Dramatizing Development: The Celebration and Reality of West German Village Projects in West Africa, 1962-1977

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Carnegie Mellon University

MARIANNA BROWN DIETRICH COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

Doctor of Philosophy

For the Degree of

Dramatizing Development: The Celebration and Reality of West German Village Projects in West Africa, 1962-1977

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Dramatizing Development: The Celebration and Reality of West German Village Projects in West Africa, 1962-1977

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John W. Weigel, B.A., M.A.

DISSERTATION

Presentation to the Faculty of the Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences of Carnegie Mellon University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

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Abstract

In West Africa, the Federal Republic of Germany hoped to do well by doing good. In cooperation with the host governments of Ghana, Togo and Dahomey and with local notables, official West German development agencies planned and operated four development projects during the 1960s and early 1970s, aiming to help several villages earn their way to higher standards of living by forming cooperatives and producing for agricultural or fish markets. At the same time the FRG and host governments joined together to stage “development theater.” That is, they exploited the projects through ceremonies and publicity to highlight their own benevolence and the villagers’ gratitude. In reality the projects mostly fared badly because of practical German mistakes, incompetent German managers, and confusion over the proper organization of cooperatives. The Germans were also guilty of cultural hubris, failing either to investigate villager needs or to appreciate the wisdom of local practices.

This dissertation ties together disparate bodies of scholarly literature on symbolic politics, development aid administration, development aid critiques, and the history of conflict between European and African agricultural, domestic and medical knowledge and practices. Small village development projects served the needs of symbolic politics much as large-scale projects have done, even though they brought only small or no advantage to the villagers. The projects went astray largely because the West Germans were blinded by a “colonial gaze” that prevented them from valuing villager experience, yet the “gaze,” projected outward, became an advantage in “development theater” by
making villagers appear needy and ignorant or, where necessary, guilty of making the projects go wrong by not working hard enough.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iii

Abstract ......................................................................................................................... vi

Introduction

Development Theater: Projects Onstage and Backstage .............................................. 1

Chapter 1

Chapter 2
Reconfiguring Failure: The Togo Model Villages, 1962-75 ......................................... 93

Chapter 3
In Pursuit of Profit: The Cooperatives of Tori Cada, 1962-73 ................................. 164

Chapter 4
Building a Debacle: The Settlement Project at Peki, 1969-75 .................................. 209

Chapter 5
A Fragile Success: Three Projects in Biriwa, 1962-73 ............................................. 256

Chapter 6
The Development Triangle: Project, Government and Village .............................. 308

Chapter 7
Development Theater in Practice: Village Projects as an Optical Experience .......... 360

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 424

Appendix A
Guide to Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 431

Appendix B
Dramatis Personae: Significant People in the Village Projects ............................... 433

Appendix C
FRG Ministerial Appropriations for Village Development Projects ...................... 441

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 444
Introduction – Development Theater: Projects Onstage and Backstage

With the example of Biriwa it is demonstrated how with minimal technical aid funds not only a good to very good success in publicity work can be achieved, but also a resonance in the population itself. In the meantime, Biriwa is considered to be a model village to which representatives of other villages are “making a pilgrimage.”

Chargé d’affaires Schaad, West German Embassy in Ghana, April 4, 1967

The development project looked good, and that was important. For nearly five years the West German embassy had worked with West German citizen and Ghanaian health official Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann for better nutrition and hygiene in the coastal fishing village of Biriwa with fishing nets, a new bathhouse and new latrines. Now further improvements were on the way and both governments took the opportunity to show off their present and future achievements to the village and to Ghana’s general public with an inauguration ceremony on March 11, 1967. Eight days later, the Ghanaian Sunday Mirror story cried “BIRIWA GETS SANITARY AMENITIES,” adding that “The people are very grateful.” Beneath photographs of local Chief Nana Kwa Bonku IV, Dr. Hoffmann, and Lieutenant Colonel R. J. G. Dontoh, military boss of Ghana’s Central Region, was a photo of one of the latrines themselves, a sturdy, well-ventilated cinderblock edifice decorated front and center by a splendid mosaic. The Daily Graphic, Ghana’s largest newspaper, also reported the event and ran a photograph of Dontoh’s wife, Elsie, unveiling a mosaic. Long before the ceremony, the latrines so impressed nearby villages that West German officials spoke of an aura or radiating effect

1 Schaad, Embassy in Accra, April 28, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.
(Ausstrahlung), as if sanitary technology traveled on beams of light.\(^4\) The mosaics, one of which portrayed a larger-than-life fisher woman, intensified this radiation.\(^5\) Alas, the latrines did not turn out so well; several years later no one could use them, because the tanks beneath them filled up, and no vehicle could pump them out because Dr. Hoffmann had failed to install an access road.\(^6\) As late as 1977 the problem remained unsolved.\(^7\) Perhaps Biriwa still looked good, but the latrines radiated nothing now except a bad smell.

Why did the West German government trouble itself with a small community on the West African coast and trouble its residents too? What did it stand to gain? It gained drama, a chance to display itself upon a public stage and call upon all onlookers to behold its good deeds. Host governments owned and shared the stage. Together they basked in the light of ceremony and publicity while leaving in the shade the problems that arose and the goals that went unfulfilled. They were the co-producers of a development theater meant to impress local and national publics in the host country, occasionally the West German general public, and sometimes the very small West German public of development aid specialists.\(^8\) Biriwa was only one of several West

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\(^4\) Dr. Schuster, Oberregierungsrat, and Neufelt, RegAss, Referat II B/7, BMZ to II A and AL II, State Secretary and BMZ Minister, June 4, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.


\(^7\) Travel Report of Mechthild Heyer, GTZ, December 1977, BArchiv B 213/32447.

\(^8\) Mine is not the first use of the phrase “development theater.” For Bernard J. Lecomte, Project Aid: Limitations and Alternatives (Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1986), 67–68, “development theatre” refers to projects themselves and the project cycle; in the first play the three acts are identification, feasibility study, and negotiation, and in the sequel the three acts are execution, evaluation, and handover. He identifies the main actors as negotiators, foreign consultants and contractors, and local public corporations, but he would like the recipients to take
African villages so favored. During the 1960s and early 1970s experts and volunteers also went to Agou, Nuatja, Kambolé (Togo), Tori Cada (Dahomey/Benin), and Peki (Ghana). There too, and no doubt in other communities in other parts of the world, governments worked together to celebrate their achievements, real or pretended.

Yet these projects had to be more than grand gestures, splendid phrases, and glowing press accounts. Unless the actors played their parts with conviction behind the scenes as well as in front, by spending years planning, building, cajoling, listening and sweating in genuine efforts to improve village life, they would convince neither audiences nor themselves of their good intentions. The projects at Biriwa, Peki, Agou, Nuatja, Cambolé, and Tori Cada were not merely a “theater-state” or “device for the enactment of mass ritual” in which public spectacle was the entire goal.\(^9\) Nor was development theater so dishonest at the outset as “security theater,” which provides the public with the feeling rather than the reality of security.\(^10\) The West Germans promised real goods and services, and then did their best to deliver. It was limits to their knowledge of place, people and culture, their poor planning, and sometimes their erratic management and arrogance that defeated them, not their unwillingness to provide.

This dissertation will make three important contributions. First, it will go beyond the current literature on development projects as political symbols to prove that governments exploit small projects in rural areas as well as large, expensive ones with their place. “Development theatre” may also refer to the use of drama to promote development in general or development projects. See Victor N. Gomia, *Mobilizing the Hordes: Radio Drama as Development Theatre in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa Research and Publishing CIG, 2012), xi, 1-2, 11-13, 52.


very high visibility; no opportunity to shine is overlooked.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, development theater in bilateral projects is an act of international cooperation, in which governments join hands across borders and oceans to cooperate in generating publicity for mutual gain; earlier studies have examined only domestic projects and therefore lacked the international aspect. This fact deepens our understanding of the purpose of official development aid, whose scholars and critics have up to now concerned themselves with practical, moral and discursive issues rather than symbolic ones.\textsuperscript{12} As I will soon show, West Germany and the governments of Ghana, Togo, and Dahomey had historically specific reasons to perform development theater. Finally, this dissertation will show that development theater not only enhances the symbolic position of governments as well-doers, but necessarily reduces that of the villagers to grateful recipients at best or lazy ingrates at worst. It invites audiences in both donor and recipient countries to see rural beneficiaries through a “colonial gaze” that makes the latter appear as tradition-bound inferiors requiring proper instruction. It also gives host governments an opportunity to further degrade villagers by explicitly and publicly commanding diligence and obedience.


a symbolic aspect of projects that no other scholar has yet examined or perhaps even encountered.

Second, this dissertation will contribute to the critical literature on development projects by providing a new type of comparison. Earlier studies have examined projects in one rural community, integrated rural development projects in a whole region, or multiple projects of different types. This study, however, offers a unique comparison in which the same subdivision of the same development agency—the West Africa Referat of the West German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ)—ran four projects in three adjoining countries that were largely similar yet had important variations. All operated in communities of some few thousands at roughly the same time, but three involved existing villages while one set up a new settlement, three involved agriculture while the fourth dealt with fish processing and marketing, and three established cooperatives and one did not. This variety, allied to the accumulated experience at the West Africa Referat, should have helped the BMZ to success somewhere, but none of the projects established sustained profitability. The results suggest the difficulty or even impossibility of improving village life through official development aid. Furthermore, the projects changed the balance of power between village and state by establishing new

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13 Ferguson, supra; Roland Weiss, “Wir haben mehr Geld – aber es geht uns schlechter: Über die Folgen der Entwicklungshilfe am Beispiel Burkina Faso (Saarbrücken: Verlag breitenbach, 1986); Horst Meier, Die geplante Misere: Zur soziologischen Problematik fehlgeschagener Entwicklungsprojekte (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1971); Doug Porter, Bryant Allen, and Dave Thompson, Paved with Good Intentions (New York: Routledge, 1991); Hubertus Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe: Deutsche Entwicklungsarbeit in Afrika, 1960-1975 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2014). Weiss uses two projects in Burkina Faso, one for integrated rural development and the other for resettlement project, to argue that rural projects in general hurt peasants because agencies refuse to consult them. Meier’s book analyzes twenty-eight failed projects around the world, several of them attempting to establish a settlement or improve a single village. Porter, Allen and Thompson examine the Magarini Settlement Project in Kenya. Büschel discusses the outcome of three projects: the Model Villages in Togo, a training center at Wum in Cameroon, and a housing construction project in Zanzibar, the first two by West Germany and the third by East Germany.
local institutions under government control, though village elites could sometimes mitigate this control with their own participation and extract benefits for the villages as well.

Third, this dissertation will deepen scholars’ understanding of failures in development aid by drawing from historical works on conflicts between European or Western administration and culture and African ecology and society after 1800. For decades development scholars have analyzed projects to find out why they fail as well as to offer solutions for improving the chances for future projects, such as more flexible planning and beneficiary participation.14 Some have argued that projects as such are the problem, not merely mistakes within projects, because they rest upon the faulty assumption that “development” is helpful and desirable. In this view “development” was and is a one-way imposition of unhelpful European or Western “knowledge” and expertise that ignores and devalues local knowledge and practice.15 It is an expression of Europeans’ tendency to view Third World peoples through the “colonial gaze,” a perspective going back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.16 Yet even these critics are missing the broader context. Development projects with their troubles, and “development” itself, have been merely some of the many contentious direct encounters during the colonial and postcolonial era, in which ignorant European outsiders presumed

16 Henning Melber, Der Weißheit letzter Schluß: Rassismus und kolonialer Blick (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apfel, 1992); Ute Zurmühl, Der “Koloniale Blick” im entwicklungspolitischen Diskurs: Welt-Bilder und Bilder-Welten in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik, 1995).
to instruct Africans on proper labor rhythms, agriculture, ecology, housekeeping and medicine, and Africans often responded with resistance, evasion, or partial accommodation. The same general tendencies ran throughout the village projects in Ghana, Togo and Dahomey. When West German aid workers came to West Africa in the early to late 1960s, they brought with them long-established European assumptions that primed them to misunderstand local practices and attitudes and often spoiled their work by stirring up resentment and resistance. One can understand the full range of German difficulties only within the context of the longer and wider historical experience of European intervention in Africa and elsewhere.\(^{17}\)

The remainder of this Introduction falls into eight sections. The first will summarize the literature of symbolic politics, including its application in development projects. The second and third will examine some of the issues facing West German and West African governments during the 1960s and early 1970s and suggest their reasons for engaging in development theater. The fourth will discuss the village projects and their results, with some cross-project comparisons. The fifth and sixth will focus on two particular problems that undermined West German efforts: project management difficulties and the entanglement of FRG aid workers and officials in power conflicts between and within host governments and local communities. The final section will lay out the chapter structure and briefly discuss source problems.

\(^{17}\) For other examples of development projects that failed or ran into serious difficulties because donors ignored local knowledge and practices, see Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*, Jean Filipovich, “Destined to Fail: Forced Settlement at the Office du Niger, 1926-1945,” *Journal of African History* 42, no. 2 (2001), and Porter, Allen and Thompson, *Paved with Good Intentions*. 
Development Theater: Symbolic Politics and Development Projects

Scholars and political actors have long understood that politics is theater. In 1867 Walter Bagehot wrote that English government contained “efficient” and “dignified” parts. The former were those by which government actually worked and ruled and the latter those that “excite[d] and preserve[d] the reverence of the population.” He went on to say that “The elements which excite the most easy reverence will be the theatrical elements—those which appeal to the senses which claim to be embodiments of the greatest human ideas, which boast in some cases of far more than human origin.” In 1992 Ulrich Sarasinelli called politics “a stage with actors, directors, stage designers, scene-shifters, participating and non-participating spectators...” Even the giving of advice in private may be deemed a drama. Historians have often looked to theatrical metaphors for royal ceremonies and political rituals. In Kennedy in Berlin, Andreas W. Daum wrote of the famous 1963 presidential visit’s “Script and Staging” and “Dramatic Climax.” Revolutionaries also have their theatrics; two historians of the Russian Revolution have observed “The boundary between street theatre and revolution can indeed be blurred—not just because the struggle is a drama but because the protagonists

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themselves are prone to act out roles (the messenger, the hero, the martyr and so on) as if upon a stage.”

The theatrical analogy is part of the study of political symbolism, in which symbols serve as a tool of control. They evoke “the ideas society wants to believe are true,” so they are in a sense real. They signal and command attention, manage quantities of information, carry out a certain view of the world through the power of definition, and—most importantly—mobilize emotions. Symbolization creates “units of discourse” and “units of feeling around which loyalty and assurance can cluster.” Clifford Geertz has observed that “Thrones may be out of fashion, and pageantry too; but political authority requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it.” Through the symbolic activity of rituals, the existing political system gains legitimacy by becoming sacred, even under a regime that abjures formal religion, like the USSR with its May Day parades and anniversaries of the October Revolution. In 1964 political scientist Murray Edelman argued that elites manipulate symbols to reassure the masses and keep them quiescent, leaving the elites

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26 Sarcinelli, 167.
free to quietly allocate resources and benefits to themselves through lobbying and administrative activity. A leader’s political effectiveness comes not from the results of political acts, but from conveying the impression of knowing what is to be done. “The leader’s dramaturgical jousts with public problems make the world understandable and convey the promise of collective accomplishments to masses who are bewildered, uncertain, and alone.”

Symbolic behavior distracts as well as focuses attention. In the words of David I. Kertzer, ritual “structures our experience; it guides our perceptions and channels our interpretation of those perceptions.” It dims critical thinking by presenting participants and spectators with a “well-defined course of action.” By emphasizing “a limited series of visual images” and focusing on them intently, rituals shut out other objects from our perceptions. According to Steven Lukes, a ritual helps “define as authoritative certain ways of seeing society” and “draws people’s attention to certain forms of relationships and activity” while diverting them from other forms “since every way of seeing it is also

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31 Ibid., 91. Others have pointed out that dissenters, rebels and revolutionaries also engage in symbolic politics. See, e.g., Kertzer, 152-53; Figes and Kolonitskii, supra. Since I focus on governments’ use of development theater, Edelman’s arguments remain apt. One commentator has claimed the reverse of Edelman; seeing politics as theater means admitting that public opinion matters (because politicians must hold the attention of their audience) and that people know what is good for them. See Ferdinand Mount, _The Theatre of Politics_ (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), 8-9. Since I will show that development theater involves a fair amount of evasion, silence about important setbacks, or even deception, I discount Mount’s argument here.
32 In the scholarly literature on symbolic politics, “theater” and “drama” overlap and blend with “ceremony,” “ritual,” and “spectacle.” All possess symbolic elements, actors, settings, and scripts supposed to inspire feelings in their audiences. Kertzer, for example, calls rituals dramatic and Sean Wilentz describes ceremonies and insignia as “minidramas.” Johannes Paulmann’s essay on nineteenth century monarchs applies the label of theatricality to use of ceremony. According to Lisa Wedeen, spectacles “dramatize” a regime’s aspirations. See Kertzer, 11; Sean Wilentz, “Introduction: Teufelsdröckh’s Dilemma: On Symbolism, Politics and History,” in Wilentz, _Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics_, 3; Paulmann, 446-49; and Lisa Wedeen, _Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 13.
33 Kertzer, 84-85.
Edelman argued that governmental acts in courtroom, police station and legislature divert audiences from “cognitive and rational analysis and manipulation of the environment.” Even foreign policy can “serve as a drama to distract public attention.”

Symbolic politics needs visibility. As Michael Walzer has written, “the state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen and symbolized before it can be loved.” During his Berlin visit, Kennedy needed to see and be seen. His success depended upon the visit’s “political optic.” “High visibility” made large-scale Israeli development projects politically attractive. Public spectacles (“visible symbolic displays of power”), writes one scholar on modern Syria, “dramatize the aspirations of the regime, but also promote images designed to convey certain ideas to spectators.”

Newspapers and magazines, and more recently radio and television have extended the reach of symbolism. They have even reshaped the content of politics because, as Sarcinelli has said, politicians behave a certain way only because the media are there. News reporting, according to Edelman is a spectacle that “continuously constructs and reconstructs social problems, crises, enemies, and leaders, and so creates a success of threats and reassurances.”

Development projects serve symbolic politics in two ways. First, their mere existence promises modernization and eventually rising standards of living. Here

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36 Blackbourn, 249.
37 Sarcinelli, 161, also includes acoustic and linguistic stimuli within “political symbolism.”
38 Walzer, 194.
39 Daum, 10.
40 Steinberg, 133.
41 Lisa Wedeen, 13.
42 Paulmann, 449; Sarcinelli, 171.
scholars have focused only on large-scale projects, which appeal to governments because they demonstrate the capacity of state and regime to get things done, they achieve high visibility thanks to their scale, and they unify diverse populations behind shared symbols of modernization.\textsuperscript{44} Under Josef Stalin’s Five-Year Plans the USSR built the Turksib Railway, the Dneprostroy dam, the Volga-Don Canal, the Magnitostroi steel plant, and the White-Sea-Baltic Sea Canal as “major symbolic markers of the building of a new socialist society.”\textsuperscript{45} Israel, hoping to stir national pride and validate the Zionist emphasis on state-led technological development, launched high-profile programs to build the Lavi stealth combat aircraft, the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal, and a nuclear power system, approving them at cabinet level and funding them outside ministerial budgets.\textsuperscript{46} President Park Chung Hee, who took over South Korea in a military coup in 1961, demanded construction of the Gyeongbu Highway from Busan in the south to Seoul in the north as a symbol of Korean industrialization and of future unification with North Korea. He announced it in 1967 just four days before voters went to the polls in his reelection campaign.\textsuperscript{47} In Kuwait the monarchy razed its historic port town and capital city around 1952 in line with its modernizing ideology of *al-nahda* (“the awakening”) and over the next few decades built a new one with modernist architecture, supposedly Islamic in character, and then a “historic” *suq* (market) district to show the power of its oil wealth.\textsuperscript{48} In Ghana the government promised to resettle tens of thousands to be displaced by the Akosombo Dam over the Volta River during the 1960s. They would all

\textsuperscript{44} Steinberg, 333.
\textsuperscript{45} Gill, 89.
\textsuperscript{46} Steinberg, 334, 342.
\textsuperscript{47} Jeon, 57, 60.
\textsuperscript{48} Al-Nakib, 7-8, 16-20, 21-24.
receive better housing and higher incomes through improved agriculture. In the words of Prime Minister (later President) Kwame Nkrumah in 1953, no one would be worse off.\textsuperscript{49}

Second, any projects, whether large or small, may use ceremonies to amplify their symbolic power. President Park’s Gyeongbu Highway opened in grand style on July 7, 1970. “Seoul’s public buildings and city buses put up celebratory placards. Thousands of balloons and doves were released for the parade to the site of the opening ceremony, and the government issued commemorative stamps.”\textsuperscript{50} In Ghana, the Volta Resettlement project staged a special evacuation ceremony for the first village to be flooded, attended by ministers, district commissioners, and chiefs.\textsuperscript{51} In Sri Lanka the government celebrated the commissioning of water control projects with processions of decorated vehicles carrying monks, drummers, and officials to deliver pots of water to several Buddhist pilgrimage sites. It also erected a forty-one-meter high statue of the Buddha.\textsuperscript{52}

Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte was an important pioneer in development theater. President and then emperor of France from 1849 to 1870 as Napoleon III, he promoted himself as a bringer of modernization, citing “immense cultivated territories to clear, roads to open, ports to dig, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, [and] our network of railways to complete…” To bring the point home, he and other officials organized and presided over stone-setting and inauguration ceremonies. Stone-setting celebrated the beginning of new building projects, while inaugurations did the same for any public improvement coming into service, whether statue, railway, hospital, church or even a manmade lake in the Bois de Boulogne. Most inaugurations were local, presided over by a mayor, prefect

\textsuperscript{49} Miescher, 185-89.
\textsuperscript{50} Jeon, 70.
\textsuperscript{51} Miescher, 189.
or sub-prefect, and included speeches and banquets, though railway inaugurations usually included at least one national official; Louis-Napoleon presided over twelve of them while president. These “spectacles of prosperity” drew large crowds, providing visible proof of Louis-Napoleon’s popularity and conveying the impression that France owed its prosperity to his rule. They also shored up his questionable legitimacy. Louis-Napoleon had abused his office as president to overthrow the Second Republic and arrange his own rise to emperor in a plebiscite. His only “dynastic” predecessor was Emperor Napoleon I, who himself had taken power in a coup. Weak in constitutional and traditional authority, Louis-Napoleon relied heavily on the “theatricality of politics” to produce charismatic authority. The theater of development projects was of similar benefit to West Germany on the one hand, and Ghana, Togo, and Dahomey on the other.

**The Federal Republic of Germany: Diplomacy and Development Aid**

West Germany—the Federal Republic of Germany--was a child of the Cold War. The principle issue over which the Western Allies, the United States, Great Britain and France, fell out with the Soviet Union was how to reconstruct beaten Germany. Neither side would risk the entire nation drifting into the camp of the other. Instead each created a separate German state on the soil it occupied. In the western occupation zones a genuine multiparty system emerged, with the center-right Christian Democratic Union (married to the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) as the principle competitors, and the liberal Free Democratic Party as a much smaller third party. While the Soviets at first allowed open party competition in their zone, they quickly forced the SPD there to merge with the Communists into the Socialist

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54 Baguley, 151; Truesdell, 82.
Unity Party (SED) and then pressed other parties into an “anti-fascist” bloc under SED control. When the western Allies approved a provisional constitution in 1949 for the new Federal Republic in their zones, the Soviets followed suit by sponsoring a new SED-dominated East Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR).\(^{55}\) West Germany was by far the more populous of the two, having fifty-five million citizens in 1963 compared to sixteen million for East Germany.\(^{56}\)

Until 1972 the FRG claimed the right to represent all Germany and demanded that other states honor the claim. So far as it was concerned, the GDR was nothing more than the “Pankow government” (referring to a district of East Berlin) or the “Soviet occupation zone.”\(^{57}\) Should any country recognize the GDR by taking up diplomatic relations, West Germany would regard this step as an “unfriendly act,” against which it would retaliate, possibly by breaking off diplomatic relations with the offender. The news media named this threat the “Hallstein Doctrine.”\(^{58}\) The government held to its position despite opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which of course already had relations with the GDR, in 1955. The Soviet Union was a special case, insisted West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-63), because it retained certain occupation rights.\(^{59}\) He and his Foreign Office meant business; when Yugoslavia established relations with East Germany in 1957, West Germany broke off relations with

\(^{55}\) Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *Germany from Partition to Reunification* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 33-54.


\(^{59}\) Gray, 37-38; Booz, 15-19; Eckart Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart* (München: Siedler Verlag, 2009), 92.
Yugoslavia. Suitably warned, almost all other nations, including states just emerging from colonial rule, avoided recognizing East Germany. After a major diplomatic debacle in the Middle East in 1965, however, and a frustrated attempt to improve relations with other Communist states in Europe, the West Germans began to see the Hallstein Doctrine as increasingly burdensome. When Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-74) entered office at the head of an SPD-FDP coalition, he began negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Eastern European states, and finally the GDR, which resulted in the Basic Treaty of December 1972. Both German governments agreed to respect each other’s authority, although they exchanged “permanent missions” rather than embassies. In the West German view, the FRG recognized the GDR as another sovereign state within the German nation.

During the 1950s, West Germany established itself as a donor of bilateral (government to government) development aid, and then in 1961 escalated its spending under pressure from the United States. Such aid fell into two types, capital and technical. The one offered loans on favorable terms while the other provided advisers,
trainers, experts or specialist workers, and equipment. To coordinate allocation, two interministerial committees for technical and capital aid formed during the late 1950s (it is not clear exactly when), and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s cabinet added a higher-level Steering Committee at the end of 1960. Unfortunately, they were unwieldy and easily paralyzed because each ministry held a veto. To improve coordination, and to give his FDP coalition partners a ministry, Adenauer convinced the cabinet to create the Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ) and appointed Walter Scheel (1961-66) its head. The BMZ had little formal power, but Scheel took advantage of its fuzzy mandate to expand its reach. At the end of 1964, he won the right to administer technical aid. In 1973 the committees were abolished and the BMZ gained control over capital aid for projects less than fifteen million DM. For projects worth more than fifteen million, the BMZ still needed approval of both Economics Ministry (BMWi) and Foreign Office. For technical aid, BMZ needed only the Foreign Office’s agreement.

Because the BMZ lacked the manpower to carry out its projects, it relied on several executive organizations to do so. The Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW)

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65 Jürgen Dennert, *Entwicklungshilfe geplant oder verwaltet? Entstehung und Konzeption des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit* (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1968), 37-42; Burisch, 71-72; Jack L. Knusel, *West German Aid to Developing Countries* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 53-55. See also Bastian Hein, *Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt: Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungsdienste zwischen Reform und Revolte 1959-1974* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), 43-44 in which Hein gives October 25, 1956 as the date on which the cabinet approved an Interministerial Committee for the Promotion of Cooperation with Developing Countries, but it is not clear whether this was the predecessor of the technical or capital aid committee or both.
66 Burisch, 72.
67 Dennert, 49-57.
68 Ibid., 73; Burisch, 72.
disbursed capital aid. For technical aid, the BMZ, or up to 1964 any other ministry, had the Federal Occupational Office (BAW) place an order with the German Promotional Corporation for Developing Countries (GAWI) to implement the project. In 1969 the federal cabinet of ministers transferred the contract function from BAW to a new Federal Office for Development Aid (BfE), but also ordered the BfE to plan, supervise and carry out projects. The resulting overlap in functions with GAWI led the government to combine both agencies into a new German Corporation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), effective January 1975. Today it is called the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ).

Technical aid, including our village projects, was a partnership between governments rather than a German grant to communities or individuals. It began with a general agreement, such as the ones the Federal Republic signed with Ghana and Togo in 1959-60. The general agreement’s provisions were repeated, modified or supplemented in separate project agreements, creating a partnership in which each government promised to provide certain goods and services. As the Federal Ministry of Agriculture (BML) recommended in 1961, the Germans should send personnel and equipment while the host government should provide the ground, erect buildings, furnish transportation, apartments, and domestic personnel, and ensure that all goods passed toll-free through

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70 Dennert, 41; Hein, 47.
71 Burisch, 73; Schloz, 83-85; Knasel, 55.
73 Schloz, 88-91.
74 See www.giz.de.
customs. German participation should not last longer than three years.\textsuperscript{76} The host government should also provide counterparts to receive training and eventually replace German personnel.\textsuperscript{77} As we shall see, host countries could not always supply all that the Germans expected of them, and none of our village projects was finished within three years.

In 1963 the BMZ entered into a joint venture with a coalition of non-profit organizations to create the German Development Service (DED), West Germany’s version of the U.S. Peace Corps. The DED differed from the latter in preferring trained craftsmen to generalists. Volunteers, also known as “development helpers,” entered contractual service for two years, with the possibility of renewal for one year, after a demanding application process. Once in the host country, they answered to the DED’s country commissioner, and to the GAWI project manager if the DED assigned them to a technical aid project. In 1971, the first year for which I have a figure, their mean age was twenty-five years old.\textsuperscript{78} The organization adopted a two-fold mission of helping to overcome underdevelopment abroad and contributing to volunteers’ own education—helping and learning. Principles included solidarity with people in the Third World, integration into host countries and their development programs, orientation toward the poor and poorest countries, learning alongside collaborating, and (later) volunteer

\textsuperscript{76} Guidelines for the Use of Funds for Technical Assistance to Developing Countries, June 13, 1961, BArchiv B 116/31902.
\textsuperscript{77} John White, 80.
participation in decision-making.\textsuperscript{79} At the beginning of 2011, the DED was merged into the GIZ.\textsuperscript{80}

As to why West Germany became and remained an aid donor, scholars have argued for three different explanations. The most popular has been the “multi-functional” one that Klaus Bodomer promoted in 1974, meaning a mixture of motives: humanitarian, economic (jobs in Germany, access to raw materials and markets abroad) and foreign policy. Until 1966, the latter focused mainly on discouraging recipients from recognizing East Germany, and thereafter (until Bodemer wrote his book) reducing tensions between the wealthy global North and the poor South.\textsuperscript{81} The economic and foreign policy motives found expression through the BMWi and the Foreign Office, but humanitarianism was not quite the BMZ’s essence. Instead that ministry represented aid as an independent policy branch with an emphasis on global welfare, economic restructuring and long-term planning. Unfortunately, it was the weakest of the three ministries, though it gained some autonomy as the Hallstein Doctrine came under increasing strain after 1965.\textsuperscript{82} Other scholars have agreed that (1) FRG diplomatic and trade needs have subjected aid to multi-functionality or “heteronomy” (the influence of various interests)\textsuperscript{83}, (2) the FRG tried to “instrumentalize” aid for its claim to represent

\textsuperscript{79} Haase, 43-44, 49.
\textsuperscript{80} http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/einzelakteure/ded/index.html?PHPSESSID=361b6857941c87c2dfdee7aed78357c.
\textsuperscript{82} Bodemer, \textit{Entwicklungshilfe – politik für wen}, 87-91, 98-101, 359-71. On the BMZ promoting recipient country well-being as its central concept, see also Dennert, 57.
\textsuperscript{83} Hans-Joachim Spanger and Lothar Brock, \textit{Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt: Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR – eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland?} (Opladen:
all Germany; and (3) development policy gained more autonomy and the BMZ more freedom of action by the early 1970s. Furthermore, as Bastian Hein has observed, the FRG had different motives for cooperating with different countries: investments in Brazil, strategic partnership with Turkey, and displaying “unselfish” behavior in Tanzania.

The second and third explanations—neo-colonial and altruistic—have emphasized either the economic or the humanitarian motive. In the former view, West German development policy exploits the Third World by removing barriers to capitalist penetration there. At best, aid protects the interests of the whole capitalist system by counteracting the damaging effects of capitalist expansion. At worst, it enriches


85 Glagow, Hartmann, Menne, Pollvogt and Schimank, 209; Conze, 530-32

86 Hein, 4-5.

87 Rainer Falk, Die heimliche Kolonialmacht: Bundesrepublik und Dritte Welt (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1985), 15-17. Some scholars have agreed without the accusatory tone that aid’s purpose is to help integrate developing countries into the donor’s economic system, capitalist in West Germany’s case. See Jetzlsperger, 322. Uwe Schimank works this thesis into a multi-functional scheme that follows Bodemer. See Uwe Schimank, “Das außenpolitische Interorganisationsnetz als Hemmnis einer eigenständigen deutschen Entwicklungspolitik: Heteronomie und Autonomisierungsbestrebungen des Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit,” in Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik: Aspekte und Probleme ihrer Entscheidungsstruktur, 61-69.
favored companies and perpetuates an unequal global division of labor in which developing countries export primary products in exchange for finished goods from industrialized countries.\textsuperscript{88} Siemens Corporation, for example, persuaded the BMZ and the government of Bangladesh to install new electronic telephone exchanges that needed Siemens parts manufactured in Germany.\textsuperscript{89} In the latter view, the FRG has desired primarily to promote development and higher standards of living in the Third World, while the Hallstein Doctrine acted only as a bar to aiding countries that recognized East Germany, not as a motive for extending aid in the first place.\textsuperscript{90}

None of the explanations is thoroughly convincing. Altruism is the least so; even its advocates admit the presence of other motives.\textsuperscript{91} The neo-colonial explanation reduces politics to a mere instrument of economics, as one scholar has objected.\textsuperscript{92} It also suffers from weak evidence; West German exports to and investments in the Third World declined during the 1960s, shrinking rather than expanding opportunities for exploitation.\textsuperscript{93} A 1975 study of FRG relations with Ghana found that on balance the former did not exercise “imperialist” control and that aid aimed at an import-substituting effect that might reduce purchases of West German products, though the author conceded that by vetting proposed projects West German officials influenced Ghanaian internal


\textsuperscript{89} Erler, 38-39.

\textsuperscript{90} John White, 75; Burisch, 76; Horst Dumke, \textit{Anfänge der deutschen staatlichen Entwicklungspolitik: Eine Korrektur des politischen Bildes} (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 1997), 48; Schmidt, 487-88.

\textsuperscript{91} John White, 75; Burisch, 76; Dumke, 10, 18, 20; Schmidt, 478, 488. Hein also notes Dumke’s self-contradiction, although his page numbers for Dumke do not match mine; see Hein, 36.


\textsuperscript{93} Falk, 79, 84-85; Schulz, 168. Falk notes recovery in FRG exports during the 1970s, but mainly to OPEC members and to newly industrialized countries; other importing countries continued to lose importance.
decisions.\textsuperscript{94} The multi-functional explanation has by far the strongest empirical support and opens many avenues to further research, as Hein points out, at the country level. Even so it remains incomplete. For one thing, it pays no heed to recipient country interests, and certainly host governments have had a decisive influence on project selection. For another, it overlooks an interest shared by all ministries: making themselves and the FRG look good.

The Federal Republic had a vital interest in playing the role of global benefactor. At the same time it competed with the GDR over who was the better Germany, West Germany had to distance itself from the memory and deeds of National Socialism. To crowd out old images of panzers and stiff-arm salutes, it must create new ones of workshops, wells, training institutes, dams, and medical clinics in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As two Americans wrote in 1968, “for Germany, which has struggled with what is now called an ‘image problem’ for two decades with varying success, publicity for the nation’s humanitarianism satisfies a special need.”\textsuperscript{95} In the middle of her argument for the FRG’s altruism, Heide-Marie Schmidt let slip the same point, “Foreign aid was seen from the perspective of how a ‘new’ Germany presented itself to the world.”\textsuperscript{96} For “new,” read post-Nazi. It helped that Germany, unlike the other Western powers, had not held colonies since the end of World War I, so the Federal Republic expected to inspire more confidence among newly independent states.\textsuperscript{97} John White

\textsuperscript{\textit{95}} Holbik and Myers, 48.
\textsuperscript{\textit{96}} Schmidt, 488.
\textsuperscript{\textit{97}} Dennert, 16-17; Conze, 325; Stephen Michael Kirby, “The two Germanyys in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1957-1972: Ideological universalism versus traditional statecraft” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1993), 66-67; Engel and Schleicher, 35; Holbik and Myers, 90-91; Andreas Eckert, “Westdeutsche
noted the FRG’s “longing to cut a dash in the world” as one of its aid motives. West German officials spoke of a “radiance” that projects would give to “free Germany.” The BMZ’s second minister, Hans-Jürgen Wischnerwski (1966-68) mildly remarked that sensible project selection would indirectly influence foreign policy through a “positive policy of self-presentation.” Former BMZ official Brigitte Erler blasted development aid, but she too attested to the importance of appearance. An expert on a pump repair project in Bangladesh installed expensive machinery in a massive workshop rather than hand out simple tools, because the BMZ insisted there must be something to see.

On the other hand, the BMZ was also anxious to avoid losing face by leaving behind evidence of failed projects, also known as “development ruins.” In 1967, for example, the weekly *Die Zeit* complained that the federal government, in hopes of persuading Cambodia not to recognize East Germany, had built a railroad station in Sihanoukville without a railroad. “It is, as it is called in technical jargon, a development ruin.” Brigitte Erler wrote sarcastically that the probable collapse of a cattle-breeding project in Bangladesh threatened harm to the BMZ’s standing in the “donors community”—noted for lively partying in every developing country—injure West German national pride, and reduce FRG influence in the host country. It might even put

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98 John White, 75.
99 Bohnet, 41.
101 Erler, 15.
102 Hein, 15, uses the term in reference to a hen farm in British-ruled Zambia.
a scratch in the “German consciousness of being, after the World Bank, the best and most unselfish development helper.”

This concern with appearances, with cutting a dash in the world, would form an important motive for developing villages in Ghana, Togo and Dahomey. The projects could hardly provide much raw material to the FRG or any other industrial power, nor could they long absorb many West German industrial products beyond some vehicles, agricultural machines and power tools. Neither do they seem to have been important enough to influence the host government’s attitude toward the FRG’s claim to represent all Germany. They did, however, repeatedly provide the Federal Republic with a stage upon which to produce development theater. I now turn to its co-producers, the host governments.

**Ghana, Togo and Dahomey: Instability, Legitimacy and Development Theater**

Ghana, Togo and Dahomey (Benin since 1975) were born out of the overthrow of European colonial rule that followed World War II. South of the Sahara Desert, Ghana led the way in 1957 after more than eighty years as the British Gold Coast colony. Togo and Dahomey joined it in independence three years later, along with the rest of French West Africa (except Guinea, which had already declared independence in 1958). West Germany soon established diplomatic relations with all three, while East Germany never managed more than an exchange of consulates with Ghana until after 1972.

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104 Erler, 36-37.
106 The FRG established a general consulate in Ghana (then the Gold Coast) in 1956, which it later upgraded to an embassy. See Country Summary for Ghana, September 17, 1980, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 127544. It did not open an embassy in Dahomey until October 1962. See Country Summary for People’s
The three states, lying in a neat sequence along the southern coast of West Africa between Ivory Coast and Nigeria, had much in common. In 1960 all had populations far smaller than West Germany’s: about seven, one and a half, and two million in Ghana, Togo and Dahomey than the FRG’s more than fifty million. They were also far poorer, having a per capita GDP in 1970 of $500.10, $452.30 and $439.50 in 2005 terms next to Germany’s $17,463.50. They also remained so; the figures for 1980 were $412.10, $533.50, $448.10, and $23,194.50. All of them depended on primary products for export earnings, cocoa and gold from Ghana, cotton, palm products and tropical fruit from Togo and Dahomey, and cocoa, coffee and phosphates from Togo. Each had its capital in a major coastal city: Accra (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), and Porto-Novo (Dahomey), though Cotonou was Dahomey’s largest city and the FRG would place its embassy there. Like other sub-Saharan African states, all three inherited from colonialism an administrative system that combined powerful officials in a bureaucratic hierarchy at the provincial and district levels with “traditional” indigenous chiefs whose authority may or may not have predated European rule. Once collectors of taxes, forced

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International Database, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php, viewed June 24, 2015. The figures for mid-year 1960 are 6,958,000 in Ghana, 1,456,000 in Togo, and 2,055,000 in Dahomey/Benin.


labor and soldiers for the colonialists, these chiefs tended to lose power to the central
government shortly before or after independence, but they retained influence and prestige
through social networks, ceremonial display, informal arbitration of disputes, and the
ability to attract development projects. In at least some cases, they also kept the ability to
allot the village’s arable land for cultivation.\textsuperscript{111}

Unfortunately, all three countries shared the lamentable experience of multiple
changes in government by military means during the 1960s and 1970s. In Ghana, the
dictatorial regime of President Kwame Nkrumah fell to a February 1966 police and army
coup, whose organizers established the National Liberation Council. In 1969, the NLC
yielded power to a constitutional regime run by Prime Minister Kofia Busia, candidate of
the majority Progress Party. Busia became unpopular by imposing economic austerity,
attempting to suppress political opponents, and devaluing the currency, so in 1972 he lost
power to another military coup. The new junta, headed by Colonel I.K. Acheampong,
styled itself the National Redemption Council. Three years later, Acheampong
subordinated the NRC to a smaller Supreme Military Council that included himself.
Dissension within the regime and a mismanaged referendum led to Acheampong’s ouster
by General F. Akuffo in 1978. By then, the NRC/SMC regime had lost all popularity due
to inflation, economic decline and corruption. In 1979 a coup of junior officers loyal to

\textsuperscript{111} Nugent, \textit{Africa Since Independence}, 111, 126-27; Naomi Chazan and others, \textit{Politics and Society in
Contemporary Africa}, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 82; Jeffrey Herbst, \textit{State and
Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000), 173. On Nkrumah’s reining in of chiefly authority and on the continuation of chiefly disposal over
village “stool” land, see Gocking, 123-24, 283; Nugent, \textit{Africa Since Independence}, 126, Chazan and others,
87, and Petchenike, 166. For Togo see Jürgen Theres, \textit{Die Evolution der politisch-administrativen
Strukturen in Togo: Eine Fallstudie zur administrativen Anthropologie} (München: Verlag V. Florentz GmbH,
Auswirkungen auf die Kleinbauern} (Münster/Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1993), 110-12. Olschewski writes that
Eyadéma reduced chiefs to a “folkloristic decoration” with only a “symbolic character.” In 1975 Benin’s
Kéréou’s regime tried to replace chiefs with village-level Committees of Revolutionary Defense and to
Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings Flight Lieutenant overthrew their superiors, had Acheampong, Akuffo and a few others shot, and then ceded power to Ghana’s Third Republic. Rawlings took power back at the end of 1981. It was no wonder that in 1988 a Ghanaian scholar asked in frustration, “How can any country progress or develop in this atmosphere of political musical chairs?”

Compared to Ghana, Togo was a model of stability. In October 1963 President Sylvanus Olympio suffered assassination at the hands of disgruntled soldiers, who included Sergeant Etienne Eyadéma. They allowed the return of civilian rule under President Nicolas Grunitzky, Olympio’s brother-in-law, but overthrew him in January 1967. Eyadéma, now Lieutenant Colonel, promoted himself to general and remained in power until his death in 2005.

Dahomey was the most unstable of all up to the early 1970s. It differed from the other two countries in lacking a single “founding father” like Nkrumah or Olympio. Instead three men dominated politics: Hubert Maga from Dahomey’s north, Justin Ahomadégbé from the Fon-dominated southwest, and Sourou Migan Apithy from the Yoruba southeast. They were unable to cooperate. None of them was a national leader, but rather all were regional leaders at the national level, each with a mass regional-ethnic following fearful of being subordinated by the others regions. The first military coup, by General Christophe Soglo, ousted President Maga in 1963 and replaced him with an Apithy-Ahomadégbé coalition. In November 1965 Soglo overthrew President Ahomadégbé after clashing with him over how to handle street protests, but Soglo lost support from fellow officers and fell from power in 1967. New elections failed because a

112 Nugent, 214-19, 261; Gocking, 115-190.
boycott by Maga and Apithy kept turnout down to a mere seventeen percent, so in 1968
the army invited Emile Zinsou to serve as caretaker president for five years. He lasted
seventeen months before Major Maurice Kouandété deposed him in December 1969. A
new junta invited the three founding leaders back to power; after further quarreling, they
agreed on a rotating presidency, which Major Mathieu Kérékou overthrew on October 26,
1972. In 1974 he adopted Marxism-Leninism as the new regime’s official ideology. He
remained in power until 1990.115

Since Ghana, Togo, and Dahomey have had plenty of company in political
instability, many scholars have diagnosed sub-Saharan African states as suffering from
weak legitimacy.116 Their borders derived from agreement among the European powers,
especially at the 1884-85 Congress of Berlin, rather than local historical, political or
ethnographic facts, so each state contained multiple precolonial societies with differing
languages and religions and sometimes they split particular societies with other states.
Such boundaries “compelled groups that frequently had no history of ongoing ties to
relate to each other.” The people—or peoples—therefore lacked a “shared political
culture.” Colonial institutions were alien, however much use they made use of
“traditional” chiefs.117 Lacking any connection to precolonial sources of authority,
postcolonial African state structures are not “the endogenous creations of local history.

115 Nugent, 213-14, 251; Heilbrunn, 368-91; Dov Ronen, Dahomey Between Tradition and Modernity
116 Crawford Young identifies the search for legitimacy as one of the state’s six imperatives. “Through
investing its institutions with legitimate authority, the state seeks habitual acquiescence in and consent to
its rule.” See Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven/London:
117 Chazan and others, 26—30. But see Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the
Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands Since 1914 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 7-
8, which argues that for all the frequent local traffic across the border, local Ghanaians identified with
Ghana rather than their fellow Ewe-speakers in Togo. The border has become stronger because, not in
spite of, local practices like smuggling.
They are not embedded in domestic power relations.” As Arthur Goldsmith has written, “Rushed to birth in the 1960s, the typical African state has a questionable right to rule in the eyes of many of its supposed subjects,” a fact that increases the “cost of governing.” Without legitimacy, leaders and followers have been more likely to resort to patronage, nepotism, and corruption to secure their power, “substituting patron-client links for [the state’s] lack of moral foundations.” Corruption in turn reduces legitimacy. In such an environment, peoples have continued to give their primary loyalty to extended families, local communities or ethnic groups defined by language and/or culture.

Of course African leaders have tried to increase their appeal. Kwame Nkrumah and others resorted to all the modern symbolic tools of nation-states, like statues, museums, national anthems, national flags, and images on currency, coins and postage stamps. From the 1970s, if not before, they have tried to borrow symbolic capital from the “traditional” authority of chiefs. Eyadéma, for example, held himself out as a sort of national chief. In Dahomey, the parties of Maga, Apithy, and Ahomadegbé appealed to rural masses through their chiefs. Nationwide rituals also played a part, as

122 Chazan and others, 76-83.
124 Herbst, 175-76.
125 Nugent, Africa Since Independence, 244.
126 Ronen, 138-40, 239-42.
David Kertzer has pointed out. Tanzania’s ruling party, for example, made sure that its local sections and wards gave standardized presentations at their meetings to help attendees identify with distant fellow Tanzanians as well as with the government.\textsuperscript{127} In the early years, however, leaders also promised that independence, under their leadership, would improve the people’s lives.\textsuperscript{128} As Kwame Nkrumah said in 1951, “Seek ye the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you,” with “all things” implying economic development.\textsuperscript{129} In 1966 BMZ official Gabriele Wülker wrote that when President Olympio took office in Togo, the people expected from him—unfairly in her opinion—a “miracle” of higher standards of living for the whole population, without (in her rather prejudiced view) hard exertion on their part.\textsuperscript{130} In this quest regimes were happy to seek outside assistance, including that of the FRG.\textsuperscript{131}

Actual development was not enough, however; Ghana, Togo and Dahomey also needed development theater. Like Napoleon III, they wanted to improve their legitimacy by presenting themselves in public spectacles as bringers of modernization and a better material life. Projects must be seen.\textsuperscript{132} To take an example, in May 1973 Accra’s \textit{Daily Graphic} carried several stories on domestic development projects. A new branch of the National Vocational Training Institute—the same agency that would establish itself in Biriwa during the next two years—opened in Kumasi; the Commissioner for Labour,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Kertzer, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Frederick Cooper, \textit{Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 88. On the role of development in legitimizing the late colonial state, see Young, \textit{The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective}, 208-13.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Cooper, \textit{Africa Since 1940}, 161; David Rooney, \textit{Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 67.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Gabriele Wülker, \textit{Togo – Tradition und Entwicklung} (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1966), 40.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Thomas Bierschenk, Georg Elwert, and Dirk Kohnert, “Einleitung: Entwicklungshilfe und ihre Folgen,” in \textit{Entwicklungshilfe und ihre Folgen: Ergebnisse Untersuchungen in Afrika}, ed. Thomas Bierschenk and Georg Elwert (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1993), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 30.
\end{itemize}
Social Welfare and Co-operatives was expected to preside at a ceremony.\textsuperscript{133} There were three celebrations of new drinking water systems in the villages of Prestea, Sovie, and Bortianor, each with a different regional executive presiding. In each case photos showed him drawing or drinking water from a new tap.\textsuperscript{134} Lieutenant Colonel Habadah also laid a foundation stone for the Kpondu-Torkor Fishing Harbour.\textsuperscript{135} Finally, the government began digging a fifty-mile irrigation canal; the headline promised that the armed forces would help.\textsuperscript{136} In this way the National Redemption Council sought to convince Ghanaians that it was working hard for the nation’s economic development.

In the West German village development projects, both governments came together, at times with local leaders, to act out their roles as bringers of prosperity, and then to publicly celebrate themselves \textit{and} each other. They organized ceremonies at the outset of project, at the close of a project, and sometimes in between to mark an important project milestone, to arrange for the visit of a host government dignitary, or to allow the host government to express its gratitude by awarding a decoration to one or more FRG project workers. Some ceremonies featured music, dancers, or a common meal and others did not. In every case, however, there were speeches to instruct listeners and observers on the project’s great usefulness to its community and to the host country, and most of all there was a visible physical act, whether a handshake, the transfer of a written agreement, the award of a decoration or some other, to fix the public gaze on a single moment and concentrate the ceremony’s and the project’s symbolic value. The governments made sure that host country media covered each ceremony and encouraged

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attention to the project among West German newspapers and development publications *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit* and *DED-Briefe*. While none of these elements was unique to development projects, they were unique in combination with the larger political context. Each ceremony or favorable news story gave the West Germans an opportunity to outshine the never-mentioned East German regime, and gave the host government a chance to—in Edelman’s words—reassure the masses and keep them quiescent by providing tangible evidence of development, and to distract them from the dismal material facts of everyday life, whether material shortages, bad weather, corruption, or political turmoil.

**Backstage: The Travails of Village Development**

Unlike most political ceremonies, rituals, spectacles, or other symbolic acts, development theater required real attempts at development and ran the risk of creating embarrassing facts that might dissolve the suspension of disbelief and ruin the show. Israel had to cancel its Lavi aircraft, its Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal, and its nuclear power reactor due to escalating costs.\(^{137}\) President Park’s Gyeongbu Highway made little economic sense for a country that had only sixty thousand cars at the time he ordered it built, and under his pressure to finish it quickly, engineers built so shoddily that cracks appeared even before the opening ceremony and the road soon required multiple overlays. It became a “symbol of modernization gone astray.”\(^{138}\) Kuwait City’s modernization created a shopping thoroughfare of buildings with attractive facades and interiors with such poor quality and bad air circulation that the entire street required demolition in 2005. Lack of planning let other buildings go up in isolation from each

\(^{137}\) Steinberg, 335-39.

other, surrounded only by vacant sandlots.\textsuperscript{139} The attempt to resettle and modernize Ghanaian peasants made homeless by the Volta River dam worked out poorly as tractors broke down, disease killed livestock, and the displaced deserted their new, unfinished homes.\textsuperscript{140} In Louis-Napoleon’s France, the first stone of the new Sorbonne went down with due ceremony in 1855, but no further stones followed until after his reign ended in 1870.\textsuperscript{141} And so it was in the West German village projects in West Africa, which suffered in varying degrees from a gap between public presentation and real achievement.

In Togo West German project manager Otto Schnellbach designated Agou-Nyongbo, Nuatja and Kambolé as “model villages” in 1962 and planned to modernize their agriculture and crafts by establishing producer cooperatives, requiring single-crop rather than mixed-crop planting on co-op land, and bringing in heavy equipment. At first villagers willingly donated labor, but soon resented work without pay. Though the West Germans eventually offered them “advances” against future profits, the amounts were too small and profits never appeared, so when Schnellbach left Togo at the end of 1965, discontent blew up in the face of his successor, Hans von der Decken, in 1966. After more than a year and a half, the West Germans split the project up into three, renamed the “model villages” as “agricultural advisory centers,” abandoned Nuatja after erecting some new buildings, and replaced the producer co-ops with purchasing and sales co-ops. In Agou-Nyongbo they wound down involvement in agriculture and concentrated on a profitable wood-processing operation with carpentry shop and sawmill, which they eventually transferred to the Togolese government. At Kambolé project manager Volkmar Kehrein promoted cotton cultivation in the region around the village, but his

\textsuperscript{139} Al-Nakib, 13-14, 15-16, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{140} Miescher, 190-91.
\textsuperscript{141} Truesdell, 83.
campaign ended in disaster after droughts ruined the crops and left co-op members in debt. Only a regional successor project might retrieve the debacle there. The West Germans did well erecting a useful bridge near Nuatja and constructing fifteen cisterns in and near the villages, but excepting the Agou wood-processing operation, their attempt to bring economic development came to naught.

The Tori Cada “model villages” project in Dahomey did far better, but not quite well enough. From the outset project manager Balduin Zimmer avoided mechanization and producer cooperatives in favor of purchasing and sales co-ops. Rather than promote cotton at the expense of food production, Zimmer aimed to help peasants improve maize yields through counseling services. In particular they should learn to plant in rows rather than broadcast their seeds, a practice that peasants resisted for reasons I will return to. Expanding beyond the original three “model villages,” the West Germans were able to create two dozen or more village co-ops, all subordinate to a co-op union, the UCRT. The West Germans were long uncertain, however, whether the UCRT was turning a profit. In the end, an evaluation team found that it was, but not enough to remain viable without outside support. This support would come from a new regional project.

The project at Peki, Ghana was the worst of all. Invited by local leaders to start a model farm, the West Germans instead opted for a new settlement that would operate as a “production promotion cooperative,” requiring unpaid labor from the settlers in exchange for a chance at future profits, as in Schnellbach’s plan for the Togo model villages. Just as the project got going, landowner resistance forced the West Germans to change locations and settle for a smaller site, probably too small to earn a profit. The Ghanaian government refused to let the settlers’ co-op have any control over the settlement and
interfered with crop selection. The settlers refused to work as long and as persistently as the West Germans expected them to, even after moving into their homes at the site. Although the co-op did not become self-supporting, the West Germans handed it over to the government and left. Even then they were not free of Peki. The settlement’s mechanic’s shop ran out of spare parts within two years after the handover, so the FRG felt obliged to make good the shortage. Years later the settlement seems to have disappeared or at least to have failed as an enterprise.

At the Ghanaian coastal fishing village of Biriwa, the West Germans seemed to have several solid achievements, but after the handover so many severe problems broke out that they had to rehabilitate what was left. Rather than a single project, there were four. In Biriwa I the village received a gift of fishing nets, two concrete block latrines and two bathhouses with a sanitary forum. In Biriwa II the West Germans sold more nets at a discount. Biriwa III tried to make the village a commercial fishing center, with a shop for repairing boat motors, yet more nets, and large ovens for smoking fish that the village could then sell elsewhere using a truck the Germans would provide. The West Germans also set up a carpentry shop and planned various improvements, including the removal of rocks blocking a beach, a vegetable garden, flood and drainage control, new housing, a new school, and a health clinic. Much went wrong. Village women had no interest in the ovens and GAWI delivered the wrong type of truck. Except for the school and health clinic, the village improvements never happened. Still, when the West Germans transferred Biriwa III to a government-controlled trust board and began Biriwa IV, the establishment of a vocational training institute, they handed over a functioning repair shop, a carpentry shop, the ovens repurposed to smoke fish brought in from
outside, and the sanitary forum with latrines and bathhouses. Unfortunately, they learned within two years that the neither shop was profitable without more assistance and that no one could pump out the septic tanks beneath the latrines. The ovens were simply abandoned. So was the clinic, though the Biriwa IV project manager began reviving it on his own. Eventually the Germans committed themselves to “one-time” aftercare measures to put the shops and latrines back in working order, to prevent their “success” from becoming a notorious failure.

The West German approaches to village development via cooperatives and “model villages” were inconsistent and troublesome. In each of three projects they began with a different cooperative concept, and in Biriwa there was never a co-op at all. Cooperatives had a long history in Germany, but in the village projects the West Germans had considerable difficulty with the “free rider” problem. A free rider is one who benefits from a “public good” thanks to his membership in a group without bearing a proportional share of the cost. In the case of a production cooperative, such a person could receive an equal share of the profit while doing less work or none at all, forcing other members to work harder or let overall output decline. One response would be to make each member’s profit equivalent to his labor contribution, which would require checks on attendance and performance. Yet when German project managers tried to do so, they rightly aroused resentment from villagers who were now working under outsider supervision for remuneration that might never arrive. Marketing co-ops are also

exposed to free riding members who seek larger profits by selling produce to merchants rather than to the co-op. The Germans experienced this problem at Tori Cada. In only two of the four projects did they consistently apply the label “model village,” a term they left undefined in project documents, except a brief remark by Balduin Zimmer that it should be an “exemplary village, that is, it must be able to be recognized and imitated by surrounding villages.” This vagueness would cause trouble between Togolese and West German experts, as each side brought its own understanding of what a “model village” was. In Biriwa the West Germans had high hopes for the latrines as an inspiration to nearby communities, but they rarely called it a “model village,” and never formally. At Peki, they tried creating a whole new mini-village rather than work with an existing community, but that was not a “model village” either.

Most consistent was the DED’s heavy involvement in three of the four projects (excluding Peki), with development helpers serving a dual and heavily gendered role. Men supported the project’s economic mission, erecting project buildings, participating in agricultural counseling, and training male vocational students in carpentry or mechanics. Other development helpers, mostly female, engaged in independent “village work,” which usually consisted of healthcare provision, health and nutritional counseling, cooking, and sewing. Bookkeeping work might involve either male or female volunteers.

Problems across Projects: Faulty Project Management

Projects are such notoriously cantankerous and wild creatures that a whole body of literature has grown up to identify and deal with the unexpected difficulties they throw

up. Many scholars have connected setbacks to particular phases of the project life cycle, for which they have created many descriptive schemes.\textsuperscript{146} Rather than expect to foresee and prevent all problems before they appear, sociologist Albert O. Hirschman recommended embracing uncertainty. Each project, he said in 1967, comes with “unsuspected threats to its profitability and existence,” but also equally “unsuspected remedial actions” to overcome them. A beneficial “Hiding Hand” hides difficulties that might otherwise scare off aid donors until it is too late to back out, and they are forced to apply their creativity to solve them. In Hirschman’s view, all projects are “problem-ridden,” so the difference is between “those that are more or less successful in overcoming their troubles and those that are not.” Donors should treat implementation with its many uncertainties as a “long voyage of discovery in the most varied domains, from technology to politics.”\textsuperscript{147} In similar vein, Dennis Rondinelli has urged that project designers, rather than engaging in “rationalistic planning” with top-down corporate-style feasibility studies, cost-benefit analyses, or planning-programming-budgeting systems,

\textsuperscript{147} Hirschman, 11-13, 1-3, 35. Gerald M. Steinberg has argued that Hirschman’s Hiding Hand does not work well with large-scale projects like the Israeli Lavi aircraft, the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal and the nuclear power program. As the project scale increases, so does the scale of losses and failure. Nations have undertaken such projects out of political, ideological and symbolic significance rather than rational assessment of risks, obstacles and benefits. See Steinberg, 345. On failed large-scale projects see also Dirk van Laak, \textit{Weiße Elefanten. Anspruch und Scheitern technischer Grossprojekte im 20. Jahrhundert} (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), and Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter, \textit{Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
should allow “continuous learning and interaction” during implementation to deal with complexities and uncertainties—the constraints that previously remained hidden.\textsuperscript{148} Their arguments for flexibility are convincing, yet they should not relieve project managers and agencies from due diligence or competence, factors that troubled all four village projects at various times.

The West Germans and host governments repeatedly failed to involve villagers, the presumed beneficiaries, in planning the projects or even to sound them out.\textsuperscript{149} In Togo this neglect led to a conflict of expectations between donor and beneficiary, a case in which the images each side had of the project diverged.\textsuperscript{150} To Otto Schnellbach, “model villages” would require producer cooperatives and hard work from villagers to earn their way to a higher standard of living, but to villagers the phrase represented a promise of public improvements and amenities. As one development historian has written about modernization theory, “Individuals and collectives have integrated varieties of ‘modern’ into their lives, but they have done so without necessarily embracing whatever vision of social order might be attached to the modernity-bearing products, behaviors, or mentalities that they have acquired.”\textsuperscript{151} The mutual misunderstanding eventually led to mutual resentment and abandonment of Schnellbach’s plan. In Biriwa, the Ghanaian government, and the FRG following its lead without further inquiry,

\textsuperscript{149} Rondinelli, “Why Development Projects Fail: Problems of Project Management in Developing Countries,” 12, lists “lack of interaction between project planners and ultimate users, clients and beneficiaries during design” as a cause of failure. Neun, 8, 265, attacks “one-sided” technical aid strategies that ignore the target group’s “self-determination potential” and fail during planning to consider beneficiary acceptance. LeComte at 34 blames the project approach itself for excluding local beneficiaries because of its need for advance planning and detailed budgeting.
\textsuperscript{150} Meier, 96-97, 110-11.
thought that village women would like large public ovens for smoking the fish their men
caught, but after the West Germans built them they learned that the women preferred to
stick to their small loam household ovens.¹⁵² The project manager found a “remedial
action,” as Hirschman would have it, by trucking in fish from large suppliers and cooking
it in the ovens for sale elsewhere, but this procedure was of no direct use to the village.
In Togo and at Peki project designers trusted too readily promises by local chiefs of
unpaid labor and land. In Dahomey, on the other hand, the first project manager at least
surveyed the residents of his first three villages as to their population, family structure,
farm size, and crop mix, so at least he planned with some knowledge of local people if
not their participation. As I have already noted in brief earlier and will discuss at length
in Chapter 1, this tendency to disregard local concerns or needs went beyond bad
management, though it was also that; it lay at the heart of development aid. West
Germans saw villagers through a historically conditioned “colonial gaze” that made the
latter appear insufficient and rendered local knowledge and rationality invisible.

