A.4 Tests of Additional Hypotheses	115
B Appendix to Chapter 2	119
B.1 Substitutability and Price Externalities	120
B.1.1 Stage Game	120
B.1.2 Infinitely-Repeated Game	121
B.2 Definitions and Proofs	124
B.2.1 Definitions and Proofs from Sections 2.2 and 2.3	124
B.2.2 Proofs from Appendix B.1	131
B.3 Computational Algorithm	137
C Appendix to Chapter 3	139
C.1 Cointegration Tests	140
C.2 Advertising Expenditures and Long-Run Risk	142
C.3 Derivation of the Stochastic Discount Factor	144
C.4 Computational Algorithm	144

List of Tables

1.1	Summary Statistics	13
1.2	The Policy Effect on Bank Shareholder Value	19
1.3	Robustness and Placebo Tests: Tobin's q	22
1.4	The Policy Effect on Bank Professional Expenditure	24
1.5	Professional Expenditure Growth and Post-Treatment Value Losses	26
1.6	Managerial Rents: Earnings Smoothing in the Financial Crisis	29
1.7	Cash Flow Risk, Shareholder Value, and Professional Expenditures	30
1.8	Ownership, Management Monitoring, and Value	31
3.1	Summary Statistics for Predictors, Post-War Period	76
3.2	Consumption Growth and Excess Returns Predictability, Post-War Period	77
3.3	Excess Returns Predictive Regressions, Post-War Period	78
3.4	Tri-Variate Excess Returns Predictive Regressions, Post-War Period	79
3.5	VAR Model for Advertising and Consumption Growth, Post-War Period	80
3.6	VAR Model for Advertising and Consumption Growth, 1922-2009 and 1982-2009	81
3.7	Consumption Growth Predictive Regressions, Post-War Period	82

3.8	Out-of-Sample Excess Returns Predictive Regressions	85
3.9	Model-Simulated Moments	93
3.10	Results: Returns Predictability	94
3.11	Predictability in the Centralized Economy	96
A1	Robustness and Placebo Tests: Market-to-Book	101
A2	Bank Size Manipulation Tests	102
A3	Event Study Around Policy Date	102
A4	Additional Robustness	103
A5	Quarterly Treatment Effects	104
A6	Falsification Tests: Non-Fed-Regulated Firms	105
A7	Triple Differences: Policy Effect on Market-to-Book	106
A8	Audit Fees	107
A9	Internal Controls and Post-Treatment Professional Expenditure	108
A10	SEC Accelerated Filers	109
A11	Summary Statistics: Funding Costs, Profitability, and Earnings Smoothing	110
A12	Funding Costs and Earnings Smoothing: Robustness and Placebo	111
A13	Robustness: Cash Flow Risk, Shareholder Value, and Professional Expenditure	112
A14	Chairman Ownership and Professional Expenditure Persistence	113
A15	Chairman Ownership and Market-to-Book Discount Persistence	114
A16	Government Tail Risk Insurance	115
A17	Voluntary Reporting	116
A18	Liquidity, Volatility, and Market Frictions	117
A19	Leverage and Capital Ratios	118
C1	Philips-Ouliaris and Johansen Tests for Cointegration	141
C2	Vector-Error-Correction Model for Consumption Growth Predictions, Post-War Period	142

List of Figures

1.1	Common Trends in Pre-Policy Bank Valuation	17
1.2	Bank Size Manipulation	18
2.1	Equilibrium Value Sets and Group Punishments	62
2.2	Input Substitutability and the Welfare Impact of Group Punishments	64
3.1	Expenditures in Physical and Non-Physical Advertising in the U.S., 1950-2010	72
3.2	Per-Capita Consumption and Advertising in the U.S., 1950-2010	73
3.3	Advertising Expenditures Growth, Consumption Growth and Excess Returns in the U.S., 1950-2010	74
3.4	Coefficient Estimates in Out-of-Sample Excess Returns Predictive Regressions, 1980-2010	84
3.5	Customer Capital Investment	95
B1	Comparative Statics: Marginal Cost of Production and Welfare	124

Chapter 1

The Value of Regulators as Monitors: Evidence from Banking

1.1 Introduction

A common view in the banking industry is that financial regulation has a negative impact on shareholder value: regulatory compliance subtracts resources from lending and deposit-making activities, reduces profits, and ultimately hurts investors. As a result, the recent decline of small and medium-sized banks in the United States has often been attributed to regulation, and regulatory burden reduction for small banks is now a priority on the agenda of the US Federal Reserve (the Fed). In a recent testimony to the House Financial Services Committee, the Chair of the Fed Board of Governors Janet Yellen stated: “*With respect to small and medium-sized banks, we must build on the steps we have already taken to ensure that they do not face undue regulatory burdens.*”¹ While the current policy discussion highlights the costs of financial regulation for bank investors, agency theory suggests a positive role for regulation in reducing the costs incurred by shareholders to monitor bank management.

In this paper, I exploit the regulatory environment of US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) to study the value impact of regulatory monitoring.² The US Federal Reserve (the Fed) is the primary regulator of BHCs, and a pervasive component of the Fed’s monitoring activity is the collection and analysis of BHC financial statements. Both the frequency and the volume of BHC reporting to the Fed are based on a fixed asset size threshold, such that smaller BHCs falling below the threshold are exempted from most of the reporting requirements faced by larger BHCs above the threshold. I use a 2006 Fed policy raising this size threshold as a shock to regulatory monitoring, and study changes in bank value around the new threshold in a regression discontinuity design. My identification strategy comes from the quasi-random assignment of treated banks just below the threshold and control banks just above the threshold *before* the Fed implements its policy, such that any systematic value difference *after* the policy implementation is only due to differences in regulatory monitoring.

Following the predictions of agency theory, I interpret the change in Fed regulatory monitoring as a shock to shareholder monitoring costs. To provide a structure to my empirical tests, I build a stylized model of monitoring in the class of [Townsend \(1979\)](#), and derive three key predictions on the impact

¹[Yellen \(2016\)](#).

²Even if a BHC can include more than one bank, I will use the two terms interchangeably in the rest of the paper.

of monitoring costs on shareholder value. In the model, a manager has private incentives to mis-report bank cash flows and a shareholder can pay a monitoring cost to verify the cash flows reported by the manager. When monitoring costs are small, the shareholder always monitors and extracts the entire surplus from the bank. As monitoring becomes more expensive (as for treated banks), shareholder value drops due to increased monitoring expenditures and increased managerial rents. The first model prediction is therefore that reduced regulatory monitoring should lead to shareholder value losses.

My main finding is consistent with the first prediction of the model: I show that, relative to control banks, treated banks experience a 1% decrease in Tobin's q (the market value of bank assets divided by the book value of bank assets) and a 7% decrease in Market-to-Book (the market-to-book value of bank equity) after the treatment. The finding is robust across a number of empirical specifications, sample restrictions, placebo tests, and falsification tests. For example, the treatment effect is stronger around the policy implementation date and threshold and disappears when I use arbitrary placebo dates and thresholds to separate treatment and control groups, reducing sample selection concerns. Moreover, my estimate of the treatment effect is not driven by pre-existing differences in valuation across treated and control groups, and it is not biased by pre-treatment size manipulation.³ Importantly, the finding is not driven by changes in government bailout guarantees ([Gandhi and Lustig \(2015\)](#)), financial disclosure ([Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian \(2009\)](#)), stock liquidity and volatility, and other size-based regulations implemented by the Fed at the beginning of 2006.

The second model prediction is that the value losses experienced by treated banks should be due to increased monitoring expenditures and increased managerial rents. In line with this prediction, I show that treated banks experience a 25% increase in their professional expenditures after the treatment. These professional expenditures are largely related to bank internal controls, and strongly correlated with post-treatment losses in shareholder value. Moreover, during the financial crisis banks below the policy implementation threshold engage in more aggressive earnings smoothing than banks above the threshold, confirming the prediction of increased managerial rents ([Fudenberg](#)

³Reporting exemptions are based on June 2005 BHC assets, but the threshold change is first announced by the Fed only in November 2005. Additionally, [McCrary \(2008\)](#) tests show no evidence of pre-treatment asset size manipulation.

and [Tirole \(1995\)](#)). Specifically, banks below the threshold decrease their Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) by more than banks above the threshold, and these LLP changes are due to managerial discretion rather than to bank performance.

The third model prediction is that value losses and monitoring expenditures in treated banks should both be positively correlated with the risk of their unobservable cash flows. Intuitively, high cash flow risk increases the likelihood of tail states where cash flows are low or managerial rents are high, decreasing bank value and increasing the marginal value of monitoring. Empirically, I proxy the risk of unobservable cash flows with the absolute difference between analyst-forecasted and realized bank profitability. I find that treated banks with high cash flow risk experience larger value losses and professional expenditure growth than banks with low expected cash flow risk.

Finally, I argue that the increased monitoring costs faced by treated banks' shareholders increase their incentives to free-ride on each other's monitoring ([Grossman and Hart \(1980\)](#), [Holmström \(1982\)](#)). Consistent with [Shleifer and Vishny \(1986\)](#), the presence of a large shareholder—the board chairman—helps to mitigate shareholder free-riding problems after the treatment. I show that treated banks with high chairman ownership experience higher professional expenditure growth and larger value losses than treated banks with low chairman ownership. Moreover, post-treatment professional expenditure growth is more persistent and value drops are less persistent in banks with high chairman ownership.

Overall, my paper is among the first to quantify the shareholder value of monitoring. Quantitatively, I attribute around sixty percent of the loss in shareholder value for deregulated banks to increased monitoring expenditure and managerial rents, and I attribute around forty percent of the loss to increased free-riding problems. I conclude that regulation can be value-increasing for shareholders when regulators monitor the management. My results are potentially applicable to other heavily-regulated industries besides the banking industry, and provide new evidence against the standing consensus that financial regulation negatively affects bank shareholders.

Related Literature A long-standing question in financial economics is the extent to which monitoring affects shareholder value. Motivated by theoretical arguments (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998)), the literature has traditionally focused on institutional ownership as a measure of monitoring to estimate the impact of monitoring on firm value (McConnell and Servaes (1990), Ferreira and Matos (2008)). Causal inference is however difficult in these studies, because firm ownership and value are endogenously determined by firms' contracting environment (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2012)). My paper contributes to this literature by using a novel identification strategy to estimate a large and positive impact of monitoring on value. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to test the predictions of a traditional class of monitoring models (Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)), and among the first to show that monitoring is valuable because it reduces managerial rent-seeking.⁴

Theoretical and empirical research shows that agency frictions are particularly severe in the context of banking. The risk profile of bank assets is difficult to observe by outsiders and easy to modify by insiders (Morgan (2002), Dang, Gorton, Holmström, and Ordóñez (2017)), and deposit insurance gives bank lenders low incentives to monitor the management (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)). Moreover, deposit insurance and other bank regulations might distort shareholder incentives to take risk (Merton (1977)), possibly in contrast with managerial preferences (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990)). Previous empirical work has argued that agency frictions and managerial rent-seeking can have a negative impact on bank value (Laeven and Levine (2007), Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013)). My work provides causal evidence on the impact of agency frictions on bank value, and demonstrates regulatory monitoring as an effective tool to mitigate these frictions.

The recent crisis has stimulated academic interest in the costs and benefits of financial regulation. While many papers show that financial regulation is positively related to bank efficiency (Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, and Song (2013)), and negatively related to bank risk-taking and failure (Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi (2014), Hirtle, Kovner, and Plosser (2016), Kandrac and Schlusche (2017)), a recent

⁴In this respect, my results are close to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2016), and Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017), who focus on different outcome variables to show that monitoring reduces rent-seeking. Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lei (2014) show a positive impact of monitoring on firm value, but are silent about the specific mechanism through which monitoring increases value.

study by [Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru \(2017\)](#) shows that bank regulatory burden is one of the main reasons for the raise of shadow banking. My paper adds to this literature by providing the first estimate of the value of monitoring by financial regulators.

1.2 Institutional Background and Motivating Theory

The banking industry provides an ideal laboratory to study the impact of regulatory monitoring on shareholder value. A common view in the banking industry is that regulatory burden is particularly detrimental to bank profitability and value, and financial regulation is a commonly-cited reason for the decline of small banks in the United States. This view gained momentum among financial authorities since the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, and small bank regulatory burden reduction is now an important priority on the policymaker's agenda ([Yellen \(2016\)](#)). While the costs and benefits of financial regulation are yet not fully understood, agency theory predicts that financial regulation can have a positive impact on bank value by reducing shareholder monitoring costs.

1.2.1 Institutional Background

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 broadly defines a BHC as any company that owns and/or has control over one or more banks. Commercial banks in the United States are not mandated to be part of a BHC structure. However, being part of a BHC offers substantial benefits, such as increased flexibility in raising external financing and acquiring other banks, as well as the ability to acquire non-bank subsidiaries. In practice, these benefits are such that at the end of 2016 around eighty-four percent of commercial banks in the US were part of a BHC.⁵

The benefits of being part of a BHC come at the cost of compliance with the regulatory and supervisory requirements imposed by the Fed. From a regulatory standpoint, Regulation Y from 1980 gives the Fed exclusive jurisdiction in establishing BHC capital requirements, regulating BHC mergers and acquisitions, and defining and regulating non-banking activities performed by BHC subsidiaries.

⁵<https://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/grow-shareholder-value/bank-holding-companies>.

From a supervisory standpoint, Section 5 of the Bank Holding Company Act provides guidance for the off-site and on-site inspections regularly conducted by regional Fed officials under delegated authority from the Board.

The main information source for Fed off-site inspections is a set of financial statements collected and reviewed by the Fed on a regular basis. In practice, specialized teams of Fed officials focus on the analysis and cross-bank comparison of these statements to monitor the safety and soundness of individual banks, and to identify potential threats to the financial system (Eisenbach, Haughwout, Hirtle, Kovner, Lucca, and Plosser (2017)). The process through which the Fed collects financial statements is different for large and small BHCs. Large BHCs need to file every quarter consolidated financial statements (form FR Y-9C) and holding parent company statements (FR Y-9LP) which contain detailed balance sheet, income statement, and off-balance sheet information about the bank's activity. To avoid reporting burden, the Fed allows smaller BHCs to only file an annual statement for the holding parent company (FR Y-9SP), such that small BHCs face substantially lower reporting requirements than large BHCs.

The Fed separates small and large reporting BHCs based on a fixed, bank-independent asset size threshold. From 1986 until the end of 2005, this size threshold was set to \$150 million in total assets. In March 2006, the Fed implemented a regulation increasing the threshold to \$500 million (regulation 71-FR-11194), therefore providing new reporting exemptions to all BHCs with assets between \$150 and \$500 million. I use this change in reporting requirements as a shock to the monitoring costs of deregulated banks' shareholders.

1.2.2 Predictions from Agency Theory

What kind of responses can be expected following a shock to shareholder monitoring costs? In this section I use the lens of a classic model of monitoring (Townsend (1979)) to derive three key testable predictions and provide structure to the empirical tests of the rest of the paper.

There are two agents in the model, a penniless manager and a shareholder with deep pockets. The manager and the shareholder are both risk-neutral, and the risk-free rate is zero. The manager has

monopoly access to a project with cost I , which will generate a random cash flow $y \in [\underline{y}, \bar{y}] \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$ with cdf F and pdf f at the end of the period. The project has positive NPV, which I denote by V_f :

$$V_f = \int_{\underline{y}}^{\bar{y}} y dF(y) - I > 0. \quad (1.1)$$

The manager costlessly observes the realized project cash flow, and must report the cash flow to shareholder. The manager can consume the difference between the realized cash flow and the cash flow that she reports to the shareholder, and therefore has an incentive to under-report to the shareholder. On the other hand, the shareholder can pay an audit cost k to perfectly observe the realized cash flow.

The shareholder has full bargaining power, and her problem is to maximize her expected profits while eliciting truthful cash flow revelation by the manager. Resorting to the revelation principle, I characterize contracts in which the manager always reveals the true cash flow. A contract is then a couple $\{\pi(y), m(y)\}$ that specifies payments from the manager to the shareholder $\pi(y) : [\underline{y}, \bar{y}] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and monitoring decisions $m(y) : [\underline{y}, \bar{y}] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as functions of the cash flow reported by the manager. I assume that audits are deterministic, in the sense that for all y , $m(y)$ is either 0 or 1. This partitions the set $[\underline{y}, \bar{y}]$ in a region where the shareholders always audits the manager and a region where the shareholder never audits the manager.

The shareholder maximizes her expected profits

$$\int_{\underline{y}}^{\bar{y}} [\pi(y) - m(y)k] dF(y) - I, \quad (1.2)$$

subject to the manager's participation constraint

$$\int_{\underline{y}}^{\bar{y}} [y - \pi(y)] dF(y) \geq 0, \quad (1.3)$$

the manager's limited liability constraint that, for all y ,

$$y \geq \pi(y), \quad (1.4)$$

and the incentive-compatibility constraints ensuring that the manager always reveals the true cash

flow. For the contract to be incentive-compatible, the following conditions must be verified. First, in the non-monitoring region the shareholder must always receive a constant payment P .⁶ This allows to write the payment $\pi(y)$ as

$$\pi(y) = (1 - m(y))P + m(y)\pi_1(y), \quad (1.5)$$

where $\pi_1(y)$ is the payment in the monitoring region. Second, to prevent the manager to report cash flows in the non-monitoring region when the observed cash flow is in the monitoring region, it must be that

$$m(y)\pi_1(y) \leq P. \quad (1.6)$$

Constraints (1.5) and (1.6) characterize incentive-compatibility by the manager. The shareholder's problem then becomes finding $m(y)$ and $\pi_1(y)$ to maximize her expected profits, subject to constraints (1.3)-(1.6).

In the appendix, I solve for the optimal contract. As in [Gale and Hellwig \(1985\)](#), the optimal contract is such that the monitoring region is the low cash flow region for which $\pi(y) = y < P$, and the non-monitoring region is the high cash flow region for which $y \geq \pi(y) = P$. In the monitoring region, the shareholder pays the monitoring cost k and the manager gives all the cash flow to the shareholder. In the non-monitoring region, the shareholder receives the fixed payment P and the manager keeps $y - P$.

Finally, conditional on the optimal contract, the optimal fixed payment P^* is chosen by the shareholder to solve the unconstrained maximization problem

$$\max_P \int_y^P (y - k) dF(y) + P(1 - F(P)) - I. \quad (1.7)$$

Taking the first-order conditions of this problem and re-arranging, I get

$$1 - F(P^*) = kf(P^*), \quad (1.8)$$

⁶If for some cash flow realization in the monitoring region the contract specifies a lower payment to the shareholder than for other realizations in the monitoring region, there is an incentive for the manager to report the cash flow associated with the lower payment.

showing that at the optimum, the shareholder balances the benefits of increasing P coming from reduced managerial rents with the costs coming from increased monitoring.

The first testable prediction of the model therefore comes from inspection of Equation (1.8), by noting that as the monitoring cost k becomes small, the probability $F(P^*)$ that the shareholder monitors the manager approaches one. In other words, when monitoring is inexpensive the shareholder always monitors and extracts the entire NPV from the project.

Prediction 1. *An increase in shareholder monitoring costs leads to shareholder value losses.*

Next, let V_c denote shareholder value when monitoring is costly (i.e. $k > 0$):

$$V_c = \int_{\underline{y}}^{P^*} (y - k) dF(y) + P^* (1 - F(P^*)) - I. \quad (1.9)$$

The loss in shareholder value from a world where monitoring is costless and the shareholder extracts the entire project NPV is then

$$V_f - V_c = kF(P^*) + \int_{P^*}^{\bar{y}} (y - P^*) dF(y), \quad (1.10)$$

which consists of monitoring expenditures and managerial rents.

Prediction 2. *When shareholder monitoring costs increase, losses in shareholder value are due to increased monitoring expenditure and managerial rents.*

The last model prediction requires assumptions on the distribution of bank cash flows. To provide intuition, I assume that cash flows are uniformly distributed over the interval $[\underline{y}, \bar{y}]$. The model generates similar predictions for other types of distributions (e.g. lognormal). Using a uniform distribution, some simple algebra shows that the shareholder value loss (1.10) becomes

$$V_f - V_c = k \left(1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{k}{\bar{y} - \underline{y}} \right), \quad (1.11)$$

which is increasing in the term $\bar{y} - \underline{y}$. Noting that expected monitoring expenditure, $kF(P^*)$, is also increasing in $\bar{y} - \underline{y}$, and that $\bar{y} - \underline{y}$ is proportional to cash flow risk, the last prediction directly follows.⁷

Prediction 3. *When shareholder monitoring costs increase, shareholder value losses and monitoring expenditure are increasing in cash flow risk.*

Intuitively, when cash flow risk increases the likelihood of states where income is low or managerial rents are high increases, and this reduces shareholder value relative to a world where monitoring is costless and the manager cannot extract any rents. Over the next few sections I show that regulatory monitoring reduces shareholder monitoring costs by testing the predictions of my stylized model in the data.

1.3 Empirical Setting

In this section I describe how I measure bank value, monitoring expenditure, and cash flow risk in the data, and describe how I use these variables to estimate the shareholder value of regulatory monitoring.

1.3.1 Data Sources and Measurement

The data on BHC total consolidated assets comes from the Federal Reserve Regulatory Dataset. This dataset is publicly available on the Federal Reserve of Chicago's website, and contains information directly coming from the FR Y-9C, FR Y-9LP, and FR Y-9SP reports. I use the dataset to categorize BHCs into treated and control groups based on their 2005 average consolidated assets, and to keep track of which BHCs file which forms in each quarter.⁸ Since the Fed policy allows treated banks to stop reporting their FR Y-9C consolidated statements, I use Compustat Bank as my main source of

⁷The standard deviation of a uniform distribution with support $[a, b]$ is given by $(b - a) / \sqrt{12}$.

⁸This is important because, as I show in Section 1.6, some BHCs voluntarily keep filing forms FR Y-9C and FR Y-9LP even if their total assets are below \$500 million after the treatment.

BHC consolidated financial data. I combine this dataset with CRSP to obtain end-of-quarter BHC market-to-book values, and in turn merge the Compustat-CRSP combined dataset with the Federal Reserve Regulatory Dataset using the link table available on the Federal Reserve of New York's website. Finally, I obtain data on analyst forecasts of bank profitability from I/B/E/S.

The observation frequency is quarterly, starting with the first quarter of 2004 and ending with the last quarter of 2007. Within this time period, I construct my main sample as follows. I focus on top-tier BHCs (defined as in [Goetz, Laeven, and Levine \(2016\)](#)) with average 2005 total assets between \$150 and \$850 million, and with stock price data available on CRSP. I assign individual BHCs to the treated group if their average total assets in 2005 are between \$150 million and \$500 million, and to the control group if their average total assets in 2005 are between \$500 million and \$850 million.⁹ The final sample consists of 2,780 observations on 208 distinct BHCs, out of which 108 belong to the treated group and 100 belong to the control group. These BHCs represent around ten percent of the total number of BHCs in the US at the end of 2005, and around forty-six percent of the BHCs listed on the stock market at the end of 2005. In terms of size, these banks represent around one percent of the total assets in the banking sector at the end of 2005, and around five percent of the assets in the bottom ninety-nine percent of the asset distribution. Finally, the average pre-treatment BHC asset size in my sample is \$519 million, right above the policy implementation threshold.

Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for my main measures of bank value, monitoring expenditure, and cash flow risk, both in the full sample and in the treated and control sub-samples.¹⁰ The first two rows of Panel A show summary statistics for my measures of bank shareholder value, Tobin's q and the Market-to-Book ratio of bank equity. The data shows little dispersion in these valuation ratios, both within the main sample and across the treated and control sub-samples. The average and median Tobin's q in the main sample are 1.07 and 1.06, respectively, and the average and median Market-to-Book are 1.75 and 1.65.

⁹I choose the upper bound of \$850 million in total assets in such a way that the final treated and control samples contain approximately the same number of banks. In Section 3.2.2, I use \$1 billion and \$1.5 billion as alternative upper bounds, and show that the main results of the paper are not sensitive to these choices.

¹⁰Since I only observe evidence of managerial rents during the financial crisis, I leave a description of how I measure these rents to Section 1.5.1.

Table 1.1
Summary Statistics

This table reports summary statistics for the variables in the paper, both in the main sample and in the treated and control sub-samples. In Panel A, Tobin's q is the market value of total assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Professional Services are fees paid to management consulting firms, investment banks, and auditing firms, in millions of US dollars. Cash flow risk is a quarterly average of the absolute difference between monthly analyst consensus forecast of two-year-forward bank EPS and the realized EPS value corresponding to each consensus forecasts. In Panel B, leverage is total liabilities divided by total assets, Tier 1 Ratio is Tier 1 Capital divided by Risk-Weighted Assets, Profitability is net income divided by net interest income, and ROE is net income divided by book value of equity. Total Assets are reported in millions of US dollars. Finally, diversification is non-interest income divided by net interest income, and asset growth is quarterly growth in BHC total assets.

Panel A: Shareholder Value, Monitoring Expenditure, and Cash Flow Risk												
	Full Sample				Treated				Control			
	N	Mean	Med.	SD	N	Mean	Med.	SD	N	Mean	Med.	SD
Tobin's q	2,623	1.07	1.06	0.05	1,329	1.06	1.06	0.05	1,294	1.07	1.06	0.05
Market-to-Book	2,623	1.75	1.65	0.57	1,329	1.71	1.60	0.57	1,294	1.80	1.72	0.56
Professional Fees	1,756	0.14	0.10	0.16	862	0.13	0.10	0.14	894	0.16	0.12	0.18
Cash Flow Risk	937	0.87	0.24	2.38	306	1.54	0.34	3.80	631	0.55	0.22	1.04

Panel B: Additional Variables												
	Full Sample				Treated				Control			
	N	Mean	Med.	SD	N	Mean	Med.	SD	N	Mean	Med.	SD
Leverage	2,624	0.91	0.91	0.03	1,329	0.91	0.91	0.03	1,295	0.91	0.91	0.02
Tier 1 Ratio	2,289	0.12	0.12	0.03	1,096	0.13	0.12	0.04	1,193	0.12	0.11	0.03
Total Assets	2,703	554.9	535.6	232.5	1,341	386.5	382.8	128.5	1,362	720.6	696.8	188.8
Profitability	2,701	0.23	0.26	0.34	1,340	0.20	0.24	0.44	1,361	0.25	0.27	0.19
ROE	2,624	0.02	0.03	0.03	1,329	0.02	0.02	0.03	1,295	0.03	0.03	0.02
Diversification	2,701	0.27	0.22	0.24	1,340	0.26	0.20	0.29	1,361	0.27	0.24	0.18
Asset Growth	2,655	0.03	0.02	0.06	1,308	0.03	0.02	0.06	1,347	0.03	0.02	0.05

The third row of Panel A shows summary statistics for bank professional expenditures, in millions of US dollars. These expenditures are recorded as a separate item on bank income statements, and include fees paid to consultants, auditors, and investment bankers. In Section 1.5.1, I show that professional expenditures are a good proxy for shareholder monitoring in my sample, because they are mostly related to the implementation of internal controls. Banks in the treated group pay slightly lower professional fees than banks in the control group. On average, treated banks spend 0.13 million of dollars per quarter in professional services, with a standard deviation of 0.14 million. Control banks spend on average 0.16 million of dollars per quarter in professional services, with a standard deviation of 0.18 million.

The last row of Panel A finally presents my primary cash flow risk measure, the absolute difference between analyst consensus forecast of two-year-forward bank EPS and the realized EPS value corresponding to each consensus forecast. By construction, this variable provides a time-varying measure of analyst uncertainty about future bank profitability, and therefore represents a close approximation to the risk of unobservable cash flows in my model. The table shows that cash flow risk is on average higher for treated banks than for control banks, partially reflecting lower analyst coverage of small banks. Both before and after the treatment, the average treated bank is covered by approximately four analysts in a given quarter, while the average control bank is covered by six analysts.

Panel B of Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the other key variables in the paper, which I borrow from the literature as potential determinants of cross-sectional heterogeneity in bank value (Laeven and Levine (2007), Minton, Stulz, and Taboada (2017)). These variables include leverage (total liabilities minus noncontrolling interest divided by total assets), the regulatory Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio (henceforth Tier 1 Ratio, the bank self-reported ratio of Tier 1 Capital divided by Risk-Weighted Assets), total assets, profitability (net income divided by net interest income), Return on Equity (ROE, net income divided by book value of equity), diversification (noninterest income divided by net interest income), and quarterly asset growth. As in Panel A, the data reveals little differences in these variables across treated and control groups, thus confirming the comparability of these two sets of banks.

1.3.2 Estimation Strategy and Identification

In this section, I describe my strategy to test the model predictions in the data and to measure the shareholder value of regulatory monitoring. I exploit the change in regulatory reporting requirement to the Fed as a quasi-natural source of variation in shareholder monitoring costs. My empirical strategy consists in comparing the value and monitoring expenditure of smaller, treated banks with pre-treatment total assets just below \$500 million with the value of larger, control banks with pre-treatment total assets just above \$500 million, before and after the treatment. More precisely, I estimate the model

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i) + \beta_2 X_{it} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1.12)$$

where Y_{it} is an outcome variable (e.g. Tobin's q) for BHC i in quarter t , Post_t is an indicator equal to one if quarter t follows the last quarter of 2005 and zero otherwise, Treated_i is an indicator equal to one if the average assets of BHC i during 2005 are just below \$500 million, X_{it} is a matrix of time-varying control variables (such as assets and profitability), γ_i is a time-invariant and BHC-specific fixed effect, δ_t is a BHC-invariant and time-specific fixed effect, and ε_{it} is a normally-distributed error term. The coefficient of interest is β_1 , my estimate of the value difference between treated and control banks before and after the treatment.

My empirical strategy relies on the key identification assumption of quasi-random assignment of treated and control banks around the threshold *before* the Fed changes the reporting requirements of treated banks, such that any systematic value difference *after* the policy implementation is arguably only due to differences in regulatory monitoring. In practice, this assumption can be violated for two reasons. First, the assumption is violated if the threshold change results from lobbying, making the treatment an endogenous outcome. Second, the assumption is violated if, even in absence of lobbying, banks engage in size manipulation around the new threshold before its implementation.

Although the institutional details of the policy suggest that lobbying was unlikely, whether the policy was unanticipated by bank shareholders is ultimately an empirical question.¹¹ In Figure 1.1 I report

¹¹The first proposal for public comment on the policy dates to November 2005, and the policy was quickly implemented at the beginning of March 2006 without modifications to the initial proposal.

a diagnostic test aimed at detecting pre-existing differences in the average valuation of treated and control banks before the treatment. Panels A and B report these diagnostics for Tobin's q and Market-to-Book, respectively, and are constructed as follows. I first divide the sample into two sub-samples, the pre-treatment sample before the first quarter of 2006 and the post-treatment sample starting with the first quarter of 2006. In each of these sub-samples, I run a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression to obtain a smoothed estimate of the trend component of treated and control banks' valuation. In Figure 1.1 I then plot these estimated trend components and their associated confidence intervals as functions of the observation quarter, both in the pre- and in the post-treatment periods.¹² Figure 1.1 shows that the trend components of treated and control banks' valuation are statistically indistinguishable from each other in the pre-treatment period, supporting the claim that the threshold change was unanticipated. Moreover, the figure shows an increase in the difference between treated and control banks' average valuation after the treatment, providing a visual preview of the results in the next section.

In Figure 1.2, I report the results of a [McCrary \(2008\)](#) discontinuity test to reduce concerns of bank size manipulation around the \$500 million threshold. Specifically, I construct a finely-gridded histogram of bank total assets, which I then smooth on each side of the threshold using local linear regression. In Figure 1.2, I then report point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of smoothed asset densities during the 2005-2007 period (Panel A) and during the four quarters immediately before the treatment (Panel B). Both before and after the treatment, the estimated asset density below the threshold is not statistically different from the estimated asset density above the threshold.¹³ Importantly, a specific institutional feature of the policy reduces residual concerns of asset manipulation before the treatment. The policy states that individual BHCs qualify for reporting exemptions only if their June 2005 consolidated assets are below \$500 million. At the same time, the Fed first publicly announces the threshold change in November 2005, preventing pre-treatment size manipulation.

¹²I divide the sample to avoid post-treatment observations entering the estimation of the pre-treatment trend, and vice-versa. All panels of Figure 1.1 are constructed using an Epanechnikov kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth size suggested in [Fan and Gijbels \(1996\)](#). Different kernel and bandwidth choices generate similar results.

