Verifying Object-Oriented Code Using Object Propositions

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Abstract

The modular verification of object-oriented code is made difficult by the presence of aliasing. If there are multiple clients depending on the properties of an object, one client may break the property that others depend on. Knowledge of both aliasing and predicates allows us to verify whether clients and implementations are compliant with specifications.

We have developed a modular verification approach, by introducing the novel abstraction object propositions, that combines predicates and information about object aliasing. In our methodology, even if shared data is modified, we know that an object invariant specified by a client holds. This allows two references pointing to the same object to have a consistent view of the object. Our object invariant is different than a class invariant such as the ones in ESC/Java, as in our system two objects of the same class are allowed to have different invariants.

Although there are separation logic approaches that can be used to specify similar programs, the specifications are complex and not modular. In separation logic, the specification of a method must describe all the heap cells that the method touches. The exact data shared between objects will then be exposed. With the help of access permissions, we are able to hide the aliasing information when possible. This is very important for software evolution because local changes to the code in a system should not modify the specification of other parts of the system.

The formal verification of modules should ideally follow the same principle: the specification and verification of a method should not depend on another method. To reason about aliases, the verification system has to be aware of interactions between all the references to the same object. Moreover, if two objects share data, there are situations when the specifications of the methods using these objects should not reveal the shared data or the internal representation of the objects. When possible, shared data should be hidden, especially when the shared information is likely to change. Unfortunately, when using existing separation logic techniques to write the specification of a method, the entire footprint of that method has to be mentioned. By its very nature, separation logic (Reynolds 2002) will require the specification to reveal which cells in the heap are owned by two objects. For each method using the objects, a mention of shared data is needed. This gives rise to very unmodular verification techniques. There exist versions of higher-order separation logics that try to account for modular verification of code, but they are more complicated and difficult to automate.

Our novel approach does not suffer from these shortcomings. Through the use of access permissions, we are able to hide the shared data that two objects have in common. We will know only that the two objects have shared permission to that data. Our solution is more modular and similar systems (Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007) have been automated.

1. Introduction

In this paper, we are proposing a method for modular verification of object-oriented code in the presence of aliasing, i.e. the existence of multiple references to the same object. The seminal work of (Parnas 1972) describes the importance of modular programming, where the information hiding criteria is used to divide the system into modules. In a world where software systems have to be continually changed in order to satisfy new (client) requirements, the software engineering principle of modular programming becomes crucial: it brings flexibility, by allowing changes to one module without modifying the others.

2. Overview

Our methodology uses abstract predicates (Parkinson and Bierman 2005) over the fields of an object, a logical framework and access permissions (Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007). Access permissions were originally proposed for typestate checking, but here we use them for full verification. They are useful when there are multiple aliases that reference the same object in the program. With the help of permissions, we can track how a reference is allowed to read and/or modify the referenced object and, in the case there were other references to the object, how those references might access the object. The different kinds of permissions are: unique, immutable and share.
Immutable permissions (Boyland 2003) grant read-only access to the referenced object and guarantee that no reference has read/write access to the same object.

Unique permissions (Boyland 2003) grant read/write access and guarantee that no other reference has any access to the object.

Share permissions (DeLine and Fähndrich 2004) are the trickiest: they grant read/write access to the referenced object, but other references also have read/write access to the same object. For share permissions to be usable, they must guarantee that they will never violate the predicate invariant of the object.

Our main technical contribution is a novel abstraction, called object proposition, that combines predicates with aliasing information about objects. For eg., to express that the object \( q \) in Figure 1 has a unique permission to a queue of integers in range \([0, 10]\), we use the object proposition \( \text{unique}(q) \text{ in } \text{Range}(0, 10) \).