At other times West Germans bungled what should have been routine planning
matters. At Biriwa informal or “honorary” project manager Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann failed
to let GAWI know in advance that the village lacked electricity, forcing it to add a
generator to the procurement of powered carpentry equipment.¹⁵³ He was also the man
who planned and built the latrines without laying down an access road for trucks to

¹⁵² Cusack and Franks, 12, regard “cultural misfit of the project’s objectives and activities within the
environment and a lack of local knowledge and understanding,” itself a subset of “reactions of people
affected by the project” as an external factor contributing to project failure. I disagree with them and
agree with Meier, Neun and others; beneficiary acceptance should be intrinsic to project planning or,
better still, selection.
¹⁵³ Rondinelli, “Why Development Projects Fail: Problems of Project Management in Developing
Countries,” 13 (“inadequate equipment specifications”).
approach and pump out the septic pits.\textsuperscript{154} But another mistake was not his; GAWI prematurely ordered a truck after he asked it to wait for more information, so that it delivered the wrong type. GAWI also long delayed delivery of carpentry equipment and a new generator.\textsuperscript{155} At Peki, project manager Ulrich simply refused to plan at all despite repeated demands from the BMZ; he preferred to move ahead with immediate land clearance without worrying about profitability calculations or making sure of legal control over the land.\textsuperscript{156}

In all four projects the supervising agency had to remove a project manager.\textsuperscript{157} Project managers fill a demanding position. They must answer to their superiors while supervising and supporting subordinates, placate host governments and project beneficiaries, plan and schedule tasks, keep up the pressure for timely material deliveries, and complete tasks on time or make sure that others do so. In developing countries they must accomplish all this through the filters (or blinders) of unfamiliar languages and customs. As a correspondent to the Bulletin of the German Institute for Developing Countries (DSE) observed in 1964, they need “The dignity of an archbishop, the selflessness of a missionary, the tact of an ambassador, the persistence of a tax official, the experience of a business manager, the labor power of a coolie, the genius of a Nobel Prize winner, the optimism of a shipwreck victim, the eloquence of a minister, the resourcefulness of a lawyer, the elastic conscience of a politician, the health of an

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 12 (“inadequate or inappropriate specifications, poor siting, use of defective or improper materials causing inferior construction of capital facilities”).

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 13 (“inadequate equipment specifications” and “delays in delivery and inability to procure required resources, materials and supplies”).

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid. (“conflict among project staff or between project administration and professional staff.”).

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 12 (“lack of adequately trained and competent project managers”)
Olympic boxer, the smile of a film star and the thick skin of a hippopotamus.”

It is no wonder that some men fell short. In Togo villager resistance and depletion of project funds, problems inherited from Otto Schnellbach, drove Dr. Hans von der Decken to intense frustration, anxiety, mood swings, and fury toward his BMZ superior in Bonn for what he regarded as neglect and dishonesty. When the BMZ split up the project, it did not assign him to any of the villages. For Dahomey the BML, which supervised Tori Cada for the first several years, had trouble finding a qualified replacement to follow up the apparently successful tenure of Balduin Zimmer, so it sent instead gardener Johannes Fabricius. Opposition to him among DED volunteers arose even before he arrived, and grew more intense when he proved that he neither understood nor valued their work or their talents. The BML soon had to find someone else and reassign him. At Peki F.T. Ulrich not only shirked his planning duties, but he soon resented the Pekian notables responsible for initiating the project. His conduct toward them forced the West German ambassador to summarily remove him and send him back to Germany. After a year of stopgap managers, the BMZ had to send one of its own officials to take over. In Biriwa the BMZ replaced Dr. Hoffmann as project manager after losing patience with his technical incompetence. The doctor was never really a development expert at all, but a paid official of Ghana’s Ministry of Health who had induced the FRG to take an interest in the village. These four men remind us that while we find ourselves shaped by long-running natural, political, economic, social and cultural forces, we individuals also make history, and sometimes we make it badly.

Finally, the West Germans often neglected to learn from their experiences, returning from their “long voyage of discovery” (as Hirschman called it) empty handed.

158 “Anspruchsvolle Definition...,” Mitteilungen, Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer, July 1, 1964, 7.
To be sure, managers visited each other’s projects, and GAWI particularly urged Dr. von der Decken to examine the favorable experience with Zimmer’s Tori Cada cooperatives. Unfortunately, the BMZ seemed to have completely forgotten its displeasure over the failure of cooperative production in Togo when it approved a “producer promotion cooperative” for the Peki settlement, again plunging the West Germans into the difficulties of extracting labor from unwilling or apathetic villagers. This institutional inertia or even laziness was all the more startling in that both projects went through the same West Africa Referat (department or office) under the same director, Ministerialrat Dr. Theierl. Worse, the BMZ dispatched Ulrich to Peki even though it knew he had failed as manager in two other projects. Furthermore, the BMZ never received a final report from GAWI’s successor organization, the GTZ, so it never analyzed the reasons for failure at Peki. In a like manner, there was never a final report for Biriwa. There, as at Kambolé and Tori Cada, the coming launch of a new project distracted the BMZ from a thorough evaluation of the old one. In 1973 an official of the BMZ’s Referat for International Cooperation cited the experiences of Peki and the Togo model villages when he objected to proposed technical aid guidelines that would try to bring West Africa’s subsistence zones into production for the market. Only where producers lived near cities, as in the Dahomeyan model villages, was this practical.159 Here at least was a valiant attempt to draw on lessons learned. But it did not stop the BMZ from going ahead with “integrated” rural development in Togo’s Central Region and Dahomey’s Atlantic Department.

159 ORR Dr. Neuhoff, Referat II B 1, BMZ to Referat A 2, BMZ, March 19, 1973, BArchiv B 213/20024.
Problems across Projects: Relations among Project, Government, and Village

In the second set of problems, the village projects changed power relations in the host countries between government and local community, but were also subject to them. Each acted upon the other in a triangular relationship. While giving attention to donor and recipient governments, official development aid critics have tended to miss or underplay the community’s capacity to act in its own right. In his famous book on aid in Lesotho, James Ferguson pointed out that for all the obvious repeated failures to achieve helpful goals like improving crop yields or raising peasant income, projects consistently led to the “expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power,” power of the central government over local communities while foreign donor institutions produced a discourse denying any political effects. The integrated rural development project in the country’s Tsaba-Theka region, which the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ran from 1975 to 1984 in cooperation with Lesotho’s Ministries of Rural Development and Interior, left behind roads, a new post office, a police station, an immigrant control office, nutrition and health officials, a new prison, and an army garrison. The chief beneficiary was not the people of Tsaba-Theka, but the dictatorial regime of Chief Jonathan, ruling through the Basutho National Party. Under such circumstances, the bureaucracy does not impartially serve the general public, but “individuals, cliques, factions and class interests.”

On the other hand, recent analysts of the African state have largely stressed its limits. We have already seen scholars cite weak legitimacy and corruption. Others have

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160 Ferguson, xiv-xv, 252-53, 105-11, 194.
pointed to difficulty collecting direct taxes.\textsuperscript{161} Without their own revenue, states rely on external sources.\textsuperscript{162} The reverse proposition may also be true; unearned income in foreign aid or oil also allows states to neglect tax collection, avoiding the need to seek popular support by providing effective services or to build efficient bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{163} Aid’s critics have called it a “curse” for feeding corruption, supporting growth-harming collectivist policies and discouraging foreign investment.\textsuperscript{164} This vicious circle has inspired Frederick Cooper to posit the “gatekeeper state,” a product of European rule. Having difficulty controlling peasant masses in the interior of each country and extracting revenue from them, colonial regimes relied on their position “astride the intersection of the colonial territory and the outside world.” They drew their revenue from import and export duties, issued business licenses, and determined who could enter to provide education or who could leave to get it. Left without better ways to achieve wealth and power, post-independence rulers remained at the gate, resorting to patronage and political repression to keep it. In addition to colonial era tools, they could add manipulation of currency controls and foreign aid.\textsuperscript{165} Jean-François Bayart has likewise drawn attention to what he calls “extraversion,” by which he means states “mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly) unequal relationship with the external environment.” From this

\textsuperscript{162} Frederick Cooper, \textit{Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present}, 156-57.  
\textsuperscript{163} Goldsmith, 17-18; Herbst, 121, 131.  
position, “The dominant groups who hold power in black Africa continue to live chiefly off the income they derive from their position as intermediaries vis-à-vis the international system.” Though these arguments agree with Ferguson’s picture of a corrupt and abusive apparatus, they suggest constricted rather than expansive states.

Our village projects show evidence on both sides. When they took place, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the era was one in which African states tended to expand, before mushrooming governmental debts and structural adjustment programs forced retrenchment during the 1980s. At Agou, Peki, and Biriwa, the central government made sure that it, not the village, would control the institutions the projects created, and the BMZ went along. Not content with this, officials sometimes used ceremonial speeches to warn local listeners of the need to work hard and make the project successful, and at Peki even threatening to open the settlement to outsiders if need be. They thereby reversed the gaze in development theater from stage to audience and put the latter under the former’s surveillance. Also at Peki the government reshaped project goals to serve itself rather than the community. At Kambolé, for a while, a government parastatal corporation tried to seize control of the project’s advisory services. All these actions testify in favor of Ferguson’s “expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power.” Yet the projects also suffered from state weakness or disorganization, when the host government could not pay out promised subsidies or delayed in providing counterparts the West Germans needed to train before they could leave. Indecision within the


government might delay project handover. On some occasions, the West Germans had trouble getting equipment or personal belongings through customs; the state as gatekeeper thereby blocked, if only temporarily, its own expansion.

The picture becomes still more complicated when we look at the local actors. Ferguson argues that donors and host governments cooperate to impose themselves upon local communities, though the latter might covertly resist this interference by sabotage or non-compliance. The West Germans agreed long before Ferguson wrote his book, considering the host government as their partner and treating the community as merely an object. In our village projects, however, we find the villages acting openly and collectively to guide events. Chiefs, sometimes in combination with other elite villagers, invited FRG projects on their own initiative. At Agou and Nuatja, villagers summoned up the host government’s influence to press their displeasure upon the West Germans. At Agou their protests over government control won the right to share in that control. On the other hand, communities acted against themselves, because villages were sometimes sites of conflict rather than solidarity. Chiefs found they could not deliver labor or land that they had promised. Agou’s two sub-villages repeatedly clashed over who would get which benefit from the project. The aid relationship was therefore a triangular one in which the parties at any two points might unite against the third, or the party at any one point might break down in a way that endangered the project. What Ferguson wrote about Tsaba-Theka was also often true of our projects; they were not “simply acting on a

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168 Residents in Tsaba-Theka tore down fencing that reserved land to project grazing associations and dug up woodlots standing on land expropriated for the project. See Ferguson, 171-76, 242-47.
169 Bierschenk, Elwert and Kohnert, 31.
system in place,” but were “grabbed and pulled and twisted every which way by forces [they] did not understand or have the means to deal with.”

Problems across the Projects: Implications for Development Theater

These problems of management and power generally remained out of view so as not to disrupt the show. For the purposes of both governments, ceremony attendees and newspaper readers need not learn about the wreck of Schnellbach’s plan for cooperative production in “model villages” or about delivery delays in Biriwa and elsewhere or about the failure to carry out village improvements for Biriwa or about crop failures at Kambolé. They certainly would not benefit, as an audience, from knowing that the West Germans had to remove one manager from each project, because all attention should focus on the achievements of both governments and their agents. At Peki both sides did openly acknowledge the struggle for land, because it was essential to the project’s survival and it was too public to paper over. Labor problems came up at Peki ceremonies, but in official statements and press reports the settlers (in dual roles as audience members and minor players) were at fault, not the governments (the principal actors). Finally, problems that surfaced after the official handover, whether lack of spare parts, degradation of project buildings, or failure of an enterprise, were irrelevant to the show’s original success. The drama had closed to great applause, the actors had moved on to the next production, the press’s eye was elsewhere, and both governments had banked their symbolic capital. Only the threat of losing that capital prompted the FRG to approve rehabilitation measures that would prevent success from turning into public embarrassment.

170 Ferguson, 224-25.
Chapter Structure and Sources

The chapter plan is very simple. Chapter 1 will discuss some of the literature regarding the colonial gaze and the effects it had on encounters between Europeans and Africans during and after the colonial era. These encounters anticipated and shaped the perceptions and plans of West German development workers, with baleful consequences for the projects. The next four chapters shall each, after describing the village(s) involved, examine the origin, plan and execution of each project, beginning with the Togo Model Villages (Chapter 2), continuing with Tori Cada (Chapter 3) and the Peki settlement (Chapter 4) and ending with Biriwa (Chapter 5). Each chapter shall analyze West German mistakes or setbacks and their consequences, and contain separate sections dealing with the project’s failed leader and with activities of the DED. Chapter 6 shall examine the triangular relationship among host government, community, and West German government plus project management, and their influences upon one another. Chapter 7 will analyze development theater. It will begin by cataloging the types and components of development ceremonies—and examine six ceremonies in particular: an inauguration of the Peki project, handover ceremonies for the Haho River bridge at Nuatja and the Nuatja project itself, a visit by a Dahomeyan minister to Tori Cada, and three brief decoration ceremonies. It will discuss coverage by the press, mostly in the host countries, and by West German specialist periodicals. Finally, it will describe certain incidents of “damage control” by the West Germans to muffle or suppress unwanted information from coming into public view. The Conclusion will draw together the balance of the project’s accomplishments and compare them to their public presentation. The reader will find lists of the personnel important to each project in...
Appendix B and project appropriations by the FRG in Appendix C. Appendix A contains a list of abbreviations.

This dissertation rests upon rich German documentary evidence, especially project files at the Federal Archive in Koblenz, supplemented by project-related documents at the Political Archive of the Foreign Office in Berlin and the smaller DED archive at the GIZ, of which it is now part, in Bad Godesberg. The federal government’s forty-year lookback period has been a hindrance only in the case of Biriwa, for which I was unable to obtain files beyond 1977. There are no detailed anthropological or ethnographical studies of any of the villages, but a few published works have filled in additional information. The files are very forthcoming about difficulties and mistakes, but they give voice to villagers rarely, only through West German writers, and without giving their names, unless they were chiefs or other notables. I have tried to bring out their views and grievances while deflecting the West German “colonial gaze” as well as the documents will allow. I hope to reduce this limitation in the future by traveling to West Africa and interviewing anyone with knowledge of the projects and perhaps finding new documents there; co-op records, if they still exist, would be helpful. Once there I would like to investigate present and past cultivation methods at Tori Cada, Peki, Agou, Nuatja and Cambolé, the fishing operations at Biriwa, social networks, housekeeping, nutrition, hygiene and healing in all the villages to better understand the practices the West Germans were trying to change, though of course such practices may well have changed for other reasons since the 1970s. If possible after so many decades, I would like to gain villagers’ impressions of the projects and their explanations for West German failure. Finally, I would simply like to see and photograph what remains of any the
German projects, whether institutions, infrastructure or buildings. Perhaps even the dreaded “development ruins” have vanished, sparing the FRG present-day embarrassment.
Chapter 1

The Colonial Gaze: Seeing and Not Seeing Africans and African Knowledge

We assumed that it would suffice if we had one German tropical farmer for all three villages to prepare the cultivation plans, the fertilizer plans, and pest control. The Africans should—in our opinion—know more about their own tropical agriculture than we do. Far from it! They only know their own small cultivation: here some maize, there in between a few lumps of yams, some cotton, some vegetables and peanuts or beans—all beautifully mixed up and not planted in rows. For the first time they saw in their new cooperative fields of several hectares in size, planted with one type of plant, and these in rows.

... It isn’t enough to conclude again and again that the Africans are “different.” We try to ascertain why they are different. And mostly it shows itself that this “otherness” has its good reasons. It is climatically, historically, sociologically conditioned and the more we try to penetrate into the background, all the more will we come to an understanding of the African. And without this understanding our work would be doomed to failure.  

Former project manager Otto Schnellbach, August 8, 1966

Herr Schnellbach meant well, but his motives were at cross-purposes and his perceptions were crooked. Months before writing those lines he had returned to the Federal Republic from a four-year stint as manager for the Togo Model Villages, a project of his own design. When he sat down at home to write his final report, an

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awesome one hundred forty-three pages long, he aimed to explain the project and to justify it in the face of severe problems that cropped up during his tenure and remained unsolved. He wanted to blame these problems on the difficulty of working with “Africans”—the Togolese villagers of Agou and Nuatja--while remaining friendly toward them. At the same time he wanted to share his hard-earned lessons about “Africans” and to show he had learned to appreciate their good points. Many had arrived late to work in the cooperative fields, but how could they understand punctuality when there was no village clock and the tropical working day remained the same length throughout the year? Europeans’ rural grandfathers worked without clocks too. “Africans” didn’t plan ahead and provide for the future, but why should they when there was always something edible growing in the area? They liked to measure commodities by size rather than weight, but that method was easier and anyways Americans still used the bushel. “Africans” did not work cheerfully by the clock, but let them work in their own fashion, with drums and cries in a friendly competition and they got the job done. They valued prestige based on position rather than achievement, but as Africans were more emotional than “we rational people” [Verstandsmenschen], one had to adapt.\footnote{Ibid.} And so on. In this way Schnellbach wanted to show that “Africans” were “different” yet equal to Europeans in their fellow humanity.

The project manager seems to have been blissfully unaware that the “lessons” he and his fellow development workers learned in Togo, Dahomey and Ghana were “climatically, historically, sociologically conditioned” in a European tradition more than a hundred and fifty years old of regarding Africans as inferior in knowledge and “progress.” That tradition included a dismissal of intercropping, which Schnellbach
deemed unsuitable for the modern cooperative agriculture he planned, but this item was only one of many across a wide range of African practices in agriculture, family, dress, housekeeping, and medicine that Europeans disliked and sought to remake. In their view, European knowledge and practices were universally valid and superior to anything in Africa or elsewhere. As outsiders with great power in money, organization and technology but little understanding or appreciation of local knowledge in Africa, Europeans (and Westerners from outside Europe) saw through a “colonial gaze” that viewed all others as inferior to themselves in social, economic, political and moral development. Many Europeans regarded this supposed inferiority as evidence that non-Europeans, especially Africans, constituted lower “races.” The reality, of course, was something else. Africans had (and have) knowledge about their local environment superior to whatever the Europeans arrived with, and local practices built soundly upon that knowledge. African social, economic, political, and religious relations bent under the weight of European/Western political domination, but continued to assert themselves as Africans resisted or selectively adopted outside ways. This antagonism between outside and local ways continued into the era of African independence, when postcolonial states, international agencies at their side, stepped into the shoes, habits, and mindsets of their colonial predecessors.

This chapter will review certain scholarly literature on the encounter between European/Western and African knowledge and practices on African soil. It will explain the importance of the “gaze” for European colonialism and postcolonial development aid and briefly examine its relationship to Western racism. Then it will discuss historic

applications of the “gaze” in confrontations over labor practices, agriculture, ecological management, domesticity and medicine. In some cases African governments continued the policies of their colonial predecessors, to no better effect. At the end of this chapter I will summarize the effect of the “gaze” upon the West German village projects.

The Gaze in General

The colonial gaze goes back to European thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century who arranged mankind on a scale that put white Europeans on top as the most cultured and intelligent. Those who believed, like the philosophe Marquis de Condorcet, that any people might move up along that scale still assumed that the West would serve as their model and their instructor. There was but one line of progress with Europe in the lead. Hierarchy thus remained intact. Europeans often dispensed with the scale and resolved all differences into a binary of civilization and barbarism, seeing the non-Westerner as reverse images of themselves. These notions legitimated European colonial rule via its supposed “mission” to free non-Western peoples from their supposed defects in favor of European virtues and practices. The reform-minded

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missionaries and officials who penetrated and ruled over the non-Western world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Africa in particular, expected indigenous peoples to learn to live in patriarchal, monogamous nuclear families in permanent settlements, respect private property, submit to formal state structures, and see the natural world as governed by invariant laws.\textsuperscript{179} Certain colonial powers might add their own nationally specific values. The republican French, for example, hoped as part of their \textit{mission civilisatrice} to teach West Africans opposition to tyranny, anti-clericalism, faith in reason, science and progress, and patriotism, though likely not resistance to \textit{French} tyranny.\textsuperscript{180} In this scheme, existing non-Western values did not deserve respect. Even European scholars studying the non-Western world did so in a way that served colonial rule and incorporated the colonial gaze, whether in biology, medicine or in social science. This last field was divided between sociology for studying Western societies and anthropology for studying everyone else.\textsuperscript{181}

After World War II, as colonial states neared and then achieved independence, social scientists repackaged the dichotomy of “barbarism” and “civilization” into modernization theories that rated societies as either “traditional” or “modern,” “underdeveloped” or “developed.”\textsuperscript{182} Traditional societies were inward-looking, fearful of change, superstitious, static, economically simple, and passive toward nature, while modern societies were cosmopolitan, open to change, secular, mobile, economically

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 7-8.
\textsuperscript{181} Conrad, 124-25.
complex and molded the natural environment. Modernization meant a “package” of changes from subsistence to commerce, from political subjection to participation, from inherited status to status by achievement, from extended to nuclear kinship, and from religion to worldly ideology. Like Condorcet these theorists believed that underdeveloped states could proceed forward only along the path the Europe (or the US) had laid down. To put it bluntly, the West knew best. The FRG agreed and so, with an appropriate adjustment toward the USSR and Marxism-Leninism, did the GDR. In 1972, for example, BMZ State Secretary Karl-Heinz Sohn, promoting country programming as superior to individual projects, wrote that the Third World’s “stationary societies” needed a “snowball effect” because they were “burdened” and “encrusted” by tradition. He did not see that it was he who was burdened and encrusted by a Western tradition of dismissing indigenous practices and knowledge.

Development aid was supposed to help close the gap between modern/developed and traditional/underdeveloped, but by its very nature it kept the gap open and


perpetuated the colonial gaze. As Arturo Escobar has written, “Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European.”

Furthermore, the transfer of knowledge inherent in technical aid requires a permanent distinction between experts as professional “know-it-alls” and beneficiaries supposed to learn from them; the transfer always flows in one direction. Ironically, this assumption of superior knowledge has doomed development aid to a “structural amnesia” that has led experts to ignore previous failures, dooming them to repeat the mistakes of their predecessors, sometimes even in the same area. In Nuatja before World War I the Germans tried unsuccessfully to convince Togolese to plant monocrops. In the mid-1960s Otto Schnellbach did the same thing with the same results.

The Gaze and Racism

The colonial gaze has much in common with Western racism against non-Europeans, yet is distinct from it. British moral reformers leveled the same critiques regarding work ethic, cleanliness and hygiene at the British poor—presumably the same “race” as themselves—that they did of Africans and resorted to similar imagery, even

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189 Lepenies, 33-34.

speaking of the poor as “wandering tribes” living in “urban jungles.”

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, elites described the rural population as backward and passive, and argued that the countryside needed external intervention to improve cultivation techniques and increase production. In West Germany officials viewed their own rural population in the same way. In 1954 the BML supported a village community house program by the Curatorium for Technology in Agriculture, run by Marianne Muth. Such houses could accommodate machinery that would help villagers save labor. She promoted their educational (erzieherische) effect—an echo of colonial “education into work,” and claimed they would release the brakes traditional thinking put on modernization.

In no other occupational station are men and women so strongly bound with old customs as in agriculture. Even labor methods that no longer correspond to the current state of the work process are not altered in spite of frequent counseling. If, for example, the peasant woman, like her ancestors, handles laundry with a washing brush up to the present day, she often could not be convinced that a washing machine, however primitive, washes clothes just as clean but substantially more gently. By using the washing machine in the village community house these peasant women are necessarily led to the washing machine and it will take at most only a short time before they have become convinced of the good work of these appliances. So it is not astonishing if, after several villages have performed pioneering work, the thought of the village community house has become known to the village population surprisingly quickly, and the demand for these establishments is greater than the available funding.

When German peasants came into the gaze of a reformer like Muth, they presented an appearance similar to that of the African peasant in the eyes of development workers ten years earlier.

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years later—primitive and stubbornly clinging to tradition. The gaze has even appeared among non-Westerners, such as Japanese studying Koreans from 1910 to 1945 and more recently Hong Kong women running development projects supposed to uplift and educate girls and women in mainland China.\footnote{E. Taylor Atkins, \textit{Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910-1945} (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 4-6; Yuk-Lin Renita Wong, “When East Meets West: Nation, Colony, and Hong Kong Women’s Subjectivities in Gender and China Development,” \textit{Modern China} 30, no. 2 (April 2004): 267-69.} Finally, as we shall see, postcolonial African governments inherited the colonial gaze to some extent, but without openly sharing Western racial prejudices.

On the other hand, other scholars argue that development theory and even development aid contain “racist structures of prejudice.”\footnote{Melber, 9; Zurmühl, 7; Sarah White, “Thinking race, thinking development,” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 23, no. 3 (2002): 417-18, has attacked development for its implicit racial privilege despite its formal color blindness..} In this view, colonial “cultural missionary” thinking was as racist as social Darwinism, though the former expressed ideals of “humanitarian” intervention with “educational” aims while the latter asserted the right to rule of the biologically stronger.\footnote{Michael Schubert, \textit{Der schwarze Fremde: Das Bild des Schwarzafricaners in the parlamentarischen und publizistischen Kolonialdiskussion in Deutschland von den 1870er bis in die 1930er Jahre} (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003), 13. Conklin at 9 acknowledges that the French language of civilizing mission and French policies in West Africa were racist to the extent that officials thought of peoples of color as inferior to white Europeans, but she argues for shifts in stereotypes and policies between 1895 and 1930. The distinction between biological and cultural racism matches the debate between Europeans who argued for polygenesis—the separate evolution of races—and those who promoted monogenesis—the emergence of races from a single human stock. Monogenesists believed lesser races could be improved by education and environment while polygenesists did not. See Bethencourt, 252-89 and Richard Reid, \textit{A History of Modern Africa, 1800 to the Present}, 2nd ed. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 144-45.} The African context in particular makes the colonial gaze a racial one as well. Eighteenth and nineteenth century classifications of mankind always put Africans at or near the bottom. For example, Carl Linnaeaus, the founder of modern biological taxonomy, described Africans, by comparison to Europeans, American Indians and Asiatics, as being indolent, negligent,
crafty, and governed by caprice rather than law (like the Europeans), opinion (American Indians) or custom (Asiatics).\textsuperscript{197} In 1913 the governor-general of Portugal’s colonies wrote “The black of Angola is effectively a savage and one of the lowest in the scales of civilization and intelligence.”\textsuperscript{198} In the 1920s British officials, academics and journalists were still arguing whether Africans had an intrinsically inferior mentality and were still confusing race with culture and language.\textsuperscript{199}

Germans certainly participated in anti-African racial discourse. The famous philosopher Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) wrote that “the” Negro “presents the natural person in all his wildness and unruliness,” whose character lacked “anything reminiscent of humanity” (\textit{es ist nichts an das Menschliche anklingende in diesem Charakter zu finden}). Black Africa was a “child-land beyond the daylight of self-conscious history, veiled in the black color of night.”\textsuperscript{200} More than a century later, in the Federal Republic, grade school textbooks presented Africa as a land without history prior to European conquest, “white” colonial rule as positive despite its exploitation and oppression of Africans, and contrasted local “wild” cultures with the “high cultures” of Europe. \textit{Gymnasium} geology textbooks explained that Europeans were hard-working, unlike “natives” (\textit{Eingeborene} - a term never applied to Europeans) able to satisfy their needs from nature’s bounty. After 1960 schoolbooks began to view colonialism more critically, but the black/white or wild/civilized dichotomy remained, rephrased as

\textsuperscript{197} Bethencourt, 252-53.
\textsuperscript{198} Jerónimo, 90.
African/European. Even up to the early 1990s West German media still spoke of chiefs, natives, kraals, medicine men, and sorcerers. In 1985 a textbook illustration for pupils in their 7th and 8th years portrayed male figures (white rather than black) in the “orange” and “banana” (subtropical and tropical) as reclining passively while another figure in the “potato” (temperate) zone strode forward with knapsack and walking stick. In the African setting, therefore, colonial officials, missionaries and educators, postcolonial development experts and volunteers, even with the best of intentions, regarded Africans with a racial as well as colonial gaze.

**Gazing at Labor**

Thus equipped with faulty vision and misunderstanding, Europeans set forth to dominate, exploit, supervise, convert, and teach African peoples across a wide range of activities: labor in general, agriculture, ecology, medicine, housing, clothing and even housekeeping. For each of these activities, however, Africans had their own ideas and practices that often baffled or frustrated the would-be civilizers. Controlling African labor was the sorest point of conflict. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Europeans arrived expecting Africans to adopt the values of industrial capitalism. British Nonconformist missionaries (Methodists or other dissenters outside the established Church of England) ministering to the Southern Tswana of present-day South Africa, for example, treasured self-discipline, self-denial, and self-realization through work as well as punctuality and diligence. In a house run on behalf of the London Missionary Society they installed a large clock in 1818 so that their neighbors would learn to appreciate the

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202 Zurmühl, 88.
203 Melber, 52.
need to make the most out of time throughout the twenty-four-hour day. The Tswana disliked this device for regulating their lives. In fact, Africans had little time for European time. In Natal, also in South Africa, Zulu immigrant workers who agreed to be paid by the month insisted on the 28-day lunar month rather than the European calendar month of up to thirty-one days, saying “The moon is dead! Give us our money!” They also measured the workday from sunup to sundown rather than the clock, a serious problem for planters trying to get their cane sugar crushed as quickly as possible. In Natal’s countryside and in the capital of Durban they wanted and got day labor (togt) because they knew courts favored employers in contract or payment disputes. Furthermore, they made “praise songs” to spread the reputation of their employers, good or bad, just as they had about their patrons in Zululand. Male laundry washers defied white opinion by maintaining a guild monopoly for nearly forty years. British colonists could and would not understand Zulu work culture, so they responded with loud complaints about African laziness and demands to impose on the Zulus long contracts, low wages, and punishment of vagrancy (i.e. refusing to work for whites at the terms offered).

In Mombasa too, during the first half of the twentieth century, Kenyan workers who retained ties to their home villages preferred day labor to contract work and dared to strike repeatedly against wage cuts, so a 1947 official report claimed the British had to teach “the” African time discipline by separating him from the “enervating and

204 Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 1, xi-xii.
retarding influence of his economic and cultural background” by paying a family wage high enough for city living.206

The fundamental problem for Europeans wanting to exploit labor in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa was the relative thinness of the population in many places that made land plentiful and labor scarce.207 There was also a trade-off between off-farm labor and food production; building roads in colonial Zambia, for example, required the British to turn peasants from growers feeding themselves into workers who needed food from somewhere else. Getting more food in turn required more roads.208 Rather than face up to this fact and pay wages high enough to attract workers or invest more money in the colonies, Europeans comforted themselves with stereotypes of African laziness. The French believed that once Africans “filled their grain reserves for the coming year,” the latter would “refuse any further labor.”209 Portuguese officials claimed, anticipating Schnellbach, that the “exuberant fertility of the tropical zones,” which produced cassava and bananas, allowed Africans to feed themselves without working.210 According to historian Hubertus Büschel, some interwar anthropologists similarly claimed that tropical abundance kept Africans from saving, although others, including Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévy-Bruhl, attributed lack of individual thrift to reciprocal aid within African communities.211 At the Gezira irrigation scheme in Sudan, British authorities who

209 Conklin, 213.
210 Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, 82.
themselves often lacked agricultural qualifications accused unhappy tenants—and I will return to the reasons for their unhappiness later—of lethargy and compared them unfavorably to hardworking Egyptian fellahin or denounced them as “gentlemen loafers.” Sudanese bureaucrats still blame poor yields on “irresponsible” farmers. Meeting this sort of resistance, Europeans readily resorted to coercion, whether by imposing head or hut taxes that forced peasants to work for the colonial state or for European planters, or by rounding up peasants and lashing them with a hippopotamus whip in case of insufficient diligence. Officials and private employers referred to these procedures as an “education into work” for Africans and invoked the necessity of developing the colonies, whether building roads or railroads or digging canals or establishing profitable European-owned businesses, so (they claimed) it was all for the Africans’ long-term good. Of course there were variations in the level of coercion according to colony and colonial power, and officials debated appropriate tactics among themselves, but the urge to instill a proper European-style work ethic was general.

Physical coercion ended even before the colonial era was over, but the Western mentality of “education to work” continued, even outside Africa. Development theorists

Sahlins applied the abundance argument more convincingly to hunters and gatherers, who as members of the “original affluent society” could usually find something to eat so long as they kept on the move but faced diminishing returns if they remained in one place to accumulate surplus food. See Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972), 31-32. Büschel, 62, cites Sahlins without noting the differences between the latter’s argument and the claims of colonial administrators justifying forced labor.


For examples of internal debates, see Conklin and von Strandmann, supra.
and experts expected punctuality, diligence, reliability, cleanliness, and responsibility.\textsuperscript{215} When instead they faced absenteeism, apathy, tardiness, and irresponsibility, they put it down to the workers’ mental and cultural backwardness. At the Rourkela steel plant in India during the late 1950s and early 1960s, West Germans criticized Indians stressing busyness rather than achievement; the workers needed reeducation. One diplomat feared this process would take generations.\textsuperscript{216} These complaints, however, came because of protests against an imported power drill, which workers feared might destroy local jobs—a very “modern” concern.

**Gazing at Agriculture**

With or without direct labor conflict, Europeans often collided with Africans over agriculture. The latter had developed farming systems best suited for the environments they lived in, often using extensive cultivation, intercropping, and local innovation. Many have also formed special attachments to the land that combine local knowledge with spiritual and social relations. As to the first practice, Africans shifted their fields every so often rather than grow crops in the same place permanently, because land was plentiful and because this method required less labor.\textsuperscript{217} They could also keep plots widely scattered to take advantage of different soil types.\textsuperscript{218} According to Paul Richards, West African peasants will often use a piece of forest soil for one to four years and then allow it to lie fallow for five to fifteen years to recover its fertility. For savanna soil, the

figures would be two to ten years under cultivation, and twenty to thirty years fallow. Most combine shifting cultivation in dry uplands with farming in valley-bottom wetlands. In the Northern Province of present-day Zambia, the Bemba have practiced *citemene* cultivation, top-cutting trees or cutting them down to waist height, burning the brush and strewing the ash to fertilize the soil, and then cultivating the field for either four to six years with a mixture of crops or for three years with crops in sequence, such as finger millet in the first year and groundnuts in the second. All too often such activity left Europeans unimpressed. The British, for example, tended to write off *citemene* as “wasteful” and “unsustainable.” They also disliked the Bemba habit of living in dispersed settlements and tried to force them to concentrate for easier tax collection.

In Tanganyika after WWII the British similarly criticized shifting cultivation as ecologically “unsustainable” and tried to convince the Sukuma to adopt intensive cultivation, even though some colonial researchers were already coming to see the value of indigenous methods. The French, apparently with more success than the British, “regrouped” dispersed peasants such as the Mpiemu of the present-day Central African Republic into large villages near roads.

Intercropping, the mixing of multiple crop types in a given field, has several important advantages over monocropping, or the planting of only one crop type. It can provide better and more reliable yields by combining crops with different nutrient needs, such as cereals and legumes or by extracting nutrients from different soil levels, hinders

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221 Hodge, 231-35.
the spread of pests, weeds, and diseases, and smooths out “labor peaks” because different crops need attention at different times. According to Richards, eighty percent of West African farmland was intercropped as of 1985. In the early twentieth century, the *citamene* fields of northern Zambia might contain mixtures or sequences of finger millet, cassava, maize, sorghum, beans and groundnuts (peanuts). Along the *dambo* floodplains of the Tchiri River in present-day Malawi, peasants intercropped long-grained maize, beans, pumpkins, tobacco, sugar cane, vegetables, legumes, and wetland rice. By contrast, monocropping under European guidance or compulsion may have reduced soil fertility, created a need for fertilizers and herbicides and allowed indigenous knowledge to atrophy.

Numerous examples of local innovation in African agriculture belie European stereotypes about rural peoples mired in tradition. Ghanaian peasants from the Akim Abuakwa area prospered in proper capitalist fashion during the late very nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by adopting cocoa cultivation without any prompting by the British colonial officials then ruling the Gold Coast. Having earned a profit on one farm by drawing on unpaid family labor (in a matrilineal system) or by hiring labor, cocoa farmers then bought more land by pooling funds from family members or by forming temporary “companies” with other prospective purchasers. The colony’s cocoa exports

223 Ibid., 55-59, 66-70. See also Moore and Vaughan, 37-42.
224 Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, 63-64.
225 Moore and Vaughan, 25-36.
rose from near nothing in 1892 to fifty thousand tons in 1914.\textsuperscript{228} In Sierra Leone during the Great Depression, farmers responding to market demands for increased food production combined upland rice cultivation with two types of wetland rice as an alternative to the swamp rice that British officials promoted.\textsuperscript{229} Richards found a high turnover in rice varieties at a Sierra Leonean village during the mid-1980s and he himself introduced three new varieties to see what would happen to them. One went extinct, a second nearly so, but the third flourished as peasants gladly fitted it into their farming.\textsuperscript{230}

Many rural communities have bound themselves to the land by wrapping knowledge about it around relations with the living and the dead. In Guinea the Kuranko and Kissi have several customs that fulfill these functions: recognizing first-comer groups (to a village site) as holding authority, using particular forest patches as meeting places for gender-specific associations, burying a couple’s first child within a village, and maintaining ancestral shrines and tree crops in abandoned villages. They find it important to establish secure relations with the local spirits, who may bestow special gifts in hunting or farming, or who—if unappeased—may attack.\textsuperscript{231} In the same way the Iraqw in Tanzania must consult and perhaps pacify the appropriate Neetlang’w, a fearsome male spirit, when establishing a new settlement. Preferring to live on the upper slope, but not the top, of a ridge, the Iraqw believe that the far side (windward and cold) is an ill-omened place. When the Nyerere regime forcibly resettled them during Operation Vijiji from 1974 to 1976 in a manner similar to the French colonial \textit{regroupements}, it cut them--

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off from the burial places of their ancestors, sometimes put them on the wrong side of ridges, and exposed them to possible attack by strange Neetlang’w.\textsuperscript{232} The CAR’s Mpiemu, perhaps more mobile than the Kuranko, Kissi and Iraqw, rely on \textit{doli} to orient themselves. \textit{Doli} is a way of understanding past and present, a changing corpus of knowledge about farming, hunting and the environment, and a fund of wisdom for children. The goal is to “leave a person behind,” a young individual who will respect his or her elders and know how to use the landscape.\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Guiriri} among the Banda, another CAR people, is similar, but where \textit{doli} uses images of vines, cords, wandering and sitting, guiri refers to roads and places that connect people to each other and past to the present, but also to the “right road”—obedience to elders, hospitality and good manners.\textsuperscript{234}

Taking charge of the countryside, Europeans presumed to teach Africans how to farm in Africa by changing the local relationship with cattle, establishing tightly controlled irrigation systems, or introducing mechanization, but these ideas often fared badly. They also brought from Europe an obsession with imposing straight lines and right angles, in fencing, irrigation works, roads, streets and—as we shall see later—houses, as if geometry itself established the superiority of Western reason.\textsuperscript{235}

In much of southern and eastern Africa, men kept—and still keep—large numbers of cattle as storage units for accumulated wealth, as investments, as marks of material

\textsuperscript{233} Giles-Vernick, \textit{Cutting the Vines of the Past}, 1-5, 47-55.
\textsuperscript{235} Frontani, 161.
success, and as mediums of social relations through borrowing and lending.\textsuperscript{236} Excepting mass cattle death during a rinderpest epidemic in the 1890s, Europeans believed African men had too many of them. To missionaries sedentary agriculture meant civility, but cattle betokened shiftlessness.\textsuperscript{237} Furthermore, in the European view, having too many cattle in too few places caused soil erosion and risked turning grassland into desert. So colonialists in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa, for example, forced African men to reduce the number of cattle and to rotate them in grazing reserves bounded by straight fences, and tried to interest them in smaller numbers of “better” breeds, though in fact evidence for desertification was lacking.\textsuperscript{238} To the extent soil erosion was a reality, the blame properly rested, at least in Rhodesia, with colonial expropriation of African land and compression of African peasants into overcrowded reserves for the benefit of white employers.\textsuperscript{239} In the Tanganyika Sukumaland Development Scheme, the British likewise pushed destocking and grazing reserves.\textsuperscript{240} The World Bank’s Thaba-Tseka Project attempted grazing control, though not destocking measures, among the Basutho during the late 1970s and early 1980s.\textsuperscript{241} In both Tanganyika and Lesotho, the Sukuma Federation of Chiefs and the government of Lesotho (respectively) resisted outside interference.\textsuperscript{242} The Tswana resisted too, at times

\textsuperscript{236} Comaroff and Comaroff, “Home-Made Hegemony,” 173-80; Ferguson, 136-66.
\textsuperscript{239} Macombe, 159-64.
\textsuperscript{240} Hodge, 214-217.
\textsuperscript{241} Ferguson, 169-179.
\textsuperscript{242} Hodge, 217-21; Ferguson, 190-92.
by violence, and remained attached to their cattle. 243 In French West Africa, colonial officials took the opposite tack. They promoted “mixed farming,” in which peasants would acquire cattle for plowing rather than hoeing the ground themselves. 244 In Tanganyika, the British also campaigned for mixed farming and found the Sukuma uncooperative, because penning livestock every night and preparing manure cost more labor than the animals were worth. Most could not afford an oxcart and thirty to fifty percent of homesteads had no cattle at all. 245

In some of their most aggressive interventions into daily practice, the British and French imposed irrigation works on peasants, the former at Gezira in the Sudan and the latter along the Niger River in present-day Mali. At Gezira in 1921 the British expropriated local farmers of their land rights and turned them into tenants under government supervision, overriding preexisting land use patterns and social relations. Four years later they began constructing canals and laying out a grid of uniform fields on thousands of hectares, mainly for growing cotton. In what Victoria Bernal has called the “colonial moral economy,” inspectors imposed British discipline by telling tenants which crops to grow and how much to plant, checking afterward to make sure the tenants did what they were told. Whereas peasants had shared their crops with owners of land and water wheels, they now had to share profits with the British, who ran the accounting system and could pay debts owed by any one tenant out of proceeds earned by another. Tenants felt like prisoners, loathing the “horrid little squares” that confined their farming and symbolized their regimentation. They reacted by withholding rents or labor. The scheme lost money almost every other year from 1925 to 1946, but it has survived until

244 Van Beusekom, Negotiating Development, 40-41.
245 Hodge, 217-21.
the present, generating export revenues for the Sudanese government. French officials found Gezira inspiring and determined to start their own scheme under an agency called Office du Niger. It did not work out so well as Gezira; supposed to improve 1.85 million hectares for cotton, it did not cover more than sixty thousand. The French tried to overcome the area’s sparse population by forced recruitment of about thirty-one thousand settlers up to 1946, though ninety-five hundred or about thirty percent of them got away. Those who could not escape had to work a minimum number of hours per day or suffer corporal punishment or loss of rations. Guards patrolled roads to prevent them from leaving or selling crops to private traders. Unsurprisingly, the settlers called themselves “slaves of the whites.” A 1945 commission found the installations defective, qualified technicians few, the soil poorly prepared, the crops not rotated, water and fertilizer in short supply, and management obsessed solely with extracting the greatest possible labor time and with being obeyed. The project was heavily in debt into the 1950s. The abolition of forced labor in 1946 made it easier for settlers to adapt to their situation. Required to grow rice and cotton on Office land, settlers planted millet, rice, maize, fonio, peanuts and garden crops on land outside Office control. Project officials called this production primitive and irrational, but they could not stop it, especially since the settlers paid no fee for extra-Office land, kept the full harvest, and sold it whenever and however they wished. The Office even began paying attention to local knowledge of soil types and crops suitable for them and the director emphasized the need for adapting to African

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conditions, though he still attacked the “mentality of extensive agriculture” and blamed settlers for not heeding supposedly universal principles of crop rotation, manuring and best planting dates.248

The British promoted irrigation elsewhere in Africa, again ignoring local practice. In Kenya the Marakwet already had a system of hill furrow irrigation along a fifty-kilometer escarpment of the Rift Valley above the Kerio River, but after 1940 the British disparaged it as backward, wasteful of water and tending to erode soil. To show the Marakwet a better way, the British used tractors and disc plows to realign furrows on the Valley floor beginning in 1959, but they did a poor job at unreasonable cost and stopped the scheme in 1963.249 In South Africa around 1800 the Thlaping group of the Tswana in the Kuruman Valley practiced pastoralism, shifting cultivation and foraging, and did not irrigate; they preferred conserving water rather than investing labor to get more. Among other sources, they visited a spring called the “Eye.” When British missionaries arrived in 1818, they introduced irrigation as part of their campaign to Europeanize local society and culture. Eventually the Tlhaping did adopt irrigation, but as a supplement rather than replacement for extensive agriculture; missionaries criticized the water-furrows for being zigzag rather than straight. Unfortunately, the Tlhaping eventually lost control of the Eye to British colonial authorities and then in the twentieth century to the South African government, which allowed the new town of Kuruman to absorb all of the Eye’s water for the exclusive benefit of white farmers.250 In general, Europeans repeatedly had difficulty understanding that African peasants already had a “portable” water system in

248 Ibid., 87-97.
their heads, as Richards has argued for rice cultivation. Rather than invest labor in irrigation, they can move their plots up or down slopes to take advantage of sites with different drainage, soil moisture and fertility, and they can select seed varieties appropriate for each site.251

In the late colonial era after WWII, the British backed mechanization on a grand scale in hopes of increasing crop production and export earnings to alleviate food shortages and a shortage of US dollars. The most ambitious and infamous attempt began in 1946 with the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme, which aimed to produce peanuts for export to Britain and to impress local peasants with an “ocular demonstration” of what bulldozers, rooters, tractors, sowing machines and combine harvesters could do. Instead of inspiring anyone, the scheme was a fiasco. The machinery was second-hand and broke down frequently without repair facilities and few parts. The rooters could not cope with the tough roots, nor the harvesters with ground baked hard during dry season. By the end of 1947, only seventy-five hundred of one hundred fifty thousand acres at the first of three sites were ready—a ratio of five percent. The cost of clearing per was ten times higher than expected. A new plan in 1949 reduced the total projected acreage from 2.4 million to six hundred thousand, but even the lower figure was beyond reach of the British. The parastatal Overseas Food Corporation took over the project in early 1948, but suffered heavy financial losses and was dissolved in 1954. British mistakes had made the project’s collapse a certainty, especially the failure to try out the equipment, designed for use in North America rather than East Africa, on the selected ground before beginning

251 Richards, “Versatility of the Poor,” 197-198.
the operation or to gather information on rainfall and soil composition.\textsuperscript{252} Meanwhile the British also established the Colonial Development Corporation in 1948 to start and manage projects, mostly to grow and process produce for the Ministry of Food. Two years later the CDC was earning profits from only eight of twenty projects and was running losses overall. Its first big failure was the Gambia Poultry Farm, supposed to produce twenty million eggs and one million pounds of dressed chicken per year. Because the sixteen tractors supposed to clear land kept breaking down, the farm grew too little feed for the chickens, half of whom died. The eggs and poultry the CDC shipped to the United Kingdom were unfit for consumption.\textsuperscript{253} These experiences showed what happened when European planners took little account of African conditions, ignored local knowledge, and skipped careful cost calculation before bringing in the machines.

During the 1960s and 70s, Westerners introduced to Africa as well as India and elsewhere the so-called “Green Revolution,” which seemed a sure benefit but led to ambivalent consequences. It offered a package of goods including hybrid high-yielding grains, chemical fertilizer and irrigation that in combination could achieve a yield of eight times existing grain varieties. Unfortunately, the cost of fertilizer and irrigation locked out poorer farmers, while the wealthier farmers put their profits back into mechanization that eliminated jobs, so the Green Revolution tended to worsen rural inequality and unemployment.\textsuperscript{254} On the other hand, poor farmers who did take up the new grains found themselves burdened with a heavier workload. In Zambia’s Northern Province hybrid

\textsuperscript{252} Michael Havinden and David Meredith, Colonialism and Development: Britain and its tropical colonies, 1850-1960 (New York: Routledge, 1993), 276-82. See also Hodge, 209-14.

\textsuperscript{253} Havinden and Meredith, 283-92.

\textsuperscript{254} Hodge, 268-69.
maize brought in cash, but depressed crop diversity and reduced the time women could put into preparing food for their children. Families therefore had more money, but worse child malnutrition.²⁵⁵

**Gazing at Ecology**

Ecological strategies have also been contested. Europeans and postcolonial African governments viewed African peasants as careless about managing natural resources, wrongly blaming them for soil erosion, deforestation, desertification, and unnecessary threats to megafauna. Western bureaucrats, scientists, and environmental agencies formulated universal “received wisdom” that ignored local knowledge and served as the basis for interventions by colonial, national and international institutions.²⁵⁶

Anti-erosion campaigns, beginning in the early 1930s, have been perhaps the most common and irritating interventions, with their insistence that African peasants make massive labor contributions. Colonial administrators feared that growing populations of peasants and cattle were exhausting the soil and denuding grazing lands, perhaps opening in Africa the possibility of an American-style “dust bowl.”²⁵⁷ In colonial-era Malawi, Kenya, Tanganyika, for example, and post-colonial Lesotho and Ethiopia, governments forced peasants to terrace hillsides, build up ridges and bunds, and sometimes plant grass buffer strips or trees.²⁵⁸ Predictably and unfortunately, soil erosion measures ignored other factors and failed to incorporate local experiences and feedback.

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²⁵⁵ Moore and Vaughan, 178-84, 197-205.
In Kenya, for example, the government itself contributed to a supposed overpopulation problem among Kikuyu settlers by limiting where they could settle legally.\textsuperscript{259} Rather than consult with peasants the Sukumuland project relied on a mathematical equation to determine the ideal population density for humans and livestock and then tried to limit settlement to match those figures. Constructing ridges along contours was actually risky, because without absolute accuracy or without proper drainage channels, water would build up and break through the lowest point in the ridge, damaging crops.\textsuperscript{260} In Malawi’s Lower Tchiri Valley, the peasants were not convinced that ridging would improve their productivity, and trials at a British experimental station from 1942 to 1947 proved them right. The British went ahead anyways. In at least one district, compulsory ridging led to peasant flight and increasing support for Malawi’s nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{261} In Ethiopia under the 1980s military regime, peasants disliked stone bunds and terracing for reducing arable land and sheltering rodents, terracing for bringing subsoil to the surface, and trees for shading cropland and attracting wildlife that liked to eat crops. They were right. By 1991 research stations had determined that soil plots using the new conservation measures did indeed have lower crop yields than control plots without them.\textsuperscript{262} One scholar has argued that scientists may misread the physical evidence. Gullies, for example may act as mere conduits for water flow rather than cause erosion. Rather than bind soil, some trees may feed erosion by collecting water into large super-drops that make a big splash.\textsuperscript{263}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{259} Berry, 78-88.
\bibitem{260} Hodge, 214-21.
\bibitem{261} Mandala, 197-207, 219-37.
\bibitem{262} Hoben, 197-99, 202-05.
\end{thebibliography}
Governments have also blamed peasants for deforestation that may have been imaginary rather than real. Since 1893, French and Guinean ecologists, along with international agencies, have looked at the landscape and assumed that forest islands in the middle of the savanna represent remnants of a great forest that once stood there until local peoples cut or burned it down for shifting cultivation. This assumption rests on the belief that a landscape will, if humans leave it unmolested, reach some equilibrium, commonly with a “climax forest.” To protect the supposed remnants, governments set guards and banned bush fires on pain of fines or even death. Yet, as James Fairhead and Melissa Leach found, there never was a great forest. Forest islands have appeared only where the local Kuranko and Kissi have established villages and promoted tree growth around them by setting fires, creating firebreaks and dumping wastes. They then use these woods for protection from wind and heat, wood products, tree crops, and rituals. Forest cover has actually grown rather than shrunk as one can see by comparing aerial photos from 1952 and 1992. Climate historians have also found evidence of long-term fluctuations between wet and dry conditions that undermine the idea of a stable climax forest. Unfortunately, officials found reasons to disbelieve this evidence and continue their repressive policies. As Fairhead and Leach argue, the image of the farmer as environmental destroyer justifies the self-image of urban intellectuals as modern and civilized.264 In Nigeria’s northern drylands, forests are essential for subsistence and trade, but the official forestry administration has struggled with local peoples over how best to manage them. The former aims to conserve trees as a timber resource and promotes regularly-spaced monocultural stands of similar ages, while the latter value fruit

and food production, shade, and multi-purpose species. Local peoples also see no dividing line between forest and farm trees; both are part of a common landscape.\textsuperscript{265}

Western and African governments have long worried that pastoralists and peasants have been promoting the spread of deserts, as we have seen in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, but their worries are likely unjustified.\textsuperscript{266} In West Africa desertification fears first surfaced among French administrators during the 1920s and spread to the British. According to the “received wisdom” on this topic, the southward spread of the Sahara Desert was speeding up due to a falling water table and decreasing rainfall due to shifting cultivation, overgrazing, tree lopping, and bush fires. The desertification idea submerged during the 1950s and 60s, but resurfaced in the 1970s, when a major drought struck West Africa and the Horn. The United Nations Conference on Desertification recommended five large projects for managing aquifers, planting green belts, monitoring desertification and controlling livestock. Further research during the 1980s found no major shifts in the northern limits of arable land. The desertification narrative persisted as long as it did in the face of contrary evidence because it justified foreign aid and state intervention in local land use, and gave employment to ecologists.\textsuperscript{267}

Governments and international agencies like the World Wildlife Federation have also clashed with rural peoples over the protection of wild animals and habitats. Where Westerners see elephants, leopards and gorillas in the Sangha River basin of the Central African Republic as precious megafauna in a fragile, unchanging forest needing protection, the local Mpiemu see them as a resource at best and a threat at worst.

\textsuperscript{266} See Scoones, supra, and Beinart, supra.
Elephants, for example, attack crops in the field. Because of restrictions on hunting and gathering, the Mpiemu are not allowed even to pick koko leaves because gorillas eat them. In response the Mpiemu have told stories about aggressive gorillas menacing or even carrying off women. At a broader level, Western ecologists have presumed that pristine environments untouched by human hands have the greatest possible “biodiversity,” so that any increase in humans reduces that diversity. The obvious policy is then to exclude humans from a given habitat or at least limit their activities. That has been the case in the CAR, where the government with backing from the World Bank and World Wildlife Fund created Dzanga-Ndoki National Park and the Dzanga-Sangha Special Reserve in 1990 with the intent of excluding settlement, hunting and foraging, though the Mpiemu found ways of evading these restrictions and the government continues diamond mining and logging in the forests. In addition, the WWF distinguished between the “migrant” Mpiemu who had no special privileges and the “indigenous” Baka who received free health care and better access to game. As Tamara Giles-Vernick points out, “migration” and “indigeneity” are not neutral terms, but categories of intervention. Pastoralists were evicted from Tanzania’s Mkomazi Game Reserve in 1988 even though their herds and wildlife had coexisted on rangelands for thousands of years. In fact the presumption that people are always bad for wildlife

268 Giles-Vernick, Cutting the Vines of the Past, 144-49, 186-91.
270 Frontani, 162.
271 Giles-Vernick, Cutting the Vines of the Past, 44-46, 115-18, 39-44, 179-86.
ignores cases in which smallholder cultivation promotes high levels of diversity.\textsuperscript{274} Pastoralists may likewise enrich diversity by creating nutrient-rich patches and using fire to manage rangelands.\textsuperscript{275}

**Gazing at the Home**

Not content with their interference in African agriculture and ecology, European colonialist reformers and sometimes their postcolonial successors also sought to remake African domesticity—families, homes, clothes, housekeeping and hygiene. In Europe the ideal family consisted of one husband and one wife, with the husband in the world of work and the wife confined to the domestic sphere.\textsuperscript{276} Quite predictably, Christian missionaries in Africa tried to shut down polygyny, which they shunned as licensed promiscuity.\textsuperscript{277} They had, however, to face persuasive objections from the peoples targeted for conversion. For the Mpiemu in the Sangha River basin, monogamy would limit the number of children any Christian father would have, restricting the labor power and wealth he could command, and also making it harder to “leave a person behind.”\textsuperscript{278} Tswana royals—the chief’s extended kinfolk—who remained attached to polygyny pointed out that Kings David and Solomon had multiple wives.\textsuperscript{279} Missionaries also objected when they found women laboring away from the home. In many regions African women did much or most of the fieldwork—planting, weeding and harvesting—while men handled other tasks like felling trees, managing cattle, hunting, making war (before the colonial era) or emigrating to work for cash, though of course there were and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{275} Brockington and Homewood, 95-97.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 1, 60-70.
\item \textsuperscript{277} Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, “Home-Made Hegemony, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Giles-Vernick, *Cutting the Vines of the Past*, 107-15.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Jean and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 2, 73-78.
\end{itemize}
have been many exceptions.  

Such was the situation among the Southern Tswana when Nonconformist missionaries arrived in the early nineteenth century. These Christians were appalled. The Tswana felt the same way when they saw male missionaries in the field doing women’s work. The difference was in the missionaries’ lack of realism; in early 19th century Britain only affluent men could afford to confine their wives to the home; poor women had to work for a living. Nonetheless, Europeans viewed African men’s absence from the fields (where prevalent) as proof that the latter were “lazy lords of creation.” During the 1920s a Portuguese official remarked “It is known that, in general, the black men live off the work of the women; their life is one of idleness. Their wealth depends on the number of women who work for them. So often, under a hot sun, we have seen them, their children on their backs, carrying out the agricultural tasks that only the men ought to do.” Setting African society in its proper order meant reversing the gender division of labor. As in Britain, however, only wealthy men could afford to take their women out of agricultural production. More often women remained in the fields or otherwise earned income at home while men emigrated elsewhere to work for cash wages, especially southern Africa. Where men did enter agriculture, they sometimes took control of women’s labor and the cash crops that it made possible.

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281 Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 1, 200-06.
283 Jerónimo, 174.
285 Comaroff and Comaroff, “Home-Made Hegemony,” 50; Moore and Vaughan, 210-16.
Wherever households adopted new European-style equipment, men rather than women received money and prestige.\textsuperscript{286}

African houses also offended European sensibilities. Where homes of the Southern Tswana were circular to maximize floor space, made out of local materials, and partitioned into general-purposes spaces, the missionaries wanted them to be rectangular, fitted with manufactured hinges, latches and shutters, divided into square rooms with specialized functions, and furnished with beds, tables, chairs and wardrobes. The missionaries built a mission house to demonstrate these principles. Where Tswana dwellings were clustered around the chief’s court, missionaries found the arrangement untidy and wanted them laid out along a street grid. The Tswana showed themselves open to change, but rather than merely copy European architecture wholesale, they often chose specific elements from it to create a mixture, a “bricolage,” such as rectangular structures with windows and doors, but built of red earth and decorated with local geometric patterns. A chief might have one building in European style next to another in Tswana style. Over time, there emerged a three-way class division in which the poorest dwelled in conical, unfurnished huts, the Christian elite in fully European homes and the majority in bricolage.\textsuperscript{287} In the 1960s Tswana still disparaged elites who lived in square houses fenced off from others as being “naked” like “plucked birds.”\textsuperscript{288} The Tanzanian government of the 1970s shared the missionaries’ architectural taste; when it resettled the Iraqw, it moved them into new rectangular style dwellings colder and smaller than the round huts they had lived in.\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{286} Boserup, 53, 56-57.
\textsuperscript{288} Comaroff and Comaroff, “Home-Made Hegemony,” 52.
\textsuperscript{289} Lawi, 84-85.
Tswana clothing also needed reformation, in missionaries’ opinion. Although adult Tswana wore skin cloaks, pinned at the shoulder for men and fastened across the chest for women, men wore loincloths, and both sexes wore sandals, and children covered their groins with flaps or short skirts, the missionaries saw them as naked, degenerate, dirty and contagious. By contrast European clothing signified refinement and civility, but also industrial consumerism and proper gender division of labor, since manufactured clothes would require women to clean them at home with manufactured soap. As with housing, the Tswana largely adopted a bricolage rather than the full Western kit, such as wearing only a shirt or only pants. Women in particular adopted a durable outfit of dresses, shawls for the upper body, and headscarves. Store-bought blankets served the same coverall function as skin cloaks had earlier.\(^{290}\)

To transfer their ideas about domesticity, dress, cleanliness, sewing, cooking, and hygiene, Europeans offered Africans domestic training. In colonialism’s early days, these efforts were informal. Among the Southern Tswana missionary wives offered lessons at the mission house in childcare, knitting, sewing, dressmaking, and preparing European food, though of course Tswana mothers were already well-practiced in childcare. At least these efforts led some Tswana women to take in sewing for payment as early as the 1830s.\(^{291}\) In colonial Kenya, the wives of colonial administrators likewise taught sewing, hygiene and (European) cooking to urban African women.\(^{292}\) Colonialists also set up formal programs, however, in “domestic science,” later known as home economics, for select female populations. In Nigerian Yorubaland during the early


twentieth century, missionaries set up girls’ boarding schools for the Christian elite, where pupils grew their own food, cooked meals, swept the compound, washed clothes, and took in laundry from boys’ schools. There were also marriage training homes for instructing young betrothed Christian women in punctuality, cleanliness, helpfulness, moderate voice tone, decent language and regular bathing. In fact, the Yoruba already had a domestic ideal largely similar to the European, in which the wife’s life revolved around the home with cooking, cleaning, childcare, and nursing the sick, but it differed in expecting the wife to earn outside income by working in crafts like basket-weaving or soap-making, because husbands did not fully support the household. This difference led Gladys Plummer, Lady Superintendent of Education (later deputy director) of Nigeria’s southern provinces from 1931 to 1950, to encourage training for turning occupational skills into commercial enterprises.293 In Usumbura in present-day Burundi, the Belgian colonial state sponsored Catholic-run “social homes” during the 1940s and 50s supposed to teach Western domesticity to married urban women in domestic skills, with separate sections for Catholic and Muslim students, the latter not required to be monogamous. At the basic level the social homes taught sewing and knitting, and the best students could move up to housekeeping classes for “true ladies of the house” in setting tables, making dinner, and laundering clothes. From 1953 lessons took place in a model house with kitchen, dining room and bedroom. At the third level, the most gifted women would receive training to become “monitors”—paid assistants to European social workers—able to help with maternal hygiene and child rearing. All enrolled women had to open their homes for visits to check for cleanliness, propriety and display of appropriate consumer

goods. This education was not for the masses, but for an affluent, leisured few among the colonized, bestowing the aura, though not the reality of power.  