¹³All the results are calculated using the histogram bin size and local linear regression bandwidth suggested in [McCrary \(2008\)](#).

Figure 1.1
Common Trends in Pre-Policy Bank Valuation

This figure reports a parallel trends diagnostic test on treated and control banks' Tobin's q (Panel A) and Market-to-Book (Panel B). I first divide the sample into two sub-samples, the pre-treatment sample before the first quarter of 2006 and the post-treatment sample starting with the first quarter of 2006. In each of these sub-samples, I run a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression to obtain a smoothed estimate of the trend component of valuation. The local polynomial regression uses an Epanechnikov kernel and the rule-of-thumb bandwidth suggested in [Fan and Gijbels \(1996\)](#). The figure reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the trend component of treated and control banks' valuation as functions of the estimation quarter. Tobin's q and Market-to-Book are defined as in [Table 1.1](#).





Figure 1.2

Bank Size Manipulation

This figure shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the smoothed cross-sectional density of bank total assets during the 2005-2007 period (Panel A) and during the four quarters preceding the Policy (Panel B). The goal of the figure is to detect discontinuities indicative of size manipulation around the Policy threshold. The smoothed densities are obtained by first constructing finely-gridded histograms of the cross-section of bank total assets, and by then smoothing the histograms on each side of the threshold using local linear regression. The optimal histogram bin size and local linear regression bandwidth are calculated using the procedure in McCrary (2008).



1.4 The Value of Regulatory Monitoring

In this section I present my main results on the value impact of regulatory monitoring.

1.4.1 Main Results

Table 1.2 shows my main findings on the value impact of regulatory monitoring. The table reports point estimates for the coefficients in Equation (1.12), along with their standard errors (clustered at the BHC-level). The main coefficient of interest is associated with the “Post \times Treated” term, which represents an estimate of the percentage change in Tobin’s q and Market-to-Book due to the change in reporting requirements.

When I estimate Equation (1.12) only including quarter- and BHC-level fixed effects, the policy treatment leads to a one percent decline in treated bank Tobin’s q , relative to control banks. The economic

Table 1.2
The Policy Effect on Bank Shareholder Value

This table reports estimates of the treatment effect on bank valuation using the empirical specification in Equation (1.12). The coefficient associated with the “Post \times Treated” interaction term captures the percentage change in treated bank valuation due to the treatment. The table includes year-quarter Fixed Effects (FE) and BHC FE. All the variables are defined as in Table 1.1.

	log Tobin's q			log Market-to-Book		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.069*** (0.03)	-0.079*** (0.02)	-0.074*** (0.02)
Leverage		0.318*** (0.12)	0.253** (0.10)		5.473*** (0.81)	5.170*** (0.68)
Tier 1 Ratio		0.376*** (0.08)	0.280*** (0.07)		2.539*** (0.51)	1.746*** (0.48)
log Assets			-0.032*** (0.01)			-0.234*** (0.05)
Profitability			-0.004 (0.00)			0.041 (0.04)
ROE			0.091** (0.04)			0.292 (0.47)
Diversification			-0.004 (0.00)			-0.054 (0.04)
Asset Growth			-0.006 (0.01)			-0.021 (0.07)
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.360	0.393	0.418	0.413	0.470	0.503
Observations	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

magnitude and statistical significance of the treatment effect are not affected by the inclusion of leverage and Tier 1 Ratio, reducing concerns that the effect might be due to contemporaneous changes in small bank capital requirements (see Section 1.6). Everything else equal, a ten percent increase in leverage and Tier 1 Ratio are respectively associated to a 3.2 and 3.8 percent increase in Tobin's q , but the treatment still induces a 1.1 percent decrease in Tobin's q after the inclusion of these variables. Finally, the results are robust to the inclusion of size, profitability, diversification, and asset growth as additional controls.

In the last three specifications of the table, I repeat the same exercise using Market-to-Book as dependent variable. The table shows that the treatment induces a 6.9 percent loss in Market-to-Book for treated banks, and this value loss is as high as 7.9 percent when I add time-varying controls to the specification. To put these numbers in perspective, a seven percent relative decrease in Market-to-Book corresponds to a \$4 million relative decrease in market capitalization for the average treated bank, implying an aggregate market capitalization loss of approximately \$430 million. Finally, a comparison of the first three and the last three columns of Table 1.2 shows that the treatment effect on Tobin's q is almost one order of magnitude smaller than the treatment effect on Market-to-Book. This is due to leverage, which reduces the impact of equity fluctuations on the market value of bank assets.¹⁴ Overall, the results of the table are consistent with the prediction that increased monitoring costs reduce bank shareholder value.

¹⁴A simple example can illustrate this point. Respectively define by E_t , D_t and M_t the book value of equity, the book value of debt and the market value of equity in quarter t . Suppose that E_t and D_t do not change between quarter t and quarter $t + 1$ (i.e. $E_t = E_{t+1} \equiv E$ and $D_t = D_{t+1} \equiv D$), but M_t changes to M_{t+1} . Let $\Delta M_{t+1} \equiv M_{t+1} - M_t$. Finally, let mb_t and q_t respectively define the Market-to-Book ratio and Tobin's q at time t . The change in Market-to-Book between time t and $t + 1$ is given by

$$\Delta mb_{t+1} = \frac{M_{t+1}}{E_{t+1}} - \frac{M_t}{E_t} = \frac{\Delta M_{t+1}}{E}. \quad (1.13)$$

Then, changes in Tobin's q can be expressed as a function of changes in Market-to-Book and bank leverage:

$$\Delta q_{t+1} = \frac{M_{t+1} + D_{t+1}}{E_{t+1} + D_{t+1}} - \frac{M_t + D_t}{E_t + D_t} = \frac{\Delta M_{t+1}}{E + D} = \left(1 - \frac{D}{E + D}\right) \Delta mb_{t+1}, \quad (1.14)$$

where the term in parentheses in (1.14) is on average equal to 9% in my sample.

1.4.2 Robustness, Placebo, and Falsification Tests

Table 1.3 reports two sets of tests aimed at reducing sample selection concerns. In the interest of space, I only present results for Tobin's q , leaving the results for Market-to-Book to the appendix. In Panel A, I test the impact of different sample bandwidth restrictions on my main result. In the first four specifications of the table, I use two small samples of BHCs with average 2005 total assets between \$400 and \$600 million, and between \$300 and \$700 million. In the last four specifications, I conversely use two large samples of BHCs with total assets between \$150 million and \$1 billion, and between \$150 million and \$1.5 billion. To mitigate the impact of confounding factors at the onset of the financial crisis as the sample size changes, the results in Table 1.3 only include data for 2005 and 2006. The table shows that the main results of the paper are not sensitive to different sample bandwidth choices. Moreover, the first four specifications—which measure the treatment effect on banks closest to the threshold—show that the treatment leads to an average 1.2 percent discount in Tobin's q , slightly larger than the effect found in Table 1.2.

In Panel B I conversely show that the statistical and economic magnitude of my results disappear when I separate treated and control banks using arbitrary treatment thresholds and quarters. The first six specifications show that the results disappear when I use asset thresholds of \$300 million, \$750 million and \$1 billion to separate treated and control banks. Similarly, Specifications (7) and (8) show that the results disappear when I use the last quarter of 2004 as treatment quarter, and the last two specifications show that the results disappear when I use the last quarter of 2006 as treatment quarter.

In the appendix, I provide additional robustness tests. First, I run an event study to show that the observed drop in Tobin's q and Market-to-Book are driven by a drop in the market value of treated banks as opposed to an increase in their book value or an increase in the market value of control banks. Second, I apply different restrictions on my sample to include the financial crisis, exclude banks that drop out of the sample, and exclude banks that are not listed on the stock market before the policy. Again, my results are robust to these restrictions. Third, I show that the treatment effect on bank value is roughly uniform at the peak of the business cycle in 2006 and at the beginning of

Table 1.3

Robustness and Placebo Tests: Tobin's q

This table reports sample bandwidth selection tests (Panel A) and placebo tests (Panel B) on my main Tobin's q result. In the first four specifications of Panel A, I use two small samples of BHCs with average 2005 total assets between \$400 and \$600 million (Specifications (1) and (2)), and between \$300 and \$700 million (Specifications (3) and (4)). In the last four specifications, I use two large samples of BHCs with total assets between \$150 million and \$1 billion (Specifications (5) and (6)), and between \$150 million and \$1.5 billion (Specifications (7) and (8)). In the first six specifications of Panel B, I use asset thresholds of \$300 million, \$750 million and \$1 billion to separate treated and control BHCs. In Specifications (7) and (8) I use the last quarter of 2004 as treatment quarter, dropping post-2005 observations from the sample. In the last two specifications, I use the last quarter of 2006 as treatment quarter. The dependent variable in all specifications is the natural logarithm of Tobin's q . Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

Panel A: Sample Bandwidth Selection									
	\$400M-600M		\$300M-700M		\$150M-1B		\$150M-1.5B		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Post \times Treated	-0.012** (0.01)	-0.012** (0.01)	-0.011** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
R-Squared	0.117	0.169	0.087	0.131	0.058	0.105	0.046	0.089	
Observations	355	355	724	724	1,313	1,313	1,611	1,611	

Panel B: Placebo Tests										
	\$300M Threshold		\$750M Threshold		\$1B Threshold		After 12/2004		After 12/2006	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post \times Treated	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.385	0.459	0.339	0.403	0.360	0.422	0.054	0.146	0.351	0.408
Observations	1,056	1,056	1,509	1,509	2,076	2,076	1,028	1,028	2,177	2,177

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

the financial crisis in 2007, supporting the validity of my results outside the specific environment of early 2006. Fourth, using Compustat data I construct two falsification samples of non-financial firms and non-BHC financial firms (e.g. insurance companies and banks that are not BHCs), and study whether the valuation of firms with 2005 average total assets just below \$500 million changes after the treatment date, relative to the valuation of firms with total assets just above \$500 million. The results show no evidence of value changes in these falsification samples, confirming that the Fed threshold change, as opposed to other size-based regulations, drives the drop in treated bank value.

1.5 How does Regulatory Monitoring Benefit Shareholders?

In this section I provide additional evidence for my proposed mechanism by testing the remaining model predictions, namely that reduced regulatory monitoring increases shareholder monitoring expenditure and managerial rents, and that bank value losses and monitoring expenditure are positively correlated with cash flow risk. Moreover, I show that increased shareholder monitoring costs increase shareholder incentives to free-ride on each other's monitoring.

1.5.1 Bank Value, Monitoring Expenditure, and Managerial Rents

The second prediction of the costly state verification model is that the observed losses in treated bank value should be due to increased shareholder monitoring expenditure and managerial rents. Table 1.4, provides a first test of this prediction by showing that the policy results in a twenty-five percent increase in treated bank professional expenditure. This relative professional expenditure increase is economically large for treated banks, amounting to approximately twenty-seven thousand dollars per quarter or 3.8 percent of the average treated bank's pre-treatment quarterly net income. Consistent with the model's predictions, when I discount these increased professional expenditures (after-taxes) at an average quarterly ROE of two percent, their discounted present value amounts to slightly less than a million dollars, around twenty-five percent of the four million relative drop in market value experienced by the average treated bank. In other words, increased monitoring expenditures only account for a fraction of the loss in treated bank market value.

Table 1.4

The Policy Effect on Bank Professional Expenditure

This table shows the treatment effect on treated banks' professional expenditure. In the first three specifications I use the natural logarithm of professional fees as dependent variable, while in the last three specifications I use the natural logarithm of professional fees normalized by net interest income. Additional control variables not reported in the table include total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

	log Professional Fees			log $\frac{\text{Professional Fees}}{\text{Net Interest Income}}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	0.259*** (0.09)	0.267*** (0.09)	0.244*** (0.07)	0.225** (0.09)	0.224** (0.09)	0.232*** (0.08)
Leverage		-2.080 (3.22)	-1.640 (2.49)		2.051 (3.08)	0.885 (2.53)
Tier 1 Ratio		-4.471*** (1.51)	-2.173 (1.34)		-1.436 (1.46)	-1.290 (1.35)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.076	0.101	0.182	0.047	0.062	0.129
Observations	999	999	999	999	999	999

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Next, in Table 1.5, I show that the post-treatment losses in market value are strongly correlated with professional expenditures. In practice, I augment the main specification of Table 1.2 with an interaction term for professional expenditures incurred by treated banks only after the treatment, capturing the post-treatment correlation between treated bank professional expenditure and value. In most specifications, I include time-varying risk controls such as Z-Score, equity return volatility, and a tail risk measure borrowed from [Ellul and Yerramilli \(2013\)](#). The table shows that the statistical significance of the treatment effect is entirely captured by post-treatment professional expenditures by treated banks. While the magnitude of this triple-differences estimate has no clear economic interpretation, its significance suggests a strong positive correlation between post-treatment professional expenditure and losses in shareholder value. Moreover, in the appendix I show that this correlation does not seem to be mechanically driven by changes in profitability, size, or risk variables that are potentially correlated with both professional expenditure and value.

Finally, a more in-depth analysis reveals that post-treatment professional expenditure growth for treated banks is mainly related to increased management monitoring, as opposed to other professional services such as auditing and investment banking. In the appendix, I show that fees paid to consultants experience a much larger increase after the treatment than fees paid to auditors (from annual AuditAnalytics). Moreover, when I divide treated banks based on whether their post-treatment 10-K notes cite internal controls consulting as a component of professional expenditure, the increase in professional expenditure is larger for treated banks that cite internal controls as a significant source of expenditure.¹⁵

Managerial Rents

In this section I provide empirical support for the hypothesis that reduced monitoring costs increase managerial rents, where I measure managerial rents by earnings smoothing ([Fudenberg and Tirole \(1995\)](#)). Specifically, I use the August 2007 rise in money market interest rates as a shock to the

¹⁵In many banks, internal controls expenditures are related to Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). In the appendix, I show that the observed decline in treated banks' valuation is however not due to interactions between the policy and size-related SOX provisions (see, for example, [Iliev \(2010\)](#)).

Table 1.5

Professional Expenditure Growth and Post-Treatment Value Losses

In this table I study the interaction between post-treatment professional expenditure growth and post-treatment bank value losses. In the table, the term “Post \times Treated \times Prof. Fees” captures treated banks’ professional expenditures that only occur after the treatment. Z-Score is computed as the moving average of bank capital-asset ratio (book value of equity divided by book value of assets), plus the moving average of ROA, divided by the moving standard deviation of ROA. Moving averages are calculated over a horizon of three quarters. Equity Volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of daily equity returns. Tail risk is the negative of the average return over the 5% worst return days that a bank’s stock experiences in a given quarter (Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)). Professional fees are normalized by net interest income. Unreported control variables include total assets, leverage, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

	log Tobin’s q			log Market-to-Book		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	0.003 (0.04)	-0.000 (0.03)	0.004 (0.03)
Prof. Fees	-0.037 (0.05)	-0.067 (0.04)	-0.075* (0.04)	-0.103 (0.52)	-0.244 (0.45)	-0.437 (0.36)
Post \times Treated \times Prof. Fees	-0.139*** (0.05)	-0.105** (0.05)	-0.124** (0.06)	-1.447*** (0.54)	-1.196*** (0.43)	-1.188*** (0.39)
Z-Score		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Equity Volatility		1.681*** (0.29)	1.681*** (0.25)		11.419*** (1.41)	10.430*** (1.55)
Tail Risk		-0.813*** (0.11)	-0.789*** (0.10)		-6.008*** (0.63)	-5.713*** (0.54)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.290	0.336	0.376	0.368	0.417	0.485
Observations	1,641	1,641	1,641	1,641	1,641	1,641

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

funding costs of BHCs with total assets around \$500 million, and analyze the impact of this negative shock on managerial earnings smoothing right above and right below the threshold. Since money market interest rates are determined in the interbank lending market of large banks, non-systemic banks with assets around \$500 million arguably play a negligible role in determining this funding shock. Any observed difference in funding costs and earnings smoothing of banks right above and below the threshold should therefore only arise from the different exposure of these banks to Fed monitoring.

To test whether the 2007 shock has a different impact on banks with assets right above and right below the threshold, I construct two new groups of treated and control BHCs. The new group of treated, “unmonitored” BHCs consists of BHCs with less than \$500 million in assets during the 2006-2008 period. The new group of control, “monitored” BHCs consists of BHCs with more than \$500 million in assets during the same period. To avoid potential bias due to the change in the definition of small BHCs, I drop observations before the first quarter of 2006. Moreover, I drop BHCs with total assets above \$700 million such that systemic banks are excluded from the sample and such that the unmonitored and monitored groups have roughly the same number of banks (sixty-seven and fifty-seven, respectively). My results are not sensitive to this sample bandwidth choice.

In Table 1.6 I report my main results on the impact of Fed supervision on funding costs, profitability, and earnings smoothing during the crisis.¹⁶ Panel A shows the impact of Fed supervision on the funding costs and profitability of unmonitored banks relative to monitored banks. In the first two specifications of Panel A, I use total interest expense divided by total loans as a measure of BHC funding costs. The table shows that during the crisis the difference between the cost of funding of unmonitored and monitored banks increases by 5.3 percent relative to the pre-crisis period, and that this effect is robust to the inclusion of lagged Tobin’s q , leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, diversification and asset growth as regression covariates. The next specifications show that this relative increase in unmonitored bank funding costs is however not associated with an increase in interest revenue (interest income divided by total loans), and only by a marginally significant decrease in

¹⁶Summary statistics for the dependent variables used in this section are reported in the appendix.

ROE. As a result, unmonitored banks' higher funding costs must be followed by higher noninterest revenue, lower noninterest expense, or both.

In the first two specifications of Panel B, I show that unmonitored bank Loan Loss Provisions—a component of noninterest expense—indeed experience a large decline during the financial crisis. While the results of the baseline Specification (1) are not statistically significant, the second specification of Panel B shows that during the crisis unmonitored bank LLPs decrease by fifty-three percent relative to monitored bank LLPs after controlling for size, profitability, and other sources of bank heterogeneity. The observed decline is not due to bank size or performance, and is therefore consistent with the hypothesis of earnings smoothing (as previously documented by [Huizinga and Laeven \(2012\)](#)). In the last four specifications of Panel B, I confirm this hypothesis by showing a relative increase in small bank Discretionary Negative Loan Loss Provisions (DNLLPs) during the crisis. These discretionary provisions are the absolute negative residuals from a first-stage regression of LLP on observable performance variables, and measure the negative change in LLP that is not due to bank performance ([Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo \(2014\)](#)). Panel B shows a relative DNLLPs increase as large as seventy percent for unmonitored banks, confirming that the decline in LLP documented in the first two specifications is due to managerial discretion as opposed to performance.

In the appendix, I conduct additional tests to address potential concerns that the results of Table 1.6 are driven by a subset of small, distressed banks during the crisis rather than by Fed monitoring. In particular, I show that the results are robust within the sample of banks surviving for the entire 2006–2008 period, and lose economic and statistical significance when I choose an alternative threshold of \$400 million to define the two groups of unmonitored and monitored banks.

Cash Flow Risk

In Table 1.7 I test my third prediction that banks with higher cash flow risk should experience a larger decline in value and a larger increase in monitoring expenditure after the treatment. To do so, I divide treated banks into two sub-groups based on whether their average cash flow risk (as defined in Section 1.3.1) is above or below the median cash flow risk in my sample. In the table, I

Table 1.6

Managerial Rents: Earnings Smoothing in the Financial Crisis

In this table, I study the impact of Fed monitoring on bank funding costs, profitability, and earnings smoothing during the financial crisis. In Panel A, I study the change in funding costs (total interest expense divided by total loans), interest revenue (interest income divided by total loans), and ROE. In Panel B, I study the change in LLP (loan loss provisions normalized by net interest income) and DNLLP (constructed following Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) as the absolute negative residual from a regression of LLP on previous-quarter loan loss allowance, current-quarter loan charge-offs to assets, loans to assets, non-performing loans to assets and change in total loans) during the financial crisis. The dependent variable used to calculate DNLLP 1 is current-quarter LLP, while the dependent variable used to calculate DNLLP 2 is previous-quarter LLP. The sample period is 2006-2008. Unmonitored banks are banks that are below the \$500 million threshold for the entire sample period. Unreported controls include previous-quarter Tobin's q , leverage, the Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, diversification and asset growth in Panel A, as well as operating profitability and ROE in Panel B.

Panel A: Funding Costs and Profitability						
	$\log \frac{\text{Int. Expense}}{\text{Total Loans}}$		$\log \frac{\text{Int. Income}}{\text{Total Loans}}$		ROE	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Crisis \times Unmonitored	0.053** (0.02)	0.053*** (0.02)	0.018 (0.01)	0.019 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.00)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.673	0.755	0.626	0.662	0.184	0.530
Observations	899	899	899	899	899	899

Panel B: Loan Loss Provisions						
	$\log \frac{\text{LLP}}{\text{Net Int. Income}}$		log DNLLP 1		log DNLLP 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Crisis \times Unmonitored	-0.359 (0.25)	-0.531*** (0.18)	0.610** (0.25)	0.614** (0.25)	0.704*** (0.24)	0.708*** (0.24)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.286	0.521	0.336	0.351	0.344	0.360
Observations	614	614	543	543	549	549

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

then study the treatment effect on value and professional expenditure in these two cash flow risk groups. The table shows that treated banks with high cash flow risk experience larger value losses than treated banks with low cash flow risk. For example, the relative loss in Market-to-Book for treated banks with high cash flow risk is twice as large as the average value loss in the main sample, while the relative value loss for treated banks with low cash flow risk is not statistically different from zero. Moreover, treated banks with high cash flow risk also experience a much larger increase in monitoring expense than treated banks with low cash flow risk, again in line with the predictions of the model. In the appendix, I finally show that most of the results of the table also hold when using alternative risk measures such as Z-Scores and equity return volatility.

Table 1.7

Cash Flow Risk, Shareholder Value, and Professional Expenditures

In this table I study the treatment effect on value and professional expenditure for treated banks with above- and below-median cash flow risk, where cash flow risk is defined as in Table 1.1. Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification and asset growth.

	log Tobin's q		log Market-to-Book		log Prof. Fees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated \times Low CF Risk	0.001 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.015 (0.04)	-0.021 (0.04)	0.101 (0.10)	0.202** (0.10)
Post \times Treated \times High CF Risk	-0.018*** (0.01)	-0.014*** (0.01)	-0.152*** (0.04)	-0.114*** (0.04)	0.421*** (0.12)	0.338*** (0.08)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.373	0.434	0.436	0.525	0.135	0.271
Observations	1,547	1,547	1,547	1,547	737	737

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

1.5.2 Regulatory Monitoring and Shareholder Free-Riding

I finally argue that increased shareholder monitoring costs increase their incentives to free-ride on each other's monitoring (Grossman and Hart (1980), Holmström (1982)). Consistent with the the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), I show that the presence of a large shareholder—the chairman of the board of directors—helps mitigating this free-rider problem and increases bank value.

Table 1.8
Ownership, Management Monitoring, and Value

In this table I study the post-treatment interaction between bank ownership, professional expenditure, and value, immediately following the treatment. I first assign treated banks to two groups based on whether their pre-treatment chairman ownership falls in the bottom two terciles (low-ownership) or in the top tercile (high-ownership) of the pre-treatment chairman ownership distribution in my sample. In the table, I then study how different levels of pre-treatment chairman ownership interact with changes in post-treatment professional expenditure and value. Since the focus of the table is the short-term treatment effect on professional expenditure and value, my estimates only include data from 2005 and 2006. Quarterly bank ownership data comes from S&P Capital IQ. Unreported control variables include total assets, leverage, the Tier 1 Ratio, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

	log Prof. Fees		log $\frac{\text{Prof. Fees}}{\text{Net Int. Income}}$		log Market-to-Book	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated \times Low Chair Own.	0.167* (0.09)	0.183* (0.09)	0.188* (0.09)	0.187* (0.10)	-0.079*** (0.03)	-0.077*** (0.03)
Post \times Treated \times High Chair Own.	0.521*** (0.07)	0.512*** (0.06)	0.416*** (0.11)	0.477*** (0.08)	-0.028 (0.05)	-0.045* (0.03)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.085	0.149	0.083	0.175	0.055	0.228
Observations	368	368	368	368	782	782

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

In Table 1.8, I investigate how different levels of chairman ownership affect monitoring costs and valuation immediately after the treatment.¹⁷ Similar to Table 1.7, I first divide treated banks in two groups based on whether their pre-treatment ownership by the chairman falls in the bottom two terciles or in the top tercile of the pre-treatment chairman ownership distribution in my sample. In the table, I then study the professional spending and value losses in these two groups of banks. The main objective of this table is to show the short-term treatment effect on professional expenditure and value for banks with different levels of ownership, and the table therefore only reports results for the years 2005 and 2006.

The first four specifications show that banks with low and high levels of chairman ownership respec-

¹⁷Ownership data comes from S&P Capital IQ. The results presented in the table are qualitatively similar, although statistically and economically weaker, for other categories of ownership such as institutional ownership. A possible explanation for this result is that the banks in my sample are relatively small compared to other financial institutions, and likely represent a small fraction of institutional investors' portfolio (Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015)).

tively increase their professional expenditure by eighteen and fifty-one percent after the treatment. In absolute terms, these relative changes translate into an average twenty-five thousand dollar increase in professional expenditure for banks with low chairman ownership, and an average thirty thousand dollar increase for banks with high chairman ownership. Despite the much larger increase in relative professional expenditure and the slightly larger increase in absolute expenditure, the last two specifications show that treated banks with high chairman ownership only experience around sixty percent of the value drop of treated banks with low chairman ownership.¹⁸ In other words, while the discounted present value of bank professional expenditure is approximately the same across the two ownership groups, the valuation of banks with low chairman ownership drops by much more than the valuation of banks with high chairman ownership.

Consistent with the idea that ownership resolves shareholder free-riding problems, in the appendix I finally show that the treatment effect on professional expenditure is not only larger but also more persistent in banks with high chairman ownership. At the same time, the post-treatment drop in shareholder value is lower and less persistent for these banks relative to banks with low chairman ownership.

1.6 Discussion and Tests of Alternative Hypotheses

Collectively, the results of the previous sections suggest that the large value losses of treated banks are due to increased shareholder monitoring costs. Quantitatively, the discounted present value of increased monitoring expenditures accounts for around twenty-five percent of their loss in shareholder value. Moreover, as just shown in Section 1.5.2, around forty percent of the value loss can be attributed to free-riding problems as shareholder monitoring becomes more expensive. Following the guidance of my model and my previous empirical results, I finally attribute the residual shareholder value losses to increased managerial rents.

¹⁸Pre-treatment valuations in the two ownership groups are not statistically different from each other.

Despite empirical evidence supporting the model's predictions, my results make it difficult to finally conclude that the residual shareholder value losses are necessarily due to managerial rents. My strategy is to rule out alternative hypotheses that might explain these residual value losses.¹⁹

Government Tail Risk Insurance An important question is whether the government provides different degrees of tail risk insurance to small and large banks. If this is the case, part of the discounts observed in treated bank value might just reflect a loss of government insurance, as opposed to reduced Fed monitoring. To test this hypothesis, I construct a daily version of the [Gandhi and Lustig \(2015\)](#) risk factor capturing aggregate tail risk in US banks' stock returns. As discussed in their paper, this size factor is the normal risk-adjusted return on a portfolio that goes long in small bank stocks and short in large bank stocks, and represents a bank-specific risk factor orthogonal to other equity and bond factors. In the appendix, I test whether treated banks experience a change in their exposure to bank-specific tail risk after the treatment, where I measure this risk exposure as the quarterly loading of bank excess returns on the size factor. In practice, I repeat the usual exercise using each bank's quarterly loading on the size factor (the estimate from a quarterly time-series regression of daily bank excess returns on the daily size factor) as dependent variable. My results show no significant changes in deregulated banks' exposure to tail risk, and therefore to government tail risk insurance.

Financial Statement Disclosure A second possible channel for the residual losses in treated bank value is reduced financial disclosure ([Hutton et al. \(2009\)](#)). To rule out this hypothesis, I use a policy provision of the Fed policy allowing treated BHCs to keep filing form FR Y-9C, while also preventing them to revert to form FR Y-9SP if they choose to do so. Following this provision, I define treated banks as voluntary filers if they file form FR Y-9C in March 2006 (the first quarter in which the policy becomes effective).²⁰ In the appendix, I analyze the treatment effect on twenty-nine voluntary filers

¹⁹For expositional convenience, the tables relative to this section are confined to the appendix.

²⁰The policy gives the Fed the option to determine if a small bank should file form FR Y-9C based on additional individual criteria such as diversification. However, this provision is only effective from the second half of 2006 and virtually never used by the Fed in subsequent periods.

(the voluntary-reporting group), and compare it to the effect on the remaining treated banks (the not-reporting group). The treatment effect on each sub-group is a one percent decrease in Tobin's q , both in baseline specifications and when I add time-varying controls. Similarly, the treatment induces a 7.7 percent drop in voluntary-reporting BHCs' Market-to-Book, almost identical to the 7.6 percent drop for not-reporting BHCs. The results are similar when I add time-varying controls, confirming that the treatment affects treated banks irrespective of their financial disclosure.

Liquidity, Volatility, and Market Frictions Another possible concern is that the stocks of treated BHCs become riskier or less liquid following the treatment. Lower information availability might decrease the liquidity of treated banks' stocks—therefore justifying an illiquidity premium. Alternatively, institutional investors might treat the stocks of small and large banks differently, possibly using Fed thresholds to define their investment strategy. For example, if many institutional investors can only hold stocks of large banks, one would expect a decrease in turnover, an increase in idiosyncratic risk, and a decrease in market information responsiveness for treated banks' stocks.

My results show no significant changes in the liquidity, volatility, and market information responsiveness of treated banks' stocks after the treatment. More specifically, the data shows no significant changes in five stock liquidity measures commonly used in the market microstructure literature, namely Effective Tick Size ([Holden \(2009\)](#), [Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka \(2009\)](#)), the [Corwin and Schultz \(2012\)](#) Bid-Ask Spread measure, the [Amihud \(2002\)](#) measure, Zero Days Traded (the number of days in which a stock is not traded) and Turnover (traded volume divided by shares outstanding). Similarly, the data shows no significant changes in treated banks' risk profile, where I use the standard deviation of BHC stock returns to measure total risk and the residual standard deviations from the Fama-French four factor model and the [Adrian, Friedman, and Muir \(2015\)](#) Financial CAPM model to measure bank idiosyncratic risk. Finally, I find no evidence of changes in stock price responsiveness to market information, as measured by the delay variables of [Hou and Moskowitz \(2005\)](#).

Leverage and Capital Requirements I finally analyze the treatment effect on leverage and capital ratios. The policy closely follows another Fed regulation relaxing the capital requirements of treated

BHCs' parent companies (71 FR 9897). According to this regulation, the parent companies of BHCs with less than \$500 million in total assets (i.e. the parent companies of treated BHCs) are exempted from regular capital requirements to finance levered acquisitions. Although unlikely (capital requirements exemptions are optional, and the banking subsidiaries of treated BHCs are still subject to regular capital requirements), there might be a concern that high leverage increases bank default risk, resulting in lower valuation. The appendix shows that the leverage and the regulatory capital ratios of treated banks do not change after the treatment.

1.7 Conclusion

In this paper, I use a Fed policy relaxing the reporting requirements of a subset of US banks as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the impact of regulatory monitoring on shareholder value. The paper shows that Tobin's q and equity market-to-book of deregulated banks respectively fall by one and seven percent after the policy, and shows that this result is due to an increase in shareholder monitoring costs when regulatory monitoring decreases. I show that, absent regulatory monitoring, increased shareholder monitoring costs lead to increased monitoring expenditure, managerial rents, and free-riding problems between shareholders.

From an economic standpoint, the paper shows that monitoring has a large impact on firm value, and demonstrates the positive role of regulation in reducing shareholder monitoring costs. From a policy standpoint, the paper provides an empirical counter-argument to the standing view that financial regulation is bad for bank investors, especially in small and medium-sized banks. In this sense, future work should be aimed at measuring the contribution of agency frictions to the value discounts observed in very large banks (Minton et al. (2017)), and quantifying the costs and benefits of financial regulation for these large, complex financial institutions.