We want our checking approach to be modular and to verify that implementations follow their design intent. To prove that a postcondition, i.e. an abstract proposition defined in terms of fields, of a method holds on exiting the method, we have to keep track of the current values of the fields (including for fields of primitive type \( \text{int} \)). By doing this, we can more easily deduce what object propositions are true at the end of a method, considering that the precondition was true in the beginning. In the same way as Fahndrich and DeLine (2002) track a set of capabilities, i.e. at each point in the program the type system maintains the keys of the tracked objects that are currently live, we also have a set of keys. Those variables and fields that have a place in the heap will be present in the set of keys and will point to the current value. Thus, we have two kinds of permissions: abstract, represented by the object propositions, and concrete, represented by the field keys. We make a subtle distinction: if we consider an object \( o \) having a field \( f \) with current value \( x \) and the current permission having read/write access, the set will contain \( f \rightarrow x \). On the other hand, if the current permission has read-only access, the set will contain \( f \rightarrow \bot \), to mean that the field \( f \) cannot be modified.

Let’s consider the two linked queues \( q \) and \( r \) that share a common tail \( p \), in Figure 1. In separation logic, the specification of any method has to describe the entire footprint of the method, i.e. all heap locations that are being touched through reading or writing in the body of the method. That is, the shared data \( p \) has to be specified in the specification of all methods accessing any of the objects \( q \) and \( r \). Using our object propositions, we have to mention only \( \text{share}(q) \) (\( \text{share}(r) \) respectively) in the specification of a method accessing \( q \) (or \( r \)). The fact that \( p \) is shared between the two aliases is hidden by the access permission \( \text{share} \).

We give the technical details of the differences between verifying this example using separation logic versus object propositions.

### 3. Example

In Figure 2, we present a simple class and object propositions, that are useful for reasoning about the correctness of client code and about whether the implementation of a method respects the specification. Since they contain access permissions, which represent resources that have to be consumed upon usage, the object propositions are consumed upon usage and their duplication is forbidden. Therefore, we use linear logic (Girard 1987) to write our specifications. Pre- and post-conditions are separated with a linear implication \( \rightarrow \) and use multiplicative conjunction \( \otimes \), additive disjunction \( \oplus \) and existential/universal quantifiers (where there is a need to quantify over the parameters of the predicates).

In our methodology, whenever a new object is created, the object will satisfy the first predicate in the class. At the point where the permission to the object is first split (either into two share permissions, or two immutable ones, see Figure 6), the client can specify the invariant that he expects the object to always satisfy. Different references pointing to the same object, which can be a shared or immutable object, will always be able to rely on that invariant when calling methods on the object.

A critical part of our work is allowing clients to depend on a property of a shared object. In this queue example, clients depend on the shared Link items being in a consistent range. Other methodologies such as Boogie (Barnett et al. 2005) allow a client to depend only on properties of objects that it owns and verify object invariants. Our novel verification technique allows a client to depend on properties of objects that it doesn’t own too.

To gain read or write access to the fields of an object, we have to unpack it (DeLine and Fähndrich 2004). If we unpack a share or unique permission, we gain modifying access, while immutable permissions only give us read access to the object’s fields. After a method finishes working with the fields of a shared object, our proof rules in Figure 7 require that the object be packed to the same predicate as before the unpacking. Since for a unique object, there is only one reference in the system pointing to it and no risk of interferences, we don’t require packing to the same predicate for unique objects. We avoid inconsistencies by allowing only one object proposition to be unpacked at the same time. Why? Because otherwise an unpacked shared object may not satisfy its invariant any more, but other aliases to it will not know this. Other aliases will rely on the invariant, which is...
The predicate `Range(int x, int y)` in Figure 2 ensures that all the elements in a linked queue starting from the current Link are in the range `[x, y]`. The predicate mentions `share(o)`, thus requiring the existence of at least a share permission (it could be unique) to each Link of the queue. On the contrary, the predicate `UniRange(int x, int y)` requires the presence of a unique permission to all elements in the queue. These restrictions mean that the only method that can be called on a shared Link object satisfying invariant `Range(0, 10)` is `addModulo11`. The specification of the `addModulo11(int x)` method is the only one that does not break the invariant. Also, if the programmer wants to modify some value in the queue using the `add(int z)` method, the queue must be accessed through a unique permission.