Good European mothering included proper nutrition and hygiene. In much of East and Central Africa by the early 1930s medical missionaries sought to break the cultural hold of “heathen grandmothers” who acted as midwives by establishing Christian “houses of birth” and child welfare clinics for mothers to learn “habits of regularity” in feeding their children, as if motherhood should obey the rhythm of industrial capitalism. In Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika the colonial administration set up a “model native house” to serve as clinic and to set an example of cleanliness and good living. Sanitary inspectors campaigned for year-long breast feeding and a pair of surgeons organized baby shows with prizes going to the healthiest. By 1956 the Belgian “social homes” in Burundi featured a socio-medical program with weekly service for sickly and malnourished children, which included weighing the little ones, distributing milk and instructing mothers on how to raise and nourish them. In Morocco, where the French construed the Muslim home as disorderly, dirty and unhygienic, the office for Maternal and Infant Protection (PMI) began opening centers in 1948 to teach puériculture, a curriculum of “modern” time and work for the family, in which babies would sleep alone instead of being swaddled and mothers would keep them on a strict feeding schedule rather than nurse on demand. The centers also offered lessons in food preparation,

297 Nancy Rose Hunt, 460.
housework and hygiene, to save babies from contaminated food and dirty clothes causing skin and blood infections.  

**Gazing at Medicine**

Beyond their housekeeping ideas, Europeans also promoted and sometimes imposed their notions of medicine and dismissed preexisting African practices, particularly once germ theory became dominant among Europeans in the late nineteenth century. Some African healers already applied European-style treatments, such as lancing and cupping (in Europe based on the older humoral theory of illness) among the Southern Tswana or inoculation among the Tswana and in the Belgian Congo. Unlike Europeans, however, local healers also looked for disturbances in social relations as possible causes for illness, perhaps hostility among community members or even some malicious act of sorcery, so therapy required removing those disturbances. Healers also had a broader range of responsibilities for social well-being beyond the narrow scope of “medicine” in European terms; they gave opinions about the best time for planting crops, offered good luck in combat, forecasted events, or protected villages from demons, forest spirits, and sorcerers. Sooner or later after arriving, Europeans tried to do away with indigenous healing and replace it with their own theories and practices; results varied. From 1905 the Belgians imposed harsh measures in their attempt to fight trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) borne by the tsetse fly. First they tried to isolate all

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infected individuals, causing Congolese to flee medical teams and then they tried to examine the entire population. Health rules banned fishing, washing, traveling in or drawing water from streams they deemed unsafe, allowed the administration to destroy canoes or “regroup” whole populations, and required all adult men (but apparently not women or children) to carry medical passports. The Belgians did not, however, train any Congolese physicians. European-style, top-down state-mandated public health was so unpopular in the Congo that it disappeared within fifteen years of independence.\(^{301}\) In post-WWII colonial Zambia, a Sister Wadsworth on behalf of the Christian Missionaries in Many Lands reorganized the training of medical auxiliaries, intending to win souls for Christ by fighting Lunda medical practices with scientific European medicine and Christian belief in God as the ultimate healer. Instead she had to make concessions to Lunda sensibilities by raising the training age (because patients did not trust too-young and unmarried auxiliaries) and allowing the children of current or former auxiliaries into training (because Lunda healing was a hereditary profession). Program graduates treated social or spiritual ailments as well as medical ones by settling disputes, inventing their own rituals, praying with patients, and handling witchcraft cases. Auxiliaries accepted germ theory while also laying a “network of concern” beneath the sick and dying.\(^{302}\) In a similar manner, dingaka healers among the late nineteenth and twentieth century Tswana mixed indigenous and European medicine while still focusing on social relations. While elite Tswana trained in Europe as physicians, independent Tswana churches stressed healing by laying on of hands.\(^{303}\) Here as elsewhere indigenous people refused to

\(^{301}\) Lyons, 365-77.
\(^{302}\) Kalusa, 160-65.
\(^{303}\) Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, 358-64.
swallow European medicine—actual as well as metaphorical—without complaint or modification.

**Conclusion: Gazing at the Village Projects**

And so it was in the West German village projects, where villagers had their own ideas about what they needed and what would or would not make their lives better, while the “misinformation, misconceptions and stereotypes” that make up the colonial gaze hindered German planners, experts and development helpers from understanding local concerns and attitudes.\(^\text{304}\) In the Togo Model Villages of Agou and Nuatja, and in the Peki settlement, West Germans construed resistance to project labor demands as lack of diligence, unreliability, or failure of punctuality, and saw as through a warped lens the problem as one of Africans needing more education or discipline rather than as a rational response to West German incompetence, intrusion and impertinence.\(^\text{305}\) Only later, partially and with some reluctance did project managers and officials acknowledge that villagers had good reasons for apathy and absenteeism, such as lack of pay or at least poor returns to labor. West German efforts to improve agriculture suffered from a similar blindness. In Agou and Tori Cada Otto Schnellbach and Balduin Zimmer and their assistants pushed villagers to plant in rows—another instance of the European fascination with straight lines—and read their reluctance to give up the benefits of intercropping as mere laziness. The Germans also underestimated the environmental challenges to their projects. In Agou and Nuatja storms knocked down buildings while in Cambolé drought ruined what seemed to be a promising cotton enterprise, and in Togo

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\(^{305}\) For the uses of stereotypes in blaming Africans for development project failures, see, e.g., Grubbs, 16, 145.
generally rough tracks wore out vehicles with unexpected speed. Hopes for profitably mechanizing agriculture in Togo and at Peki proved as futile there as in British Tanganyika. Meanwhile DED volunteers who taught sewing, cooking, nutrition, hygiene, and housekeeping followed in the footsteps of colonial domestic science training programs in Nigeria, Belgian Congo and elsewhere, though they never made clear why West African women or girls might need sewing and cooking lessons from outsiders. Their reports show little or no evidence of awareness about indigenous practices. Certainly no one asked in advance the women of Biriwa whether they wanted large communal ovens for smoking fish. Until they corrected their faulty vision the West Germans could not enjoy success or learn from their mistakes.

Yet for the Germans the colonial gaze had helpful functions. It kept them from wondering whether development projects as such were ever a good idea. Equally important, they along with the host government and press could reposition the distorted lens for ceremonies and publicity so that the host country public too would view the project village through the “gaze,” seeing wise and selfless Germans and responsible domestic government on the one hand and needful, grateful or perhaps feckless beneficiaries on the other. The colonial gaze was thus an important tool of development theater.
Chapter 2

Reconfiguring Failure: The Togo Model Villages, 1962-75

They are therefore bitterly disappointed by us, whenever we insist on work and pay only wages corresponding to profits. In this way we carry, in the view of the Africans, a Janus head, on the one side the generous, rich uncle and giver of many things and on the other side the exploiter, wage squeezer and neocolonialist.\(^{306}\)

Project manager Hans von der Decken, October 8, 1966

It was a clash of good intentions. In 1961-62 West Germans led by Otto Schnellbach arrived in Togo expecting to help the people of Agou-Nyongbo, Nuatja, and Kambolé by establishing model villages and cooperatives that would raise their standard of living through more efficient agricultural and craft production via communal labor. The villagers expected the West Germans to bring the benefits of modern life, like running water, electricity, and paved streets. Unfortunately, hopes soured as Togolese efforts fell below West German expectations, West Germans impatiently demanded rather than suggested what to do, the Togolese resisted as much as they cooperated, and the project disappointed everyone.

Thus far, the story of this project has already received detailed examination in Hubertus Büschel’s 2014 *Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe: Deutsche Entwicklungsarbeit in Afrika 1960-1975* (Help Towards Self-Help: German Development Aid in Africa, 1960-1975). Büschel uses it along with a West German training center in Cameroon and an East German construction project in Zanzibar to critique the contemporary ideal of community development (CD) or “help toward self-help.” As an alternative to development directed

by the central government, CD was supposed to inspire and enable villages to define their own problems and implement solutions through voluntary communal labor. Projects might include infrastructure, schools, or health facilities.\textsuperscript{307} The practice, however, fell well short of the ideal, as governments ignored local opinion, village CD workers dealt mainly with local elites, and villagers responded with apathy.\textsuperscript{308} In Tanzania local leaders resorted to violence to induce the necessary “voluntary” cooperation.\textsuperscript{309} The Togo Model Villages too, Büschel argues, could not escape the inborn contradiction between the “imperative of local initiative” and the need to plan ahead and get things done even at the cost of abandoning the principle of development “from below.” Frustrated villagers faced “preconceived plans and goals where their wishes and ideas were supposed to be decisive,” and village leaders were angry that the Germans did not build them roads, schools or houses. Unable to accept the structural defects of “help toward self-help,” the project’s designer and first manager, Otto Schnellbach, and his colleagues fell back on colonial-era racist truisms about “African” mentalities to explain their failure. About the project Büschel concludes that “…in the ‘three model villages’ much energy, time and money were expended for almost no result.”\textsuperscript{310}

This chapter will move beyond Büschel’s analysis in four ways. First, it will cover the entire term of the original project and its three successor projects up to 1975,

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\item \textsuperscript{309} Hubertus Büschel, “Eine Brücke am Mount Meru: Zur Globalgeschichte von Hilfe zur Selbshilfe und Gewalt in Tanganjika,” in \textit{Entwicklungswelten: Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit}, ed. Hubertus Büschel and Daniel Speich (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2009), 179, 194-201.
\item \textsuperscript{310} Büschel, \textit{Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe}, 432-36.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
whereas he broke off his account around 1967. This change allows me to make a more nuanced assessment of the project’s results; instead of “almost no result,” I argue that the negative results outweighed the positive ones, but that there were some positive results, perhaps even sustainable ones. Nowhere were the cooperatives profitable for long, but in Agou the West Germans set up a viable wood-processing operation with a carpentry shop and saw mill, supported by a mechanical shop. At the Haho River nearby Nuatja may have benefited from a new bridge. All three villages and others not part of the main project received more than a dozen new cisterns to ease water collection. DED volunteers supported the project’s economic operations and offered courses in sewing, nutrition and health care; perhaps some of these courses were helpful. Second, my discussion of the first several years in Agou and Nuatja will pass over the implications for community development theory, which Büschel so ably draws out, and focus on the mutual incomprehension between West German experts and Togolese villagers. It will also draw attention to problems of natural environment and project management that made a bad situation worse. Third, my account pays greater attention than Büschel’s to the cooperatives, which the Germans intended to be the vehicles for earning profits and funding village improvements; one cannot properly understand the project’s goals and failures without them. The co-ops were production cooperatives, supposed to mobilize and control labor as well as purchase supplies and sell produce. In this form they utterly failed, but the West Germans tried to save the project in 1967 by abandoning cooperative production for cooperative marketing and by breaking up the single project into three, a flexible response that Büschel overlooks. Fourth, my account pays far more attention than Büschel’s to the third model village, Kambolé, where the West Germans began work
only in late 1965. The negative results there were actually worse than the ones in Agou-Nyongbo and Nuatja, because the initially successful network of marketing cooperatives the West Germans organized and promoted left their peasant members in debt. This outcome is one reason for my conclusion that the project’s negatives outweighed its positives.

In the pages that follow I will narrate the entire project from beginning to end. The ultimately futile efforts of Otto Schnellbach and his successor Dr. Hans von der Decken to manage Togolese labor and to make production cooperation pay ended with the West Germans blaming the Togolese for insufficient diligence and imagination, but also reorganizing the project and dropping von der Decken. I will then discuss the last years of the projects in Agou-Nyongbo under Heinz Lähne and Nuatja under Gerd Hofmeier, and the West German marketing cooperative campaign around Kambolé under project managers Volkmar Kehrein, Reinhard von der Lühe, and Volker Kobelt. In the chapter’s last sections I will examine the work of the DED and the successful, though long-delayed, completion of the Haho River bridge and the cisterns.

The Villages

Agou, consisting of two sub-villages, Nyongbo (or Dalavé) and Agbétiko, lay on the western slope of Mount Agou, in the district of Klouto in the Region of Plateaus.\(^{311}\) They were one hundred fifteen kilometers northwest of the coastal capital of Lomé and twelve kilometers from the district capital of Palimé.\(^{312}\) Their populations in the 1960s were about one thousand and twelve hundred, respectively, and belonged mostly to the...


Ewe ethnic group. When the project began, one could reach Agou only over unimproved roads that required an off-road vehicle during the rainy season. The nearest train station and post office with long-distance telephone service lay six kilometers away.

Agou made its living from shifting slash-and-burn agriculture in a zone of forested savanna with several riverbeds that had water only during rainy season. As tropical agricultural expert Ehrenfried Zillich observed in May 1963, villagers burned off the ground once a year, felled trees and removed the roots with hoes, and then laid in intercropped manioc, yams, white maize, and cotton, using beans and peanuts to increase the soil’s humus content. Zillich seems to have disliked the local practice of burning rather than composting the roots, perhaps unaware that ashes could fertilize the soil. Kabrés from northern Togo also cultivated dry maize. In some cases the villagers resorted to cultivation in what Zillich called a “purely acquisitory [aneignenden] economic form,” harvesting only crops that reproduced themselves, a method that would have minimized labor requirements. In 1964 Schnellbach reported a gender division of labor in field work, with men opening up holes for planting and women depositing seed. Rather than look for a larger social context, he chalked the practice up to “old heathen fertility magic,” failing to consider that in such a case women should perhaps be opening the holes and men depositing the seed. There were approximately two dozen part-time

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craftsmen: masons, smiths, carpenters, metalworkers (Schlosser), and weavers. For export the villagers cultivated coffee and cocoa.\(^{317}\) According to scholar E. Konu, investigating the project in the late 1960s, the village economy had declined for at least three reasons. Coffee and cocoa prices were declining, and coffee had dropped so far since 1958 that it took several hectares to earn what one hectare used to. Cocoa was suffering from swollen shoot disease. Finally, home production of soap by women was disappearing as foreign imports poured into Togo. So for all its remoteness, Agou was prey to fluctuations in global markets.\(^{318}\) In 1990 another scholar observed a clear class distinction between Ewe and Kabré, with the one constituting the majority of landowners and the other a majority of tenants.\(^{319}\) This remark came a generation later, but perhaps reflected the situation as the Germans had found it.

Nuatja, also known as Notsé or Notsie, was also located in the Region of Plateaus about a hundred kilometers north of Lomé.\(^{320}\) Dr. Schnellbach characterized Nuatja as “not a cohesive settlement,” but a cluster of seven villages grouped around churches, schools, and a hospital. One of them, Agbalebemé, was the home of a male work group, one hundred fifty strong, with experience in street and building construction and maintenance and able to supply the mayor with twenty workers a day. The area around Nuatja was flat, the soil good and largely stone-free. Unfortunately, pests consumed


\(^{318}\) Konu, 9-12.


stored maize, up to forty or fifty percent within three months.\footnote{Report of Schnellbach, Lähne, Joseph, Hofmeier, Kehrein, Zillich, April 15, 1965, April 15, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111; Report of Dr. Schnellbach, von der Decken, Hofmeier, Zillich, Lähne, Joseph, Kehrein, and Rinsche, December 31, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111.} Nuatja was not merely an Ewe village, but in origin the Ewe village, the birthplace of the entire ethnic group. Probably founded during the sixteenth century, its population—according to legend—fled in three different directions from the tyrannical rule of King Agokoli I. Some settled at Peki. By the mid-twentieth century, Nuatja was suffering a severe chronic water shortage due to drought and overuse of local water holes; it lasted until the government installed a new dam and filtration plant in 1978. Until then, approximately seventy-five percent of the population suffered from guinea worm, a parasite picked up by drinking contaminated standing water. In 1970 the village contained 7,605 residents.\footnote{Vernay Mitchell-McKnight, “Notsie: Ancestral Enclave of the Ewe People,” ed. Benjamin Lawrance, A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 66-72.}

Unknown to the West Germans, and perhaps to their contacts in the village too, Germany had already run an unsuccessful development project in Nuatja before World War I. In 1904, and in cooperation with agents from the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, they opened a school for training young farmers in growing cotton as a monocrop; most students were conscripted rather than volunteers. Graduates received as gifts a plow, a bush knife, a hoe, and a spade and were assigned to new settlements; they performed poorly and often ran away. The school’s effect on cotton production was nil. After an unfavorable report form African-American John Booth, the Germans converted the school into a research station in 1911. As if in advanced refutation of the modernization Schnellbach would attempt, Booth praised the existing method of intercropping with hoes
and criticized the attempt to introduce European-style monocropping with plows as impractical.  

Kambolé (today referred to as Kaboli) lay in Sokodé District of the Central Region near the border with Dahomey, four hundred thirty-five kilometers by road from Lomé and seventy-six kilometers (or eighty-six, according to Dr. Schnellbach) east of the regional capital of Sokodé, so it was far north of the other two villages.  

West German estimates of the population varied wildly, strongly suggesting a lack of interest in understanding the community: three thousand in 1968, one thousand in 1969, two thousand eight hundred and sixty-two in 1969, seven thousand in 1972, and five thousand (Dr. Volker Kobelt in 1976).  

The telephone line between Sokodé and Kambolé almost never worked, and most postal transactions, such as registered letters, required a trip to Sokodé.  

As late as 1976 there was electricity only for a saw mill and the project headquarters.  

Yet the village was not entirely isolated. In 1968 it had a primary school, a Catholic church with an elderly French priest, and a dispensary. There was a weekly local market with one hundred fifty to two hundred sellers, and much of the population worked outside the region.  

The hilly landscape around Kambolé consisted of tree savannah, “partly forest, individual groups of trees, and always and everywhere man-high bush grass.”  

In between lay cultivated fields. A DED volunteer remarked that

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323 Norris, 145-151. See also Zimmerman, 153-72.  
327 Dr. Volker Kobelt, BfE, Concluding Report, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.  
the dry season, from November to April, produced heat, dust and frequent bush fires that burned out “huge areas.”329 The rainy season was from May to October.330 According to Dr. Schnellbach, few could read or write, or speak French. He complained that all explanations had to be translated twice, into Fon and then Ana, allowing great potential for misunderstandings.331 Unremarked by the Germans, the land tenure system involved allocation of parcels by the village chief rather than individual sale or purchase. Anyone might get a parcel, but descendants of the village’s legendary founder, a hunter named Odéamoun, were entitled to enhanced rights.332

**Origin and Concept of the Project**

The Togo Model Villages project began as a central government initiative, but in the West Germans’ mind it became a rare example of development aid from the bottom up (“von unten her”).333 Its author was Otto Schnellbach, engineer for land machines. An agricultural expert whose career extended back to the Third Reich, Dr. Schnellbach arrived in Lomé under contract with the Federal Republic to help the new Togolese government plan its economic development.334 Despite his vision of bottom-up development, inspired by the rhetoric of community development, Schnellbach planned the project in Lomé rather than in discussions with the villagers.335 In his first report to

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330 Dr. Volker Kobelt, BfE, Concluding Report, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
333 Dr. Henske, BMWi, Memorandum on the Erection of Three Model Villages (Schnellbach Plan), September 9, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
President Olympio, Schnellbach proposed designating three model villages, yet to be determined, in which to promote “agriculture, domestic economy, village crafts and small industry through peasant self-help on a cooperative basis.” At the end of May 1962 Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid approved an initial appropriation of DM nine hundred seventy thousand without knowing where the villages would be. Schnellbach then identified Agou-Nyongbo, Nuatja, and Kambolé as his targets, because “the chiefs have manifested the intention of developing thanks to the proper efforts of the population.” In fact, as to the first two, the chiefs had begun by turning to Pastor Erich Viering of the Bremer Mission, who was already acquainted with Schnellbach. As model villages, Agou, Nuatja and Kambolé would inspire others to imitation. Hans von der Decken, Schnellbach’s successor, wrote in 1966 that the ultimate sense of West Germany’s work was “fertilizing” other villages by becoming “centers of stimulation” through advice, research and reciprocal support for the good of all.

Once the Germans had started work, Schnellbach asked for two add-on projects. One was a new bridge, which he had already suggested in June 1962 because he believed Nuatja’s residents needed it to cultivate fallow land on the other side of the Haho River. Vice-President Antoine Meatchi made the request official on August 2, 1963.

336 Dr. Erdmann, Referat V C 6, BMWi to Referate 801, 418, Foreign Office, May 14, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4111. Schnellbach’s report is not in the model villages files.
338 Dr. Otto Schnellbach, Villages-Pilotes Au Togo, June 1962, BArchiv B 213/4111. The document is in French.
339 Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, 418.
The other was a cluster of cisterns, which Togo badly needed to relieve its water shortage. Schnellbach contemplated fifty with a capacity of one thousand liters, enough to serve as a model for the Togolese to build others. President Grunitzky raised the total to seventy-five. Ignoring Grunitzky’s request, the BMZ, BMWi, BML and Ministry of Labor (BMA) suggested reducing Schnellbach’s fifty to fifteen—five per village—with others to follow later. The Health Ministry (BMGes) would supervise construction. The Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid approved the cisterns on this basis on December 4, 1963.

For the model villages, Dr. Schnellbach foresaw a great leap forward with the aid of mechanization, experimentation, and cooperation. The West Germans would show the Togolese how heavy tractors could clear new land, and how new plant varieties and better soil preparation could increase yields. Harvested crops could be more easily processed with maize mills and coffee huskers (décortiqueurs). Machines would also ease the work of carpenters, weavers, makers of pots and pans, and wives. In the last case, small hand equipment would help women find a better balance between housework and commercial production. The project would require new buildings, such as a central storehouse to hold the new tools and equipment, and brick presses and block-making machines for new houses. Everything would have to be imported and a special fund set

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342 Vice-President A. Meatchi to Ambassador, August 2, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111; IRA Session on September 18, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
344 President Grunitzky to Embassy in Lomé, August 24, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111; N. Grunitzky, President of the Republic of Togo to Embassy in Lomé, September 6, 1963, PAAA B 68/176.
345 Dr. Henske, BMWi, Memorandum on the Erection of Three Model Villages (Schnellbach Plan), September 9, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
up for the first two years. In addition, the project would provide each village with carpentry, repair, and weavers’ shops as well as storage facilities. The DED would have a strong presence. In June 1965 a project proposal listed three farmers, three mechanics, four merchants, two carpenters, two gardeners, and one mason—fifteen volunteers.

**Agou and Nuatja – Founding the Co-ops**

West German funds and expertise would reach villagers through cooperatives under leaders of their own choosing. Schnellbach does not seem to have sketched out details in 1962, but by 1963, he decided upon producer cooperatives. After West German machinery cleared the land, cooperative members would perform “self-help” by working it in common without pay until the first harvests came in and they could share in the new revenues. These cooperatives would also mix husbandry with craft industry, and the carpenters, mechanics, and weavers would likewise work without pay. Schnellbach and his colleagues admitted that while Togo had a history of cooperatives, the idea of mixing peasants and craftsmen in a single organization was new. It was to be an experiment. Ironically, as German project critics were to note later, his co-ops resembled Communist East Germany’s compulsory rural production co-ops, the *Landesproduktionsgenossenschaften* (LPGs).

Perhaps Schnellbach drew inspiration from the idea that had circulated among anthropologists and ethnologists since the 1930s that African societies

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347 Dr. Otto Schnellbach, Villages-Pilotes Au Togo, June 1962, BArchiv B 213/4111.
349 Em, DED, Project Submission, June 21, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111. See also Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 9, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4110.
already had traditions of reciprocal aid and communal self-help with voluntary labor, though damaged by colonial rule. In this view the co-operatives that German experts like Schnellbach promoted meant not an innovation but a recovery of these “good” traditions for the purpose of mobilizing labor.\(^{352}\)

It took more than two years for the West Germans to get Agou’s cooperative established. The first assembly of elders met in early 1963, with one representative from each of ten parts of the village, to discuss bylaws and submit them to the central government for review.\(^{353}\) At about the same time the West Germans established bookkeeping for the cooperative-to-be, recording work carried out, days worked by each member, and shop repairs billed to non-members.\(^{354}\) Yet in April 1964 leading villagers still were not ready, and more education, perhaps with a change of personnel, was needed.\(^{355}\) At last in mid-November Schnellbach reported a successful assembly. The West Germans explained the cooperative concept and Togolese officials explained the legal requirements and model statutes. Seventy-six members put up twelve candidates for the seven-member administrative council, which they chose in a secret, written ballot.\(^{356}\) As Dr. Schnellbach later admitted, this process was difficult in a community with many illiterate members.\(^{357}\) The council would then select a president and vice-


\(^{357}\) Report of Dr.-Ing. Otto Schnellbach, August 8, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112. This 143-page document is a rich source of project history and his own prejudices about Africans, but where possible I have tried to rely on his contemporaneous writings rather than this his final report.
president from among themselves. By February 1965, the council approved bylaws and hired a business manager, a bookkeeper, and a stores supervisor. The General Assembly made decisions about cultivation, crop sales and work in the shops while the Germans only advised, or so Schnellbach said.

Schnellbach gave less information about the startup of the Nuatja cooperatives. He pronounced Nuatja’s chief as very helpful in making land available, recruiting members, and serving as both chair and business manager, but unhelpful in failing to behave as an officer with duties to the members rather than as the sole administrator of an economic enterprise. The West Germans had him replaced at a general assembly by a temporary administrative council, which elected teacher Dominique Agbahay as chair and a Mr. Wéti as bookkeeper after he had served a six-month internship with a small cooperative in southern Germany.

To the West Germans, the projects seemed to be going well. In 1964 GAWI told the BAW that the project “apparently is running really very satisfactorily,” and in 1965 it wrote the BMZ that the villages “belong to the really successful development projects.”

Ambassador Seeliger was quite enthusiastic in March 1965 when he counted the model villages among “the most successful projects that we have running in Togo.” Even if there were problems during a long startup period, which he blamed on the

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“faulty comprehension of the Togolese cooperative members,” it still amounted to a “remarkable success.” They were wrong.

**Agou and Nuatja – Agriculture**

Agriculture was to be the centerpiece of the cooperatives in both Agou and Nuatja. In Agou the team had to begin by clearing and planting land that was uncomfortably far from the village, because the villagers were reluctant to donate anything close by. Schnellbach’s team claimed to have overcome this difficulty by the end of 1963. Thirty-five hectares were cleared by 1964. The team supervised the planting of crops it knew the villagers to be familiar with—rice, maize, and manioc. It also tried out artificial fertilizers and different intervals between maize plants. It tried other crops: yams, cotton, beans, and peanuts. Schnellbach’s team also set up an “experimental garden” of fifteen hundred square meters, eventually three hectares, for trials with maize, sugar cane and yams. Nuatja had seventy hectares by April 1965, planted with maize, rice, peanuts, beans and cotton. The Germans made up for the lack of intercropping by applying pesticides, though of course this method also required manual or machine labor and cost money.

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Schnellbach and his team aimed to change Togolese motivations and practices. Zillich wrote that “by and by the labor ethos must be raised and the best cultivation methods formed and demonstrated, especially through comparative trials.” They worked hard to persuade villagers in Agou and Nuatja to plant co-op fields in rows for better yields rather than intercrop, and claimed some success. The goal was to expand production beyond subsistence to a marketable surplus. This process would include activating the reserves of unused land and of what Dr. Schnellbach called “disguised unemployment.” In 1965 the West Germans also tried to limit post-harvest maize losses by promoting wooden and mesh silos with corrugated metal roofs. These silos permitted losses to pests of only three to four percent after three months rather than the fifty percent typical of native storage. Better yet, they could be made with local materials and tools. At the end of December, he changed these figures to five and forty percent, still a healthy improvement.

Unfortunately, agriculture failed to pay its way, even after several years of effort. 1964 was a bad year for Togo, because the second rainy season came later or not at all. Yields were miserably low. Rains came late in 1965 too, and then excessively so that tractors sank into the soft soil. In the spring of 1966, von der Decken listed nine items problems with agriculture: an unfavorable location, unclear property relations,
excessively high costs for clearing land, wrong farm size, a “difficult” cost-to-income ratio, lack of capital, lack of a proper farm manager, business management “insufficiencies,” and “socio-cultural” reasons.\textsuperscript{377} As we shall see shortly, the last two items were an allusion to the project’s problems with labor control and corruption. In late 1967, Dr. Theierl, head of the BMZ’s West Africa \textit{Referat}, would fault the qualifications of several experts, without giving any details, and Schnellbach’s failure to investigate the profitability of using land machines or the prospects of marketing the co-ops’ produce. Labor, however, was the number one problem.\textsuperscript{378}

\textbf{Agou and Nuatja – The Shops}

With one exception, the shops in both villages were as unprofitable as the agriculture. The weaver’s shops each took more than a year to get going, and neither got very far. In Agou the project team first reported two weaving chairs in operation on April 15, 1964 and looked forward to the shop exerting an “aura” on surrounding villages.\textsuperscript{379} Yet in his final report of August 1966, Schnellbach wrote of shutting down the operation and giving away the chairs.\textsuperscript{380} The shops’ equipment appeared so antiquated to Dr. von der Decken that he likened it to that of the Silesian weavers in the early nineteenth century. Cloth was therefore too low in quality and too high in price. At the same time there was competition from Japan, India and France. He called the shops a “stillborn child,” where earnings were so low—only one thousand CFA or one hundred forty-four DM over seven months--the four weavers could “neither live nor die.”\textsuperscript{381} In

\textsuperscript{377} ORR Dr. Theierl to GAWI, May 20, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112; Hans von der Decken to BMZ, June 10, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{378} RegDir Dr. Theierl to UAL I A, AL I, State Secretary, BMZ, October 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{381} Third Quarterly Report of Dr. Hans von der Decken, October 8, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
Nuatja, DED worker Käthe Erzig (later Hoffmann) kept the shop alive into 1968. For the first half of 1967, she managed the tiny profit of 15,875 CFA or two hundred-seventy DM.\footnote{Situation and Activity Report of Ing. Gerd Hofmeier, July 21, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4113.} Here too the BMZ decided to shut down the shop and parcel out the chairs. The building would then house a cultural center.\footnote{Third Quarterly Report of Dr. Hans von der Decken, October 8, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.} The mechanic’s shops in Agou and Nuatja remained subordinate to the project rather than becoming independent businesses. In Agou two-thirds of repairs were done for the project and only one-third for outside orders.\footnote{Report of Schnellbach, von der Decken, Hofmeier, Zillich, Lähne, Kehrein, Burchard, Rinsche, December 31, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111.} Some of the project repairs were at a loss to the shop, because the agricultural operation could not “produce a penny for repairs” of its tractors, as Dr. von der Decken pointed out.\footnote{Third Quarterly Report of Dr. Fritz Stangen, BMZ, June 30, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.} Nuatja’s carpentry shop did not work out either. Traveling BMZ expert Fritz Stangen considered it a “hopeless enterprise,” and recommended sending its machines to another project.\footnote{Fritz Simbriger, Report on Inspection of Project FE 344, undated but under GAWI cover letter of August 18, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.} Nearby villages could supply furniture and other wood items at one-third the price.\footnote{Travel Report of Dr. Fritz Stangen, BMZ, June 30, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.} Dr. Theierl confirmed the closure in late 1967.\footnote{MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to BAW, November 27, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.}

The exception was Agou’s carpentry shop, in operation from April 1964, under management of Heinz Lähne.\footnote{Fourth Report of Hofmeier, Lähne, Schnellbach, Zillich, mid-April 1964, BArchiv B 213/4111.} The equipment there included a separating saw to cut planks and boards, a circular saw, a band saw, a planer, and a polishing machine for sharpening saw blades.\footnote{Hofmeier, Lähne, Schnellbach, Zillich, Help Through Self-Help - An Experiment in Peasant Self-Help as Development Task in Togo, Easter Day (March 29), 1964, BArchiv B 213/4111.} The most critical problem was getting enough large-scale orders to make those machines profitable. The first big customer was the North German or Bremer Mission, planning to build a one hundred twenty bed hospital in Agou. The
Mission’s order included all wooden items, from the roof to interior furnishings. The following year the team listed several other customers, including the Cogho development project in Avétonou, a Protestant high school in Palimé, the Bremer Mission’s agricultural center on the Plateaux de Daye, and a school for the Goethe Institute in Agou-Nyongbo. Products included doors, windows, beds, tables, wardrobes, and school benches. In 1967 the shop received its first large order from a construction company, the Travaux Afriques Company. Just one order of that size per year, which would use thirty-three percent of the shop’s capacity, would make it profitable. Of course the shop had some problems. Because Agou had no connection to an electrical grid, the shop depended on a generator, which sometimes broke down, as from September to December 1965, when the nearest electrician was in Lomé. Von der Decken had to buy a used generator in Lomé; two new ones sat in their containers in Nuatja and Kambolé, but those villages would not let them go. Still, the shop turned a profit estimated variously at fourteen thousand or thirty thousand DM.

The Agou carpentry shop came with a saw mill to provide it with raw material. Some of the mill’s timber came from the project’s land clearance, and the rest from the

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396 Travel Report of MinRat Dr. Theierl, Ref I A 6, BMZ, March 29, 1968, PAAA B 68/266; Wolfgang Buch, Afrika-Verein, Observation Report for Agou, June 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
Bremer Mission, or from state forests. Unlike the carpentry shop, the Agou mill was able to undercut small producers on price. Lähne reported that he could offer cut wood cheaper by 3000 CFA—at what volume he did not say—than wood traders in Lomé. The West Germans were also delivering lumber to buyers outside the project as well as to the carpentry shop, although their reports do not say who was buying. By the time the West Germans left the Agou project, they had to introduce a two to four-week delivery time, because the saw mill was overburdened with orders.

**Agou and Nuatja – Labor Management, Cooperation, and the Colonial Gaze**

Rainfall and market imponderables aside, the project really ran aground on the problems of managing labor and cooperative affairs. The West Germans were not supposed to engage in either the management of labor or the co-op, even though they were providing equipment and funds, but as some Togolese evaded work requirements, complained or abused authority as co-op leaders, the West Germans asserted de facto supervisory authority. Unable master the situation, they resorted to blaming the beneficiaries for presumed lack of virtues as seen through the colonial gaze. Ultimately, however, they had no choice but to question their own project design and management as well.

The problems grew out of the substantial burden that Schnellbach’s production cooperation imposed on the villagers. In Agou, as of early 1963, between twenty and fifty men and women showed up every day and worked without pay. The West Germans kept a work card for every craftsman and field worker, noting his or her time for later

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398 Lähne to GAWI, October 1, 1970, BArchiv B 213/11895.
compensation out of co-op receipts. The villages of Agou donated unpaid labor from 1963 to 1964 and in 1964 Nuatja donated six months. In the West German view, the villagers were owners, not employees, of their cooperative. As von der Decken wrote in June 1966, a co-op could not “pay” its members, but only distribute profits. If there were none, the co-op would have to go bankrupt like any other business. Then there was a matter of instilling the proper spirit of entrepreneurship and collective effort; as Ehrenfried Zillich later wrote, the team wanted villagers to work without pay, believing that convictions, certain sacrifices and pride were more effective incentives.

This system of deferred compensation began falling apart in less a year. In September 1963 a BMWi official wrote that the project must begin paying Agou’s craftsmen, whose “work zeal” had declined and who needed money now for their most urgent obligations, including taxes. West Germany would fund wage payments on condition that the co-op later set aside an equivalent amount for equipment purchases. Schnellbach welcomed the news, but rather than set wages himself, he allowed the co-op to decide how much to borrow and what to pay, as a way of learning to bear responsibility. From January 1964, the FRG was also paying “monthly wages” to the (male) peasants. They had to survive, and time they spent cultivating the co-op fields was time that they could not spend on their own. Rather than admit that these payments were wages, Schnellbach called them an “advance” against members’ earnings due at the

402 Dr. H.v.d. Decken to BMZ, June 10, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4111.
404 Memorandum of Dr. Henske, BMWi, September 9, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
end of the year. He admitted that to Germans they might look like “lost subsidies,” but he glided over the possibility that these “advances” might never be repaid.406

The West German approach produced another problem; the experts appeared to be in charge rather than the Togolese, and to some extent they were. Schnellbach’s reports emphasized over and over again that he and his colleagues were merely advisers and that it was up to co-op members and leaders to take charge. The team must “guard against the mistake of taking management into our hands and simply ordering what must be done.”407 Yet frustration at apparent lack of progress or even effort led them to repeatedly exceed their station and become managers. As we just saw, they secured the deposition of Nuatja’s chief as head of the co-op. They interfered in planning; Schnellbach later wrote that “The first plans of the Africans were very vague and we had to change them first into the form of a development project. But we remain always in the background and guide the Africans carefully, to always give them the feeling: this is our plan and our task.”408 They exerted power over the villagers; in 1965 Zillich boasted that “we do not have to exercise compulsion on work attitudes, as in the beginning. The members appear in general regularly and punctually at the beginning of work.”409 (emphasis added) Here Zillich looked back with nostalgia toward colonial-era forced labor. The Germans also nagged; in Agou Zillich and Gerd Hofmeier held an assembly with Pastor Viering at which they exhorted the members to take pride in themselves,

think ahead, work hard and change their attitude. In the words of Victorial Bernal, writing on the Gezira irrigation scheme in British Sudan, the West Germans were trying to impose a “colonial moral economy” in which they could distinguish themselves from the Togolese through tropes of “rationality and calculation.”

Rather than meekly fall in with German directives, the Togolese resisted with impertinent questions, comparisons, arguments, and refusals. In 1963, before the West Germans began issuing “advances,” Agou villagers asked why they were not receiving money. After the “advances” began flowing, they pointed out that workers received better pay from the Bremer Mission projects in both villages and from a nearby official West German project for an animal breeding and cultivation institute. When the Germans demanded that villagers build houses for them, the villagers balked despite the promise that the houses would eventually become co-op property. The Togolese complained about the project’s direction and stood up to nagging from Zillich and Hofmeier for more unpaid labor, with results not at all favorable for the two Germans. As GAWI recorded in 1966, “The members expressed their impatience with developments up to now, which then led again to impatient utterances by Messrs. Zillich and Hofmeier, so that both were practically persona non grata for a while in the villages of Nuatja and Agou. Even Mr. Schnellbach had to take account of this fact and to quiet

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411 Bernal, 448.
the village elders forbid Mr. Zillich to visit the villages for a while."

Shop workers failed to show, especially if they knew there was a big order to fill. Like the washermen of Natal and the workers of Mombasa, they knew how to leverage an employer’s desperation into concessions. In March 1966 von der Decken reported threats of strikes and accusations of “hunger wages” and “colonialism in refined form.”

Four months later he had serious trouble with three apprentices—farmer Simon Wetí, mechanic Koffí Vincent, and weaver Samuel Agbeno—who had received special training in Germany and on their return demanded far higher wages than he felt the co-op could afford to pay. In August angry villagers held a demonstration in front of von der Decken’s house, lamenting years of unpaid or minimally paid labor. GAWI learned an additional reason for Agou villagers’ reluctance to work the land; before the project began they had hired Kabré migrant workers from northern Togo to do it for them, in exchange for room, board, and a share of the harvest.

Agou villagers working with the project may also have engaged in sabotage. According to Schnellbach, a driver damaged the Volkswagen Kombi in two trips, putting it out of use for weeks. The storage administrator forgot to shake a canister of benzene-oil mixture into a small generator, so that the generator received only pure gasoline and the pistons froze. Some unknown person ruined a small maize scrap mill motor. The

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415 Memorandum of GAWI-Frankfurt am Main, July 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
tractor driver broke an axle on a tree and in a separate incident engaged a differential lock and broke the transmission shaft. Schnellbach’s own driver overheated the car engine by failing to shift it back while driving in the mountains, in spite of repeated instructions. In the latter two cases, Schnellbach blamed the men’s religious belief that vehicles had minds of their own and should be expected to counteract human mistakes, but he ignored the possibility of intentional breakage.422

Rather than questioning cooperative production and reconciling themselves to a supervisory rather than purely advisory role, the West Germans fell back upon their racially-tinged colonial gaze. Like development officials and experts the world over, most West Germans saw African beneficiaries (and Schnellbach’s team usually referred to them as “Africans” rather than Togolese) as junior rather than equal partners, as pupils rather than colleagues or clients. “Africans,” the Germans assumed, had so much to learn and they often failed to do so even after German instruction. In Togo the project team wrote, “We must lead the Africans so that they make their own decisions, so that they learn to plan and forecast, and that they are clear about the costs and benefits of every work.”423 In 1965, Schnellbach foresaw that this task would take another two to three years.424 In 1967 “Africans,” he said, still understood the difference between private enterprise and state projects only with difficulty.425 He and his teammates catalogued a litany of complaints about “Africans.” “Africans” needed to learn a proper work ethic.

424 Dr. Ing. Otto Schnellbach to Mr Dr. Erichmann, BMWi, June 18, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111.
They must understand only persistent work brought success.\textsuperscript{426} They must learn the virtues of punctuality, ordered life, community consciousness—“all work for the future of their village.”\textsuperscript{427} This last item echoed, no doubt unintentionally, the old Nazi slogan, “Common interest comes before self-interest” (\textit{Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz}), but it glossed over the project’s failure to satisfy the villagers’ \textit{individual} interests.\textsuperscript{428} “Africans” were also untidy; after having racks installed to store tools neatly, the team called them “a completely unusual arrangement for African conditions, because until now all tools were simply thrown into a heap.”\textsuperscript{429} “Africans” had to learn to do their jobs well. Early in 1964 the team wrote that it was keeping the office staff low to show “the Africans” the “difference between productive and unproductive work.” They needed to hear “again and again” that economic success, not mere presence at work, would give the cooperative resources to pay wages.\textsuperscript{430} In his final report Schnellbach wrote, “We must educate the Africans to the insight that not presence at work but rather the performance is paid for,” one of many recurrences in project reports of the the colonial “education into work” motif.\textsuperscript{431}

Germans complained repeatedly that the “Africans” were also unable to think far ahead. After noting they had explained to villagers that the work would eventually pay off, Zillich and Hofmeier added “For the presentist [\textit{gegenwartsnahe}] thinking of the Africans that was naturally not easy to understand, for the African person is not used to

\textsuperscript{427} Dr.-Ing. Otto Schnellbach, Application for Engagement of Development Helpers by DED, November 1964, DED TOG 01 - 04 64 65.
\textsuperscript{430} Fourth Report of Hofmeier, Lähne, Schnellbach, Zillich, April 15, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4111.
planning in advance, he lives in the present.”432 In his final report Schnellbach wrote that “As present-minded people they see only the effort expected of them today without counter-performance. The future doesn’t interest them.” As we saw in the last chapter, he blamed this supposed mindset on the year-round ease of getting food.433 In 1967 he claimed again “The African knows no looking ahead, but rather the things only of momentary advantage.”434 That Europeans might also refuse to work many months without remuneration did not occur to the Germans. As development experts, they received salaries.435

Schnellbach and his workers had company in their assessment of the villagers’ attitude toward labor. Togo’s Ministry of Finance and Planning looked forward to “a progressive evolution as much of mentalities as of behavioral habit to bring the Togolese peasant to elevate his level of life by proper work.”436 In 1968, Dr. Theierl wrote that “the African,” unlike “the” European failed to feel the proper satisfaction in work for its own sake. “He does not seek self-affirmation in keeping to a certain level of work, but in the etiquette accompanying work (e.g. white coat, desk, telephone, etc.) and in reaching a status that spares him certain labor.”437

435 See, e.g. Extract from GAWI Activity Report, August 31, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111, which gives a contract expiration date and salary grade (E-Gruppe) for Ehrenfried Zillich.
436 Togo Ministry of Finance and Planning, Memorandum on the Development Project of Village Communities Having For Its Objective of Helping the Populations to Help Themselves, April 16, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4111.
437 Report on Trip to Senegal and Togo, MinRat Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, March 29, 1968, PAAA B 68/266.
In his time as project manager Dr. von der Decken voiced the same views as Schnellbach, though in a much more irritable tone. In his first independent report he wrote that “the African” preferred mere subsistence to surplus and leisure to “earning through work.” He added “This and other properties distinguish him from the European.” “Africans” rarely displayed “responsible and risk-taking entrepreneurship.” He accused all “Africans” of the “inability to distinguish between labor and achievement, meaning the mistaken belief that labor has a claim on wages.”

Agou suffered from a “collective lack of responsibility.” The “lazy and unwilling to work” were allowed to remain as full members and absenteeism was covered up by false attendance lists. When “our gentlemen” objected, the residents accused them of “interference, discrimination, etc.” Of course, the villagers, in von der Decken’s view, welcomed “interference” in the form of donated equipment and wages while still complaining that those wages were too low. Unfortunately, the Germans had put themselves in a position to be pressured by paying supposedly “transitional” wages in the first place. Africans had, he complained, a “sixth sense” for raising such pressure, which von der Decken characterized as “thumbscrews.” Education (“public relations work”) was necessary to make the Togolese understand that model villages required time and effort.

He wanted “Prussian order,” “Prussian bureaucratic honesty,” and “Prussian work maxims.”

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439 Dr. H.v.d. Decken to BMZ, June 10, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4111.
Yet von der Decken was more willing than Schnellbach to have West Germans share the blame. They had not proved that modern methods could produce a higher yield or earn a profit. Under these circumstances “African” reluctance to change was quite rational. “With justification he sticks to his centuries-old production methods, because his subsistence economy allows him no experiments and no special risks,” apparently referring to extensive cultivation and intercropping. The West Germans still had to work out “improved crop rotation, optimal sowing times and new seeds, raising of area productivity and labor productivity.” He also admitted that co-op members felt cheated. After clearing land and erecting buildings “with burning zeal” in the project’s early days without pay, they did not reap the promised profits did not appear. The West Germans had also erred, he said, in allowing themselves to become de facto employers rather than advisers. Furthermore, no one should demand gratis labor “ad infinitum,” but only in limited quantity for a limited time and for a visible improvement, such as a cistern or well. Otherwise it could (and did) become a “dangerous boomerang” against the employer.

Other West Germans were willing to look somewhat beyond their own prejudices for underlying causes. In 1968 Wolfgang Buch of the Africa Association identified the early period of unpaid labor as the “germ of later spreading discontent.” He rejected the team’s claims that the villagers were gaining “insight” into the project’s goals. “[O]bviously,” he wrote, “one had taken too seriously the declared readiness of the Africans, before the project’s beginning, for cost-free labor, because about its extent they

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certainly had no idea.” The better workers dropped out first, because they could earn more elsewhere, so that nonpayment produced a “negative selection.” Appeals to work for the greater good of Togo were useless and, as Buch added darkly, all means of coercion, whether by nature or by the government, were lacking. Like Zillich, he seemed to think that forced labor might have been in order here, bearing out Büschel’s thesis that “help toward self-help” could eventually lead to state-sanctioned violence.

Adding to their labor headaches, the West Germans also objected to Togolese management of the cooperatives. They wearied of the local custom of seeking consensus in hours-long “palavers” rather than taking votes and following the majority decision. Discussion involving the Germans also required translation between French and Ewe or Kotokoli. Schnellbach complained that the meetings required “unending patience.” Here he and the other Germans failed to appreciate that the co-op members, who would be living in the village long after the Germans left, may have put a higher priority on maintaining good relations with each other than on making a speedy decision that might produce lingering resentment among those in the minority on a given issue.

A more serious German accusation was the practice of embezzlement and improvidence among the Togolese. According to Schnellbach’s final report, the Nuatja chief deposed as co-op chair had misused funds by paying advances of eleven months against prospective yields. The chief had also granted long-term credits at the repair shop to contract haulers without fixing payment deadlines or checking creditworthiness.

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Schnellbach blamed either stupidity or a desire to procure influence.\textsuperscript{447} He and master carpenter Joseph in Nuatja received blame of their own from Buch for their “boundless trust” in the Togolese.\textsuperscript{448} Von der Decken, without naming names, complained about the “‘reach into the cash box’ according to good old African tradition, to which admittedly the way was made easy by us.”\textsuperscript{449} In July 1967 Gerd Hofmeier predicted of Nuatja that

> Because money management by Africans according to commercial, real criteria is almost never possible, money will be privately squandered, as has already happened. In spite of everything the Africans want to prove that they can carry out everything easier and better without ‘whites.’ Unfortunately that is, as is already obvious after 3 weeks of self-management, a fallacy of the Africans.\textsuperscript{450}

One or both co-ops wanted control of West German funds, according to von der Decken, who wrote they sought money rather than tractors and wanted to distribute it themselves rather than “you whites” doing it. Rather than set aside money to maintain a new mill, they wanted to spend it immediately. They believed that whenever the mill was used up, GAWI—which von der Decken sarcastically referred to here as “Père Noël” (Father Christmas)—would ship another.\textsuperscript{451} Finally, the co-ops carried too much overhead. Their administrators, including presidents and directors, received salaries, laying an “unbearable burden” on organizations already unable to cover their costs.\textsuperscript{452} According to BMZ investigator Fritz Stangen in the spring of 1967, co-op members were more interested in finding places for relatives than in running efficient organizations.\textsuperscript{453}

\textsuperscript{449} Hans von der Decken to BMZ, February 14, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{451} Hans von der Decken, Twelve-Point Program for FE 344 – Three Model Villages, December 31, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4113.
\textsuperscript{452} Memorandum of GAWI, July 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{453} Travel Report of Dr. Fritz Stangen, BMZ, June 30, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
Without having the Nuatjan side of events or access to the account books, it is difficult to know how seriously to take these accusations. Whatever happened, these Germans were already primed by their prejudices about Africans lacking punctuality, foresight, and diligence to expect the worst of co-op officers and members. Contrary to the assertions of von der Decken and Hofmeier, of course, there has never been anything specifically “African” about embezzlement or any evidence that “Africans” as such lacked money management skills—consider the cocoa farmers of Ghana or the many West African women engaged in independent trade, as we will see in Biriwa. If in fact the chief of Nuatja or other co-op members manipulated funds in the way the Germans claimed, these Togolese may have seen nothing wrong; after all, the Germans had brought the money for the good of the village. They knew its needs best, and the co-op was merely an invention of the Germans.

**Agou and Nuatja – Other Difficulties**

Besides labor and co-op problems, the project faced challenges of weather, housing, terrain and cash flow. The weather, combined with poor workmanship, destroyed buildings that Dr. Schnellbach was very proud of. He did without an architect, merely telling “African” masons what sizes he wanted and letting them work with their own methods and materials, namely cinder blocks made of cement and sand, and corrugated metal as roofing. He made an exception for the roof frame, using nailed planks to save wood—a method he said was “wholly unknown” to the “Africans.” He had suffered criticism for presenting buildings that were not “worthy of the German name,” but he preferred structures that other villages could imitate to any “decorative
Yet if other villages were paying attention, they would have avoided his techniques. In Nuatja the left wing of the hall for the saw mill and carpentry shop was nearly destroyed by the wind in late 1965. As Dr. Schnellbach wrote, “The storm had blown down the roof together with the pillars, partly down to the foundation. The whole work of months was lost.” He added that “The Nuatja region is infamous for heavy whirlwinds.” Twice more the roofs of the mechanic’s shop and the “provisionally housed” carpentry shop were torn away. The roofs in Agou flew away in February 1967 on the west and east side of the main building, just one day before a visit by two GAWI officials. A former West German government master builder complained that in the two villages “even the most primitive rules of architecture [Baukunst] were ignored.” By May the rest of the roofs in Agou went off. Dr. von der Decken complained that “I have now seen myself forced immediately to put all levers into motion to repair the roofs because rain was now hitting carpentry machines and the finished goods storage. When consultant Fritz Simbriger visited, he discovered that recent storms had destroyed a shed in Agou.
In December von der Decken wrote mournfully that a whirlwind had destroyed the last roofs and structures in Nuatja from the co-op’s “founding era.”\(^{460}\) When BMZ Minister Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski visited Agou in 1968, he saw “catastrophic conditions,” with abandoned fields and the carpentry shop a “heap of ruins.”\(^{461}\) The project would have to build all over again.

Some West German experts lived in poor housing. The first two in Nuatja had to live in a mobile home for months.\(^{462}\) Dr. von der Decken considered living conditions for his subordinates “catastrophic,” and “undignified, unhygienic and unreasonable, for the men as well as for the women and children.” As late as mid-1966, master carpenter Joseph in Nuatja did not have a room of his own and had to sleep in a space that was a hallway to a toilet and shower.\(^{463}\) The Kehrein and Joseph families lived in the work halls, where apartments were “impossible,” like the “modern” concrete stalls (“cement coffins”) people had built for pigs fifty years before, only to see the pigs die in them.\(^{464}\) Only by early 1967 could von der Decken could pronounce the “housing distress” in Nuatja—and Agou--gone.\(^{465}\)

The ground was hard on equipment and vehicles. Disk plows, bush clearers, harrows, cultivators and rollers were too weak for the Togolese countryside.\(^{466}\) One is reminded here of the breakdowns that plagued rooters and tractors in the British

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\(^{460}\) H.v.d. Decken to GAWI and Dr. Theierl, BMZ, December 20, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.


Tanganyika Groundnut and Gambia Poultry Schemes. Thanks to moisture, dust and corrugated metal roads, a VW would rust over after thirty thousand kilometers, by which time it would have gone through three sets of tires. DKW Mungas also survived only thirty thousand because drive shafts wore out and the frames were too weak. Bad roads were especially burdensome on the project manager, who needed a whole day to reach Kambolé from the project headquarters in Lomé or a half-day to reach Agou or Nuatja. For Schnellbach the case was worse, because he spent only half the year in Togo. These long distances and absences in turn led to gaps in project accounting.

After Schnellbach’s departure, lack of cash filled Dr. von der Decken with anxiety. In March 1966, only two months after assuming control of the project, he warned Dr. Theierl that he would soon have to borrow from the embassy in case Bonn did not soon send money. “I…have no cash box, no ledger, and no bank account—but taken over a heap of old debts.” Creditors included suppliers of gasoline and seeds, the

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467 Havinden and Meredith, 776-92.
471 GAWI to Referat I A 6, BMZ, September 10, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
cooperatives, and laborers who had excavated cisterns and now accused the Germans of “colonial exploitation in refined form.” How high was his budget? When was the money coming? “This perpetual ‘being on the run’ from creditors is making me sick,” he wrote. According to Büschel, the Agou co-op was “de facto” bankrupt by the summer of 1966, and both BMZ and GAWI refused further subsidies.

Von der Decken’s exasperation only grew during 1967. On New Year’s Day he complained that lack of operating funds was having severe consequences: no harvest for the lack of seeds or spraying fluid; a complete stop to all construction, breakdown of transportation links, and demoralization of the West German team. He also wanted to know whether the BMZ would fund his DM 3.5 million three-year plan. Dr. Theierl gave immediate relief by approving a reallocation of two hundred thousand DM from personnel to operating funds, but he also cut the plan by nearly half to DM 1.8 million over two years. To lessen the disappointment, he offered a two- rather than three-year extension, boosting funds per year to nine hundred thousand. Von der Decken was furious, not mollified by the imminent availability of some money. He warned against “makeshift buildings” (Behelfsbauten) that would require renovation every three years. That would be “thriftiness on the wrong spot.” From GAWI he again demanded to know how much money was ready or soon would be. At year’s end, he wrote that for two years there had been no money to restore the four buildings already destroyed, to

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473 Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, 425.
475 GAWI to Referat I A 6, BMZ and Referat IV 2, BAW, January 13, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112; RegDir Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Dr. v.d. Decken, January 30, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
476 RegDir Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Dr. H.v.d Decken, February 3, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112; RegDir Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, to GAWI, BAW, February 9, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
finish half-built halls, to set up machines, to repair vehicles and machines, or to securely store tools and devices. Bonn would be committing the “greatest development mistake” by liquidating or handing over “half-finished operations condemned to death.”

**Agou and Nuatja – Reorganizing the Project**

The project’s woes persuaded the West Germans that they would have to make major changes, and one of them was abandoning the “model village” tag. German reports reveal a critical difference of opinion over what a “model village” meant and what it required. The Germans imagined it as a place with superior earning prospects thanks to the cooperative and its business enterprises, but to the villagers it signified a village with superior amenities for a better life. Von der Decken blamed the name for raising unrealistic expectations and “flower bouquets” of wishes for “telephones, road-building, water connections, electricity, sports fields, municipal and assembly hall, new village settlement, improvement of existing homes, etc.” It contributed to a “gift psychosis,” among the Togolese. In fact, unhappy villagers had claimed that the title of “model village” brought with it obligations on the West Germans’ part, so the West Germans should keep their promises. Chief Pebi himself wrote Schnellbach on January 4, 1966 after the project manager’s departure from Togo that the “model village” name had inspired the hope that German experts would help with electricity, telephone connections and expanding water lines. “It is necessary that the model village be entirely

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481 See Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, 428. Büschel cites a September 9, 1967 report from the embassy in Lomé on a visit by Dr. Fritz Stangen, to which Pebi’s letter was appended. I have a copy of the same report, but without the letter. My copy is from the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Büschel’s from the Political Archive of the Foreign Office in Berlin.
transformed, that its primitive aspect be changed.”

Villagers presented von der Decken with a list of twelve items that Schnellbach had supposedly promised, including road improvements, a village assembly center, sports field, soccer equipment, a fish pond, and a goods shop. They also wanted more equipment for the co-op, such as livestock stalls, a truck, new shelling machines, and musical instruments. They especially wanted the four DED development helpers who arrived in 1965 to tear down old huts and build new houses. If these promises were not kept soon, they told von der Decken, shame (honte) would fall on the heads of Pebi and von der Decken himself.

Other Germans agreed with von der Decken. GAWI had already anticipated his line of thinking.

Obviously Dr. Schnellbach has painted for the village dwellers as well as the responsible representatives of the Togolese government the future picture of a model village as could be achieved by the commitment of all involved in ten to fifteen years at the earliest. Beyond that the Togolese have so understood the word “model village” as if someone had promised them new houses, streets, water connection, electrical light and all other technical comforts along with fertile fields after the course of a few years.

In this way Schnellbach had pressured himself to make progress in all areas at the same time—agriculture, craft operations, cisterns and road-building—so that too little time was available for any of them. The village managers were also overburdened with too many tasks. In September it added that “We, that is you and your colleagues, must free us all from the concept ‘model villages,’ which in their conception hitherto are nothing but subsidized businesses [Versorgungsbetriebe] (as you say: combines) of 3 village communities, which wish to expand their traditional hierarchy unchanged without

482 Il faudrait que le village pilote soit entièrement transformé, c’est à dire que son aspect primitif soit changé.” H.v.d. Decken, Attachment 2 to von der Decken Plan, Wishes of Village I Agou for Expansion of Model Villages, recited at assembly June 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.

483 Ibid.

484 Memorandum of GAWI, July 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
genuine participation of the individual members.” The project should focus on co-ops instead of villages.  

Consultant Fritz Simbriger, inspecting the project in spring 1967, likewise wanted to do without the label of “model villages,” since the project had become a “completely muddled affair.” None of them presented a “model” for either agriculture or technology. In spite of higher expenses, project crops were no better than the local kind. Neither had there been progress in “human development.”

One of Agou’s chiefs filled Simbriger’s ears with the “bitterest reproaches about the failure of German aid.”

The BMZ and Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid agreed it was time to change names. When they extended the project in August 1967, Agou, Nuatja and Kambolé became “agricultural advisory centers.”

The new name implied a less ambitious mission of improving farming techniques rather than remaking entire communities.