Chapter 2

Group Punishments without Commitment

2.1 Introduction

Teams exist in many economic settings, ranging from teams of individuals working together in clubs, partnerships, or firms, to teams of companies in the form of cartels and lobby groups, to teams of nations in the form of political alliances and economic unions. In each of these settings, teams aim to improve outcomes by coordinating efforts across members and are often successful in doing so. Organizing as a team, however, may also introduce moral hazard problems, especially when team outcomes are shared and individual effort is not perfectly observed.

In static environments of team production subject to unobservable moral hazard, [Holmström \(1982\)](#) shows the only way to alleviate moral hazard problems is to rely on an outsider who can punish the entire team after observing an aggregate outcome associated with a deviation by some team member. Punishments take the form of throwing away some share of the team's output. [Holmström \(1982\)](#) argues that the intervention of an outsider is also necessary to implement such punishments in a repeated environment, as the team might not want to enforce these punishments once team production outcomes are realized: *“There is a problem [...] in enforcing such group penalties if they are self-imposed by the worker team. [...] Ex post it is not in the interest of any of the team members to waste some of the outcome. But if it is expected that penalties will not be enforced, we are back in the situation with budget-balancing, and the free-rider problem reappears.”*

In this paper, we ask if and under what conditions outsiders are truly needed to enforce group punishments in a repeated context. In other words, we ask whether the ability of individual team members to punish other team members in the future enables the team to enforce group punishments which occur *after* aggregate outcomes are realized but *before* the realization of individual payoffs in the current period. We call such within-the-period punishments *static group punishments*. Since these punishments occur sequentially after individuals choose their private actions, this environment resembles a repeated extensive form game as in [Mailath et al. \(2017\)](#). We obtain a simple characterization of the set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs and show that, depending on the nature of the payoffs that agents obtain from team production, the team can indeed enforce static group pun-

ishments. In such cases, the threat of static group punishments is welfare enhancing relative to an environment in which the team’s action set does not allow for static group punishments.

We start our analysis from a generalized model of repeated team production, featuring a team of agents and a benevolent Principal—a construct to represent team-wide preferences. In our model, agents individually choose a level of effort to contribute to the realization of a common outcome. After observing this common outcome, the Principal chooses a group punishment (possibly zero) which negatively affects the common outcome. The Principal, like the agents, cannot commit to a long-term strategy for group punishments. Since the Principal’s action occurs after the common outcome is observed, the benevolent Principal values period utility of all agents plus the sum of future discounted stage-game payoffs of all the agents.

Our main contribution is to show that this commonly studied repeated team production environment admits a simple, recursive characterization for the set of perfect-public equilibria. Specifically, we show how to characterize the entire equilibrium set of our generalized team production model using simple “carrot-and-stick” strategies for the worst perfect-public equilibrium (as in [Abreu \(1986\)](#)). We show that group punishments reduce the gains from deviations in the “carrot” phase, but increase the gains from deviations in the “stick” phase. Therefore, deviations from the “stick” never call for immediate implementation of group punishments, further simplifying the recursive characterization of the equilibrium set.¹

Our main findings are that static group punishments can be enforced by the threat of future actions by *team members*; and that the threat of static group punishments strictly improves the best attainable equilibrium welfare relative to an economy where the Principal’s actions are restricted to never implement group punishments. Moreover, we show that a necessary condition for static group punishments to improve welfare is the presence of complementarities between aggregate outcomes and private actions in team members’ stage game payoffs. We show that the *total static deviation payoff* (the total payoff that a deviant team member obtains within the deviation period) can be expressed as the deviant’s static private gain minus a cost to incentivize the Principal to implement group

¹We argue that imperfect observability plays a key role in our recursive characterization, making continuation payoffs independent of the identity of the deviator ([Mailath et al. \(2017\)](#)).

punishments. Absent complementarities between aggregate outcomes and private actions, group punishments have no impact on this total static deviation payoff, and are therefore ineffective in deterring individual deviations—an outsider à la [Holmström \(1982\)](#) is required to improve welfare. Conversely, when team members' private actions interact with aggregate outcomes group punishments do reduce the total static deviation payoff by indirectly reducing team members' private incentives to deviate. In these cases, group punishments are useful to deter individual deviations, and an outsider may not be needed to improve welfare.

Our findings in the generalized model indicate that in presence of complementarities between aggregate outcomes and private actions, the Principal who lacks commitment (i.e. the team) might be capable of replicating incentive schemes which do not satisfy budget balancing without the aid of outsiders. In the second part of the paper, we apply our generalized team production model to the repeated oligopoly model of [Abreu \(1986\)](#), and ask which features of producers' payoffs make self-imposed group punishments most effective in improving team welfare—and therefore limit the need for an outsider. In the oligopoly model, team members are producers individually choosing how much output to produce, and the team outcome is the common price faced by all producers (a decreasing function of aggregate team output). On the other hand, the group punishment imposed by the Principal is a tax rate (possibly zero) which has the effect of reducing the price of producers' output. As in the generalized model, the Principal cannot commit to a long-term strategy for taxes.

Within the context of the oligopoly model, we first show that group punishments imposed by the Principal are particularly effective in increasing team welfare for intermediate levels of the producers' discount factor. Intuitively, when producers are very impatient the threat of future punishments is weak and only small group punishments can be sustained following static deviations. For intermediate levels of the discount factor, the team can sustain large enough static group punishments such that the threat of these punishments allows the team to achieve the socially-optimal level of production. When producers are very patient, the threat of future punishments is strong enough that the team can sustain the socially-optimal level of production even without resorting to group punishments. Second, we show that for a given level of the discount factor group punishments are

more effective when producers' output is highly substitutable. In these cases, deviations by individual producers have a small impact on the common price, increasing producers' static incentives to deviate, and increasing the ability of group punishments to improve team welfare relative to an economy where group punishments are not part of the team's action set.

Related Literature Our paper is related to a large literature concerning moral hazard in static team production settings. [Alchian and Demsetz \(1972\)](#) describe the opportunity for team members to shirk and still receive compensation and the need for a principal to prevent shirking. [Holmström \(1982\)](#) suggests a particular kind of contract in which a principal withholds payment whenever output is below its socially optimal level. Other studies solve the moral hazard problem by injecting a degree of competition among team members via tournaments, rankings, or other relative performance measures (see [Hart and Holmström \(1986\)](#) for a survey).

One of the main challenges in taking these static team production games to the infinitely-repeated domain is to characterize the set of perfect-public equilibrium payoffs. [Mailath et al. \(2017\)](#) show that in a wide range of extensive-form games (including team production games) the equilibrium set cannot be characterized using simple penal codes, because both within-period punishments and continuation payoffs need to fit the identity of the deviator after a deviation has occurred. In our paper, we assume that group punishments can only affect team outcomes (due to imperfect observability), and show how under this assumption the equilibrium set can be characterized using simple penal codes. In other words, we show that simple penal codes can be used to characterize the entire set of perfect-public equilibrium payoffs in a broad set of repeated extensive-form games featuring imperfect observability.

An alternative to group punishments is to allow agents to make side payments to each other ([Goldlücke and Kranz \(2012, 2013\)](#)). This arrangement avoids costly forms of retaliation when an agent deviates, and yet is still incentive-compatible since the non-deviant agent receives a positive money transfer from the deviant. [Harrington and Skrzypacz \(2007, 2011\)](#) describe how the lysine and citric acid cartels successfully used these types of contracts, and employed monitors to audit the money-transfer

process. This class of models offer a recursive characterization of the equilibrium set using simple penal codes, but is limited to teams of two agents or settings in which individual actions are observable.

More in general, our analysis is concerned with team production when a static game is repeated for infinitely many periods. In this setting, agents have an opportunity to retaliate against the team in future periods if shirking is detected (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992). Moreover, in repeated settings enforcing the aforementioned mechanisms of peer evaluations and relative performance rankings can become strategic problems in their own right, as exemplified by Che and Yoo (2001), Fuchs (2007), and Cheng (2016). Finally, our question bears some similarity to the “Who will guard the guardians?” question examined in Hurwicz (2008), Rahman (2012), Aldashev and Zanarone (2017), and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2015) among others. Our setup differs slightly in that the guardian is the team itself, and individual team members must be willing to retaliate against the team when group punishments are not enforced.

2.2 A Generalized Model of Repeated Team Production

We begin by describing a model of repeated team production where a benevolent Principal can impose group punishments after observing aggregate deviations. We provide conditions under which the Principal’s ability to impose static group punishments—defined as punishments that occur *after* aggregate output is observed, but *before* current-period payoffs are realized—can be sustained in equilibrium to increase the welfare of the team. Moreover, if team members are sufficiently patient, the threat of these punishments can strictly increase team welfare relative to an environment where the Principal’s actions are restricted to never implement group punishments.

2.2.1 Stage Game

A team consists of n agents indexed by $i = 1, \dots, n$.² Each agent chooses an unobservable and non-negative action $a_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$, representing a level of effort. The cost of action a_i is given by $c(a_i)$, where

²In what follows, we use the terms “agents” and “team members” interchangeably.

$c'(a_i) > 0$, $c''(a_i) \geq 0$, and $c(0) = 0$. Moreover, we write

$$a_{-i} = (a_1, \dots, a_{i-1}, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_n), a = (a_i, a_{-i}),$$

where the vector a constitutes an *effort profile*. An effort profile determines the aggregate outcome of team production according to a generic outcome function $x : \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$.

In addition to team members, a benevolent Principal (a construct for team payoffs) observes the aggregate outcome x and chooses a group punishment $\tau \geq 0$ that reduces the team's aggregate outcome. A strategy for the Principal is therefore $\tau : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$. For notational convenience, we define the final result of the team's effort after the Principal imposes punishments as the *aggregate net outcome function* $\ell(a, \tau)$, where $\ell : \mathbb{R}_+^{n+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$. We make two sets of assumptions on this aggregate net outcome function. First, $\ell_\tau(a, \tau) < 0$, where the subscript denotes the partial derivative of $\ell(\cdot)$ with respect to τ . This assumption reflects the fact that in our model the Principal is just a construct for the team. Since the only resource available to the Principal is the outcome of team production, the Principal can never increase this outcome using group punishments. In other words, our first assumption rules out external subsidies from the model. Second, to keep the analysis close to [Holmström \(1982\)](#) we assume that for all i, j , $\ell_{a_i}(a, \tau) = \ell_{a_j}(a, \tau) \geq 0$ and $\ell_{a_i a_j}(a, \tau) \leq 0$, where the subscripts again denote partial derivatives.

Finally, the net outcome ℓ is distributed among team members according to a predetermined set of sharing rules $\{s_i\}_{i=1}^n$, where each $s_i \in (0, 1)$ and

$$\sum_{i=1}^n s_i = 1. \quad (2.1)$$

To keep our analysis concise, we limit ourselves to cases where $s_i = 1/n$. This assumption can be relaxed to other sharing rules as long as each s_i is constant and (2.1) is satisfied.

Team members have identical preferences over their share of the aggregate outcome. Utility is given by $\pi : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ which satisfies standard assumptions $\pi'(\ell) > 0$, $\pi''(\ell) \leq 0$, and $\lim_{\ell \rightarrow 0} \pi(\ell) = -\infty$. Additionally, utility from output interacts with individual effort according to a function $f : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$, which satisfies $f'(a_i) \leq 0$ and $f''(a_i) \leq 0$. The function $f(\cdot)$ represents possible interactions

between the common payoff component, $\ell(a, \tau)$, and the individual agent's private effort a_i , and its interaction with $\pi(\cdot)$ allows us to nest the [Abreu \(1986\)](#) repeated oligopoly model within our generalized framework. In the oligopoly model, $\pi(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$ respectively correspond to prices and quantities. Prices, like output shares, are common across all agents. Quantities, however, can vary across agents.³ In our more general setting, one interpretation sees $f(\cdot)$ as part of a labor/leisure trade-off, while the cost function $c(\cdot)$ reflects all other personal costs related to production. The important feature that $f(\cdot)$ captures is that private and public gains from effort have a nontrivial interaction. In this general model, we can discipline this interaction more explicitly through our assumptions on $f(\cdot)$. Later on, we remove this interaction and find that a principal has no ability to improve outcomes.⁴

Since the Principal ignores sunk effort costs $c(\cdot)$, payoffs to the agents and Principal are respectively

$$u(a_i, a_{-i}, \tau) = \pi(s_i \ell(a_i, a_{-i}, \tau)) f(a_i) - c(a_i), \quad (2.2)$$

$$w(a, \tau) = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi(s_i \ell(a, \tau)) f(a_i). \quad (2.3)$$

Stage Game Equilibrium

A symmetric *perfect-public equilibrium* of the stage game consists of effort choices a_i by team members and a group punishment choice $\tau(x)$ by the Principal such that for every x , $\tau(x)$ maximizes (2.3) and such that given τ and a_{-i} , a_i maximizes (2.2)

Since in a static setting it is optimal for the principal not to impose group punishments (i.e. to set $\tau(x) = 0$), the optimal effort a^N of the static equilibrium, which we denote by a^N , is given by

$$a_i^N = \operatorname{argmax}_{a_i} \left[\pi(s_i \ell(a_i, a_{-i}^N, 0)) f(a_i) - c(a_i) \right]. \quad (2.4)$$

³The fact that oligopoly prices decrease in q while output shares increase in a is offset by $f(a)$ decreasing in a while q is increasing (in itself).

⁴The assumption that $\lim_{\ell \rightarrow 0} \pi(\ell) = -\infty$ is only needed when $\ell_{a_i} \geq 0$ to ensure that the team members can impose unbounded punishments on each other. On the other hand, the assumption that $f'(\cdot) \leq 0$ is necessary to guarantee the problem has an interior solution when $\ell_{a_i} \geq 0$. More generally, the necessary assumption for the repeated model of team production to have an interior solution is that $\operatorname{sign}(\ell_{a_i}) = -\operatorname{sign}(f')$. The assumption that $f''(\cdot) \leq 0$ is sufficient but not necessary to obtain our results, and allows us to easily compare the generalized model with the repeated oligopoly model of [Abreu \(1986\)](#) in Section 2.3.

Note that facing the Principal's optimal decision not to impose group punishments, the socially-optimal level of effort a^* which maximizes the sum of individual utilities is given by

$$a^* = \operatorname{argmax}_a \sum_{i=1}^n u(a_i, a_{-i}, 0). \quad (2.5)$$

In the following Lemma 2.2.1, we establish that the equilibrium level of effort of this static game is smaller than the socially-optimal level of effort.

Lemma 1. $0 < a_i^N < a_i^*$.

Proof. An individual agent's first-order conditions yield

$$s_i \ell_{a_i}(a_i, a_{-i}, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a_i, a_{-i}, 0)) f(a_i) + f'(a_i) \pi(s_i \ell(a_i, a_{-i}, 0)) = c'(a_i). \quad (2.6)$$

The profile a^N necessarily satisfies (2.6) for all agents $i = 1, \dots, n$. That is,

$$s_i \ell_{a_i}(a^N, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a^N, 0)) f(a_i^N) + f'(a_i^N) \pi(s_i \ell(a^N, 0)) = c'(a_i^N). \quad (2.7)$$

The first order condition for the socially-optimal level of effort, on the other hand, implies that for all i

$$s_i \ell_{a_i}(a^*, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a^*, 0)) f(a_i^*) + f'(a_i^*) \pi(s_i \ell(a^*, 0)) + \sum_{j \neq i} s_j \ell_{a_i}(a^*, 0) \pi'(s_j \ell(a^*, 0)) f(a_j^*) = c'(a_i^*). \quad (2.8)$$

Conditions (2.6) and (2.8) differ by an additional term in (2.8). This extra term represents the positive externality of one agent's additional effort on the remaining $(n - 1)$ agents. Since $\pi' > 0$, $s_i \in [0, 1]$, and $f(a_j) > 0$ for any $a_j > 0$, the additional term is necessarily positive. This implies that

$$\begin{aligned} s_i \ell_{a_i}(a^N, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a^N, 0)) f(a_i^N) + f'(a_i^N) \pi(s_i \ell(a^N, 0)) - c'(a_i^N) &> \\ s_i \ell_{a_i}(a^*, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a^*, 0)) f(a_i^*) + f'(a_i^*) \pi(s_i \ell(a^*, 0)) - c'(a_i^*). & \end{aligned} \quad (2.9)$$

The result follows from our assumptions on $\ell(\cdot)$, $\pi(\cdot)$, and $f(\cdot)$. Since $\lim_{\ell \rightarrow 0^+} \pi(\ell) = -\infty$, we rule out the boundary solution $a_i^N = 0$, so $0 < a_i^N < a_i^*$. \square

Note that if the Principal were able to commit to group punishments when the aggregate outcome is smaller than $x(a^*)$, then each producer contributing a_i^* would be an equilibrium. For example, for a given effort profile a , if the Principal's strategy was to implement some $\tau(x(a)) > 0$ such that $\ell(a, \tau(x(a))) = 0$ if $x(a) < x(a^*)$, and conversely to implement $\tau = 0$ if $x(a) = x(a^*)$, then each agent's best response to a_{-i}^* would be to choose $a_i = a_i^*$.⁵ In this sense, the threat of group punishments would be useful if the Principal could commit to such a strategy. In the next section, we investigate whether group punishments may be sustainable and welfare-improving when agents and the Principal interact repeatedly. Before proceeding to the repeated game, we establish the intermediate result that agents will increase their effort in the interior of $[a_i^N, a_i^*]$ when $a_{-i} < a_i^N$.

Corollary 2. *If $a_{-i} < a_i^N$, then the most profitable deviation a_i' is such that $a_i' > a_i^N$.*

Proof. Consider the condition that is satisfied when $a_i = a_i^N$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$.

$$s_i \ell_{a_i}(a_i^N, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a_i^N, 0)) f(a_i^N) + f'(a_i^N) \pi(s_i \ell(a_i^N, 0)) = c'(a_i^N). \quad (2.10)$$

Now suppose that the effort by all other producers but i (denoted by a_{-i}) decreases from a_i^N . Then,

$$s_i \ell_{a_i}(a_i^N, a_{-i}, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a_i^N, a_{-i}, 0)) f(a_i^N) + f'(a_i^N) \pi(s_i \ell(a_i^N, a_{-i}, 0)) > c'(a_i^N). \quad (2.11)$$

The optimal response a_i' by agent must satisfy the first-order condition

$$s_i \ell_{a_i}(a_i', a_{-i}, 0) \pi'(s_i \ell(a_i', a_{-i}, 0)) f(a_i') + f'(a_i') \pi(s_i \ell(a_i', a_{-i}, 0)) = c'(a_i'), \quad (2.12)$$

which means that the right-hand side of (2.11) must increase and/or its left-hand side must decrease.

Therefore, $a_i' > a_i^N$. □

2.2.2 Infinitely-Repeated Game

In this section, we develop and analyze an infinitely-repeated version of the static team production model described above. We focus on symmetric, perfect-public equilibria and illustrate how team

⁵In this example, we assume that for each a , there always exists some $\tau(x(a)) > 0$ such that $\ell(a, \tau(x(a))) = 0$. In other words, we assume that there exists a punishment such that the Principal can completely destroy the aggregate outcome.

members may incentivize the Principal such that group punishments are sustainable in equilibrium even when the Principal lacks commitment. We go on to show that along the best equilibrium path, group punishments are not implemented. However, the threat of group punishments allows team members to attain strictly higher welfare than they would in an economy where group punishments are not allowed—the Principal's actions are restricted to never impose group punishments.

Histories, Perfect-Public Equilibria, and One-Shot Deviations

Here we describe the infinitely-repeated game, define our notion of equilibrium, and simplify our equilibrium characterization by appealing to the one-shot deviation principle. Proposition 3 of this section shows that the entire set of perfect-public equilibria can be attained by preventing single-period (one-shot) deviations in the infinitely-repeated game.

Let $h_t^w \in H^w$ where $H^w = \mathbb{R}_+^2$ denote the public outcomes (x_t, τ_t) observed at the end of period t . Then, let \mathcal{H}^w denote set of public histories with $\mathcal{H}^w = \bigcup_{t=0}^{\infty} (H^w)^t$. Similarly, define the set of histories for agent i as $\mathcal{H}^i = \bigcup_{t=0}^{\infty} (\mathbb{R}_+ \times H^w)^t$. A pure strategy for agent i is a mapping from the set of all possible agent i histories into the set of pure actions,

$$\sigma_i : \mathcal{H}^i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+.$$

A pure strategy for the Principal is a mapping from the set of public histories and an observation of the aggregate outcome into the set of pure actions for the Principal,

$$\sigma_w : \mathcal{H}^w \times \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+.$$

We assume agents and the Principal have a common discount factor δ and restrict attention to public strategies which are functions only of the public history. Given a strategy profile $\sigma = (\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n, \sigma_w)$, if $h^{wt} \in H^{wt}$ denotes a generic period- t history, we let $U_i^t(h^{wt}, \sigma)$ denote the discounted continuation payoffs agent i obtains from period t onwards. Since the Principal chooses an action after period- t

effort decisions are sunk, the Principal's discounted continuation payoffs satisfy

$$U_i^w(h^{wt}, \sigma) = \sum_i U_i^i(h^{wt}, \sigma) + (1 - \delta) c \sum_i \sigma_i(h^{wt}). \quad (2.13)$$

In Appendix B.2.1 we define continuation games and strategies, perfect-public equilibria, and one-shot deviations. In the next proposition, we prove that equilibria can be constructed recursively by ensuring that for any history, neither the agents nor the Principal have a profitable one-shot deviation.

Proposition 3. *A strategy profile $\sigma = (\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n, \sigma_w)$ is perfect-public if and only if there are no profitable one-shot deviations for the agents and there are no profitable one-shot deviations for the Principal.*

Proof. See Appendix B.2.1. □

Equilibrium Set Characterization

We now describe a procedure to characterize the set of symmetric equilibrium payoffs using carrot-and-stick strategies as in Abreu (1986). As we will argue, individual deviations by team members may be subject to group punishments chosen by the Principal. However, limited commitment of the Principal implies that agents will need to impose discipline on the Principal in the event that the Principal attempts to avoid the static losses associated with group punishments. Nonetheless, we will show that extremal equilibrium payoffs (both the best and the worst equilibrium payoff) need not feature group punishments.

We focus on characterizing *strongly* symmetric equilibria, and we therefore simplify our notation by dropping i subscripts and by using a in place of (a, a, \dots, a) for producers' strategies, $u(a, 0)$ in place of $u_i(a, a, \dots, a, \tau = 0)$ for producers' payoffs and so on.

Under the one-shot deviation principle, given the worst perfect-public equilibrium payoff \underline{v} , the best perfect-public equilibrium payoff \bar{v} can be constructed as the solution to the following program:

$$\bar{v} = \max_{a, \tau(\cdot), v(\cdot, a, \tau(\cdot))} u(a, 0), \quad (2.14)$$

subject to, for all a'

$$u(a, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) u(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) + \delta v(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) \quad (2.15)$$

$$v(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}], \quad (2.16)$$

and

$$(1 - \delta) w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) + n\delta v(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) \geq (1 - \delta) w(a', a, 0) + n\delta \underline{v}. \quad (2.17)$$

Inequality (2.15) represents the incentive compatibility constraint for each agent, which requires the symmetric payoff $u(a, 0)$ to be greater or equal to the payoff associated with a deviation effort a' with static payoff $u(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))$ and continuation payoff $v(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))$. Equation (2.16) represents the feasibility constraint for the continuation payoff $v(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))$, which must lie between the worst equilibrium payoff \underline{v} and the best equilibrium payoff \bar{v} . Finally, (2.17) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the Principal, requiring the Principal to have sufficient incentives to enforce the prescribed group punishment once one of the n team members deviates to a' . The left-hand side of (2.17) is the Principal's payoff when implementing the prescribed group punishment while the right-hand side is the payoff from a deviation to $\tau = 0$, followed by the worst perfect-public equilibrium payoff \underline{v} .

It is useful here to reduce the dimensionality of the problem by eliminating the Principal's incentive-compatibility constraint. Since (2.17) must bind in any solution to the above program, the continuation payoff following a deviation by an agent must satisfy

$$v(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) = \underline{v} + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} [w(a', a, 0) - w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))]. \quad (2.18)$$

Hence, for any deviation a' , we may write the agent's incentive-compatibility constraint (2.15) as

$$u(a', a, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) \left[u(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) + \frac{1}{n} [w(a', a, 0) - w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))] \right] + \delta \underline{v}. \quad (2.19)$$

Let $g(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))$ denote the static payoff for an individual agent exerting effort a' when all other producers produce a —the term in the outer square brackets on the right-hand side

of (2.19). We call this quantity the *total static deviation payoff*. Using this definition, we re-write the problem (2.14)-(2.17) as

$$\bar{v} = \max_a u(a, 0), \quad (2.20)$$

subject to, for all a' ,

$$u(a, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) g(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) + \delta \underline{v}, \quad (2.21)$$

$$\bar{v} \geq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} [w(a', a, 0) - w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))] + \underline{v}, \quad (2.22)$$

$$g(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) = u(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) + \frac{1}{n} [w(a', a, 0) - w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))] . \quad (2.23)$$

Note from (2.23) that the total static deviation payoff comprises two components. The first component, $u(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))$, represents the agent's static utility from a deviation to a' (under the expectation that the Principal will implement the prescribed group punishment). The second component, $[w(a', a, 0) - w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))] / n$, represents the deviating agent's share of the net benefit the Principal generates by deviating and not implementing the prescribed group punishment. Next, it is useful to define the maximum deviation payoff an agent can achieve by deviating to a' from profile a , which we denote by $\hat{g}(a, \tau(\cdot))$. This payoff satisfies

$$\hat{g}(a, \tau(\cdot)) = \max_{a'} g(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) .$$

In the next lemma, we show that as long as the prescribed level of effort is smaller than the static Nash equilibrium level of effort, the maximum deviation payoff $\hat{g}(a, \tau(\cdot))$ is minimized when the Principal imposes no group punishments (i.e. when $\tau = 0$).

Lemma 4. *Suppose that $f'(a) < 0$. Then $\hat{g}(a, \tau(\cdot)) \geq \hat{g}(a, \tau = 0)$ when $a \leq a^N$.*

Proof. For notational simplicity, we remove the dependency of $\tau(\cdot)$ on its arguments. Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g}{\partial \tau} &= s_i \ell_\tau(a', a, \tau) \pi'(s_i \ell(a', a, \tau)) f(a') \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{n} s_i \ell_\tau(a', a, \tau) \pi'(s_i h(a', a, \tau)) [(n-1)f(a) + f(a')] \end{aligned} \quad (2.24)$$

$$= s_i \ell_\tau(a', a, \tau) \pi'(s_i \ell(a', a, \tau)) \frac{n-1}{n} [f(a') - f(a)] . \quad (2.25)$$

Since $\ell_\tau \leq 0$ and $\pi' > 0$, for $\partial g/\partial \tau > 0$ we need only show that $[f(a') - f(a)] < 0$. Since $a \leq a^N$, the most profitable deviation from a satisfies $a' > a$ by Corollary 2. As $f(a)$ is decreasing, the most profitable deviation satisfies $f(a') < f(a)$, which yields the desired result. \square

Lemma 4 establishes that group punishments ($\tau(\cdot) > 0$) increase the incentives of individual agents to deviate when $a \leq a^N$. The first line of (2.24) reveals that a small increase in τ decreases total output, in turn decreasing the total static deviation payoff. Intuitively, imposing punishments after agents exert more effort reduces their incentives to do so. However, the second line of (2.24) reveals that a small increase in τ may reduce the total static deviation payoff. The reason is that an increase in τ increases in Principal's incentive to deviate from implementing the group punishment. In sum, (2.25) reveals that when $f(a)$ is decreasing, the effect on the Principal's incentives dominates the effect on the agent's incentives so that an increase in τ increases the total static deviation payoff (when $a \leq a^N$). Imposing group punishments for excess effort in this region, therefore, strengthens individual agents' incentives to exert effort, and so has no use in enforcing the prescribed behavior.

Lemma 4 plays a key role in allowing us to characterize simple equilibrium strategies which obtain the the infimum perfect-public equilibrium payoff \underline{v} . To construct \underline{v} , we propose a carrot-and-stick strategy, which with a small abuse of notation we write as $\sigma((\bar{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$. This strategy calls for agents to play some "stick" level of effort \bar{a} and subsequently revert to the "carrot" level \bar{a} —the level of effort prescribed in the best perfect-public equilibrium. If either the carrot or the stick are played by all agents as prescribed by the strategy, the Principal chooses $\tau = 0$. If the Principal detects an aggregate deviation $x(a', \bar{a}) \neq x(\bar{a})$ from the carrot \bar{a} , the Principal chooses to implement a group punishment $\tau(x(a', \bar{a})) > 0$, and the agents consequently revert to some strategy with value $v(a', \bar{a}, \tau(x(a', \bar{a})))$. If the Principal observes an aggregate deviation $x(a', \bar{a}) \neq x(\bar{a})$ from the stick \bar{a} , the Principal chooses $\tau(x(a', \bar{a})) = 0$, and the producers consequently revert to the carrot-and-stick strategy $\sigma((\bar{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$ with value \underline{v} . Finally, any deviation by the Principal causes the carrot-and-stick strategy to be repeated.

Proposition 5. *There exists an output \bar{a} such that the carrot-and-stick strategy $\sigma((\bar{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$ attains the value \underline{v} —that is, $\sigma((\bar{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$ is an optimal punishment.*

Proof. Given \underline{v} , the infimum of symmetric perfect-public equilibrium payoffs and hence \bar{a} (the value that attains the maximum, \bar{v} in the program (2.20)-(2.23)), we may obtain \tilde{a} such that

$$\underline{v} = (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0). \quad (2.26)$$

We now argue that the carrot-and-stick strategy $\sigma((\tilde{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$ is an equilibrium. By construction, the punishment has value \underline{v} . Since deviations from \bar{a} are unprofitable when punished by \underline{v} , they are by construction unprofitable when punished by $\sigma((\tilde{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$.

To show that no producer wishes to deviate when prescribed to contribute effort \tilde{a} , we must show that for all a' ,

$$\underline{v} = (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) g(a', \tilde{a}, 0) + \delta \underline{v}, \quad (2.27)$$

and in particular

$$\underline{v} = (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) \hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta \underline{v}. \quad (2.28)$$

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose (2.28) does not hold. Then there must exist another (strongly symmetric) equilibrium σ^y with first-period output $a^y \leq a^N$ such that

$$(1 - \delta) \hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta \underline{v} > (1 - \delta) u(a^y, 0) + \delta U(\sigma^y|_{a^y}) \geq \underline{v} \quad (2.29)$$

where $U(\sigma^y|_{a^y})$ is the continuation payoff to a single producer from σ^y after contributing a^y in the first period.⁶

Replacing the definition of \underline{v} in (2.29) implies

$$(1 - \delta) u(a^y, 0) + \delta U(\sigma^y|_{a^y}) \geq (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0). \quad (2.30)$$

⁶Since repeated play of the static Nash equilibrium output a^N with no punishments must be an equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that the prescribed effort under the “stick” must satisfy $\tilde{a} \leq a^N$. If $a^y > a^N$, however, (2.29) implies that

$$\hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) > \hat{g}(a^N, 0).$$

Since the best deviation payoff in the absence of punishments is increasing in a , this would imply $a^N < \tilde{a}$, a contradiction.

Since $U(\sigma^y|_{a^y}) \leq u(\tilde{a}, 0)$, it must be that $u(a^y, 0) \geq u(\tilde{a}, 0)$ and therefore $a^y \geq \tilde{a}$. However, we will show that if σ^y is a perfect-public equilibrium, $\tilde{a} > a^y$, yielding the necessary contradiction. Since σ^y is an equilibrium,

$$(1 - \delta)u(a^y, 0) + \delta U(\sigma^y|_{a^y}) \geq (1 - \delta)\hat{g}(a^y, \tau(x(a^y))) + \delta \underline{v}, \quad (2.31)$$

so that from (2.29)

$$(1 - \delta)g(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta \underline{v} > (1 - \delta)\hat{g}(a^y, \tau(x(a^y))) + \delta \underline{v}. \quad (2.32)$$

Since $a^y \leq a^N$, Lemma 4 implies that

$$\hat{g}(a^y, \tau(y(a^y))) \geq \hat{g}(a^y, 0) \quad (2.33)$$

so that

$$\hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) > \hat{g}(a^y, 0). \quad (2.34)$$

Since $\hat{g}(a, 0)$ is increasing in a , (2.34) implies $\tilde{a} > a^y$ providing the needed contradiction. \square

Proposition 5 greatly simplifies the characterization of the set of perfect-public equilibrium payoffs. We have shown that the worst equilibrium payoff can be attained without requiring group punishments (either on the equilibrium path, or off the equilibrium path following deviations from the “stick”). The key feature of our economy which yields this result is the fact that during the “stick” phase of the worst equilibrium strategy, group punishments actually make deviations from the stick more appealing to producers. Consequently the optimal strategy for the Principal is to not impose group punishments. Using the results from Proposition 5, we now characterize strategies that allow us to attain the entire set of perfect-public equilibria.