How do we use the predicates and the proof rules in Figure 7 to prove the correctness of code? We use them in the following manner: we try to apply the proof rules from the beginning of a program until the end. Each expression in the program has a designated proof rule in the static semantics and we apply that specific rule. If we can apply all the needed rules from the beginning until the end of the program, it means the program is correct. If not, there could be an error in the program.

```java
class Link {
    int val;
    Link next;

    predicate LinkPred(int x, Link l) ≡
    val → v ⊗ next → o ⊗ v = x ⊗ o = l

    predicate Range(int x, int y) ≡
    val → v ⊗ next → o ⊗ v ≥ x ⊗ v ≤ y
    ⊗ [share(o) in Range(x,y) ⊗ o==null]

    predicate NotInRange(int x, int y) ≡
    val → v ⊗ next → o ⊗ v < x ⊗ v > y
    ⊗ [share(o) in NotInRange(x,y) ⊗ o==null]

    predicate UniRange(int x, int y) ≡
    val → v ⊗ next → o ⊗ v ≥ x ⊗ v ≤ y
    ⊗ [unique(o) in UniRange(x,y) ⊗ o==null]

    void addModulo11(int x)
    share(this) in Range(0,10) —
    share(this) in Range(0,10)
    {val = (val + x)% 11;
      if (next!=null) {next.addModulo11(x);} }

    void add(int z)
    ∀ x:int, y:int, x≤y .unique(this) in UniRange(x,y)
    — unique(this) in UniRange(x+z,y+z)
    {val = val + z;
      if (next!=null) {next.add(z);} }
}
```

Figure 2. Link class and range predicates

actually broken. It is thus safer to unpack a single object at a time.

When creating the object `la` in Figure 3, we get a unique permission to it, satisfying the first predicate `LinkPred(3, null)`. We then unpack `la`, make sure it satisfies the predicate `Range(0, 10)`, pack it and split its unique permission into two share permissions, as we have to pass a permission to `la` to the constructor of `Link` when creating `p`. This unpack-pack-split procedure takes place whenever we have to split a unique permission into two share ones. Since `la` can be accessed through `p` from now on, we do not need to mention `la` in the following object proposition sets. In this respect, our system is an affine one (as opposed to a linear one), because we can drop a resource if we do not need it any more.

When creating the object `q`, we need to pass in a share permission to `p`. We obtain it by splitting the current unique permission to `p` into two share permissions. Before calling method `addModulo11` on `r`, we also have to split the permission to `r` so that a share permission can be passed to the method. The splitting of permissions is similar when we call `addModulo11` on `q`.

The specification in separation logic is more cumbersome and unable to hide shared data. To express the fact that all
values in a segment of linked elements are in the interval \([n_1, n_2]\), we need to define the following predicate:

\[
\text{Listsseg}(r, p, n_1, n_2) \equiv (r = p) \vee (r \rightarrow (i, s) \star \text{Listsseg}(s, p, n_1, n_2) \land n_1 \leq i \leq n_2).
\]

This predicate states that either the segment is null, or the val field of \(r\) points to \(i\) and the next field points to \(o\), such that \(n_1 \leq i \leq n_2\), and the elements on the segment from \(o\) to \(p\) are in the interval \([n_1, n_2]\). The verification of the same code in separation logic is given in Figure 4.

```
...  
Link la = new Link(3, null);  
    {Listsseg(la, null, 0, 10)}  
Link p = new Link(6, la);  
    {Listsseg(p, null, 0, 10)}  
Link q = new Link(1, p);  
    {Listsseg(q, p, 0, 10) \star Listsseg(p, null, 0, 10)}  
Link r = new Link(5, p);  
    {Listsseg(q, p, 0, 10) \star Listsseg(r, p, 0, 10)\star Listsseg(p, null, 0, 10)}

r.addModulo11(9);  
    {Listsseg(q, p, 0, 10) \star Listsseg(r, p, 0, 10)}

****missing step*****  
    {Listsseg(q, null, 0, 10) \star Listsseg(r, p, 0, 10)}  
q.addModulo11(7);  
    {Listsseg(q, null, 0, 10) \star Listsseg(r, p, 0, 10)}
...
```

Figure 4. Separation logic verification

In separation logic, the natural pre and post-conditions of the method `addModulo11` are `Listsseg(this, null, 0, 10)`, i.e., the method takes in a list of elements in \([0, 10]\) and returns a list in the same range.