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The second and more substantive change was the replacement of production with marketing cooperation. In August 1966 von der Decken recommended that the various project arms of agriculture, carpentry and “metalworking” (Schmiede) be made independent. The co-op would still “serve the common interest through acquisition of agricultural supplies and equipment [Produktionsmittel] and sale of its products.” Rather than operate a “big farm” with big machines, the co-op should lease land to “efficient so-called pilot farmers.” The German experts would retain five hectares for “systematic experiments.”488 He wanted to end the situation in which the West Germans funded everything, but controlled nothing. Allotting co-op land would free the project from wage payments, quarrels over the amount of wages, “undignified” labor controls over co-op members, falsification of attendance lists, and demands that the West Germans pay for co-op land that they had “taken away” from previous owners.489 As of October 1, subsidies to the director salaries and member wages would be stopped. He hoped to re-found the co-op with new president and directors chosen from the most efficient members. There would be no more bonuses merely for showing up; those who would not work would not earn. As to the carpentry business, only the name of cooperative would be kept, again for “optical reasons,” while in reality it would continue as a “purely capitalist wage enterprise.”490

Labor problems aside, the main reason for converting to a marketing-only strategy was the unprofitability of cooperative production. Von der Decken denounced the co-ops as subsidized enterprises, and such enterprises were “gifts of the Danaians” (Danaer-

490 H.v.d. Decken, Attachment 1 to Decken Plan, August 8, 1866, BArchiv B 213/4112.
Geschenke), a reference to the famous last words of Laocoön warning his fellow Trojans against accepting a massive wooden horse from the Greeks.\textsuperscript{491} The project could not profitably clear and cultivate land by machine, because clearance cost about two thousand DM per hectare while raw yields of cotton produced only about seventy-five DM per hectare, and maize only three hundred.\textsuperscript{492} He halted cooperative planting by mid-1967, according to visiting BMZ official Dr. Fritz Stangen, because with member apathy, lack of productivity, and the moist soil hindering cultivation by machine, the venture was simply not profitable.\textsuperscript{493}

The BMZ accepted Dr. von der Decken’s recommendations. According to an interdepartmental meeting in January 1967, the project would convert the production co-ops to purchasing and sales co-ops, divide up the cleared land, retain an experimental parcel, and restrict other German agricultural activity to counseling.\textsuperscript{494} At another meeting in March, those present agreed that “the present situation of two model villages (Agou and Nuatja) is very critical. The promotion of production cooperatives has proved itself a failure.”\textsuperscript{495} Dr. Theierl informed his superiors in October of the change to marketing cooperation.\textsuperscript{496} In 1970 BMZ experts Drs. J. Friedrichsen and Kurt W. Gall would dismissively label Schnellbach’s production co-op an “LPG.” They blamed the failure of cooperative agriculture in Agou on the income opportunities already available through cocoa and coffee cultivation. The villagers’ “leisure preference” was so high that

\textsuperscript{492} Third Quarterly Report of Dr. Hans von der Decken, October 8, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{493} Travel Report of Dr. Fritz Stangen, BMZ, June 30, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{494} Minutes of Department Meeting at BMZ on January 23, 1967, BArchiv B 213/11894.
\textsuperscript{495} Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to UAL I, BMZ, March 30, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{496} RegDir Dr. Theierl to UAL I A, AL I, State Secretary, BMZ, October 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
they considered production of less lucrative crops like maize and manioc an “impertinence.” Reviving cooperative production should not be considered. 497 Of course what Friedrichsen and Gall called a “leisure preference”—a polite way of saying “lazy”--was in fact a rational maximizing of agricultural income.

Surprisingly, a Togolese scholar defended cooperative production at Agou more than a year after the West Germans had given it up. In late 1968, E. Konu argued that it was still a good idea, because it allowed members to purchase machinery and achieve higher yields than they could individually. He worried that “The abandonment of the cooperative will have appalling psychological repercussions in the environment. In particular, it will totally destroy any notion of cooperative organization of production and will repulse or maintain the peasant in his agrarian individualism.” “Frenzied agrarian individualism” might work well in Europe, but “it cannot be permitted in the economic context of a country like ours.” Leaving the “isolated” peasant to his “primitive tools and archaic methods of work” would doom him to “misery.” 498 Konu blamed the Germans’ labor troubles on the co-op’s organization, the lack of a co-op statute, poor crop selection and the dominance their funding gave them over the co-op. 499 If Konu’s views reached the West Germans, they had no impact; their files make no mention of him.

The third great change was converting each village into an independent project. The proposal seems to have originated in mid-1967 after the visits of BMZ official Fritz Stangen and consultant Fritz Simbriger. Stangen proposed that each village get its own project number, beginning January 1, 1968. Kambolé would have its own leader while Agou and Nuatja would retain a common manager above each village manager. The

498 Konu, 41, 21-22.
499 Konu, 19, 30, 37-39, 47.
headquarters in Lomé should be dissolved after six months and Dr. von der Decken assigned to the next available agricultural research task. Consultant Fritz Simbriger agreed with the breakup, but he wanted to retain the Lomé office until each village project had sufficient staff, supplies and funds to manage itself. In August 1967 Dr. Theierl, taking both reports as a basis, submitted an application to the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid for a three-year extension. The Lomé office would be closed at the end of the year, as Stangen recommended. All three village projects would now have five experts and seven or eight DED volunteers. The Committee agreed. Each project received a new number; instead of FE 344 for all of them, Agou became FE 1265, Nuatja FE 1266 and Kambolé FE 1267. The breakup angered Dr. von der Decken. He wanted all three villages kept under his own supervision, and the Lomé office kept open. Without a single project leader in Lomé, each village leader would have to go there for supplies, repairs and contracts. The BMZ should at least keep a house there. But the decision was already made.

**The Fall of Hans von der Decken**

The behavior of Dr. von der Decken provoked the final piece in the project’s reorganization: his own removal. The trouble was neither his qualifications nor his proposals, but his personality. On paper, at least, his tone was pessimistic and frustrated at best and nearly hysterical at worst, his correspondence obsessively repetitive, and his

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502 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 11, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4110.
503 Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 23, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4110.
pride easily wounded. In 1967 his mood darkened to anger and paranoia. In February alone he bombarded Dr. Theierl with seven letters of complaint.\textsuperscript{505} He lashed out at GAWI as well as the BMZ over GAWI misallocating expensive equipment and withholding funds, and over project problems that neither agency had caused. “I myself believe all of you would have preferred to let this crap \textit{[Mist]} keep going on and to present to all people Potemkin villages instead of model villages. Unending aggravation, many letters and very many sleepless nights would have been spared me.” He threatened to “capitulate” if GAWI did not make changes he suggested. He asked Dr. Theierl to mediate.\textsuperscript{506} The project manager must have sensed he had gone too far, because his subsequent annual report at the end of April 1967 was uncharacteristically sunny. Now the project was mostly going well rather than badly. In the accompanying letter addressed to GAWI and BMZ he wrote “From different letters and utterances I have gained the impression of a certain pessimism \textit{on your part} regarding the future of the ‘Three Model Villages’ [emphasis added].”\textsuperscript{507} The report’s first subheading said “Great Accomplishments,” and without a hint of sarcasm. Whatever he hoped to accomplish with his unusually cheerful report did not take place. Instead he greatly reduced GAWI’s confidence in himself. GAWI remarked to both the BMZ and BAW that

\begin{quote}
After the reading \textit{[Lektüre]} of the first eight pages of the annual report the impression necessarily arises that the “model villages” so intensively discussed and discredited in recent months have in fact changed overnight into real model villages. At least the contents stand in crass contrast to the project manager’s reports handed in during the last twelve months.”\textsuperscript{508}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{505} Specifically on February 3, 4, 14, 21, 24, 25 and 26, 1967, all in BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{507} Dr. H.v.d. Decken to GAWI, BMZ, Embassy in Lomé, April 28, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
\textsuperscript{508} GAWI to Referate I A 6 and I B 4, BMZ, Referate IV 1 and IV 2, BAW, May 10, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
By May, Dr. von der Decken’s paranoia was rather justified. Hearing of deliberations about his replacement, he protested to Dr. Theierl. At age sixty-four he would need time to find a new job. He demanded to know what he had done wrong. Dr. Theierl had asked for open and unvarnished reports, but now “I have the impression it was the greatest mistake of my life to have taken this to heart, for obviously false conclusions have been drawn from all [the] reports, e.g. that I would never be finished with problems here.” He had accomplished “almost superhuman” deeds; lack of money, a problem the BMZ had been slow to remedy, had been the project’s curse during the past year and a half, forcing him to muddle through without a plan.509

From September 1967 von der Decken seems to have accepted, however ungraciously, that he would have to leave the project, so now his distress took the form of worrying about what would happen to the model villages once he was gone. The project had no co-op expert, and he was the only man who was both agricultural practitioner and business economist. Much of what he and his colleagues had done was due only to his decades of experience since 1922. Now that he was leaving, after he had smoothed the way for the next project leader, the BMZ was at last making money available.510 In October he objected in a letter to Dr. Theierl to his exclusion from the previous month’s negotiations over the project’s future. “I have asked to be consulted several times, but have the impression that I am simply undesired by you, or that you want to settle everything among yourselves [intra muros].”511

The BMZ and GAWI were unmoved; they made sure he would have no future in the project beyond spring 1968. Someone at the BMZ—it is not clear who—authored a

509 Dr. Hans v.d. Decken to Dr. Theierl, BMZ, May 27, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
510 Dr. H.v.d. Decken to GAWI, BMZ, BArchiv B 213/4112.
memo near the end of 1967 that discussed von der Decken’s removal. It was a mistake, the author wrote, to have entrusted him with a project that had already done so poorly. “We are therefore forced to relieve him there and to send a suitable successor.” Noting that von der Decken’s contract had been extended to the end of March 1968, the author also bemoaned his inappropriate discussions of project difficulties with outsiders.512 Roßmann at GAWI blamed both Schnellbach and von der Decken for the project’s outcome to date. He wondered how either man could have imagined managing from Lomé, given the problems of transportation and communication. Their behavior, he said, was “dilettantish.” He would have liked to hinder von der Decken’s return from West Germany to Togo until a “real specialist” could be found.513

After his contract expired, von der Decken refused to drop his grievances. Theierl had personally assured him in the fall of 1967 that he would continue to lead the project after more funds were approved, and repeated the offer via GAWI in March 1968. In April, the offer went away and the doctor now wanted to know why. Dr. Theierl did not answer, but on the letter he asked in a note whether the BMZ could find him a place with GAWI or a research project. The problems with the model villages were not his fault, and he had not done bad work. He also needed the money. The Referat for Development Policy Research, Academic Advisory Council, and East Bloc Development Aid replied that they certainly had no use for von der Decken.514 Still seeking vindication, von der Decken wrote BMZ State Secretary U. Hein and to the Foreign Office about the project’s

poor condition. He actually provoked a sympathetic reaction from the Foreign Office’s West Africa Referat, which asked the BMZ, BML and GAWI for an explanation of the matter. Dr. Theierl politely answered that he had heard it all from Dr. von der Decken before, as had State Secretary Hein. And that was the end of the matter.

Agou and Nuatja – Finishing and Assessing the Project

The Nuatja project lasted less than a year more. The West Germans did not even bother trying to save the co-op. Gerd Hofmeier reported handing over management and the account to Togolese control on June 30, 1967. Gerhard Goronzy, temporary project manager for both villages, reported that the common fund was split up at the beginning of 1968 to avoid discouraging the profitable branches. His last remark was odd, given that agriculture, weaving and carpentry had all failed. The West Germans dismissed one hundred twenty “so-called” co-op members while giving them each a share of the thirty-four hectares in cleared co-op land; the “Kolchoz” (a Soviet collective farm) was now dissolved. Before they left, however, the West Germans constructed new buildings: a work hall, a cultural center, the weaver’s hall, and a residential hall for the Togolese agency SORAD, with storage space. All the other buildings from the Schnellbach era should be removed. The old buildings’ remains were demolished in three days, the roof sheeting, stones and wooden parts given away to the villagers.

520 MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, January 24, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
construction was finished by September 1968. At least the new buildings looked good. As Goronzy and Hofmeier put it, “we have tried to avoid all investments that would have been without a great optical use-effect...”

All internal reviews of Nuatja were negative. In the view of Goronzy and Hofmeier, who combined business sense with racial prejudice, the “main mistake” was the establishment of the production cooperative, which limited the initiative of the peasants and craftsmen because they did not have the “direct feeling of working for themselves,” and “promoted fraud and embezzlement.” The other great problem was unprofitability of all activities, partly because of over-mechanization and partly because of poor Togolese managers. Rather than select for performance, the co-op members chose according to “African tradition,” i.e. the local notables: chief, section chief, church choir leader, and landowner. Such people need not have been excluded, but there should have been more emphasis on “younger and more competent counterparts.” The German project management, i.e. Schnellbach, trusted Africans too readily with managing cash, supervising labor and controlling the magazine, leading to “embezzlement of money, theft, and absenteeism from work in spite of payment.” The “Africans” laughed at German naiveté, which—as Goronzy and Hofmeier wrote drily—“did not promote the advisory effect.” Still observing Nuatjans through a colonial gaze, they wrote “Africans must at the beginning be led rigidly to slowly prepare them for the task, to not overtax them.” In other words, Nuatjans needed more “education into work.” The embassy was more succinct and more biting. “The development policy effect of the...model village Nuatja is estimated to be extremely trivial, if not to say a complete zero. The

expectations that the population set on the project were in no way fulfilled.” The Foreign Ministry in Lomé also informed that embassy of its displeasure. “The Togolese Government takes the occasion to ask the Federal Republic of Germany for a total reexamination of the model villages project in order to define a program better adapted to Togolese needs and realities.”

Matters went better in Agou, where carpenter Heinz Lähne remained in charge until the handover in 1973. He led the refounding of Agou’s production cooperative as a marketing co-op, purchasing a twenty by twelve meter hall in Lomé and setting it up in the village. By the beginning of 1971, there were sixty-nine members who had planted cocoa, palms, avocado, coffee, citrus fruit, peppers, pineapples, papayas and bananas over at least one hundred twenty-three hectares.

Lähne seems have transferred control of agricultural counseling to his Togolese counterpart, Ministry of Agriculture official Gabriel Y. Segbé, at the end of 1970. In early 1973 the co-op was still active, selling cocoa plants grown from seeds smuggled in from Ghana. The carpentry shop did really well; in mid-1969 Lähne reported that “the

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order situation is good, i.e. we are overburdened.”529 By March 1970, the shop, sawmill and mechanic’s shop together employed ninety people and represented an approximate value of 650,000 DM or fifty million CFA.530 At the time of handover on April 4, 1974, the project employed thirty-three workers in carpentry, nineteen in the sawmill, ten in the repair shop, seven in administration, and six as watchmen or day laborers—seventy-five in all. Lähne had little doubt about the shop’s benefits.

Through creating workplaces at which the employees have exploited the opportunity to improve their standard of living and were able to send their children to school, we have with the project made an important contribution to development of the country. If attention is paid by the Togolese side that the project remains preserved through a properly led business management, which I don’t doubt, the goal planned in 1967 would be reached 100%.531

One year after Agou’s handover in early 1974, a BMZ official wrote that the project continued “to make a good impression,” still employing about sixty-five workers.532 No one explained the decline in personnel, but Agou’s shop was successful enough to be worth a struggle between the community one the one side and the government and West Germans on the other. We will see the outcome of this struggle in Chapter 6.

Kambolé – The Marketing Cooperatives

Kambolé took a very different path from its companions. First, it was founded relatively late, in 1965. At year’s end it had ninety members, led by Robert Komlan, a farmer, merchant and hauler.533 Second, its primary business was always agriculture; it seems never to have had a carpentry or weaver’s shop. It did have a mechanic’s shop,

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532 Extract from Travel Report of RD Adam for April 16 to 25, 1974, BMZ, undated, BArchiv B 213/11897.
which concentrated almost completely on maintaining project vehicles and equipment and training apprentices.\textsuperscript{534} Third, its manager Volkmar Kehrein seems to have had more freedom of action thanks to the greater distance from Lomé and from Dr. Schnellbach. He quickly abandoned cooperative production in favor of a network of marketing cooperatives with Kambolé as a central hub. In each case the West Germans picked up the costs for the initial agricultural supplies (seeds, fertilizer and pesticides), for experts, transportation, training and payment of “African” advisers and administrators. Later these expenses would be covered by the co-op’s harvest earnings. In each village the West Germans would set up a demonstration field, worked by small-holding peasants who would receive bonuses, to convince people of the advantages of new labor methods, probably monocropping and row-planting.\textsuperscript{535} Proceeds from the sale of agricultural supplies would go back into a revolving fund used to purchase more supplies.\textsuperscript{536} This path seemed very promising for a while, but it too eventually led to disappointment for the West Germans and their Togolese beneficiaries.

Kehrein soon expanded his cooperative network. By mid-1967 he planned an


\textsuperscript{536} Volkmar Kehrein, undated and untitled cost calculation for running project up to 1975, BArchiv B 213/4110.
advisory area of nine villages within forty kilometers of Kambolé, each with an adviser (Encadreur). The whole system would collaborate with Togo’s state-run agricultural advisory service, SORAD (Société Régionale d’Aménagement et de Développement), based in Sokodé. The villages included Tchamba, Kouloumi, Balanka, Goubi, Bagou and Djomé, among others. By the beginning of 1969, the West Germans had sponsored the formation of twenty-five pre-cooperatives “to make the sense of cooperatives more easily comprehensible to the cultivators.” Compared to standard cooperatives, the pre-cooperatives required a smaller share and simplified entry and exit.

In January the central co-op was registered with Togo’s National Cooperation Service under the name “Coopérative des Agriculteurs de Cambolé – COOPAC.” According to a draft statute, members agreed to deliver all their produce to the co-op at the rates it set, and purchase their supplies exclusively from the co-op. They were also obliged to follow co-op rules, “work in a manner to develop the cooperative spirit,” and “respect scrupulously” the German work program. Members elected for two years an administrative council consisting of the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and a council member at large. They established the works program, drew up an annual budget, authorized transactions, and appointed a director who hired other personnel. In fact, Kehrein intended to hire personnel himself until the project handover.

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540 Statut de la Cooperative des Agriculteurs de Cambolé, undated, BArchiv B 213/4110.
541 Volkmar Kehrein, undated and untitled cost calculation for running project up to 1975, BArchiv B 213/4110.
one in Kambolé) and opened shops in Kambolé, Balanka and Tchamba. The shops sold up to thirty-three different items, including cement, corrugated metal, nails, dyes, drinks, oil lamps, mats, shoes and rice. Mechanization made gradual progress as the peasants began hiring a co-op tractor. The rate depended on whether the operation was plowing (4000 CFA per hectare), shelling (2500), scything (2500) or sowing (1500).  

Unfortunately, the co-op’s internal affairs would prove troublesome. Longtime director Robert Komlan was abrasive, berating DED merchant/bookkeeper Hans-Joachim Geisberger over minor matters. He demanded that the co-op hire an apprentice from his extended family rather than the best-qualified boy from a nearby village. He was also apparently corrupt. At the BfE Volker Kobelt wrote in 1972 that “Amidst great difficulties the project manager [Reinard von der Lühe] has succeeded in relieving the former co-op director, against whom embezzlement and self-dealing could be proved.” He added that “Because this director disposed of great influence among the population, it was very difficult to convince the responsible authorities in Togo about the measures

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taken.” Finally even the “population” realized that the man had to go. Then Komlan’s successor turned out to be a “local patriotist” who condemned the hiring of people from other parts of Togo and who let “himself be manipulated much too much today by interest groups of the village.” In 1974 four hundred members attended the annual general assembly and received the year’s fiscal statement, but factionalism in Kambolé forced a postponement of electing a new president. The administrative council finally managed to elect a new president on February 14, 1975. For the first time the winner came from Tchamba rather than Kambolé. Two of the other three officers were also from other villages.

**Kambolé – The Cotton Disaster and the Block Cultivation Experiment**

Aiming for maximum profit, Kehrein promoted cotton. By August 1966 he introduced the crop and set up advisory and supply services that encompassed five villages. The West Germans distributed the seeds and pesticides, lent out sprayers, evaluated the cotton as it came into the co-op, and arranged transportation for sale. Two purchasing groups of seven or eight people each went out from the project while the government provided three controllers. Kehrein understood the importance of crop diversity and rotation. From 1967 he encouraged continued planting of millet and maize. For two years he and agricultural expert Siegfried Kremer tried out rice, apparently never planted before in Kambolé. The results were discouraging, so by the

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545 Semi-Annual Report of Dr. Kobelt, BfE, August 8, 1972, BArchiv B 213/218127.
547 R. Reinhard as Reporter, Dr. V. Kobelt as Project Manager, Attachment 5 to Quarterly Report, September 15, 1974, BArchiv B 213/21828.
time Kremer left in January 1969, he advised against that crop.\(^{552}\) In any case, cotton seemed to be putting cash into the pockets of co-op members. By 1968 they began spending it on corrugated metal roofs, cement-sandstone houses, radios, bicycles, and clothing.\(^{553}\)

Unfortunately, cotton promotion ended badly because of weather. Rainfall around Kambolé dropped from 1501 millimeters in 1969 to 956 in 1970 and 806 for the first ten and a half months of 1971.\(^ {554}\) Cotton yields and hectares under cotton cultivation fell correspondingly. After reaching a peak yield of seven hundred fifty kilos per hectare in 1968, still far below what the West Germans hoped to achieve, cotton fell in two years to a pitiful two hundred ninety-two in 1971. Hectares devoted to cotton plunged from nine hundred twenty in 1968 to two hundred thirty-eight in 1971 and one hundred seventy-two in 1972.\(^ {555}\) The peasants were worse than disappointed; they were in debt. Most of the cooperative’s six hundred fifty-six members owed the co-op for loans or supplies purchases. Now they could not pay

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\(^{554}\) Travel Report of Dr. Neumann-Damerau, Referat III A 6, BMZ, undated but after December 6, 1971, BArchiv B 213/21827.

because of the poor harvests. As interest continued to accumulate, the debtors fell six months behind in payments.556

The West Germans blamed Kehrein. A 1974 report that labeled his effort a “crash-programme” (English in the original) attributed its failure to the lack of “long-term personnel coverage by indigenous adviser cadres and a carefully coordinated production promotion program” as well as bad weather and mistakes by German advisers in pest control. Their advice neglected “the position of cotton in the crop sequence,” and the “heightened business risk among the one-sidedly advised clients.”557 Some West German officials, especially at GAWI, had never wanted Kehrein as project manager to begin with, and did not warm to him later. The main difficulty was his lack of relevant credentials; he was by profession a shipbuilding engineer. In 1967 Simbriger had wanted him replaced by a senior and a junior farming expert. He also accused him of making false statements.558 A GAWI official also wanted a farmer, at least as a supplement if not a replacement for Kehrein.559 DED bookkeeper Geisberger

557 A. Andreas Bodenstedt, Ottfried C. Kirsch, Detlef Koker, Forschungsstelle für International Agrarentwicklung e.V., Possibilities for Agricultural Counseling in the Central Region/Togo, July 1974, BArchiv B 213/21828.
complained that Kehrein was “willing to cooperate, yet not predestined for teamwork.” GAWI attacked Kehrein’s reports as distorted or silent as to per hectare yields. In forwarding his project plan for the next several years, GAWI remarked “As is well known to you, all statements from Mr. Kehrein must be constantly regarded very critically.” Why did Kehrein do as well as he did in agriculture, considering his training? According to one DED official, he had acquired his knowledge on his parents’ farm.

Yet the project did not really improve under Kehrein’s successor, Reinard von der Lühe, despite further crop experimentation, especially with tobacco. When the farmers seemed ready to expand their cotton cultivation after the good harvest of 1972, late rainfall in 1973 caused them to assume a “waiting attitude.” They were willing to plant cotton only after laying in the fields with maize, millet and other food crops. Cashew trees planted under Kehrein mostly burned to the ground by von der Lühe’s time because of grass fires. So long as no one stopped the fires, delivering more trees to peasants seemed useless. In Kambolé and Tchamba, at least, trees remained safe from fire. Other fruit trees, including orange, lemon, grapefruit and mangos, mostly died for lack of care, because (according to von der Lühe) “the peasant has not yet recognized the value of a planting that brings crops only in four or five years.” Here he echoed Schnellbach in accusing Togolese of “presentist” thinking, so perhaps more likely reasons were lack of confidence in rainfall or lack of interest in expending labor on co-op property. The co-

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561 GAWI to Referate I A 6, I B 3, I B 4, BMZ, December 12, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113;
562 VA Eckenmann (?), DED, January 13, 1972, BArchiv B 213/21827.
op’s loss for 1972 stood at seven million CFA, and members’ debts at thirteen million four hundred thousand. All but two hundred thousand of the co-op’s 13.6 million CFA (about DM 177,000) in receivables consisted of uncollectible claims against members while at the same time the co-op owed more than 11.7 million CFA (about DM 152,000) to its creditors. Only the “one-time” grant of 9.55 million CFA (about DM 124,150) by GAWI allowed COOPAC to pay off or reduce its debts. The project seemed to turn a corner in 1974, when all activities except the sale of pesticides and packaging material earned profits. Unfortunately, losses for the fiscal year ending May 1975, the co-op’s last before project end, came to 9.5 million, including five million for write-offs. On the positive side, COOPAC had twenty-five million CFA cash on hand as opposed to less than twelve million in debts.

During its last two years, the project tested a new method called “block cultivation” supposed to combine mechanized land preparation with crop rotation. In this system, ten peasants would be chosen (how or by whom is not clear) to receive one cleared and plowed hectare that they could each plant with cotton. In the next year, this group “A” would plant millet or maize while ten new peasants would raise cotton in another cleared and plowed ten hectare-parcel as members of Group B. In the third year Group C would arrive, and while it raised cotton, Group A would turn to peanuts and Group B to millet and maize. Only the cotton fields would be deep-plowed, so peasants

568 R. Reinhard as Reporter, Dr. V. Kobelt as Project Manager, Attachment 5 to Quarterly Report, September 15, 1974, BArchiv B 213/21828.
569 Final Report of Dr. V. Kobelt, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
would continue to tend the other crops with hand hoe in the traditional manner. Each peasant agreed to the co-op’s planting schedule and promised to follow adviser instructions and pay the co-op for fertilizer, pesticide and transportation out of harvest proceeds. Peasants who cleared a second or third hectare by themselves received food aid. Cleared parcels were assigned to peasants by lot, so that no peasant knew in advance which parcel he would get and would not favor any particular one over another during the clearing.

Did the block field system succeed? In 1974 a team from the Research Office for International Agricultural Development said no. The partly mechanized and permanent cultivation cost more than traditional shifting cultivation, destroying any incentive to adopt the new system. As keeper of the tractors and supplier of fertilizer the co-op was in effect subsidizing the block field system; it would not be able to do so in the future.

The project’s last manager, Volker Kobelt of the BfE, vehemently rejected this conclusion and disputed the team’s figures. In his final report of April 1976, Kobelt offered figures that seemed to prove the superiority of block fields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Kg/Ha – Block Field</th>
<th>Kg/Ha – Traditional</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet/Maize</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanuts</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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571 Final Report of Dr. V. Kobelt, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
572 A. Andreas Bodenstedt, Ottfried C. Kirsch, Detlef Koker, Forschungsstelle für International Agrarentwicklung e.V., Possibilities for Agricultural Counseling in the Central Region/Togo, July 1974, BArchiv B 213/21828.
So block fields required less labor (except as to peanuts) and produced higher yields and earnings. The peasants had reacted well, expanding block field area from one hundred twenty-nine and a half hectares in 1973 to six hundred forty-four in 1975. Unfortunately, the Togolese government could not or would not carry on what the West Germans had started, failing to name counterparts until after the project handover, too late for them to receive adequate training. “With the departure of the last German workers the attempt [thus] begun must therefore be seen as prematurely broken off, at a point in time when neither a failure nor a success could be confirmed.”

The new Corporation for Technical Aid (GTZ) found Kobelt’s yield estimates too high, because they ignored diminishing returns. That is, the first hundred hectares produced what they did through “massive intervention,” but each further hundred hectares would have seen a drop in yields. The GTZ saw failure, but also opportunity for a fresh start in a coming successor project. “We believe that after twelve years of vain experiments an experiment may also be quietly broken off. Actually the ‘block field system’ experiment is not being broken off, but rather continued in the framework of Togolese possibilities with support of the project “Development of the Central Region.”

Indeed, the West Germans had no intention of really giving up on Kambolé; instead they expected to expand the area under their care. In the spring of 1974,

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Block Field</th>
<th>Traditional System</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workdays</td>
<td>CFA/Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet/Maize</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanuts</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
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574 Final Report of Dr. V. Kobelt, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
575 Dr. Sartorius, Gorony, GTZ to Referat 113, BMZ, October 1, 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
Regierungsdirektor Adam of the BMZ’s West Africa Referat considered Kambolé a failure. Its lack of infrastructure and its distance from potential markets made it unwise to concentrate agricultural counseling there. Despite spending more than DM four million, or about DM thirteen thousand per co-op member, the project had not raised the income of the members. On the other hand, a project covering a larger territory, able to use agricultural counselors more efficiently, would do better. The Kambolé advisory area would therefore become the nucleus of a new “integrated” project to develop Togo’s entire Central Region.\textsuperscript{576} Even before the handover, Adam asked the GTZ to have a new expert commission visit Togo and write up a ten-year plan with details of the new project’s first two years, 1976 and 1977.\textsuperscript{577} Meanwhile the West Germans officially handed over Kambolé on November 11, 1975.\textsuperscript{578}

\textbf{The DED at Work}

While the experts worked, mostly in vain, to build up profitable cooperatives, DED volunteers assisted them. At Agou Max Metzger spent his time on agriculture and Rolf Kotzurek did so in the mechanic’s shop.\textsuperscript{579} At Kambolé agricultural engineer Ulrich Posselt worked with Siegfried Kremer to manage two Togolese tractor drivers, a cowherd, and sixteen agricultural counselors. The counselors, whose prior six weeks’ training Posselt described as “meager,” received from him two half-day courses per

\textsuperscript{576} Travel Report of RD Adam, Referat 113, BMZ, May 31, 1974, BArchiv B 213/21828. Adam exaggerated; assuming approximately six hundred fifty co-op members, the amount per member was “only” DM sixty-one hundred, still a huge figure. Yet the Peki project spent far more on fewer on far fewer settlers, as we shall see in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{577} Adam, Referat 113, BMZ to GTZ, February 13, 1975, BArchiv B 213/21828.

\textsuperscript{578} Haferkamp, Embassy in Lomé to Referat 313, November 20, 1975, BArchiv B 213/21828.

\textsuperscript{579} As to Kotzurek, see Heinz Lähne, Village Manager to GAWI, June 5, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113. Both Metzger and Kotzurek continued in the project as GAWI employees after finishing their time with the DED.
In early 1969 farmer Peter Arndt worked on oxen traction with a single Peul herder, whose abilities he described as “outstanding.” From June 1 he supervised four advisers (Encadreurs) in five villages near Tchamba. Bookkeeper Geisberger worked with one employee who could carry out cash transactions and manage the cash ledger. Mechanic Detlev Weischedel worked at maintaining the project’s vehicles, generator and water pumps.

Other volunteers engaged in health, nutrition and housekeeping education reminiscent of colonial-era home economics training in British Yorubaland and the Belgian Congo, seeking to instruct Africans in European domesticity. In Nuatja, Rita Dietsche began by teaching some girls embroidery, sewing, knitting, crocheting, reading, writing and ball games, but their attendance was irregular, perhaps because students had already learned these skills or considered them irrelevant. After six months she switched to instructing women in hygiene, boiling water (likely regarding its hygienic importance rather than merely how to do it), infant nutrition (“tailored to local concepts”), illnesses and contagion. In that way she attracted up to twenty-five or thirty attendees at once. As we saw earlier, she tried to restart the weaver’s shop and introduce new bookkeeping.

Gerd Hoffmann, a decorator by profession, built a playground for children with a “palaver” hut for adults and taught crafts at schools in Nuatja. Stefanie Strähler served as instructor at Kambolé’s central school, where she took over the school garden and

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583 Denzer, 116-39; Nancy Rose Hunt, 447-74.
584 Activity Report of Rita Dietsche, DED, July 8, 1966, DED TOG 01 - 04 64 65.
taught home economics. She also taught nutrition courses and worked with the international Cathwell program for nourishing preschool children up to age six (including the distribution of milk powder). Her work, she believed, could be helpful, because the people hardly ate fruit or vegetables and received little protein due to the expense of meat and milk. Manfred and Luise Dassio proposed a new birthing station (Maternité), but ran into a snarl with the home office over the “form” of their application for funds to buy materials for cinder blocks. The station did eventually go up, thanks to mason Jörg Ammerlahn, Manfred Dassio’s successor. It was equipped with toilet and shower stall. Ammerlahn also laid foundations and erected a wall for a kindergarten. Unfortunately, Kobelt dismissed all their good works, writing briefly in 1976 that they had produced no “lasting success.”

Teacher Barbara Clement provided a detailed account of her work at the Kambolé social center in maternal and other health counseling. She wrote “The troublemakers were weighed, the weight entered onto graphs, a demonstration brew was cooked and the course was held, worked out on the previous day with some hygiene theme or other.” She taught sewing and knitting classes for women with the aid of a female government rural agent (animatrice), but they lost interest when they began having to pay for their own material. She also taught crocheting to girls in school and played volleyball with

588 Luise and Manfred Dassio to DED, September 16, 1968, DED TOG 01 – 03 68; Dr. Peter Hermann, DED to Dr. Ludger Reuke, DED, October 24, 1968, DED TOG 01 – 03 68. After his return to Germany, Dassio felt disillusioned about the promise of development “from below” and he complained about witnessing racism among Germans in Togo. See Büschel, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, 416; Hubertus Büschel, “In Afrika helfen. Akteure westdeutscher ‘Entwicklungshilfe’ und ostdeutscher ‘Solidarität’ 1955-1975,” 355, both citing Dassio, “Einen Blinden über die Straße bringen,” 170.
590 Final Report of Dr. V. Kobelt, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
village boys. At the birthing station she took it upon herself to give instruction in nutrition during pregnancy, menstruation, development of the embryo, the needs of small children, and children’s diseases. Actual medical practice she left to the Togolese matrons. At a dispensary she spent mornings with a French nurse, seeing sick and malnourished children lacking protein or vitamins and consulting with their mothers. While mothers waited with their children, Clement gave them short presentations on hygiene of the body, clothing, nutrition and habitation.\textsuperscript{591} The implication in these lessons was that Togolese women were ignorant of proper “scientific” European methods or perhaps attached to false indigenous ones, though she did not say so.\textsuperscript{592} Later she assisted with “stool investigations” and visited homes with an animatrice employed by the Cathwell organization, a procedure reminiscent of visits by “social home” workers in the Belgian Congo. At the social center she and others continued to holding cooking demonstrations for enriched child nutrition and give knitting lessons. For the Cathwell nutrition program she now handled only money while leaving courses and demonstrations to the Togolese animatrices.\textsuperscript{593} Sounding like von der Decken, she believed the DED had done enough in Kambolé, where villagers had become “spoiled” with too many “gifts” and had enough cash income from cotton to buy coveted consumer goods while continuing to scold whites as exploiters and deceivers. It was time to move on to other villages in the region, to nearby Balanka, for example, which lacked even a

\textsuperscript{592} Amster, 185-86.
\textsuperscript{593} Barbara Clement, DED, Short Compilation of Activities in Kambolé, undated, DED TOG 08a – e 72.
well or any other hygienic facilities. People there would be more grateful than in Kambolé.  

**Bridge and Cistern Project**

![Bridge over Haho at Time of Opening Ceremony](image)

Source: Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 213/4113

The Haho River bridge was to be an adjunct to the Nuatja portion of the model villages project, allowing residents to cultivate unused land on the other side of the river, but it took longer and cost more than expected. Dr. Schnellbach believed it would be necessary for the Nuatja cooperative to succeed.  

The bridge would have a load capacity of ten tons.  

Togolese Vice-President Meatchi promised that Togo would pay for transport of bridge materials to the construction site, and the Ministry of Public Works would make specialists available and erect two pillars for the bridge.  

In September 1963, BMWi told the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid it expected to finish the project by the end of the year.  

The Committee approved funding five days later.  

Unfortunately, the pillars would have to be larger and sturdier than foreseen, raising the cost from DM 24,000 to DM...

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595 Memorandum of Dr. Henske, BMWi, September 9, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
597 Vice-President A. Meatchi to Embassy in Lomé, August 2, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
598 Referat V A 5, BMWi, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Assistance, September 13, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
599 Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Assistance, September 18, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4111.
120,000. Togo could not pay, so the BMZ agreed to cover the cost. Vice President Meatchi followed up with a request to West Germany for an additional DM 150,000. The BMZ agreed, as did the Interministerial Committee. Construction also took much longer than planned due to difficulties getting a contractor to assemble the bridge and install the pillars. Only on February 24, 1967, three years after the projected completion date, did Dr. von der Decken report it finished.

The cisterns were certainly needed, but building them turned out to be challenging and, like the bridge, ran into delays. The government had wanted cisterns to relieve water scarcity in the countryside. In 1963 Dr. Schnellbach remarked that Agou was well-watered, but the areas around Nuatja and Kambolé enjoyed less rainfall and suffered long dry spells. Only a few of the public buildings had gutters, downspouts and cisterns, so most people drank from river, brooks and standing pools spiced with typhus, dysentery, guinea worms, hook worms and other

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600 Hans U. Burchard, Construction Engineer to Embassy in Lomé, June 2, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111.
601 President in absentia/Vice President A. Meatchi to Embassy in Lomé, July 9, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111.
602 ORR Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to BAW, October 1, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111.
603 Memorandum of GAWI, July 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
intestinal parasites. German reports repeatedly characterized the water situation as “catastrophic.” Schnellbach proposed having halls with roofs sheathed in aluminum as the initial collecting points, and providing them with gutters, downspouts, wing pumps and filters to feed cisterns in the ground. The cisterns would be lined with cement and supported by iron round bar and wooden beams. Toward the end of 1964, GAWI hired Hans U. Burchard as project engineer. He arrived in Togo on March 19, 1965. In early 1966, the BMZ took over management of the cistern project from the Ministry of Health.

Merely getting the materials to construction sites undamaged was difficult because of poor roads. In mid-November 1964 Schnellbach and his team reported that the previous month nearly thirty tons of cement arrived at Nuatja in burst sacks and that

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610 Dr.-Ing. Clodius, Referat III A 3 to BMZ, February 8, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4111.
some iron assemblies were twisted. Fortunately, marine insurance paid for procuring new cement and repairing the bent parts. In 1968 flooding of a ford in the East Mono Region forced the Germans to drive three hundred kilometers from Nuatja by way of Dahomey rather than the usual fifty. At one location sand and and pebbles had to come from a river bed more than fifty kilometers away and even then women had to carry it on their heads from the bed to a nearby trailer. Both tractor and trailer took a beating from rough terrain and poor African driving so that they required repair, and in the meanwhile they were unavailable for agriculture.

The very lack of water that cisterns were supposed to cure made it harder to build them because water was an ingredient in mixing cement; the Germans had to fetch theirs from the Mono River, forty kilometers away. Hans von der Decken gave the figures as a minimum of ten to fifteen and a maximum of one hundred kilometers. He later mentioned a heartbreaking detail; when a vehicle brought in water for mixing cement while the village wells were dry, it would be “besieged” by desperate women. He complained that “it simply could not be made clear” to them that the finished cistern would get them drinking water year round.

The ground and weather were unpredictable. Diggers ran into “stone-hard” soil below one meter, forcing the West Germans to have enough dirt built up around the

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cistern pits so as make them one-third above ground.\textsuperscript{618} Conditions were particularly challenging east of the Mono River. Paths were drivable in the rainy season only by all-terrain vehicles. Once there the Germans found the ground so hard that it could be broken only with pneumatic equipment, but they had no craftsmen, haulers or any materials, not even a nail. In mid-1968 all work stopped.\textsuperscript{619} In March 1969 Burchard reported that wet weather had again hindered the project from October until December.\textsuperscript{620}

In the end, the efforts of Burchard and the Togolese showed results. His final report listed cisterns at the Catholic missions of Nuatja and Kodokpe, the Protestant school in Nuatja, a social center in Nawolo, the Protestant churches in Nuatja, Tohoun and Kpekpleme, a Catholic mission in Ahassomé, the Kambolé advisory center, Agou-Nyongbo, and four at the Nuatja co-op. Burchard did not name the fifteenth cistern’s location. There were also ten steel halls alongside the cisterns in Nuatja, Kambolé, Nawolo and Tohoun. The project’s total cost was DM 880,000. Burchard boasted that whereas water quality had been very bad, Nuatja’s access to clean water and that of smaller communities in the East Mono Region “can be considered secured.” In his view “The cistern project has more than fulfilled its purpose.”\textsuperscript{621} Ambassador von Wistinghausen officially handed it over to Togo’s Planning Commissariat on August 11, 1969.\textsuperscript{622} A later accounting lowered the amount spent to DM 828,172.08, with a balance

\textsuperscript{619} Hans U. Burchard, Construction Engineer, Report on Construction Work in Model Villages Nuatja and Agou-Nyogbo as well as on Cistern Construction, June 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4110.
\textsuperscript{620} Hans U. Buchard to GAWI, March 30, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
\textsuperscript{622} Ambassador von Wistinghausen, Embassy in Lomé to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, August 13, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
of DM 43,995.59 being transferred to the Agou-Nyongbo project.\footnote{Dr. Steinacher, Referat III/2, BfE to Referat III A 6, August 18, 1971, BArchiv B 213/11895.} No one ever explained why “well-watered” Agou-Nyongbo needed a cistern. The fifteen built were far short of the Togolese government’s request for seventy-five.

**Conclusion**

The Schnellbach Plan, as modified in 1966-68 by von der Decken, the BMZ and other project managers, was not a total loss for either Togo or the Federal Republic. Agou gained a thriving wood-processing business that provided several dozen jobs, Nuatja a new bridge. Together with Kambolé they received one or more cisterns, though Nuatja continued to lack clean drinking water until the government installed its dam and filtration plant in 1978. To that extent the West Germans left the Togolese beneficiaries better off than they found them. One cannot tell from West German records whether DED sewing, crocheting, knitting, cooking or health lessons were really needed, but Gerd Hoffmann’s playground and the birthing station built by the Dassios and Jörg Ammerlahn were likely welcome.

Unfortunately, the project almost completely failed, at a cost of DM ten million, in its main goal of establishing profitable cooperatives that could raise the villagers’ standard of living.\footnote{For a breakdown of FRG project appropriations, see Appendix C.} Schnellbach’s choice of unproven production cooperation and his determination to maintain it in the teeth of local fatigue, resistance, and co-op mismanagement robbed the Agou and Nuatja co-ops of whatever chance they might have had to see a profit. Whether he would have done much better by beginning with marketing cooperation is hard to say. Kambolé’s bad experience with cotton and Togo’s general difficulty with rainfall suggest that the answer might have been no. Yet
Schnellbach would at least have avoided the ill will that West German control over Togolese labor created. Furthermore, the West Germans were already trying marketing cooperation in three Dahomeyan villages before the final results of the Togo Model Villages were in. It is to that project I now turn in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3

In Pursuit of Profit: The Cooperatives of Tori Cada, Dahomey, 1962-73

After the unhappy experiences and conclusions that were made in Project FE 344 – Model Villages Togo, it was extremely revealing and pleasing to see what German specialists have achieved up to now in the same area in Dahomey.625

GAWI Official, April 22, 1968

In Dahomey the West Germans thought they had a success, one that made their misadventure in Togo look all the more foolish. In September 1966 GAWI urged von der Decken to look at Tori Cada in setting up and managing a revolving fund for agricultural supplies. “The result up to now in Dahomey has showed that the aura of a genuine, tightly organized cooperative is much greater and attractive than the previous scheme, according to which ‘model villages’ were built up.”626 In truth, the two projects were twins separated at birth, whose varying fates showed the difference a good upbringing could make.

At conception in 1962-63, the Dahomey project began with three “model villages” just like the Schnellbach Plan, but from the design stage in 1964-65 to implementation from 1965, its development followed a different path. The BML rather than the BMZ controlled the project until the end of September, 1970.627 The first manager, Balduin Zimmer, carefully studied and documented the landholding patterns, cultivation practices and family structure of his target villages, something Schnellbach had not done. He quickly turned down production cooperation and mechanization in

625 Memorandum of GAWI, April 22, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4067.
626 GAWI to Dr. H.v.d. Decken, September 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.
favor of marketing cooperation and counseling peasants on their own plots. The three villages would become nuclei for a larger network of cooperatives belonging to a central organization. In this he anticipated what Volkmar Kehrein would later attempt at Kambolé, but he did so more successfully. Rather than promote an exclusively commercial crop like cotton, he encouraged the continued cultivation of maize, though with the better seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and better planting techniques that the West Germans could provide. Schnellbach had brought in DED volunteers only three years after beginning work at Agou—when the DED did not even yet exist—Zimmer planned their commitment from the start. As well as needing their help with marketing cooperation, he saw their work on village improvements, home economics, nutrition and health counseling as an essential complement. They made themselves so indispensable that a BMZ department head remarked in 1968, “They carry the project.” Their word carried so much weight that they were largely responsible for the removal of the project’s second manager, Johannes Fabricius, and his replacement with their own former country commissioner, Martin Dietz. Finally, the Dahomey project seems to have mostly avoided the labor troubles and communal dissatisfaction that so plagued Schnellbach’s team and von der Decken in Agou and Nuatja. The “model villages” label stuck until 1968, when the BML replaced it with “model district,” but the phrase never became a point of contention between the West Germans and their beneficiaries.

Yet the West Germans themselves were ambivalent about their accomplishments. For years they were uncertain whether the cooperatives were really profitable.

628 Extract from Travel Report of Dr. Börnstein, AL I, BMZ, December 12, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4067.
Eventually a special evaluation team found that they were, but not enough to stand on their own without further support. Rather than dwell on the causes of this not-quite-satisfying outcome, the West Germans moved on to a bigger, if not better, regional project in the 1970s. In the meantime, members undercut their own co-ops by selling some of their produce to local traders. The West Germans and their Dahomeyan assistants also tried to convince Dahomeyan peasants that row-planting was superior to broadcasting, but whether the effort was successful or welcome remains unclear. It differed from Schnellbach’s in taking place on peasants’ own land rather than that of the cooperative.

In the pages that follow, I will begin with Balduin Zimmer’s development of his detailed project concept, his successful construction of a cooperative organization, and his agricultural counseling program. Then I will turn to the crisis that began with the arrival of Johannes Fabricius in the fall of 1968 and ended with his departure and replacement in the spring of 1969 by Martin Dietz, the project’s last manager. After discussing the project’s struggle with profitability, I will examine the activities of the DED.

The Villages

The initial model villages of Tori Cada, Zounhoue and Akpé all lay within the same Atlantic Department and the same sub-prefecture of Allada, only fifty to sixty kilometers from the coastal capital of Cotonou.\(^630\) Zimmer investigated them all far more

thoroughly than his colleagues their villages in Togo and Ghana. He and two advisers from the Dahomeyan Agriculture Ministry took more than two months to visit every family and fill out a survey for each one. The populations of each were 2,880, 1,637, and 239, respectively. Average farm sizes were 3.89, 4.4, and 2.33 hectares per household. The first two villages had two male laborers per household, but Akpé had only 1.3, so families there were significantly poorer in both land and male labor. Families lived not in isolated nuclear households, but in “concessions” of four to twenty huts accessible through only one entrance. Concessions contained on average about eighty members, and the largest one hundred. The head of each extended family was usually the oldest male and largest landowner; he enjoyed “rather unlimited authority.” Zimmer regretted that he did not have the chance to further examine property relations within the family.

The surveys allowed a detailed picture of local agriculture, in which more than ninety per cent of Tori Cada’s population engaged. The primary crop was maize. Villagers planted it during the rainy season in March and April, harvested it in August, planted it again, and harvested a second time in December. Others crops included manioc, beans, peanuts, oil palms, coffee, and bananas. Villagers kept hens, goats, and pigs, but cattle-raising was limited to the “Lagunaire” variety because all others were

susceptible to trypanosomiasis, the parasitic sleeping sickness borne by tsetse flies. Agricultural practices were the same in Zounhoué and Akpé. Villagers practiced intercropping, mixing much of their maize with manioc or oil palms, and at Zounhoué their coffee and oil palms. Uncultivated land lay fallow for fifteen to twenty years, while harvests on cultivated land took place twice a year. Women sold the produce, often after purchasing it from the men, and from these earnings they supported themselves and their children.

Distance consumed a lot of energy and time. On average a local peasant family worked about two hectares of scattered parcels, sometimes two or three and sometimes six or seven kilometers apart. Even Tori Cada itself was a sprawling fifteen square kilometers. Villagers had to spend much time and effort carrying harvests home on their heads. As an example, Zimmer cited a hypothetical case of a maize field, one hectare in size, six kilometers away. That single hectare might produce a thousand kilograms of corn cobs. Assuming four trips a day, bringing home the harvest would take ten days. Zimmer did not say whether both genders did this work.

Despite their nearness to Cotonou, the peasants did not prosper. If they sold crops to local traders right after harvest, they had to do so at low prices. The traders were able to hold crops for sale until shortly before the next harvest, when prices were at their

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638 Memorandum of Balduin Zimmer on Why Moto-Mechanization in Dahomey is Premature, undated but under GAWI cover letter of October 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
640 Memorandum of Balduin Zimmer on Why Moto-Mechanization in Dahomey is Premature, undated but under GAWI cover letter of October 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
642 Memorandum of Balduin Zimmer on Why Moto-Mechanization in Dahomey is Premature, undated but under GAWI cover letter of October 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
highest, so that they rather than the peasants profited.\textsuperscript{643} To make matters worse, peasants were dependent on the same traders for credit. A handful took matters into their own hands; fifteen villagers in Akpé had started up a producer cooperative that operated a parcel of six hectares.\textsuperscript{644} Furthermore, despite an annual rainfall of twelve hundred millimeters, the area suffered severe water scarcity during dry season and Tori Cada had no well. Villagers had to haul water, undrinkable by European standards according to Zimmer, from four to ten kilometers away. Because of bad water and poor nutrition, the population suffered from skin diseases, anemia, rickets, and vulnerability to malaria.\textsuperscript{645} Finally, pests consumed up to a quarter of the maize during three months of storage, an incentive for sale right after harvest.\textsuperscript{646}

\textbf{Origin and Concept of the Project}

The Tori Cada project had a complicated beginning that involved several actors, even Swiss ones. In June 1962 the Dahomeyan government requested German agricultural experts and help setting up a cooperative in each of the country’s six departments.\textsuperscript{647} In fact, the West Germans were already thinking about co-ops there. When they learned that the League of Swiss Consumer Associations (VSK) was already active in Dahomey, the FRG hired the VSK’s project manager, Frank Rawyler, to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{643} Monthly Report of Balduin Zimmer for August/September 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\item \textsuperscript{644} Monthly Report of Balduin Zimmer for August/September 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\item \textsuperscript{646} Balduin Zimmer, Plan for the Erecting of Model Villages in Dahomey, undated but initialed by Kern of BMZ on March 9, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\item \textsuperscript{647} Dahomey’s Embassy in Bad Godesberg to Foreign Office, June 16, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4063; Dahomey’s Embassy in Bad Godesberg, June 19, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\end{itemize}
investigate the possibilities and write a report.\textsuperscript{648} Rawyler submitted it near the end of September 1963. Taking his proposal as its basis, the BML applied to the IRA for Technical Aid for three model villages to be organized as cooperatives.\textsuperscript{649} This action triggered a confrontation with the BMZ, which would not win the right to implement technical aid projects until the following year. At the Interministerial Committee’s November 21, 1963 meeting, the BMZ rejected the application because it proposed eventually expanding the cooperatives “to all areas of village life,” an intrusion into the BMZ’s competency of community development (CD). The BML retaliated by blocking a BMZ CD project in the Congo and appealed to the Steering Committee.\textsuperscript{650} On April 3, 1964 the Steering Committee put the Congo project aside for consultation with the FRG embassy in that country, and freed the BML to implement the Dahomey project after further consultation with the Interministerial Committee.\textsuperscript{651} Now the Dahomeyan government imposed a change of location. Because the Swiss were active in the north, Rawyler had recommended putting the West German project in Dahomey’s central region, around Djougou. The Ministry of Agriculture felt, however, that the south had been neglected, so Zimmer picked out Tori-Cada, Akpé and Zounhoué. Unlike Kambolé


\textsuperscript{649} Referat VII B 8, BML, Application to the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, November 13, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4063.

\textsuperscript{650} Extract from the Report of the Foreign Office on the Session of the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, November 21, 1963; Memorandum of RR Dr. Theierl, Referat II B 1, BMZ, December 6, 1963; Dr. Ehmann, BMZ to MinDiri Dr. Martinsteller, BML, February 20, 1964. All are in BArchiv B 213/4067.

\textsuperscript{651} 83\textsuperscript{rd} Session of the Steering Committee on April 3, 1964; Dr. Magura, Referat VII B 7, BML to GAWI, April 30, 1964. Both are in BArchiv B 213/4067.
in Togo, these villages had easier access to markets lying on a main road and rail line to Cotonou, only fifty kilometers to the southeast.\textsuperscript{652}

When Zimmer developed his concept for Tori Cada in 1964, he made sure it would not look like the Togo model villages.\textsuperscript{653} Frank Rawyler had recommended setting up producer cooperatives equipped with tractors and paying co-op members clearing bonuses. Zimmer said no. He rejected mechanization as not yet practical because yields were too low.\textsuperscript{654} Machine costs would exceed earnings by about DM fifty per hectare. Because tractor manufacturers lacked customer service outlets in Dahomey, spare parts were difficult to get. Some tractors in Rawyler’s cooperatives had lain idle for weeks or months due to breakdowns. If used for land clearance, a tractor would require replacement after four years.\textsuperscript{655} Qualified drivers were also scarce in Dahomey. Zimmer rejected producer cooperatives because Dahomeyan peasants disliked them. Their biggest natural communal unit was the extended family, and it was difficult to merge several families into an “economic community-cooperative.”\textsuperscript{656} Rawyler’s clearing bonuses would backfire, he predicted. People would take such work, but when the clearing was done, they would become discontented because they would have no harvest after letting their own fields decline. By receiving regular pay they would feel themselves wage laborers rather than proprietors, and their interest in the cooperative

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Balduin Zimmer, The Plan for The German Project, undated but under GAWI cover letter of August 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\item Balduin Zimmer, Plan for German Project, undated but under GAWI cover letter of August 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\item Balduin Zimmer, Why Moto-Mechanization is Premature, undated but under GAWI cover letter of August 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\item Balduin Zimmer, Plan for Model Villages, Undated but initialed by Kern, BMZ, on March 9, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
would disappear when the bonuses ran out.\(^{657}\) Perhaps Zimmer was already aware of Schnellbach’s labor problems in Agou and Nuatja.

Zimmer instead planned marketing cooperatives that would help peasants toward economically independent family farms with a reliable future income. Co-ops would help smooth out price fluctuations across the year (and bypass extortionate local traders) by using silos to store the grain for three or four months after harvest. By offering advances against the next harvest, they could encourage peasants to clear more land. Whatever profits were available for members after the sale of harvested crops and deduction of their advances would go to them in goods rather than cash or be kept as operating capital for purchasing seeds, fertilizer and pesticides. Eventually the cooperative might be able to purchase machines for communal use. It should also set up a savings and loan operation. To make all these benefits possible, the West Germans would provide startup capital.\(^{658}\)

The West Germans would provide knowledge as well as organization. The project would send to the villages several two-person teams from the new DED to provide advice and demonstrations. In the first phase they would contact the population and study social and economic problems. In the second they would direct advice to interested families, leading the people through “persuasion, example, and working together.” They would of course train domestic counterparts to take over after the Germans left. Agricultural counseling would help peasants with good seedbed preparation, better crop management through isolation (i.e. more space between plants) and hoeing, pest control, and harvest


\(^{658}\) Balduin Zimmer, Plan for German Project, undated but under GAWI cover letter of August 27, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4067.
timing. The project would also set up a community field for demonstrations and extra income toward future goods purchases; Zimmer did not say who would work it. There would be a two-hectare ranch for breeding the project’s cattle; the FAO would provide the first parent stock and German experts would maintain it. Most important, a new center for coordinating the whole project would offer courses of instruction on modern devices during periods of little work and demonstrate new technology and methods. It would also allow the cooperation members, counterparts, and West German advisers to exchange opinions and experiences. The project would poach on the BMZ’s CD turf, as the BMZ had feared. Zimmer remarked that agricultural counseling and development (ländliche Animation) was incomplete without measures for home economics (Hauswirtschaft), including better housing, nutrition, hygiene, and health. So the project would bring in two women volunteers, a social worker and a nurse. Eventually the DED agreed to send a carpenter, a smith, a mechanic, two to four practical farmers, a nurse, and a home economics teacher, all responsible to him.

Zimmer filled out important details in a second version of his plan, drafted in early 1965. He recommended a specific four-year sequence for crop rotation beginning with legumes, and then alternating maize with peanuts, cotton, and manioc; it is not clear whether he actually implemented this aspect of the plan. The project would ease water collection by building cisterns and wells to free villagers from having several kilometers or more a day so they could spend the time on other tasks. Better water would improve the people’s health. Water was also a prerequisite to raising cattle and applying

659 Ibid.
pesticides to cotton fields. The cooperatives would provide metal silos to protect grain from pests, but also diversify their products by storing and processing coffee and peanuts. Because shelling machines for these crops were expensive, the cooperative would keep them in the main building.\(^{662}\)

Zimmer laid out the process for organizing cooperatives. In the first stage, small cooperatives would form with about forty to fifty farms, representing four or five extended families. In the second, three cooperatives would amalgamate into a group sharing a common carpentry shop and smithy. Each pair of groups would maintain drying facilities so that maize need not dry in the field where it was vulnerable to pests. In the final stage, four groups would combine into an association with a central organization and headquarters. He therefore expected to set up twelve co-ops in all. After three years the organization could set up a savings and loan fund. Because there was no umbrella organization for cooperatives in Dahomey, the government’s Cooperative Service would audit the books. Normally one would expect prospective cooperative members to buy a share, but because peasants here lacked cash, early entrants would be able to contribute labor instead.\(^{663}\)

**Cooperatives and Counseling in Action**

Zimmer and his co-op experts created two levels of organization: the individual cooperatives and the central cooperative, the *Union des Coopératives de la Région de Tori* (UCRT); he dropped the intermediate groups of three without comment. Each co-op had a three-member administrative council, with president, vice-president and secretary. Each president sat on the UCRT’s executive board. At the UCRT, three board members

\(^{662}\) Balduin Zimmer, Plan for Model Villages, Undated but initialed by Kern, BMZ, on March 9, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4067.

\(^{663}\) Ibid.
formed the UCRT’s own administrative council and the rest sat on the supervisory board.\textsuperscript{664} There was also a guardianship council composed of teachers, clerics and bureaucrats from the UCRT’s territory supposed to ensure honest and efficient management. Both levels were governed by statutes that expert Lothar Heck drew up in collaboration with Dahomey’s \textit{Service de Cooperation}.\textsuperscript{665} The organization seems to have had a statute dated July 10, 1966 and been registered with the Dahomeyan government on August 10, though the only statute appearing in the file is dated July 7, 1969.\textsuperscript{666} In early 1969 the UCRT Administrative Council included President Paul Comlan, First Vice President Dossou Tcholinou Kindonou, Second Vice President Ignace Hounsou, First Secretary Lucien Lima, Second Secretary Isidore Zinsou and Honorary President Dossou Gbessiho.\textsuperscript{667} Each co-op employed two persons for purchasing and sales, two workers and an office employee.\textsuperscript{668}

Before and after a co-op was founded Zimmer and Heck held mass meetings with prospective and present members to explain the principles of cooperation. They also worked hard to instruct the newly elected administrative council, which met each month.\textsuperscript{669} They apparently had help from Togolese colleagues or expected to, because the project files contain a French-language checklist of how to organize a co-op. Organizers should begin with discussion among the local chief, council members, and “influential personages.” They would fix the initial meeting date, which the chief would


\textsuperscript{665} Lothar Heck to GAWI, February 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4067.

\textsuperscript{666} GAWI to Referate II A 2 and I B 4, BMZ, October 23, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4068; Statuts de l’Union des Cooperatives de la Region de Tori (U.C.R.T.), July 7, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4068.


\textsuperscript{668} Lothar Heck to GAWI, February 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4067.

\textsuperscript{669} Lothar Heck to GAWI, February 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4067.
publicize no more than fifteen days in advance. The meeting should take place somewhere that offered shelter from sun, wind, rain and noise. Necessary equipment would include seats for attendees, a small black table, measuring sticks and writing materials. Organizers should welcome attendees with a handshake, thank them for coming, and announce the agenda. They should avoid smoking, be “polite but firm,” and keep the meeting to about an hour and a half, forty-five minutes for explanation, and forty-five for discussion. They should explain the task of the “agricultural agent” (apparently the UCRT employee who would purchase their produce), overcome peasant distrust, give examples of the difference between peasant and “agricultural agent,” and introduce a “convinced peasant” to persuade prospective members.670

Zimmer had considerable success propagating cooperation, but West German records contradict each other as to how many co-ops there were, and how many members they had. Various estimates from 1966 and 1967 gave figures of ten co-ops representing four hundred sixty-seven members, two officially registered co-ops with more than five hundred members, thirteen with eleven hundred, and twelve with eight hundred sixty-one members.671 In 1971 project manager Dietz told author Jürgen Maiwald that there were seventeen hundred and sixty members.672 Some of the confusion may be due to the distinction between registered co-ops with “proven” members and pre-cooperatives, which had to wait a year before registering.673 An evaluation team led by Andreas

670 Processus D’Organisation et de Tenue de Reunions, undated, BArchiv B 213/4067.
Bodenstedt in 1972 found six registered co-ops with four hundred twenty-one members as of 1971 and twenty-four pre-co-ops with fifteen hundred and eight members. In 1972 there were thirty-one co-ops with an unknown number of members. The co-ops embraced far more than three villages; a 1968 note from the Dahomeyan government listed five communities with co-ops--Tori Cada, Dohinouko, Azouhoué Aliho, Azouhoué Cada, and Soyo-Drabo—and proposed to add Adjadi Cossoé, Adjadi Batta, Adjadi Zoungomé, Azouhoué Hounbo, Hèkandji, Tori Bossito, Gbovié, Honvié, Tori Gbégoudo, Agouako, Avamè, and Tokoli. It is not clear what happened to Zounhoué and Akpé, but perhaps they were tacitly included with Tori Cada.