Proposition 6. *If the strategy σ is a Perfect-Public Equilibrium, then $u(\sigma) \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$. If $v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, then there exists a Perfect-Public Equilibrium strategy σ such that $u(\sigma) = v$.*

Here we provide a sketch of the argument and leave a formal proof to Appendix B.2.1. It is clear that any equilibrium satisfies the constraints of the program (2.14)-(2.17) and therefore $U(\sigma) \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$.

It only remains to show that any value in this set may be attained by some equilibrium strategy. We prove this result using an induction argument. To begin, it is straightforward to characterize the set of values that can be attained with strategies which restrict the Principal never to impose punishments (either on or off the equilibrium path). This set, which we denote $[\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A]$ defines the set of values that are attainable as subgame-perfect equilibria, and can be easily constructed with carrot-and-stick strategies following [Abreu \(1986\)](#).

Since $\underline{v}^A < \bar{v}^A$, it is feasible to sustain one period of punishments in the event some agent deviates from a prescribed level of effort. We therefore construct equilibria in which all agents are asked to contribute some effort level a . If all agents do so, then no punishments are implemented and the strategy repeats. If some agent deviates to some a' —so that the aggregate outcome is different than $x(a)$ —then the Principal is called upon to implement a punishment. If the Principal implements the prescribed punishment, agents play some equilibrium without punishments which delivers the value $v(a', a, \tau)$. If the Principal does not implement the prescribed punishment, agents play the strategy associated with the worst equilibrium of a model where punishments are not allowed, with value \underline{v}^A . We choose a positive but sufficiently small punishment τ to ensure that $v(a', a, \tau) \in (\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A]$ for all relevant deviations a' . We show that this strategy delivers equilibrium values $u(a) > \bar{v}^A$. Given these strategies, we are able to construct carrot-and-stick equilibrium strategies which deliver values strictly below \underline{v}^A . In following these steps, we have constructed an operator which maps equilibrium value sets supported by perfect-public equilibrium strategies into similar sets that are strictly larger and yet still attainable with perfect-public equilibrium strategies. We show that repeated application of this operator starting from a set where group punishments are not part of the Principal's action set necessarily converges to the set $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$ defined by the program (2.14)-(2.17). In this way, we construct a perfect-public equilibrium strategy which delivers each value $v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$.

We now use Proposition 7 to fully characterize the values of the best and worst perfect-public equilibrium payoffs.

Proposition 7. *The optimal carrot-and-stick punishment satisfies*

$$\hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) = (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0) = \underline{v}, \quad (2.35)$$

$$\hat{g}(\bar{a}, \tau(\cdot)) = u(\bar{a}, 0) + \delta(u(\bar{a}, 0) - u(\tilde{a}, 0)) \text{ if } \bar{a} < a^*, \quad (2.36)$$

and

$$\hat{g}(\bar{a}, \tau(\cdot)) \leq u(\bar{a}, 0) + \delta(u(\bar{a}, 0) - u(\tilde{a}, 0)) \text{ if } \bar{a} = a^*. \quad (2.37)$$

The proof is a straightforward extension of those found in [Abreu \(1986\)](#) and hence relegated to the Appendix (see Section [B.2.1](#)). Propositions [5](#) and [7](#) show that neither the best nor the worst perfect-public equilibria feature group punishments imposed by the Principal. Nonetheless, we will show momentarily that the out-of-equilibrium threat of group punishments allows team members to attain higher welfare than in an economy where group punishments are not part of the Principal's action set. For expositional brevity, we will refer to such economy as an economy where group punishments "are not allowed". Let \bar{a}^A and \tilde{a}^A respectively denote the carrot and stick levels of output in the model where group punishments are not allowed. Similarly, let \bar{v}^A and \underline{v}^A denote the best and worst perfect-public equilibrium values in the model where group punishments are not allowed. Proposition [8](#) formally establishes that if the equilibrium output level \bar{a} is sustained by a positive punishment threat (a deviation by an agent is followed by a strictly positive group punishment implemented by the Principal), then the presence of such a threat *strictly* improves welfare, or $\bar{v} > \bar{v}^A$.

Proposition 8. *For any equilibrium output levels $\bar{a} \leq a^*$, $\bar{a}^A < \bar{a}$ if \bar{a} is sustained by a positive punishment threat (for some $a' \neq \bar{a}$, $\tau(x(a', \bar{a})) > 0$), then $\bar{v} = u(\bar{a}, 0) > u(\bar{a}^A, 0) = \bar{v}^A$.*

Proof. First, note that since the Principal can always choose $\tau = 0$, $[\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A] \subseteq [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$. Therefore $u(\bar{a}, 0) \geq u(\bar{a}^A, 0)$, or $\bar{a} \geq \bar{a}^A$. Now suppose by contradiction that if \bar{a} is sustained by a positive threat $\tau > 0$, then $\bar{a} = \bar{a}^A$. Since $\bar{a} = \bar{a}^A > a^N$, $\hat{g}(\bar{a}^A, 0) = \hat{g}(\bar{a}, 0) > \hat{g}(\bar{a}, \tau)$. From [\(2.36\)](#),

$$u(\bar{a}^A, 0) + \delta(u(\bar{a}^A, 0) - u(\bar{a}^A, 0)) > u(\bar{a}, 0) + \delta(u(\bar{a}, 0) - u(\tilde{a}, 0)), \quad (2.38)$$

or

$$u(\tilde{a}, 0) > u(\tilde{a}^A, 0). \quad (2.39)$$

But from (2.35), this implies

$$\underline{v} = (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0) > (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}^A, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}^A, 0) = \underline{v}^A, \quad (2.40)$$

a contradiction with $[\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A] \subseteq [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$. \square

We conclude this section by providing conditions on agents' static payoffs such that group punishments improve welfare. Specifically, we note that the assumption underlying our Lemma 4 and Propositions 5 to 8 is that the private utility component $f(a_i)$, is decreasing in effort. Proposition 9 considers the alternative case where $f(a_i)$ is constant. We find that the interaction between private and publicly observed payoffs is essential in enabling static group punishments to enlarge the equilibrium set, relative to an economy where punishments are not allowed.

Proposition 9. *Let κ be some constant. If $f(a) = \kappa$, for all $a \in [0, a^*]$, static group punishments do not improve equilibrium outcomes relative to a model where the Principal is not allowed to impose group punishments.*

Proof. This result is clear from Equation (2.25). If $f(a) = f(a') = \kappa$, then $\partial g / \partial \tau = 0$ and group punishment have no effect on producers' payoffs. \square

Proposition 9 states that a necessary condition for static group punishments to improve welfare is the presence of complementarities between aggregate outcomes and private actions in the individual agents' stage game payoffs. Absent these complementarities (i.e. when $f(a) = \kappa$), group punishments have no effect on the total deviation payoff g because the impact of the punishment on the static deviation gain $u(a', a, \tau(x(a', a)))$ is the exactly equal to the impact that these punishments have on the per-capita share of the cost to incentivize the Principal, $[w(a', a, \tau(x(a', a))) - w(a', a, 0)] / n$.

When team members' private actions instead interact with aggregate outcomes (i.e. $f(a)$ is not constant in a), then group punishments can reduce team members' private incentives to deviate through the interaction of these private incentives with the aggregate outcome. In these cases, group punishments are useful to deter individual deviations, and an outsider is not needed to improve welfare. In other words, in presence of complementarities between aggregate and individual outcomes, the team (represented by the Principal) can implement budget-breaking static punishments that improve welfare without requiring the intervention of an outsider.

2.3 An Application: Repeated Oligopoly with a Principal

In this section, we apply our generalized team production model to the repeated oligopoly model of [Abreu \(1986\)](#). We start by characterizing the stage game payoffs and equilibria, and we then provide a numerical illustration of our main result that group punishments increase team welfare in a repeated setting. In [Section 2.3.3](#), we show how different degrees of interaction between oligopolistic producers can impact the effectiveness of group punishments.

2.3.1 Stage Game

A team is composed by n producers indexed by $i = 1, \dots, n$. Each producer chooses an unobservable action $q_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ where q_i represents a level of output generated by producer i . Each producer generates output at a constant marginal cost $c \in (0, 1)$. We let $q = (q_1, \dots, q_n) \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ and we write

$$q_{-i} = (q_1, \dots, q_{i-1}, q_{i+1}, \dots, q_n), q = (q_i, q_{-i}).$$

The producers' choices of output give rise to an aggregate quantity of output $Q = \sum_{i=1}^n q_i$. Each producer's stage-game strategy is simply $q_i \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$.

In addition to the producers, a benevolent Principal observes aggregate output Q and imposes an observable group punishment $\tau \in [0, 1]$, which represents an implicit tax imposed by the Principal on the consumers of the good. A strategy for the Principal is $\tau : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$.

The price at which producers sell their output is a function of aggregate output and the tax chosen by the Principal. Specifically,

$$p(Q, \tau) = \max \{(1 - \tau) - Q, 0\}. \quad (2.41)$$

This price function represents an inverse demand curve for consumers who face taxes τ on purchases of units of output. From (2.41) it is clear that the Principal's choice of the tax may reduce the price of output for all producers.

Given actions by the producers and the Principal, each producer's payoff is given by

$$u_i(q, \tau) = p(Q, \tau) q_i - cq_i. \quad (2.42)$$

We again assume that the Principal is benevolent in the sense that the Principal has preferences over a weighted average of the producers' utility. Since the Principal chooses the tax τ after production costs are sunk, the Principal's payoff from any level of total output Q and tax τ is given by

$$w(Q, \tau) = p(Q, \tau) Q. \quad (2.43)$$

Note that (2.42)-(2.43) immediately map to the generalized payoffs (2.2)-(2.3) when we i) impose symmetric sharing rules (i.e. $s_i = 1/n$), ii) impose linear utility, interaction and cost functions of the form $\pi(s_i \ell) = s_i \ell$, $f(a_i) = a_i$ and $c(a_i) = ca_i$, respectively, and iii) define the aggregate net outcome function as $\ell(a, \tau) = n \max\{1 - \tau - \sum_i a_i, 0\}$.⁷

A symmetric *perfect-public equilibrium* in the stage game consists of choices for producers q_i and a Principal's strategy $\tau(Q)$ such that for every Q , $\tau(Q)$ maximizes (2.43) and given τ and q_{-i} , q_i maximizes (2.42). This equilibrium is straightforward to determine since for any Q , the Principal optimally chooses $\tau(Q) = 0$. Facing q_{-i} each producer's best response satisfies

$$q_i = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} (1 - \sum_{-i} q_{-i} - c) & \text{if } 1 - \sum_{-i} q_{-i} - c > 0, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (2.44)$$

⁷Contrary to our generalized model, the oligopoly model's net outcome function is such that, for all i, j , $\ell_{a_i}(a, \tau) = \ell_{a_j}(a, \tau) < 0$. This changes the sign of the main inequalities of our paper (for example, the Nash equilibrium level of output is larger than the socially-optimal level of output), but the procedure to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs is identical to the procedure developed in the previous section.

with the equilibrium level of q_i satisfying

$$q_i^N = \frac{1-c}{n+1}. \quad (2.45)$$

Note that facing the Principal's optimal decision to set the tax equal to zero, the level of output which maximizes the producers' joint profits satisfies

$$q_i^m = \arg \max_{q_i} q_i (1 - nq_i - c), \quad (2.46)$$

with solution

$$q_i^m = \frac{1-c}{2n}. \quad (2.47)$$

From (2.45) and (2.47), observe that the level of output which maximizes joint producer profits is lower than the perfect-public equilibrium outcome. Intuitively, producer i has an incentive to generate more output when the other producers generate less than q_i^N and prices are high. In contrast, producer i has an incentive to generate less output when the other producers generate more than q_i^N .

2.3.2 Infinitely-Repeated Game

As in the previous sections, we focus on characterizing strongly symmetric equilibria. Following the same steps as in Section 2.2.2, it is easy to show that the generalized program (2.20)-(2.23) maps to the following program in the repeated oligopoly model:

$$\bar{v} = \max_q u(q, 0), \quad (2.48)$$

subject to, for all q' ,

$$u(q, 0) \geq (1-\delta) g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) + \delta \underline{v}, \quad (2.49)$$

$$\bar{v} \geq \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} [w(q' + (n-1)q, 0) - w(q' + (n-1)q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q))] + \underline{v}, \quad (2.50)$$

where \underline{v} and \bar{v} again denote the worst and the best perfect-public equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game, and where (using (2.42) and (2.43)) the total static deviation payoff $g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q))$

is given in closed-form by

$$g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) = q'((1 - \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) - (q' + (n-1)q) - c) + \frac{1}{n}\tau(q' + (n-1)q)(q' + (n-1)q). \quad (2.51)$$

As in the generalized model, this closed-form expression reveals that the static deviation payoff in the oligopoly model is comprised of two components. The first component can be re-written as $p(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q))q'$, and represents the static payoff that the producer obtains by deviating to q' from q when the deviation is punished by a tax $\tau(q' + (n-1)q)$. The second component, $\tau(q' + (n-1)q)(q' + (n-1)q)/n$, is the payoff accruing to the deviator when the Principal does not implement the prescribed group punishment and instead levies no taxes.

Finally, let $\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot))$ denote the maximum deviation payoff one producer can achieve from a deviation to q' when other producers generate q . As in Lemma 4, we now show that as long as the prescribed output is larger than the static Nash equilibrium output, the maximum deviation payoff $\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot))$ is minimized when the Principal levies no taxes (i.e., when $\tau = 0$).

Lemma 10. $\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot)) \geq \hat{g}(q, \tau = 0)$ when $q \geq q^N$.

Proof. See Appendix B.2.1. □

Using Lemma 10, the results from Propositions 5 to 8 naturally extend to the repeated oligopoly model, and are therefore omitted for the sake of brevity. In particular, we find that the worst perfect-public equilibrium payoff can be attained by strategies that do not feature on-path group punishments, and the best and the worst can be jointly characterized as solutions to (2.48)-(2.51). Moreover, group punishments are sustainable and strictly improve welfare relative to a model where group punishments are not allowed.

In Figure 2.1, we provide a numerical illustration of how group punishments can increase the welfare of the team of oligopolists. In Figure 2.1a, we fix the number of producers n to ten and plot the value of the best and worst perfect-public equilibria for each level of the discount factor δ . Note that in

Figure 2.1a, for any δ , values to the left of the static Nash equilibrium value (roughly 0.007) represent worst equilibrium values while values to the right represent best equilibrium values. The dashed line in Figure 2.1a shows these best and worst equilibrium values when group punishments are allowed, while the solid line shows these values when these punishments are not allowed. Since the dashed lines lie outside the solid lines, for all levels of the discount factor the model where taxes are allowed yields weakly higher best equilibrium payoffs than the model where taxes are not allowed. In particular, the repeated interaction between producers and the Principal leads to welfare gains for intermediate values of the discount factor, and no (or relatively small) gains when the discount factor is low or high.


For low values of δ , the Principal has weak incentives to levy the prescribed taxes. The continuation value that producers have to promise to the Principal for implementing such taxes is too to satisfy the feasibility constraint (2.50). As a result, very small or (approximately) no taxes can be sustained leading to small or (approximately) no welfare gains. On the other hand, for high values of δ the repeated interaction of producers is sufficient to guarantee the static most collusive level of output even in the absence of the Principal.

For intermediate levels of δ , the presence of the Principal increases welfare considerably. To illustrate the gains associated with sustainable group punishments (or taxes), Figure 2.1b illustrates the effect of the Principal's punishments on the level of output in the best equilibrium. Specifically, the solid line shows the percentage reduction in output in the best equilibrium which is obtained in our model relative to a model where group punishments are not allowed. Observe that our model features a most collusive output level as much as thirty percent lower than the model where group punishments are not allowed. To achieve these lower levels of output, which correspond to higher levels of welfare, the Principal reduces the value of the most profitable, static deviation by any of the producers by as much as 80%. This finding suggests that the role of the Principal in the oligopoly model is to decrease the common price to a level closer to the producer's marginal cost in case of a deviation, therefore reducing the value of deviations.

Figure 2.1

Equilibrium Value Sets and Group Punishments

Numerical illustration of the equilibrium value sets (panel (a)) and impact of group punishments on best equilibrium output and best deviation payoff from best equilibrium (panel (b)).



2.3.3 Substitutability and Price Externalities

In this section, we provide an overview of our additional results on how different degrees of interaction between oligopolistic producers can impact the effectiveness of group punishments. A full discussion of these results is provided in Appendix B.1.

The main point of departure of this section is the use of a new price function, which allows for different degrees of substitutability between producers' output. Specifically, we make the assumption that the inverse demand function for each producer i 's output satisfies

$$p_i(q, \tau) = \alpha \frac{q_i^{\rho-1}}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i^{\rho}} - \tau, \quad (2.52)$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho \in (0, 1)$ are exogenous parameters, q_i is the quantity produced by producer i and τ is the tax chosen by the Principal. This price function arises naturally in an economy where consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over a bundle of individual producers' output and a

numeraire good. In particular, the parameter α is a Cobb-Douglas parameter that governs the substitutability between the numeraire good and the bundle of producers' output, while the parameter ρ governs the degree of substitutability between each producer's output. Under this formulation, a higher level of ρ implies a higher degree of substitutability.

In the Appendix, we extend the analysis of the previous sections to the new inverse demand function (2.52), and we analyze the relationship between the usefulness of group punishments and the substitutability parameter ρ . Specifically, we ask how the effectiveness of taxes in improving welfare (relative to a model where taxes are not allowed) changes as the substitutability of producers' output changes. Our main result for this section shows that the effectiveness of taxes in improving welfare increases as the substitutability parameter ρ increases:

Proposition 11. *Fix $\rho \in (0, 1)$. For n sufficiently large, there exist a $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and $\bar{\rho} > 0$ such that for all $\rho' \in (\rho, \bar{\rho})$, the welfare gains from allowing the Principal to implement group punishments are increasing in ρ' .*

Proof. See Appendix B.1. □

The intuition behind the result of Proposition 11 is that when goods become more substitutable, individual producers have higher incentives to deviate from their prescribed quantities because deviations have a lower negative impact on the common price. This increases the producers' incentives to over-produce and leads to lower equilibrium values, but also increases the relative gains from group punishments relative to the model where these punishments are now allowed. In other words, when goods are more substitutable and deviations are more profitable, group punishments that deter these deviations increase welfare by more.


Finally, in Figure 2.2 we provide a numerical illustration of our result. The figure shows the value of the best equilibrium under a low value of the substitutability parameter ($\rho = 0.31$) and under a high value of the substitutability parameter ($\rho = 0.83$). As in Figure 2.1a, the solid lines in Figure 2.2 represent the best equilibrium payoffs in the economies where group punishments are not allowed,

and the dashed lines represent the equilibrium payoffs in the economies where group punishments are allowed. The difference between the dashed lines and the solid lines represent the welfare gains from allowing group punishments.

Figure 2.2

Input Substitutability and the Welfare Impact of Group Punishments

Best equilibrium values for $\rho = 0.31$ and $\rho = 0.83$ when group punishments are not allowed (solid lines) and are allowed (dashed lines). In this example, we set $n = 5$, $\alpha = 0.7$ and $c = 0.1$.



The figure provides a clear illustration of our result that group punishments yields significantly larger increases in best equilibrium values when producers' output is more substitutable relative to when producers' output is less substitutable. For example, for a discount factor of roughly 0.4, with high degree of substitutability, the best equilibrium value when group punishments are not allowed is roughly 0.1 while it is roughly 0.13 when they are allowed, implying a 30% gain from group punishments. Instead, with a low degree of substitutability, the best equilibrium value when group punishment are not allowed is roughly 0.125 while it is roughly 0.13 when they are allowed, implying only a 4% gain from group punishments.

2.4 Conclusion

The potential for moral hazard is ubiquitous in team production settings and especially where the actions of individual team members are not perfectly observable. A widely accepted principle is that in these team production settings it is against the team's own interest to implement a group punishment when an individual deviation has occurred. An outsider is therefore needed to implement the team's first-best level of production.

In a generalized repeated team production model, we show that the team can always sustain self-imposed group punishments after aggregate outcomes are observed when team members' utility interacts in non-trivial ways with aggregate team outcomes. Moreover, we provide conditions under which the threat of these punishments improves the welfare of the team relative to a model where group punishments are not part of the team's action set. Using the repeated oligopoly model of [Abreu \(1986\)](#) as an application, we show that team self-imposed group punishments are most effective in improving team welfare when team members are sufficiently patient and when their contributions to the aggregate outcome are more substitutable.

Our theoretical results provide direct guidance for future applied and empirical research. In particular, our model predicts that team production environments featuring a strong interaction between aggregate outcomes and individual utilities are also environments where self-inflicted group punishments can provide large welfare gains to the team. Economic unions such as the European Union are particularly good examples of teams where team members have historically been tempted to deviate from their prescribed actions, and where aggregate team outcomes (e.g. common interest rates and exchange rates) interact in non-trivial ways with the individual utility of team members (e.g. individual output). Large corporations with multiple project managers are another setting to apply our model, especially since the presence of a non-benevolent top management lacking commitment to group punishments might exacerbate the moral hazard problem among individual project managers. Additional settings relevant to our analysis include environmental pacts, workplace management, and cartels. The analysis of the interaction between team members and the quantification of possi-

ble welfare gains from implementing group punishments in these settings constitutes in our opinion areas of fruitful future research.

Chapter 3

Advertising, Consumption, and Asset Prices

3.1 Introduction

The post-war period has seen a steady increase in aggregate advertising, and a dramatic evolution in the way companies use advertising to induce the purchase of their products. The introduction of new means of communication such as television and the internet has been quickly followed by the effort of companies to use these new means to inform potential customers about their products. Despite the existence of an entire field of economics studying how advertising can influence consumption choices ([Bagwell \(2007\)](#)), and despite the central role that consumption plays in modern financial economics, surprisingly little research has however analyzed the implications for financial economics of the advertising-consumption relation. This paper aims to be the first to explore these implications, both empirically and theoretically, through the lens of consumption-based asset pricing.

I begin by documenting an empirical relationship between aggregate advertising expenditures, consumption and equity returns in the United States. I first show that aggregate advertising growth predicts future aggregate consumption growth at annual horizons of one to two years. This predictability relation is time-varying and holds across different robustness tests in post-war data. Then, I show that advertising and consumption growth together predict excess returns, and they do so better than most predictors such as the dividend-price ratio and the dividend payout ratio. In particular, high advertising growth predicts high future returns, and high consumption growth predicts low future returns.

I build a model of frictional search in the goods market to replicate the predictability found in the data. The model features two goods, one of which is exogenously endowed to households. The second good is sold by firms on a goods market characterized by two frictions. The first friction is an informational friction such that, absent advertising, households are only aware of the existence of their endowment. Firms use advertising to overcome this friction and search for new customers among the households. Once a firm attracts a household, the firm and the household form a customer relationship that lasts for multiple (as in [Gourio and Rudanko \(2014\)](#)). The second friction is

an advertising externality that makes the customer search process more difficult for each firm whenever advertising by other firms is high. Following the labor search literature, I call this externality a goods market congestion effect. The model has direct implications for the impact of advertising and customer relationships on household consumption and equity returns. On the household side, advertising shifts consumption away from the endowment good and creates a persistent component in the consumption of goods produced by firms. On the firm side, customers are risky assets. In bad times, firms may want to decrease their stock of customers but they are prevented from doing so because their advertising cannot be negative. Conversely, in good times firms would like to increase their customers, but because advertising by other firms is also high the congestion effect makes their advertising less effective in attracting new customers.

The model is able to replicate the predictive power of advertising growth and consumption growth on equity returns, as advertising growth induces negative co-variation between expected marginal utility and equity returns. High advertising growth shifts expected consumption away from the numeraire and therefore increases the numeraire's expected marginal utility. At the same time, high advertising growth lowers expected returns from advertising, which in the model are paid in units of the endowment good. This happens because i) high growth in advertising reduces the future marginal revenues of the firm and ii) high advertising growth at the individual firm level generates high aggregate advertising growth which reduces the likelihood for individual firms to attract new customers. Put together, these conditions imply that times when advertising growth is high are times of low expected returns, high expected marginal utility and high returns. Finally, the results show that the goods market congestion effect is a key element in driving the predictive power of advertising growth on excess returns. To compensate the externalities arising from advertising individual firms widely vary their advertising decisions depending on the state of the economy. The model therefore generates large shifts in advertising growth that map into large shifts in the growth of consumption, marginal utility and marginal profits, and that drive the predictive power of advertising on future consumption and returns. A counterfactual exercise shows that, absent any goods market congestion, the predictive power of advertising growth on excess returns vanishes.

Related Literature The contribution of the paper to the literature is twofold. First, the paper provides empirical evidence supporting the idea that standard consumption-based asset pricing models hold when conditioning on variables that provide information about agents' future expectations (Campbell and Cochrane (2000)). Different from the previous literature, which conditions on variables that contain a price and therefore directly predict future expected returns (Ferson and Schadt (1996), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Cochrane (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b)), I however predict returns using advertising through the channel of future expected consumption. My results are in this sense close to those in Savov (2011).¹ Second, this is the first paper to explore the theoretical implications of advertising, goods market frictions and customer capital for aggregate consumption and asset pricing. In this respect, my work relates to two strands of literature. From the macroeconomics standpoint, frictions in the goods market have been recently shown to be a key ingredient in generating features observed in business cycles. Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015) demonstrate goods market frictions as an intuitive way to endogenously generate persistent business cycle fluctuations. In a similar spirit, Den Haan (2013) analyzes the role of inventories as coming from imperfect market clearing in generating business cycles, while Storesletten et al. (2011) show that goods-market frictions allow a model with demand shocks to match most of the features of a standard model with productivity shocks. Finally, Hall (2014) relates the pro-cyclical variation of advertising expenditures to macroeconomic wedges, and in particular to frictions in the goods market. From the financial economics standpoint, my work builds on two recent sub-fields of the production-based asset pricing literature (Cochrane (1991, 1996) and Jermann (1998)). The first builds on Berk et al. (1999) to analyze the impact of growth options in intangible capital (Ai et al. (2013)), organization capital (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013)) and brand capital (Belo et al. (2014b) and Vitorino (2014)) on the cross-section of expected stock returns. The second focuses on how search frictions in the labor market affect asset prices (Kuehn et al. (2012), Belo et al. (2014a) and Kuehn et al. (2017)). Finally, from a modeling point of view the two papers most closely related to mine are Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Gourio and Rudanko (2014), which however respectively focus on international prices and the cross section of firm characteristics.

¹He uses garbage as a measure of realized consumption to test the consumption-based asset pricing model, while I use advertising as a measure of expected consumption.

3.2 Aggregate Advertising Expenditures and Equity Returns

Robert J. Coen from the advertising company Erickson-McCann used to regularly publish data on aggregate advertisement expenditures in the United States. The dataset ranges from 1900 to 2007 and includes, among other variables, U.S. aggregate expenditures for advertising on newspapers, periodicals, yellow pages, radio, television and internet.² In Figure 3.1, I explore the time-series evolution and composition of post-war advertising by breaking the variable in two broad categories, physical and non-physical advertising. I define physical advertising as the sum of advertising on newspapers, periodicals, magazines, direct mail, yellow pages, farm publications, billboards and business papers, and non-physical advertising as the sum of advertising on radio, television, and internet. The Figure shows that the level of aggregate advertising expenditures in the US is five times larger in the late 2000s than in the 1950s, and that advertising growth is mainly due to physical advertising growth. Second, traditional physical advertising and modern non-physical advertising are complements rather than substitutes. Despite the advent of television and internet advertising and the increasing relative importance of these channels (Panel B), the average U.S. company in 2010 still spends more than twice as much in physical than in non-physical advertising.

In Figure 3.2, Panel A, I compare the post-war evolution of per-capita advertising expenditures and per-capita consumption in the United States. The data for consumption come from personal consumption expenditures in the NIPA tables, and both advertising expenditures and consumption are expressed in 2005 US dollars, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for consumption and the Producer Price Index (PPI) for advertising expenditures.³ As extensively documented in the literature (see Hall (2014) and references therein), advertising is a pro-cyclical variable, and therefore highly correlated (but not cointegrated, see Appendix C.1) with consumption. In Panel B I plot the advertising-consumption ratio. The Figure shows that the ratio is a slowly-moving process, decreasing during recessions in the late 80s and early 2000s and expansions in the 50s and 90s expansions.


²The data can be found on Douglas Galbi's website: <http://purplemotes.net/2008/09/14/us-advertising-expenditure-data/>. For the years 2007 to 2010, Hall (2014) updates this dataset using revenue data from companies in the information sector published by the Census Bureau. These data are no longer available, but can be found on Hall's website.

³I keep this definition of consumption through the rest of the paper. The main results of the paper hold when I use more granular definitions of consumption such as consumption of nondurable goods, durable goods and services.

Figure 3.1

Expenditures in Physical and Non-Physical Advertising in the U.S., 1950-2010

Physical advertising is the sum of advertising on newspapers, periodicals, magazines, direct mail, yellow pages, farm publications, billboards and business papers. Non-physical advertising includes radio, television and internet. Total advertising is the sum of physical and non-physical advertising. The advertising data for the years 1900-2007 are hand-collected by Robert J. Coen from the advertising company Erickson-McCann and can be found on Douglas Galbi's website. For the years 2007 to 2010, Hall (2014) updates this dataset using revenue data from companies in the information sector published by the Census Bureau. These data are no longer available, but can be found on Hall's website. All the data are expressed in 2005 US billion dollars using the producer price index.



In Figure 3.3, I finally plot advertising growth, consumption growth and excess returns on U.S. equity in the post-war period. The data for excess returns, defined as the yearly returns on the S&P 500 minus the one-year interest rate, come from Robert Shiller's website. Panel A of the Figure shows that the growth rates in advertising and consumption are highly correlated, advertising growth is more volatile than consumption growth and (especially after 1980) leads consumption growth. Panel B similarly shows a positive correlation between advertising growth and excess returns on equity.

3.2.1 Consumption Growth and Excess Returns Predictability

In this Subsection I show that advertising expenditures growth predicts consumption growth at predictive horizons of one to two years, and that advertising and consumption growth jointly predict excess returns at horizons of one to four years. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for advertising expenditures growth, consumption growth and other known predictors.

Figure 3.2

Per-Capita Consumption and Advertising in the U.S., 1950-2010

Consumption is Personal Consumption Expenditures from NIPA Tables, expressed in 2005 US dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Advertising is the sum of advertising on newspapers, periodicals, magazines, direct mail, yellow pages, farm publications, billboards, business papers, radio, television and internet. The advertising data for the years 1900-2007 are hand-collected by Robert J. Coen from the advertising company Erickson-McCann and can be found on Douglas Galbi’s website. For the years 2007 to 2010, Hall (2014) updates this dataset using revenue data from companies in the information sector published by the Census Bureau. These data are no longer available, but can be found on Hall’s website. Advertising expenditures is expressed in 2005 US dollars using the producer price index.





Figure 3.3

Advertising Expenditures Growth, Consumption Growth and Excess Returns in the U.S., 1950-2010

Consumption is Personal Consumption Expenditures from NIPA Tables. The advertising data for the years 1900-2007 are hand-collected by Robert J. Coen from the advertising company Erickson-McCann and can be found on Douglas Galbi's website. For the years 2007 to 2010, [Hall \(2014\)](#) updates this dataset using revenue data from companies in the information sector published by the Census Bureau. These data are no longer available, but can be found on Hall's website. Advertising is the sum of advertising on newspapers, periodicals, magazines, direct mail, yellow pages, farm publications, billboards, business papers, radio, television and internet. Excess returns are yearly returns on the S&P 500 minus the one-year interest rate from Robert Shiller's website.