Thus, before calling `addModulo11` on \(r\), we have to combine `Listsseg(r, p, 0, 10) \star Listsseg(p, null, 0, 10)` into `Listsseg(r, null, 0, 10)`. We observe the following problem: in order to call `addModulo11` on \(q\), we have to take out `Listsseg(p, null, 0, 10)` and combine it with `Listsseg(q, p, 0, 10)`, to obtain `Listsseg(q, null, 0, 10)`. But the specification of the method does not allow it, hence the missing step in Figure 4. The specification of `addModulo11` has to be modified instead, by mentioning that there exists some sublist `Listsseg(p, null, 0, 10)` that we pass in, and which gets passed back out again. The modification is unnatural: the specification of `addModulo11` involving sublists becomes awkward. We can imagine an even more complicated example, where there are three sublists that we need to pass in and out of `addModulo11`. It is impossible to know, at the time we write the specification of a method, on what kind of shared data that method will be used. Separation logic approaches will thus have a difficult time trying to verify this kind of code, while object propositions allow us to call methods on both lists, no manipulation of predicates being necessary.

4. Grammar

The programming language that we are using is inspired by Feather-weight Java (Igarashi et al. 2001), extended to include object propositions. We have retained only the most important Java concepts for us, that are relevant for showing our methodology. Thus, we have not taken into account features such as inheritance, casting or dynamic dispatch that are too complex and not important for making our point.

Figure 5 shows the syntax of our simple class-based object-oriented language.

```
program PR ::= \langle CL, e \rangle  
class decls CL ::= class C \{ F Q partially = P \}  
field decls F ::= f : T  
methods M ::= T m(T x) : MS = e  
method spec MS ::= P_1 \rightarrow P_2  
predicates P ::= q \mid x \mid \text{binop} P_1 P_2 \mid P_1 \& P_2 \mid 0 \mid 1 \mid | \star P \mid | \star \text{statement}  
binop ::= + \mid - \mid \% \mid = \mid \leq \mid \lt \mid \gt \mid \geq  
terms t ::= x \mid o \mid \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid 1 \mid 2 \mid \text{not} \ t \mid \text{and} \ t_1 \text{or} \ t_2  
expressions e ::= t \mid f \mid \text{assign} f := t \mid \text{new C(T)} \mid t_c.m(f) \mid \text{if}(t, e_1, e_2) \mid \text{let} \ x = e_1 \text{in} e_2 \mid t_1 \text{binop} t_2 \mid \text{unpack} r \text{from} \ P \text{in} e \mid \text{pack} r \text{to} \ P \text{in} e  
references r ::= x \mid o  
types T ::= C \mid \text{bool} \mid \text{int}  
permissions q ::= \text{Perm}(T) \text{in} Q(T) \mid \text{unpacked}(r, q) \mid \text{none}(r)  
permission kind Perm ::= \text{share} \mid \text{immutable} \mid \text{unique}
```

Figure 5. Language and Permission syntax.

4.1 Permission Splitting

We need a mechanism for tracking permissions in our verification approach.

When a client has a unique permission to a shared object and an alias capturing a shared permission to the object is created, we want the client to still have access to the collection. How can this be achieved? By saying that the client now has a shared permission to the shared object. This mechanism is called permission splitting. Before method calls we

split the original permission into two, one of which is retained by the caller. The splitting rules reflect the fact that the permission assumptions are not violated: a unique permission is never duplicated and no immutable permission co-exists with a share permission. The splitting rules are the following.

unique(x) ⇒ share(x) ⊗ share(x)
share(x) ⇒ share(x) ⊗ share(x)
immutable(x) ⇒ immutable(x) ⊗ immutable(x)

This leads to the rules in Figure 6.

The next natural idea is that we would like to reverse permission splits to regain the initial permission to the shared object. This idea is called permission joining and can be allowed if we introduce the notion of fractions (Boylan 2003). We will study permission joining in our future work.

5. Proof Rules

This section describes the proof rules in Figure 7 used for guaranteeing at compile-time that protocol violations will not occur at runtime. The judgement to check an expression e is of the form Γ; Π ⊢C e : ∃x : T.P. This is read “in valid context Γ and linear context Π, an expression e executed within receiver class C has type T and satisfies object proposition P”. By writing ∃x, we bound the variable x to the result of the expression e.