The cooperatives engaged in two lines of business. The first and most important was acquiring members’ crops with payment of an advance, storing them for sale, and then finding appropriate buyers. In 1966, for example, West German-supplied drying facilities and two silos allowed the co-ops to store more than two hundred tons of maize with the possibility of selling them early next year at double the price. Other crops included tobacco, cotton, peanuts, coffee, and especially palm seeds. The second line of business was selling goods to the rural population. By February 1967 there was a monthly turnover of more than three hundred thousand CFA with an assortment of fifty

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675 Government of Dahomey to FRG, Project of Technical Aid as Renewal and Expansion of the Model Villages Tori Action, undated but under West German embassy cover letter of March 14, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.
items. Buyers saved five to thirty percent from the retail price because the co-op could buy directly from importers and wholesalers. The co-op sold powdered milk and construction materials at cost because of their importance to “village development.”

Other items included petroleum and the grinding of maize (the main products at the Tori Cada store until November 1966), and cement, corrugated metal, petroleum, lamps, salt, tomato paste, soap, and detergent (at the Tori-Bossito store from February 1967). Co-op expert Hans Hansen also mentioned bush knives, clocks, and cloth.

At the same time the West Germans ran their counseling program, using their own experts and volunteers as well as Dahomeyan government employees. Some of the latter included Léopold Chablis, Placide Koussanou, Victor N’Djigio, Antoine Atakin, Léopold Bovis, and Jean-Claude Malehossou. Like Schnellbach in Togo and in defiance of local practice, the counselors were especially at pains to get peasants to plant their maize kernels in rows rather than broadcast them (Breitsaat or semis traditionnel). Everyone claimed success, but figures varied. Zimmer claimed that broadcasting yielded eleven hundred and fifty-two kilograms per hectare, but row-planting yielded eighteen hundred seventy-four kilograms. The following year a BML official gave figures of seven hundred and seventeen hundred, respectively. In 1971 Dietz gave Maiwald still lower

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678 Lothar Heck to GAWI, February 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4067.
684 Extract from Travel Report of Miss RegDir Dr. Hoffmann, BML for Togo, Dahomey, Chad and Central African Republic from March 9 – March 30, 1968, undated, BArchiv B 213/4064. She stated the figures as 0.7 and 1.7 tons.
figures of six and twelve hundred. No one seems to have compared the labor requirements of each method. David Ogoundélé, an instructor (moniteur) for Dahomey’s Agricultural Service asserted that “the peasants in general are convinced of the profitability of this method.” Those who were not merely did not want to “shake off their laziness,” but even these would become convinced. Why peasants should be too “lazy” to want higher yields he did not say.

A memorandum explained how counselors should handle meetings. The speaker should first explain the meeting’s purpose with reference to choice of ground, choice of seeds, method of preparing them, timing of sowing, and the method of sowing. The speaker could also sound out the audience by asking helpful questions such as “Why have you found one [sowing method] better than the other?” Possible responses might include the number of poquets (apparently the planting holes) per hectare, the ease of replacing missing plants, the ease of weeding, the ease of harvesting, or high productivity. The speaker might also compare the performance of two hypothetical peasants, Hounsou using the traditional method and Thomas sowing in rows. While Hounsou might cover a larger area, both would dig an equal number of poquets. The speaker might also demonstrate by tracing two five-meter squares in the dirt, and having participants use hoes or some other customary tools to test the two methods side by side. The memo claimed “Assuredly the two numbers will not be equal and the larger number will be the one with poquets aligned.” Or the speaker might cite real-life examples from the project. The problem with these guidelines, however, was that they allowed the meetings to have only one predetermined outcome: peasant acceptance of row-planting.

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685 Maiwald, 33.
687 Exemple d’Exposé sur le Semis en Ligne, undated, BArchiv B 213/4067.
A defense of broadcasting, which Zimmer and the counselors stigmatized as “traditional,” was not allowed.

Row-planting had severe drawbacks, however. First, it required more labor, as Dietz admitted off-handedly in 1971, hence the “laziness” that Ogoundélé complained about. If the West Germans had investigated further, they might have found the number of work hours per kilogram of maize was higher with row-planting than with broadcasting. Second, it sacrificed the benefits of intercropping. Zimmer had observed that peasants interspersed maize with manioc or oil palms, but he does not seem to have understood the significance of this practice. As Chapter 1 explained, intercropping can combine crops with different nutrient needs, smooth labor peaks, and discourage pests or diseases. Row-planting meant monocropping, which made the stalks more vulnerable to mass predation. The West Germans never confessed to such a problem, but when Kenyan peasant Silas Kataina, a participant in Australia’s Magarini Settlement Project (1977-88), planted maize in rows, mice started at one end and ate their way to the other, so he lost a whole crop. Dahomeyans who refused to “shake off their laziness” might have sensed this risk. Dietz complained to Maiwald that many farmers still believed planting crisscross or higgledy-piggledy (kreuz und quer) was easier and faster than row planting. The possibility that the peasants with their knowledge of local conditions may have been right never seems to have occurred to him, because he saw them and their practices through the colonial gaze.

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690 Porter, Allen and Thompson, 194-96.
691 Maiwald, 36.
While encouraging the formation and maintenance of cooperatives, the West Germans carried out their building program. They supplied silos and encouraged co-op members to excavate and build cisterns. In 1968 GAWI official Dr. H. Flachs found the number of buildings impressive. Tori Cada itself had an office building, a house for six people, a double hall with mechanic’s and carpentry shops, spare parts storage, agricultural office, storage spaces, the co-op’s storage, and a store. There were also stall complexes for pigs and cattle, a small magazine under construction, two garages, a cistern (capacity one hundred fifty cubic meters), an aid station with two dwelling rooms (already existing before the project, but expanded under Zimmer), an assembly hall that also served as waiting room for the aid station, a well with motor pump and water connection to the headquarters, a well with hand pump as well as wash place and shower for the villagers. Zounhoué had a house for six people, a hall with maize silos, a deep well, and a cistern. Other villages or hamlets with wells, cisterns, and/or storage halls included Zoungoudo, Gbegoudo, Kanta, Doinoko, Tanto, Azohé-Aliho, and Azohé-Cada. Of course, as the number of co-ops grew, so did the number of buildings needed. In fact, Zimmer had built too much too quickly; he generated a material cost overrun of sixteen thousand DM in August 1968 and asked for sixty thousand more.

In the project’s early days the West Germans took great pride in their success. The contrast with Schnellbach’s project could only make Tori Cada look good. In July 1966, the same month in which it issued the first grim warnings about the Togo Model Villages project, GAWI wrote that Zimmer had created “the basis for a genuine

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693 Travel Report of Dr. H. Flachs, Agricultural Department, GAWI, September 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.
694 Memorandum of Referat VII B 5, BML, August 21, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.
cooperative formation” in less than a year.\textsuperscript{695} At a DED evaluation seminar in Cotonou, volunteers and country commissioner agreed that the “model village” project in Dahomey had developed into a conspicuous “model project.” By contrast, the model villages in Togo were less well prepared.\textsuperscript{696} Ambassador von Kameke praised DED Country Commissioner Dietz for his “skillful, understanding manner of handling his protégés,” which had helped them develop “astounding initiative.”\textsuperscript{697} Zimmer even received a decoration from the Dahomeyan government, as GAWI and Ambassador Horstmann were pleased to note.\textsuperscript{698} The BML’s 1968 application to the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid boasted that the experts and volunteers at Tori Cada were already working “with great success.” Zimmer himself drew praise for helping the project develop “in exemplary fashion” (\textit{mustergültig}) under his leadership. The West Germans’ work had already contributed to higher crop yields and earnings for co-op members as well as improved living and health conditions for the population.\textsuperscript{699} When the Committee met, it was informed that “A systematic adaptation of production to the actually existing demand has led to the project [sic] working profitably.”\textsuperscript{700} Yet profitability would turn out to be the project’s weakness. In the meantime, there were other problems.

The savings and loan fund that Zimmer envisioned came about only under Dietz, and it did not work out as hoped. For one thing, GAWI took fright when Dietz had

\textsuperscript{695} Memorandum of GAWI, July 19, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\textsuperscript{697} Ambassador von Kameke, Embassy in Cotonou to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, September 03, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4067.
\textsuperscript{698} GAWI to Referate I A 6, I B 3 and I B 4, BMZ and Referat VII B 5, BML, October 20, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4064; Ambassador Horstmann, Embassy in Cotonou to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, November 24, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4064.
\textsuperscript{699} Referat VII B 5, BML, Application to the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, March 4, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
\textsuperscript{700} Extract from Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, March 20, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
revealed not only that the fund existed, but that Dietz himself had deposited money into it, becoming a creditor of the UCRT. So did several volunteers, the dispensary, some co-op members and several strangers for a total of DM ninety-five hundred. Dietz was presently the UCRT’s business manager as well as project manager; what were his commercial intentions on the UCRT’s behalf? After receiving Dietz’s arguments for the fund, GAWI wrote the BMZ with a dozen objections. Dietz’s participation as depositor, for instance, was irreconcilable with his independence as project manager. No one had ever before tried to draw interest from his own development project. Furthermore, money-lending required specific abilities that knowledge that project personnel did not have. GAWI’s concerns became moot when the project closed down the fund. Volunteer Bernd Baumann explained that the UCRT’s offer to pay savers three-percent interest was less attractive than the Dahomeyan Post Office’s three-and-a-half percent. The UCRT tried lending at six percent, but few would-be borrowers could put up collateral.

Despite the lack of Togo-like cooperative production, the project still had some labor troubles as well as difficulty with one German’s poor attitude toward “Africans.” Hans Hansen complained in 1967 about the “African” secretary in the office, “whose work performance lay in no relation to her overpaid salary,” so that the project had to hire two apprentices to assist her. The Germans had to turn over business manager to the authorities for fraud, for which he received four months in jail and five years of

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probation. Hansen observed drily that he had stolen only eight hundred CFA, a far smaller amount than business managers would have stolen in other companies, according to “influential people at the court in Cotonou.” He was in any case not able to handle the demands of a “steadily expanding enterprise.” Hansen also dismissed three laborers, who mostly “walked around unobserved and failed when it came to work.” The work, consisting of loading and unloading or cleaning up, was now done by the piece, which encouraged workers to do the job much better and more quickly.\textsuperscript{704} That was his side of the story. In the view of DED country commissioner Dr. Reuke, Hansen had an “absolutely impossible attitude” toward the Dahomeyans. “That has showed itself not only in daily arguments, but also in many utterances of Mr. Hansen in relation to the abilities of the indigenous [people].”\textsuperscript{705} Once again, a German employer viewed laborers through the colonial gaze to explain away undesirable behavior. This time, however, a German official challenged a German expert’s dismissive and probably racist attitude. Hansen had not kept his hostile views private and confined them to correspondence with Bonn, but was causing open friction with Dahomeyans. His behavior thus resembled that of Zillich and Hofmeier, who had become \textit{personae non gratae} for a while among Togolese villagers. Yet Hansen does not seem to have suffered any administrative discipline or official reprimand. Furthermore, Reuke represented an organization that prided itself on “solidarity” with Third World peoples and may have been more sensitive than GAWI or the BMZ to racist slurs against project employees and beneficiaries.

Hansen also used his position to reshape the membership and leadership. In late 1967, he held assemblies to expel members who caused “great problems” in repaying

\textsuperscript{705} Dr. Reuke, Country Commissioner, DED Dahomey to Reinders, DED, March 6, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4068.
advances against future harvests and had not listened to their agricultural counselor. At the same time, the UCRT admitted non-members with good references from a counselor. Of eight hundred seventy-three belonging to co-ops, ninety-three lost their membership and more than a hundred thirty lost the right to collect advances. A hundred new members joined at the same time. Hansen also replaced “so far as necessary” vice-presidents or presidents unwilling to enter their offices.  

So he arrogated to himself even greater authority than Schnellbach, Hofmeier and Zillich had exercised over co-ops in Agou and Nuatja.

Finding and training an indigenous project manager turned out to be a serious difficulty. Hansen complained in 1967 that the counterpart problem was not even close to being solved, particularly that of the future project leader. Dahomey would also have to provide a cooperative expert and a good bookkeeper. Only in late 1969, two year’s after Hansen’s complaint, did Dahomey provide one: Gratien Zanouvi. He had received three years of training in Ivory Coast and worked in the Dahomeyan coastal town of Ouidah, but the embassy wanted him to have additional training at the University of Aix in Marseilles. The Dahomeyan government registered its approval for the training. Unfortunately, resentment against Zanouvi had already broken out in Tori Cada. He disappears from the project file without even an indication as to whether he made it to France or not. A new counterpart named Fassasi joined the project in his stead.

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709 Embassy in Cotonou to BMZ, January 22, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4068.
710 Dahomeyan Government to Embassy in Cotonou, July 17, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4068.
on June 23, 1972. He came with education as an agricultural engineer in Ivory Coast, France and the Soviet Union, and five years of experience in northern Dahomey.  

**The Stillborn Tenure of Johannes Fabricius**

Balduin Zimmer’s impending departure in the early autumn of 1968 threw the project into its one great crisis, because finding a new project manager proved to be extremely difficult. After passing over two of Zimmer’s project colleagues as unsuitable, the BML brought in gardener Johannes Fabricius, only to find that he aroused so much furious opposition from Zimmer, the DED volunteers, and even officials from Bonn it had to dump him within months for another man: former DED country commissioner Martin Dietz. Fabricius seems to have suffered from two fatal flaws, his lack of qualifications and a personality that inspired deep mistrust in co-workers.

Neither Hans Hansen nor Immo Richter, himself a former DED volunteer on the project, would do as project manager. To DED officials, Hansen’s relationship with the volunteers had been “problematic” from the start. Dr. Reuke told Dr. Flachs of GAWI that Hansen was very diligent and experienced in co-op matters but failed to understand the importance of agriculture and village work. He never found the right attitude toward the DED and the relationship between them was “destroyed by two particular incidents.” What those were Flachs did not note. Zimmer also dismissed Hansen’s French ability as insufficient. Richter had been active in the project for two years with the DED and his French was supposed to be very good, but Flachs doubted that either Hansen or most

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volunteers would acknowledge him even as a transitional project manager.\footnote{Travel Report of Dr. H. Flachs, Agricultural Department, GAWI, September 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.} Dr. Reuke estimated in a file memo that at least four and probably eight volunteers would not work in the project under Hansen. As for Richter, Reuke did not see it as “permissible” \textit{(angängig)} to force the volunteers to work under someone who had been part of their group just months earlier.\footnote{Attachment 6 to Travel Report of Dr. H. Flachs, Agricultural Department, GAWI, September 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.}

GAWI therefore sent in Fabricius, and the resistance to him was immediate and fierce. Long before he arrived, Ambassador Horstmann warned against appointing him for longer than several months and urged GAWI to keep looking.\footnote{Ambassador U. Horstmann, Embassy in Cotonou to MinDir Pirkmayr, BML, June 16, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} When Fabricius did arrive in Cotonou on October 22, 1968, almost everyone tried to get rid of him. According to Fabricius, the volunteers assembled on October 28 and made a decision against him even though some had not met him yet.\footnote{Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to GAWI, November 1, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} Zimmer suggested transferring project control to a “committee of four” instead of Fabricius.\footnote{Zimmer, Fabricius to GAWI, October 31, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} It would include Hansen, Richter, DED architect Buse and DED mechanic Bauer, all men.\footnote{Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to GAWI, November 1, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} Horstmann objected that Fabricius was neither an experienced tropical farmer nor cooperative expert nor someone with expertise in village work. He would also not be able to handle negotiating with the Dahomeyan government during the project’s next phase. Horstmann begged for the man’s immediate recall so as to end his “especially difficult human situation.” Trying to foist him onto the project would lead volunteers to quit and GAWI workers to request
Zimmer wired GAWI on November 2, expanding upon Fabricius’s insufficiencies. He had no knowledge of local crops, or of rural cooperation and marketing. His ability in French was “wholly insufficient.” Nor could his technical ignorance be balanced out by a “prominent [profilierte] personality.” Zimmer added that Fabricius had lost all confidence of his workers “in an utterance…in which he said a falsehood and argued completely contradictorily.”

At this early stage, Fabricius had an important defender in Bonn: Ministerialdirigent Pirkmayr of the BML. To Horstmann Pirkmayr wrote that the Foreign Office, the BMZ, GAWI and the DED agreed on November 11 that the proposed committee of four was impractical. At present there was no one else who could replace Zimmer. So when Fabricius finished a consulting report on fruit and vegetable cultivation in Chad in September, the BML was pleased to find someone whose qualifications approached what they were looking for. If he had not been available, the BML would have had to consider stopping the project; it was very difficult to find qualified agricultural experts with the ability to speak French. Fabricius should therefore lead the project for six months until a final decision about the position was made, provided that he should consult with the DED’s country commissioner and with Horstmann himself on an ongoing basis. Pirkmayr asked the ambassador to support Fabricius and give him a chance.

He then wrote BMZ Ministerialdirektor Dr. Börnstein, now at the embassy in Cotonou, asking him to ease the situation. Perhaps he

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719 Ambassador Horstmann, Embassy in Cotonou to Referat Z B 6, Foreign Office, November 1, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
720 Zimmer to GAWI, November 2, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063. This document may be the same one referred to by Horstmann, postdated by a day.
721 Ministerialdirigent Pirkmayr, Referat VII B 5, BML to Ambassador Horstmann, Embassy in Cotonou, November 11, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
should let the dissidents know that Zimmer had also considered none of them suitable, since this “rebellion” might be arising from the hopes of several to become the next project manager.\textsuperscript{722}

Fabricius’s self-presentation in his correspondence during November was one of innocence unfairly accused. He had acted contrary to neither contract nor mission, and called the group’s actions “overhasty, emotion and imprudent.” The volunteers had “no clear idea about the practical and actual continuation of the project.” He pointed out quite reasonably that no one on the “committee of four” was authorized to sign anything on the project’s behalf or to have access to its bank account.\textsuperscript{723} On the 17th, he complained that the latest letters to GAWI from Zimmer and the DED’s country commissioner (November 3 and 13) contained “partly insulting, distorting, untrue contents,” for which he did not understand their motives. He now believed the three GAWI workers other than Zimmer, i.e. Hansen, Richter and one other, were ready for “objective, loyal collaboration.” Since he perceived the solid coalition (\textit{Frontstellung}) against him even in his first days in Dahomey, it must have been based on preconceived opinions. All negotiations happened “behind my back” or “over my head.” Fabricius had no counterproposals, but he pointed out that eight of the volunteers would be going on annual leave in two weeks.\textsuperscript{724} An encouraging letter from Pirkmayr strengthened Fabricius’s confidence, so on the 24\textsuperscript{th} that the latter claimed the situation was “normalized to a large extent,” and again wrote that the GAWI workers had assured him of their willingness to “loyal and correct collaboration.” As for the volunteers, the bulk

\textsuperscript{722} Ministerialdirigent Pirkmayr to Ministerialdirektor Dr. Börnstein, c/o Embassy in Cotonou, November 12, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
\textsuperscript{723} Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to GAWI, November 1, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
\textsuperscript{724} Johannes Fabricius to GAWI, November 17, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063. The third man was Georg Kölbl. See GAWI to Georg Kölbl, December 4, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.
of the group was going on leave the next month anyways, and several of them were leaving the project.\footnote{Johannes Fabricius to GAWI, November 24, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} He asked Pirkmayr for clarity about his long-term situation.\footnote{Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to Ministerialdirigent Pirkmayr, BML, November 30, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.}

The project manager’s situation was grave, though he did not know it yet. Behind his back, the embassy suggested replacing him with Dietz or possibly the Duke of Oldenburg.\footnote{Embassy in Cotonou to BMZ, BML, November 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} The BML had supported keeping Fabricius in place for the next six months, but it forwarded the embassy’s telegram to GAWI with the request to follow up.\footnote{Schulze, Referat BVII B 5, BML to GAWI, November 19, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} In mid-December, two DED officials wrote the BML that Dietz was willing to assume project leadership and could do so beginning May 1969. According to Dietz, the volunteers, the current country commissioner and the embassy would all welcome him taking the reins.\footnote{Reinhold, Reinders, DED to BML, December 11, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4063.} The next day Dr. Börnstein submitted his report on Tori Cada. The decision of the ministries to leave Fabricius in place for the time being was “unsustainable and bypasses the realities.” Fabricius freely acknowledged his lack of knowledge and experience for this project, but he also lacked the necessary leadership qualities. Among the fourteen DED volunteers were several “especially intellectual [individuals] with especially ideal initiative and activity.” The ministerial decision could kill the project and “annihilate” Fabricius personally and in his reputation, when he might otherwise be used in another project. Bonn should send a new manager as soon as possible who possessed “youth leader qualities.”\footnote{Extract from Travel Report of AL I Dr. Börnstein, BMZ, December 12, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4067.}

The DED’s current country commissioner, Dr. Reuke, sent horrified reports to the home office about Fabricius’s behavior. The project manager announced that he was no
longer ready to provide a car for the volunteers’ Saturday morning supply runs. He was now making decisions with his three GAWI colleagues alone without the DED team leader; the leader, Mr. Strehler, offered to resign. In this and other cases volunteers felt treated like common laborers (Hilfsarbeiter) by Fabricius, but also by their former colleague, Richter. When Reuke asked for a discussion of Fabricius’s conception for the project, the latter replied, “Oh, we’ll certainly see again later.” While in November Reuke saw Fabricius as merely “unsuited” because of the “hopelessly poisoned relations to the volunteers,” in January he considered him “absolutely unbearable.” In Bad Godesberg DED officials concluded that an extension of Fabricius’s contract term beyond April would cause the volunteers to leave and the DED to give up its participation.731 On January 10, Fabricius had further evaded discussion of a project conception and contentious discussion about construction and village work. He had already tried to exclude architect Buse from the meeting, and now admitted under pressure that he saw no need for Buse’s contract to be renewed. When village work was finally discussed on January 14, Fabricius made it obvious that he did not understand it. Reuke closed his account by remarking “I hardly believe that I must append to the above remarks a renewed plea for the quick takeover of the project by Mr. Dietz.”732 To GAWI Fabricius acknowledged requesting Buse’s transfer because of “unjustified opposition and the refusal to accept instructions. Buse had already caused unnecessary expense through “unauthorized measures.”733

731 Dr. P. Molt, i.V., Reinders, DED to RegDir Dr. Hoffmann, BML, January 13, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063. Reuke’s report does not appear in the file, but this letter quotes it at several points.  
733 Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to GAWI, January 23, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.
Fabricius was doomed. Dr. Börnstein urged upon the BML and GAWI a swift replacement, hiring a new project leader now, if possible, to act until Dietz was available in May. At a meeting of BML and BMZ officials on February 5 Pirkmayr agreed with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Börnstein that a project manager who did not enjoy the confidence of German embassy and host government and who could not work well with other Germans in the project was intolerable “in the long run.” Although a sort of “domestic ceasefire” (Burgfrieden) with the volunteers now prevailed, tensions would come back into the open if Fabricius kept the project management. His technical ability was also “not uncontested.” Either Dietz or some other “suitable personality” must take over. Fabricius knew the knives were out. By January 7, he heard from Dr. Reuke that the BML and BMZ had decided to replace him with Dietz. On that day and in further messages he requested from GAWI an unequivocal statement about his future on the project. Dr. Inge Hoffmann at the BML finally put Fabricius out of his misery in March. The BML, BMZ and GAWI all now agreed that it would be best, and in Fabricius’s own interest, to release him from his task in Dahomey. GAWI might send him to the Bamako area in Mali, where a qualified gardener with good French was urgently needed for consulting in vegetable cultivation. The mission there would take three months, beginning in May. Dietz would succeed him in that month. And so it

734 Dr. Börnstein, Referat I B 3, BMZ to BML, GAWI, January 23, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.
735 Memorandum of ORR Dr. Preuss, Referat II B 4, February 6, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4068.
736 Johannes Fabricius to GAWI, January 7, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063; Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to GAWI, January 23, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063; Johannes Fabricius to GAWI, February 16, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063; Johannes Fabricius, Dipl.-Gtn. to RegDir Dr. Inge Hoffmann, BML, uncertain date, BArchiv B 213/4063. The letter is misdated as January 5, but refers to Fabricius’s previous letters of January 5, January 23 and February 16. Even a BML or BMZ official handling the document was confused, noting “Februar?” on it.
737 RegDir Dr. Hoffmann, Referat VII B 5, BML to Diplomgärtner Johannes Fabricius, March 19, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.
was; Dietz arrived in Dahomey on May 26, 1969.\textsuperscript{738} Fabricius remained in the development aid industry and went back to gardening.\textsuperscript{739}

**The Unsuccessful Search for Profitability**

The project’s success rose or fell with the UCRT’s profitability, but determining whether the co-op was profitable made difficulties. First, the West Germans’ patchy crop reporting left gaps that make it difficult to get an overview of their sales. The annual reports of Hansen and Dietz lacked figures for maize in 1968-69, palm seeds in 1967-68, and coffee from 1967 to 1970. Dietz also returned quarterly reports that either lacked figures or gave ones that, when combined, came in a little below or a little above the annual figures.\textsuperscript{740} Second, they failed to keep accurate books, and here Balduin Zimmer was the culprit. GAWI’s Dr. Flachs believed that the books, kept by two volunteers, were in order. He praised Zimmer’s “exactness” in handling money.\textsuperscript{741} Unfortunately, Flachs was wrong. At the end of January GAWI informed the BML that on the date of the project’s transfer from Zimmer to Fabricius on November 11, 1968 there were discrepancies between figures in the transfer protocol and the statements GAWI had received before. The amounts in doubt were high enough for the agency to send Dr. Zinkernagel from its Internal Audit Department.\textsuperscript{742} From his examination, Zinkernagel drew several embarrassing conclusions. Zimmer’s accounting of operating and revolving funds had to be rejected; he had consciously submitted figures out of line with the project

\textsuperscript{738} GAWI to Embassy in Cotonou, May 20, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4064.  
\textsuperscript{739} See Dr. Sartorius, Referat IV 5, BfE to BMZ, March 6, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4068.  
\textsuperscript{741} Travel Report of Dr. H. Flachs, Agricultural Department, GAWI, September 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.  
\textsuperscript{742} GAWI to Referat VII B 5, January 29, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.
books, and understated receipts. Up to October 1967 the project books were incomplete, useless for a seamless verification of financial events. Also up to the same month, conspicuous discrepancies between bank account and entries in the ledger that needed clearing up, something Zimmer must help with. False entries in GAWI’s records for the operating fund also needed correction. Various buildings and all vehicles were omitted from the co-ops, so these must be activated. The division of costs between project and co-op did not follow the “cost-cause” principle. The profit and loss statement indicated a more favorable result than should have actually resulted, taking all costs into account.\footnote{Evaluation Report of Dipl.-Kfm. Dr. Zinkernagel, GAWI, March 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.}

In its cover letter to the BML and BMZ, GAWI drew attention to other facts. Zimmer had only partly declared income from cattle, artificial fertilizer and other sources and stated expenditures that the undeclared income had already paid for or did not rise to the amount declared. This gap between declared and actual funds created a “quiet reserve” of 559,224 CFA (DM 9059). There was a previously undisclosed side account valued at 142,512 CFA (DM 2309). In a meeting with Dr. Zinkernagel and Dr. Heisch, the embassy’s legation counselor, Zimmer explained that by forming a hidden reserve and making the project’s financial situation appear unfavorable, he hoped to prompt the FRG to make available funds to expand the project. GAWI cautioned, however, that nothing had showed Zimmer to have extracted “personal advantages” from his measures.\footnote{GAWI to Referat VII B 5, BML, Referat I B 2, BMZ, April 11, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.}

GAWI later politely drew a veil over Zimmer’s admittedly fraudulent behavior. On July 4, 1969, it wrote the ministries that it had finished investigating the audit results. In spite of all the defects in Zimmer’s bookkeeping, GAWI pronounced them
“insignificant.” The sum of all invoices nearly agreed with the sum of all payments, so that there was a difference of only 12,579 CFA or about DM two hundred. Further detailed investigation would not change the result enough to be worthwhile. Later that year, GAWI required Dietz rather than Zimmer to provide a proper accounting of assets and liabilities.

The third problem was separating UCRT operations, which were supposed to make a profit, from those of the project, which were not. Dr. Theierl, writing at a time when the BML still controlled the project, complained about this issue to the BMZ’s State Secretary in January 1970, when the BML applied for a project extension. He wanted the BML to clearly separate the individual project parts and eliminate items from the UCRT’s account, such as cisterns or wells, not necessary for running the business. Planning documents should explain how profitability calculations would reveal which parts were viable or not. FRG participation in the co-op’s running costs should decline over time, to be replaced by loans from Dahomeyan banks. The BML had given him no satisfaction. He concluded that “Whether profitability can be achieved in the future is uncertain.” In March 1970, Dietz claimed in response that “The issue of the demarcation between the cooperative union obliged to profitability and the remaining project realm relying on subsidies is practically cleared up.” To the latter category he assigned general project administration, agricultural counseling and production promotion, animal husbandry, village work and health care, and craft businesses.

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746 GAWI Memorandum on Discussions with Martin Dietz from November 17 to 24, 1969, December 3, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.
747 MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to State Secretary, BMZ, January 8, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4068.
mechanic’s shop, construction upkeep and carpentry shop). He assumed that during the coming years the cooperative would work with its own funds.  

During and after the struggle with accounting issues, several West Germans doubted the UCRT’s profitability. In his September 1969 business report, Hans Hansen complained that “several costs, like wages and transportation, were very high.” The operating statement and balance sheet showed that “the UCRT is still far from a profitable enterprise.” The business year 1968-69 closed with a “pure profit” of merely 62,536 CFA. To be sure, he reconsidered this judgment in a later memorandum, in which he argued that the UCRT would have earned a half million CFA but for the 2.5 million in taxes charged by the Dahomeyan government. This rosy view did not spread to others. On a May 1970 letter from Dietz to Josef Hansen at the BMZ, an official—probably Hansen himself—noted that it remained an open question whether the project [sic] could become “profitable and viable” in the coming years. “Until now [only] losses were recorded [gewirtschaftet].” In his report for the 1969-70 business year Dietz admitted that the UCRT had not yet achieved profitability, but argued that with “progressive consolidation of the enterprise profitability can…be expected in the future.” He was too optimistic. In September 1970 he sent GAWI profitability calculations with statements of future profits and losses. When GAWI presented the BfE with Dietz’s cost and budget estimates, it projected a future deficiency of DM

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748 Martin Dietz to GAWI, March 24, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4063.
The UCRT would not be able to cover this amount out of its own funds or out of the revolving fund, so the FRG would have to assume it. To the Interministerial Committee the BMZ claimed that the UCRT’s financial situation was “balanced,” so long as the West Germans continued paying the business manager and bookkeeper and maintained its revolving the organization’s revolving fund, but acknowledged its continuation without capital aid was “not yet secure.”

So for all of the hard work by Zimmer, Dietz, their German and Dahomeyan colleagues, and the co-op’s members, and for all its superiority over Schnellbach’s model villages, the UCRT’s future as an independent business after the West German handover was in doubt. At the project handover ceremony on March 28, 1973, Dahomey’s Minister of Rural Development and Cooperation, Captain Mama Djougou warned that co-op members still had to achieve the goal of using the UCRT to improve the people’s standard of living.

Yet the project was profitable, with some cautions, according to the 1972 Bodenstedt report. In a cost-benefit analysis, the team took as its basis a fifteen year period covering the previous years from 1965 and projecting from mid-1972 to mid-1980 and calculated an internal rate of return of 8.1%. From 1972 the UCRT should see an excess of receipts over expenses in the amount of twenty million CFA per year. Assuming a future co-op membership of four thousand, as opposed to two thousand in 1971, this figure would break down into five thousand CFA per member or $111 in 2015

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756 Stecker, Referat I B 4, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, March 1, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4068.
In fact, the UCRT had earned only 8,261,000 CFA or $183,405.97 in 2015 terms during the 1971-72 business year, the organization’s best, though with only two thousand members that still meant $91.70 per capita. $111 was far below Dahomey’s $535.15 per capita GDP (in 2015 terms), but this profit represented what was left after the UCRT paid members for their produce.

Surprisingly, however, the Bodenstedt team found the results rather disappointing. An 8.1% rate of return was just above the 8.0% “critical threshold” typical for developed countries, a performance that it called “relatively minimal.” It blamed the project’s long start-up time and the lack of a detailed feasibility study, an odd objection considering Balduin Zimmer’s careful research and planning in 1964-65. In any case, the UCRT had benefited from the project covering certain costs for masonry work and the mechanic’s and carpentry shops, but with the handover it would no longer do so. The organization might have done better had members fulfilled their duty of selling all their maize to their local co-op; instead they were selling much of it at local markets or to middlemen. Ironically, some local traders then tried to sell to the UCRT, which refused, because buying from them would undercut the goal of raising members’ standard of living. At present, the team concluded, the UCRT must improve its “economic

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759 Bodenstedt and others, 51, 110.


761 Ibid., 51.

762 These costs included administration, wear and tear of tools, and the difference between amounts invoiced for work not finished and the amounts actually incurred in doing the work. See Bodenstedt and others, 57.

763 Ibid., 27-28.
results,” for it was still not viable without some outside support. Fortunately, such support soon came from a new project.\footnote{Ibid., 58, 56.}

According to a proposal worked up by the BMZ’s Agriculture Referat, this project would operate across Dahomey’s entire Atlantic Department. In addition to Tori Cada the FRG and Dahomey would establish three more central cooperative organizations at Abomey-Calavi, Ouidah and Ouagbo. All four would operate under a main organization in Abomey-Calavi, to be known as the Regional Action Center for Rural Development or CARDER (Centre d’Action Régionale de Développement Rural). Like its predecessor the Atlantic/CARDER project would build up a cooperative structure for storage and sale of agricultural products and for purchase of agricultural supplies. It would also erect a marketing system, especially for maize, with silos and drying facilities. It would intensify agricultural counseling, improve three hundred thirty-eight kilometers of dirt roads, and set up and maintain apartments, offices, “economic buildings” and silos. It would probably require at least eight years, with twelve million DM spent in the first five years, of which five million would come from the government of Dahomey. Because that government could not actually afford such a contribution, West Germany would establish a special fund of two million for Dahomey to draw upon.\footnote{Dr. Neumann, Referat III A 6, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, November 23, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4068.} In its December 14, 1972 session, the Committee approved the proposal.\footnote{Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, December 14, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4068.}

The DED at Work

Some volunteers engaged in the same work as their comrades in Togo. In December 1967 a DED official reported the presence of an auto mechanic, a merchant
(likely for bookkeeping), a secretary, a farmer for livestock breeding, a building engineer, a social worker teaching sewing and washing, a carpenter making furniture, doors and windows for the co-op and training Dahomeyan carpenters, a social worker/nurse, a gardener, and a land machine engineer. Volunteers built two walk-in clinics (Ambulanzenstationen) as well as houses for themselves. By March 1968 project workers had built six wells able to supply water year-round, just as Zimmer had planned. By 1972 there were three big cisterns and fifteen village wells. Women volunteers gave cooking and sewing courses lasting six to eight weeks for eight to twelve students. Home economics was not just for Dahomeyan girls, but also for their mothers. Angelika Mecklenburg put the number of women attending cooking courses in six villages at between fifty and seventy. During the first half of 1971, physician’s assistant Evamaria Neugebauer demonstrated various recipes with beans, vegetables, maize and fish. She did not say what villagers were already eating at home. Once a week there was a demonstration on correct washing, and the volunteers also instructed village women on keeping their huts clean. Like the Belgian social homes and missionary wives in South Africa, DED development helpers presumed to teach local women proper domesticity, betraying a German belief that Dahomeyan women were

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769 Government of Dahomey to FRG, Project of Technical Aid as Renewal and Expansion of the Model Villages Tori Action, undated but under West German embassy cover letter of March 14, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.
770 Bodenstedt and others, 12.
incompetent in the kitchen and slipshod in their housekeeping. Presumably the Dahomeyans would not have accepted such a description of themselves, but the reports remain silent about their actual motives in attending such demonstrations.

In addition, the volunteers in Dahomey intervened more directly in peasant practices than those in Togo had, such as encouraging vegetable gardening, though here their efforts were unsuccessful. Physician’s assistant Evamaria Neugebauer cited thirty vegetable gardens as one of her accomplishments. But Brigitte Pfund was disappointed; most women preferred to sow their vegetable seeds in the field because they did not see the advantage of a garden near the home; for them it just meant unnecessary extra work. Perhaps the women wanted to use the vegetables as intercrops rather than group them together in a confined space. The German idea may have also implied a European-style gender division of labor between gardening (at or near home) as women’s work and field cultivation as men’s work, a division irrelevant to the Dahomeyan women. Volunteer Manfred Küper questioned the value of family gardening because it benefited only a privileged few. Several gardens had grown so much that the families hired others to work them. He suggested switching to community gardens, which could be planted wherever cooperatives existed. Of course such a program could succeed only by encouraging “Africans” to change their eating habits. So far only Europeans in Africa and “Europeanized Africans” ate European vegetables, for two reasons. First, many Africans disliked vegetables, even domestic varieties like okra and “fotteté.” Second, European vegetables were expensive, although the price would

776 Final Report of Evamaria Neugebauer, DED, February 17, 1972, DED DAH 08 c 72.
fall somewhat with increased production. These factors might explain why the population abandoned their gardens after a nurse (whether DED or Togolese is not clear) quit.

Volunteers also promoted small livestock. After failures with hens, Angelika Rebholz launched her own “Operation Rooster,” which lent out roosters to father offspring more resistant to diseases. She also built a demonstration rabbit hutch with twenty compartments and began breeding a local variety. When this seemed to go well, she imported two males of the California variety, which produced more meat. After her departure, Bernd Baumann believed rabbit-breeding was going well and reported “numerous inquiries,” but the distribution of roosters (coq de rasse) was “extremely bad,” because the locals preferred letting chickens roam freely to feed themselves rather than keep them cooped up, so no one had any control over how many chicks hatched and grew. Losses were great, he said. Baumann did not explain whether the cause was disease, malnutrition, theft or escape, or why confining them would reduce rather than increase losses due to lack of exercise and perhaps a greater chance of an infection spreading among the chickens. By assuming peasant mismanagement, he did not see that he was asking the Dahomeyans to invest more labor and capital by housing and feeding the chickens. Perhaps they resisted cooping simply out of regard for the chickens’ well-being. He also worked with twelve young farmers’ clubs in the Tori Cada area to

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778 Full Assembly of Dahomey in Porga from February 5 to 8, 1973, undated, DED DAH e 73 74.
779 Full Assembly of Dahomey in Porga from February 5 to 8, 1973, undated, DED DAH e 73 74.
780 Final Report of Angelika Rebholz, March 6, 1972, DED DAH 08 c 72.
encourage the cultivation of fruit, vegetables and small livestock, not just maize. Six clubs began literacy programs.\footnote{Development Helper Report of Bernd Baumann for July 1 – December 31, 1971, undated, DED DAH 08 c 72.}

Also unlike the Togo volunteers, those of Dahomey engaged in direct provision of health care. In early 1967 a DED nurse at one aid station was treating forty to sixty patients a day.\footnote{Activity Report of Joachim Wadsack for October 1966 - April 1967, undated but under GAWI cover letter of May 22, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4064.} In early 1968, Zimmer reported the daily treatment rate as up to one hundred twenty patients, because a Dahomeyan dispensary in Tori-Bossito twenty kilometers away had closed, so that the Tori-Cada dispensaries in the village of that name and in Acadjamé were the only facilities available. The nurses’ educational work had gone so far that the “part of the medications were paid for [getragen] by the population itself,” so that all medications were being applied to preventive treatment.\footnote{Activity Report of Balduin Zimmer for October 1967 to March 1968, undated but under GAWI cover letter of April 11, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.} Illnesses treated included “all types of worm diseases, stomach and intestinal diseases, cold sicknesses, rheumatism, malaria, skin diseases as well as nutritional disturbances among small children and adults.” One cause was poor hygiene, including poor water provision, lack of toilets, cohabitation of people and animals, “unhealthy living conditions,” and insufficient clothing. To address them a teacher was advising women about furnishing their huts and covering rainwater cisterns. The other cause was poor nutrition.\footnote{Attachment 4 to Travel Report of Dr. H. Flachs, Agricultural Department, GAWI, September 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4064.} Dietz regularly supplied figures for patients treated at the dispensary, which during 1969-71 ranged from a low of forty per day to a high of ninety-two per day.\footnote{Quarterly Report of Martin Dietz, October 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063; Quarterly Report of Martin Dietz, for October, November, December 1969, undated but under GAWI cover letter of February 11, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4063; Quarterly Report of Martin Dietz for January, February, March 1970, undated but}
Zimmer argued the volunteers were making a significant difference in Dahomeyans' health and well-being in the Tori Cada project area. He based this belief on a survey by volunteer Werning comparing the responses of eight hundred eighty-five residents of six villages within the project area to a village with comparable social structure and income outside the project area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>6 Villages</th>
<th>Control Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents who stated they were sick</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick people who had themselves treated in dispensary</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huts covered with sheet metal</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants with co-op membership card</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended meetings on agriculture or cooperation</td>
<td>10-11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of visits to co-op member by agricultural counselor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of sacks of maize harvested during last year</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures sowed (4.5 kilograms per unit)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three criteria indicated villagers in the project area were doing better than those outside it. They were less frequently ill—though still often so—their huts were fancier, and they harvested more maize. Zimmer credited the lower sickness rate to hut improvement and project-built wells and cisterns as well as to medical treatment. He took the eighty-percent rate of Tori Cada patients visiting the dispensary as a sign that the population trusted European more than the “medicine man” for serious cases. Here he was wrong; the figures demonstrated no such thing. Patients wanting to try all options would have been quite able to consult local healers and visit the dispensary too. Furthermore, he had not taken care to document local medical practices as he had agricultural, so he would

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have missed the types of cases healers treated and the methods they used; they may well have sought and addressed underlying social disturbances as their colleagues in other parts of Africa did.\textsuperscript{787} His use of the pejorative “medicine man” demonstrated a belief that African healers served no legitimate purpose.

Evamaria Neugebauer provided two strongly moving stories, both involving young girls that she agreed to take care of for a limited period. The first was Houngoué, “born in the house of the fetish,” and nicknamed “Sabine” by the volunteers. When Sabine was only four months old her mother died. A week later the village chief asked whether the volunteers might look after infant for a little while; they agreed to two or three months. When they brought her back, the father had married his third wife, who took the child. Unfortunately, whenever Neugebauer or others visited the village, people begged them to take the child again because she was sick and would decline, and she did decline. Two and a half months after leaving Sabine with the stepmother, the latter gave Sabine back because the father’s family had rejected her—the stepmother—forcing her to leave the village. The father occasionally sent the volunteers maize, eggs, pineapples and bananas, but was uninterested in what would happen to his daughter after the volunteers were gone. Fortunately, Neugebauer heard from a German couple who wanted to adopt Sabine, and they completed the process in early 1972. Sabine had now become a “splendid year and a half old child, who is proud of her attempts to walk and her vocabulary.” Another girl had a more difficult time. Neugebauer found five-year old Jenoukoumé thinned to a skeleton and swollen in the face and at the extremities. Her skin was so frail that “one could partly pull it off like parchment paper.” Neugebauer took Jenoukoumé to the project, where she received a daily infusion (apparently from a

physician) and from Neugebauer a few spoonfuls of rice or gruel with vegetable water five times per day. The girl remained six weeks with Neugebauer, sleeping on a mat because she was afraid of beds. Unfortunately, she urinated, defecated and often threw up while she slept. When the girl was able to eat normally, Neugebauer turned her over to an aunt in her village with the admonition to feed her a bland diet, with little red oil and hardly any pimento. The girl developed well after that, but Neugebauer feared that she had suffered persistent damage to her brain cells and nervous system. Neugebauer concluded “Anyone who lives in the bush is often confronted with a Sabine or Jenoukoumé situation. In general, however, one can say: get involved only if both parents are seriously interested in the life of their child, or otherwise under the circumstances one is back at the beginning after a few months. Yet one should in my opinion never say ‘never.’”

Unfortunately, Neugebauer had absolutely nothing to say about the social factors behind these two cases. Was maternal mortality high? Were customary welfare systems, if any, in the villages breaking down? In short, why would families neglect these infants? Most important, were these two cases part of a larger problem of mass infant malnutrition?

**Conclusion**

Tori Cada had all the makings of a success. It began under a project manager careful enough to learn about the villagers and wise enough to avoid the labor management troubles of cooperative production and the financial bleeding of mechanization. He and his colleagues built up a cooperative organization with more than two dozen constituent co-ops and administered agricultural counseling. They helped Dahomeyans double their maize yields with row-planting or so they claimed. They built

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788 Final Report of Evamaria Neugebauer, DED, February 17, 1972, DED DAH 08 c 72.
silos to prevent losses and storage. Total FRG ministerial expenditures for Tori Cada were about DM 5.5 million, little more than half of what the FRG spent in Togo.\textsuperscript{789} The project had its troubles but overcame them. When Fabricius came to Dahomey, the project expelled him as quickly as if he were a virus. GAWI eventually sorted out its accounting problems. Hans Hansen’s attitude and high-handed methods might have irritated the Dahomeyans, but they do not seem to have provoked the mass resentment that flared up against Ehrenfried Zillich and Gerd Hofmeier.

Even so the West Germans did not feel sure that they had a success. Profits were there at the time of handover, but not large enough to guarantee the UCRT an independent existence. Even after the West Germans and their Dahomeyan colleagues had spent years promoting cooperation and its benefits, members went around the UCRT in search of the highest prices for their produce. Perhaps only the arrival of the CARDER Atlantic project prevented the UCRT from declining into irrelevance.

Some of the DED’s work was helpful, some not. On the positive side, volunteers built wells and cisterns and treated illnesses. Houngoué/Sabine and Jenoukoué may have had their lives changed for the better by Evamarie Neugebauer and her colleagues, so that their presence was not wholly in vain. They managed these accomplishments without even understanding the local language, having to rely on translators.\textsuperscript{790} On the other hand, vegetable gardening ran into a dead end, the small livestock operation remained small, and it is unclear whether sewing, cooking or home cleanliness instruction was ever helpful.

\textsuperscript{789} See Appendix C.
In the end, the Tori Cada project’s outcome was ambivalent. It did not win a clear success, but with the brief exception of Johannes Fabricius, it also did not suffer the kind of loud failures that the Togo project did. For failure on a grand scale, we must turn to the settlement project at Peki, Ghana in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Building a Debacle: The Settlement Project at Peki, 1969-75

The preconditions described doubtlessly do not speak against the merit [Förderungswürdigkeit] of an agricultural project in Peki. It seems worrying, however, that on the part of the community and the government the erection of a collective large-scale farm is desired, whose carrier is supposed to be either the greater Peki community or a cooperative. If the project management were taken over by the German side, it would have to be reckoned that in Peki the experiences of German development aid...in the model villages project of Togo, also in the Ewe region, regarding production cooperative agriculture will be repeated.\(^791\)

Dr. Fritz Stangen, BMZ, July 31, 1967

Despite Stangen’s warning, the West Germans failed to learn their lesson in Togo, and at Peki in Ghana, they paid the price in frustration and in millions of deutschmarks. The Schnellbach Plan showed that villagers would not long work without pay or income in hopes of some gain in the remote future, and they would not work zealously in the service of a production cooperative rather than themselves individually. Yet the BMZ’s West Africa Referat, not six months after dropping cooperative production in Togo, signed onto an even riskier scheme for Peki called a “production promotion cooperative.” Where the former began with an existing village, the latter proposed to draw in settlers from nearby villages to create an entire community from scratch, building new houses, new amenities, new relationships, and of course new production methods. Where the former had, at least in theory, more than a thousand persons per village to support the

\(^{791}\) Travel Report of Dr. F. Stangen, July 31, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4041.
costs of mechanized cultivation, the latter imposed a similar burden on a community of fewer than a hundred souls. That the Peki settlement, ultimately named Peki-Agbateh, failed to inspire hard work among settlers or to earn a profit should not surprise any reader of Chapter 2.

In fact, the debacle at Peki was worse than a mere repeat of the Togo Model Villages. To the problems of labor, Peki added land and leadership. Only after beginning to clear the project site did the West Germans discover that the Peki community leaders who promised free land were unable to deliver, even after a change in location. Difficulties securing possession of the new site cast a shadow over the co-op’s long-term prospects. It was also smaller, making profitability much less likely. For their part the West Germans selected as their first project manager a man unable to plan ahead, keep his cool through setbacks or tolerate the project initiators. His removal and delayed replacement knocked the project off balance for more than a year. Furthermore, at no time did either Ghanaian government or the project manager allow the settlers to govern what was supposed to be their cooperative; this tack avoided the embezzling and pilferage that allegedly embarrassed Agou and Nuatja, but it also rendered settler alienation from the project more likely. The project survived for some years beyond its 1975 handover, allowing the West Germans a face-saving departure, but within two decades it was gone.

In the pages that follow I will examine the project from its first mooting by Peki leaders in 1966 to its handover and beyond. After discussing the West German struggle to find a workable concept, I will examine the project’s overhasty launch by manager Franz Theodor Ulrich and his fall from grace. The next sections will cover the West
German attempt to build up the project under interim project manager Kurt W. Gall and his long-term successor Thomas Schurig in the areas of management and settler selection, housing, and agriculture as well the losing battle to control labor. The final sections will deal with Schurig’s preparations for handover, the West German and Pekian assessment of the project results, and the project’s ultimate fate.

The Villages

Peki, which had a population of 10,414 in 1960 and 11,850 in 1970, was a loose cluster of villages that included Wudome, Dzogbati, Blengo, Afeviwofe, Avetile, and Dzake in Ghana’s Volta Region. A development expert periodical later praised the area as a “green, fruitful, thickly forested valley scenically very beautiful, surrounded by hills.” As the West Germans observed, Peki had already enjoyed considerable development. It lay on a two-lane laterite road usable through the whole year, so a car could reach the Accra-Tema area within an hour and a half. Peki-Blengo had a post office, telephone connections, a bank, water connections, a hospital, and schools. The whole cluster had seven primary schools, eight middle schools, two secondary schools, a teacher training college, and a seminar. The central government’s agricultural extension service had four advisers in Peki. As of 1967, however, electricity had not arrived, despite the nearness of the new Volta River dam. None of the younger residents were illiterate. Crops included cassava, manioc, yams, coco-yam, maize, bananas, carica papaya, citrus fruit, and a small amount of cocoa. Except for cocoa, all these foodstuffs

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went for home consumption rather than sale. A German expert called cultivation methods “primitive, the harvests correspondingly low,” but gave no details.\textsuperscript{795} There were two harvests a year.\textsuperscript{796}

Peki had a considerable history of which the Germans were mostly unaware. By the seventeenth century Ewe émigrés from Nuatja had arrived and settled there. In 1833 Peki chief Kwadzo Dei I overthrew the rule of the Akan state Akwamu and established his own local hegemony. Unfortunately, Peki lost much of its territory when the British and Germans drew a border through it in 1890; Peki’s core remained within the British Gold Coast colony and the rest fell to German Togoland in 1890. Though the British acquired a share of Togoland in 1918, they did not restore Peki’s lost territory. Nonetheless the villages enjoyed much prosperity under colonial rule until World War II thanks to local cocoa cultivation, which paid for new houses, furniture, clothing, and schools. This “golden age” ended with the arrival of swollen shoot disease, which destroyed cocoa cultivation by the 1950s. As cocoa faltered, young educated people began leaving the area in search of work. The one fact that interested the Germans was the long presence of the North German (or Bremen) Missionary Society, which established itself at Peki in 1847.\textsuperscript{797}

\textbf{Origin and Concept of the Project}

The Peki project began as a creature of the local elite. In mid-April 1966, Peki’s Paramount Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI wrote the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture to request aid for a model farm. Because Peki lacked industries and an adequate road, many “educated and talented” Pekians had moved to the cities for work,
depleting the local population. He and a committee of leading citizens agreed that a
model farm could invest its earnings in local development, provide jobs for young people
and raise protein-rich foods for local consumption as well as sale. The committee had
already discussed its idea with the West German ambassador and now asked the Ministry
of Agriculture to make the request official. He expected a favorable response because
German ties to the area went back to the arrival of Bremer Missionaries. In the
meantime, ten thousand acres (four thousand hectares) were available. The paramount
chief’s letter mentioned one “leading citizen” in particular: Dr. Alexander R. Ababio.\textsuperscript{798}
He was a physician at the Ghana Academy of Sciences and a major force behind the
project.\textsuperscript{799} Along with other affluent Pekians working in Accra, he was a member of the
Peki Union led by Dr. E.A. Amu of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana,
Legon.\textsuperscript{800}

The BMZ quickly turned down the proposal. Agronomist Grosse Herrentey, sent
to investigate, wrote in November 1966 that the “projected farm is hardly suited to act
beneficially for the whole region.” He predicted failure, because state enterprises in a
“western-oriented economy” could not adapt quickly to changing conditions and because
it was difficult to find “Africans” able to lead projects after handover free of influence

\textsuperscript{798} Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI, Paramount Chief of Peki, Peki-Blengo, Volta Region to Principal Secretary,
Ministry of Agriculture, Accra, April 15, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\textsuperscript{799} Report of Dipl.-Ing. Michael Jeroch, Africa Association, March 1967, BArchiv B 213/4041. See also
Langer, 136.
\textsuperscript{800} Other members included Eric C. Djamson, barrister and secretary to the Ghana Commercial Bank,
barrister Enoch D. Kom, industrialist Esther Ocloo, and the Peki Union’s general secretary, Victor K.
Akudeka. See Langer, 136; S.B. Dankyi, Minutes of Steering Committee, November 5, 1974, BArchiv B
213/32442; “New palace to be built,” \textit{Daily Graphic}, March 7, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041; “Peki Union to
help improve hospital,” \textit{Ghanaian Times}, April 19, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041. Chazan and others, 81, note
that such “hometown associations” help newcomers to the city, but also “raise funds for village
improvement, initiate projects, and support local festivals.”
from “group interests.” Dr. Theierl agreed. Model enterprises had shown themselves unsuitable elsewhere; he named Tahir Ova (Turkey), Aliabad (Iran), Multan (Pakistan), and Karual/Franga (Chad). They could not be imitated because of their size and equipment and they represented an attempt to impose innovation from outside rather than attaching themselves to existing economic and organizational conditions, so that peasants worked for a foreign enterprise rather than themselves. Model enterprises required large appropriations, had to be state-controlled and in general were unprofitable. Furthermore, scarce development aid money should go to the most productive use, with the goal of raising standards of living as quickly as possible. He later added harshly that such a farm would end up as a “kolkhoz.” Theierl suggested instead sending some fertilizer and advisers to aid peasants on their own parcels. Unfortunately, West German ambassador Hans Georg Steltzer kept up a steady pressure to go ahead with the project anyways. In search of other ideas, the BMZ solicited and received three more reports from Michael Jeroch of the Africa Association, Günter Wöhlk of the DED, and Heinz Büchner of Interagro during 1967.
Büchner’s report became the basis of the Peki project. He too rejected a model farm as likely to lose money and unlikely to attain higher production. Instead he proposed a “production promotion cooperative” that would bring settlers to the project site, offer cooperative planning, counseling and demonstrations, set up a purchasing and sales system, negotiate bargains with credit institutions, and orient members towards market production. It would also increase settlers’ income and help Ghana by increasing domestic food production and forming a free peasant middle class. To accumulate capital, the Germans would set up a reserve fund for members’ entry fees (cooperative shares) and fifteen percent of earnings from commodity sales. There should also be a separate revolving fund through which the cooperative could purchase fertilizer, pesticides, and seed, and sell them to the members. Members would oblige themselves to communal cultivation measures, such as crop rotation. Büchner recommended processing facilities, especially to produce juices and marmalade, even though the project would not supply enough raw materials to use them during the first three years, because they would serve as a basis for social and cultural services and create jobs.807

Dr. Theierl had questions about the Büchner report—thirty-two in fact—and some of them anticipated problems the project would face. What were current property relations and how should they be regulated by the project agreement with Ghana? Should the government buy up the land? If settlers were to have only use rights, should they receive a leasehold and for what term? Büchner showed that the co-op would operate with declining losses over the first three years, but Theierl wanted a forecast of when it would become profitable. He wondered about the sequence of setting up the co-op. How could the cooperative choose the settlers and give them land before the settlers were there

to constitute it? How could anyone found the co-op before the land was cleared and would the Paramount Chief’s committee do it? Though Theierl may not have realized it, settlement projects were quite risky.

Nonetheless, the project went ahead after the Agriculture Referat insisted on cutting its complexity and duration by reducing the area from four thousand hectares and three hundred lots to one thousand hectares and eighty lots. According to the BMZ application to the Interministerial Committee, the project would replace the “primitive and no longer sustainable system of shifting cultivation with modern agricultural production for the market.” Given that Peki was losing young people to emigration and not growing rapidly in population, the claim of unsustainability expressed a conventional European disdain for African methods, as when the British in colonial Zambia belittled citemene cultivation in the same terms. Founding a new settlement, the application claimed, would be easier than trying to change traditional relations in an existing community. At the end of February 1968 the Committee approved. Büchner expected that the first phase of organizing the cooperative, settling the site with eighty settlers, and acquainting them with modern cultivation methods would take two years.

Josef Hansen at West Africa Referat instructed the BAW to make sure the project

809 Meier describes failed settlements during the 1950s in the Hilmend Valley in Afghanistan, at Shendam, Nigeria, and in British-ruled Tangyika. In the first two cases, governments were trying to force cattle-herding nomads or wandering slash-and-burn farmers to stay in one spot. In the first and third cases, the governments also tried to make settlers maintain irrigation systems. Meier, 31-32, 44-45, 63. See also Porter, Allen and Thompson on the Magarini Settlement Project, in which the Kenyan and Australian governments worked to settle the Giriama people in a defined territory with poor soil and unreliable rainfall and convert them from shifting to permanent cultivation.
810 RegDir Ruhenstroth via Dirig I A, BMZ to Referat I A 6, BMZ, January 16, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041; Dr. Stangen via Dirig I A to Referat I A 6, BMZ, January 19, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
811 Moore and Vaughan, 3-4.
812 Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, January 31, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
813 Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, February 28, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
manager arrived two months ahead of other experts to create “all organizational, legal and institutional prerequisites” and to review profitability calculations. This would turn out to be more difficult than he expected.815

Peki never used DED volunteers even though pre-project proposals included them again and again. Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI specified one or two experienced carpenters, one all-around mechanic, one or two gardeners, and two masons for a possible total of seven, and even more might be needed.816 Wöhlk—himself a DED official—and Büchner recommended several volunteers.817 Regierungsdirektor Ruhenstroth of the BMZ wanted two or three, although he cautioned against regarding development helpers as full-fledged experts.818 DED officials were quite willing to supply helpers provided their engagement was stipulated in the project agreement. The first group should amount to no more than five.819 And yet the DED never came. While the documents give us no clear reason, the most likely was the poor performance of first project manager F.T. Ulrich, which we shall see shortly. The last word came from a brief notation in the monthly report of the DED country commissioner for Ghana. “Peki-Project/Mr. Ulrich: Engagement [GAWI mechanic] Lödige has failed. Unsolid project planning. Await development!”820

815 Hansen, Referat I A 6, BMZ to BAW, January 13, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4041.
816 Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, April 15, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4041.
818 RegDir Ruhenstroth, BMZ to Referat I A 6, BMZ, January 16, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
819 Dr. Molt and Weyers, DED to Referat II B 1, BMZ, July 4, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
Clearing the Land

The first task the West Germans carried out was neither recruiting settlers nor establishing the cooperative nor planning the project in detail, but clearing the land. The BAW was aware that clearance would be challenging, because it would have to deal with thick stands of trees and bushes, elephant grass and scattered clumps of trees.\textsuperscript{821} At the same time project manager F.T. Ulrich received his appointment, in July 1969, Josef Hansen of the BMZ’s West Africa Referat suggested to Ambassador Müller that the project would have to hire Ferrostaal, a company already active in West Africa, because the delivery times for West German equipment would be quite long.\textsuperscript{822} Müller was anxious to get the project going and favored clearance as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{823} Ulrich also pressed Hansen, wanting to know whether he would approve Ferrostaal, wanted another company, or wanted to wait for West German equipment. This last option would call forth the “greatest disappointment and loss of confidence in our engagement,” as a meeting that very morning at the Ministry of Agriculture with the state secretary, the Ambassador Müller, Dr. Ababio, the paramount chief, and other officials made clear to him.\textsuperscript{824} Hansen replied that he had asked Ferrostaal to begin negotiations with Ulrich, because machinery from the FRG could not possibly arrive in Ghana before the middle of 1970.\textsuperscript{825} Ferrostaal expected to be able to begin work as soon as September 1 with the site “as seen,” but not including watercourses, swamp, rocks or grades of more than ten degrees. The offer assumed contiguous clearing areas of at least fifty hectares. To the

\textsuperscript{821} Dr. Otto, BAW, Request for Proposals for Project Leader, March 10, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\textsuperscript{822} Hansen, BMZ to Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra, July 1, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\textsuperscript{823} Müller, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, August 5, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
\textsuperscript{824} F.T. Ulrich to ORR Hansen, BMZ, August 8, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
\textsuperscript{825} Regierungsrat J. Hansen, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Franz Theodor Ulrich, August 13, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
extent these assumptions did not hold true, Ferrostaal would be entitled to an hourly rate of DM one hundred forty-five.\textsuperscript{826} Hansen approved.\textsuperscript{827} In November Ulrich realized he had made no provision for getting rid of debris, so he obtained and forwarded a supplemental contract from Ferrostaal to heap the debris in swaths (\textit{aufschwaden}) that the project could later remove with its tractors.\textsuperscript{828} GAWI signed on January 13, 1970.\textsuperscript{829} Ferrostaal remained active until July, when the BfE told project management to carry out any remaining work.\textsuperscript{830}

Early land clearance produced two grave consequences. First, it revealed that the paramount chief and the Peki Union could not deliver the land they had promised due to resistance from landowners. We will examine the controversy in detail in Chapter 6, but the upshot was that the West Germans had to settle for a new site of only five hundred hectares. Because some landowners at the new site also objected, the Ghanaian government had to purchase their land or sign thirty-three years leases to make the whole site available to the project.\textsuperscript{831} Second, it led to dismissal of the project’s first manager.