Advertising growth (Δa) has a mean of 2.3 percent and a standard deviation of 5.6 percent, respectively three times higher than consumption growth. The variable is positively correlated with the dividend-price ratio, the earnings-price ratio and the payout ratio, so that times when corporate earnings are high are also times when advertising expenditures are high. Moreover, Δa is positively correlated with the [Lettau and Ludvigson \(2001a\)](#) cointegrating residual cay , so that advertising expenditures grow whenever consumption is above its long-run equilibrium level. Finally, consumption and advertising growth are mildly autocorrelated with AR(1) coefficients of 0.27 and 0.39 (t -statistics of 2.04 and 3.04), respectively, but the null hypothesis of a unit root in augmented [Dickey and Fuller \(1979\)](#) tests is rejected for these two time series (the p -values of the tests are equal to zero up to four decimal points).

Table 3.2 presents the main empirical results of the paper, the predictive power of advertising growth on consumption growth and the predictive power of advertising and consumption growth on excess returns on equity. Panel A reports coefficient estimates and associated [Hansen and Hodrick \(1980\)](#) t -statistics for predictive regressions of cumulative consumption growth from year t to year $t + \tau$ ($\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$), using lagged consumption growth and lagged advertising growth as predictors. In the Table, the predictive horizon τ varies from one to four years. Specification (2) shows that lagged consumption growth predicts future consumption growth only up to one year in the future. Specifications (1) and (3) show that advertising expenditures predict consumption growth at horizons of one and two years. In particular, specification (3) shows that the predictive power of current consumption growth in forecasting future consumption growth in specification (2) arises from the component of consumption growth correlated to advertising growth.⁴ Section 3.2.2 and Appendix C.1 provide additional robustness tests for the predictive power of consumption growth on advertising growth. Panel B of Table 3.2 similarly reports the coefficient estimates and t -statistics for predictive regressions of cumulative excess returns ($r^x_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$), using the same predictors as in Panel A. Specifications (1) to (3) show that even if consumption growth and advertising growth do not predict excess returns individually (but consumption at long horizons), together they predict excess returns at any

⁴As an additional experiment, I regress consumption growth on a constant and advertising growth, and use the resulting residual to predict cumulative consumption growth. The null hypothesis of no predictive power of the residual cannot be rejected for any horizon from one to four years (p -values of 0.996, 0.448, 0.423 and 0.457, respectively).

Table 3.1

Summary Statistics for Predictors, Post-War Period

The Table gives summary statistics for advertising expenditures growth (Δa_t), consumption growth (Δc_t), as well as other known stock returns predictors. Consumption is Personal Consumption Expenditures from NIPA Tables. Advertising is the sum of advertising on newspapers, periodicals, magazines, direct mail, yellow pages, farm publications, billboards, business papers, radio, television and internet. The advertising data for the years 1900-2007 are hand-collected by Robert J. Coen from the advertising company Erickson-McCann and can be found on Douglas Galbi's website. For the years 2007 to 2010, Hall (2014) updates this dataset using revenue data from companies in the information sector published by the Census Bureau. These data are no longer available, but can be found on Hall's website. $\log dp_t$ and $\log pe_t$ are respectively the log price-dividend ratio and the cyclically-adjusted log price-earnings ratio, both from Robert Shiller's website. pay_t is the net payout yield from Michael Roberts's website. The default spread def_t is the difference between the yield of Baa and Aaa corporate bonds, while the term spread $term_t$ is the difference between the yield of a 10 year constant maturity U.S. government bond and the yield on a 3 month constant maturity U.S. T-bill. The inflation rate π_t is the growth rate of the Consumer Price Index. The data for def_t , $term_t$ and π_t comes from FRED. The data for the consumption-wealth cointegrating residual cay_t comes from Martin Lettau's website. ADF is the augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test statistic.

	Mean	St. Dev.	Max.	Min.	Corr. Δa_t	AR(1)	t-stat	ADF	p-value	Range
Δa_t	0.023	0.056	0.136	-0.132	1.000	0.387	3.035	-4.361	0.000	1950-2010
Δc_t	0.022	0.018	0.054	-0.019	-0.060	0.269	2.044	-4.446	0.000	1950-2010
$\log dp_t$	-3.501	0.423	-2.669	-4.448	0.122	0.932	19.016	-1.843	0.359	1950-2012
$\log pe_t$	2.755	0.410	3.833	1.985	-0.079	0.843	11.858	-2.651	0.083	1950-2012
pay_t	0.115	0.021	0.161	0.054	0.149	0.787	12.451	-3.026	0.033	1950-2010
def_t	0.943	0.420	2.320	0.000	-0.105	0.838	18.452	-3.586	0.006	1950-2014
$term_t$	1.810	1.072	3.490	-0.060	0.122	0.480	2.496	-4.034	0.001	1950-2014
π_t	0.037	0.029	0.139	-0.007	-0.315	0.739	8.655	-3.079	0.028	1950-2013
cay_t	-0.000	0.017	0.033	-0.036	0.272	0.887	14.948	-1.360	0.601	1952-2013

Table 3.2

Consumption Growth and Excess Returns Predictability, Post-War Period

The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$) and excess returns ($r_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}^x$) predictive regressions using lagged advertising expenditures growth ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) and consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) as predictors. Excess returns are yearly returns on the S&P 500 minus the one-year interest rate from Robert Shiller's website. The t -statistics in parentheses are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors. R_{adj}^2 and F are the adjusted R-squared and F-statistics, respectively.

		Panel A: Consumption Growth				Panel B: Excess Returns			
		$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+4}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+1}^x$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+2}^x$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+3}^x$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+4}^x$
(1)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.129 (3.25)	0.160 (2.10)	0.128 (1.20)	0.085 (0.67)	0.293 (0.78)	0.476 (0.76)	0.956 (1.12)	0.910 (0.83)
	R_{adj}^2	0.143	0.074	0.018	-0.007	-0.007	-0.005	0.015	0.001
(2)	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.266 (2.03)	0.183 (0.75)	0.043 (0.14)	-0.069 (-0.19)	-2.127 (-1.92)	-3.291 (-1.84)	-4.020 (-1.74)	-6.191 (-2.13)
	R_{adj}^2	0.051	-0.006	-0.018	-0.018	0.040	0.046	0.045	0.067
(3)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.127 (2.47)	0.201 (2.00)	0.195 (1.33)	0.161 (0.91)	1.203 (2.92)	1.900 (2.88)	2.936 (3.18)	3.626 (2.93)
	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.010 (0.07)	-0.214 (-0.71)	-0.337 (-0.79)	-0.380 (-0.74)	-4.404 (-3.42)	-6.887 (-3.46)	-9.579 (-3.62)	-13.477 (-3.72)
	R_{adj}^2	0.128	0.067	0.016	-0.010	0.128	0.148	0.215	0.224
	F	5.049	2.186	0.859	0.397	6.037	6.219	6.829	6.718

horizon from one to four years. In particular, conditional on consumption growth high current advertising growth predicts high future excess returns.

In Table 3.3, I compare the predictive power of advertising and consumption growth to the predictive power of the predictors summarized in Table 3.1. As the previous literature documents, the dividend-price price-earnings ratios are effective at predicting long-horizon returns, while the predictive power of the payout ratio and term spread decreases with the predictive horizon. Advertising and consumption growth, similar to *cay*, have high predictive power at any predictive horizon. The term spread is the only variable that has stronger predictive power (as measured by the predictive regression's R-squared) than advertising and consumption at any horizon, while *cay* has higher predictive power at horizons of three and four years.

Table 3.3

Excess Returns Predictive Regressions, Post-War Period

The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative excess returns ($r_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}^x$) predictive regressions using lagged growth in advertising ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$, conditional on lagged consumption growth $\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) as well as other variables, as predictors. Excess returns are yearly returns on the S&P 500 minus the one-year interest rate from Robert Shiller's website. The reported t -statistics are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors. R_{adj}^2 is the adjusted R-squared statistics.

	$r_{t \rightarrow t+1}^x$			$r_{t \rightarrow t+2}^x$			$r_{t \rightarrow t+3}^x$			$r_{t \rightarrow t+4}^x$		
	Coeff.	t-stat	R_{adj}^2	Coeff.	t-stat	R_{adj}^2	Coeff.	t-stat	R_{adj}^2	Coeff.	t-stat	R_{adj}^2
$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	1.20	2.92	0.13	1.90	2.88	0.15	2.94	3.18	0.21	3.63	2.93	0.22
$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-4.40	-3.42		-6.89	-3.46		-9.58	-3.62		-13.48	-3.72	
$\log dp_{t-1}$	0.10	2.01	0.05	0.18	2.04	0.09	0.25	1.71	0.11	0.38	1.81	0.16
$\log pe_{t-1}$	-0.04	-0.86	-0.01	-0.07	-0.82	-0.00	-0.11	-0.82	0.01	-0.23	-1.15	0.04
pay_{t-1}	2.51	2.74	0.09	3.85	2.27	0.10	4.96	1.80	0.10	6.64	1.76	0.12
def_{t-1}	0.01	0.14	-0.02	-0.04	-0.45	-0.01	-0.04	-0.31	-0.01	-0.02	-0.11	-0.02
$term_{t-1}$	0.07	2.65	0.16	0.11	2.36	0.19	0.14	2.10	0.19	0.19	2.08	0.20
π_{t-1}	-0.44	-0.65	-0.01	-1.12	-0.91	0.00	-1.31	-0.69	-0.00	-0.50	-0.19	-0.02
cay_{t-1}	2.55	2.30	0.05	5.11	2.65	0.11	8.11	2.96	0.19	11.33	3.23	0.25

In Table 3.4, I run tri-variate excess returns predictive regressions using advertising growth, consumption growth and one of the other predictors as regressors, in the spirit of Huang (2015). For every predictive horizon I consider, advertising growth (and consumption growth, omitted in the Table) is always a significant predictor of excess stock returns. The only variables that are jointly statistically significant with advertising and consumption growth are the term spread and the payout ratio. For horizons of two years, the default spread, inflation and cay are jointly significant. Finally, at horizons of three and four years, cay is the only jointly significant predictor of excess returns.

3.2.2 Robustness

Table 3.5 shows the results of the estimation of a Vector-Autoregressive model of order two for advertising and consumption growth. The estimation results show that advertising growth is predicted by consumption growth and is autocorrelated conditional on advertising growth. On the other hand,

Table 3.4

Tri-Variate Excess Returns Predictive Regressions, Post-War Period

The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative excess returns ($r_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}^x$) predictive regressions using the lagged growth in advertising ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) and consumption ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$, omitted in the Table) in tri-variate regressions with other predictors. Excess returns are yearly returns on the S&P 500 minus the one-year interest rate from Robert Shiller's website. The reported t -statistics are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors. R_{adj}^2 and F are the adjusted R-squared and F-statistics, respectively.

	$r_{t \rightarrow t+1}^x$		$r_{t \rightarrow t+2}^x$									
	Coeff. Δa_{t-1}	t -stat Δa_{t-1}	Coeff.	t -stat	R_{adj}^2	F	Coeff. Δa_{t-1}	t -stat Δa_{t-1}	Coeff.	t -stat	R_{adj}^2	F
$\log dp_{t-1}$	1.05	2.40	0.07	1.54	0.14	4.89	1.57	2.26	0.14	1.85	0.19	4.79
$\log pe_{t-1}$	1.20	2.78	-0.00	-0.08	0.11	4.01	1.87	2.74	-0.02	-0.24	0.13	4.12
$\log pay_{t-1}$	1.01	2.39	1.68	2.02	0.16	5.65	1.60	2.38	2.59	1.79	0.18	5.06
def_{t-1}	1.28	3.16	-0.05	-1.23	0.13	4.54	2.11	3.47	-0.14	-2.15	0.18	6.69
$term_{t-1}$	1.48	2.47	0.05	1.94	0.27	4.57	1.49	1.53	0.08	1.88	0.22	2.76
π_{t-1}	1.21	3.07	-0.93	-1.68	0.16	5.67	1.87	3.06	-2.00	-2.13	0.21	6.88
cay_{t-1}	1.01	2.26	1.83	1.74	0.16	6.11	1.45	2.15	4.06	2.36	0.23	7.29
	$r_{t \rightarrow t+3}^x$		$r_{t \rightarrow t+4}^x$									
	Coeff. Δa_{t-1}	t -stat Δa_{t-1}	Coeff.	t -stat	R_{adj}^2	F	Coeff. Δa_{t-1}	t -stat Δa_{t-1}	Coeff.	t -stat	R_{adj}^2	F
$\log dp_{t-1}$	2.54	2.74	0.17	1.47	0.25	4.71	2.91	2.32	0.26	1.57	0.29	4.60
$\log pe_{t-1}$	2.88	3.13	-0.03	-0.29	0.20	4.48	3.43	2.81	-0.08	-0.52	0.22	4.41
$\log pay_{t-1}$	2.61	2.83	2.87	1.31	0.24	4.85	3.10	2.52	4.34	1.44	0.26	4.85
def_{t-1}	3.20	3.68	-0.17	-1.78	0.25	6.37	3.82	3.24	-0.17	-1.16	0.24	5.36
$term_{t-1}$	2.18	1.63	0.10	1.57	0.25	2.50	2.83	1.81	0.15	1.70	0.32	3.43
π_{t-1}	2.89	3.34	-2.26	-1.65	0.26	6.47	3.85	3.63	-2.82	-1.61	0.33	8.33
cay_{t-1}	2.17	2.50	5.92	2.63	0.31	7.71	2.58	2.60	7.91	2.97	0.38	10.04

Table 3.5

VAR Model for Advertising and Consumption Growth, Post-War Period

The Table shows coefficient estimates for a Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) model of advertising expenses and consumption growth (Δa and Δc , respectively). The t -statistics are in parentheses. In each equation, R^2 and F are the R-squared and F-statistics, respectively.

	Panel A: One Lag		Panel B: Two Lags	
	$\Delta a_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta a_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$
$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.679 (4.71)	0.127 (2.52)	0.515 (3.23)	0.124 (2.16)
$\Delta a_{t-2 \rightarrow t-1}$			0.242 (1.49)	-0.0167 (-0.28)
$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-1.417 (-3.11)	0.0105 (0.07)	-1.119 (-2.39)	0.0681 (0.41)
$\Delta c_{t-2 \rightarrow t-1}$			-1.180 (-2.38)	0.00771 (0.04)
R^2	0.274	0.158	0.336	0.170
F	11.12	5.521	7.333	2.973

consumption growth is not conditionally autocorrelated and is predicted by advertising expenditures growth.

Table 3.6 shows the results of Table 3.5 for different sub-samples of my dataset. In Panel A, I report the results for the 1922-2009 sample, while in Panel B for the 1982-2009 sample.⁵ The results show that the dynamics of the advertising-consumption relationship dynamic dramatically change over the course of the last century. The sign of the VAR coefficients does not change across different samples, but their magnitude and statistical significance increases when I restrict the sample to more recent years. The time-varying relation between advertising growth and consumption growth therefore limits the use of advertising growth as an instrumental variable for expected consumption growth, and rather calls for a model to explore the joint dynamics of the variables.

⁵Tests for cointegration between consumption and advertising in these two samples fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.

Table 3.6

VAR Model for Advertising and Consumption Growth, 1922-2009 and 1982-2009

The Table shows coefficient estimates for a Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) model of advertising expenses and consumption growth (Δa and Δc , respectively) across different samples. The t -statistics are in parentheses. In each equation, R^2 and F are the R-squared and F-statistics, respectively.

	Panel A: 1922-2009				Panel B: 1982-2009			
	One Lag		Two Lags		One Lag		Two Lags	
	$\Delta a_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta a_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta a_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta a_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$
$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.352 (2.97)	0.0666 (1.16)	0.301 (2.39)	0.0433 (0.70)	0.783 (4.10)	0.166 (3.37)	0.454 (2.73)	0.117 (2.25)
$\Delta a_{t-2 \rightarrow t-1}$			0.0602 (0.49)	0.0572 (0.95)			0.856 (4.53)	0.137 (2.31)
$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-0.242 (-0.95)	0.140 (1.13)	-0.190 (-0.73)	0.159 (1.25)	-1.312 (-1.95)	0.224 (1.29)	-1.614 (-2.36)	0.155 (0.72)
$\Delta c_{t-2 \rightarrow t-1}$			-0.124 (-0.47)	-0.0885 (-0.70)			-1.900 (-3.15)	-0.261 (-1.38)
R^2	0.0966	0.0612	0.0825	0.0676	0.383	0.543	0.651	0.604
F	4.759	2.900	1.978	1.596	8.992	17.24	13.06	10.70

Table 3.7

Consumption Growth Predictive Regressions, Post-War Period

The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$) predictive regressions using lagged consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$), advertising expenditures growth ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$), as well as the lagged short-term interest rate (r_{t-1}^{3m}) and lagged term spread from $t-1$ to $t-1+\tau$ (r_{t-1}^τ) (Harvey (1988)) as predictors. The short-term interest rate is the yield on a 3 month constant maturity U.S. T-bill, and the term spread is the difference between a U.S. government bond with constant maturity τ and the short-term interest rate. The data is from FRED. The t -statistics in parentheses are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors. R_{adj}^2 and F are the adjusted R-squared and F-statistics, respectively.

		$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+4}$
(1)	r_{t-1}^{3m}	0.001 (0.85)	0.001 (0.26)	0.003 (0.81)	0.071 (0.70)
	r_{t-1}^τ	0.020 (1.82)	0.030 (2.81)	0.023 (1.80)	0.063 (0.65)
	R_{adj}^2	0.172	0.272	0.146	0.072
	F	2.590	3.669	1.588	0.654
(2)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.149 (2.36)	0.395 (3.51)	0.541 (3.07)	0.629 (3.25)
	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.241 (1.21)	-0.281 (-0.76)	-0.786 (-1.38)	-1.104 (-1.65)
	r_{t-1}^{3m}	-0.000 (-0.38)	-0.002 (-1.17)	-0.001 (-0.43)	0.023 (0.29)
	r_{t-1}^τ	0.010 (1.14)	0.013 (1.59)	0.009 (0.87)	0.022 (0.29)
	R_{adj}^2	0.475	0.519	0.351	0.305
	F	7.511	6.196	3.154	2.599

In Table 3.7, I test the robustness of advertising growth in predicting consumption growth, by augmenting specification (3) of Table 3.2 with an additional predictor. To the best of my knowledge, the term structure of the interest rates is one of the few variables known to predict consumption growth at long horizons. I follow Harvey (1988) and run consumption growth predictive regressions using the short-term risk-free rate and the term spread as a proxy for the term structure. Specification (1) of Table 3.7 confirms that the term structure is a good predictor of consumption growth at horizons from one to three years. Specification (2) shows that the predictive power of advertising growth significantly decreases the predictive power of the term structure at any predictive horizon.

Figures 3.4 and Table 3.8 report the results of my third robustness test, which measures the out-of-sample performance of advertising growth in predicting excess returns using both moving-window and expanding-window regressions. In moving-window regressions, I use a fixed rolling window of fifty observations as fitting sample. In expanding-window regressions, I start with fitting the model on the first fifty annual observations, and expand the sample one observation at a time to obtain the full 1950-2010 sample. Figure 3.4 plots point estimates for the coefficients of one-year-ahead excess returns predictive regressions, as well as their associated 95 percent confidence intervals, for the out-of-sample period 1980-2010. In both moving regressions (Panel A) and expanding regressions (Panel B), the regression coefficient associated to advertising growth is around one (but for years 2003-2008 in moving regressions), and always statistically different from zero at a 95 percent confidence level.

Finally, Table 3.8 reports the results of the out-of-sample R-squared statistics of [Campbell and Thompson \(2008\)](#) and the adjusted mean squared prediction error (MSPE) statistics of [Clark and West \(2007\)](#). The out-of-sample R-squared displays similar values in moving and expanding regressions. The within-sample R-squared increases with the predictive horizon. The adjusted-MSPE statistics speaks in favor of long-run predictability. The (one-sided) t -statistic for a difference in predictive accuracy between within sample and out-of-sample predictions is rejected in both moving and expanding regressions at a five percent confidence level for horizons of two to four years.

Finally, in Appendix C.2 I show that advertising growth predicts a component of aggregate consumption growth not captured by the [Bansal and Yaron \(2004\)](#) long-run risk. In the next Section, I introduce a dynamic investment-based asset pricing model of frictions in the goods market to replicate the observed predictive power of advertising expenditures on aggregate consumption growth and excess returns.

3.3 Model

The model is a discrete-time, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two goods. The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households and a continuum of identical firms.

Figure 3.4

Coefficient Estimates in Out-of-Sample Excess Returns Predictive Regressions, 1980-2010

Growth in advertising expenditures and consumption are used to predict excess returns in the next year, where excess returns are the yearly returns on the S&P 500 minus the one-year interest rate from Robert Shiller's website. Panel A reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the slope coefficient of advertising expenditures, using a regression with a rolling window of 50 periods (years). Panel B reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the slope coefficient of relative advertising expenditures, using an expanding regression with an initial length of 50 periods (years).




Table 3.8

Out-of-Sample Excess Returns Predictive Regressions

The Table shows the out-of-sample performance of cumulative excess returns ($r_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}^x$) predictive regressions using lagged growth in advertising ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) and consumption ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) as predictors. The statistic R_{ws}^2 is the within-sample adjusted R-squared statistic. Out-of-sample moving regressions use a 30-year rolling window to predict cumulative excess returns at different horizons, starting from 1980. Out-of-sample expanding regressions use the initial 1950-1980 sample to predict cumulative excess returns at different horizons. The procedure is then repeated by expanding the sample in one-year steps until the full 1950-2010 sample is obtained. The statistic R_{os}^2 is the out-of-sample R-squared statistic detailed in [Campbell and Thompson \(2008\)](#). The Newey-West (NW) t -statistics are obtained from regressing the adjusted-MSPE statistics of [Clark and West \(2007\)](#) on a constant. The test is a one-side test for a zero coefficient.

Horizon (years)	Within-Sample	Out-of-Sample Moving		Out-of-Sample Expanding	
	R_{ws}^2	R_{os}^2	NW t -stat.	R_{os}^2	NW t -stat.
1	0.128	0.071	1.216	0.066	1.385
2	0.148	0.129	1.916	0.114	2.017
3	0.215	0.153	2.005	0.147	2.419
4	0.224	0.139	2.349	0.177	3.178

The model features two key frictions. First, absent advertising households in the economy are only aware of the existence of their endowment (numeraire) good. Firms overcome this friction by spending resources to advertise their product. Once firms and customers match with each other, they form a relationship that lasts for multiple periods. Second, the advertising process is subject to search externalities. Times when all the firms in the economy post many advertisements are also times when it is harder for an individual firm to attract a customer by posting an advertisement (ad). In particular, once every firm has posted its ad 's, the sum of the individual ad 's in the economy determines the probability that one ad will turn into a customer for an individual firm.⁶ I denote this probability by λ . I assume that product search is costless for the household, and normalize the household search cost to one. Using a [den Haan et al. \(2000\)](#) function with elasticity $\vartheta > 0$, the matching function between a household and an ad is given by

$$G(ad) = \frac{ad}{(1 + ad^\vartheta)^{1/\vartheta}}. \quad (3.1)$$

⁶For tractability, I abstract from the difference between customer and marketing/brand capital ([Drozd and Nosal \(2012\)](#)), where advertising expenditures build marketing capital, which in turn determines the likelihood of attracting new customers.

Denoting aggregate variables with uppercase letters, the probability λ that an advertisement attracts a household is a function of the total ad 's in the economy:

$$\lambda(AD) = \frac{G(AD)}{AD} = \frac{1}{(1 + AD^\theta)^{1/\theta}}. \quad (3.2)$$

Finally, customer relations are long-lasting. I denote the stock of firm customers (customer capital, [Gourio and Rudanko \(2014\)](#)) by n and assume that in each period t the firm loses an exogenous fraction $\varphi \in [0, 1]$ of its customers. The aggregate law of motion for customer capital between period t and period $t + 1$ is then

$$N_{t+1} = (1 - \varphi) N_t + G(AD_t) \quad (3.3)$$

$$= (1 - \varphi) N_t + \lambda(AD_t) AD_t. \quad (3.4)$$

3.3.1 Firm Problem and Return on Equity

Firms enter each time period with a stock of customers, observe the aggregate endowment of the numeraire good and decide how much to spend in advertising to build their customer capital. Firm revenue is the product between the unit price of the manufactured good and the number of firm customers. Moreover, firms pay a convex advertising cost to attract customers. Three assumptions on firm profits allow to simplify the analysis while retaining the model's main insights. First, firms extract all the matching surplus from households, so that the manufactured good's price is the marginal rate of intratemporal substitution between the manufactured good and the numeraire. This eliminates the issue of time-inconsistent pricing ([Nakamura and Steinsson \(2011\)](#)). Second, I do not explicitly model production of the advertised good. I assume that the advertised good is always available for firms to buy and re-sell to households at the price of purchase once a firm finds a customer. This allows to reduce the state space and focus on the implications of advertising externalities for return predictability. Finally, the model features convex advertising costs to reduce the volatility of advertising.

As in [Liu et al. \(2009\)](#) and [Kuehn et al. \(2012\)](#), the firm's problem at time t is to maximize the discounted expected value of its dividend stream S_t , subject to the law of motion for its customer base

and a non-negativity constraint on advertising. Let P_t denote the period- t relative price of the advertised good in terms of the numeraire. The representative firm's problem is

$$S_t = \max_{\{AD_{t+j}\}_{j=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} M_{t+j} \left[P_{t+j} - \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{AD_{t+j}}{N_{t+j}} \right)^2 \right] N_{t+j}, \quad (3.5)$$

subject to, for all j ,

$$AD_{t+j} \geq 0 \quad (3.6)$$

and the law of motion (3.3). Here, M_{t+j} denotes the stochastic discount factor (SDF) between t and $t+j$, χ is a convex adjustment cost parameter and (3.6) is a non-negativity constraint on effort. Since the matching probability λ_t is greater than zero, (3.6) can be re-written as

$$\lambda_{t+j} AD_{t+j} \geq 0. \quad (3.7)$$

Substituting the first constraint into (3.5), and respectively denoting by μ_t^n and μ_t^λ the time- t Lagrange multipliers on (3.3) and (3.7), the problem's first order conditions are

$$\mu_t^n = \frac{\chi}{\lambda_t} \frac{AD_t}{N_t} - \mu_t^\lambda, \quad (3.8)$$

$$\mu_t^n = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} \left[P_{t+1} + \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{AD_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} \right)^2 + (1 - \varphi) \mu_{t+1}^n \right], \quad (3.9)$$

plus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on (3.3) and (3.7). The Euler equation for customer capital accumulation is therefore

$$\frac{\chi}{\lambda_t} \frac{AD_t}{N_t} - \mu_t^n = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} \left[P_{t+1} + \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{AD_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} \right)^2 + (1 - \varphi) \left(\frac{\chi}{\lambda_{t+1}} \frac{AD_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} - \mu_{t+1}^n \right) \right]. \quad (3.10)$$

The Euler equation relates the marginal cost of adding one unit of search effort at time t to the marginal benefit in period $t+1$ of having λ_t additional customers, in turn consisting of higher revenues, lower adjustment costs, higher servicing costs and the discounted marginal cost of postponing

to period $t + 1$ the unit increase in advertising. Note that at the optimum

$$S_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} M_{t+j} \left[P_{t+j} N_{t+j} - \frac{\chi}{2} \frac{AD_{t+j}^2}{N_{t+j}} - \kappa N_{t+j} \right. \\ \left. + \mu_{t+j}^n ((1 - \varphi) N_{t+j} + \lambda_{t+j} AD_{t+j} - N_{t+j+1}) + \mu_{t+j}^\lambda \lambda_{t+j} AD_{t+j} \right], \quad (3.11)$$

so that expanding S_t , I get

$$S_t = P_t N_t - \frac{\chi}{2} \frac{AD_t^2}{N_t} - \kappa N_t + \mu_t^n ((1 - \varphi) N_t + \lambda_t AD_t - N_{t+1}) + \mu_t^\lambda \lambda_t AD_t \\ + \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} \left[P_{t+1} N_{t+1} - \frac{\chi}{2} \frac{AD_{t+1}^2}{N_{t+1}} - \kappa N_{t+1} \right. \quad (3.12)$$

$$\left. + \mu_{t+1}^n ((1 - \varphi) N_{t+1} + \lambda_{t+1} AD_{t+1} - N_{t+2}) + \mu_{t+1}^\lambda \lambda_{t+1} AD_{t+1} + \dots \right]. \quad (3.13)$$

Recursively substituting (3.10) into (3.12) the equilibrium, cum-dividend price of equity is

$$S_t = \left(P_t + \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{AD_t}{N_t} \right)^2 + (1 - \varphi) \mu_t^n \right) N_t, \quad (3.14)$$

and the ex-dividend stock price denoted by \tilde{S}_t is equal to

$$\tilde{S}_t = \mu_t^n N_{t+1}. \quad (3.15)$$

Finally note that whenever (3.6) does not bind at time t (i.e., advertising is positive) the return of one unit of advertising is equal to the return on equity R_{t+1} between t and $t + 1$, and is given by

$$R_{t+1} = \frac{S_{t+1}}{\tilde{S}_t} \quad (3.16)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\mu_t^n} \left(P_{t+1} + \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{AD_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} \right)^2 + (1 - \varphi) \mu_{t+1}^n \right) \quad (3.17)$$

The return on equity, as in [Cochrane \(1991\)](#), is the trade-off between the marginal benefit of posting an additional ad in period t - accrued between period t and $t + 1$ - and the ad cost incurred in period t . Note that for a given level of past advertising, high current advertising and therefore high current advertising growth reduce future expected returns. This happens because i) through the goods market friction high advertising reduces the probability that an additional ad will turn into

a customer (from (3.8), μ^n is decreasing in λ) and ii) high current advertising (and future customer capital) reduces future marginal revenues.

3.3.2 Household Problem

The household derives its period utility from a bundle of the numeraire good and the advertised good, and decides how much of its endowment to allocate to consumption, investment in a claim to firm profits and investment in a risk-free bond. Denote by C_0 and C_1 the representative household's consumption of the numeraire and advertised goods, respectively. Further denote by Y the endowment of the numeraire good, by ϕ the household investment in claims to the firm profits, and by θ the household investment in a risk-free asset with current price of one and gross return R^f . The claims to firm profits and the risk-free assets are in unit and zero aggregate net supply, respectively. The household's budget constraint at time $t + j$ is therefore

$$C_{0,t+j} \leq Y_{t+j} + \phi_{t+j-1} S_{t+j} + \theta_{t+j-1} R_{t+j}^f - P_{t+j} C_{1,t+j} - \phi_{t+j} \tilde{S}_{t+j} - \theta_{t+j}. \quad (3.18)$$

Moreover, I assume that each firm customer consumes only one unit of the advertised good, so that $C_{1,t+j} \leq N_{t+j}$. The household's intraperiod utility is given by the CES function

$$u(C_0; C_1) = \left((1 - \alpha) C_0^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha C_1^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}, \quad (3.19)$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, and $\eta \geq 0$ is the elasticity of substitution between the numeraire and manufactured goods. Finally, the household's intertemporal utility is denoted by V_t , and is specified by the recursion

$$V_t = \left\{ (1 - \beta) u(C_{0,t}; C_{1,t})^{1-\frac{1}{\psi}} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[V_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right]^{\frac{1-1/\psi}{1-\gamma}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-1/\psi}}, \quad (3.20)$$

where β is the time discount factor, ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and γ is the relative risk aversion coefficient (Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989)). The relative

price of C_1 is the marginal rate of substitution between C_0 and C_1 , or

$$P = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{C_1}{C_0} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}. \quad (3.21)$$

In Appendix C.3 I show that the stochastic discount factor is

$$M_{t+1} = \beta \left(\frac{C_{0,t+1}}{C_{0,t}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \left(\frac{u(C_{0,t+1}; C_{1,t+1})}{u(C_{0,t}; C_{1,t})} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\psi}} \left[\frac{V_{t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t \left(V_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\psi} - \gamma}. \quad (3.22)$$

Note that, for a fixed level of past advertising, high current advertising and therefore high current advertising growth increase customer capital, decrease the numeraire good's consumption, and increase the stochastic discount factor. This and the fact that future expected returns (3.16) are decreasing in advertising growth implies that high advertising growth generates high negative co-variation between the stochastic discount factor and expected excess returns, and therefore high risk premia. Finally, the risk-free rate is

$$R_{t+1}^f = \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_t [M_{t+1}]}. \quad (3.23)$$

3.3.3 Equilibrium

For each combination of the state variables $(Y; N)$, a competitive equilibrium of search in the goods market specifies policy functions for firm advertising $AD(Y; N)$; policy functions for household numeraire consumption $C_0(Y; N)$, stock holdings $\phi(Y; N)$ and risk-free asset holdings $\theta(Y; N)$; a stock price $S(Y; N)$, a risk-free rate $R^f(Y; N)$ and a relative price of the manufactured good in terms of the numeraire $P(Y; N)$, such that firms and households maximize their constrained objectives, markets for the numeraire and the advertised goods clear, and aggregate stock and bond markets clear. In particular, note that the equilibrium conditions in the goods market imply that

$$C_0 = Y - \frac{\lambda}{2} \left(\frac{AD}{N} \right)^2 N, \quad (3.24)$$

and $C_1 = N$.