Before presenting the detailed rules, we provide the intuition for why our system is sound (a formal proof is the subject of current work). The first invariant enforced by our system is that there will never be two conflicting permissions to the same object. The permission splitting rules can give rise to only one of three situations, for a particular object: there exists a unique reference to the object, all the references to this object are immutable or all are shared. For the first two cases, sound reasoning is easy because either aliasing or mutability is prohibited.

The third case, shared, follows an inductive argument, based on the property that the invariant of a shared object always holds whenever that object is packed. The base case in the induction occurs when a unique object whose invariant holds first becomes shared. In order to access an object, we must first unpack it; by induction, we can assume its invariant holds as long as the object is packed. But we know the object is packed immediately before the unpack operation, because the rules of our system ensure only one object can be unpacked at a time; therefore, we know the object’s invariant holds. Assignments to the object’s fields may later violate the invariant, but in order to pack the object back up (which we need to do in order to access another object) we must restore its invariant. For a shared object, packing must restore the same invariant the object had when it was unpacked; thus the invariant of an object never changes once that object is shared, avoiding inconsistencies between aliases to the object. This completes the inductive case for soundness of shared objects. All of the predicates we might infer will thus be sound because we will never assume anything more about that object than the predicate invariant, which should hold according to the above argument.

The rule TERM formalizes the standard logical judgement for existential introduction. The notation [e′/x]e substitutes e′ for occurrences of x in e. The FIELD rule checks field accesses analogously.

NEW checks object construction. The parameters fn passed to the object constructor have to satisfy initialization predicate Q0, which has exactly the same arguments as the constructor of the object, and become the object’s initial field values. The new existentially qualified object is naturally associated with a unique permission to the root state. The init judgement looks up the initialization predicate for a class. When this object becomes shared, it will have to satisfy the object invariant given by the programmer. This can be accomplished by unpacking the object from Q0, packing it to the invariant and then splitting the unique permission into two shared permissions.

IF is the rule that introduces disjunctive types in the system and checks if-expressions.

LET checks a let binding and makes sure that outdated object propositions are not available after assignments.

The rules for packing and unpacking are PACK-SH-IMM, PACK-UNI, UNPACK-SH-UNI and UNPACK-IMM. When we pack an object to a share permission, we have to pack it to the same object proposition that was true before the object was unpacked. This restriction also holds for immutable permissions because, by definition, the object will not be modified, so it will satisfy the object proposition that was true before unpacking. The restriction is not necessary for unique permissions: objects that are packed to unique permissions can be packed to a different object proposition that the one that was true for them before unpacking. There is a special rule for the unpacking of immutable objects because we want to emphasize that all their fields are also immutable. This restricts the current system by requiring that the predicates of immutable objects should only contain immutable permissions to their fields. Although special predicates have to be written for immutable objects, the soundness of the system is preserved.

Since we allow only one unpacked object at any time in the system, we have to keep track if there currently exists an unpacked object. We do this by having a flag ok that shows if there is another unpacked object in the system. If there is, ok = false and we are not allowed to unpack another object. When we apply one of the PACK rules, ok becomes true because the only unpacked object in the system has just been packed.

The CALL rule simply states what is the object proposition that holds about the result of the method being called. This rule first identifies the specification of the method (using the helper judgement MTYPE) and then goes on to state the object proposition holding for the result.
The rule ASSIGN assigns an object \( t \) to a field \( f_i \) and returns the old field value as an existential \( x \). For this rule to work, the current object \( this \) has to be unpacked and to not have permission immutable (because objects with immutable permissions do not allow modification of their fields).

### 6. Verification of Implementations

Now, we want to verify that a method implementation respects the specification. Whenever we can apply the proof rules we presented in Figure 7, we apply them. But those proof rules do not deal with primitive types. When fields or variables on the heap are assigned primitive types, we will use the standard linear logic and arithmetic rules presented in the Appendix.