\textbf{The Fall of Franz Theodor Ulrich}

Within months of arriving in Ghana, F.T. Ulrich weakened and then destroyed his own position through his misplaced priorities, his abrasive personality, and his bad temper. An impetuous man, he was eager to begin work and disregarded clear
instructions to put planning first. Here he had enthusiastic support from Ambassador Müller. But when local opposition forced the project site’s relocation and shrinkage, Ulrich erupted in frustration and anger. The tone of his correspondence offended both Hansen and GAWI. Already disdainful of “Africans,” he began to suspect Dr. Ababio and the Paramount Chief of gulling the FRG into a scheme for their self-enrichment, with Müller acting as willing dupe, and treated them all accordingly. It was this breakdown in personal relations that led to his abrupt removal in January 1970. Whether Ulrich ever had the slightest basis for his suspicions, or he fell entirely into the clutches of his inner demons is not clear from the files.

The battle over planning began with Ulrich’s appointment in July and continued to December. In his July 1, 1969 note approving Ulrich’s hiring through GAWI, Hansen especially wanted a “procurement plan for necessary materials as well as an assignment plan for further personnel.”832 He also told Müller he wanted Ulrich to begin detailed planning immediately after his arrival and to work with Ghanaian authorities to create the necessary “legal and organizational prerequisites for local implementation of the project.”833 In other words, Ulrich was supposed to answer Dr. Theierl’s questions about the Büchner plan. In early August, Ulrich wrote that the Ministry of Agriculture and the chiefs and people of Peki expected work to begin immediately.834 Hansen responded by insisting that Ulrich clear up property relations, co-op organization, settler selection, financial issues, market conditions, and profitability.835 Ulrich replied that the BMZ must

832 Hansen, Referat I A 6, BMZ to GAWI, July 1, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
833 Hansen, BMZ to Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra, July 1, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.
834 F.T. Ulrich to ORR Hansen, BMZ, August 8, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
first decide about clearance as a prerequisite to planning. Müller asked Hansen to give Ulrich the “greatest possible maneuvering room for [his] own decisions on the spot.”

The tone worsened in mid-November, after months of struggle over land. Ulrich, seemingly in near-despair, exclaimed that the conditions Büchner described did not exist and only Ambassador Müller and Dr. Ababio wanted the project. He called it “A wholly cursed [vertuefelter] job.” Hansen was most displeased. He wrote the BfE asking it to get him planning documents soon. To Ulrich he insisted that it was not true only Müller and Ababio wanted the project; Hansen himself had participated in negotiations with Pekis authorities and representatives of the Peki Union. But if it were true, Ulrich should not have begun land clearance. Ulrich was supposed to have investigated conditions and drawn up detailed plans, and the BMZ still needed them to give him technical support. The BfE joined its plea to Hansen’s, asking for plans. But in December Ulrich continued to make excuses. If he had tried to stop the project, the Ghanaian government and Müller would have merely demanded another expert. Clearing had to come before planning, because soil varied widely at the site. “As a farmer conscious of responsibility, I can only draw up a reasonable planning if I know what material I have to work with.” He promised to begin planning in coming weeks and

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837 Ambassador Helmut Müller, Embassy in Accra to Oberregierungsrat J. Hansen, BMZ, September 1, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
838 F.T. Ulrich to Regierungsrat J. Hansen, BMZ, November 15, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076. His tone was all the worse, because he was anxiously awaiting the dispatch of experts Hans Jürgen Luthardt and Hans-Karl Klindworth.
839 MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to BfE, November 17, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076. Despite the memo going out under Theierl’s name, references to the writer’s past relations with Ulrich makes Hansen’s authorship extremely likely.
asked Hansen to come to Peki to see what conditions were like now. Müller chimed in to support Ulrich, and also suggested Hansen come to Peki. By now a GAWI official suspected that Ulrich was not capable of planning, and proposed bringing in an economist or farmer with business management training to do it for him. Dr. Theierl shared these doubts, but for “optical reasons” was not yet ready to relieve Ulrich in the near future.

In the meantime, Ulrich irritated GAWI. On the same day he wrote Hansen in mid-November, he complained to GAWI that “Three months long I consumed myself with a nerve-wracking struggle against bureaucracy, red tape, competency disputes, ignorance and partly even malice.” He had had to collect land for the project by begging. “Now,” he wrote, “begins the battle for the settlers and building up the cooperative.” He was also anxious to get his “two missing experts,” Hans Jürgen Luthardt and Hans-Karl Klindworth. GAWI did not care for his choice of words or for his tone. He should not “battle,” but “work through example and instruction presented in suitable form.” He should also not “beg together” (zusammenbetteln) land. Writing about “nerve-wracking struggle against bureaucracy, red tape” and so on was improper and even dangerous, given postal censorship or inspection of local files. Ulrich also acted wrongly in sending carbon copies to other agencies with accusations against GAWI; if he had any well-founded complaints, he should contact the agency’s business manager.

843 Helmut Müller, Embassy in Accra to Regierungsrat J. Hansen, December 11, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.
845 MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Referate I B 4, BMZ, January 12, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076.
846 F.T. Ulrich to GAWI, November 15, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076. Ulrich was offended that GAWI sent Luthardt a recruiting letter even though the man was already waiting for a contract. He called this a “faux pas.”
847 GAWI to F.T. Ulrich, November 26, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438. About the letter sent to Luthardt, GAWI replied that it was merely a routine inquiry and excused itself by pointing to the difficulty of keeping a sixty-five hundred card file of expert candidates up to date.
caused Müller some concern. To Hansen he wrote in December that he had tried to convince Ulrich of the harm from the project manager’s “over-foaming temper and his emotional fits of pride [*Selbststeigerungen*].” One could not find a more active project manager, but “calm and patience” were “not his strengths.”

Late the next month Müller turned about face and removed Ulrich from the project. On January 21, the ambassador wired the Foreign Office that it was “obvious that the loss of trust of the Peki community and the Ghanaian government representatives has progressed considerably,” and he wanted Ulrich’s co-worker, agricultural engineer Moshe Pridan, to take over immediately as temporary manager. Ulrich stood accused of “not respecting African tradition, constant rude behavior, and disrespect toward Africans in general.” Two days later Müller explained that Ulrich was unbearable for three reasons. First, in dealings with others he took what Europeans regarded as “barracks tone” and Ghanaians as “colonial tone.” Second, he showed an “egotism [*Ich-Bezogenheit*] that, with a shocking degree of intolerance and a repellent appeal to his own, decades-long experiences, excludes the validity of others’ opinions.” Third, he refused to understand Peki’s “historic and traditional conditions,” meaning its past relationship with the Bremer Mission and the institution of paramount chief. At the Advisory Committee meeting on January 17, the paramount chief had accused Ulrich, said Müller, of disrespect for his position and suspected him of harboring color prejudice. Ulrich took these words as a “mortal insult,” and now relations between the men were

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848 Helmut Müller, Embassy in Accra to Regierungsrat J. Hansen, December 11, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.
“irreparable.” Müller even feared “embarrassing press reports” if Ulrich remained.\footnote{Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, January 23, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076.} Bad press was of course the opposite of what a development project was supposed to accomplish. On the 28\textsuperscript{th} Müller wrote the Foreign Office again to inform it he had relieved Ulrich two days earlier and told him to leave the country within the next few days. His reasons for this precipitate act included Ulrich deceiving the other three experts into co-signing a telegram to GAWI threatening to resign, telling people in Peki and Accra that the project was being stopped, telling Ferrostaal to stop work, and intending to publicly “unmask” the project initiators and Müller himself as the true villains. Müller could not stand by while watching Ulrich damage the FRG’s reputation in public, endanger the project and harm German-Ghanaian relations.\footnote{Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office (for Ruhenstroth), January 28, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076.}

Back in Germany, Ulrich wrote the BMZ in his own defense. He denied the accusations in Müller’s letter of January 28, attributing them to misunderstandings or false rumors and providing his own version of events.\footnote{F.T. Ulrich to GAWI, February 15, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076.} He agreed, however, that he had fallen out with the project initiators. He accused them of preventing him from setting up a co-op so that they could profit from the project as absentee landowners, while he wanted only to help the poor and landless. That was why they preferred Peki-Wudome landowners, chiefs and residents as settlers. Ulrich blamed Müller for taking sides against him, but Dr. Ababio was the ultimate villain. Ulrich’s long, hate-filled yet poetic diatribe against Ababio is worth quoting in full.

The German-speaking physician Dr. Alexander Ababio, the baleful figure in the background, who knows how to exploit the inexperience of a German ambassador with tendril-like cunning, has him offered the ‘honorary chieftain dignity’ of Peki, who made false statements to Dr. Büchner for his report and then judged him
wholly deprecatingly, said about observer Michael Jeroch, observer of the Africa Association: ‘His days in West Africa are numbered, I’ll make sure of that.’

The physician Ababio, who said about my worried fears over the destruction of the maize and manioc fields lying in the clearing area: ‘I’ll shoot the people dead, I have enough ammunition. I’ll set myself on the bulldozer and roll the huts flat.’ (A rare humor).

The physician Ababio, at my request to at least give the settlers one warm meal a day: ‘They can look around for something at midday; there are cassava-yams and bananas lying around everywhere.’ (To the retrieval of the German ambassador I must say that he most personally worked for the warm meal and procured rations for the settlers through the Christian Council).

Dr. Ababio, who denied both German families Klindworth and Luthardt the one decent house I could find in Peki, because the owner justifiably wanted an advance of two years, for since November the rent for my house in Peki was not paid; who is building a restaurant with possibilities for an overnight stay, to be the first to profit from the German-Ghanaian project.

The physician Ababio has disseminated through his middlemen, I was too hard with people and wanted to curse them when I said, ‘Settlers, you are working for yourselves and your children. Very hard work is necessary to come quickly to production and to money.’ By the way, these demands stand every day in every Ghanaian newspaper.

And this physician Ababio is the confidante and adviser of the German ambassador. He misleads him to say: ‘There are already so many millions blown on development aid, so more or less for my Peki project won’t matter.’

Dr. Ababio wants to be the project manager, he wants to determine policy. The German experts are supposed to earn the yields and he would like to distribute the dividends. What does he care about the little settler or co-op member? How often have I recited these facts for the German ambassador; he became angry and believes as ever in his Rasputin.

So my colleague Pridan, the experienced and thoroughly efficient settlement specialist said: ‘The German ambassador has thrown out a project manager…what happens now?’

To this amazing letter there seems to have been no reply or even any comment from the BMZ or anyone else. Without local investigation, and perhaps even with it, there is no

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way of knowing whether any of Ulrich’s indictment against Ababio was true. The remarks he attributed to Ababio are difficult to believe.

Whatever the truth, officials at the Agriculture Referat blamed him, not Müller or Ababio, for the failure. Schurig wrote that Ulrich completely lacked human contact to the settlers as well as to the official Ghanaian authorities. [Having] only the project goal in mind, he flouted historical and traditional conditions with a frightening degree of intolerance, to overcome difficulties with force and Prussian élan. Incomprehension, rejection and partly hate on the part of the Ghanaians was the consequence, so that a further presence of the project manager in the project would have heavily burdened German-Ghanaian relations and certainly brought the project itself to failure.  

Ironically, Schurig himself was partly to blame for Ulrich’s appointment. In early February it came out that he had known an important fact about the man that the embassy and the West Africa Referat had not; Ulrich had already failed as project manager in Malawi and Turkey. An embassy official wrote bitterly that “Mr. Ulrich was announced to the embassy as an excellent man, the best-suited for the Peki project…I request [you] urgently to make sure that these sorts of mishaps are not repeated in the future. The damage that otherwise threatens the reputation of the Federal Republic can be very great.”

To be fair, Ulrich had company in his difficulties with Ambassador Müller and Dr. Ababio, because interim project manager Kurt Gall had a similar experience. Gall received his appointment in July 1970. He was soon locking horns with Müller and the project initiators. On October 13 he wrote that he had registered the cooperative over the ambassador’s objections. He accused counterpart manager Roland Ata of spreading

855 Dr. Kuhn, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, February 6, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
harmful rumors about the project, stirring up the landowners against the government and against each other, thwarting the cooperative, giving out false information, and defaming project members, so that experts Luthardt and Michael Boguslawski, as well as he himself, refused to work with Ata any longer. Ata considered himself the paramount chief’s servant even though his salary came from the Ministry of Agriculture. Because of “special conditions in the German embassy,” i.e. Müller’s opposition, Gall expected to fall from favor soon and felt he had little to lose. He therefore saw as his task clearing obstacles to a thriving project,” instead of behaving as a “mild expert,” as originally agreed in Bonn. If he were successful, his successor would be able to go ahead without the “burdens of the past.”

On the 21st, Dr. Gall reported the project’s subordination to the Ministry of Agriculture and Ata’s upcoming dismissal. He boasted that “Dr. Ababio and his friends will find it hard to reconcile themselves to their ‘departure.’” Gall had excluded Ambassador Müller from the project during the last eight weeks. Müller forecast a “catastrophe à la Ulrich” if Gall refused to respect “traditional structures,” referring to the Paramount Chief’s appointment to the new Advisory Committee. Gall upped the ante by telling Müller that the ambassador always had the option of “elevating such things to the political level” and demanding Gall’s recall to prevent “damage to German reputation.”

Nothing happened immediately, but Gall left for Germany on November 15. He did not return. Schurig wrote in January 1971 that Dr. Gall “fell into the same mistakes and had no understanding for certain African insufficiencies that should be overcome together on the way to a patient collaboration.” The population was disappointed, the project initiators were embittered, and the Ghanaian authorities were

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858 Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, October 21, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
irritated. “So the Minister of Agriculture asked the German ambassador for a speedy and noiseless withdrawal of the second project manager.”

Schurig himself would shortly report to Peki as the new permanent West German project manager.

**Organizing the Cooperative from Above**

After a year of negotiations, the March 1969 project agreement answered Dr. Theierl’s question about how to organize the co-op and select the settlers; the Ghanaian government, in consultation with the West German ambassador, would appoint the committees to run the co-op and find the settlers. When Togbe Kwadzo Dei first contacted the West Germans in 1966, his Peki Farm Committee included himself, a representative of his sub-chiefs, representatives of the Peki Students’ Union, the women’s organization in Peki, and affluent émigrés in Tema and Accra (i.e. the Peki Union), a lawyer serving as secretary to the governor of the Bank of Ghana, an Accra businessman, a degreed farmer, a cattle-breeding instructor at the University of Legon in Accra, project initiator Dr. Ababio, and a Ministry of Agriculture official not from Peki. The government snubbed this committee in favor of two bodies still weighted toward local representation, but now including Germans and settlers. One was an Advisory Committee to advise and the other a Management Committee to plan and organize. As of 1970, the Advisory Committee included the Paramount Chief, Dr. Ababio, Ambassador Müller, the West German project manager, his Ghanaian counterpart, the government’s Chief Agricultural Settlement Officer and two other members, at least one of them representing the settlers. On the Management Committee sat the project manager, his

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860 Schurig, Referat III A 6, BMZ to Madame Parliamentary State Secretary, BMZ, January 21, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
counterpart, the Chief Linguist of the Peki Traditional Area, Peki’s Chief District Crop Officer, the Ministry of Agriculture’s director for the Volta Regional Government, a Ghanaian co-op specialist, one of the unaffiliated members of the Advisory Committee, and two settlers.  

Later that year interim manager Kurt W. Gall arranged to tighten the central government’s grip, but only temporarily. A new Advisory Committee replaced the two old committees, and its members included the Ministry of Agriculture’s Principal Secretary and Chief Agricultural Settlement Officer, the Regional Co-op Officer, the paramount chief, the co-op chairman, the project manager and his counterpart, and one unaffiliated member. Neither Ababio nor Müller had a seat at the table now. The project and project manager would now answer only to the Ministry of Agriculture through the Chief Agricultural Settlement Officer. All interest groups such as the Peki Union or the “Peki Farm Project Committee” would have to turn to the Ministry to handle any complaints or claims. Yet by 1974 a predominantly local membership had returned, with Müller and Ababio back on board. Chief Agricultural Settlement Officer Quartey Papafio did not even bother to attend either of two meetings in May and June. The Advisory Committee was now named the Steering Committee. Also under Gall, the co-op was officially registered as the Peki Settlement Co-Operative Mixed Farming

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864 Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, October 21, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
865 S.B. Dankyi, Minutes of the Steering Committee, May 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442; S.B. Dankyi, Project Co-Manager, Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting, June 28, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
Society Limited at the end of September 1970, after the end of land clearance and the beginning of settler selection.  

Top-down control was more pronounced in the lack of statutes. The cooperative had none until after March 1974, if at all, when project manager Schurig mentioned that he had now discussed a draft with the settlers in assembly. Without statutes there could be no proper election of officers or policy-making by the members, leaving control in the hands of the West German and Ghanaian governments. Well before F.T. Ulrich’s appointment in July 1969, the West Germans had already designated the German project manager, with the assistance of his Ghanaian counterpart, as the co-op’s business manager.

In recruiting settlers the project manager and his colleagues on the relevant committee wanted the right kind of people. Several prerequisites were already established by March 1969, when the BAW put out bids for a project manager. Each settler must be able to read and write, be willing to live on his land, and have agricultural knowledge. The German project manager would share power with the committee in expelling settlers who did not fulfill the condition of proper cultivation. In February 1970 the Advisory Committee set the following criteria: an age range of twenty to forty-five and graduation from middle school. Settlers who did not own their land must lease it from the landowners through the co-op. In no case should the project accept settlers who did not work their own land, because only the desire to enjoy the fruits of their own labor would drive the settlers to make the best use of available funds and opportunities. As

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867 Seventh Activity Report ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
868 Request for Proposals Dr. Otto, BAW, March 10, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4041.
869 Ibid.
well as following instructions of West German experts and their counterparts, members must use funds “carefully and reasonably.” As Ulrich had feared, the Committee would allow landowners to nominate family members, though it expected not all would be able to do so.\textsuperscript{870} The Peki farm committee had had a list of seventy candidates as far back as 1968, but there is no way to know how many met the selection criteria.\textsuperscript{871} Actual settlers began appearing on the scene by June 1970 when chargé d’affaires Dr. Kuhn reported forty-eight of them at work on the project, plus ninety other laborers.\textsuperscript{872} In March 1971 the BMZ wrote of fifty-six settlers, though this number dropped slightly to fifty-four in Schurig’s first report two months later.\textsuperscript{873}

The quantity to be recruited and the lot size for each family changed repeatedly during the project’s first two years. Heinz Büchner had expected to place eighty on a thousand hectares, meaning 12.5 hectares or thirty-one acres, grouped in blocks of eight for easy machine use.\textsuperscript{874} The shrinkage of land available to the project reduced settlers to only sixty on five hundred forty hectares. Each family would receive one hectare for its own use, the other land worked by the members in common.\textsuperscript{875} In October 1971 Schurig raised the settler number to seventy-five.\textsuperscript{876} Soon the West Germans raised the number to one hundred. The total settlement area of thirteen hundred acres (not hectares) would be allotted as follows: fifty for the new co-op village Peki-Agbateh, fifteen for the buildings, twenty for roads, streets and water courses, three hundred and later four hundred for

\textsuperscript{871} RR Hansen, Referat I A 6, BMZ, November 4, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\textsuperscript{872} Dr. Kuhn, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, June 12, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\textsuperscript{875} Memorandum of Schurig, Referat III A 6, BMZ on Extension and Replenishment of Project, February 3, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\textsuperscript{876} Second Project Report of Thomas Schurig, October 14, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32439.
settler parcels of four acres each, one hundred thirteen and later one hundred fifty for reserve land that might later join settler acres, twenty for communal garden land, six hundred for oil palms, a remainder for the first phase only of one hundred thirty-seven, and forty-five for waste (*Unland*), walls and wood storage. The last settler lots were distributed by lottery on February 22, 1973.

**Building a Village**

The settlers may have begun working the land in 1970, but they would have to wait two or more years to live there. As late as February 1971 Ambassador Müller was urging erection of settler houses, laying out of village streets, water provision, sanitary facilities and other investments for the future cooperative, all to stiffen the settlers’ “labor morale.” The very next month, after a three-man team consisting of two engineers and an architect submitted recommendations for housing construction, the Interministerial Committee approved funding for sixty settler homes, six expert houses, a storage hall, plus infrastructure for electricity, water and drainage. Schurig suggested not building houses for the experts, who could stay more cheaply in their current houses. The proposed houses, better equipped than settler homes, would also provoke tension and conflict after the West Germans left. The money should instead go into social facilities. Eventually the BMZ, BfE, GAWI and Schurig agreed to build nine more

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877 Minutes of Meeting on Peki Settlement and Cooperative Project, undated but after November 10, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32439.
879 Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, February 3, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
settler homes instead. The BMZ then raised to a hundred the number of homes to be built in its 1972 application to the Interministerial Committee for a project extension. The Committee approved.

Construction took more than two years from the Interministerial Committee’s first approval in March 1971. Several more months went by while Schurig worked on the plans. There was a brief snag in October 1971 when Schurig decided to relocate the village onto a hillside to avoid the risk of sewage contamination and to compress it into an area of forty-four acres. In 1973 the project added a school with five (later six) classrooms. The settlers would receive electricity and septic tanks. In March 1974 Schurig reported the “handover” of the settlement to Commissioner for Agriculture Bernasko in the presence of Ambassador Müller on December 14, 1973. It now consisted of a hundred settler houses, a six-class school, an aid station, a water reservoir with one hundred fifty cubic meter capacity, two pumping stations and two power stations with five generators and a capacity of one hundred ninety KVA.

Making Agriculture Pay…or Not

To remain in business the cooperative had to make a profit, a challenge that became far more difficult when landowner resistance halved the amount of land it had to work with. In October 1970 Kurt Gall inferred from his calculations that maize, cassava, cowpeas or cotton could not carry the co-op above the profitability threshold.

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882 File Memorandum of Referat III A 6, BMZ, July 19, 1972, BArchiv B 213/32439.
883 Dr. Neumann, Referat III A 6, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 16, 1972, BArchiv B 213/32439.
884 Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, September 6, 1972, BArchiv B 213/32439.
888 Seventh Activity Report of ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
The first maize harvest, carried out manually over two months, brought in only eighty of one hundred ten hectares. To cultivate maize on a larger scale would require a harvester, a drying facility with capacity of two tons per hour, blast air silos, two additional tractors, and another seven-ton truck. Yet the expected earnings of seventy to eighty thousand New Cedis, or only forty thousand if the government was the purchaser, would not suffice to pay for depreciation, let alone other expenses. The giant “precious scrapyards” of projects at Tamale-Nyankpala, Accra-amasaman and Tsito proved the danger of capital-intensive development policy. On the other hand, low labor intensity among the settlers and other laborers meant that a labor-intensive policy would not fare well either. He recommended planting two hundred hectares (five hundred acres) with oil palm or citrus trees (citrus was less promising), which needed little care. The project could also cultivate onions and irrigate two hectares to grow vegetables for the European market in Accra. It could not give up completely on maize for political reasons, but no than fifty hectares for subsistence or for chicken and swine fodder should be planted with it.  

Unfortunately, those “political reasons” quickly asserted themselves, as we will see in Chapter 6. On October 23, Principal Secretary Sraha of the Ministry of Agriculture demanded that the co-op cultivate three hundred acres (one hundred twenty hectares) of maize, even at a loss. The West Germans would settle on oil palms, six hundred acres of them, as the co-op’s best option. Unfortunately, they would begin yield returns only after six to seven years. In the meantime the settlement carried a lot of overhead due to mechanization. A United Nations delegation visiting in 1974 noted “a bulldozer, tractors,

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892 Minutes of Meeting on Peki Settlement and Cooperative Project, undated but after November 10, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32439.
ploughs, harrows, planters, cars, shellers, tobacco barns, a dryer for grain, a mechanical workshop, fertilizer, grain storage facilities and a feed grinding mill.”

Vegetable production faced several problems, however. This revelation came not from internal documents, but from a 1971 article in a periodical for development experts, *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*. First, seeds of varieties suitable for the tropics had to be shipped from South Africa to Europe and then back to Accra. Second, an onion crop was attacked by a disease, which the project treated with protective agents, but peasants could not pay for and apply such a method. Though the article did not say so, this incident should have served as a warning against the dangers of monocropping and a counter to the Germans’ disdain for “unsustainable” shifting cultivation. Third, because indigenous peoples did not eat European vegetables, the article questioned whether production of those items would continue after the Germans left.

The Endless Woes of Labor Management

As in Togo, West Germans officials and project managers scorned “Africans” for failing to live up to European norms of modernity and diligence and preferred cultural to practical explanations for workplace apathy. In November 1969, Ambassador Müller worried that “Just as little as a technically uneducated central European can really understand space flight and the moon landing is it possible for peasants in the Peki Valley to imagine a different kind of use of his land than in the centuries-old “shifting

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cultivation” in the middle of the bush.” Müller was wrong on at least three counts. Pekians had showed themselves capable of entrepreneurship and innovation when they participated in the cocoa boom of the early twentieth century. His tacit assumption that shifting cultivation was somehow simpler and inferior to intensive cultivation ignored the flexibility it gave peasants in minimizing labor investment, cultivating different soil types, and recharging soil fertility without resort to artificial fertilizers. Finally, West African peasants were quite capable of combining extensive cultivation in some places with intensive cultivation in others. In the same month, Ulrich wrote GAWI that hard work was “a foreign concept for them.” Making his opinion more pointed, he indulged a pun by calling the Pekians “Pekinese,” i.e. the dog breed. Six days later he saw another opportunity to slight them as he reported on the first month of clearing work.

Such labors in the past decades and centuries were carried out in Africa without machine [and] only by hand. But now the colonial age is passé and our black friends are no longer ready to fertilize even their own fields with sweat. They have seen modern machine labor and output and want to know the same thing applied to their own, independent countries.

He allowed for the problems of “one-sided” nutrition and high temperatures, but added to them the “totally ruined” labor morale “so slight as I have never yet met in my long tropical years in different countries and parts of the earth.” To the BMZ’s Josef Hansen he wrote that they needed help to break out of their traditional work methods by embracing the modern virtues.

… it is also understandable—I mean the reserve and partly the refractoriness of the people who have practiced only fire clearing and subsistence economy for centuries, are used only to digging stick, bush knife and hand hoe, and now suddenly confronted with the most modern

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896 Jacobs, 238; Hodge, 200; Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, 49-50.
897 F.T. Ulrich to GAWI, November 24, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.
machines. We German experts must initially instruct the settlers in concepts of time, punctuality, labor morality, feeling of responsibility and handling of efficient hand tools and machines. 899

Paramount Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI was quite right when he detected color prejudice in Ulrich. In his correspondence the project manager was eagerly repeating the tropes of African laziness and “education into work” that Europeans had used since the early nineteenth century to promote the virtues of capitalist labor and justify extracting forced labor. 900 His remarks were not even appropriate to the occasion; as of early December 1969 land clearance was still underway and the settlers could hardly have begun working. Ulrich’s real purpose was to distract from his own neglect of planning.

While Ulrich’s racist views were unusually crude, Schurig also lamented supposed Pekian laziness in somewhat the same tone. His last report before the project handover in May 1975, in late October 1974, described the settlers’ work performance as “frighteningly slight.” “Many settlers are completely satisfied with what they need for daily life, the incentive for a surplus is hardly there.” He blamed the local environment for offering food year-round, so that “the population in this part of the country has never suffered hunger.” They therefore “perceived the constant driving to labor as a burden and wait for the day on which the German experts leave the project.” People in the other Peki villages called them “German slaves.” On the other hand, some prestige-conscious settlers were increasingly hiring wage laborers, even if they had to go into debt to do so. Schurig claimed that the idea, brought by English colonialism, that “working in the field is a punishment” was more deeply ingrained than previously understood. He did not trust them to run the cooperative after the handover, because they lacked “any economic

900 See, e.g. Keletso Atkins, 1-8; Jerônimo, 82-90, and discussion of this issue in the Introduction.
understanding, which considering their education level also can’t be expected.”

Like Ulrich, as well as Schnellbach in Togo, Schurig was echoing colonial-era themes, such as the notion that the bounteous tropics discouraged hard work, something the Portuguese and others claimed in the early twentieth century.

All these complaints about Pekians lacking a proper work ethic helped Schurig avoid facing fundamental defects in the project’s approach. First, there was a lack of pay. Between Ulrich’s removal in January 1970 and Schurig’s arrival a year later, the project tried to extract unpaid labor in communal production from settlers and their many “assistants,” probably members of their extended families or friends, for help, in exchange for the promise of future profits. The only “pay” was free breakfast and lunch, provided by the Volta River Authority. From early 1971 until the May 1975 handover, settlers received some compensation, but arguably too little to encourage them.

Second, the West Germans and Schurig in particular tried to exercise tight control over work timing and performance, denying the settlers autonomy, and that in the name of a cooperative which was never under settler control.

Settlers wearied of unpaid labor as quickly as the villagers of Agou-Nyongbo and Nuatja. An embassy official wrote in June 1970 that morale was good, but by October that was no longer the case. Kurt W. Gall complained that the settlers’ performance and that of their assistants was “minimal,” so that the project had to hire many wage laborers for “peak times.” They too were inefficient, yet entitled to receive 0.75 New

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903 Dr. Kuhn, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, June 12, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
904 Ibid.
Cedis per day as a minimum wage. The situation was no better the following month and perhaps worse.

After an average of nine months of gratis labor, the work performance of the settlers and their assistants is understandably converging on zero. Even ‘flaming’ appeals and collaboration of German project personnel on the field evoke only short-lived sympathy reactions (‘O.K., Mr. ____, I will do it because of you’). The addresses of Ghanaian counterparts, sporadic anyhow, are completely ignored. Even the prospect of a share in the proceeds from the sale of products (for 50 settlers and around 170 helpers around 17,000 NC in the first year) offers no inducement anymore.

Unfortunately for the project’s labor needs, the settlers had realized that their overseers had no way to pin down the actual performance of any individual and reward him accordingly. Even the threat of dismissal no longer had any effect; after receiving and cultivating individual plots in June 1970, they considered themselves “unfireable.” Gall felt that the West Germans were helpless to control settler labor. “The German experts bear the whole responsibility for the project, without being equipped with corresponding institutional authority.” Because persuasion and material sanctions no longer worked at all, experts ran the risk of using means that could be interpreted as threats or attempts at intimidation and thus expose themselves to the accusation of having a “neocolonialist” attitude.

The project also used unpaid assistants for a time, though officials and experts had not discussed them during planning, but the added labor power was no help. It is not clear whether these assistants satisfied the criteria used to select settlers. In December co-op expert Michael Boguslawski wanted to give them up because of high fluctuation in their attendance, from forty to one hundred forty per day, which made planning impossible. They were also unreliable, coming and going when they pleased, hesitating

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906 Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, November 25, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
to follow instructions, slow to do unpleasant work, and burdening settlers with costs. Not surprisingly, they were suffering from increasing “labor weariness” and felt exploited. Simply procuring the assistants had caused trouble, because someone (he did not say who) had threatened settlers with dismissal unless they procured six assistants each. Some complied and some did not, and when nothing bad happened to those who did not, those who complied felt punished.” Boguslawski’s report raises the question of why the West Germans or perhaps the Ghanaian project initiators even wanted “assistants” who unlike the settlers had no direct stake in the co-op and its future profits, if any. The mystery is not that they refused to work as the Germans wished, but that they showed up at all.

Seeing—as in Togo—the futility of unpaid labor, the West Germans tried to reform the system. In November an ad hoc committee consisting of Boguslawski, co-manager Ata, agricultural officer counterpart A. Osei Kwarty, Ghanaian co-op specialist S.B. Dankyi, and representatives of the “settlers-aspirants” decided to fire all the “assistants” at the end of November and to rehire sixty of them the next day on a contractual basis. Now all settlers and assistants would receive small back wages out of settlement income and rehired assistants would receive a pay increase after March 1971. Unfortunately, delays at the Ministry of Agriculture meant that settlers and assistants continued to work without pay at least until December, with the same depressing results. Real pay would have to await Schurig’s arrival in 1971.

To their credit, Gall and his colleagues greatly reduced communal labor. He recommended that the cooperative should drop “production promotion” and become a

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908 Ibid.
purchasing and sales co-op. The common land should be surveyed and divided up, a process that would take at least a year. The co-op’s workshop would become a machine- and tractor-lending station.\textsuperscript{909} The BMZ incorporated the new concept in its March 1971 application for a project extension; each settler would first receive one hectare for his own cultivation, and after two years the common land would be divided among them. In the long term, there would be no production cooperative. The co-op would still organize purchasing and sales, and counsel settlers regarding production on their own land and maintain the existing machine park.\textsuperscript{910} The Interministerial Committee approved.\textsuperscript{911} Cooperative production henceforth would apply only to the oil palms and a vegetable garden.\textsuperscript{912}

Despite the planned breakup of communal cultivation, project management continued and perhaps intensified work controls. Probably from his arrival in early 1971 until the beginning of 1974 Schurig held a morning roll call of settlers and kept attendance lists. He also required attendance at morning work meetings to give settlers instructions. It is no wonder other Pekians regarded the settlers as “slaves.” Schurig did not discuss these controls in surviving documents until March 1974, when he reported giving them up now that the settlers felt attached to their new village and no longer felt like German laborers. After a year and a half of training the settlers could now decide what to do on their own plots, so morning work meetings took place only between the experts and agricultural officers, each of the latter to contact twenty-five settlers every

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{909} Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, November 25, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\item \textsuperscript{910} Stecker, Referat I B 4, BMZ, Application to the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, March 23, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\item \textsuperscript{911} Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, March 30, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\item \textsuperscript{912} Dr. Neumann, Referat III A 6, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 16, 1972, BArchiv B 213/32439.
\end{itemize}
week. Schurig also seems to have directed what the settlers should plant. In early 1973 he reported three acres of maize, three-quarter acres of cassava, and a half acre each of yams and tobacco per lot. The following year the mix was four and a half acres of maize, a half to three quarters of tobacco and one quarter to one half of cassava.

On the other hand, Schurig provided positive incentives. Thanks to satisfactory yields, settlers could draw fifty to sixty New Cedis. For the individual settler who earned only thirty New Pesewas or one DM per day, this amount was more than he could earn anywhere else in Peki, Schurig claimed. They would also receive an advance of twenty DM a month for April through June 1972, when they would have no income. To these incentives, Schurig added food. At the end of January 1972, the project was distributing one hundred forty-five breakfasts and two hundred forty-five lunches per day to settlers and other workers. The BMZ extended food aid through 1972, feeding three hundred fifty or four hundred a day, including construction workers, settlers, tractor drivers, agricultural workers, and craftsmen. Schurig was somewhat skeptical, because controlling so many participants was not possible, nor had food “treats” (Essenbons) improved workers’ diligence. Five to eight percent of the eaters were not even employed in the project. Employees who tried to control distribution were hindered by threats of beatings. Yet food aid was still an advantage, because the project’s remote location

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913 Seventh Activity Report ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
915 Seventh Activity Report ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
917 Schurig to Reg Dir Kirschstein, Referat II B 3, BMZ, January 30, 1972, BArchiv B 213/32439.
would have made supporting workers a problem. In Schurig’s judgment, the food was also “thoroughly better and more nutritious in comparison with locally cooked food.”

Schurig eventually desired to control consumption as well as labor. In early 1973 he decided to pay out harvest proceeds in monthly installments rather than lump sums, because settlers were frivolously wasting money, he said, on unnecessary purchases and on bars. Here he shared a common European concern with supposed African improvidence. Part of the problem was how fast they spent their money. The UN delegation observed that management disliked lump sums, because recipients spent in only six weeks payouts supposed to last six months, and then asked the co-op for loans. In March 1974 Schurig wrote that the “Cooperative Committee” (probably the Advisory Committee) had cut off credit to sixteen settlers until the harvest in next August. They would have to feed themselves from their garden.

Yet even with all these changes, controls and incentives, the West Germans could never extract the labor they wanted from settlers, as we have seen from Schurig’s complaints at the end of October 1974, and for this failure there are several possible explanations. Perhaps Schurig was correct that they were satisfied with mere subsistence or preferred to hire others to work for them rather than do it themselves, but this conclusion prompts the question of why they were in the settlement at all. Here Schurig blamed poor selection of the first sixty settlers. Some were forced to register by their

922 Seventh Activity Report ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
families to represent landowners. Some already had jobs in the larger cities as “masons, wheelwrights or bookkeepers,” better paid than farmers in Peki. Some were sent by families that regarded them as “difficult and work-shy” and were tired of feeding them. Schurig had gotten rid of twelve, and three others gave up voluntarily. Schurig believed that settlers were now receiving enough money to motivate them, but in 1974, a BfE official named Schladitz thought that the return to labor was low; the average income increase for the individual settler was equivalent to DM hundred ninety per year, or about the wage of an unskilled laborer. His project critique contained three other important points. Rather than resting upon an existing community, the West Germans had tried to create a new one out of “heterogeneous groups whose interest position was not correctly recognized” and so could not be sufficiently motivated. Furthermore, “the settlers could not identify with an organism that had been imposed on them from outside, which was led by outsiders and must be further directed and subsidized by them (and the government in the future).” In other words, the settlers were not willing to work hard without collective self-governance, whose absence was a clear violation of the cooperative principle. Finally, the settlers suffered from loss of prestige as “German slaves.” So the controls supposed to encourage hard work also discouraged it to some extent.

The West Germans should have considered another factor, the delay in constructing housing at the project site. Until they had homes of their own in 1972 or 1973, the settlers necessarily had to stay with their families and walk to the site, or drive if they lived outside Peki, limiting the time they were willing to stay there. Remaining in

their earlier homes encouraged them to continue working outside the project. In late 1971 Schurig remarked that they had time to work their plots only in the afternoons and on Saturdays, so only half of each family’s 2.5 acres (i.e. one hectare) could be planted.\textsuperscript{925} As he noted in 1974, some settlers held onto their skilled craft jobs rather than cultivate in Peki full-time. A successful settlement project would have to give new residents a place to stay while at the same time entice them from their prior bases of support.

The land problem was a final reason for settlers to hold back from maximum effort. Neither “their” co-op nor they as individuals owned the land they lived and worked on. As the 1974 UN delegation observed, “Some feel there will be a land problem when their children grow up and want to farm. Others worry about what will happen to them at the end of the present 33 1/3 year lease if government does not step in to acquire this land outright for them permanently.”\textsuperscript{926}

**Preparing the Handover**

Having no more trust in the settlers’ capacity for self-governance than in their diligence, the West Germans decided to turn over the major project assets to the Ministry of Agriculture rather than to the cooperative. In 1974 Schurig wrote that even though the co-op was functioning well, it was still in no state to take over management. The future Ghanaian manager, who came from Peki, was “timid” in relations with his fellow dwellers and often could not oppose their unfulfillable wishes.\textsuperscript{927} The “overtaxed” settlers lacked any “economic understanding,” and even intensive training would not give

\textsuperscript{925} Second Project Report of Thomas Schurig, October 14, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32439.
\textsuperscript{927} Seventh Activity Report ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
them “sustained economic thinking, so that they understand the business processes of the cooperative.” They were also reluctant to cooperate and carry out work that did not affect them directly, such as caring for the oil palms or the communal harvest of a settler plot. “The settlers here are much too much individualists to be good members of a cooperative.”

Schurig wanted the Ministry of Agriculture to take over the project for another three years after the West German departure so that the settlers would have time to take responsibility. The machines and equipment would remain Ministry property, though perhaps the houses could be handed over to the co-op. The Ministry would stop supporting the project financially from the 1975-76 fiscal year. As Schurig’s successors, he proposed S.B. Dankyi as “Overall Manager” and Osei Kwarty as “Field Manager.”

The settlers were also poor citizens of their village, according to Schurig. “You can see the football place without grass you can see the gutters filled with sand you can see the streets were [sic] weed is growing. Nobody cares.” Schurig spoke with settlers several times, and that accomplished nothing. He invited the Peki Union as project initiator to come talk to the settlers, but that also “was not very satisfactory.” Schurig met again with Dr. Amu, Reverend Ansme and Dankyi, and they proposed that the co-op president should be the “headman” of this village, and the members of the (Steering) Committee should be a town committee with one representative of the Peki Union. In other words, neither Schurig nor anyone else had thought about who would manage the village as opposed to the co-op. Without a responsible authority to take charge, any one settler who wanted to enjoy the “public good” of a tidy village could not count on the aid.

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929 Report by the Manager, Attachment 5 to Eighth Activity Report of Thomas Schurig, October 28, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
930 Ibid.
of other settlers able to act as free riders. Schurig was also concerned that the ownership of houses and plots remained unclear, leaving settlers insecure and dissatisfied. The Ministry should inform the settlers of its policy as to this and other matters soon as possible to avoid rumors and support its officers in the project.\footnote{Statement on Problems at the Ghanaian-German Settlement, Peki which should be solved before the handing-over in May 1975, Attachment 6 to Schurig’s Eighth Activity Report of October 28, 1974, undated, BArchiv B 213/32442.}

**Evaluating the Project**

Despite his many complaints, Schurig felt quite positive about his accomplishments. From the beginning the project had five objectives: to increase agricultural production in the area, to prevent the drift of youth to Accra or other towns while building up a cooperative, to be a model for other projects, to employ the unemployed, and to establish whether the Peki Project could be an example of cooperation between the two governments. As to the first objective, “You can buy now maize, cassava, vegetables, eggs, chicken and poultry feed at any time and to [sic] normal prizes [sic].” As to the second, “You can see the village over there the [sic] settlement, which is organized in a co-operative.” He did not actually say youth emigration had slowed. As to the third objective, some people were “complaining the houses were too well built, to [sic] nice and therefore to [sic] costly”; Schurig assured them that the houses cost less than low-cost homes in Tema. As to the fourth, the project was too small to employ everyone who needed work, but for the last two and a half years, it gave jobs to three hundred and fifty in construction, a hundred in agriculture, and of course a hundred settlers. The fifth objective, proving the ability of the governments to cooperate, was also fulfilled. His new budget showed the co-op to be profitable, though it would be desirable if the Ministry could “participate” in paying wages for two to three years to reduce
expenses to individual settlers. An oil mill to be built after the handover would increase settler income.\footnote{Report by the Manager, Attachment 5 to Eighth Activity Report of Thomas Schurig, October 28, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.} On the other hand, he wanted that mill, as well as an animal feed mill, run as a separate agricultural station, not part of the co-op.\footnote{Statement on Problems at the Ghanaian-German Settlement, Peki which should be solved before the handing-over in May 1975, Attachment 6 to Schurig’s Eighth Activity Report of October 28, 1974, undated, BArchiv B 213/32442.} The West German project files do not bear out Schurig’s profitability claim, however. They contain no profit and loss or financial statements whatsoever.

Pekians took a more negative view. The settlers were unhappy at having to work longer than four hours, the typical day of local food growers (according to the UN delegation) and having to continue contributing communal labor. They also wanted changes to co-op rules and to be able to borrow money from management.\footnote{Report of Fieldwork in Ghana, United Nations Institute for Development and Economic Planning – Training Session on Environment in the Forest and Forested Savanna Area, undated but during or after July 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.} As Schurig admitted, the Peki Union and the population of Peki were disappointed. They had expected to enjoy financial benefits, foodstuffs at reduced prices and attachment to electrical and water systems (apparently for all Peki, not just the settlement), and saw none of it. They had manifested their unhappiness in an unsuccessful campaign to have the government remove the counterparts. The Peki Union also wanted the West Germans to extend the project another year, a request that Schurig rejected outright. He dismissed the Union as a body that “pursues only its selfish interests.” An extension would only postpone the problems Ghanaians should solve themselves and impose considerable costs on the FRG.\footnote{Eighth Activity Report of Thomas Schurig, October 28, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.} He did, however, see a need to give Peki something. When local leaders approached Schurig to ask whether the West Germans might build a mayor’s office for
the commune, he recommended approval. The settlers lived in “new, clean houses with electricity and water” while the rest of Peki had to live in the “old mud huts,” so by building a mayor’s office the West Germans could set up a bridge between settlement and community. It could be West Germany’s “farewell gift” to the Peki community. The BMZ’s West Africa Referat gave its approval, with payment to come out of the Peki project account. As in Nuatja, the West Germans provided something extra to reduce local resentment over the project failing to deliver expected benefits.

Independent scholar Peter Langer came to a negative conclusion before the project was finished. In 1971 and 1972 he interviewed former Ambassador Steltzer, Ambassador Müller, former embassy economic attaché Dr. Armbruster, economic attaché H. von Weyhe, Michael Boguslawski as co-op expert, gardening expert Th. Gawandtka and BMZ officials B. Schweiger and H. Stryk. From them he learned that “Like no other, the project has gotten into very great difficulties from the very beginning.” All project personnel had to be changed in 1971. Boguslawski feared for the co-op’s ability to manage production and marketing after handover, and he believed that the need to use machines would make dividing the common land impossible. Yet the common land could “probably be cultivated only with poorly paid seasonal workers, that is, almost early-capitalistic methods.” Langer also quoted a BMZ report: “The total clear-cutting, perplexity on the production side, disregard of the social structure and personnel insufficiencies can no longer be gotten rid today of by well-meaning corrections. The unhappy situation of the project finds in Accra an echo that could damage the image of all German technical aid.” Langer himself concluded that “it was not very sensible to

936 Thomas Schurig to BfE, December 3, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
937 Adam, Referat 113, BMZ to GTZ, January 8, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32442.
938 Langer, 195-96.
place a large settlement project in the middle of a rainforest, of all places. Local and personal interests of influential people and the overhasty engagement of the German ambassador—certainly for honest reasons—obviously hindered a fundamental preliminary evaluation of the project.¹⁹³⁹

Later West German analysts also attacked the project. Consultant H. Ruthenberg believed in February 1974 that it offered “little prospect” of offering “satisfactory solutions” at the level of either individual farm or for the whole operation. It was in fact an embarrassment for the FRG. “The current conception is really the best that one can do in face of the situation. We should visibly [and] with propriety distance ourselves from the project.” Ruthenberg gave a dozen reasons, with three especially worth singling out. First, the project lacked a “halfway sensible starting conception.” He could not see any purpose for a settlement in Peki. The site was not really new land, but land previously used for the locally typical mixture of cocoa, bananas and forest, with extensive slash-and-burn cultivation that allowed steady production without exhausting the soil and with minimal costs. Common European opinion underestimated traditional practices with the wrong-headed assumption that they were “chaotic and irrational.” Second, the modernization approach here was to introduce “large-area, mechanized production with non-irrigated farming”; successful models for this method did not yet exist in the moist lowlands of West Africa. Mechanization paid off only where crops had a high monetary yield; such crops were not at Peki. Third, and in direct contradiction of Schurig’s opinion, the combination of high costs and small plot size produced minimal settler

¹⁹³⁹ Langer, 137-38. I have been unable to find a copy of this report, written by an evaluation commission led by Kruse-Rodenacker, in the BMZ’s files.
Schladitz noted the co-op’s shaky finances. After devouring so much in subsidies thanks to overinvestments, bad investments, personnel discontinuities, and taking on additional services, the organization had to shrink rather than grow. Other details such as lack of adaptation in technical areas and separating co-op and project finances at a very late point in time meant that the settlers never carried the co-op. The project’s technical objective was reached, and so was the economic, if one accepted Schurig’s premises and calculations, but the co-op was not able to carry the entire project, either managerially or financially, so Ministry employees would continue to be necessary for guidance and control.

Officials at the West Africa Referat were especially biting. Regierungsdirektor Adam wrote at the end of May 1974 that “experiments with cooperative organizational forms in Kambolé as well as in Peki promise little success over the medium term.” Cooperation rested on the influence and initiative of the West German experts and on the material advantages that co-op members received because of the project. The problem of guiding and controlling co-op management was unsolved. Even when an efficient manager could be found, members were unable to supervise him—there had been difficulties in both Kambolé and Peki—so again West German experts served as the “counterweight” to these managers, making the co-ops further dependent upon them. Even in spite of their control embezzlement often took place. He later warned against taking Peki as a model for other settlements or for national planning. He dismissed it as “nothing more than an experiment, an experiment that has proved very expensive and

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comprises a multiplicity of unsolved technical [sachliche] problems." The head of the West Africa Referat, Ministerialrat Schweiger, was downright sarcastic, and saw nothing to learn from Peki. The project was conceived, he wrote, “when development policy ideas in the area of agriculture were different than today’s. Thus [Insofern] no substantial insights can be expected from the project. From the present-day point of view, the mistaken conception is already settled.” Perhaps the GTZ thought so too; it never submitted a final report that might have provided a thorough post-mortem. A request from the West Africa Referat remains in the file, unanswered.

After the Handover

The West Germans handed over Peki on May 16, 1975, but they were not quite done with it yet. There was no successor project as in Kambolé or Tori Cada, but a serious problem cropped up that they not taken seriously enough: the lack of spare parts. Back in 1968, Josef Hansen had followed up the Büchner report with a reminder that when technical aid funds paid for FRG equipment, they should also include a supply of spare parts; the Ghanaians would have to buy more in the future. In late 1974, Schladitz at the BfE feared Schurig’s spare parts estimates were three hundred percent too low, given Ghana’s lack of foreign currency. Yet the project managed to run short less than two years after the handover. An embassy official wrote that “a series of vehicles and tools are no longer operable, because defective motors, tires and other parts

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943 Adam, Referat 113, BMZ to Referat 312, BMZ, July 9, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
945 AR Rücker, Referat 113, BMZ to GTZ, August 13, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32442.
946 Cracknell, 45, identifies “horrendous delays in obtaining spare parts,” as one reason for bad maintenance after handover.
947 RR Hansen, Referat I A 6, BMZ, November 4, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
cannot be replaced due to the chronic undersupply of spare parts in the country.” He asked whether leftover funds could pay for spare parts, a list of which he included.949 Several months later the GTZ informed the Foreign Office that Peki would receive spare parts, and additional funds for them would be made available. It urgently asked for the workshop manager to submit an inventory according to his priorities and the list of spare parts.950 The matter was then woefully delayed; only in late 1979 did the GTZ submit an offer to the BMZ, which approved it on November 23.951 Still later the BMZ, lacking confidence in the Ghanaian project management, decided to send an expert to check the procurement list before ordering, and to ensure proper storage and use after the parts arrived.952

Spare parts could not keep Peki-Agbateh alive. It was still there in 1979, when eighty-eight of a hundred settler lots were still under cultivation, with harvest yields “relatively constant.” Alongside eight Ministry of Agriculture officials fifty workers were active in the workshop, motor pool and administration.953 But that was no longer true by 1999, when historian Birgit Meyer wrote that the “maize farm,” had failed. “The project attracted many people from different Peki villages, but after some initial years of good harvests, the fertility of the ground declined rapidly and the machines broke down. Apart from this unsuccessful attempt, no other significant income-generating development projects were instigated.” Emigration of the “enterprising young” remained

950 GTZ to Foreign Office, November 8, 1977, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 115530.
951 Referat 111, BMZ, Decision on Order for Project Implementation, undated but after GTZ offer of October 10, 1979, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 127547; Referat 111, BMZ, Decision on Order for Project Implementation, August 27, 1980, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 127547.
952 Referat 111, BMZ, Decision on Order for Project Implementation, August 27, 1980, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 127547.
953 Referat 111, BMZ, Decision on Order for Project Implementation, undated but after GTZ offer of October 10, 1979, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 127547.
a problem. By 2002, the “Ghana-German Settlement project” had been “defunct for several years” and former landowners in Peki-Wudome were suing to force the government to sell the land back to them rather than to a private investment firm. At present I am unable to say whether Peki-Agbateh is there at all.

**Conclusion**

At a cost of DM 8,704,000 (more than $15,000,000 in 2014) or 870,404 per settler lot, the West Germans purchased themselves an expensive debacle, which they owed to their failure to learn. Dr. Theierl allowed pressure from the embassy in Accra to draw him into a farming project at Peki against his better judgment and he signed up for a “production promotion cooperative” despite its potential for creating the same labor problems as the Togo Model Villages. He rejected a model farm for fear that it would require large appropriations, that it would be state-controlled, that it would be unprofitable, and that it would make peasants feel they were working for a foreign enterprise rather than themselves. Instead he chose a settlement project that required large appropriations, was state controlled, was unprofitable, and made settlers feel they were working for a foreign enterprise rather than themselves. The BMZ compounded its blunder by allowing the appointment of a project manager whom its Agriculture Referat knew to have personal difficulties. His impetuosity in clearing land as soon as possible helped commit the West Germans to the project irrevocably at the same time it stirred up landowner opposition. Here the Pekian project initiators rightly bore much of the blame for leading the West Germans into a trap, but proper advance investigation by Ulrich

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954 Meyer, 19.
956 See Appendix C.
might have revealed the trap before he stepped into it. Still worse, the West Germans failed to learn from their bad experience. *Ministerialrat* Schweiger wrote that “the mistaken conception is already settled,” but he failed to elaborate on what the conception was or why it was mistaken. If he believed that Peki provided no “substantial insights” into future projects, he might have considered its implications for embassy influence over project selection and for the difficulty of finding qualified project managers. The absence of a final report made sure that the BMZ and the GTZ (successor to GAWI and the BfE) would never thoroughly study the reasons for their debacle. From its “voyage of discovery,” to quote Albert O. Hirschman, the BMZ returned both empty-handed and empty-headed.

The next chapter will examine the projects in Biriwa, Ghana, where in contrast to Peki the BMZ gladly took credit for success yet had trouble making success stay intact.
Chapter 5

A Fragile Success: Three Projects in Biriwa, 1962-77

The previous village development project, as sole project of this kind in the region, already had a strong aura.\textsuperscript{957}

Ministerialrat Schweiger of the BMZ West Africa Referat, April 26, 1974

\textit{I hope this time a very serious view might be taken as a result of this Memo to forestall the already created image of the project and to avoid possible close down and complete failure of the project. I do not wish to see that and I hope that you would act immediately to prove that you do not wish so either.}\textsuperscript{958}

Frank Neequaye, Manager, Biriwa Project, December 23, 1975

It was as if a beaming lighthouse threatened to crumble into a pile of rubble. In Biriwa on Ghana’s coast the West Germans had a project that made them so proud they boasted of its aura, literally its “radiating power” (\textit{Ausstrahlungskraft}), a success certain to inspire imitation in nearby communities and enlarge the reputation of West German development aid. For nine years Ghanaian and West German embassy officials, a BMZ expert, DED volunteers, Ghanaian trainees and Biriwa residents worked to improve the village’s hygiene and help it earn a higher standard of living. The village received new nets, concrete latrines with a decorated sanitary forum, modern ovens for smoking fish, a motor repair shop, a carpentry shop, a new school, and a dressing station. When in 1973 the BMZ’s project manager surrendered the project to Ghanaian control, the West Germans thought they had a winner. They did not. Two years later the BMZ learned that

\textsuperscript{957} Schweiger, BMZ, Application for Technical Aid, April 26, 1974, BArchiv B 213/4042.

\textsuperscript{958} Frank Neequaye, Manager, Biriwa Project to Chairman, Biriwa Project, December 23, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.
nearly everything it had built was abandoned or collapsing financially, if not literally. After some investigation, the BMZ decided that it would have to save what was already supposed to have succeeded. In fact, though the public was not to know it, much had already failed or not even been attempted before the handover, so that the project’s genuine *Ausstrahlungskraft* was considerably dimmer than West Germans and Ghanaians had imagined.

Biriwa had important similarities to and differences from the other projects. There too the West Germans tried to raise the village from mere subsistence to intensive production for the market, even if the “crop” was fish rather than grain or cotton, and there too a large force of DED volunteers supported the effort. On the other hand, Biriwa consisted of not one but four separate projects. While in Togo this multiplicity was across space, in Biriwa it was over time.

Biriwa I (1962-64) involved the nets and sanitary facilities, Biriwa II (1963-65) a further delivery of nets to Biriwa and neighboring villages, and Biriwa III (1965-73), a complicated batch of social or health improvements and of economic enterprises. It was for this project that the DED came to the village. Biriwa IV (1973-90) created a Vocational Training and Rehabilitation Centre; this project is outside the scope of the dissertation, but early in its term Biriwa III’s serious flaws became known. As in the other projects the West Germans were forced to push aside an unwanted project manager, but here the manager had an unusual career as West German national, Ghanaian health official, one-time informant to the West German embassy, and company captain of Biriwa’s militia. His name was Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann. Finally, at Biriwa, unlike the projects in Togo, or at Tori Cada or Peki, the West Germans made no serious attempt to
set up a cooperative and eventually put the project under a board responsible to the Ghanaian government.

In the pages that follow, I will take up the Biriwa projects with Dr. Hoffmann’s request for the Federal Republic’s aid on the village’s behalf and pursue them through Biriwa I, II, and the early stages of Biriwa III, which suffered some setbacks in 1965-66, including the removal of Dr. Hoffmann himself. I will then examine Biriwa III’s somewhat successful economic enterprises under Dr. Hoffmann and his successor, Hans-Josef Glinke, the mostly unsuccessful village improvement efforts, and the DED’s establishment of a dressing station. I will end with the revelations of Biriwa III’s troubles under Biriwa IV project manager Walter Kleinebudde and the beginnings of plans for its restoration.

The Village

West German reports portrayed Biriwa, a coastal community in the Fante traditional state of Nkusukum midway between Saltpond and Mori, as an unpleasant place. Steep rocks made the village difficult to reach by land and hindered the passage of boats onto the beaches. Night landings were especially dangerous. The rough surf sometimes left fishermen with fractured femurs while they tried to walk their fish-laden boats back to shore. During the rainy season, floods tore down houses, so one-seventh of the village always lay in ruins, as collapses kept up with rebuilding. The village

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961 Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann to Dr. Theierl, BMZ, February 4, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
962 Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, August 6, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
turned into a swampland infested with flies and malaria-bearing mosquitoes. Biriwans lacked public latrines and did their “business” on the beach or “the immediately surrounding area.” The wind could carry worm eggs and pathogens to cooking places. A quagmire ditch separated the village’s western part from a country road, and those who stepped into it barefoot risked hook or tunnel worms. Tsetse flies made cattle-raising impossible. Sheep and goats were very rare, and only in dwarf form. Biriwa could not cultivate vegetables or fruit, and in the mid-1960s, the nearest vegetable market lay in Mankesim, thirty kilometers away.

Biriwans earned their keep through fishing and wage labor. Apart from helping Biriwans subsist, fishing earned surpluses during the “large” herring season from June to October and the “small” one from February to March, enabling them to purchase cassava, manioc, yam, maize, and plantain. Maize and plantain they processed into kenkey (a rough corn meal) and fufu (a sticky dumpling from plantain marrow). Biriwan men fished in dugout boats, which they traditionally moved by oar. In 1960-61 the Ghanaian government lent a hand by lending coastal fishermen the money to buy boat motors and providing training in their use and maintenance. When Biriwan men landed fish in

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967 Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
970 Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, August 6, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
their home village, they sold the fish to the wives for smoking and resale, though the German report that notes this does not say whether a given man necessarily sold to his own wife or other women. As for wage labor, male villagers worked as “boatmen” in the port of Accra for three or four generations up to 1962, transporting goods between ship and shore. Though the Germans may not have known it, Fante boatmen had been active since the slave trade days, especially at nearby Cape Coast. Each crew completed its contractually required quota of three hundred-thirty trips as quickly as possible, working twelve to fourteen hours per day. The West Germans mentioned no income or wealth disparities in Biriwa, but such may have existed. A study of two other villages along the Fante coast found functional distinctions among those who owned boats, owned nets, steered boats, operated engines, and cast nets. While these roles might overlap, in one of the villages there was a polarization between boat and/or net owners and non-owning crew members. Those who owned large boats received much larger shares of fish than the crews.

Biriwa’s population size was a matter of some confusion. Dr. Hoffmann variously used figures of four thousand, six thousand, three thousand, and between twenty-five hundred and three thousand. The *Daily Graphic* and DED volunteers thought it was four thousand, while an evaluation commission cited eighteen hundred

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975 Vercrujsse, 17-21, 25.
976 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, May 30, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040; Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Rosenberg, Bundesvorstand DGB, July 24, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040; Dr. and PMP C.S. Hoffmann to Embassy in Accra, October 17, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040; Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, August 6, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040; Report of Dr. Arno Meschkat, FAO, October 4, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
“registered inhabitants” yet heard local claims of three thousand actual ones. Ghana’s official census listed 1853 people in 1960 and 2642 in 1970, but a Ghanaian official wrote in 1972 that there were forty-five hundred.

**Origin of the Projects**

Biriwa began as the brainchild of Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann, a Senior Medical Officer for the Ghanaian Health Ministry and a West German national. According to 1967 press release, he became involved with the village after he examined Biriwan surfboat worker Kobina Atta at Korle Bu Hospital in Accra. The doctor tried to admit Atta to the hospital, but the patient “escaped.” Dr. Hoffmann tracked him down and returned him to the hospital. The village’s bad hygiene and malnutrition appalled him, moving him to write the West German embassy on May 30, 1962. Thanks to the new port at Tema, village men like Atta had lost their jobs at the old port of Accra. Although they had already been fishing herring with wide-meshed nets when at home, they now needed smaller-meshed nets to capture small, sprat-like fish during the herring’s off season. The people were “helpless and hungry” and could not afford new nets. Creditors were repossessing outboard motors, and without motors the villagers could not bring long-distance catches home in useful condition. Hoffmann requested money for nets, fourteen

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978 Edward Vickery, “Fertility Determinants in West Africa: The Case of Biriwa, Ghana” (Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute, November 21, 1974), 3. This report is not available publicly; I received part of it from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa, Canada. See also S.C. Ohene, Regional Head, Central Region, Department of Social Welfare and Community Development to The Director, Accra, March 17, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4078.

outboard motors, two block-making machines, building materials for two septic-tank latrines, and tubing to connect Biriwa with a water main. To satisfy official aid protocol, he characterized the request as a “pilot scheme,” a demonstration that would inspire imitation elsewhere.\(^{980}\) A Ghanaian minister seconded Hoffmann’s request.\(^ {981}\) Dr. Jovy of the Foreign Office’s Referat for Technical Aid excitedly wrote several West German ministers, “The Foreign Office would welcome it in view of the unusual nature of this case, if this project, which promises to achieve a good success with relatively trivial means, could be realized. In this connection it should positively taken into consideration that there is already a German who is thoroughly familiar with the state of things is already on the spot.”\(^ {982}\) In late July the Interministerial Committee appropriated 50,000 DM.\(^ {983}\) This decision marked the beginning of the Biriwa projects.