3.4 Results

Section 3.4.1 describes my calibration strategy and solution method. Section 3.4.2 compares the predictability results coming from simulations of the model to those coming from post-war US data. Finally, section 3.4.3 highlights the quantitative importance of goods market frictions in obtaining the predictability results.

3.4.1 Calibration and Computation

I calibrate the model at an annual frequency. In my calibration strategy I do not try to match the equity returns predictive regression coefficients found in the data, but rather show that the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of these coefficients arise naturally when the model is calibrated to match other data moments. Broda and Weinstein (2010) report a median annualized entry rate of new goods in consumer baskets equal to 0.25. When normalizing household search effort to unit, this entry rate in the model is equal to $(1 + AD^{-\vartheta})^{-1/\vartheta}$, which I target to a steady-state value of 0.30 with a matching function elasticity $\vartheta = 0.57$. Finally, the results are not sensitive to the convex adjustment cost parameter χ , which I therefore set equal to one. On the household side, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015) document that average annual expenditures on food consumed at home, plus utilities, amount to 10-15 percent of total annual expenditures in the 1984-2009 Household Consumption Expenditure Survey. I target this share in the model to 17 percent with a bias parameter α equal to 0.79. I use an AR(1) process in logs to describe the time-series evolution of the numeraire good's endowment, and set the persistence and volatility of the endowment process equal to 0.75 and 0.13, respectively. Finally, I set the relative risk aversion coefficient γ equal to 21. The last three parameters target a equity premium of three percent, a equity premium volatility of twelve percent and a consumption growth volatility of 1.8 percent while retaining the main predictability results.

I borrow the remaining parameters from the literature. I choose a customer capital depreciation rate φ equal to 0.20 as in Gourio and Rudanko (2014), in the mid-range of the empirical estimates of Bronnenberg et al. (2012) and in the low range of the estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2010).

Modeling household preferences, I set the annual discount rate β to 0.95, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ to 1.5 following [Bansal and Yaron \(2004\)](#). Finally, I set the elasticity of substitution parameter η equal to 0.83 following the international trade literature ([Heathcote and Perri \(2002\)](#), [Bianchi \(2009\)](#) and [Huo and Ríos-Rull \(2013\)](#)).

The model is challenging to solve numerically. First, the equilibrium allocations are not Pareto-optimal. A social planner confronted with the constrained equity maximization problem (3.5) would in fact internalize the congestion effect created by search effort, while individual firms do not. This in turn requires solving the model using its first-order conditions. Second, the non-negativity constraint on search effort renders perturbation methods not suited for this type of problems. For these reasons, I solve for the competitive search equilibrium using the globally nonlinear computational algorithm of [Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang \(2017\)](#). In particular, for each point in the aggregate endowment-customer capital state space (Y_t, N_t) , the algorithm solves for optimal advertising $AD_t^* = AD(Y_t, N_t)$ and the multiplier on its non-negativity constraint $\mu_t^{n*} = \mu^n(Y_t, N_t)$ from the Euler equation

$$\frac{\chi}{\lambda_t} \frac{AD_t}{N_t} - \mu^n(Y_t, N_t) = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} \left[P_{t+1} + (1 - \varphi) \left(\frac{\chi}{\lambda_{t+1}} - \mu^n(Y_t, N_t) \right) \right], \quad (3.25)$$

where both λ_t and P_t are functions of $AD(Y_t, N_t)$. Appendix C.4 provides details on the computational algorithm.

3.4.2 Simulated Moments and Predictability

I simulate ten thousand samples of sixty-one annual observations, and in each simulated sample compute average advertising and consumption growth, return on equity and risk-free rate. Moreover, in each simulated sample I run predictive regressions of equity returns using consumption growth and advertising growth as predictors.

Panel A of Table 3.9 reports the average first moment and standard deviation of advertising and consumption growth, equity premium and risk-free rate across the simulated samples. Panel B reports the corresponding moments in post-war US data. The calibration of the model allows to reasonably

Table 3.9
Model-Simulated Moments

	Panel A: Model		Panel B: Data	
	Mean	St. Dev	Mean	St. Dev
Δa	0.026	0.237	0.023	0.056
Δc	0.001	0.021	0.022	0.018
$R - R^f$	0.052	0.173	0.066	0.164
R^f	0.003	0.056	0.017	0.027

match the first moments of the selected variables, and to match the volatility of consumption growth, equity premium and risk-free rate.

Table 3.10 tests the predictive power of advertising and consumption growth on future equity returns. As in the data, neither advertising nor consumption growth can alone predict future returns in the model. Moreover, Conditional on consumption growth, advertising growth however significantly predicts future returns. The predictive power of advertising (and consumption) is higher at longer horizons, and the economic magnitude of the coefficients is close their empirical counterparts. As in the data, advertising positively predicts consumption growth and is therefore a priced aggregate risk factor. Through customer capital, in fact, advertising growth determines growth in consumption of the manufactured good and increases the numeraire goods' future marginal utility. At the same time, advertising growth reduces expected returns to investing in claims to customer capital. These conditions imply that times when firms spend more resources in advertising are times of low expected returns and high expected marginal utility, and therefore high risk premia.

3.4.3 The Quantitative Impact of Goods Market Frictions

In this section, I use the insights of the model to explore the effect of goods market frictions on predictability. In particular, I show that the congestion effect created by aggregate advertising is quantitatively important in driving both consumption and returns predictability.

Table 3.10

Results: Returns Predictability


The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative returns ($r_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$) predictive regressions coming from model simulations (Panel A) and from post-war data (Panel B) using lagged advertising expenditures growth ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) and consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) as predictors. The t -statistics in parentheses are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors.

		Panel A: Model				Panel B: Data (Post-War)			
		$r_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+4}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+4}$
(1)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-0.084 (-0.67)	-0.144 (-1.33)	-0.219 (-1.65)	-0.263 (-1.67)	0.358 (0.94)	0.636 (0.96)	1.273 (1.38)	1.385 (1.13)
	R_{adj}^2	0.027	0.030	0.037	0.038	-0.003	0.003	0.031	0.016
(2)	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-0.103 (-1.11)	-0.179 (-1.42)	-0.270 (-1.74)	-0.326 (-1.75)	-2.189 (-1.94)	-3.410 (-1.81)	-4.121 (-1.64)	-6.843 (-2.12)
	R_{adj}^2	0.028	0.032	0.040	0.041	0.042	0.045	0.038	0.065
(3)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	4.334 (1.83)	8.512 (1.92)	12.198 (2.13)	15.543 (2.20)	1.332 (3.24)	2.204 (3.24)	3.492 (3.57)	4.644 (3.51)
	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-5.071 (-1.46)	-9.934 (-1.95)	-14.242 (-2.16)	-18.126 (-2.23)	-4.712 (-3.66)	-7.583 (-3.69)	-10.731 (-3.82)	-16.174 (-4.16)
	R_{adj}^2	0.069	0.103	0.132	0.149	0.150	0.175	0.246	0.277

Figure 3.5

Customer Capital Investment

The Figure compares the optimal customer capital investment λE in the decentralized economy with the investment in the centralized economy. Panel A shows the investment as a function of customer capital N , for the lowest possible realization of the endowment process Y . Panel B shows the investment as a function of customer capital N , for the highest possible realization of the endowment process Y .



As noted before, the equilibrium allocation in the decentralized economy is not Pareto-optimal. To solve for the Pareto-optimal allocation, I keep the same steady-state parametrization of the model described in section 3.4.1 and solve the constrained optimization problem (3.5) using standard value function iteration. Since firms in the centralized economy do not over-advertise to compensate the congestion effect created by aggregate advertising, the optimal amount of firm search effort in the centralized economy is as much as ten times lower than in the decentralized economy. Figure 3.5 shows that as a consequence the effective firm investment in customer capital, λE , is low and almost flat.

Table 3.11 reports estimates of the same predictive regressions coefficients of Table (3.10) for the

Table 3.11
Predictability in the Centralized Economy

The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$) and returns ($r_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$) predictive regressions coming from simulations of the centralized economy, using lagged advertising expenditures growth ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) and consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$) as predictors. The t -statistics in parentheses are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors.

		Panel A: Consumption				Panel B: Returns			
		$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+4}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$r_{t \rightarrow t+4}$
(1)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-0.116	-0.228	-0.325	-0.378	-0.121	-0.213	-0.326	-0.403
		(-1.00)	(-1.51)	(-1.86)	(-1.90)	(-1.10)	(-1.41)	(-1.64)	(-1.82)
	R^2_{adj}	0.024	0.033	0.042	0.043	0.024	0.027	0.035	0.039
(2)	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-0.100	-0.197	-0.278	-0.327	-0.103	-0.184	-0.282	-0.350
		(-1.00)	(-1.80)	(-1.89)	(-2.00)	(-1.04)	(-1.30)	(-1.74)	(-1.92)
	R^2_{adj}	0.025	0.035	0.045	0.048	0.025	0.030	0.038	0.042
(3)	$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.159	0.343	0.385	0.552	0.113	0.293	0.398	0.597
		(0.24)	(0.42)	(0.53)	(0.44)	(0.15)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.43)
	$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	-0.219	-0.463	-0.581	-0.765	-0.186	-0.405	-0.588	-0.820
		(-0.40)	(-0.84)	(-0.87)	(-0.84)	(-0.32)	(-0.54)	(-0.69)	(-0.89)
	R^2_{adj}	0.041	0.047	0.054	0.058	0.041	0.041	0.050	0.054

centralized economy. The results show that the volatility of advertising in the decentralized economy has key implications for predictability. On the consumption predictability side companies do not over-advertise in the centralized economy, customer capital growth is flat and current advertising growth does not generate large movements in future customer capital and consumption. On the returns predictability side, a flat effective investment in customer capital (λE) reduces the large shifts in marginal profits and marginal utility due to over-advertising, thus reducing the risk associated with advertising and the predictive power of advertising on future returns.

3.5 Conclusion

In this paper, I provide new evidence on the importance of advertising and goods market frictions for financial economics. I show that advertising growth predicts future consumption growth in post-

war US data, and use this result to verify the core prediction of dynamic asset pricing theory that expected consumption matters for expected returns. Using advertising and consumption growth to predict excess returns on equity I show that advertising positively predicts excess returns at horizons of up to four years. Motivated by these empirical findings, I build a general equilibrium model of frictional goods markets where advertising is an investment in long-lasting customer relationships that affect the dynamics of household consumption. The calibrated model is able to replicate the predictive power of advertising growth on future consumption growth and equity returns observed in the data, and highlights the importance of frictions in the goods market to quantitatively match these predictability patterns.

The paper is part of a small literature in financial economics highlighting the importance of advertising and goods market frictions at the firm level ([Gourio and Rudanko \(2014\)](#), [Vitorino \(2014\)](#)). In this paper, I show that goods market frictions are also quantitatively relevant in the aggregate. As such, future research should be devoted to further studying the aggregate implications (i.e. the trade-off between customer capital and other forms of tangible and intangible capital) and the welfare impact of these frictions.

Appendix A

Appendix to Chapter 1

A.1 Solving for the Optimal Contract

Substituting the manager's first incentive-compatibility (1.5) constraint into (1.2)-(1.4), the problem becomes finding $m(y)$ and $\pi_1(y)$ to maximize

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} &= \int_{\underline{y}}^{\bar{y}} [P - m(y)(P - \pi_1(y) + k)] dF(y) - I + \omega \int_{\underline{y}}^{\bar{y}} [y - P + m(y)(P - \pi_1(y))] dF(y) \\ &+ \int_{\underline{y}}^{\bar{y}} [\mu(y)[y - P + m(y)(P - \pi_1(y))] + \lambda(y)[P - m(y)\pi_1(y)] dy, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where ω , $\mu(y)$, and $\lambda(y)$ respectively denote the multipliers on (1.3), (1.4), and (1.6). Taking first-order conditions of (A.1) with respect to $m(y)$ yields

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial m(y)} = [P - \pi_1(y)][(\omega - 1)f(y) + \mu(y)] - kf(y) - \lambda(y)\pi_1(y). \quad (\text{A.2})$$

If $m(y) = 1$, it must be that $\partial \mathcal{L} / \partial m(y) > 0$.^{A.1} Therefore,

$$[P - \pi_1(y)][(\omega - 1)f(y) + \mu(y)] > kf(y) + \lambda(y)\pi_1(y) \geq 0. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

This implies that $R - \pi_1(y) > 0$ and $\lambda^*(y) = 0$. On the other hand,

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \pi_1(y)} = f(y)(1 - \omega) - \mu(y), \quad (\text{A.4})$$

implying that to satisfy $\partial \mathcal{L} / \partial \pi_1(y) \geq 0$, $\omega^* \leq 1$. Then from (A.3), $\mu(y) > 0$ and the limited-liability constraint must bind such that in the monitoring region $\pi_1(y) = y$.

^{A.1}For a given \hat{y} , if $m(\hat{y}) = 1$ it must be that $(\mathcal{L}(m(\hat{y}) = 1) - \mathcal{L}(m(\hat{y}) = 0)) / (1 - 0) > 0$.

A.2 Additional Results: Bank Value

Table A1

Robustness and Placebo Tests: Market-to-Book

This table reports sample bandwidth selection tests (Panel A) and placebo tests (Panel B) on my main Market-to-Book result. In the first four specifications of Panel A, I use two small samples of BHCs with average 2005 total assets between \$400 and \$600 million (Specifications (1) and (2)), and between \$300 and \$700 million (Specifications (3) and (4)). In the last four specifications I use two large samples of BHCs with total assets between \$150 million and \$1 billion (Specifications (5) and (6)), and between \$150 million and \$1.5 billion (Specifications (7) and (8)). In the first six specifications of Panel B, I use asset thresholds of \$300 million, \$750 million and \$1 billion to separate treated and control BHCs. In Specifications (7) and (8) I use the last quarter of 2004 as treatment quarter, dropping post-2005 observations from the sample. In the last two specifications, I use the last quarter of 2006 as treatment quarter. The dependent variable in all specifications is the natural logarithm of Tobin's q . Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

Panel A: Sample Bandwidth Selection										
	\$400M-600M		\$300M-700M		\$150M-1B		\$150M-1.5B			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Post \times Treated	-0.087** (0.04)	-0.088** (0.03)	-0.055** (0.03)	-0.072*** (0.02)	-0.052** (0.02)	-0.073*** (0.02)	-0.055*** (0.02)	-0.075*** (0.02)		
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes		
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
R-Squared	0.149	0.338	0.106	0.296	0.068	0.250	0.055	0.215		
Observations	355	355	724	724	1,313	1,313	1,611	1,611		
Panel B: Placebo Tests										
	\$300M Threshold		\$750M Threshold		\$1B Threshold		After 12/2004		After 12/2006	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post \times Treated	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.432	0.528	0.396	0.518	0.427	0.532	0.038	0.145	0.407	0.496
Observations	1,056	1,056	1,509	1,509	2,076	2,076	1,028	1,028	2,177	2,177

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A2

Bank Size Manipulation Tests

This table shows point estimates (and associated t -statistics) of discontinuities in the cross-sectional density of bank assets around the \$500 million policy implementation threshold. The smoothed density is obtained by first constructing a finely-gridded histogram of BHC total assets and then smoothing the histogram on each size of the threshold using local linear regression. The reported tests are then Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the log difference in the smoothed density above and below the threshold is zero. The optimal histogram bin size and local linear regression bandwidth are calculated as in [McCrary \(2008\)](#).

	2005-2007 Sample	2005 Sample	2006-2007 Sample
Discontinuity Estimate	0.0737	0.110	0.0379
t -stat	0.674	0.522	0.330
Observations	2,039	692	1,347

Table A3

Event Study Around Policy Date

In this table I report the results of an event study around the Fed policy date (March 6, 2006). For each bank in my sample, in the second half of 2005 I estimate the market model by regressing daily bank stock returns on a constant and the daily CRSP value-weighted index. I then use the estimated coefficients to compute abnormal stock returns (the difference between actual returns and market-model-predicted returns) around the event date. I choose a symmetric event window starting two weeks before and ending two weeks after the event day week. Next, I compute daily average abnormal returns in the treated and control groups, and then compute group-level Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) as the sum of these daily average abnormal returns within the event window. I finally compute the t -statistics for the null hypothesis that CAR is zero as the ratio between CAR and the standard deviation of average abnormal returns, normalized by the inverse of the square root of the number of days in the event window (see, for example, [Corrado \(2011\)](#)). In the last two columns of the table, I repeat the same exercise using weekly returns instead of daily returns.

	Daily Frequency		Weekly Frequency	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Cumulative Abnormal Return	-0.0180	0.00264	-0.0139	0.00725
t -stat	-2.144	0.277	-3.315	1.189
Observations (Event Window)	24	24	5	5

Table A4
Additional Robustness

This table provides robustness tests for the main results in Table 1.2 using different restrictions on the main sample. In the first two specifications, I restrict the sample to the years 2005 and 2006. In Specifications (3) and (4), I extend the sample to include the financial crisis. In Specifications (5) and (6) I only include survivor BHC (BHCs whose data is available for the entire 2004-2007 period). In Specifications (7) and (8), I drop banks that get listed on the stock market after the treatment. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of Tobin's q (Panel A) and Market-to-Book (Panel B). Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

Panel A: log Tobin's q Regressions								
	2005-2006 Sample		2004-2008 Sample		Survivors Only		Listed in 2005	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post \times Treated	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.008* (0.00)	-0.010** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.078	0.128	0.630	0.679	0.370	0.419	0.351	0.412
Observations	1,113	1,113	2,711	2,711	1,518	1,518	2,103	2,103

Panel B: log Market-to-Book Regressions								
	2005-2006 Sample		2004-2008 Sample		Survivors Only		Listed in 2005	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post \times Treated	-0.074*** (0.02)	-0.089*** (0.02)	-0.070** (0.03)	-0.072*** (0.03)	-0.056* (0.03)	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.069*** (0.03)	-0.075*** (0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.086	0.251	0.647	0.710	0.428	0.514	0.404	0.503
Observations	1,113	1,113	2,711	2,711	1,518	1,518	2,103	2,103

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A5
Quarterly Treatment Effects

This table provides quarterly estimates of the treatment effect on bank value. The table is identical to Table 1.2, but here I assign an individual indicator to each post-treatment quarter. For example, the “Q1-2006 × Treated” indicator identifies observations for treated banks in the first quarter of 2006. All the variables are defined as in Table 1.1.

	log Tobin's q			log Market-to-Book		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Q1-2006 × Treated	-0.009** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.010** (0.00)	-0.057** (0.02)	-0.065*** (0.02)	-0.060*** (0.02)
Q2-2006 × Treated	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.078*** (0.03)	-0.073*** (0.03)
Q3-2006 × Treated	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.079*** (0.03)	-0.089*** (0.03)	-0.084*** (0.03)
Q4-2006 × Treated	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.073** (0.03)	-0.082*** (0.03)	-0.077*** (0.03)
Q1-2007 × Treated	-0.009** (0.00)	-0.010** (0.00)	-0.009** (0.00)	-0.065** (0.03)	-0.073** (0.03)	-0.068** (0.03)
Q2-2007 × Treated	-0.008 (0.00)	-0.009** (0.00)	-0.009** (0.00)	-0.064* (0.04)	-0.079** (0.03)	-0.075** (0.03)
Q3-2007 × Treated	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.073* (0.04)	-0.081** (0.03)	-0.074** (0.03)
Q4-2007 × Treated	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.077* (0.05)	-0.086** (0.04)	-0.079** (0.04)
Leverage		0.318*** (0.12)	0.254** (0.10)		5.475*** (0.81)	5.170*** (0.68)
Tier 1 Ratio		0.376*** (0.08)	0.280*** (0.07)		2.540*** (0.51)	1.747*** (0.48)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.361	0.394	0.418	0.413	0.470	0.503
Observations	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A6

Falsification Tests: Non-Fed-Regulated Firms

In this table, I study whether firms that are not regulated by the Fed experience a valuation discount at the beginning of 2006. I first merge quarterly Compustat with the Fed Bank Regulatory dataset to identify and remove BHCs from the sample. I then identify non-BHC financial firms as firms with CRSP SIC code between 6000 and 6799. Finally, I remove observations of firms with less than \$400 million and more than \$600 million in 2005 average total assets, and use a \$500 million asset threshold to classify firms as “small” (average 2005 assets below the threshold) and “large” (average 2005 assets above the threshold). In Panel A, I investigate valuation changes in the falsification sample of non-financial firms. In Panel B, I investigate valuation changes in the sample of non-BHC financial firms. Unreported control variables include leverage (book value of debt divided by book value of equity), quarterly operating investment (percentage change in quarterly operating assets, where operating assets are the sum of PP&E, trade receivables net of trade payables, deferred taxes and investment tax credit, and other current assets), interest coverage (operating income before depreciation divided by interest expense), profitability (operating income divided by revenues), and Return on Assets (operating income divided by total assets).

Panel A: Non-Financials						
	log Tobin's q			log Market-to-Book		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Small Non-Fin.	-0.026 (0.05)	-0.042 (0.05)	-0.046 (0.04)	0.066 (0.08)	0.050 (0.08)	0.041 (0.07)
log Assets		-0.185*** (0.05)	-0.197*** (0.04)		-0.288*** (0.08)	-0.304*** (0.08)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.161	0.190	0.225	0.139	0.165	0.226
Observations	3,459	3,459	3,459	3,268	3,268	3,268
Panel B: Non-BHC Financials						
	log Tobin's q			log Market-to-Book		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Small Non-BHC	0.109 (0.20)	0.040 (0.19)	-0.032 (0.15)	0.131 (0.20)	0.112 (0.18)	0.040 (0.15)
log Assets		-0.383* (0.20)	-0.415* (0.20)		-0.105 (0.18)	-0.164 (0.17)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.231	0.337	0.508	0.310	0.314	0.558
Observations	299	299	299	299	299	299

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

A.3 Additional Results: Management Monitoring

Table A7

Triple Differences: Policy Effect on Market-to-Book

In this table I investigate whether the negative correlation between post-treatment professional expenditure growth and value discounts is mechanically driven by changes in other variables that are correlated with professional expenditures. In practice, I repeat the same exercise as in Table 1.5 but interacting the “Post × Treated” indicator with ROE, total assets and Z-Score.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post × Treated (<i>a</i>)	-0.072*** (0.03)	-0.071*** (0.03)	-0.084*** (0.03)	-0.072*** (0.03)	-0.069*** (0.03)	0.940 (0.72)	-0.072*** (0.03)	-0.073*** (0.03)	-0.065** (0.03)
ROE (<i>b</i>)		0.689** (0.33)	0.294 (0.42)						
(<i>a</i>) × (<i>b</i>)			0.654* (0.34)						
log Assets (<i>c</i>)					-0.282*** (0.06)	-0.261*** (0.06)			
(<i>a</i>) × (<i>c</i>)						-0.078 (0.06)			
Z-Score (<i>d</i>)							0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	
(<i>a</i>) × (<i>d</i>)									-0.000* (0.00)
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.368	0.377	0.380	0.368	0.403	0.406	0.368	0.376	0.377
Observations	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,516	2,516

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A8
Audit Fees

In this table, I show the treatment effect on different components of bank professional expenditure, and in particular on audit fees. The data comes from annual AuditAnalytics (AA). In Panel A, I show the treatment effect on AuditAnalytics audit fees, non-audit fees (the sum of employee benefit plan audits, due diligence and accounting related to mergers and acquisitions, internal control reviews, and other fees) and the difference between annual professional fees from Compustat and total annual fees (sum of audit and non-audit fees) from AuditAnalytics. In Panel B, I scale the variables by annual net income from Compustat. Unreported control variables include annual leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, ROE, and diversification, defined as in Table 1.1.

Panel A: log Fees						
	AA Audit Fees		AA Non-Audit Fees		Residual Prof. Fees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post × Treated	-0.029 (0.05)	-0.019 (0.05)	0.197* (0.11)	0.207* (0.11)	1.425*** (0.35)	1.306*** (0.34)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.415	0.470	0.020	0.044	0.182	0.232
Observations	894	894	855	855	218	218

Panel B: log Fees-to-Net Income						
	AA Audit Fees		AA Non-Audit Fees		Residual Prof. Fees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post × Treated	-0.009 (0.10)	0.057 (0.07)	0.186 (0.15)	0.262** (0.13)	1.316*** (0.38)	1.135*** (0.42)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.134	0.594	0.088	0.402	0.128	0.195
Observations	827	827	790	790	215	215

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A9
Internal Controls and Post-Treatment Professional Expenditure

In this table I study the interaction between internal controls and professional expenditure. I assign treated banks to one of two groups based on whether they mention (the Internal Controls (IC) group) or they do not mention (the No-IC group) internal controls as a source of professional expenditure in the notes to their 2006 and 2007 10-K filings. The table provides an estimate of the treatment effect on professional expenditure in these two groups. Unreported control variables include total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

	log Professional Fees			log $\frac{\text{Professional Fees}}{\text{Net Interest Revenue}}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated \times No-IC	0.059 (0.09)	0.057 (0.09)	0.105 (0.08)	0.086 (0.10)	0.083 (0.10)	0.087 (0.09)
Post \times Treated \times IC	0.403*** (0.11)	0.422*** (0.10)	0.331*** (0.09)	0.337*** (0.11)	0.337*** (0.11)	0.326*** (0.09)
Leverage		-1.981 (3.12)	-1.415 (2.45)		2.187 (3.10)	0.911 (2.58)
Tier 1 Ratio		-4.557*** (1.51)	-2.467* (1.35)		-1.431 (1.52)	-1.576 (1.43)
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.102	0.128	0.187	0.054	0.068	0.127
Observations	923	923	923	923	923	923

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A10
SEC Accelerated Filers

In this table, I investigate whether the observed changes in valuation and professional expenses after the treatment are due to size-related SOX provisions as opposed to the Fed policy. Similar to [Iliev \(2010\)](#), in Panel A I run a falsification test to investigate whether SEC resolution 70 FR 56825 (allowing small, non-accelerated SEC filers to postpone the implementation of SOX) has a valuation impact on non-accelerated SEC filers after the first quarter of 2006. In Panel B, I similarly investigate whether the treatment effect on professional fees comes from the subset of treated BHCs that are non-accelerated filers. Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

Panel A: Accelerated Filers vs. Non-Accelerated Filers								
	log Tobin's q		log Market-to-Book		log Prof. Fees		log $\frac{\text{Prof. Fees}}{\text{Net Int. Income}}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post \times Nonacc. Filer	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)	-0.021 (0.02)	-0.036 (0.02)	0.128 (0.08)	0.111 (0.08)	0.108 (0.09)	0.118 (0.08)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.039	0.090	0.061	0.217	0.031	0.077	0.043	0.106
Observations	985	985	985	985	461	461	461	461

Panel B: Interaction Effects, Treated \times Accelerated Filers								
	log Tobin's q		log Market-to-Book		log Prof. Fees		log $\frac{\text{Prof. Fees}}{\text{Net Int. Income}}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post \times Nonacc. Treated	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.055** (0.02)	-0.077*** (0.02)	0.246*** (0.08)	0.213** (0.08)	0.207** (0.09)	0.227*** (0.08)
Post \times Acc. Treated	-0.026*** (0.01)	-0.027*** (0.01)	-0.130*** (0.05)	-0.142*** (0.04)	0.204 (0.15)	0.214 (0.15)	0.225 (0.16)	0.201 (0.15)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.099	0.153	0.098	0.262	0.056	0.097	0.062	0.124
Observations	1,025	1,025	1,025	1,025	480	480	480	480

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A11

Summary Statistics: Funding Costs, Profitability, and Earnings Smoothing

This table reports summary statistics for the dependent variables used in Section 1.5.1, both in the 2006-2008 full sample and in the two sub-samples of banks with total assets below \$500 million and with total assets between \$500 and \$700 million (the “unmonitored” and “monitored” groups, respectively). In the table, LLP stands for Loan Loss Provisions, while DNLLP stands for Discretionary Negative Loan Loss Provisions (see Table 1.6). All the variables are constructed using data from quarterly Compustat Bank, and are reported in percentage terms.

	2006-2008 Sample				Unmonitored				Monitored			
	N	Mean	Med.	SD	N	Mean	Med.	SD	N	Mean	Med.	SD
Int. Expense/Total Loans	1,129	1.02	0.99	0.32	625	1.01	0.98	0.36	504	1.02	1.00	0.27
Int. Income/Total Loans	1,128	2.30	2.21	0.50	625	2.33	2.22	0.59	503	2.25	2.21	0.36
ROE	1,067	1.24	1.99	3.89	613	1.01	1.92	3.97	454	1.54	2.13	3.75
LLP/Net Interest Income	1,110	0.00	0.00	0.03	612	0.00	0.00	0.03	498	0.00	0.00	0.02
DNLLP 1	645	6.55	4.61	6.33	359	6.68	4.64	6.38	286	6.38	4.49	6.28
DNLLP 2	651	6.62	4.57	6.33	364	6.70	4.75	6.36	287	6.51	4.41	6.30

Table A12

Funding Costs and Earnings Smoothing: Robustness and Placebo

In this table, I show two sets of robustness test on the results of Table 1.6. In Panel A, I show changes in the funding costs (interest expense divided by interest income, Specification (1), and interest expense divided by total loans, Specification (2)), profitability (ROA and ROE), LLP (LLP to loans, Specification (5), and LLP to net interest income, Specification (6)), and discretionary LLP (DLLP 1 and 2) of unmonitored banks during the financial crisis, where I restrict the sample to banks that survive for the entire 2006-2008 period. In Panel B, I use an alternative threshold of \$400 million to define unmonitored banks. Unreported controls include previous-quarter Tobin's q , leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, diversification, and asset growth in the first four specifications of both panels, as well as operating profitability and ROE in the last four specifications.

Panel A: Surviving Banks								
	Funding Costs		ROA/ROE		LLP		DNLLP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Crisis \times Unmonitored	0.033 (0.02)	0.061** (0.02)	-0.080 (0.10)	-0.088 (0.10)	-0.519*** (0.19)	-0.553** (0.22)	0.463* (0.25)	0.619** (0.26)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.578	0.756	0.261	0.233	0.416	0.562	0.379	0.385
Observations	645	645	560	560	433	433	409	417

Panel B: \$400M Monitoring Threshold Placebo Sample								
	Funding Costs		ROA/ROE		LLP		DNLLP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Crisis \times Small	0.011 (0.02)	0.031 (0.03)	-0.140 (0.13)	-0.156 (0.13)	-0.144 (0.26)	-0.078 (0.29)	0.379 (0.27)	0.492 (0.30)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.513	0.748	0.254	0.236	0.350	0.526	0.340	0.318
Observations	911	911	783	783	630	630	541	553

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A13

Robustness: Cash Flow Risk, Shareholder Value, and Professional Expenditure

In this table I perform a robustness check on the results of Table 1.7 by using alternative risk measures to sort treated banks. In Panel A I sort treated banks based on whether their average Z-Score is above or below the median Z-Score in my sample. Similarly, in Panel B I sort treated banks based on whether their average equity volatility is above or below the median equity volatility in my sample. Both Z-Score and equity volatility are defined as in Table 1.5. Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification and asset growth.