We verify that the method \( \text{addModulo11}() \) from Figure 2 satisfies the implementation. We will assume that \( this \) is the caller of the method. Since according to our system any object is packed before calling a method, \( this \) has to be first unpacked. When verifying a method implementation, the first step that we must do is to skolemize the method specification if it is universally quantified. The specification in this case is not universally quantified so it will not be skolemized. To be able to formally deduce the postcondition, it is necessary that we unravel the meaning of the predicate \( \text{Range}(0,10) \). Also, the rules in Figure 7 do not allow us to simultaneously read and write to a field. Instead, we have to rewrite the assignment \( val = (val + x) \mod 11 \) as \( let \ t = val \ in \ val = (t + x) \mod 11 \). We obtain the following setting:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ val \rightarrow x_1 \otimes next \rightarrow o_1 \otimes x_1 \geq 0 \otimes x_1 \leq 10 \otimes \\
\quad share(o_1) \ in \ \text{Range}(0,10) \oplus o_1 == \text{null} \} \\
let \ t = val \ in \\
\quad \{ t \rightarrow x_1 \otimes next \rightarrow o_1 \otimes x_1 \geq 0 \otimes x_1 \leq 10 \otimes \\
\quad \quad share(o_1) \ in \ \text{Range}(0,10) \oplus o_1 == \text{null} \} \\
val = (t + x) \mod 11 \\
\quad \{ val \rightarrow x_2 \otimes x_2 = (x_1 + x) \mod 11 \\
\quad \quad \otimes next \rightarrow o_1 \otimes x_2 \geq 0 \\
\quad \quad \otimes x_2 \leq 10 \otimes share(o_1) \ in \ \text{Range}(0,10) \oplus o_1 == \text{null} \}
\end{align*}
\]

For obtaining the object propositions in the last step, we apply the standard linear logic and arithmetic rules from the Appendix. Next, by applying the If rule, unpacking of the next Link and the CALL rule for the recursive call, we are able to prove that the postcondition holds and the implementation of \( \text{addModulo11} \) satisfies the specification.

### 7. Specification for Modularity

To illustrate the modularity issues, we present here a more realistic example than the queue example from Section 3. In Figure 8 we depict a simulator for two queues of jobs, containing large jobs (size>10) and small jobs (size<11). The example is relevant in queueing theory, where an optimal scheduling policy might separate the jobs in two queues, according to some criteria. The role of the control is to make each producer/consumer periodically take a step in the simulation. We have modeled two FIFO queues, two producers, two consumers and a control object. Each producer needs a pointer to the end of each queue, for adding a new job, and a pointer to the start of each queue, for initializing the start of each queue in case it becomes empty. Each consumer has a pointer to the start of one queue because it consumes the element that was introduced first in that queue. The control has a pointer to each producer and to each consumer. The queues are shared by the producers and consumers, thus giving rise to a number of aliased objects with \( share \) permissions.

![Figure 8. Simulator for queues of jobs](image)
the large jobs, see Figure 9. Ideally, the specification of the control object should not change, since the consumers and the producers have the same behavior as before: each producer produces both large and small jobs and each consumer accesses only one kind of job. We will show in the following sections that our methodology does not modify the specification of the control object, thus allowing us to make changes locally without influencing other code, while
separation logic approaches (Distefano and Parkinson 2008) will modify the specification of the controller.

The code in Figures 10, 11 and 12 represents the initial running example from Figure 8, that we discussed in the Overview section. The predicates and the specifications of each class explain how the objects and methods should be used and what is their expected behavior. For eg., the Producer object has access to the two queues, it expects the queues to be shared with other objects, but also that the elements of one queue will stay in the range [0,10], while the elements of the second queue will stay in the range [11,100].

Now, let’s imagine changing the code to reflect the modifications in Figure 9. The internal representation of the predicates changes, but their external semantics stays the same: the producers produce jobs and they direct them to the appropriate queue, each consumer accesses only one kind of queue (either the queue of small jobs or the queue of big jobs), and the controller is still the manager of the system. The predicate BothInRange() of the Producer class is exactly the same. The predicate ConsumeInRange(x,y) of the Consumer class changes to ConsumeInRange(x,y) ≡ startJobs1 → o1 ⊗ startJobs2 → o2 ⊗ share(o1) in Range(x,y) ⊗ share(o2) in Range(x,y).