**Biriwa I. II and III: Fishing Nets and Latrines**

If one could take Dr. Hoffmann at his word, the nets were a great success. In October 1963 he wrote the embassy that the project had distributed two hundred of them, two per boat, that it had redeemed nine outboard motors, and given away two Johnson ten-horsepower motors with lines for manipulating a “traditional cooperative net” for tuna and “a big sturgeon-like fish called Opaa.” He conducted a survey. Of one hundred forty-two interviewees, one hundred thirty told him that fish had not appeared in greater numbers, yet all one hundred forty-two reported catches had risen by fifty to a hundred percent. More reliable individual statements indicated a sixty-three percent increase in local income from January to October, though it is not clear whether Hoffmann factored

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\(^{980}\) Dr. Carl S. Hoffman to Ambassador, May 30, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040.

\(^{981}\) Minister Abavana, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing, to Dr. Lüders, June 1, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040.


\(^{983}\) Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, July 25, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040.
out 1963’s seasonal herring income. Hoffmann listed eight specific improvements. Since the distribution of nets and motors in January and February 1963, not a single fisherman had emigrated and twenty-four had returned. Nutrition improved, with two major meals eaten per day and people buying eggs again. The inhabitants were better clothed. No fisherman was sitting around; all were at sea or repairing their nets. Drinking “fusel gin” had become rare. People were willing to give money for communal collection and the Catholics were building a chapel. Finally, eight new canoes appeared. Biriwa’s chief Nana Kwa Bonku IV was so delighted he sent Ambassador Carl H. Lüders a letter praising “your pure love toward Africans.” He claimed that the FRG’s gift was “the general topic of conversation in Ghana.”

Not satisfied with the FRG’s generosity, Dr. Hoffmann approached the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) with a request for more nets, two hundred for Biriwa and one hundred forty each for Anomabu and Moree. As justification he pointed to the existence of protein-deficiency diseases Kwashiorkor and “sugar baby” in children. E.K. Okoh, secretary to Nkrumah’s cabinet, also wrote the DGB in support. The DGB ultimately kicked the request over to the BMZ. The Interministerial Committee approved fifty thousand DM for more nets, so long as German material was purchased. This project became Biriwa II. When the nets arrived, Ambassador Steltzer presented them, three hundred sixty-six in number, to

984 Dr. and PMP C.S. Hoffmann to Embassy in Accra, October 17, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040.
986 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Rosenberg, Bundesvorstand DGB, July 24, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040.
987 E.K. Okoh, Secretary to the Cabinet, Office of the President to Ludwig Rosenberg, Bundesvorstand DGB, August 5, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040.
Opanin Kojo Asoku, chairman of the Biriwa Town Development Committee, in a ceremony in the first week of August 1965. The village chief remarked that “the Federal Government has put our village on the map.” A third of the nets were sold rather than donated, with the proceeds going to build Biriwa’s new sanitary facilities. On September 7, 1965 the embassy’s economic attaché gave one hundred thirty-five nets to the fishermen of Abandzi in the presence of the Minister of Fisheries and the Regional Commissioner. The Biriwa II nets therefore totaled about five hundred.

Nets would also find a modest place in Biriwa III, when the Ghanaian government requested one hundred thirty-five nylon herring nets in February 1965. Dr. Hoffmann explained that fishermen had not been able to procure nets, corks or lines in the ordinary course of business, even if they had money. Nets were available on the black market, but not corks or lines. GAWI shipped out lead plates and corks during the winter of 1966 and the nets during April. In September Dr. Meschkat of the Food and Agriculture Organization complimented the nets’ “correct thread quantity and mesh size,” and found that “They have been bought and obviously used correctly.”

As much as nets, the latrines were a critical part of Biriwa I. Dr. Hoffmann planned two of them, one for men and one for women, to seat fourteen each and be equipped with septic tanks.

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991 Michael Jeroch later wrote that the nets were sold to Biriwans at “preferential discounts.” See Observation Report of Michael Jeroch, Afrika-Verein e.V., May 29, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4036.
994 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
995 Attachment, GAWI to Referat II B 1, BMZ, April 15, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
997 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador Dr. Lüders, Embassy in Accra, October 7, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040.
Biriwan men inside their latrine
Source: Bundesarchiv B 213/4040

Biriwan men in front of their latrine
Source: Bundesarchiv Koblenz 213/4040
He had the assistance of a “Health Education Officer,” two masons, a carpenter, and “voluntary and not so voluntary” communal labor provided by villagers; he did not explain why some villagers resisted labor or what means the government used to coerce them. Getting the latrines built seems to have taken some time. By September 1964 only the men’s latrine was finished. The women’s latrine was merely an iron framework in the ground, and Dr. Hoffmann asked the embassy for four hundred twenty pounds to finish it. He had, however, also used a thousand-pound donation from Nkrumah to build a bathhouse near the beach, so that after Biriwans bathed in the sea they could wash off salt water. With its water tower, water cocks, tiles and sprinklers, the bathhouse had become the “showpiece of the coast” and the “civic pride” of the place. Hoffmann bragged that the new sanitary facilities had already made “history,” and were seen in rural districts as the “last word” (Dernier Cri) and a “status symbol.”

Latrines came into Biriwa III as well. Hoffmann wanted to build two more on the east side, where there were twenty-four hundred “non-sunken” defecations a day containing worms (Ascaris or roundworm), larvae of tunnel worms, and enteric bacteria or cysts spread by wind and flies after the feces dried out. In any case, the original two with their bathhouse would become a sanitary forum, decorated with mosaics on each latrine. The men’s mosaic was already installed by February 1966, and Dr. Hoffmann wrote Dr. Theierl asking for funds to pay the German designer for materials and transportation. Dr. Theierl said no. Hoffmann nonetheless found the money

998 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, Embassy in Accra, September 11, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4040.
999 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, August 6, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1000 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Dr. Theierl, BMZ, February 7, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1001 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Mr. Hoffmann, February 12, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
somewhere, and the designer installed his mosaic, a larger-than-life fisherwoman, during the summer.\footnote{Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Armbruster, August 17, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.}

Not content with improving life in Biriwa, Dr. Hoffmann and West German officials expected its sanitary facilities to inspire nearby communities to build their own. In August 1965 Hoffmann boasted that they had brought a “flow of visitors,” including “ministers, municipal administrations, etc.” and inspired excavation and the beginning of construction in Abakrampa and Abura-Dunkwa, two “relatively prosperous villages in the hinterland, which cultivated cocoa.” Both had asked his office for “Biriwa-style” building plans, Biriwa style now being “a new concept and a slogan that has placed our derelict fishing village into the ‘Christian Dior’ class in the area of sanitary facilities.”\footnote{Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, August 6, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.}

In 1969 Michael Jeroch of the Africa Association found seven toilet facilities in operation: the two in Biriwa, four in Abakrampa, and one in Abura-Dunkwa. Thirteen facilities in six places were under construction: two in Abakrampa, two in Abura-Dunkwa, two in Fanti-Nyankumasi, one in Mouri, two in Oboden, and four in Kissi. Ten other villages had asked for support, although he could not determine whether they had sufficient funds. Jeroch remarked on the opportunity these developments presented: “Here lies a rare great radiating effect of a German project that until now has been only insufficiently used.”\footnote{Observation Report of Michael Jeroch, Afrika-Verein e.V., May 29, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4036.}

Unfortunately, many Biriwans shunned their fine latrines, at least according to German reports. From 1965 to 1967, Hoffmann gave out various figures of twelve or
fourteen hundred users out of three thousand or more Biriwans. But two DED officials concluded from a 1967 visit to Biriwa that people were not using the toilets. A BMZ official described the toilets as unused, while the “old, primitive loo” was popular as ever and emptied its products into filthy runnels, in which swine wallowed and children played. Glinke admitted at the beginning of 1968 that not all inhabitants were using the toilets, instead answering the call of nature (ihre Notdurft verrichten) on the beach. Several health officers were now, on the initiative of Dr. Hoffmann, checking the beach and fining any offender five shillings. In 1969 Jeroch wrote that the men’s toilets were used by eighty percent of the men, but women seldom used their latrine. Dr. Hoffmann, no longer project manager but still a Ghanaian health official, heard that several swine-raising women kept other women from using the toilets so that they would not lose fodder for the swine. In other words, pigs were rooting through human excrement. Swine-keeping in villages was supposed to be against the law, so perhaps the Ghanaian Health Service would take action. Peter Langer also heard about the muck-eating pigs in 1971. It is difficult to know what credence to give this tale, but Biriwans who preferred arrangements other than the latrines may have had other reasons as well, such as distance from their homes. On the other hand, many did use the latrines,

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1010 Langer, 135. Unlikely as it seems, the swine may really have scavenged through human excrement; American medical officials found the same practice in the Philippines during the era of U.S. rule. See Warwick Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 109. I thank Caroline Acker for referring me to this work.
because by 1975 the West Germans learned, as we shall see, that the septic tanks were full.

Biriwa III: The Concept

Returning to 1965, both West German and Ghanaian governments were ready for a more ambitious project. Ambassador Steltzer had already mooted the idea of developing Biriwa as a “model village” to President Nkrumah, and found him receptive.1011 On February 26, 1965, Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a note requesting thirteen different measures: the herring nets, three ovens for smoking fish, a truck to carry the fish, a shop for repairing boat motors, a carpentry shop, a vegetable garden, the two latrines, blasting of rocks in front of Biriwa’s beaches, a poultry-raising operation, a school with pipe-borne water, four looms for disabled villagers, four block-making machines, a school, and village renovations to remove rubble and control flooding.1012 These details came from discussions between Dr. Hoffmann and Ambassador Steltzer, at least according to Dr. Hoffmann.1013

Biriwa III marked a shift from survival to commerce. As Dr. Theierl wrote,

> The measures up to now have, so far as I can view them from here, served in the economic sector to increase the fishermen’s catch and thereby improve the fishermen’s ability to feed themselves, but also to supply yields that require a market for sale. Measures of fish conservation like smokers, for which corresponding appliances have been made available, and of transportation, for which a truck will soon be delivered, point out here a development path from a subsistence economy to a small industrial [handwerklich] fishery with production for the market.1014

Meanwhile he made sure to include the DED in his application to the Interministerial Committee. Eight development helpers would promote the goal of “improving the

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1011 Ambassador Steltzer, Embassy in Accra to Prot 1, Foreign Office, October 9, 1964, PAAA B 34/485.
1013 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1014 ORR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Dr. C.S. Hoffmann, April 22, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
economic and social structure of the fishing villagers on the Fanti coast.”

On September 8, 1965, the Committee approved Biriwa III.

**Biriwa III: Trust, not Cooperation**

Biriwa stood apart from the other village projects in *not* becoming a cooperative. In a letter to Dr. Hoffmann on April 22, 1966, Dr. Theierl floated the idea of a co-op that would handle production, sales and credit. “It is [well] known what significance the formation of cooperatives has had for the economic development in the small industrial and agricultural sector in our country and still has today.” Hoffmann responded that he too had been thinking of a co-op and had contacted a Chartered Accountant for help. This idea ultimately ran into a blockade when the BML informed the BMZ that it could provide no co-op specialist. Meanwhile the Central Region’s military boss, D.J.G. Dontoh, was thinking of helping the villagers to found a “limited liability” company under the name of Biriwa Industries. Yet another idea, from interim project manager Günter Wöhlk, was to found a “limited” now and subordinate it to a co-op later. None of these ideas came about.

The West Germans instead accepted a Ghanaian proposal to set up a community development trust. This form would guarantee the right import licenses, confer a tax exemption, and require that all profits be applied to village rehabilitation. The governing board would consist of Dr. Hoffmann (as Ministry of Health official), a lawyer and businessman from Cape Coast, the village chief, and the Secretary of the Central Region.

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1015 Dr. Theierl, BMZ, Application for Technical Aid, August 31, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1017 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Dr. Hoffmann, April 22, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1018 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Dr. Theierl, BMZ May 4, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1019 Dr. Seemann, Referat III C 3, BML to BMZ, November 25, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
All profits would go to renovating the village.\textsuperscript{1022} Yet the trust took five years to emerge. In March 1972 a Ghanaian official noted that “attempts have been made to form and register Biriwa Village Development Trust during the last three years, with the Attorney General Department preparing the current draft.”\textsuperscript{1023} He did not explain the delay. West German Ambassador Müller blamed the 1969 and 1972 changes in government. Only on December 20, 1972 did he and Major Kwame Asante, the Commissioner for Labor, execute the deed giving the trust responsibility for the project.\textsuperscript{1024} In fact, Hans-Josef Glinke continued managing the project during spring 1973 because the Ghanaian director (Frank Neequaye) was overloaded.\textsuperscript{1025} The board eventually included the West German project manager for Biriwa IV (Kleinebudde), a representative of the West German embassy, the Regional Administrative Officer, the Regional Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development, a director of the Bank of Ghana, and a representative of Biriwa. It was supposed to meet three times per year.\textsuperscript{1026}

\textbf{Biriwa III: Early Difficulties}

Troubles with GAWI and the DED hindered the project’s startup during the first year. GAWI was partly responsible for two significant blunders that hurt the project while also reducing BMZ respect for Dr. Hoffmann. The first was failing to deliver motor repair and other equipment, plus parts, before the volunteers arrived in late 1965. Dr. Theierl and Ambassador Steltzer anxiously reminded GAWI to get it there on

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\item S.C. Ohene, Regional Head, Central Region, Department of Social Welfare and Community Development to Director, Accra, March 17, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4078.
\item Müller, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, January 12, 1973, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 102947.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
time. Their efforts were in vain; the volunteers came and found nothing ready. Until the equipment arrived, motor repair was possible only with “the greatest effort.” GAWI shifted blame from itself to the BAW, which did not formally commission GAWI until November 12, but also to Dr. Hoffmann for failing to provide proper specifications. The BMZ accepted this excuse, seeing a problem in the doctor’s lack of technical qualifications. The delay became a semi-public embarrassment when Bundestag member Hermann Saam contacted Minister Walter Scheel about it. Scheel blamed “an unhappy chain of circumstances,” now remedied. The problem was “not of bureaucratic origin,” i.e. it was not the BMZ’s fault. The “decisive cause” was that technical data necessary for issuing and handling the order were presented late, i.e. by Dr. Hoffmann. The minister had made sure that the most urgent items were on the way and was making every effort to have the rest sent as soon as possible. GAWI eventually shipped the missing equipment from January to March 1966. The second mistake was a misunderstanding over a three-ton truck to be used with the fish ovens. When GAWI suggested instead a five-ton Daimler Benz with platform bed, Dr. Hoffmann agreed while cautioning that he wanted to find the most suitable wheel base first. Without waiting for more information, from the embassy and from Dr. Theierl as well as Dr. Hoffmann, GAWI placed the order. Unfortunately, this truck turned out to be unsuitable for carrying

1027 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to GAWI, June 24, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040; Ambassador Steltzer, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, September 10, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1030 GAWI to Oberregierungsrat Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, December 22, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1032 Walter Scheel, Minister to Herman Saam, Member of the Bundestag, January 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1033 GAWI to Dr. C.S. Hoffmann, December 28, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040; Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to GAWI, January 4, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
boats from inland manufacturers to the coast, a purpose Hoffmann had not discussed with GAWI beforehand. Only in 1968, under Glinke, did it receive an attachment allowing it to transport boats.

Missing equipment aside, the volunteers were disgruntled. They disliked having to live all together in Cape Coast. “Ten men in one house and in one project are too many. We are all between twenty-two and twenty-nine years old. Each is his own master.” There was criticism of project design. One volunteer wrote that “we miss a comprehensive project plan, with which we could orient ourselves.” Without an overall view, everyone’s activity became piecemeal work, costing “much time and money.” One example of poor planning affected the motor shop. Someone ordered a hundred propellers worth sixty-five hundred DM, but the shop needed only two or three at most. On the other hand, they had received only five needle bearings, which the shop could easily use two hundred of. A specialist could have determined the shop’s needs within two weeks. The gardener felt unappreciated by Biriwans. At least some volunteers, particularly those involved in construction, felt wrongly used as production workers rather than instructors.

Volunteer complaints became serious and loud enough for the embassy’s economic attaché (Wirtschaftsreferent), Dr. O. Armbruster, to intervene. He met with the volunteers, DED country commissioner Zimmermann and Dr. Hoffmann on May 27,

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1036 DED, Case Study #5: Everyday Worries in the Workplace, undated but internal references indicate mid-May 1966, DED GHA 01 02 66 67; Günter G. Wöhlk, Country Commissioner, DED to Project Division, DED, March 15, 1967, DED GHA 04, 05, 1971, 72.
1966 to sort things out. Armbruster pointed out that the volunteers had been told “what accommodations, work and what salary they could expect in Ghana.” They also knew they would live together in a single house. He warned them that they should not voice whatever complaints they had about housing or project “insufficiencies” in front of third parties (i.e. Ghanaians). Anyone offending against this rule could reckon on immediate return to West Germany. Hoffmann attributed “difficulties and tensions” between himself and the group to overwork with new tasks following Nkrumah’s overthrow two months earlier, but they were now settled. He and the volunteers agreed to hold “status meetings” at least once a month and promised to discuss any change in the project with the embassy and the responsible BMZ official before he got other institutions involved. All agreed that only Hoffmann as project manager would make decisions; he would discuss any problems that came up with Kleinknecht as group speaker, Zimmermann or the embassy. Gardener Reinhard and plasterer Karsuch would transfer to the Bolgatanga project.  

In their claustrophobia, the volunteers had a serious and legitimate grievance; they (and later project manager Glinke) lacked homes in or near Biriwa for nearly two years, forcing them to commute from Cape Coast. As of April 1966, they had to rely on a patched-up VW Transporter of the Ghanaian Health Service to get them to work. Later they rode mopeds for a time. Officials and Glinke complained about round-trip commuting distances of forty kilometers (twenty kilometers between Cape Coast and Biriwa, traveled once per day) or seventy-two (eighteen kilometers, traveled twice per

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1038 Memorandum of Dr. Fliedner, Referat I A 6, BMZ, April 14, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1039 Country Commissioner Günter G. Wöhlk, DED, to Projects Department, DED, March 15, 1967, DED GHA 04, 05 1971, 72.
The distance also limited volunteer working hours to five per day, 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. The West Germans could fix this problem only by building houses in Biriwa itself; as of March 1967 they planned four. By the next month the houses were roughed out, and Glinke estimated his team would need only six more weeks from the end of May to finish them. In September 1967, Glinke wrote that construction would end two to three weeks after the remaining materials arrived from Germany. By then the volunteers were “steadfast and enthusiastic about work” (gefestigt und einsatzfreudig), and Biriwa was no longer, according to DED country commissioner Günter Wöhlk, the “bogeyman” that volunteers were still hearing about in training. The improved mood may have owed something to the removal of Dr. Hoffmann.

The Fall of Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann

As chief initiator of the Biriwa projects, Dr. Hoffmann enjoyed the Federal Republic’s esteem for a time, but forfeited it by making mistakes that highlighted his erratic character as manager and his lack of technical qualifications for non-medical matters. As we saw earlier, the Foreign Office was delighted to have a West German national as a local contact in Biriwa. The village not only knew him, but elected him Asafohene on Easter Day, 1962. In theory that made him a captain in Biriwa’s

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1046 Dr. Carl S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, May 30, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040; Abavana, Minister to Dr. Lüders, Embassy in Accra, June 1, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040. Hoffmann received his ceremonial
traditional militia company. By his own account, he also sat on the Council of Elders for the traditional Fante state of Nkusukum. Hoffmann became even more useful when a failed assassination attempt against Nkrumah in August 1962 gave him an opportunity to spend six hours a day with the president for a week. Apparently unaware of any duty of confidentiality or loyalty toward Nkrumah, he briefed the West German embassy at length on his patient’s behavior during that week and on his supposed “inferiority complex and/or hatred against the “white race.” From that high point, Hoffmann’s stock fell during the next four years until the BMZ was glad to be rid of him.

The first strike was Hoffmann’s impetuosity in seeking more nets after the beginning of Biriwa I. In the summer of 1963 he went not to the embassy or to the BMZ, but to the DGB. A DGB official supported the doctor’s request and praised him as “thoroughly strongly and sympathetic personality, who everywhere radiates a corresponding effect.” Certainly the doctor touted his own reputation. He made a point of describing himself as a former German navy physician with an English certificate in hygiene, and he boasted that he enjoyed “free rein” (literally, “fool’s freedom”--*Narrenfreiheit*) with Nkrumah, because of the assassination attempt. The responding BMZ official was less impressed, wondering “why the hundred [nets ] already supplied have not been sufficient.” He suggested getting “more accurate”

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1048 Dr. Carl S. Hoffman to Ambassador, May 30, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040
1050 Schlobach, DGB to Osner, BMZ, August 14, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1051 Memorandum of E. Schlobach, DGB, August 5, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040.
information from the embassy and an application from the Ghanaian government. An embassy official promised to ask Hoffmann whether it would not be expedient to finish the first project before taking on a second one. The embassy now viewed him as “overeager” (überspannt), though it continued to recognize that “He has the confidence of the population.” The doctor’s initiative was rewarded with Biriwa II, but only after he unnecessarily irritated his fellow West Germans.

Dr. Hoffmann’s position as project manager of Biriwa III was never secure, because the BMZ refused to consider him one. On a letter in which the doctor referred to himself as “designated project manager,” a BMZ official hand-wrote on Hoffmann’s letter that “H. dr. Hoffmann is not [illegible] in GAWI contract. He is the initiator of the [illegible] wants to [illegible] for introducing the project in his character as Principal Medical Officer of the Ghanaian government.” Dr. Theierl asked the Foreign Office to have the embassy take over the project and reporting of the project. On the other hand, Dr. Schaad at the embassy remarked that during a project visit by Dr. Theierl in early 1966, “it became clear that Hoffmann will also be active without restriction as project manager.” Bringing in another expert would not be necessary; if he needed specialized help, he could get it from the development helpers. Three months later the BMZ first used a term for Dr. Hoffmann that it would often apply thereafter: ehrenamtlich, which has the sense of voluntary, honorary or unpaid. For example, Dr.

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1052 Memorandum of RR Osner, Dr. Sautter, Referat II B 6, BMZ, September 2, 1963, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1055 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 22, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1056 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to BAW, October 26, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
Theierl referred to a suggestion by Dr. Hoffmann, “who is taking care of the project *ehrenamtlich*,” to arrange counterpart training for his senior clerk, James K. Adu.\(^\text{1058}\)

The BMZ became dissatisfied with the performance of its *ehrenamtlich* project manager. We have already seen it shift blame to him for the failure to have equipment ready for the DED volunteers’ arrival. That was rather unfair, but the doctor did make one mistake all his own by neglecting to mention during most of 1965 the small yet essential fact that Biriwa had no electricity. GAWI stumbled onto this omission when it wrote him near the end of the year asking for the specifications of electricity available, so it would know what kind of powered equipment to send.\(^\text{1059}\) Dr. Hoffmann replied that Biriwa had no electrical connection and would have to wait several years for power from the Volta Dam.\(^\text{1060}\) GAWI informed the BMZ, BAW and the Foreign Office of the problem a week later.\(^\text{1061}\) In mid-March 1966 GAWI asked Hoffmann to send them information about the generator he needed so it could put one on order.\(^\text{1062}\) It had still not received “exact details” from him by mid-April, as it informed the BMZ’s Referat for Technical Aid.\(^\text{1063}\) Hansen complained to Hoffmann that “GAWI has more than once pointed out that procurements could not be carried out because the technical specifications they received from you were not sufficient. It would be best to consult with a technician in such cases. If such personnel are not available (e.g. from the DED), it would be [best] under the circumstances to consider expediting the matter by sending

\(^{1058}\) Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Referat II B 4, BMZ, May 23, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.  
\(^{1059}\) GAWI to Dr. C.S. Hoffmann, December 28, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.  
\(^{1060}\) Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to GAWI, January 4, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.  
\(^{1062}\) GAWI to Dr. C.S. Hoffmann, March 11, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.  
\(^{1063}\) GAWI to Referat II B 1, BMZ, April 15, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
an expert from the FRG." Then Dr. Theierl received word from an unnamed expert that Dr. Hoffmann had complained about several GAWI “tricks” regarding equipment it sent to Ghana, especially the three-ton truck. Dr. Theierl asked the agency to comment. GAWI defended itself point by point and asserted proudly that “We have done everything possible to supply Hoffmann what he needed. We cannot avoid concluding that your expert was either poorly or falsely informed.”

During the second half of 1966 West German officials in Bonn and Accra moved toward pushing Dr. Hoffmann aside. The idea had already occurred to Dr. Theierl on January 1966. In July an official in the BMZ’s West Africa Referat wrote on GAWI’s reply about Hoffmann’s “tricks” accusation that he wanted a specialist on the spot to provide news and assist with procurement as soon as possible. The embassy wrote that “With the expansion of the project follows more and more the necessity of either giving Dr. Hoffmann a project assistant or instead a project manager, because Dr. Hoffmann is very strongly burdened by his ongoing employment and various unpaid (ehrenamtlich) tasks, so that he can no longer engage himself in all details immediately.” Dr. Hoffman himself asked for a project manager for the same reason in conversation with Dr. Armbruster, though he expected to remain in overall charge during the new manager’s training period. Dr. Theierl complained that the project was suffering because “Dr. Hoffmann often cannot supply data necessary for a decision about

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1064 J. Hansen, Dipl. Volkswirt, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Dr. C.S. Hoffmann, June 10, 1966, BArchiv B213/4040.
1065 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to GAWI, June 21, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1067 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, July 7, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
an increase of funds and for procurement measures, or only after several inquiries.” This
hesitation led to “undesired delays, which already has led once to an intervention by Mr.
Saam, Member of the Bundestag, with the Minister [of the BMZ].” Besides that Dr.
Hoffmann was making “casuistic proposals.” Ambassador Steltzer wrote in August
that “it is proving more and more indispensable to engage a special project manager for
Biriwa III.” He quickly became impatient with Hoffmann for failing to present
applications for replacement parts to the Central Region administration, despite a
reminder from the embassy. When Dr. Theierl dispatched a three-man evaluation
commission consisting of Josef Hansen, Arno Meschkat of the FAO, and a Mr. Kohout of
GAWI, he asked it to investigate whether Bonn should send a special project
manager. Upon its return the commission obligingly said yes.

Dr. Hoffmann lost control over the project at the end of the year. Dr. Theierl
informed the Foreign Office that pending the appointment of a long-term project
manager, the engineer Wöhlk (not yet DED country commissioner) would take over the
project. He asked it to have the embassy inform the “previous ehrenamtlichen project
manager” and seek his continuing support. The BMZ’s Referat for Technical Aid
commissioned the BAW to obtain a co-op specialist as project manager for three years as
well as equipment and parts for the shops and development helpers.

1071 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to UAL I A, BMZ, August 2, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1073 Ambassador Steltzer, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, August 26, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1074 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Referat II B 7, State Secretary, BMZ, August 29, 1966, BArchiv B
213/4040.
1075 Improvement of Economic and Social Relations in the Fishing Village of Biriwa, undated but
September or October 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040. See also Appendix 1 to Letter of Dr. Theierl, BMZ to
UAL I, AL I, State Secretary, BMZ, September 28, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4029.
1076 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Foreign Office, December 21, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1077 Referat II B 1, BMZ to BAW, December 29, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
commissioned GAWI to do the same. Four days later, Dr. Theierl found the right man: Hans-Josef Glinke.

Soon after Glinke took over, he wrote back to Bonn with facts that put Dr. Hoffmann in a still poorer light. All funds from the FRG were exhausted, if not exceeded. Where Glinke went into the details of available funds and certain expected costs, a marginal note by a BMZ official, probably Hansen, interjected “This report shows how [illegible] our evaluation of the project in Sept. 66 was to us, how correct our proposals for modification were.” Glinke went on to describe some of the items that Hoffmann (and perhaps the embassy) had spent money on, such as twenty sacks of cement for the paramount chief of Yamoranza to build his own bathhouse (and here a marginal note protested “contrary to commission”) and forty-eight Cedis to compensate a volunteer whose camera was stolen. Worst of all was the stock of leftover building materials: toilet bowls, a bidet, wash basins, glass bricks, and thousands of wall tiles and plates. Glinke waxed indignant:

I could go still further in this enumeration. But there is little purpose in touching the mistakes of the past. The responsibility for them lay in equal measure with the project management, the embassy, the Ministry and GAWI. [A marginal note added: the embassy took over project implementation] The previous form of the project had the character of a Salvation Army or Charity League in which something was given to everyone.

To get the project out of this state would require “drastic measures.” Separate books would now be kept for the project’s productive and non-productive parts. All necessary expenditures could proceed only through an order book that he had established. Expenditures that had nothing to do with the project were canceled. He promised to

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1078 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to GAWI, January 10, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1079 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to GAWI, January 14, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.
submit monthly costs sheets. Hansen wrote that Glinke’s discoveries did not surprise him at all. Until Hansen visited Biriwa as a member of the evaluation commission in September 1966, the embassy had opposed sending a project manager and carried out implementation and accounting tasks itself. “Dr. Hoffmann functioned—if you like—as spiritus rector [i.e. a guiding spirit]. Officially no tasks for implementing the promotional measures were conferred upon him, even if in practice he undertook the project management.”

Biriwa III’s Economic Operations: Fish Ovens, Motor Repair, and Carpentry

Repair

As Dr. Theierl had written, Biriwa III aimed to make the village a center of production for the market. New fish ovens would allow fishermen’s wives (known to the West Germans by the deprecating name of “Mammies”) to smoke the fish their men brought home and ship them out on the three-ton truck. At present, almost every fisherman’s wife had a smoking oven made of clay or mud (Lehm), so there were about two hundred in the village. Wood was scarce and had to be fetched from further and further away, and smoking took up almost the whole day. A metal oven would “reduce unnecessary smoke, train the women to smoke in common, and train them for common marketing of the smoked fish.”

The repair shop would help their husbands by keeping boat motors in good condition. The carpentry shop would have no role in the fishing business, but it too could earn a profit.

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1082 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
Unfortunately, Biriwans ignored the ovens. According to the 1966 evaluation commission, volunteers had set them up around the village in “unfavorable locations.” The ovens’ capacity of eight hundred to a thousand fish did not suffice to smoke all of the “Mammies’” fish at once, but the West Germans also did not want to favor individuals or groups by letting some have first use. An educational campaign was also needed to convince the fisherwomen that the fish smoked in these ovens was drier, which they would consider an advantage in quality. In 1967 Glinke observed that for much of the year the fishermen traveled to distant waters and remained there several months before returning to Biriwa. Even when the Biriwan men did their fishing near home, a boat crew of ten men caught only one to two pounds of fish in four hours, so the ovens were “completely unsuited” and therefore never used. Michael Jeroch added further explanation. First, waters in front of the village “seem not to be very productive,” so the fishermen often loaded their boats onto trucks or traveled over water to other places and then brought their fish to the nearest coastland to avoid spoilage. Very little of the catch came to Biriwa. Only once during the past year had the “Mammies” taken their fish to the street for sale outside of the village. Second, the fish varied greatly in size so that filling the ovens was difficult. Fish had to be skewered, which caused more work than was necessary with the small traditional ovens. Third, “Mammies” rarely purchased enough fish from the fishermen to fill a big oven, but on the other hand, did not want to share the oven with each other. Because the ovens belonged to none of the “Mammies,”

1083 Improvement of Economic and Social Relations in the Fishing Village of Biriwa, undated but September or October 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040. See also Appendix 1 to Letter of Dr. Theierl, BMZ to UAL I, AL I, State Secretary, BMZ, September 28, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4029. On the ovens’ capacity, see Observation Report of Michael Jeroch, Afrika-Verein e.V., February 28, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4030.
none would use them. Jeroch did not explain why the women did not want to share them, but perhaps they felt that keeping track of which fish belonged to whom would have required too much effort, and this issue would have mattered because—as Jeroch pointed out—fish size was variable. In 1969 he brought out another very practical reason for the ovens’ rejection. Unlike West Germans, “Africans” preferred their fish severely smoked and nearly dried-out rather than the soft quality that Europeans preferred. Dried-out fish also lasted longer and were easier to transport. Rather discouraged (in mid-1967), Hansen suggested that perhaps the ovens should go elsewhere “if there are no prospects at all for using them in Biriwa.”

Glinke, however, found a use for them. Instead of drawing on Biriwa’s meager and seasonal offshore catch, the project would buy its own fish supply. Glinke signed a purchase contract with Mankoadze Fisheries Ltd. in Tema and found a woman to sell the fish, after the project had smoked it, in the hinterland behind the coast. There were still difficulties. No “Mammy” in Biriwa was willing to handle Mankoadze’s “deep-frozen” fish, because Biriwan women believed that ice poisoned their blood. Sticking the fish through the eyes was also a no-no, because Ghanaians believed that “the fish is then dead.” Glinke did not explain what they meant by that. In any case; the problem was easily fixed by sticking the fish through the gills. A rumor also went around that someone had sprayed medicine into the holes in the fish, because the project truck bore the title “Ministry of Health” and a red cross. Still, Glinke was able to find institutional and corporate customers willing to place bulk orders. Now he wanted three more ovens.

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built with a storage hall able to hold four or five thousand tons.\footnote{Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, September 8, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.} By October 1967 the three new ovens were in operation and the project had gained the University of Cape Coast as a customer.\footnote{Hans-Josef Glinke, Table of Receipts and Expenditures for October 1-31, 1967, November 14, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.} Near the end of March 1969, Glinke wrote that the three original ovens had been torn down and rebuilt on the project site. The project was selling fifty seven hundred tons of smoked fish each month to the University of Cape Coast, the Mfantsiman Girls School, the Teacher Training Centre in Saltpond and the Assin Manso College. It also had a contract from the Ghanaian Army in Accra and Takoradi.\footnote{Sixth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, March 25, 1969, DED GHA 04, 05 1971, 72.}

The motor shop was Biriwa III’s most important item for Biriwa’s fishermen. As Dr. Hoffmann explained, boat motors were “necessary, because the best catches are made at a distance of up to twenty English miles from the coast. A good catch spoils easily in the sun and can reach the coast in marketable condition only with the help of motors.”\footnote{Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040. Dr. Stangen later put the action radius at thirty nautical miles. See Travel Report of Dr. Stangen, BMZ for June 9 to 21, 1967, July 31, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4041.} The Ghanaian government had equipped craft fishermen with outboard motors, but it neglected the need for maintenance and repair. Only to a slight extent did fishermen receive appropriate training, so most motors became defective after only a short time. The fishermen were unable to increase their yields; instead they had to accept losses because of spending money on the motors.\footnote{Appendix 1 to Letter of Dr. Theierl, BMZ to UAL I, AL I, State Secretary, BMZ, September 28, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4029.} None of the communities from Senya Beraku to the west, across Winneba, Cape Coast and Elmina and up to Komenda in the east had any repair facilities or access to spare parts.\footnote{Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, May 19, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.} According to Arno Meschkat, Johnson and Evinrude motors were “rather complicated for simple fishermen, who have
never worked with motors before,” so only experienced mechanics, preferably “specialists for these brands,” could repair them. They also consumed too much fuel to be cost-effective. On the other hand, it was now difficult or impossible to get crewmen for boats without motors—the crews were no longer willing to paddle—so the boats lay idle when the motor did not work. Fishermen became dependent on unqualified “bush fitters” who caused further avoidable damage. The BMZ’s Dr. Stangen added that the motors were designed for sporting boats, not dugout canoes. Estimates of boat motors on the coast varied from twenty-five hundred to four thousand in 1966, and eight to ten thousand in 1969.

The shop, which entered operation in May 1966, was an impressively successful operation, though it experienced a downturn in its third year. According to Hoffmann, it became the “talk of the coast” and delegations from other fishing villages visited to ask for repair of their motors too. He had to turn them down, because the shop was busy servicing Biriwa’s ninety motors. During 1967, however, it caught up with local repairs and looked for work along the coast. Two motors even came from Sierra Leone, fifteen hundred kilometers away. In September the shop could carry itself,

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1100 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Dr. Theierl, BMZ, May 4, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040. To Ambassador Steltzer, Hoffmann wrote that there were seventy motors in Biriwa. See Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, May 19, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
performing sixty to eighty repairs a month. \textsuperscript{1102} Thanks to discounts from Johnson and Evinrude sales representatives in Accra, of five and ten percent respectively, the shop also became a seller of new motors and parts. \textsuperscript{1103} 1968 was rather disappointing by comparison. There was no herring season at all, so income from both repairs and new motor sales lay far below expectations. Because of bad experiences with some customers, all motors had to be paid for in cash and in some cases held on advance deposit. \textsuperscript{1104} An attempt in 1970–71 to set up one or more branch stations elsewhere along the coast failed for lack of a suitable development helper. \textsuperscript{1105} Yet the shop was still operating in 1971. \textsuperscript{1106}

The carpentry shop would become useful to Biriwa III, but it took three years to get there because of uncertainty over its mission, difficulty getting the right equipment, and problems with electricity. In 1966 a DED carpenter named Manfred Armbruster (not the embassy official) wondered whether the shop should train Ghanaians with “old traditional manual tools” or should work with machines to earn a profit. The DED favored the latter approach, because young people would not be excited to learn “outdated bush methods.” The shop’s three apprentices were working at the YMCA teaching shop in Accra and when they returned, “It would be downright paradoxical to send back the boys from a modern instructional business to end their training with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1102} Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, September 8, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.
  \item \textsuperscript{1103} Hans-Josef Glinke, Statement of Receipts and Expenses, September 5, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.
  \item \textsuperscript{1104} Sixth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, March 25, 1969, DED GHA 04, 05 1971, 72.
  \item \textsuperscript{1105} Country Commissioner D. Rössing, DED, Semi-Annual Report on Development in Project Technical-Craft Program, September 12, 1971, DED GHA 05.
  \item \textsuperscript{1106} Travel Report of Dr. Walther Resch, GAWI for March 29 – April 7, 1971, April 30, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4033.
\end{itemize}
antiquated methods.”[1107] Dr. Theierl agreed and applied to the Interministerial Committee for funding in November.[1108] GAWI now took its time procuring the power equipment, which it did not ship until near the end of September 1967.[1109] Of course, even the best power equipment could not work without electricity. The shop had a generator, but its capacity of only seven KvA was not enough for the planned expansion; a twenty KvA unit was necessary.[1110] Worse, it suffered repeated breakdowns, as did the drive motor.[1111] In July 1968 Glinke complained that he had waited eighteen months for a new generator. “Under these circumstances no productive work can be accomplished by the DED master carpenter and the six counterparts.” They were forced to give away six thousand New Cedis worth of orders that he had already accepted.[1112] By the end of November the generator had at last arrived.[1113] It went into operation in January 1969.[1114] At the end of April 1971, a GAWI official reported that the shop was in full operation, the work space was appropriate to conditions, and all machines were working to full capacity.[1115] There was a hiccup in April 1973, when Glinke reported that personnel had been unable to keep up with a recent tripling of the shop’s capacity, and that poor labor allocation was delaying product delivery and harming quality. Yet he did

[1107] Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Armbruster, Embassy in Accra, August 17, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040; Dr. Wilpert, DED to Referat II B 7, BMZ, August 18, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
[1110] Evaluation Commission of Hansen (BMZ), Meschkat (FAO), and Kohout (GAWI), Situation Report on Biriwa, undated but September or October 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
not seem unduly alarmed, since volunteer Hans-Joachim Räder would remain until the year’s end, after the project handover.\footnote{HJG/GSG, Project Inspection Report, November 2, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4042; Thirteenth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, April 10, 1973, BArchiv B 213/4042.}

Once the shop had what it needed, the West Germans reconsidered whether it should focus on training or profitability; here theory and practice diverged. As of July 1968 the project had worked with thirty-two apprentices, but by 1971 training supposedly lapsed in favor of commercial operations as the project became financially dependent on the shop.\footnote{Fifth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, July 25, 1968, DED GHA 05; Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, August 27, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4078.} Glinke called it the project’s “sustaining pillar.” Rather than try to revive training, the shop should stick to production. He pointed out that Ghana’s Social Welfare Department and National Vocational Training Institute were planning a “Rural Arts and Crafts Training Centre” in Biriwa.\footnote{HJG/GSG, Project Inspection Report, November 2, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4042.} The BMZ seemed to have disagreed at first, because in 1973 it secured funds from the Interministerial Committee to upgrade the shop into an “occupational training center.”\footnote{Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, October 13, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4078; Stryk, Referat III A 3, BMZ to Referat II 3, BfE, March 7, 1973, BArchiv B 213/4042.} The next year, however, it transferred the money to Biriwa IV, the new Vocational Training and Rehabilitation project.\footnote{ORR Wüstermann, Referat 302, BMZ to Referat 113, BMZ, March 18, 1974, BArchiv B 213/4042.} Yet despite official emphasis on profitability, most of the shop’s thirty-four employees were still trainees at the time of handover.\footnote{Report of Dipl.-Ing. Joachim Leckscheidt, October 1976, BArchiv B 213/32444.}

**Biriwa III: The Broken Promise of Village Improvement**

The West Germans came to make Biriwa a better place to live. In line with the Ghanaian note of February 26, 1965, they planned a poultry operation, a vegetable garden, the blasting of rocks off Biriwa’s beaches, mitigating destructive flooding, and
building a school. Along the way, they also considered new housing and resettlement. Except for the new school, none of it happened, so here the Federal Republic broke its promises to Biriwa.

The poultry operation was aborted and the garden failed. As to the former, Ambassador Steltzer and Dr. Hoffmann decided that it was not a high priority and could wait until the following year (1966). In July 1966 Dr. Armbruster at the embassy included chicken farms “to be built later” as one of several items in the project. They never were. The garden got started, but did not last long. Dr. Hoffmann wanted it because “not a single vegetable or fruit tree grows in Biriwa, and women travel twelve miles away, once a week, to get a few peppers.” This lack contributed to “nutritional illnesses among the children.” When the DED gardener arrived, however, he became completely discouraged within six months. All the men were satisfied with fishing as their vocation, especially since new nets and outboard motors raised yields. Bananas, maize and cassava were already plentiful, so there was no demand for fine vegetables. For fishermen, work in the garden meant fewer fish. Hoeing weeds they considered beneath their dignity, so the men often refused to work or laughed at him. Volunteers had not been able to persuade young people to participate in the work, only some elderly people of limited usefulness. By July 1966 Dr. Hoffmann had also lost interest in the garden. He asked Dr. Armbruster for permission to give up on it, because the villagers

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1122 The Ghanaians had requested four looms for disabled villages, but Hoffmann preferred to spend the money on more net accessories. See June 2, 1965 note by Hansen on letter of Dr. Ehmann, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Referate II B 7 and II A 5, May 1965 (exact date unclear), BArchiv B 213/4040.
1125 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1126 DED, Case Study #5: Everyday Worries in the Workplace, undated but internal references indicate mid-May 1966, DED GHA 01 02 66 67.
were not ready to collaborate and because fishermen saw farm labor as demeaning. Armbruster approved.\textsuperscript{1127} If that were not discouragement enough, the garden was washed away by rain before the first harvest.\textsuperscript{1128}

Blasting rocks should have been one of the easiest tasks, but the West Germans never found anyone to do it. The original point was to free up space for landing boats at the western edge of Biriwa’s beach. A gold-mining company was supposed to take care of it.\textsuperscript{1129} Then in 1967 Glinke reported that the Chief Fisherman and village elders preferred instead to get rid of rocks in front of an existing landing, where they limited access to one boat at a time.\textsuperscript{1130} Villagers had to partly unload each returned boat and push it onto the beach before the next one could arrive.\textsuperscript{1131} Now the Ghanaian army was supposed to do the job, but did not. It even returned a deposit from the project. A Cape Coast “blasting master” offered to do it, but eventually begged off due to “technical difficulties.”\textsuperscript{1132} The Ghanaian Navy promised and then reneged.\textsuperscript{1133} So an item that would have significantly helped Biriwa fishermen remained unfulfilled.

The attempt to control flooding was minimal at best. In August 1966 Dr. Hoffmann reported the replacement of a small partition wall between the lagoon and beach with a new and stronger wall having a reinforced concrete foundation. It would prevent spring floods breaking into the lagoon and weakening the supporting walls of the new sanitary forum. The drainage channel from lagoon to sea was raised towards the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1127} Report of Dr. Armbruster, Embassy in Accra, June 13, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
\item \textsuperscript{1128} Observation Report of Michael Jeroch, Afrika-Verein e.V., February 28, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4030.
\item \textsuperscript{1129} Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, August 6, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
\item \textsuperscript{1131} Observation Report of Michael Jeroch, Dipl.-Ing., Afrika-Verein e.V., May 29, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4036.
\item \textsuperscript{1133} Fourth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, January 25, 1968, DED GHA 05.
\end{itemize}
latter. With the new lagoon wall the situation on the sea side was “stabilized” and new spring floods only carried out sand.\footnote{1134} Hoffmann’s new wall and channel may have protected the sanitary forum, but not the lagoon; Michael Jeroch found that drainage filled it with “stinking water” when it was not open to the sea.\footnote{1135} Not much more seems to have happened. In late March 1969 Glinke wrote lack of time and money had prevented village planning and renovation. The population was now ready to volunteer, so if he had a hundred sacks of cement, he could draw water ditches that would make it harder for the rainy season floods to undermine several houses.\footnote{1136} Nothing was done; in 1975 Kleinebudde wrote that floods were destroying houses during rainy season and turning the whole village into “swampland” hosting flies and mosquitoes.\footnote{1137}

There was also a problem with Biriwa’s water supply, which the West Germans failed to address. In 1965 Dr. Hoffmann wanted to build a reservoir, because pressure in the main water lines failed for three hours a day.\footnote{1138} Nothing happened; Kleinebudde repeated the idea in 1975, because the village and the new VTRC had lacked water for five and a half months during the past year due to line breakdowns.\footnote{1139}

Another renovation task was replacing Biriwa’s “mud huts” with houses. According to Wöhlk, the main problem was financing, which could not come from the Central Region authorities. The indigenous people also needed “preparatory education” on how the housing project should be carried out and how it would benefit them. Model houses built with simple methods in a plain design would encourage villagers to see them

as part of their community and become more open to “the idea of self-help.” By the end of May 1967, the project had roughed out two such houses. No further discussion appears in the project files.

Yet another idea was to plan and create a new village quarter on the west side. Dr. Hoffmann suggested settling returning village émigrés there. In 1969 Michael Jeroch wanted to resettle existing villagers; he believed “intensive counseling” combined with “special incentives whose effectiveness can be determined in conversations” could persuade them. Perhaps the more prosperous fishermen with more “modern” attitudes might be convinced to move, so that a new house in a new quarter would become a status symbol. A road, a marketplace, a bath and toilet house as well as several houses could make a beginning, so that the first resettlers did not feel abandoned. The BMZ does not appear to have acted on this proposal.

In their one successful improvement, the project team and villagers built a primary school and a middle school. The current school was “a kind of chicken house with a roof, but without proper walls, no sanitary facilities or opportunities for washing.” It had fifty-eight students and seventy on a waiting list. Nothing happened for more than two years. In late January 1968, aid for building a new school was still only planned. By July, however, things had gotten moving, because the village Chief Fisherman had taken over the initiative, founding a “Reconstituted Village Development

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1142 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Ambassador, May 19, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040. See also Evaluation Commission of Hansen (BMZ), Meschkat (FAO), and Kohout (GAWI), Situation Report on Biriwa, undated but September or October 1966, BArchiv B 213/4040.
1144 Dr. C.S. Hoffmann to Hansen, BMZ, June 3, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
“Committee” with the “ten best fishing people” as its members. The Queen Mother donated a piece of ground on Biriwa’s east side, so that construction could begin. Glinke claimed the embassy donated two hundred sacks of cement, while someone collected cash from the villagers, one Cedi from each man and half a Cedi from each woman. One hundred to a hundred and fifty men and women donated their time on Tuesdays and Saturdays, when no one fished. The project provided technical management for construction, tools, materials transportation, and sometimes the labor of three masons. After payment of project receivables during the herring season, Glinke hoped to be able to support construction financially.\footnote{Fifth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, July 25, 1968, DED GHA 05. Newspaper stories recorded one hundred, not two hundred, bags of cement. See “West German Gift to Biriwa,” \textit{Daily Graphic}, November 21, 1968, DED GHA 05; “Germans give 100 bags of cement to Biriwa,” \textit{Ghanaian Times}, November 21, 1968, DED GHA 05.} The school was still not finished by March 1969, because of bad finances in the project and among the fishermen. The existing school was near collapse and would probably not survive the next rainy season. Some instruction was already taking place in the village church.\footnote{Sixth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, March 25, 1969, DED GHA 04, 05 1971, 72.} The new school was finished, as a primary school, by April 1970. So was the middle school, whose construction the reports did not describe.\footnote{Waltraud Wenz, Progress Report, undated but between June 1971 and February 1972, DED GHA 05; Activity Report of Waltraud Wenz, DED, undated but after February 29, 1972, DED GHA 05.} These buildings represented a rare occurrence in this dissertation’s village projects—genuine communal self-help in partnership with the Germans. Whereas so many other ideas for village improvement came from highly placed outsiders like Dr. Hoffmann or Ambassador Steltzer, the schools represented a need that local notables as well as students and parents found pressing.
Biriwa III: The DED at Work

As at Tori Cada, Biriwa III relied absolutely on DED helpers, who made up almost the entire German workforce, though their numbers eventually declined. They seem to have peaked at ten in early 1967, a level that Dr. Stangen deplored as “heavily overstaffed.” They included an administrative specialist, a joiner, an installer and building fitter (Bauschlosser), a machine-building engineer, a mechanic, a concrete builder, a mason, and a tile layer, later joined by a co-op specialist and a machinist. As the volunteers finished construction and trained Ghanaians, their numbers fell. By August 1970 there were only three development helpers. The DED ended its activity in the motor repair shop in November 1970 and in the carpentry shop June 1971.

Also as in Tori Cada, the DED went into direct healthcare provision and healthcare instruction, and did it on its own initiative. In March 1971, country commissioner Rössing drew up a job description for a nurse in Biriwa. She must have good knowledge of English and learn Fante during the training period. Together with a Ghanaian colleague she should establish and lead a dressing station. Alongside actual healthcare she should also provide health counseling and education. A Dr. A. Ababio in Accra—perhaps the very same Alex Ababio of the Peki Union responsible for the Peki

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1151 PersRefSts to Minister, Madame Parliamentary State Secretary, AL, UAL, Referate I A 6, I B 4 – 6, II A 4, II B 1 and II B 3-4, BMZ, August 28, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4032.
1152 D. Rössing, DED to Liselotte Miller, August 23, 1971, DED GHA G.
project--would serve as medical consultant.\textsuperscript{1153} By late August the position was filled, by Liselotte Miller.\textsuperscript{1154}

In a letter to Miller Rössing explained the station’s purpose and position as well as her function therein. Biriwa lacked systematic health education that could act in combination with the West Germans’ sanitary measures, so a small dressing station would fill this gap. A “Dressing Station” was the smallest and simplest unit of health provision, beneath Health Post, Health Centre and Hospital. From the outset a community health nurse of the Mfantsinam Urban Council would manage the station, while Miller would help her during a buildup phase of two years. The Council’s negligible finances meant limiting curative action to first aid in general, with transfers to Anomabu Health Centre or Saltpond Hospital. The station must support itself out of its own income. No patients would be transported except in pressing emergencies. Miller would face challenges. Biriwans would expect a maximum of medical provision from the station, and for free, while they would be little interested in “health education.” Biriwans would wrongly regard her and not the indigenous manager as the station head because of her skin color. Instead of giving in to her urge to get things done, she should strengthen the community health nurse’s authority and keep the station’s future status in mind.\textsuperscript{1155} Rössing did not specify here what kind of “health education” Miller should offer, nor explain why she should press it upon unwilling Biriwans, but here as elsewhere Europeans aimed to replace indigenous ideas on sickness and health with their own.\textsuperscript{1156}

\textsuperscript{1153} D. Rössing, Project Place Description, March 22, 1971, DED GHA G.
\textsuperscript{1154} D. Rössing, DED to Liselotte Miller, August 23, 1971, DED GHA G.
\textsuperscript{1155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1156} Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, 358-64; Kalusa, 160-65; Nancy Rose Hunt, 460.
Recall that Zimmer in Tori Cada had written proudly of what he took to be the declining influence of “the medicine man.”

The dressing station began operations in December 1971. The Ghanaian nurse, QRN Kate Dodoo, did not arrive until the following May, but Miller worked with eight Biriwan volunteers who wrote ambulance cards, called patients, prepared gauze and cotton wool for dressing, helped in the dressing room, filled milk powder and wheat for weekly demonstrations, and cleaned the station. A preschool feeding program began at the end of February, with a Faustina Neizer (or Neiza) in charge. Weekly demonstrations showed how to sensibly use local foodstuffs and to practice good hygiene, such as boiling water and preventing malaria. Twenty-five to fifty mothers came, except during fishing season, when attendance was minimal. Unfortunately for DED health education ambitions, Miller had the impression that the mothers were “coming to the feeding trough” (attending only to collect food donations from the Catholic Relief Service in Accra) and cared little for what they heard. She does not seem to have inquired what the mothers’ previous health ideas were or whether they had already heard all about European nutrition and hygiene. Nor did their apathy prompt her to reconsider the demonstrations’ value. She therefore recommended continuing DED health projects. Her contract expired in October 1973.

Thanks to a suggestion from project manager Glinke, a steering committee for the dressing station formed, including Glinke, the Clerk of Council, the district medical

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1157 Progress Report of Liselotte Miller, Biriwa Dressing Station, DED, undated but after May 15, 1972, DED GHA G.
1159 Progress Report of Liselotte Miller, Biriwa Dressing Station, DED, undated but after May 15, 1972, DED GHA G.
officer in Saltpond, the nurse in charge (Kate-Dodoo), a social worker (Neizer), a representative of the volunteers and a representative of the village. It was supposed to meet every two months.\textsuperscript{1160} It did meet at least twice to discuss an outbreak of tuberculosis and difficulty managing volunteers, who were appearing late and not working hard enough. The Committee decided to meet with the volunteers and “find solutions to the cause of their relaxivity.”\textsuperscript{1161} The meeting should cover punctuality, obedience to orders and instructions, initiative, discipline, patient/volunteer relations, and “French” leave (apparently meaning leave without permission).\textsuperscript{1162} By this time the volunteers were receiving three Cedis per month rather than working gratis.\textsuperscript{1163}

**Biriwa III: After the Handover**

If one observed Biriwa III before its May 17, 1973 handover to Ghana’s Department of Social Welfare, under the Ministry of Labour, and looked no further, the project would have looked largely successful despite its failings and missteps.\textsuperscript{1164} According to Michael Jeroch, it had completely reintegrated the village’s unemployed; the village even had thirty or forty new boats requiring larger crews.\textsuperscript{1165} In 1971 a GAWI official remarked on the “radiating effect of German development activity.”\textsuperscript{1166} Peter Langer’s informants told him that together the fish ovens, carpentry shop and motor shop netted the project six thousand New Cedis in 1969. He added that “In spite of lacking

\textsuperscript{1160} Progress Report of Liselotte Miller, Biriwa Dressing Station, DED, undated but after May 1972, DED GHA G.
\textsuperscript{1161} Frank Neequaye/GSG, Biriwa Project, Dressing Station Minutes; August 16, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4078.
\textsuperscript{1162} Frank Neequaye/GSG, Biriwa Project – Dressing Station Minutes of Meeting, August 23, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4078.
\textsuperscript{1163} Progress Report of Liselotte Miller, Biriwa Dressing Station, DED, undated but after May 1972, DED GHA G.
\textsuperscript{1166} Travel Report of Dr. Walther Resch, GAWI for March 29 – April 7, 1971, April 30, 1971, BArchiv B 213/4033.
success in the social realm [i.e. the latrines and village renovation], the project as a whole may described as successful, because it fits very well in the priority scale of Ghanaian economic development by increasing foodstuff production.” His only grumble, echoing Stangen, was that “the expenditure of personnel was extraordinarily great.”\footnote{Langer, 135-36.} Glinke wrote confidently in April 1973 that “the project goal is ninety percent achieved.”\footnote{Thirteenth Project Report of Hans-Josef Glinke, April 10, 1973, BArchiv B 213/4042.} The two shops were doing well, the DED had established a dressing station and built schools, the fish-smoking ovens had gained an alternative purpose, and at least most of Biriwa’s men were using the new latrines.

Alas, these accomplishments came to grief in less than two years after the handover, after Walter Kleinebudde succeeded Glinke as manager of Biriwa IV. The middle school’s roof was beset with termites. Despite the lively activity of 1967-69, the fish smoking operation disappeared completely. In 1977 Ghanaian project manager Frank Neequaye suggested tearing down the ovens to make room for a drying oven for the carpentry shop. A GTZ official remarked that the old ovens were not used, because for religious reasons the population did not want to eat fish with eyes stuck through.\footnote{Travel Report of Mechthild Heyer, GTZ for April 30 – May 8, 1977, December 1977, BArchiv B 213/32447.} In other words, the operation was so dead that the GTZ had forgotten Glinke’s innovation of skewering gills rather than eyes. The dressing station was “hardly frequented and therefore almost useless.”\footnote{Walter Kleinebudde to BfE, December 12, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32443.} As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Frank Neequaye warned about the project’s imminent collapse. In January 1976 Walter Kleinebudde forwarded this letter to the GTZ with his own warning. “It must be noted that the [Neequaye] report in large sections only approximately reflects the actual
situation. In the event that the ‘Biriwa Project’ receives no help from any side, I therefore believe that it can hardly survive the year 1976.” A project bankruptcy would embarrass the FRG in Ghana.\textsuperscript{1171} Ambassador Motz was equally emphatic, recommending “one-time remediation measures.”\textsuperscript{1172} The most alarming problems involved the carpentry and repair shops and the latrines.

Though Glinke had called the carpentry shop the project’s “sustaining pillar,” by 1975 the pillar had cracked. Kleinebudde informed the BMZ that heavy rainfall was penetrating the roof, because it was too flat.\textsuperscript{1173} By putting the shop floor under water, leakage limited furniture production and imposed frustrating waiting times on customers. Worse, the shop faced what he called an “existence-threatening crisis.” Organized to produce arts-and-crafts (\textit{kunsthandwerkliche}) objects as well as furniture, the shop sold mainly to Europeans and Americans who had long staffed the professorships of the University of Cape Coast or managed industries. The Ghanaians that increasingly replaced them had neither the money nor the urge to buy what the shop was producing. For lack of spare parts machines were no longer used and articles either could not be produced or at least not to specifications. Fortunately, thanks to “intensive efforts,” the shop was now getting orders from A. Lang, Ghana’s largest building contractor and furniture maker, and other business customers. The YMCA in Accra was also ready to share its orders with Biriwa.\textsuperscript{1174}

New orders could not save the shop, however, when workers put down their tools. After a “salary adjustment” in July 1974, the employees threatened three times to go on
strike. When manager Frank Neequaye failed to satisfy them, they began “stealing tools and materials, especially timber, lacquer, thinner,” engaged in absenteeism and slowdowns, and worked for themselves on shop time. He fired those caught in the act. New orders came in, but under these conditions the shop could not complete them and used what little money it had paying wages. The workforce shrank from thirty-one in May 1975 to fourteen at the beginning of October. The survivors received “a few Cedis” more, giving them a total of thirty or more a month. The supervisor received seventy-five. In October, however, Neequaye introduced a piecework system that improved production “considerably.” Still, he deplored the “false propaganda” that had portrayed the project as self-supporting, something it had not been, he said, since 1969.\footnote{Frank Neequaye, Manager, Biriwa Project to Chairman, Biriwa Project, December 23, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.}

In 1976 consulting engineer Joachim Leckscheidt found many serious problems, though he hoped for a turnaround. He saw the damage from the leaky roof. All machines needed an overhaul. Many devices, machine tools and almost all hand tools needed replacement. The project had accumulated obligations of 16,300 Cedis and did not have enough liquidity to purchase raw materials. The sixteen workers received wages thirty to fifty percent below what they could earn in nearby Cape Coast. Maintenance was especially bad, so the shop was now cutting with completely dull blades, yielding “disastrous consequences for productivity and quality of products.” The Ghanaian workers “obviously” had no training in maintenance or repair and manifested a “general apathy,” so they had no better solution to defects except to replace parts or whole machines. In 1973 the shop depreciated its spare parts down to eighty-three Cedis, and now none were in storage. The project also lacked transportation; only the manager’s
VW Kombi was available. Most of the current difficulties existed at the time of handover: the “crippling” form of organization, the construction defects, the lack of training in maintenance of machines and tools, the lack of vehicles and tools, and the weak liquidity. He could not say whether the project as a whole had been profitable in 1973. That it survived at all was proof of its “healthy core” and of management’s skill. Fortunately, the shop had a good stock of orders. He recommended rehabilitating it and reorganizing the moribund Trust Board.1176

Surprisingly, the motor repair shop also fell on hard times. By 1974 manufacturer representatives in Accra had stopped giving discounts, so the shop sold not a single outboard motor that year.1177 In 1976 Joachim Leckscheidt identified several problems. The facility and tools were incomplete and in bad condition. The spare parts were used up, so that the remaining stock, valued two years earlier at eight hundred sixty-nine Cedis, consisted of parts that were not in demand and would have to be written off. Thanks to Ghanaian import restrictions, new parts could be procured only “by roundabout means” at black market prices. Since the shop had no cost-accounting separate from the rest of the old project, Leckscheidt could not make any conclusions about its profitability, though he doubted that it now supported even its own personnel costs. He attributed its “initial success” to the provision of cost-free spare parts. At the moment two remaining mechanics were still carrying out “lighter repair and maintenance work.”1178 Leckscheidt did not speculate on whether perhaps competing repair shops had opened within Biriwa’s service area.