Panel A: Z-Score Sorting						
	log Tobin's q		log Market-to-Book		log Prof. Fees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated \times Low Z-Score	-0.008 (0.00)	-0.008* (0.00)	-0.050 (0.03)	-0.058* (0.03)	0.244* (0.14)	0.215** (0.09)
Post \times Control \times High Z-Score	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.086*** (0.03)	-0.088*** (0.03)	0.272*** (0.09)	0.269*** (0.09)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.361	0.419	0.414	0.504	0.076	0.182
Observations	2,177	2,177	2,177	2,177	999	999

Panel B: Equity Volatility Sorting						
	log Tobin's q		log Market-to-Book		log Prof. Fees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated \times Low Volatility	-0.006 (0.00)	-0.007 (0.00)	-0.027 (0.03)	-0.041 (0.03)	0.320*** (0.10)	0.267*** (0.09)
Post \times Treated \times High Volatility	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.095*** (0.03)	-0.094*** (0.03)	0.212* (0.12)	0.227*** (0.08)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.360	0.417	0.416	0.505	0.079	0.183
Observations	2,160	2,160	2,160	2,160	995	995

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A14
Chairman Ownership and Professional Expenditure Persistence

This table shows the persistence of the treatment effect on professional expenditure for treated banks with chairman ownership in the bottom two terciles of the chairman ownership distribution in my sample, as well as in the top tercile of the distribution. The independent variable is the natural logarithm of professional expenditures. Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification and asset growth.

	Low Chairman Own. Treated			High Chairman Own. Treated		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Q1-2006 × Treated	0.148 (0.10)	0.160* (0.09)	0.173* (0.09)	0.272** (0.11)	0.293*** (0.10)	0.238** (0.09)
Q2-2006 × Treated	0.288** (0.11)	0.280** (0.11)	0.290*** (0.11)	0.395*** (0.14)	0.404*** (0.13)	0.314** (0.12)
Q3-2006 × Treated	0.144 (0.11)	0.153 (0.10)	0.150 (0.10)	0.406*** (0.13)	0.429*** (0.13)	0.337*** (0.12)
Q4-2006 × Treated	0.033 (0.12)	0.020 (0.11)	0.027 (0.11)	0.421*** (0.16)	0.424*** (0.15)	0.328** (0.16)
Q1-2007 × Treated	0.210* (0.12)	0.196* (0.12)	0.209** (0.10)	0.484*** (0.18)	0.486*** (0.16)	0.389** (0.16)
Q2-2007 × Treated	0.275** (0.13)	0.277** (0.12)	0.265*** (0.10)	0.511*** (0.17)	0.531*** (0.15)	0.414*** (0.13)
Q3-2007 × Treated	0.351** (0.14)	0.344*** (0.13)	0.343*** (0.10)	0.530*** (0.18)	0.541*** (0.16)	0.447*** (0.14)
Q4-2007 × Treated	0.198 (0.20)	0.188 (0.20)	0.167 (0.17)	0.338 (0.27)	0.333 (0.25)	0.259 (0.24)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.069	0.098	0.173	0.120	0.137	0.190
Observations	875	875	875	667	667	667

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A15
Chairman Ownership and Market-to-Book Discount Persistence

This table shows the persistence of the treatment effect on Market-to-Book for treated banks with chairman ownership in the bottom two terciles of the chairman ownership distribution in my sample, as well as in the top tercile of the distribution. The independent variable is the natural logarithm of Market-to-Book. Unreported control variables include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, total assets, profitability, ROE, diversification and asset growth.

	Low Chairman Own. Treated			High Chairman Own. Treated		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Q1-2006 × Treated	-0.045* (0.02)	-0.053** (0.02)	-0.051** (0.02)	-0.052* (0.03)	-0.067** (0.03)	-0.056** (0.03)
Q2-2006 × Treated	-0.061** (0.03)	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.068** (0.03)	-0.061* (0.03)	-0.075** (0.03)	-0.064* (0.03)
Q3-2006 × Treated	-0.068** (0.03)	-0.075** (0.03)	-0.076*** (0.03)	-0.075** (0.04)	-0.096*** (0.03)	-0.084** (0.03)
Q4-2006 × Treated	-0.067** (0.03)	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.063 (0.04)	-0.085** (0.04)	-0.071* (0.04)
Q1-2007 × Treated	-0.069** (0.03)	-0.072** (0.03)	-0.070** (0.03)	-0.055 (0.04)	-0.075** (0.04)	-0.066* (0.03)
Q2-2007 × Treated	-0.060 (0.04)	-0.070** (0.04)	-0.070** (0.03)	-0.052 (0.05)	-0.082* (0.05)	-0.074* (0.04)
Q3-2007 × Treated	-0.075* (0.04)	-0.075** (0.04)	-0.070** (0.03)	-0.049 (0.05)	-0.082* (0.04)	-0.061 (0.04)
Q4-2007 × Treated	-0.094* (0.05)	-0.094** (0.04)	-0.090** (0.04)	-0.059 (0.06)	-0.086 (0.05)	-0.077 (0.05)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.425	0.484	0.513	0.410	0.474	0.524
Observations	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,503	1,503	1,503

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

A.4 Tests of Additional Hypotheses

Table A16
Government Tail Risk Insurance

In this table, I investigate the treatment effect on treated banks' exposure to bank-specific tail risk (Gandhi and Lustig (2015)). In each quarter from Q1-2004 to Q4-2008, I sort commercial bank stocks into five size portfolios based on their market capitalization at the end of the previous quarter. I compute daily value-weighted excess returns on each of the five size portfolios, and regress these daily excess returns on the Fama-French *market*, *hml* and *smb* risk factors (from Kenneth French's website), and two factors measuring bank interest rate risk (*ltg*, the yield on a 10-year treasury note minus the yield on a 2-year treasury note) and credit risk (*crd*, the Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield index minus the yield on a 10-year treasury note). The data used to construct *ltg* and *crd* comes from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis' website. I combine the residuals from the time-series regressions in a $(T_d \times 5)$ matrix (where T_d is the number of daily portfolio return observations for the period 2004-2007), and obtain the size factor as the second principal component of this matrix. The table shows the treatment effect on the quarterly loading of each bank's excess returns on the size risk factor. The loadings I use as dependent variables in the first three specifications come from the market model augmented with the bank size factor, while the loadings in the last three specifications come from the Gandhi-Lustig (GL) specification that includes the bank size factor and the other orthogonal factors (*market*, *hml*, *smb*, *ltg* and *crd*) as risk factors. The unreported liquidity controls include all the liquidity variables from Table A18, Panel A. The remaining unreported controls include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

	Factor Loading (Market Model)			Factor Loading (GL Model)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Liquidity Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.016	0.025	0.047	0.014	0.021	0.039
Observations	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A17

Voluntary Reporting

This table compares the treatment effect on Tobin's q (Panel A) and Market-to-Book (Panel B) across two sub-groups of treated BHCs. The first sub-group consists of treated BHCs that voluntarily file form FR Y-9C after the treatment. The second sub-group consists of treated BHCs that stop filing form FR Y-9C after the treatment. Unreported control variables include professional fees, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

Panel A: log Tobin's q Regressions						
	Voluntary Reporting			Not Reporting		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	-0.012** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.010** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)
Leverage		0.395** (0.15)	0.311** (0.13)		0.291** (0.13)	0.211* (0.11)
Tier 1 Ratio		0.489*** (0.11)	0.366*** (0.11)		0.293*** (0.07)	0.184*** (0.06)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.360	0.404	0.425	0.353	0.374	0.407
Observations	1,412	1,412	1,412	1,922	1,922	1,922

Panel B: log Market-to-Book Regressions						
	Voluntary Reporting			Not Reporting		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	-0.082* (0.04)	-0.089** (0.03)	-0.084** (0.04)	-0.078*** (0.03)	-0.084*** (0.03)	-0.075*** (0.02)
Leverage		5.873*** (0.94)	5.307*** (0.88)		5.215*** (0.91)	4.868*** (0.74)
Tier 1 Ratio		3.053*** (0.71)	2.236*** (0.73)		2.062*** (0.48)	1.094** (0.42)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.420	0.487	0.503	0.407	0.462	0.512
Observations	1,412	1,412	1,412	1,922	1,922	1,922

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A18

Liquidity, Volatility, and Market Frictions

In this table, I study the treatment effect on liquidity, volatility, and market information responsiveness of treated banks' stocks. In Panel A, I show the treatment effect on the [Holden \(2009\)](#) Effective Tick Size, the [Corwin and Schultz \(2012\)](#) Bid-Ask Spread, and the [Amihud \(2002\)](#) liquidity measures (constructed as in the referenced papers). Moreover, I show the effect on Zero Days Traded (number of days in which a stock is not traded) and Turnover (daily volume divided by shares outstanding). Effective Tick Size and Zero Days Traded are computed on a quarterly basis, while Bid-Ask Spread, Amihud and Turnover are quarterly averages of daily measures. In Panel B, I show the treatment effect on quarterly return volatility, quarterly idiosyncratic volatility (IdVol) from the Fama-French four factor model (FF4), and quarterly idiosyncratic volatility from the [Adrian et al. \(2015\)](#) Financial CAPM model (FCAPM). Finally, in Specifications (7)-(10) I show the effect on quarterly measures of price responsiveness to market information (D1 and D2, as in [Hou and Moskowitz \(2005\)](#)). All the variables used in the table are constructed using daily stock returns from CRSP. The control variables in Panels A and B include leverage, Tier 1 Ratio, profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth. Moreover, Panel B includes all the liquidity variables from Panel A as additional controls.

Panel A: Liquidity										
	Effective Tick		CS Spread		Amihud		Zero Days		Turnover	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post × Treated	-0.000	-0.000	-0.003	-0.003	0.000*	0.000*	0.006	0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.037	0.089	0.252	0.299	0.043	0.054	0.082	0.118	0.049	0.097
Observations	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044

Panel B: Equity Volatility and Market Delay										
	Total Vol		FF4 IdVol		FCAPM IdVol		D1		D2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post × Treated	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.040*	0.030	0.245	0.222
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Liquidity Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Other Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.212	0.629	0.208	0.608	0.205	0.610	0.018	0.040	0.013	0.021
Observations	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044	2,044

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Table A19
Leverage and Capital Ratios

In this table, I investigate the treatment effect on bank leverage and capital requirements. In Panel A, I investigate the treatment effect on three different measures of bank leverage, namely liabilities divided by total assets, divided by the book value of equity and divided by total earning assets (the sum of cash and due from banks, assets sold under repurchase agreements, trading account securities, investment securities, loans net of loan loss allowance, customer acceptances, and other assets). In Panel B, I investigate the treatment effect on the Tier 1, Tier 2 and Combined (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) Capital Ratio of treated banks. The Tier 1 Ratio is the sum of equity capital and minority interests, divided by risk-weighted assets. The Tier 2 Ratio is the sum of cumulative preferred stock, qualifying debt, and allowance for credit losses minus investment in certain subsidiaries, divided by risk-weighted assets. Unreported control variables include profitability, ROE, diversification, and asset growth.

Panel A: Leverage						
	$\log \frac{\text{Liabilities}}{\text{Assets}}$		$\log \frac{\text{Liabilities}}{\text{Equity}}$		$\log \frac{\text{Liabilities}}{\text{Earning Assets}}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post × Treated	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.009 (0.03)	-0.012 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.012	0.048	0.014	0.073	0.038	0.111
Observations	2,575	2,575	2,575	2,575	2,575	2,575

Panel B: Capital Ratios						
	$\log \text{Tier 1 Ratio}$		$\log \text{Tier 2 Ratio}$		$\log \text{Combined Ratio}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post × Treated	0.026 (0.02)	0.033 (0.02)	-0.064 (0.05)	-0.065 (0.05)	0.007 (0.02)	0.013 (0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.028	0.175	0.050	0.056	0.062	0.176
Observations	2,178	2,178	2,159	2,159	2,199	2,199

Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.

Appendix B

Appendix to Chapter 2

B.1 Substitutability and Price Externalities

In this Appendix extend the analysis of Section 2.3 by allowing for a rich degree of price externalities. In particular, we analyze the degree to which the ability of the Principal to impose group punishments improves social welfare when varying the degree of substitutability between the output of individual producers. In Section B.1.1, we introduce a new pricing function which admits a variable degree of substitution across producers' goods and derive equilibrium outcomes of the stage game. In Section B.1.2, we develop a recursive formulation of the infinite-horizon game and show that the usefulness of group punishments increases as goods become more substitutable.

B.1.1 Stage Game

We generalize the price function by assuming that consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over a bundle of individual producers' output and a numeraire good, and that these consumers face taxes τ on purchases of each producers' output. In this economy, the inverse demand function for each producer i 's output satisfies

$$p_i(q, \tau) = \alpha \frac{q_i^{\rho-1}}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i^\rho} - \tau, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho \in (0, 1)$. Here, the parameter α is a Cobb-Douglas parameter that governs the substitutability between the numeraire good and the bundle of producers' output, while the parameter ρ governs the degree of substitutability between each producer's output. Under this formulation, a higher level of ρ implies a higher degree of substitutability.

With prices specified in (B.1), each producer i obtains a static payoff given by

$$u_i(q, \tau) = \alpha \frac{q_i^\rho}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i^\rho} - \tau q_i - c q_i, \quad (\text{B.2})$$

while the Principal obtains a static payoff given by

$$w(Q, \tau) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i(q, \tau) q_i \quad (\text{B.3})$$

$$= \alpha - \tau Q. \quad (\text{B.4})$$

As in the case of a linear inverse demand function, after observing any level Q , the Principal optimally chooses $\tau(Q) = 0$ in the stage game. We impose a restriction on the strategy set of each producer which requires strictly positive production. Formally, we restrict $q_i \in [\underline{q}, \infty]$ with $\underline{q} < q_i^N$. Under this restriction, the level of output that maximizes joint profits in the stage game satisfies

$$q_i^m = \arg \max_{q_i \geq \underline{q}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{n} - cq_i \right) \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$= \underline{q}. \quad (\text{B.6})$$

Next, to solve for the unique perfect-public equilibrium of the stage game q_i^N , we note that for each q_{-i} , producer i solves

$$\max_{q_i} \alpha \frac{q_i^\rho}{q_i^\rho + \sum_{-i} q_{-i}^\rho} - cq_i.$$

It is straightforward to show that the unique perfect-public equilibrium of the stage game is

$$q_i^N = \frac{n-1}{n^2} \frac{\alpha \rho}{c}. \quad (\text{B.7})$$

B.1.2 Infinitely-Repeated Game

We focus on characterizing *strongly* symmetric perfect-public equilibria. We denote by $u(q, \tau)$ the producer's payoff and by $w(Q, \tau)$ the Principal's payoff, and after appealing to the one-shot deviation principle, we proceed to characterize the best and worst perfect-public equilibria of the repeated game. Under the inverse demand function (B.1), for a given level of the worst equilibrium payoff \underline{v} the best equilibrium payoff \bar{v} solves

$$\bar{v} = \max_q u(q, 0),$$

subject to, for all q' ,

$$u(q, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) + \delta \bar{v}, \quad (\text{B.8})$$

$$\bar{v} \geq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} [w(q' + (n-1)q, 0) - w(q' + (n-1)q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q))] + \underline{v}, \quad (\text{B.9})$$

where $g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q))$ now satisfies

$$g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) = u(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) + \frac{1}{n}w(q' + (n-1)q, 0) - \frac{1}{n}w(q' + (n-1)q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)). \quad (\text{B.10})$$

As in the previous section, we define the maximum payoff that can be achieved by a producer by deviating to q' when the others are producing q as $\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot))$. This maximum payoff satisfies

$$\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot)) = \max_{q'} g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)).$$

In the next lemma, we show that as long as the prescribed output is larger than the static Nash equilibrium output, the maximum deviation payoff $\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot))$ is minimized when the Principal levies no taxes (i.e., when $\tau = 0$).

Lemma 12. $\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot)) \geq \hat{g}(q, \tau = 0)$ when $q \geq q^N$.

Proof. See Appendix B.2.2. □

Given Lemma 12, the key propositions of Section 2.3 immediately extend to the environment with imperfectly substitutable goods. Here, we explore how the usefulness of group punishments in improving welfare depends on the degree of substitutability between individual producers' output. We start by showing in the following lemma that when the number of producers n is sufficiently large, the best equilibrium level of output of the model where taxes are not allowed is increasing in the substitutability parameter ρ .

Lemma 13. For n sufficiently large, $d\bar{q}^A/d\rho > 0$.

Proof. See Appendix B.2.2. □

The intuition behind this lemma is that when output is more substitutable the negative impact of an individual producer's output on the common price is lower. This increases producers' incentives

to over-produce, and leads to higher levels of production and lower equilibrium values in the best equilibrium.

Finally, in the following proposition we formalize our numerical illustration from Section 2.3.3 that the welfare gains from group punishments are increasing in the parameter ρ . For a given set of parameters, let ΔU denote the change in the value of the best equilibrium in our model relative to the value of the best equilibrium in the model where group punishments are not allowed, i.e.

$$\Delta U \equiv \frac{u(\bar{q}) - u(\bar{q}^A)}{u(\bar{q}^A)}. \quad (\text{B.11})$$


Proposition 14. *Fix $\rho \in (0, 1)$. For n sufficiently large, there exists a $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and $\bar{\rho} > 0$ such that for all $\rho' \in (\rho, \bar{\rho})$, $d\Delta U(\rho')/d\rho' > 0$.*

We give here a sketch of our argument, and leave a formal proof to Appendix B.2.2. For a fixed level of the substitutability parameter ρ , we know that our model achieves the first-best level of output q^m at a lower level of the discount factor than the model where taxes are not allowed. This happens because, as showed in Proposition 8, the threat of taxes always weakly enlarges the equilibrium set, and strictly enlarges the equilibrium set when producers are sufficiently patient. We denote by $\delta^{A*}(\rho)$ the threshold level of the discount factor at which the model where taxes are not allowed first achieves q^m as the most collusive level of output, and by $\delta^*(\rho)$ the level of the discount factor at which our model first achieves q^m as the most collusive level of output. Since $\delta^*(\rho) < \delta^{A*}(\rho)$, we can always find a discount factor δ^0 such that $\delta^*(\rho) < \delta^0 < \delta^{A*}(\rho)$. At δ^0 the model where taxes are allowed achieves q^m as the most collusive level of output, while the model where taxes are not allowed achieves a higher level of output (a lower value) than q^m . In the final step of the proof we argue that by continuity at this δ^0 , if ρ increases by a sufficiently small amount to some $\bar{\rho}' > \rho$, the model where taxes are allowed still achieves q^m as the most collusive level of output. At δ^0 , on the other hand, the most collusive level of output under $\bar{\rho}'$ is strictly greater than the most collusive level of output under ρ in the model where taxes are not allowed (from Lemma 13). Therefore the increase in output (and decrease in value) relative to q^m (the most collusive level of output at δ^0 , in the model where taxes are allowed) increases when ρ increases to $\bar{\rho}'$. Using the same argument, we prove that for all $\rho' \in (\rho, \bar{\rho})$, $d\Delta U(\rho')/d\rho' > 0$.

Figure B1

Comparative Statics: Marginal Costs of Production and Team Welfare

Percentage increase in welfare in best equilibrium from group punishments for various marginal costs of production c for a fixed discount factor ($\delta = 0.16$).



Different parametrizations of the model suggest that the results of Proposition 14 hold for a wide range of the model's key parameters. As an example, Figure B1 shows the percentage increase in welfare in the best equilibrium associated with group punishments for various values of the degree of substitutability ρ and the marginal cost of production, c . In this figure, we hold the discount factor fixed at a value of $\delta = 0.16$. This figure clearly shows that an increase in the degree of substitutability strictly raises the welfare gains associated with group punishments and that these welfare gains are not particularly sensitive to the marginal costs of production.

B.2 Definitions and Proofs

B.2.1 Definitions and Proofs from Sections 2.2 and 2.3

Repeated Game Definitions

Definition 1. For any history $h^{wt} \in \mathcal{H}^w$ the continuation game is the infinitely-repeated game that begins in period t , following history h^{wt} . For any strategy profile $\sigma = (\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n, \sigma_w)$, agent i 's continuation

strategy induced by h^{wt} is given by $\sigma_i (h^{wt}h^{ws})$ for all $h^{ws} \in \mathcal{H}^w$, where $h^{wt}h^{ws}$ is the concatenation of history h^{wt} followed by history h^{ws} . Similarly, the Principal continuation strategy induced by h^{wt} is given by $\sigma_w ((h^{wt}h^{ws}), x (\sigma_1 (h^{wt}h^{ws}), \sigma_2 (h^{wt}h^{ws}), \dots, \sigma_n (h^{wt}h^{ws})))$ for all $h^{ws} \in \mathcal{H}^w$.

Definition 2. A Perfect-Public Equilibrium is $\sigma = (\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n, \sigma_w)$ such that, for all histories $h^{wt} \in \mathcal{H}^w$,

$$U_i^t (h^{wt}, \sigma) \geq U_i^t (h^{wt}, (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) \quad (\text{B.12})$$

for all i , $\tilde{\sigma}_i$, and

$$U_w^t (h^{wt}, \sigma) \geq U_w^t (h^{wt}, (\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n, \tilde{\sigma}_w)) \quad (\text{B.13})$$

for all $\tilde{\sigma}_w$.

Definition 3. A one-shot deviation for agent i from strategy σ_i is a strategy $\tilde{\sigma}_i \neq \sigma_i$ such that there exists a unique history $\tilde{h}^{wt} \in \mathcal{H}^w$ such that for all $h^{ws} \neq \tilde{h}^{wt}$,

$$\sigma_i (h^{ws}) = \tilde{\sigma}_i (h^{ws}). \quad (\text{B.14})$$

Similarly, a one-shot deviation for the Principal from strategy σ_w is a strategy $\tilde{\sigma}_w \neq \sigma_w$ such that for all $h^{wt} \in \mathcal{H}^w$ there exists a level of the total outcome \tilde{x}_t such that for all $x_t \neq \tilde{x}_t$,

$$\sigma_w (h^{wt}, x_t) = \tilde{\sigma}_w (h^{wt}, x_t). \quad (\text{B.15})$$

Definition 4. A one-shot deviation $\tilde{\sigma}_i$ from the agent strategy σ_i is profitable if at history \tilde{h}^{wt} for which $\tilde{\sigma}_i (\tilde{h}^{wt}) \neq \sigma_i (\tilde{h}^{wt})$,

$$U_i^t (\tilde{h}^{wt}, (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) > U_i^t (\tilde{h}^{wt}, \sigma). \quad (\text{B.16})$$

A one-shot deviation $\tilde{\sigma}_w$ from the Principal strategy σ_w is profitable if for all $h^{wt} \in \mathcal{H}^w$, at the outcome level for which $\tilde{\sigma}_w (\tilde{h}^{wt}, x_t) \neq \sigma_w (\tilde{h}^{wt}, x_t)$,

$$U_w^t (\tilde{h}^{wt}, (\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n, \tilde{\sigma}_w)) > U_w^t (\tilde{h}^{wt}, \sigma). \quad (\text{B.17})$$

Proof of Proposition 3

If a profile is perfect-public, clearly there are no profitable one-shot deviations. Now suppose that the profile σ is not perfect-public. We want to show that there must be a profitable one-shot deviation. Since σ is not perfect-public, there exists a history \tilde{h}^{wt} , an agent i and a strategy $\tilde{\sigma}_i$ (the proof for the Principal follows the same steps) such that

$$U_i^t(\tilde{h}^{wt}, \sigma) < U_i^t(\tilde{h}^{wt}, (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)). \quad (\text{B.18})$$

Let $\varepsilon = U_i^t(\tilde{h}^{wt}, (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) - U_i^t(\tilde{h}^{wt}, \sigma)$. Let $m = \min_{i,q,\tau} u_i(q, \tau)$ and $M = \max_{i,q,\tau} u_i(q, \tau)$, with T large enough that $\delta^T(M - m) < \varepsilon/2$.^{B.1} Finally, for any agent i and history $h^{ws} \in \mathcal{H}^w$, let

$$u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), \sigma) = u_i\left(\{\sigma_i(\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws})\}_{i=1}^n, \sigma_w((\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), x(\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}))\right), \quad (\text{B.19})$$

where $x(\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws})$ is short-hand notation for $x(\sigma_1(\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), \sigma_2(\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), \dots, \sigma_n(\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}))$, and denote by \tilde{h}^{ws} the period- s history induced by $(\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \delta) \left[\sum_{s=t}^{T-1} \delta^s u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), \sigma) + \sum_{s=T}^{\infty} \delta^s u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), \sigma) \right] \\ &= (1 - \delta) \left[\sum_{s=0}^{T-1} \delta^s u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}\tilde{h}^{ws}), (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) + \sum_{s=T}^{\infty} \delta^s u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}\tilde{h}^{ws}), (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) \right] - \varepsilon, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.20})$$

so that

$$(1 - \delta) \sum_{s=t}^{T-1} \delta^s u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}h^{ws}), \sigma) < (1 - \delta) \sum_{s=0}^{T-1} \delta^s u_i^s((\tilde{h}^{wt}\tilde{h}^{ws}), (\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}. \quad (\text{B.21})$$

Then the strategy $\hat{\sigma}_i$ such that

$$\hat{\sigma}_i(h^{ws}) = \begin{cases} \tilde{\sigma}_i(h^{ws}) & \text{if } s < T, \\ \sigma_i(h^{ws}) & \text{if } s \geq T, \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.22})$$

^{B.1}Note that $u_i(\cdot)$ is potentially unbounded below. Here we impose that m is an arbitrarily large negative number.

is a profitable deviation from $\sigma_i(\tilde{h}^{wt})$. Now let $\hat{h}^{w(T-1)}$ denote the period $T - 1$ history induced by $(\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)$. There are two possibilities. First, suppose

$$U_i^{T-1} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)} \right), \sigma \right) < U_i^{T-1} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)} \right), (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right). \quad (\text{B.23})$$

Then, since $\hat{\sigma}_i$ agrees with σ_i in period T and after T , we have a profitable one-shot deviation after history $\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)}$. Alternatively, suppose

$$U_i^{T-1} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)} \right), \sigma \right) \geq U_i^{T-1} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)} \right), (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right), \quad (\text{B.24})$$

and construct the strategy

$$\bar{\sigma}_i(h^{ws}) = \begin{cases} \hat{\sigma}_i(h^{ws}) & \text{if } s < T - 1, \\ \sigma_i(h^{ws}) & \text{if } s \geq T - 1. \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.25})$$

Since

$$\begin{aligned} U_i^{T-2} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-2)} \right), (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right) &= (1 - \delta) u_i^{T-2} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-2)} \right), (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right) \\ &+ \delta U_i^{T-1} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)} \right), (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.26})$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\leq (1 - \delta) u_i^{T-2} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-2)} \right), (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right) \\ &+ \delta U_i^{T-1} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-1)} \right), \sigma \right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.27})$$

$$= U_i^{T-2} \left(\left(\tilde{h}^{wt} \hat{h}^{w(T-2)} \right), (\bar{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w) \right), \quad (\text{B.28})$$

then

$$U_i^t(\tilde{h}^{wt}, (\hat{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)) \leq U_i^t(\tilde{h}^{wt}, (\bar{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}, \sigma_w)), \quad (\text{B.29})$$

and $\bar{\sigma}_i$ is a profitable deviation at \tilde{h}^{wt} that only differs from σ_i in the first $T - 1$ periods. Proceeding in this way, we find a profitable one-shot deviation.

Proof of Proposition 6

We need only prove that for each $v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, there exists a perfect-public equilibrium strategy which attains the value v . To construct such strategy, we start from the set of perfect-public equilibrium strategies of the game where the Principal is not allowed to impose group punishments, $[\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A]$. We know from [Abreu \(1986\)](#) that any equilibrium value v^0 such that $v^0 \in [\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A]$ can be achieved with a perfect-public equilibrium strategy σ^0 . Under σ^0 , the Principal never imposes group punishments and agents exert effort a^0 such that $u(a^0) = v^0$ on path, and punish deviations by both Principal and agents by reversion to the worst (carrot-and-stick) perfect-public equilibrium with value \underline{v}^A . Therefore, we focus on characterizing the equilibrium strategies for the cases in which $[\underline{v}^A, \bar{v}^A] \subset [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$.

Consider a new strategy σ^1 . Define by \bar{a}^A the carrot output in the model where group punishments are not allowed. Under σ^1 , for some $\varepsilon^1 > 0$ agents choose $a^1 = \bar{a}^A + \varepsilon^1$ as long as the aggregate outcome x^1 is such that $x^1 = x(a^1)$, and the Principal never imposes punishments. Suppose that an agent deviates to some a' , such that the observed aggregate outcome is $x^1 = x(a', a^1)$. In this case, the Principal imposes an arbitrarily small punishment $\tau^1(x^1) > 0$ such that the punishment is feasible. That is, such that $v^1(a', a^1, \tau^1(x^1)) \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, where

$$v^1(a', a^1, \tau^1(x^1)) \equiv \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} \left[w(a', a^1, 0) - w(a', a^1, \tau^1(x^1)) \right]. \quad (\text{B.30})$$

If an agent deviates and the Principal implements the prescribed punishment, then agents follow the strategy $\sigma^1(v^1(a', a^1, \tau^1(x^1)))$. Therefore, the continuation value promised to agents when one of the agents deviates and the Principal imposes $\tau^1(x^1)$ can be achieved with a perfect-public equilibrium strategy. Conversely, deviations by agents followed by deviations by the Principal are punished by the worst perfect-public equilibrium strategy $\sigma^1(\underline{v}^A)$. Clearly, this strategy is a perfect-public equilibrium. Moreover, it achieves a value $u(a^1) \equiv \bar{v}^1 > \bar{v}^A$.

Next, note that reversion to the perfect-public equilibrium $\bar{v}^1 > \bar{v}^A$ allows to construct a new carrot-and-stick strategy in which agents contribute an effort level $\bar{a}^1 < \bar{a}^A$ for one period and then revert to \bar{v}^1 , with deviations from the prescription causing the prescription to be repeated. Moreover, note

that this new carrot-and-stick strategy has value $\underline{v}^1 < \underline{v}^A$. Hence, for any value $v^1 \in [\underline{v}^1, \bar{v}^1]$, we can find a perfect-public equilibrium strategy σ^1 such that $u(\sigma^1) = v^1$.

Now take some $k \geq 2$ and set $[\underline{v}^k, \bar{v}^k]$ such that $[\underline{v}^1, \bar{v}^1] \subset [\underline{v}^k, \bar{v}^k] \subset [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, and assume that for any $v^k \in [\underline{v}^k, \bar{v}^k]$ we can construct a perfect-public equilibrium strategy σ^k such that $u(\sigma^k) = v^k$. Denote by \bar{a}^k the effort level with value \bar{v}^k , and construct a new strategy σ^{k+1} . Under σ^{k+1} , for some $\varepsilon^{k+1} > 0$ agents produce $a^{k+1} = \bar{a}^k + \varepsilon^{k+1}$ as long as the observed aggregate outcome x^{k+1} is such that $x^{k+1} = x(a^{k+1})$, and the Principal never imposes punishments. Suppose that an agent deviates to some a' , such that the observed aggregate outcome is $x^{k+1} = x(a', a^{k+1})$. In this case, the Principal imposes a punishment $\tau^{k+1}(x^{k+1}) > 0$ such that the punishment is feasible. That is, such that $v^{k+1}(a', a^{k+1}, \tau^{k+1}(x^{k+1})) \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$, where

$$v^{k+1}(a', a^{k+1}, \tau^{k+1}(x^{k+1})) \equiv \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} \left[w(a', a^{k+1}, 0) - w(a', a^{k+1}, \tau^{k+1}(x^{k+1})) \right]. \quad (\text{B.31})$$

Note that since $\bar{v}^k > \bar{v}^1$, the range of punishments that can be sustained is larger than $[0, \sup_{x^1} \tau^1(x^1)]$. If an agent deviates and the Principal implements the prescribed tax, then agents follow the strategy $\sigma^{k+1}(v^{k+1}(a', a^{k+1}, \tau^{k+1}(x^{k+1})))$. Therefore, the continuation value promised to agents when one of the agents deviates and the Principal imposes $\tau^{k+1}(x^{k+1})$ can be achieved with a perfect-public equilibrium strategy. Conversely, deviations by agents followed by deviations by the Principal are punished by the worst perfect-public equilibrium strategy $\sigma^{k+1}(\underline{v}^k)$. Clearly, this strategy is a perfect-public equilibrium. Moreover, it achieves a value $u(a^{k+1}) \equiv \bar{v}^{k+1} > \bar{v}^k$. Next, note that reversion to the perfect-public equilibrium $\bar{v}^{k+1} > \bar{v}^k$ allows to construct a new carrot-and-stick strategy in which agents exert an effort level $\bar{a}^{k+1} > \bar{a}^k$ for one period and then revert to \bar{v}^{k+1} , with deviations from the prescription causing the prescription to be repeated. Moreover, note that this new carrot-and-stick strategy has value $\underline{v}^{k+1} < \underline{v}^k$. Hence, for any value $v^{k+1} \in [\underline{v}^{k+1}, \bar{v}^{k+1}]$, we can find a perfect-public equilibrium strategy σ^{k+1} such that $u(\sigma^{k+1}) = v^{k+1}$. The proof is completed by induction.