The predicate WorkingSystem() of the Control class does not change.

The local changes did not influence the specification of the Control class, thus conferring greater flexibility and modularity to the code.

The current separation logic approaches do not provide this modularity. Distefano and Parkinson (2008) introduced jStar, an automatic verification tool based on separation logic aiming at programs written in Java. Although they are able to verify various design patterns and they can define abstract predicates that hide the name of the fields, they do not have a way of hiding the aliasing. In all cases, they reveal which references point to the same shared data, and this violates the information hiding principle. By using access permissions, we can hide what is the data that two objects share. We present what are the specifications needed to verify the code in Figure 8 using separation logic.

The predicate for the Producer class is Prod(this, ss, es, sl, el), where:

Prod(p, ss, es, sl, el) ≡ p.startSmallJobs → ss ∗ p.endSmallJobs → es ∗ p.startLargeJobs → sl ∗ p.endLargeJobs → el.

The precondition for the produce() method is:
Prod(p, ss, es, sl, el) ∗ Listseg(ss, null, 0, 10) ∗
public class Consumer {
    predicate ConsumerInRange(int x, int y) ≡
        startJobs → o ⊗ share(o) in Range(x,y)
        Link startJobs;

    public Consumer(Link s) {
        startJobs = s;

    public void consume() {
        ∀ x:int, y:int. 
        share(this) in ConsumerInRange(x,y)
        → share(this) in ConsumerInRange(x,y)
    }
    }

    public void println(int startJobs.val) {
        startJobs = startJobs.next;
    }
}

Figure 11. Consumer class

Listseg(sl, null, 0, 10).
The predicate for the Consumer class is
Cons(c,s) ≡ c → s.
The precondition for the consume() method is:
Cons(c,s) * Listseg(s, null, 0, 10).
The predicate for the Control class is:
Ctrl(ct, p1, p2, c1, c2) ≡ ct.prod1 → p1 *
The precondition for makeActive() is:
Ctrl(this, p1, p2, c1, c2) * Prod(p1, ss, es, sl, el) *
Prod(p2, ss, es, sl, el) * Cons(c1, sl) *
Cons(c2, ss) * Listseg(ss, null, 0, 10) *
Listseg(sl, null, 0, 10).
The lack of modularity will manifest itself when we add
the two queues as in Figure 9.

The predicates Prod(p, ss, es, sl, el) and
Ctrl(ct, p1, p2, c1, c2) do not change, while the predicate
Cons(c, s1, s2) changes to
Cons(c, s1, s2) ≡ c.startJobs1 → s1 *
   c.startJobs2 → s2.
The precondition for the consume() method becomes:
Cons(c, s1, s2) * Listseg(s1, null, 0, 10) *
Listseg(s2, null, 0, 10).

8. Related Work

There are two main lines of research that give partial solutions
for the verification of object-oriented code in the presence
of aliasing: the permission-based work and the separation
logic approaches.

Bierhoff and Aldrich (2007) developed access permissions,
which combines typestate and object aliasing information.
Developers use access permissions to express the design intent of
t heir protocols in annotations on methods and classes. Our work
is a generalization of their work, as we use object propositions
t o modularly check that implementations follow their design intent.
The typestate (DeLine and Fähndrich 2004) formulation has certain
limits of expressiveness: it is only suited to finite state abstractions.
This makes it unsuitable for describing fields that contain
intergers and can take an infinite number of values and can satisfy
various arithmetical properties. Our object propositions
have the advantage that they can express predicates over an
infinite domain, such as the integers.

Access permissions allow predicate changes even if objects
are aliased in unknown ways. States and fractions
(Boylan 2003) capture alias types, borrowing, adoption,
and focus with a sing le mechanism. In Boylan's work,
a fractional permission means immutability (instead of sharing)
t o ensure non-interference of permissions. We use per-
missions to keep object propositions consistent but track, split, and join permissions in the same way as Boyland.

Boogie (Barnett et al. 2005) is a modular reusable verifier for Spec# programs. It provides design-time feedback and generates verification conditions to be passed to an automatic theorem prover. While Boogie allows a client to depend on properties of objects that it owns, we allow a client to depend on properties of objects that it doesn’t own too.

Krishnaswami et al. (2010) show how to modularly verify programs written using dynamically-generated bidirectional dependency information. They introduce a ramification operator in higher-order separation logic, that explains how local changes alter the knowledge of the rest of the heap. Their solution is application specific, as they need to find a version of the frame rule specifically for their library. Our methodology is a general one that can potentially be used for verifying any object-oriented program.

Nanevski et al. (2007) developed Hoare Type Theory (HTT), which combines a dependently typed, higher-order language with stateful computations. While HTT offers a semantic framework for elaborating more practical external languages, our work targets Java-like languages and does not have the complexity overhead of higher-order logic.

Cohen et al. (2010) use locally checked invariants to verify concurrent C programs. In their approach, each object has an invariant, a unique owner and they use handles (read permissions) to cater for shared objects. The disadvantage is their high annotation overhead and the need to introduce ghost fields. We do not have to change the code in order to verify our specifications.

Our work uses abstract predicates, similar to the work of Parkinson and Bierman (2005) and Dinsdale-Young et al. (2010). The abstraction makes it easy to change the internal representation of a predicate without modifying the client’s external view of it. The main mechanism is still separation logic, with its shortcomings.

There exist a set of verification methodologies for object-oriented programs in a concurrent setting: (Jacobs and Piessens 2011), (Leino and Muller 2009), (J.Smans et al. 2008), (Dinsdale-Young et al. 2010). These approaches can express externally imposed invariants on shared objects, but only for invariants that are associated with the lock protecting that object. In many cases, it may be inappropriate to associate such an invariant with the lock: for example, in a singlethreaded setting, there is no such lock. Even in multithreaded settings, a high level lock may protect a data structure with internal sharing, in which case specifying that sharing in the lock would break the modularity of the data structure. Thus, these systems do not provide an adequate solution to the modular verification problem we consider.

9. Future Work

We have made an intuitive argument that the proof rules from Figure 7 are sound. In the future, we plan to formally prove soundness, following the techniques used to prove a similar system of rules (Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007) sound. Also, we plan to explore extensions to both the language and logic.

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References


Atsushi Igarashi, Benjamin C. Pierce, and Philip Wadler. Featherweight Java: a minimal core calculus for Java and GJ. 2001.


Appendix

$$P_1; P_2 \vdash P_3$$
$$P_4 \otimes P_5 \vdash P_3 \quad (\otimes L)$$

$$P_1 \vdash P_3$$
$$P_2 \vdash P_3$$
$$P_1 \oplus P_2 \vdash P_3 \quad (\oplus L)$$

$$P_4 \vdash P_1$$
$$P_5 \vdash P_2$$
$$P_4, P_5 \vdash P_1 \otimes P_2 \quad (\otimes R)$$

$$P_1 \vdash P_3$$
$$P_2 \vdash P_3$$
$$P_1 \oplus P_2 \vdash P_3 \quad (\oplus R)$$

$$P_1(x_1) \vdash P_2 \quad (general \ x_1)$$
$$\exists x. P_1(x) \vdash P_2 \quad (PRE-\exists)$$

$$P_1(x_1) \vdash P_2 \quad (general \ x_1)$$
$$\forall x. P_1(x) \vdash P_2 \quad (PRE-\forall)$$

$$\exists x. P_1(x) \vdash P_2$$
$$P_1(x_1) \vdash P_2 \quad (constructed \ x_1)$$
$$\forall x. P_1(x) \vdash P_2 \quad (POST-\exists)$$

$$\forall x. P_1(x) \vdash P_2$$
$$P_1(x_1) \vdash P_2 \quad (general \ x_1)$$
$$\forall x. P_1(x) \vdash P_2 \quad (POST-\forall)$$

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**Figure 13.** Rules for proving predicates

$$x_1 \leq x_2; x_2 \leq x_3; x_1 \leq x_3 \vdash P \quad (M)$$

$$a = b; c = a + d; c = b + d \vdash P \quad (T)$$

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**Figure 14.** Arithmetic rules