Proof of Proposition 7

Suppose $\sigma((\tilde{a}, \bar{a}), (0, 0))$ is an optimal carrot-and-stick punishment. Recalling from Proposition 5 that $\tilde{a} \leq a^N$, the requirement that producers do not deviate from the stick and carrot outputs \tilde{a} and \bar{a} are, respectively:

$$(1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) \hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta^2 u(\bar{a}, 0), \quad (\text{B.32})$$

$$u(\bar{a}, 0) \geq (1 - \delta) \hat{g}(\bar{a}, \tau(\cdot)) + \delta (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta^2 u(\bar{a}, 0). \quad (\text{B.33})$$

Rearranging these inequalities, we get

$$\hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0) \leq (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{a}, 0) + \delta u(\bar{a}, 0) = \underline{v}, \quad (\text{B.34})$$

$$\hat{g}(\bar{a}, \tau(\cdot)) \leq u(\bar{a}, 0) + \delta (u(\bar{a}, 0) - u(\tilde{a}, 0)). \quad (\text{B.35})$$

If (B.34) holds strictly, we can decrease \tilde{a} and hence reduce $u(\tilde{a}, 0)$ while preserving (B.35). But this yields a lower punishment value than the infimum \underline{v} , a contradiction. Hence (B.34) holds with equality. Now suppose that if $\bar{a} < a^*$, (B.35) holds as a strict inequality. Then we can simultaneously decrease \tilde{a} by a small amount (therefore not violating (B.35)) and increase \bar{a} to preserve (B.34). But then since $\hat{g}(\tilde{a}, 0)$ is increasing in \tilde{a} and (B.34), we also found a lower punishment value than the infimum, again a contradiction.

Proof of Lemma 10

First, note that

$$\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot)) \geq \max_{q'} g(q', q, \tau(q' + (n-1)q)) \quad (\text{B.36})$$

$$\geq g\left(\frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2}, q, \tau\left(\frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2} + (n-1)q\right)\right). \quad (\text{B.37})$$

Moreover, note that

$$\frac{\partial g(q', q, \tau)}{\partial \tau} = -q' + \frac{1}{n} (q' + (n-1)q) \quad (\text{B.38})$$

$$= \frac{n-1}{n} (q - q'), \quad (\text{B.39})$$

so that $\partial g(q, q', \tau) / \partial \tau \geq 0$ if and only if $q' \leq q$. Finally, for $q \geq q^N$ if we choose the deviation

$$q' = \frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2}, \quad (\text{B.40})$$

then it must be that $q' \leq q$, since

$$\frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2} \leq q \iff q^N \leq q. \quad (\text{B.41})$$

Hence, for $q \geq q^N$,

$$\hat{g}(q, \tau(\cdot)) \geq g\left(\frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2}, q, \tau\left(\frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2} + (n-1)q\right)\right) \quad (\text{B.42})$$

$$\geq g\left(\frac{1 - (n-1)q - c}{2}, q, 0\right) \quad (\text{B.43})$$

$$= \hat{g}(q, 0). \quad (\text{B.44})$$

B.2.2 Proofs from Appendix B.1

Proof of Lemma 12

The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof found in Appendix B.2.1. In absence of a closed-form for the optimal deviation for the model where taxes are not allowed, the only additional step required to complete the proof is to show that for $q \geq q^N$ if we choose the deviation

$$q' = \hat{q}(q), \quad (\text{B.45})$$

then $q' \leq q$. We prove this by showing that $\hat{q}(q)$ is a smooth function that only intersects the 45 degree line at zero and q^N , and that for some $q > q^N$, $\hat{q}(q) < q$. First, note that $\hat{q}(0) = 0$, and that by definition of Nash equilibrium for $q > 0$, $\hat{q}(q) = q$ if and only if $q = q^N$. Moreover, note that

$\hat{q}(q)$ is smooth, since the problem is smooth and $\hat{q}(q)$ is the implicit function that generates from the first order conditions determining the most profitable deviation from q . Finally, note that for some $q > q^N$, $\hat{q}(q) < q$. To show this, consider any $q > q^0$, where q^0 is the minimum $q > 0$ such that $\hat{q}(q) = 0$ if and only if $\hat{g}(q, \tau = 0) = 0$. This level of q exists (as q goes to infinity, the price is driven to zero and the most profitable deviation is not to produce and avoid the associated cost) and we can always find it large enough such that $q > q^N$.

Proof of Lemma 13

Since in what follows we focus on a model where taxes are not allowed, for notational convenience we drop functional dependencies on taxes (e.g. we denote $u(q, 0)$ by $u(q)$). We similarly drop the superscript “A” which we use to compare the model where taxes are allowed to the model where taxes are not allowed. To show that for sufficiently large n , $d\bar{q}/d\rho > 0$, we analyze the two equations that characterize the carrot and the stick output in the model where taxes are not allowed, i.e.

$$g(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) = \frac{\alpha}{n} - (1 - \delta)c\bar{q}(\rho) - \delta c\bar{q}(\rho), \quad (\text{B.46})$$

$$g(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) = \frac{\alpha}{n} - (1 + \delta)c\bar{q}(\rho) + \delta c\bar{q}(\rho). \quad (\text{B.47})$$

Totally differentiating these two expressions, we obtain

$$g_q(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} + g_\rho(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) = -(1 - \delta)c \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} - \delta c \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} \quad (\text{B.48})$$

$$g_q(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} + g_\rho(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) = -(1 + \delta)c \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} + \delta c \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} \quad (\text{B.49})$$

We solve for $d\bar{q}/d\rho$ from the first equation and substitute into the second to obtain a form for $d\bar{q}/d\rho$.

We have

$$[g_q(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) + (1 - \delta)c] \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} = -g_\rho(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) - \delta c \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho}, \quad (\text{B.50})$$

so that

$$[g_q(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) + (1 + \delta)c] \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} = -g_\rho(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) + \delta c \left[\frac{-g_\rho(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) - \delta c \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho}}{g_q(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) + (1 - \delta)c} \right]. \quad (\text{B.51})$$

To be able to determine the sign of $d\bar{q}/d\rho$, we determine the sign of the derivatives $g_q(\hat{q};\rho)$ and $g_q(\hat{q};\rho)$. First, for any \hat{q} we denote the most profitable deviation from \hat{q} as a function of \hat{q} and ρ as $q^*(\hat{q},\rho)$. From the optimality conditions, we know that any $q^*(\hat{q},\rho)$ satisfies

$$\frac{\alpha\rho(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho(q^*)^{-\rho-1}}{\left[1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho(q^*)^{-\rho}\right]^2} = c. \quad (\text{B.52})$$

Next, note that the payoff from the best response satisfies

$$g_q(\hat{q};\rho) = \frac{d}{d\hat{q}} \left[\frac{\alpha}{1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho}} - q^*(\hat{q},\rho)c \right] \quad (\text{B.53})$$

$$= \frac{-\alpha}{\left[1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho}\right]^2} \left[(n-1)\rho\hat{q}^{\rho-1}q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho} \right. \\ \left. - (n-1)\rho\hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho-1}q_q^*(\hat{q},\rho) \right] - cq_q^*(\hat{q},\rho) \quad (\text{B.54})$$

$$= \frac{-\alpha\rho(n-1)\hat{q}^{\rho-1}q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho}}{\left[1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho}\right]^2} + \left[\frac{\alpha(n-1)\rho\hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho-1}}{\left[1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q},\rho)^{-\rho}\right]^2} - c \right] q_q^*(\hat{q},\rho) \quad (\text{B.55})$$

$$= \frac{-\alpha\rho(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho(q^*)^{-\rho}}{\hat{q}\left[1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho(q^*)^{-\rho}\right]^2}, \quad (\text{B.56})$$

where the last equality follows from optimality of q^* . Note also that using optimality of q^* , we may write $g_q(\hat{q};\rho)$ as

$$g_q(\hat{q};\rho) = \frac{-\alpha\rho(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho(q^*)^{-\rho}}{\hat{q}\left[1+(n-1)\hat{q}^\rho(q^*)^{-\rho}\right]^2} = -\frac{cq_q^*(\hat{q},\rho)}{\hat{q}}. \quad (\text{B.57})$$

Since if $\hat{q} < q^N$ then $q^*(\hat{q},\rho) \geq \hat{q}$ and if $\hat{q} \geq q^N$ then $q^*(\hat{q},\rho) \leq q^N$, this implies

$$g_q(\hat{q};\rho) \leq -c \text{ if } \hat{q} < q^N, \quad (\text{B.58})$$

$$g_q(\hat{q};\rho) \geq -c \text{ if } \hat{q} \geq q^N. \quad (\text{B.59})$$

Similarly, note that

$$g_\rho(\hat{q}; \rho) = \frac{d}{d\rho} \left[\frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q}, \rho)^{-\rho}} - q^*(\hat{q}, \rho) c \right] \quad (\text{B.60})$$

$$= \frac{-\alpha(n-1) q^*(\hat{q}, \rho)^{-\rho} \hat{q}^\rho}{\left[1 + (n-1) \hat{q}^\rho q^*(\hat{q}, \rho)^{-\rho}\right]^2} [\log \hat{q} - \log q^*(\hat{q}, \rho)], \quad (\text{B.61})$$

so that we can write

$$g_\rho(\hat{q}; \rho) = -\frac{c}{\rho} q^*(\hat{q}, \rho) [\log \hat{q} - \log q^*(\hat{q}, \rho)]. \quad (\text{B.62})$$

We then have

$$g_\rho(\hat{q}; \rho) \geq 0 \text{ if } \hat{q} < q^N, \quad (\text{B.63})$$

$$g_\rho(\hat{q}; \rho) \leq 0 \text{ if } \hat{q} \geq q^N. \quad (\text{B.64})$$

Next, substituting (B.57) and (B.62) into (B.51), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d\bar{q}(\rho)}{d\rho} \left[g_q(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) + (1+\delta)c + \frac{\delta^2 c^2}{g_q(\tilde{q}(\rho); \rho) + (1-\delta)c} \right] &= -g_\rho(\bar{q}(\rho); \rho) \\ &- \frac{\delta c g_\rho(\tilde{q}(\rho); \rho)}{g_q(\tilde{q}(\rho); \rho) + (1-\delta)c} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.65})$$

Simplifying and using short-hand notation, we have

$$\bar{q}_\rho \left[-\frac{\bar{q}^*}{\bar{q}} + (1+\delta) + \frac{\delta^2}{-\frac{\tilde{q}^*}{\tilde{q}} + (1-\delta)} \right] = \frac{1}{\rho} \bar{q}^* \log \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\bar{q}^*} \right) + \frac{\delta \frac{1}{\rho} \tilde{q}^* \log \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*} \right)}{-\frac{\tilde{q}^*}{\tilde{q}} + (1-\delta)} \quad (\text{B.66})$$

$$\bar{q}_\rho \left[1 - \frac{\bar{q}^*}{\bar{q}} + \frac{\delta \left[1 - \frac{\tilde{q}^*}{\tilde{q}} \right]}{1 - \frac{\tilde{q}^*}{\tilde{q}} - \delta} \right] = \frac{1}{\rho} \bar{q}^* \log \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\bar{q}^*} \right) + \frac{\delta \frac{1}{\rho} \tilde{q}^* \log \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*} \right)}{1 - \frac{\tilde{q}^*}{\tilde{q}} - \delta} \quad (\text{B.67})$$

$$\bar{q}_\rho \left[\frac{\bar{q} - \bar{q}^*}{\bar{q}} + \frac{\delta [\tilde{q} - \tilde{q}^*]}{(1-\delta)\tilde{q} - \tilde{q}^*} \right] = \frac{1}{\rho} \bar{q}^* \log \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\bar{q}^*} \right) + \frac{\delta \frac{1}{\rho} \tilde{q}^* \log \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*} \right)}{(1-\delta)\tilde{q} - \tilde{q}^*}. \quad (\text{B.68})$$

Since $\bar{q} \leq \bar{q}^*$ and $\tilde{q} \geq \tilde{q}^*$, if

$$(1-\delta)\tilde{q} - \tilde{q}^* \leq 0, \quad (\text{B.69})$$

then each term in brackets on the left-hand side and each term on the right-hand side of (B.68) are negative. This implies $\bar{q}_\rho \geq 0$. Hence, $(1 - \delta)\tilde{q} - \tilde{q}^* \leq 0$ is a sufficient condition for \bar{q}_ρ to be positive. To show this, we use the expression for $g(\tilde{q}, \rho)$ and $g(\bar{q}, \rho)$ in (B.46) and (B.47):

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - c\tilde{q}^* = \frac{\alpha}{n} - (1 - \delta)c\tilde{q} - \delta c\bar{q}, \quad (\text{B.70})$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - c\tilde{q}^* = \frac{\alpha}{n} - (1 + \delta)c\bar{q} + \delta c\tilde{q}. \quad (\text{B.71})$$

Equation (B.71) implies

$$(1 + \delta)c\bar{q} - c\tilde{q}^* = \frac{\alpha}{n} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} + \delta c\tilde{q} \quad (\text{B.72})$$

$$\leq \delta c\tilde{q}, \quad (\text{B.73})$$

which substituted into (B.70) yields

$$(1 - \delta)c\tilde{q} - c\tilde{q}^* = \frac{\alpha}{n} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - \delta c\bar{q} \quad (\text{B.74})$$

$$= (1 + \delta)c\bar{q} - c\tilde{q}^* + \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - \delta c(\tilde{q} + \bar{q}) \quad (\text{B.75})$$

$$\leq \delta c\tilde{q} + \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - \delta c(\tilde{q} + \bar{q}). \quad (\text{B.76})$$

Then, we have

$$(1 - \delta)c\tilde{q} - c\tilde{q}^* \leq -\delta c\bar{q} + \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\tilde{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho} - \frac{\alpha}{1 + (n-1) \left(\frac{\bar{q}}{\tilde{q}^*}\right)^\rho}. \quad (\text{B.77})$$

For n sufficiently large, \bar{q}^* converges to \bar{q} and \tilde{q}^* converges to \tilde{q} . Hence, for n sufficiently large the right-hand side is less than or equal to zero and the needed condition is verified.

Proof of Proposition 14

Fix $\rho \in (0, 1)$. We know that there exist a unique $\delta^{A*}(\rho)$ in the model where taxes are not allowed such that $\bar{q}^A(\rho) = q^m$. This $\delta^{A*}(\rho)$ simultaneously solves

$$\hat{g}(q^m, 0) = (1 + \delta^{A*}(\rho)) u(q^m) - \delta^{A*}(\rho) u(\bar{q}^A(\rho)), \quad (\text{B.78})$$

$$\hat{g}(\bar{q}^A(\rho), 0) = (1 - \delta^{A*}(\rho)) u(\bar{q}^A(\rho)) + \delta^{A*}(\rho) u(q^m), \quad (\text{B.79})$$

and represents the threshold level of the discount factor for which the model where taxes are not allowed achieves the first-best level of output q^m . Similarly, for the same ρ we know that there exists a unique $\delta^*(\rho)$ in the model where taxes are allowed such that $\bar{q}(\rho) = q^m$, which simultaneously solves

$$\hat{g}(q^m, \tau(\cdot)) = (1 + \delta^*(\rho)) u(q^m) - \delta^*(\rho) u(\bar{q}(\rho)), \quad (\text{B.80})$$

$$\hat{g}(\bar{q}(\rho), 0) = (1 - \delta^*(\rho)) u(\bar{q}(\rho)) + \delta^*(\rho) u(q^m). \quad (\text{B.81})$$

Next, note that since i) for any level of the discount factor we have $[\underline{v}^A; \bar{v}^A] \subseteq [\underline{v}; \bar{v}]$, and ii) for $\bar{q}^A > q^m$ if \bar{q} is sustained by a positive tax threat (for some $q' \neq \bar{q}$, $\tau(q' + (n-1)\bar{q}) > 0$) then $\bar{q}^A > \bar{q} \geq q^m$, then $\delta^*(\rho) < \delta^{A*}(\rho)$ (i.e. the model where taxes are allowed achieves the first best level of output q^m at a lower value of the discount factor than the model where taxes are not allowed). Next, let δ^0 be such that $\delta^*(\rho) < \delta^0 < \delta^{A*}(\rho)$. Note that at δ^0 , $\bar{q}(\rho) = q^m$ and $\bar{q}^A(\rho) > q^m$. Now let $\bar{\rho}' > \rho$, and let $\delta^*(\bar{\rho}')$ in the model where taxes are allowed be such that $\bar{q}(\bar{\rho}') = q^m$, which solves

$$\hat{g}(q^m, \tau(\cdot)) = (1 + \delta^*(\bar{\rho}')) u(q^m) - \delta^*(\bar{\rho}') u(\bar{q}(\bar{\rho}')) \quad (\text{B.82})$$

$$\hat{g}(\bar{q}(\bar{\rho}'), 0) = (1 - \delta^*(\bar{\rho}')) u(\bar{q}(\bar{\rho}')) + \delta^*(\bar{\rho}') u(q^m). \quad (\text{B.83})$$

By continuity we know that we can always choose $\bar{\rho}'$ small enough such that $\delta^*(\bar{\rho}') < \delta^0$. Therefore, in the model where taxes are allowed $\bar{q}(\bar{\rho}') = \bar{q}(\rho) = q^m$. Moreover, since from Lemma 13 we know that for n sufficiently large $d\bar{q}^A/d\rho > 0$, then $\bar{q}^A(\bar{\rho}') > \bar{q}^A(\rho)$. Hence, at δ^0

$$\frac{u(\bar{q}(\bar{\rho}')) - u(\bar{q}^A(\bar{\rho}'))}{u(\bar{q}^A(\bar{\rho}'))} > \frac{u(\bar{q}(\rho)) - u(\bar{q}^A(\rho))}{u(\bar{q}^A(\rho))}. \quad (\text{B.84})$$

Finally, following the same argument we have that for all $\rho' \in (\rho, \bar{\rho}')$, $d\Delta U(\rho')/d\rho' > 0$.

B.3 Computational Algorithm

In this Appendix, we describe the computational algorithm for our numerical results in Section 2.3. Define $\hat{q} \equiv \arg \max_{q'} \hat{g}(q', \bar{q}, \tau(q' + (n-1)\bar{q}))$. For each level of the discount factor δ , we aim to find \tilde{q} , \bar{q} , \hat{q} and τ that solve the following system of equations:

$$\hat{g}(\tilde{q}, 0) = (1 - \delta) u(\tilde{q}, 0) + \delta \mu(\bar{q}, 0), \quad (\text{B.85})$$

$$\hat{g}(\hat{q}, \tau(\cdot)) \leq u(\bar{q}, 0) + \delta (u(\bar{q}, 0) - u(\tilde{q}, 0)), \quad (\text{B.86})$$

$$u(\bar{q}, 0) \geq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \frac{1}{n} [w(\hat{q} + (n-1)\bar{q}, 0) - w(\hat{q} + (n-1)\bar{q}, \tau(\hat{q} + (n-1)\bar{q}))] + \hat{g}(\tilde{q}, 0). \quad (\text{B.87})$$

From Proposition 7, Equation (B.86) holds with equality only when $\bar{q} > q^m$ and is slack when $\bar{q} = q^m$. The algorithm works as follows:

1. For each level of the discount factor δ , we know $\tau \in [0, 1 - (n-1)q^N - c]$. Start with $\hat{\tau} = 1 - (n-1)q^N - c$.
 - (a) Check if q^m can be supported:
 - i. Set $\bar{q} = q^m$. Solve (B.85) for \tilde{q} .
 - ii. Obtain $\hat{q} = \arg \max_{q' \in [q^m, q^N]} \hat{g}(q', \bar{q}, \hat{\tau})$. We do this by searching for \hat{q} over a fine grid for q' . Evaluate $\hat{g}(\bar{q}, \hat{\tau})$.
 - iii. Check if the resulting values for \tilde{q} and \bar{q} satisfy (B.86) (with inequality) and (B.87). If so, the algorithm is finished.
 - (b) If either (B.86) or (B.87) is not satisfied (q^m cannot be supported), jointly solve for \bar{q} and \tilde{q} . We do this using a nested bisection algorithm to solve (B.85) and (B.86) with equality (also solving for \hat{q} as before).

- i. The nested bisection algorithm proceeds as follows. The outer bisection algorithm searches for $\tilde{q} \in [\tilde{q}_\ell, \tilde{q}_h]$. The inner bisection algorithm solves for the corresponding \bar{q} .
 - ii. At each iteration of the double bisection algorithm, check whether (B.85)-(B.87) are all satisfied.
2. If (B.85) and (B.87) are satisfied, we are done. If not decrease $\hat{\tau}$ by a small amount and return to step 1.

Appendix C

Appendix to Chapter 3

C.1 Cointegration Tests

In Table C1, I report two sets of tests for cointegration between real, per-capita advertising expenditures and consumption. In Panel A, I use the Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) procedure to test for a unit root in the residual of a regression of advertising expenditures on consumption, assuming no trend in the residuals. Panel A of Table C1 reports the Dickey and Fuller (1979) t -statistic for a unit root in the residuals using lags from one to four years, and the associated five and ten percent critical values. The null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship can never be rejected at any horizon. I use the procedure in Campbell and Perron (1991) to determine the appropriate number of lags of first differences in the regression of residuals on lagged residuals and lagged first differences of residuals, and the results of this procedure suggest that the optimal number of lag is three years. The results of Panel A provide evidence against cointegration at the optimal lag length.

As a second test, I apply the Johansen (1988, 1991) procedure to estimate the number of cointegrating relationships between advertising expenditures and consumption, assuming that the cointegrating relation should be characterized by an unrestricted constant.^{C.1} The Johansen trace statistic tests the null hypothesis $H_0 = r$ of at most r cointegrating relations in the data against the alternative hypothesis of p cointegrating relations, where p is the number of variables (two in this case), and the null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent confidence level if the trace statistics is larger than its respective critical value. Table C1, Panel B, shows that the test can never reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating relationships between advertising and consumption at any of the lags considered.

Despite the weak evidence about cointegration between advertising expenditures and consumption, in Table C2 I re-estimate the consumption growth predictive regressions of Table 3.2, Panel A, using a vector-error-correction model (VECM). The estimated VECM corrects the predictive regressions with a cointegrating residual capturing deviations of either consumption or advertising from their long-run common trend. The results show that correcting for this cointegrating residual decreases the predictive power of advertising at a two-year horizon, but leaves leaves the predictive power of advertising unchanged at a one-year horizon.

^{C.1}This assumption is common in modeling macroeconomic variables. See Johansen (1988, 1991) for details.

Table C1

Philips-Ouliaris and Johansen Tests for Cointegration

In Panel A, the [Dickey and Fuller \(1979\)](#) test statistics is applied to the fitted residuals of a regression of per-capita real advertising expenditures on per-capita real consumption. No trend is assumed in the residuals. The procedure in [Campbell and Perron \(1991\)](#) is used to determine the number of lags of first differences in the regression of residuals on lagged residuals and lagged first differences of residuals. In Panel B, I apply the [Johansen \(1988, 1991\)](#) trace statistic assuming that the relation between consumption and advertising expenditures in the data is governed by VAR model with unrestricted constant. The null hypothesis $H_0 = r$ of at most r cointegrating relationships in the data is rejected at the 5% confidence level if the trace statistics is larger than the respective critical value.

Panel A: Philips-Ouliaris Test					
Dickey-Fuller t -statistic				Critical Values	
Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=4	5%	10%
-1.346	-2.190	-2.290	-2.389	-2.926	-2.598
Panel B: Johansen Trace Statistic					
Johansen Trace Statistic				Critical Value	$H_0 = r$
Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=4	5%	$r =$
12.591	6.594	4.321	5.978	15.41	0
4.086	2.426	0.263	0.472	3.76	1

Table C2

Vector-Error-Correction Model for Consumption Growth Predictions, Post-War Period

The Table shows coefficient estimates for cumulative consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+\tau}$) predictive regressions using a Vector-Error-Correction model including lagged advertising growth ($\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$), consumption growth ($\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$), and their long-run cointegrating residual $\varepsilon(a, c)_{t-1}$ as predictors. The t -statistics in parentheses are computed using Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard errors. R_{adj}^2 and F are the adjusted R-squared and F-statistics, respectively.

	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+2}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+3}$	$\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+4}$
$\Delta a_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.112 (2.06)	0.162 (1.56)	0.151 (1.01)	0.111 (0.62)
$\Delta c_{t-1 \rightarrow t}$	0.027 (0.17)	-0.160 (-0.53)	-0.274 (-0.65)	-0.309 (-0.60)
$\varepsilon(a, c)_{t-1}$	-0.012 (-0.86)	-0.032 (-0.98)	-0.044 (-0.87)	-0.054 (-0.81)
R_{adj}^2	0.124	0.080	0.031	0.007
F	3.545	1.669	0.756	0.446

C.2 Advertising Expenditures and Long-Run Risk

In this Section, I claim that the time series properties of aggregate advertising growth make this variable a quantitatively different source of consumption dynamics than the aggregate consumption growth risk in the Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risk model. The Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risk model specifies the following process for consumption growth (for consistency with their model I use Δc_{t+1} to denote the consumption growth rate $\Delta c_{t \rightarrow t+1}$):

$$\Delta c_{t+1} = \kappa + x_t + \sigma \eta_{t+1}, \quad (\text{C.1})$$

$$x_{t+1} = \rho x_t + \phi_e \sigma e_{t+1}, \quad (\text{C.2})$$

$$e_{t+1}, \eta_{t+1} \sim N.i.i.d(0, 1), \quad (\text{C.3})$$

where the shocks e_{t+1} and η_{t+1} are mutually independent. In their model, x_t is a small and persistent predictable component that determines the expected growth rate of consumption and ρ is the

persistence of this predictable component, calibrated to a monthly $\rho = 0.979$ (annual $\rho_{ann} = 0.775$) to replicate the annualized volatility and autocorrelation of aggregate consumption growth.

On the other hand, the VAR specification from Panel A of Table 3.5 implies the following relation between consumption growth, advertising expenditures and their lagged values:

$$\Delta c_{t+1} = \alpha_c + \gamma_c \Delta a_t + u_{c,t+1}, \quad (\text{C.4})$$

$$\Delta a_{t+1} = \alpha_a + \beta_a \Delta c_t + \gamma_a \Delta a_t + u_{a,t+1}, \quad (\text{C.5})$$

$$u_{c,t+1}, u_{a,t+1} \sim N(0, \Sigma), \quad (\text{C.6})$$

with Σ the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. For simplicity, I omit the VAR coefficients that are not statistically significant. The point estimate of the coefficient γ_c in Equation (C.4) is 0.127, and its standard deviation is 0.050. The point estimates for the coefficients β_a and γ_a in Equation (C.5) are 0.679 and -1.147, respectively, and their standard deviations are 0.144 and 0.456, respectively.

The following analysis is to test whether, given these estimates, Equations (C.4) and (C.5) can respectively be re-written as Equations (C.1) and (C.2), that is whether advertising growth captures the long-run persistent component of consumption growth that generates long-run risk. First, define $\Delta \tilde{a}_t \equiv \gamma_c \Delta a_t$, so that (C.4)-(C.5) can be re-written as

$$\Delta c_{t+1} = \alpha_c + \Delta \tilde{a}_t + u_{c,t+1}, \quad (\text{C.7})$$

$$\Delta \tilde{a}_{t+1} = \gamma_c \alpha_a + \gamma_c \beta_a \Delta c_t + \gamma_c \Delta \tilde{a}_t + \gamma_c u_{a,t+1} \quad (\text{C.8})$$

Testing if (C.5) is equivalent to the long-run risk equation (C.2) then means simultaneously testing for $\gamma_c \alpha_a = \gamma_c \beta_a = 0$ and $\gamma_c = \rho_{ann} = 0.775$. Since the point estimate for γ_c in Table 3.5 is however equal to 0.127 with a 95 percent confidence interval of [0.029; 0.225], I cannot reject the null hypothesis that $\gamma_c \neq \rho_{ann}$. This suggests that advertising growth predicts a component of aggregate consumption growth not captured by long-run risk.

C.3 Derivation of the Stochastic Discount Factor

The derivative of (3.20) with respect to $C_{0,t}$ is

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial C_{0,t}} = (1 - \beta)(1 - \alpha) V_t^{\frac{1}{\psi}} u(C_{0,t}; C_{1,t})^{\frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\psi}} C_{0,t}^{-\frac{1}{\eta}}. \quad (\text{C.9})$$

The derivative of (3.20) with respect to $C_{0,t+1}$ is

$$\frac{\partial V_t}{\partial C_{0,t+1}} = V_t^{\frac{1}{\psi}} \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[V_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right]^{\frac{1-1/\psi}{1-\gamma} - 1} V_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \frac{\partial V_{t+1}}{\partial C_{0,t+1}}. \quad (\text{C.10})$$

Replacing $\partial V_{t+1}/\partial C_{0,t+1}$ by (C.9) evaluated at $t+1$, I get

$$M_{t+1} = \frac{\partial V_t / \partial C_{0,t+1}}{\partial V_t / \partial C_{0,t}} \quad (\text{C.11})$$

$$= \beta \left(\frac{C_{0,t+1}}{C_{0,t}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \left(\frac{u(C_{0,t+1}; C_{1,t+1})}{u(C_{0,t}; C_{1,t})} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\psi}} \left[\frac{V_{t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t \left(V_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\psi} - \gamma}. \quad (\text{C.12})$$

C.4 Computational Algorithm

The state space consists of aggregate endowment and customer capital, (Y_t, N_t) , and the objective is to solve for optimal advertising $AD_t^* = AD(Y_t, N_t)$ and the multiplier on its non-negativity constraint $\mu_t^{n*} = \mu^n(Y_t, N_t)$ from the functional Euler equation

$$\frac{\chi}{\lambda_t} \frac{AD_t}{N_t} - \mu^n(Y_t, N_t) = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} \left[P_{t+1} + (1 - \varphi) \left(\frac{\chi}{\lambda_{t+1}} - \mu^n(Y_t, N_t) \right) \right], \quad (\text{C.13})$$

where both λ_t and P_t are functions of $AD(Y_t, N_t)$. The algorithm works as follows. I start by approximating the left-hand side of (C.13) with a function

$$\mathcal{E}_t \equiv \mathcal{E}(Y_t, N_t) = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t+1} \left[P_{t+1} + (1 - \varphi) \left(\frac{\chi}{\lambda_{t+1}} - \mu^n(Y_t, N_t) \right) \right]. \quad (\text{C.14})$$

Since the function \mathcal{E}_t is defined over the grid (Y_t, N_t) , I can similarly define

$$\tilde{\mathcal{E}}(Y_t, N_t) \equiv \frac{1}{\chi} (N_t \mathcal{E}(Y_t, N_t)). \quad (\text{C.15})$$

Finally, since $\lambda = (1 + AD^\theta)^{-1/\theta}$, I calculate a guess $\tilde{AD}(Y_t, N_t)$ for the policy function $AD(Y_t, N_t)$ by solving

$$\tilde{AD}(Y_t, N_t) \left(1 + \tilde{AD}(Y_t, N_t)^\theta\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} = \tilde{\mathcal{E}}(Y_t, N_t), \quad (\text{C.16})$$

so that solving function for effort is:^{C.2}

$$\tilde{AD}(Y_t, N_t) = 2^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(\sqrt{4\tilde{\mathcal{E}}(Y_t, N_t)^\theta + 1} - 1 \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}. \quad (\text{C.17})$$

If $AD(Y_t, N_t) > 0$, then the non-negativity constraint on effort is not binding, $AD(Y_t, N_t) = \tilde{AD}(Y_t, N_t)$ and $\mu^n(Y_t, N_t) = 0$. If instead $\tilde{AD}(Y_t, N_t) \leq 0$, then $AD(Y_t, N_t) = 0$ and $\mu^n(Y_t, N_t) = -\tilde{\mathcal{E}}(Y_t, N_t)$.

^{C.2}The smaller root of Equation (C.16),

$$\tilde{E}(Y_t, N_t) = 2^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \left(-\sqrt{4\tilde{\mathcal{E}}(Y_t, N_t)^\theta + 1} - 1 \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}},$$

is always negative.

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