1177 Frank Neequaye, Manager, Biriwa Project to Chairman, Biriwa Project, December 23, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.
The latrines became a worse disaster than either shop; by August 1974 they had long since run over without anyone doing anything. In this condition and in this climate they presented “a contagion danger of the first order.” The population was again doing its “business” on the beach or some other place, an unacceptable condition. The latrines filled up because waste products from the toilets went into closed tanks that required periodic emptying, but there was no access road to the sanitary forum that would allow a pump truck to approach. There were other toilets in the village with the same problem, and one of them was in such bad structural shape that it had to be closed. Frank Neequaye observed that the two non-forum toilets were too shallow in the first place and filled up in less than six months. The village’s communal labor “constructed a road to one of the toilets, but it was observed that it was so caked that desludging with a tanker was impossible.” The village development committee agreed to pull them down and build bigger and deeper ones while reusing the blocks and roofing sheets. Leckscheidt detected “serious structural defects” in the “Hoffmann toilets” building at the forum. He wanted them torn down too. A GAWI official rejected this advice in 1977 for “psychological” and cost reasons, but the West Germans would have to do something because Biriwa’s chief was quite worried about the latrines and wanted them fixed soon. One can understand why; during the years from 1974 to the end of 1977, the West Germans were aware of the problem, discussed the problem, yet took no action.

1181 Frank Neequaye, Manager, Biriwa Project to Chairman, Biriwa Project, December 23, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.
The GAWI official in question wrote that water channels running near the toilets would be strengthened to allow vehicles to approach and pump them out.\textsuperscript{1184}

Neither the BMZ nor the GTZ acted promptly, because the BMZ demanded a contribution from Ghana first.\textsuperscript{1185} Only in April 1977, after Ghana poured fifty thousand Cedis into the carpentry shop, did the BMZ instruct the GTZ to begin rehabilitating Biriwa III.\textsuperscript{1186} In November the GTZ reported that it had procured a new VW Transporter and that the Ghanaian government had replaced the old Trust Board. Unfortunately, the new members also appeared to be sluggish, the board’s composition “too attuned to the current incumbents, who practice a mediocre cooperation because of personal contacts” (the report did not explain what that meant).\textsuperscript{1187} At the end of 1977, the carpentry shop roof and floor repairs were still pending, as was remediation of the latrines.\textsuperscript{1188}

The dressing station recovered without official FRG help, because Kleinebudde had his wife revive it, beginning in 1974.\textsuperscript{1189} He soon claimed that he had persuaded the chief surgeon of the Cape Coast Central Hospital to hold office hours at the station one day a week, creating a precedent that would allow raising its status to a clinic.\textsuperscript{1190} The following May he boasted that the “first aid station” had “exploded” the boundaries set by the Ministry of Health, because it was better equipped and organized than stations in nearby villages that bore the official “clinic” designation. Biriwa’s would be expanded,
because the clinic in Yamoranza was closed due to bad management and hygienic conditions.\(^{1191}\) By March 1976 the station got its upgrade from the Ministry of Health and Mrs. Kleinebudde was busy keeping its books. The chief surgeon from Cape Coast Central Hospital must have dropped out, because Kleinebudde now wrote that he had gotten Saltpond Hospital’s chief physician, a Dr. Bensah, to promise office hours three times a week. Over the last three months the station had earned a hundred Cedis per week, enough to cover all maintenance and personnel costs and even clear a modest profit.\(^{1192}\) The clinic received no funding from the GTZ.\(^{1193}\)

**Conclusion**

After so many apparent successes and so much “radiation” emitted by West German development aid from Biriwa, the projects there were little more successful than those at Agou-Nyongbo, Nuatja, Kambolé, Tori Cada, and Peki. The marvelous, inspiring latrines at the sanitary forum with their impressive mosaics filled up and stank. The shops prospered for some years and then ran into losses. The fish ovens were useless to the village, and Glinke’s commendable attempt to give them an economic purpose ultimately failed. With the departure of Liselotte Miller the dressing station went into suspended animation. Only the primary school seems to have entered the post-handover period in good condition. The nets must certainly have been welcome and helpful to Biriwa’s fishermen, but Dr. Hoffmann’s self-serving description of drastic changes in the village seems a bit implausible and never received independent review. Of course embassy and BMZ officials were only too happy to hear that such a small gift could make

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\(^{1191}\) Walter Kleinebudde to MR Schweiger, BMZ, May 23, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.

\(^{1192}\) Activity Report of Walter Kleinebudde, March 1, 1976, BArchiv B 213/32443.

such a large difference and never challenged Hoffmann’s statements. At least Biriwa’s failures and weak successes were more affordable. Excluding Biriwa IV, the FRG spent only DM 1,5530,000 or a little more than $2.8 million in 2014 terms, much less than any of the other projects.\textsuperscript{1194} Even the aftercare measures added only DM 250,000 more.\textsuperscript{1195}

There was plenty of blame for everyone. Dr. Hoffmann bore responsibility for failing to properly plan latrine maintenance, something he and his Ministry of Health should have been able to manage easily. He also seems to have not bothered consulting with Biriwan women over whether the fish ovens would be of any use to them. GAWI covered itself with embarrassment by failing to order and deliver equipment in time for the DED volunteers and providing an unsuitable truck. It pointed to Hoffmann for these mistakes, but he was long gone when GAWI took its time shipping carpentry equipment and a generator to Biriwa. The BMZ was also at fault, as Glinke said. It knew that Hoffmann lacked the knowledge and aptitude to manage Biriwa III, but allowed him de facto leadership, however \textit{ehrenamtlich}, for a year and a half.

The aftermath Biriwa III, alongside the spare parts order that Peki required after 1975, raises important questions about “success.” How many years must an enterprise survive handover to remain a success? Two, three, ten, twenty or thirty? Should the answer depend on the type of enterprise? Should a new injection of outside funds and personnel count against the enterprise’s longevity? What proportion of distinct activities must prosper for a project to be successful overall? The West Germans seem to have had no standard whatsoever for answering these questions. While this lack meant that the

\textsuperscript{1194} See Appendix C.

\textsuperscript{1195} Agreed Minutes of Ghana-German Negotiations, 1976, May 31, 1976, BArchiv B 213/3963.
BMZ had no way to track its long-term performance, it also allowed the BMZ a generous flexibility in deciding what success was, both internally and for public consumption.

This chapter is the last of the four dedicated to a single project, but I am not yet finished discussing projects’ tangible effects. In the next chapter we will see how they changed relations between and within the villages and host governments, but also how these relationships changed the projects.
Chapter 6

The Development Triangle: Project, Government and Village

I would like to make it clear that the Government has an obligation to improve upon the living standards of the people and in this task we will not allow ourselves to be swayed by those who for purely selfish reasons wish to retard our progress. As far as this Settlement Farm is concerned, legitimate and genuine grievances will be considered but the Government will continue to supervise the project until it is sufficiently viable to operate on its own. In all this we will be guided by what we consider to be in the true interests of the local people...The Officials who will be assigned to the project expect the maximum co-operation not only from the members of the Steering Committee but also from the settlers themselves and all the people in the area.\footnote{1196}  

Colonel I.K. Acheampong at Peki Settlement Handover Ceremony, May 16, 1975

When the military dictator of your country, tells you that he is managing your affairs for your betterment, you had best nod gratefully, at least until he has stepped back from the microphone. This confrontation is an example of a foreign development project promoting what James Ferguson called the “entrenchment and expansion of bureaucratic state power.”\footnote{1197} Yet this tendency is not the whole story, for communities and project beneficiaries sometimes acted on their own behalf rather than remaining passive objects or victims of changes planned by others. This very project took place at Peki only because local notables asked for it in the first place. I will show here that projects have indeed affected relationships between host government and village, but projects have also

\footnote{1196}{Speech of Colonel I.K. Acheampong, Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemption Council on the Occasion of the Handing Over of the Peki Settlement Project to the Government of Ghana, May 16, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32442.}  
\footnote{1197}{Ferguson, xiv.}
been affected by them. West German project managers and officials operated at one point in a triangle with government and village at the other two points, each able to put pressure on one or both of the others as well as to act in combination with one or the other against the third. Finally, disturbances or fractures at any point of the triangle could slow, change or even derail the project. The project not only shaped power relations, but was subject to them.

This chapter will first concentrate on two sides of the triangle, project-government and government-village, and then focus on two points—the government and village—to examine the troubles or dissensions within each. The first section will examine three cases that bore out Ferguson’s thesis. During the negotiations over Peki the West Germans considered whether the project agreement might create direct FRG obligations to the village, and ultimately decided it could not. To arrive at this conclusion, they had to deliberately misread the triangular relationship as a dual one between donor and recipient governments, with the village as only an object. The West German attempt to offer Peki some protection through a side letter failed in the face of host government resistance. At Agou the West Germans promoted a government takeover of the successful wood-processing operation, but local resistance won concessions to local interests. In Biriwa the West Germans called in a central government official to quash passive resistance to the project.

In the second section, however, we will see conflict rather than cooperation between project and government. At Agou and Nuatja the government sided with the village against the project, in the one case to embarrass the West Germans for their failures and in the other to make sure the village kept equipment the West Germans
wanted to use elsewhere. The Ghanaian and Togolese governments also annoyed the West Germans by imposing an unprofitable crop plan at Peki, by trying to subordinate the Kambolé project to a parastatal agency, and by requiring wage increases at Agou. In all three countries the projects had to reckon with Frederick Cooper’s “gatekeeper state” when trying to get goods through customs. That government and project might work at cross-purposes rather than in harmony was true even in Ferguson’s Lesotho, where the bureaucracy scotched the Canadian International Development Agency’s attempt to “decentralize” administration in Tsaba-Theka.\textsuperscript{1198}

The third section will show that host governments sometimes undermined projects through their weaknesses rather than their ambition. Togo and Ghana lacked the resources to fulfill their commitments, while reorganizations and coups d’état in all three countries put the projects into uncertainty. Here “bureaucratic state power” nearly met its match in scarcity and confusion.

The fourth and fifth sections will examine the village’s role as actor and as site of conflict. When united or at least quiescent, a village could invite aid or influence project management. When it fell into disunity, factions could force the project manager to carefully negotiate between them, as Heinz Lähne did at Agou, or they could throw the entire project into turmoil, as resistant landowners did at Peki by refusing to provide land.

\textbf{Entrenching “Bureaucratic State Power” in the Village}

At Peki and in Agou the West Germans promoted a government takeover of what began as a local initiative, while at Biriwa they actually called in the government to overcome local apathy. As to Peki, however, the West Germans first seriously debated what duties the FRG owed to the village rather than to the government. Michael Jeroch\footnote{Ferguson, 224-25.}
wrote in May 1968 that the village worried the draft agreement would convert its own project into a government project. He recommended phrasing it in a way that displayed Peki’s role as the FRG’s direct partner and accorded the government only an intermediary role.\textsuperscript{1199} Dr. Schaad at the embassy also criticized the draft, which seemed “tailored to the idea that on the Ghanaian side, the Ghanaian government” would be “the sole project agency,” rather than a self-help project of an agricultural village receiving government approval and support. The project would require government aid, but he did not want it to lose its character as “village self-help,” especially since success would depend on the population’s “interest and readiness for collaboration.”\textsuperscript{1200} Ten days later Schaad wrote that Agriculture Minister Adomakoh praised the population’s “numerous wonderful [erfreuliche] initiatives” and assured him that the government would avoid exerting too much influence over the project.\textsuperscript{1201}

The BMZ, however, saw the government rather than the village as its Ghanaian partner. \textit{Ministerialrat} Krumpholz explained on behalf of the West Africa \textit{Referat} that writing Peki’s role as executor into the project agreement was not possible. The government was certainly free to transfer its obligations to Peki or even to specific landowners, but the draft could not go into those details without more information. Peki’s interest and readiness to collaborate did not have to be harmed by government support as the embassy seemed to think, particularly since the latter’s financial aid would give the project greater chances of success, whereas drafting the agreement without obliging the government was too risky. Conditions at Peki were also too unclear to document specific obligations, so the embassy’s suggestion of merely having the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1199] Michael Jeroch, Africa Association to BMZ, May 16, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\item[1200] Dr. Schaad, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, May 20, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\item[1201] Dr. Schaad, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, May 30, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
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government assure that Peki create legal prerequisites for the settler lots was insufficient; the government had to provide the land under “precisely determined terms.”

Hansen agreed with his superior; the government must be the “acting organ,” though it could delegate obligations to lesser authorities. He suggested, however, that the two governments take account of Peki’s interests in a “side letter” that the embassy would transmit with the draft.

Ambassador Müller submitted the proposed side letter in September 1968. It specified the project should be “entrusted to a cooperative as a sponsoring agency composed of the settlers,” and that rights and obligations should be transferred to it “as soon as the agency has been founded.” The project should “be carried out largely as a self-help scheme of the population of Peki.” The government should transfer to the co-op, as soon as founded, any equipment delivered by the FRG. Furthermore, the Ghanaian government should “use the existing farm committee in Peki as agency appointed for the selection of candidates, reserving for itself such supervisory rights as it considers necessary.” When the co-op was set up, its executive committee should take over settler selection. The letter also contained statements regarding the provision of land, housing for experts, and a subsidy from the Ghanaian government.

Unfortunately, Ghana did not accept the side letter. Ghana’s Chief Settlement Officer Quartey-Papafio objected that a newly-founded co-op would need some time until the members were trained to take over its rights and duties. He suggested an Advisory Board appointed by the Ministry and the embassy, possibly composed of only

References:
1204 H. Müller, Ambassador to Mr. P.D. Anin, Commissioner for External Affairs, September 12, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
Peki people. During the build-up time this Board should have the last decision. Beneath it would serve a Management Committee composed of German project people and counterparts.¹²⁰⁵ Ambassador Müller recommended signing the agreement as soon as possible, i.e. without the letter, because Commissioner Adomakoh was leaving Ghana at the end of the month for a post with the FAO. After his departure the signing would probably be considerably delayed.¹²⁰⁶ Dr. Theierl agreed, but pointed out that they could only begin implementation when they reached accord with Ghana over certain details in the side letter; he was likely concerned far more with the land issue and the Ghanaian subsidy rather than Peki’s control over the co-op.¹²⁰⁷ On March 28, 1969 Müller announced that the treaty had been signed, with Adamokoh representing the Ghanaian side.¹²⁰⁸ When the land issue remained unsettled even after the first project manager, F.T. Ulrich had come and gone by early 1970, the West Germans tried to bring the side letter back into further negotiations between Ghana and the FRG, represented by Heinz Büchner, but there was no further discussion of local control within either government.¹²⁰⁹ As we saw in Chapter 4, the West Germans went along with the two-committee plan and eventually handed over the project to the government.

Even before the handover, the ruling National Redemption Council brandished its authority over the settlers with a menacing warning. At a June 1974 Steering Committee

¹²⁰⁶ Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, March 17, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4041.
meeting, settler representative V.K. Ayers said that the settlers had no objection to Ministry of Agriculture supervision, but they objected to keeping current officials. At that the Steering Committee agreed to bring the matter before the Volta Region’s Commissioner for discussion. On November 5, VR Commissioner Colonel J.A. Kabore addressed the Committee. Since his office had received written charges and counter-charges from settlers, individuals, groups and management, he identified the project’s chief problem as “Lack of Cordiality between the Settlers and the Management.” He complained that “The Settlers were trying to be very difficult to handle and they reluctantly adhered to instructions from the Management. Also they were getting fed up with the Ministry of Agriculture Officials with whom they had worked since the beginning [sic] of the Project.” The Colonel therefore brought a “message” from Accra. “The settlers should understand that although the farm is for Peki, the Government has a big say in the Management, and they should know that the C 1.5 million spent by the Ghana Government on the project came from taxes and etc, collected from all corners of the Country and not from Peki.” The government, he said, would not let all that money “run into the drain.” The Peki Union, which initiated the project, should pitch in and help solve its problems. After the handover, the Ministry would retain its current staff at the farm, but it would also send a more senior officer to manage it. Colonel Kabore closed with a threat. If the present settlers could not “maintain the high standard expected of them and they stay unconcern [sic] and expect the Management to force them to work when their properties are getting spoilt in the field,” he would ask the NRC to “open the farm to all Ghanaians.” What could one say to that?

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1210 S.B. Dankyi, Project Co-Manager, Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting, June 28, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
Dr. Ababio and V.K. Ayers thanked the Colonel for his remarks and promised to carry his message back to their respective groups, the Peki Union and the settlers. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Colonel Acheampong would have similar words for settlers the following year at the handover ceremony, though expressed less harshly.

Government control also meant a change in project goals. When Paramount Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI and the Peki Farm Committee first wrote the Ministry of Agriculture about a model farm, they expected it to serve the “best interests of the people of the area,” by providing jobs and “high protein food-stuffs for the market.” At the inaugural ceremony, Minister Safo-Adu confirmed the goal of improving the local food supply, but now he also wanted the project to help reduce Ghana’s dependence on food imports. According to Safo-Adu, Peki’s success or failure would influence the government’s entire settlements policy. In fact, he threatened to intervene with a “cure, however unpleasant,” if the settlers failed. So now the stakes were national rather than merely local, and were to remain so. At a 1974 meeting with project manager Thomas Schurig, Peki Union representatives argued that the project’s task was not only to create a profitable co-op, but also to make sure that all inhabitants of the Peki area and not just the settlers profited. They expected the settlement should provide Pekians with cheap foodstuffs, but instead products were being sold to Accra or even to the Togolese border. Schurig explained that the project could only survive if it worked profitably and was not weakened by fulfilling all sorts of wishes, whether supplying water and

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1211 S.B. Dankyi, Project Co-Manager, Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting, November 5, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
1212 Togbe Kwadzo Del XI, Paramount Chief of Peki, Peki-Blengo, Volta Region to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Accra, April 15, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4041.
1213 An Address by the Minister of Agriculture the Hon. Dr. K. Safo-Adu on the Occasion of the Inauguration of Ghana-German Settlement Project at Peki on Sunday, 23rd November, 1969 at 9:30 a.m., BArchiv B 213/32438.
electricity or cheap food delivery or financially supporting the Paramount Chief. He then reported on this meeting to the Regional Commissioner. “The first reaction was that no one would ever hand over this project to saboteurs of the revolution and Operation Feed Yourself.”

This “operation” referred to the government’s policy of reducing food imports. At the handover ceremony, Colonel Acheampong mentioned Pekians’ goal of dampening the “exodus of educated people to the urban areas,” but not local food provision. He hoped the settlement would demonstrate “improved methods” to area farmers and of improve “the people’s,” i.e. the Ghanaian people’s, standard of living.

At Agou, too, the West Germans promoted central government control, but here they and the government faced determined opposition. As early as March 1970 both embassy and project manager Lähne saw the Ministry of Public Works, Mines, Transportation, Post and Telecommunication as the only viable agency to carry on the wood-processing business after the West German handover. It was one of Togo’s biggest employers and maintained several workshops across the country. By agreement with the embassy and in the presence of its economic attaché, J. Friedrichsen and Kurt Gall held “non-binding” talks with Planning Director Dogo, Minister for Public Works Mivedor and his Cabinet Director Creppy.

Chief Pebi IV and his fellow co-op officers got wind of the handover proposals, so they submitted a letter of protest. When the model village project began in 1962, the talk was only of a co-op, not a commercial enterprise. “We do not understand why

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1214 Seventh Activity Report of ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
people today want to force on us a commercial enterprise against our will that aims exclusively at profit and neglects the social and educational problems of the co-op members.” Pebi also invoked the West Germans’ moral debt. “We must confess [that] our understanding of the principles of the cooperative has moved us to freely offer our land cost-free and our labor power.” Instead of a commercial enterprise controlled from above they should get a co-op expert, something they had always lacked, delaying the drawing-up of a co-op statute until December 1969. They had worked out one themselves, recently acknowledged by Togolese authorities. Co-signing the letter with Chief Pebi were co-op vice-president Théophile Galevo, treasurer Jonathan Segbename, secretary Gerson Kutowogbe, and council members Georges Kplako, Constantin Xodanu, and David Klu.\footnote{E.K. Pebi, Canton Chief, President of Administrative Council for Agou Cooperative to GAWI, June 25, 1970, BArchiv B 213/11895.}

Pebi raised further points in person with Heinz Lähne. He and Pastor Viering rather than the Togolese government had asked the FRG to aid the village. Now he and his fellow villagers feared that the government would insert strangers, local people would lose their jobs, and no one would be interested in doing anything for Agou. They were also afraid that the land on which the craft business sat would be taken away from the village. There was a precedent; the village donated land to the German administration before 1914 that eventually passed to the Togolese government and never returned. Many people lost their land that way and had to get new land up to twenty kilometers away. Pebi believed that a craft cooperative would offer the villagers “a certain security for realizing their interests.”\footnote{Heinz Lähne to BfE, August 9, 1970, BArchiv B 213/11895.}
West German officials did not see the matter as Pebi did. Dr. Sartorius of the BfE wrote that expanding the project to a sawmill plant, as Lähne had done, “offers the only chance to hand over the project as a commercial operation to the Ministry for Public Works.” The co-op “merely exists in the form of ruins,” so that there could be no thought of “continuing the project on a cooperative basis.” The Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid fudged the issue in August 1970, when it provided for an eventual transfer of the carpentry shop to “Togolese responsibility,” without specifying which Togolese, with a projected date of February 28, 1972. Dr. Theierl, however, agreed that the “wood processing plant” should be transferred to the government, possibly the Ministry for Public Works, not to the village or cooperative. In Agou there was no suitable manager for the operation, he said.

The conflict came up for public discussion in the project conference room on August 19, 1971 with Ambassador Söhnke present. Chiefs Pebi and Léléklélé appeared with a large following on behalf of Agou’s two component villages, Dalavé and Agbétiko, though Pebi spoke for both. He repeated his earlier points to Lähne about being the project initiator, about his fears of the village losing land and jobs, and Agou receiving no benefit from the project. Both villages asked that before the handover representatives of the Togolese government and the German embassy must meet with them, or else there would be difficulties. To the first part of Pebi’s remarks the ambassador could only reply with what Lähne had already said repeatedly at earlier meetings. The umbrella agreement for technical aid existed only between the two

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1220 Dr. Sartorius, Referat III 1, BfE to Referat I A 6, BMZ, August 7, 1970, BArchiv B 213/11895.
1221 Minutes of Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 12, 1970, BArchiv B 213/11897.
governments and the FRG had made no special agreement with the villages. Both chiefs must therefore direct their request to the Togolese government. The ambassador declared himself prepared to take steps to arrange such a discussion.\textsuperscript{1223}

After a year and a half of delay, the climactic meeting took place on March 10, 1973, again in the project’s conference room. From the Ministry of Commerce and Industry came Minister Dogo, Cabinet Director Seddo, Director Djomeda of Industry and Artisanate and Hadzi, head of the Artisanate Division. From the administrative district Klouto came Awutse, adjutant of the district commissioner of Palimé, and Kwadzo, head of the Agou-Gare post office. Chief Pebi came with thirty-eight people. Togolese co-director Felix Kodjo gave the opening remarks, and then Pebi spoke next, in Ewe, repeating again his earlier arguments. Lähne claimed that Dr. Stangen had told Pebi and Lélélé that the FRG would refuse to pursue the project as originally devised, because the goal could no longer be reached, but it would be ready to continue with a new plan. He himself, said Lähne, had met with the chiefs in February 1968 and they agreed with the new concept to begin on April 1. People were now too quick to claim they had believed the craft center was a cooperative to which the village had a right. Upon reflection they could have seen that none of the prerequisites were present.\textsuperscript{1224}

Minister Dogo now took center stage and said that the relevant authorities were all informed about the project’s progress. He regretted that up to now the circumstances


\textsuperscript{1224} Final Report of Heinz Lähne, Supplement to Report of April 10, 1974, July 1, 1975, BArchiv B 213/11897. Yet on July 2, 1969, Lähne recorded that the cooperative used its earnings, presumably from the shops since agriculture was unprofitable, to pay for a new water line for Agbétiko. At the same time, he dismissed as empty both chiefs’ promises that their people would work harder on co-op agriculture. See General Report of Heinz Lähne, July 2, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110. On the failure of Agou’s agricultural arm, see also Memorandum of MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ, May 2, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
had prevented this long-foreseen discussion up to now. The project had come about because of an umbrella agreement for technical aid between the two governments, and the equipment and vehicles were FRG gifts to the Togolese government, and not to the village. The government would not hand over the project, which was no co-op, to the village. Yet he offered some concessions. The craft center would operate as a para-administrative project subordinate to a supervisory board, of which the chief and three other villagers would be members. The government was ready to put up a part of the earned profits from the center for the village’s infrastructure. All this would be set down in a statute. Dogo asked the chief to give him the names of the three board members on the morrow. Finally, he advised the village to stop quarreling and Pebi to take care that the people worked diligently, so as to make a larger profit from which the village would also ultimately benefit. Lähne later wrote “Thus clarity was at last created between the village relationship to the project and Chief Pebi with his responsible people agreed to everything.”

The four Agou representatives were eventually Chief Pebi, Josephe Tsogbe, Michel Fia туwo, and Jonathan Segbename.

The Biriwa project, which began as a government rather than village initiative, also expanded the government’s presence there. As we saw in Chapter 5, the West Germans worked with the Ghanaian government to create a “village development trust” run by a board of people from outside the village rather than a locally-governed cooperative. Before that happened, however, they summoned up the intervention of Colonel Dontoh, National Liberation Council boss of the Central Region. Near the end

of July 1966, economic attaché Dr. Armbruster wrote that the village’s cooperation had worsened in recent weeks, as Dr. Hoffmann—himself a Ghanaian official as well as West German project manager—confirmed to him, so Dontoh promised the embassy that he would resort to “severe measures on the part of the regional administration.” Dontoh blamed villagers’ passivity on Biriwa’s chief, whose “favorite occupation” was taking his “daily quantum of local gin.” Since the chief had failed, a Biriwa Building and Development Committee was founded under the chairmanship of a Biriwan foreman and with “various officials” from Cape Coast among its members. The chairman was supposed to receive powers suitable for mobilizing village labor on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{1227} At the inauguration ceremony in March 1967, the colonel exerted direct pressure upon his listeners from Biriwa and nearby villages. He blamed “some” Local Councils for neglecting “environmental control services” (perhaps a reference to the drainage channels Biriwa needed) and noted that “several” towns and villages lacked “essential sanitary amenities such as lavatories and incinerators.” Instead of focusing on sanitation, “former Councillors embarked upon projects of doubtful value and manipulated to have their percentage of the dubious contract deals.” Such men who “served mammon rather than their fellow citizens who elected them to the Councils” were now “cleared out of the way” by the regime, so that “efforts are being made to build up the Councils on [a] firm and realistic basis.”\textsuperscript{1228} The project lost its uniformed supervisor by early September 1967, when Glinke reported that he had gone to India for a year to receive instruction and

\textsuperscript{1228} Speech of Colonel Dontoh, March 11, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.
would not return to Cape Coast after he came back. But Dontoh had served his purpose of improving Biriwan cooperation.

**The Clash of Government and Project**

The relationship between FRG experts and host government officials could become contentious as well as cooperative. In 1966 Schnellbach left behind growing Togolese disgruntlement for his successor, Hans von der Decken, to deal with. Planning Office director Eklou warned von der Decken that the government would soon have to end subsidies, which had included “reimbursement for gasoline expenditures” and repayment of “railroad freight costs,” and wondered when the project would repay them, so that the country could establish new model villages. Instead of seeing how villages could improve themselves, the Togolese were “bitterly disappointed”; no village was better off, everything remained the same, and the money was wasted. A Mr. Ahyi, director of the National Rural Development Service in Lomé said the same thing. Togo could become a “paradise,” but the project was not working the soil intensively.¹²³⁰

At Agou the president of Palimé district (the *Regierungspräsident* or *Chef de Circonscription*) cooperated with villagers to humiliate the West Germans. In July or early August 1966 the West Germans had to attend a meeting at which, according to Hans von der Decken, “it hailed reproaches against Germany by the district president and the co-op members, which gained traction (*Oberwasser hatten*) because of the district president’s presence.” Chief Pebi, co-op president, was also highly critical. Both said that the Germans had promised riches and a model village, but brought co-op members only disappointment and misery. Agou was anything but a model village. Since 1962,

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Togo had (according to the Planning Ministry) dumped in 5.7 million CFA (about DM 800,000) and no one saw anything. The district president gave the project a severe and embarrassing dressing-down. The Germans had taken away land from Agou-Agbétiko without paying any rent or wages. If the Germans could not earn an income, they should shut down the operation. Whenever they left, everything would collapse because of unprofitability. They should only do whatever brought money (“our view too” wrote von der Decken). As the district president spoke, a tractor came up with trailer carrying freshly harvested maize and half a dozen members picking maize cobs. “Amidst scornful laughter of the cooperative chairs,” the district president asked whether the Germans imagined that such expensive use of machines was profitable in Africa; several women could pick as much and carry it home on their heads. At the same time the co-op began in 1962, several Kabrés had settled around Palimé and earned a lot of money using traditional methods. Several other entrepreneurs had come in with little money, but today they were rich and “owned or built several beautiful houses.” The Germans failed despite investing much more money. Here von der Decken interjected in his report that the district president was confusing private business, which made only one person rich, with Schnellbach’s idea to bring higher earnings into the village for everyone.\(^\text{1231}\)

The district president went on: instead of investing huge sums in “unprofitable and expensive machines” the West Germans should instead pay “decent wages” like the nearby project in Avétontou, where good things were going on. There they were building “beautiful houses for Africans,” there one could bring in guests, there were magnificent herds of cattle. If the Germans had bought thirty head of cattle instead of tractors, then

they could have given milk to the villagers. They could have paid high wages, but instead forced the members to work for “hunger wages.” If they had given everyone a field and artificial fertilizer, they would be earning well today and the Germans would have saved much money. A tractor cost 1.2 million CFA, about DM twenty thousand. If he had had only fifty thousand CFA (DM eighty), he would have had land cleared and planted by hand, and today he would have been a rich man. If the West Germans could earn no profit with their machines, they should give up the operation and give the land to the peasants for private use rather than as a co-op. Across the country people, even co-op members, were laughing about Agou. It was a blot (Schandfleck) on his busy and constructive district; he demanded change. Chief Pedi gave the final speech: “The old Germans of 1914 were good. What they built still stands today. What they did turned a profit. Here von der Decken observed sourly: “Praise for the much-disdained alleged colonial exploitation.” Pedi asked, “Are modern Germans as good? If yes, they must prove it.” He invoked the German proverb “Ein Mann, ein Wort!”—a man keeps his word. He hoped for the eventual fulfillment of another proverb: “Ende gut, alles gut”—all’s well that ends well.1232

In 1968 the government also sided with Nuatja when the West Germans tried to withdraw carpentry machines and a generator for use elsewhere. According to Gerhard Goronzy, President Eyadéma had reversed his approval for the removal thanks to the influence of the Foreign and Interior Ministries. Goronzy believed that the president feared “any unrest,” because “he does not feel especially secure in his position.”1233 Local opinion also weighed heavily. Dr. von der Decken, himself bitter about what he

1233 Gerhard Goronzy to GAWI, March 1, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
regarded as Nuatja’s premature handover, wrote that “Disappointment in the population is monstrous.” As the people saw it, everything was being dismantled just when production was able to run properly and money to flow into the village. “The resulting hatred fanned against us, that we are supposedly giving everything to Agou and Kambolé, damages the German reputation in a manner hardly to be described. This is all the more true in that the Interior Minister, the very severe Colonel Assila, comes from Nuatja!” Von der Decken had spoken with him several times.\(^{1234}\) Goronzy too attributed the change to the Interior Minister, who wanted to keep the machines there “at any price.” The Minister said as much “in very sharp form” to the West German ambassador at a celebration. The Planning Ministry also insisted on April 5 that Togo alone would decide on the machines’ use.\(^{1235}\) So the equipment stayed.

The host government could be deliberately irritating without the legitimate excuse of correcting the project or protecting the village. At Peki, during an Advisory Committee meeting on October 23, 1970, Ministry of Agriculture Principal Secretary Sraha decreed a specific cultivation plan that strongly favored maize:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manioc</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowpeas</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Palms</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus Fruits*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>925</strong></td>
<td><strong>370</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Included grapefruit, organs, lemons, and limes


Interim project manager Kurt W. Gall was sure this plan would cause “considerable losses.” Sraha replied that any losses from maize cultivation must be made up by profits from other crops. Gall had doubts, however, about the profitability of citrus, manioc, onions and tobacco at the acreage specified.\footnote{Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, November 25, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.} Expert Michael Boguslawski agreed that Sraha’s plan was not feasible, but if the Ministry furnished a harvester, perhaps from the Volta River Authority, and if the maize could be dried at a facility in Nkwakubio fifteen kilometers away, the co-op could harvest up to a hundred and fifty hectares of maize with a yield sufficient to pay off laborers during the coming year, and without burdening the co-op with expensive and unprofitable investments. As oil palm and onion cultivation expanded in future seasons, maize production could be limited.\footnote{Project Report of Michael Boguslawski, December 14, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.}

Both Gall and Boguslawski found the government’s attitude disturbing. Gall complained about the “classic” buffer position German experts occupied between the Ministry, counterparts and settlers. An expert who tried to please the government came into conflict with the settlers or vice versa.\footnote{Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, November 25, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.} Boguslawski warned that Bonn should expect further controversies. The German experts’ ideas were increasingly colliding with “diverging views” at the Ministry of Agriculture regarding labor organization, the cultivation plan, and beginning the co-op. He had the impression that the activities of Quartey-Papafo, Principal Secretary Sraha, and various interested groups pointed toward changing the project into a new type of “state farm” rather than a cooperative settlement. The Ministry would increasingly make the decisions and turn German management into a subordinate organ receiving orders yet retaining full responsibility.\footnote{Project Report of Michael Boguslawski, December 14, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.} Boguslawski’s
report stirred anxiety in the BfE’s Dr. Clemens, who saw the government’s apparent tendency to convert the project team into an “executive organ” as a “serious threat for the entire project.” If it became stronger, the team must restrict itself to advisory functions and reject any further responsibility. Fortunately, it did not come to such a step, since the government ceased to interfere with project management in this way.

At Kambolé the West Germans had trouble with Togo’s agricultural extension agency, the Société Rurale d’Aménagement et de Développement (SORAD). SORAD was an “autonomous corporation of public law,” with a mission of promoting agricultural production in each region. It was supposed to administer all state activities in support of “rural modernization,” lend to farmers, establish cooperatives, build roads and offer aid for coordinating activities under Togo’s first five-year plan. By late 1971, however, it promoted only cotton cultivation and marketing, because specialized parastatal corporations did business in coffee, cocoa, oil palms and grain. While SORAD’s bureaucrats received pay from the state, its clerical employees received theirs from SORAD’s cotton marketing profits. The agency suffered from lack of funds, trained cadres, and coordination among its offices, according to a later study of Togolese agricultural policy by political scientist Margrit Olschewski.

SORAD and the Kambolé project began as competitors, because they were distributing fertilizer and pesticides and counseling peasants independently of each other.

1240 Dr. Clemens, Referat III 2, BfE to Referate III A 6 and I B 4, BMZ, January 20, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
1242 Olschewski, 109.
1244 Olschewski, 109.
leading to conflicts (Überschneidungen). Project manager Kehrein sought a division of territory and an exchange of information to save peasants uncertainty, irritation and money, but SORAD’s director said no, because he wanted control over the project. He would not cooperate unless Kambolé integrated itself into the agency. This intransigence had the Ministry of Agriculture’s support. In July 1967 Minister Adossama told Kehrein and GAWI’s Gerhard Goronzy that he wanted the Germans to continue to hire and pay personnel and carry out trials, but SORAD should prescribe the manner, place and scope of any advisory services. He was particularly concerned that the project should accommodate Togo’s Five-Year Plan. If there were any dispute, he—the Minister—would settle it. Goronzy did not like this scheme and wrote Bonn suggesting a project agreement for all three model villages fixing specific rights, duties and competencies for each side.1245 GAWI also did not like the prospect of the project taking orders from the Togolese, though it saw that by capitulating to SORAD, the West Germans could exit all three villages “without loss of face.”1246

Fortunately, the FRG and Togo achieved a temporary settlement, because the Togolese officials recognized that the West Germans would not submit to their domination. On February 10, 1968, representatives of project and Togolese government met at the SORAD office in Sokodé to sign an agreement dividing responsibilities. The co-op would remain administratively independent while collaborating with SORAD. It would have a “zone of action” covering the “East Mono Rural Sector,” including Kambolé, Balanka, Kouloumi, Tchamba, Koussountou, Bag (probably Bagou), and Goubi Sounaoudozo. SORAD advisory personnel active in the zone would be at the co-

1245 Gerhard Goronzy to GAWI, August 3, 1967, BArciv B 213/4113.
1246 GAWI to Referate I A 6 and I B 4, BMZ, Referat IV 2, BAW, August 10, 1967, BArciv B 213/4113.
op director’s disposal for coordinated action. SORAD would also appoint a counterpart for that director.\textsuperscript{1247}

By the end of 1971, relations between SORAD and the project worsened again, partly because the agency was now too passive rather than possessive. Project manager von der Lühe complained that it was continually replacing its advisers.\textsuperscript{1248} SORAD advisers declined in number from fourteen in 1970 to seven in 1971, according to BMZ official Dr. Neumann-Damerau. The government even suggested it might pull them all out.\textsuperscript{1249} At the same time, SORAD again saw Kambolé as a competing enterprise, and the government took little interest in the project.\textsuperscript{1250} Karkow at the embassy also reported that Togolese reproached Kambolé with acting like a “state within a state” and not working with SORAD. At the conflict’s root was the fact that SORAD had to finance its counseling services from the marketing of agricultural products, but the project marketed its own crops. Karkow wanted German experts to continue working with co-op structures and retain control of marketing until the handover.\textsuperscript{1251} As Ministerialrat Schweiger in the West Africa Referat observed in September 1973, it was officially SORAD’s job to “call cooperatives into existence,” but in fact there were “genuine inconsistencies.” He likely meant that it made no sense for SORAD to create competitors that would eat into its own income. In addition, comprehension or communication (Verständigung) between German personnel and Togolese offices was “not the best.”\textsuperscript{1252}

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\textsuperscript{1247} Minutes of Meeting at Sokodé, February 10, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
\textsuperscript{1248} Von der Lühe, Project Conception for 1972 to 1974, December 5, 1971, BArchiv B 213/21827.
\textsuperscript{1249} Travel Report of Dr. Neumann-Damerau, Referat III A 6, BMZ, undated but after December 6, 1971, BArchiv B 213/21827.
\textsuperscript{1250} Von der Lühe, Attachment 4 to Quarterly Report, June 30, 1973, BArchiv B 213/21827.
\textsuperscript{1251} Karkow, Embassy in Lomé to Foreign Office, July 5, 1973, BArchiv B 213/8910.
\textsuperscript{1252} MR Schweiger, Referat 113, BMZ to UAL 11, BMZ, September 17, 1973, BArchiv B 213/8910.
\end{flushleft}
By late 1974 the relationship with SORAD Central Region had warmed up again. After a late purchase of fertilizer from the project, at a time when no other sources were available, SORAD had intensified its cooperation and extended invitations for project personnel to SORAD sessions. Following a two-day informational trip by the project manager through the Central Region in the company of a SORAD worker, a report described relations as friendly.\textsuperscript{1253} At the time of handover, however, agency and project remained separate rather than integrated.\textsuperscript{1254}

As it turned out, SORAD was not long for the world. In October 1977 the embassy reported that Togo’s Council of Ministers had decided to dissolve and replace it with the \textit{Organisme Régional pour la Promotion de la Production Vivrière} (ORPV) or Regional Organization for Promoting Food Production.\textsuperscript{1255} In the spring of 1978, Togo introduced another new organization, the \textit{Direction Régionale de l’Animation Rurale et de l’action Coopérative} (ARAC) or Regional Director of Rural Extension and Cooperative Action. An embassy official recommended integrating the Central Region project (the successor to Kambolé) into ARAC rather than ORPV, since the latter was more oriented toward direct production rather than agricultural extension and management.\textsuperscript{1256}

A project might trip over host government policies not directly related to development. On the fourth anniversary of his seizure of power (January 13, 1971), Eyadéma raised Togo’s minimum wage by ten percent, a step that only mitigated a recent

\textsuperscript{1253} Activity Report of Centre Pilote, November 6, 1974, 21828.
\textsuperscript{1254} Final Report of Dr. V. Kobelt, April 1976, BArchiv B 213/21828.
\textsuperscript{1255} Dr. Seldis, Embassy in Lomé to Referat 445, Foreign Office, October 6, 1977, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 115607. See also Olschweski, 109.
fifty-percent increase in food stuff prices. Nonetheless, the raise added to the Agou project’s wage bill. Then Labor Inspection reclassified workers and forced the project to add another fifteen percent to their wages. The surplus annual cost burden was 1.5 million CFA. Labor union functionaries visited Agou to ask workers to join the union. Lähne complained in his final report that Labor Inspection and the union “always put themselves on the side of the workers. Conflicts that were carried out before the labor court were lost for the ‘white man’ from the outset.”

The West Germans had more frequent problems at the ports. Although machinery and other equipment were bound for development projects, they still had to get through customs. In Togo Schnellbach had to wage what he called an extended “office war.” The import paperwork had to go through the embassy, the Foreign Ministry, and then the customs authority, which might last weeks. Yet “our gentlemen knew their way around the thicket of bureaucracy and managed it so that we mostly got the crates out within a week.” Originally the Germans received free transport on the state railroad for their goods, but later there were difficulties, because the railroad did not know how to enter such freight into its books. Customs had the same problem as to port fees, the statistical fee, the lighthouse fee, and storage expenses. They needed the “procedure”! The West Germans steadfastly refused to honor the storage fees, so the Planning Office arranged to pay freight and fees out of its development fund. Unfortunately, that process reduced the Togolese money available to help with the project. Lähne, writing nine years later, observed that the West Germans had to prepare customs declarations for project vehicles,

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machines, tools and equipment as if they were trade goods even though they were gifts to Togo. That took four to six weeks. Fortunately, customs made things easier by releasing the goods with a “bon provisoir,” and there were no delays in handling applications.\textsuperscript{1260}

Togo was more insistent on limiting what experts could bring for their own use without paying duties. In 1962 the West Germans submitted a proposed project agreement for the model villages that would allow “duty-free import of medications, foodstuffs, and drinks and other articles of daily use in the framework of personal need.”\textsuperscript{1261} President Olympio, however, said no to what he called the “whiskey clause.” A BMWi official advised against pressing the issue, since the umbrella aid agreement of July 20, 1960 did not contain this clause, and the Togolese government had rejected similar attempts by the UN, the US and France. West Germany could not reasonably expect an exception for its experts.\textsuperscript{1262} The issue came up again on the FRG side in 1972, when Ambassador Söhnke wrote that the Togolese would certainly object to a provision in a draft project extension agreement allowing experts duty-free import of medicine, foodstuffs, drinks and other articles for personal consumption. He requested authority to drop foodstuffs and drinks, limiting the clause to medications and articles of personal use.\textsuperscript{1263} Schweiger at the BMZ’s West Africa \textit{Referat} agreed.\textsuperscript{1264}

Dahomey too limited duty-free goods. In 1964 the West Germans proposed a project agreement that would allow German experts and their families the “duty-free import of medications, food, drink, and other articles of daily use in the context of their

\textsuperscript{1261} Draft Verbal Note, July 7, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4111.
\textsuperscript{1262} Wolf, Referat V A 5, BMWi to Foreign Office, August 27, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4111.
\textsuperscript{1263} Söhnke, Embassy in Lomé to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, September 20, 1972, BArchiv B 213/11895.
\textsuperscript{1264} MR Schweiger, Referat I B 4, BMZ to Referat 303, Foreign Office, October 26, 1972, BArchiv B 213/11895.
personal needs.” Dahomey countered with substitute language that authorized German experts and their families duty-free import of “medications during their stay in Dahomey” and of “articles of current use…during a period of six months from the day of their arrival in Dahomey.” These articles included a refrigerator, air conditioner, household linen, silverware, dishes, glassware (*verrerie*), vacuum cleaner, fan, carpet, furniture, and kitchen utensils. Ambassador von Kameke found Dahomey’s language acceptable. The Foreign Office wanted “child and diet foods” added to medications for duty-free import and rejected the six-month limitation as violating the FRG’s 1961 umbrella aid agreement with Dahomey. Magura at the BML agreed with the Foreign Office position. The embassy’s final note to Dahomey’s Foreign Minister, however, conceded the point to Dahomey. It included the six-month time limit on duty-free import of medications, child and diet foods, and only to the extent these items were not already available in Dahomey. For experts already in the country, i.e. Balduin Zimmer and Lothar Heck, the six months would begin from the date of the note, probably in exchange for Dahomey waiving the right to sue experts except in cases of gross negligence. Dahomey’s Foreign Ministry confirmed its acceptance of this note. In 1968 the embassy secured on its own authority an amendment in 1968 allowing duty-free entry of fuel for the project.

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1265 Jovy, Referat III B 5, Foreign Office to BML, May 18, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4063.
1266 Dahomeyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Embassy in Cotonou, undated but received by embassy on September 1, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4063.
1268 Von Amsberg, Referat III B 5, Foreign Office to BML, September 14, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4063.
1269 Magura, Referat VII B 7, BML to Foreign Office, October 6, 1964, PAAA B 68/266.
Ghanaian customs caused the West Germans considerably more painful headaches in 1967, when it detained two vehicles and the first Biriwa project machines (perhaps for the carpentry shop), because the Ministry of Health owed it money. “All attempts to free our deliveries failed up to now,” Glinke wrote. He therefore alerted the embassy and hoped it could accomplish something through senior customs officials in Accra.1273 Two weeks later he complained that the vehicles and machines were still in customs. Its problems with the Ministry of Health were settled, but now it wanted a release (Freischreibung) from the Ministry of Finance. “Like everything here in Ghana that has to do with the authorities, it will take a lot of time.” The embassy was now trying to get a general release for all GAWI deliveries to the Biriwa project.1274 These letters prompted Theierl to ask the Foreign Office to have the embassy invoke the FRG’s aid treaty with Ghana, signed December 30, 1959.1275 The Foreign Office did so.1276 At the beginning of September Glinke informed GAWI the matter was now settled, and he provided a very interesting explanation. After difficulties with the first GAWI shipment of nets and corks via the port in Tema, “honorary” project manager Dr. Hoffmann turned to his “personal friends” in Takoradi. The general manager of Ghana Railways and Harbours, Mr. De-Graft Johnson, took responsibility for releasing these shipments. Lesser officials of customs, the State Transport Corporation and the port manager were “quieted” with a few bottles of whiskey and gin. When Glinke tried to receive vehicles and equipment in the same way, difficulties cropped up, because both Dr. Hoffmann and De Graft-Johnson were on leave. Another reason was that the State Transport

Corporation also owed money to customs, so all deliveries were detained. Glinke’s own difficulties traveling two hundred fifty kilometers between Accra and Takoradi delayed things further. Now all obstacles were out of the way and he expected no more difficulties with GAWI shipments. He received the most recent one only four days after the ship arrived.\footnote{Hans-Josef Glinke to GAWI, September 2, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.}

**The Government Falls Short**

Central government inefficiency or lack of resources often hindered projects. In Togo Agou needed a telephone to the nearest railroad station, six miles away, so the Planning Office budgeted money for it, but as of August 1966, more than three years after the West Germans arrived, the line was not yet installed, because the Office forgot to inform the postal administration. Schnellbach got that snag cleared up, but the postal administration still had to order iron posts, isolators and wire, which would take months to get.\footnote{Report of Dr.-Ing. Otto Schnellbach, December 31, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4112.} As we saw in Chapter 2, the Ministry of Public Works could not keep its promise to supply pillars for the bridge over the Haho River, because they would cost DM one hundred twenty thousand, several times the available amount. It could not even manage to erect the road, after proposing to do so. Schnellbach remarked in his final report that “partnership services of the recipient country” might all be very well in theory, since aid should promote help toward self-help rather than gifts, but a donor dealing with a country as poor as Togo would have to provide nearly everything.\footnote{Ibid.} In July 1972 the Togolese government reneged on its promise to compensate Co-director Kodjo at Agou. After Cabinet Director Seddo of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry asked Heinz Lähne what the wood-processing business planned to pay Kodjo, Lähne wrote drily “For
me this was a new point of view, because from our side it was expected that the co-director will be paid by the government.” He later agreed to pay Kodjo seventy thousand CFA with housing, an amount that he later described as “enormously high.” Fortunately, Kodjo contented himself with forty thousand until a final arrangement could be made, because he was still receiving thirty thousand per month from the Ministry of Culture. In early 1971 Tori Cada project manager Martin Dietz unwittingly echoed Schnellbach when he wrote that Dahomey’s budget was always in deficit, so that the West Germans should hold out only the “most modest expectations” for its government to render partnership services. Up to now it had paid wages for only some of the project employees, through the UCRT, and with a two month delay reimbursing the co-op. It also sometimes imposed fees on the co-op. Dietz wanted additional services regulated by agreement.

Ghana had plenty of financial and administrative troubles too. As we saw in Chapter 5 the government never got around to blasting rocks in front of the beach in Biriwa. Project manager Hans-Josef Glinke had to do his own land survey of the village area supposed to be improved, because “the Ghana government and thus all ministries are totally broke.” He added that the Ministry of Health, still responsible for the Ghanaian side of the project, did not have funds for “urgently necessary repairs in individual hospitals of the Central Region,” whether for air conditioners or replacing light bulbs. There had even been operations carried out with the help of several pocket lamps,

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because no new operation lamps could be purchased. The Peki project slowed in 1973 because Ghana’s lack of foreign exchange caused bottlenecks in cement deliveries. After experimenting with having a Logistics Committee set delivery priorities, the government left this function to the Regional Commissioners. Schurig remarked “How long this way is practicable, without more or less a lot of cement disappearing along the way, remains to be seen.” The NRC denied his request to procure cement in Togo, because it did not want to spend hard currency there, but he was able to get some through the intervention of the head of state (i.e. Colonel Acheampong) and the secretary of the National Redemption Council.

Money aside, conflicts within the central government also hindered projects. The Agou project suffered from long uncertainty over which Togolese ministry would appoint a co-director, pay him and take over the wood processing business, i.e. the carpentry shop and sawmill, after the handover. It was this struggle that delayed resolution of the dispute with Agou. The contestants--the Planning Directorate, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry for Public Works--agreed only that one of them rather than the Agou co-op could “manage the relatively highly mechanized [technisierten] enterprise profitably.” On August 28, 1971, the Foreign Minister informed project manager Heinz Lähne that the contenders were now the Ministries of Rural Economy (probably an alternate name for Agriculture), Commerce, Industry and Tourism, and Public Works; he was of the view that the project would come under Commerce, Industry and Tourism. Lähne favored that one and proposed letting it select the co-director,

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preferably Professor Kodjo from Ghana’s Technical College. At the end of September the West German ambassador reported that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce rather than the Ministry of Agriculture had obtained competency, but “In spite of many personal interventions a final settlement of all issues could not yet be reached.” He suggested that a Mr. Gbadoe of the Ministry for Industry and Commerce take over the project’s technical management, while Kodjo take over its commercial affairs. In fact, the competency issue remained unsettled despite the approaching expiration of the project agreement in May 1972. At last on April 21 an embassy official wired Bonn to let it know that the “responsible Togolese Ministry”—he did not say which one—had applied for a project extension. In a follow-up telegram the same day, he specified that it was the Industry and Commerce Minister. The logjam was now broken. Dr. Müller at the BfE noted Lähne’s co-director would receive payment from the government. As we have seen, that arrangement would not stand. The other personnel, including the technical manager, would enter into private service contracts with the business and receive pay out of its proceeds.

A shadow of uncertainty fell over the Kambolé project during its last months and over its successor, the Central Region project, when Togo split its Ministry of Agriculture into two, effective March 1975. The two new ministries were Rural Development under Ogama Bagnah and Rural Equipment under Samon Kortho, but the government did not

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1288 Dr. Greiff, Referat III A 5, BMZ to Foreign Office, BfE, March 14, 1972, BArchiv B 213/11895.
1289 Dohmes, Embassy in Lomé, April 21, 1972, BArchiv B 213/11895.
1290 Dohmes, Embassy in Lomé (second letter), April 21, 1972, BArchiv B 213/11895.
1291 Memorandum of Dr. Müller, Referat III 5, BfE, May 2, 1972, BArchiv B 213/11895.
immediately define their competencies. After two or two and a half months of what project manager Volker Kobelt called “crippling uncertainty,” he believed that both ministries would form ties with SORAD. The idea of a coordination office between the ministries was under discussion, but no personnel decisions had been made yet. The Ministry of Rural Equipment had outlined a program for SORAD’s regional branches. It would fit them out with heavy equipment for building roads and dams, and clearing land. It would also set up machine stations like the one in Kambolé (now called “Kaboli”) for mechanized wage work and tilling of state parcels. The government had yet to decide whether to use Kambolé as a model for other stations or to scatter its equipment to serve them. In the latter case Kambolé would become a “project ruin,” with discouraging effects on later measures in the Central Region. This danger did not come to pass, but the ministerial reorganization certainly gave Kobelt a scare.

A similar organizational change discomfited the Peki project. The NRC’s Colonel Frank G. Bernasko, in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture from March 1, 1973, split it into two divisions, a “purely administrative [one] under the leadership of a state secretary and a purely agricultural [one] under the leadership of a director for agriculture” with a deputies for various sub-fields. He also decentralized the ministry, so that each region had an assistant director with extensive powers of decision, though obliged to send weekly reports to Accra. One half to three quarters of Ministry employees who previously had their offices in Accra now relocated to individual regions. The change happened so quickly, wrote Schurig, the project now had no contact in the government, and “urgent decisions like street construction and discharge of funds” could not be

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made. \(^{1294}\) Eleven months later he complained the decentralization had led to competency disputes between the Regional Offices and the Head Office. Basic decisions, like setting up a budget for the project, were postponed again and again. The project’s contact at the Ministry was “hopelessly overloaded” and had little time for concrete discussions or plans. \(^{1295}\)

Coups in the capital city might disturb a project. The Tori Cada project received a brief shock from one that took place on December 11, 1969. According to Dietz, there was no longer a government capable of acting. \(^{1296}\) GAWI inferred from Dietz’s report, however, that in spite of uncertain political conditions the project continued to run according to plan. \(^{1297}\) In early 1970 Ministry of Agriculture State Secretary Gomez and President Paul Comlan of the UCRT told the BML’s Dr. Theiss that Dahomey had had no government since the previous September capable of action and new elections were under way, so reorganizing and expanding cooperatives would have to be temporarily postponed, to be taken up in the middle of the year. \(^{1298}\) At about the same time, Dietz wrote that political conditions were still not “consolidated.” The election results of March were annulled, pushing back the formation of an effective government. “Development policy decisions are hardly being made.” \(^{1299}\) Acheampong’s January 1972 coup in Ghana briefly froze the BMZ’s whole program in that country, where fifteen West German projects were being executed or prepared, and eight were planned. More

\(^{1294}\) Activity Report of ORR Thomas Schurig, April 14, 1973, BArchiv B 213/32442.
\(^{1295}\) Seventh Activity Report of ORR Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
\(^{1297}\) GAWI to Referat VII B 5, BML, February 11, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4063.
than a month later, the new regime had not yet made clear whether it planned to follow
the old policy. Continuing the BMZ’s program for Ghana did not seem possible at the
moment. The prerequisite for doing so would be a “formation of opinion” within the
government about development policy priorities, which had not yet happened. In the view
of “various observers,” that would take a while, because the regime had to solve
“pressing domestic problems” and deal with the country’s international debt.

The Village as Development Actor

Development aid was often not something that one or both governments imposed
on villages; local leaders were quite active in calling upon West German resources
whenever they could. We have already seen Chief Pebi’s claim that he and Pastor
Viering rather than the Togolese government requested FRG aid, and indeed Dr.
Schnellbach’s account confirmed their roles as project initiators, representing
development “from below.” The Peki farm committee developed its own proposal for
a model farm, which produced the West German counteroffer of a cooperative settlement.
Schnellbach selected Nuatja because a section chief was prepared to donate land for free
and the section’s people were ready to help build up the co-op. Unfortunately, the chief’s
motives were less than commendable (according to West German accounts). Once
established as director, he felt justified in supporting himself and his relatives from co-op
funds. He aimed to become the co-op’s proprietor. His deposition (as director,
presumably) became necessary after he committed what Goronzy and Hofmeier called
“massive embezzlement.” In 1968 the chief of Balanka, one of Kambolé’s satellite

1300 MR Schweiger, BMZ to State Secretary, BMZ, February 24, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4036.
villages, asked the DED for two volunteers, offering to make a house available for them. The responsible DED official noted “Because the chief has made a very good impression on me as well as upon Mr. Kehrein and it is said besides that he has his village tightly in his hand, Kehrein as well as I would welcome the sending of two volunteers to Balanka.”

A Monsieur Sebastian, co-op director in Kambolé from late 1972, approached the DED’s country commissioner for Togo to ask for help with building a youth center. He wanted it because older residents were not open to the cooperative idea, so he hoped to draw in young people. The center would hold regular discussions, “folkloristic” presentations and table tennis as well as recruit for the co-op. It would also reduce hostilities among ethnic groups and help “modern insights” about agriculture penetrate the population.” It is not clear from the file whether the proposal went forward.

Rather than meekly accept central government dictates and appointments, villages might erupt in protest. We have already seen how Agou’s leaders reacted to the prospect of government control of the wood-processing business. In Tori Cada during July 1971, dissidents demanded in writing that the Minister of Agriculture recall the government’s choice for Dietz’s counterpart project manager, Gratien Zanouvi. Zanouvi, they said, would not accept the government’s candidate for business manager, had wrongly dismissed apprentices after the end of their apprenticeship, and had hired a relative as bookkeeper at fifteen thousand CFA per month while another bookkeeper received only six thousand. Minister of Agriculture Chabi Mama visited Tori Cada with his leading officials, the prefect and sub-prefect of Allada district, and an embassy official. He

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1303 Dr. Reuke to DED Projects, July 4, 1968, DED TOG 01 03 – 68.
convinced the administrative council’s chair to retract the accusations, but at a membership assembly the letter’s authors refused to do so. They even expanded their complaints to include the West German experts’ business management, leading the minister to threaten a loss of German participation and then to dissolve the assembly.1305 The embassy official downplayed these events, saying one should not “dramatize” them. He hoped that the trouble would settle down after Zanouvi went to France for his training.1306 Dietz was more concerned. Zanouvi’s handling of the project during Dietz’s absence from April to June was “impeccable” in “material-technical” terms, but “management problems” made the prospect of a handover in March 1973 “appear in a less happy light than was previously the case.” Whereas Europeans enjoyed an “advance in authority and confidence,” Zanouvi seemed (to his critics) to be “full of pettiness and envy,” to take severe positions (probably in regard to firing workers) and to pursue personal advantages. Dietz blamed “hatred of aliens” in the village, mixed up with personal ambition. The business manager (apparently not the one the dissidents wanted) and an “unloved mechanic” from outside Tori Cada were also targeted. Before Dietz returned, the sub-prefect of Allada tried to restore calm by having the project rehire several terminated workers. In Dietz’s view, the incident would not mean much if not for the need to hand over the project. As it was he feared a “self-laceration in struggles for power, influence and advantages to the project’s detriment…” Perhaps the West Germans might post someone to the project even after the handover.1307 In fact, Zanouvi would never serve as the project’s co-director. Whether because the central government

bowed to local pressure, or because Zanouvi found other employment, the position went instead to a manager named Fassasi, who started work on June 23, 1972.\textsuperscript{1308}

**The Village Torn**

Unfortunately, communities might not remain united even to promote their own improvement. Personality conflicts might crop up within the elite. Villages might break into geographical factions. Leaders might promise more than the villagers they represented might readily concede. Each of these situations caused trouble in at least one of the project villages.

In Biriwa, Colonel Dontoh had company in his dislike of Chief Nana Kwa Bonku IV. The chief, who gave his own title as Ankiobahene—Dr. Hoffmann called him “Omanhene” of the Fante state of Nkusum--was only one of three customary leaders.\textsuperscript{1309} The other two were the Queen Mother and the Chief Fisherman. Sharing authority were a Council of Elders and the town development committee, which the Chief Fisherman chaired.\textsuperscript{1310} Observers differed over where power lay; Michael Jeroch called the village “strongly hierarchical,” with the Council or town development committee supporting the chief in all negotiations with outsiders, while Glinke characterized the chief as having “no sort of authority.”\textsuperscript{1311} In fact, by 1968 the Queen Mother and Chief Fisherman had taken over leadership as the chief fell into alcoholism (echoing what Dontoh said in 1966); only twenty percent of the population continued to support the chief.\textsuperscript{1312}

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\textsuperscript{1309} Dr. Carl S. Hoffman to Ambassador, May 30, 1962, BArchiv B 213/4040; Nana Kwa Bonku IV to Dr Carl H. Lüders, February 18, 1963. BArchiv B 213/4040.

\textsuperscript{1310} Activity Report of Walter Kleinebude, August 16, 1974, BArchiv B 213/4042.


According to Walter Kleinebudde, the chief and Queen Mother were on very bad terms and the Chief Fisherman was at odds with both, although the latter made up his twenty-year quarrel with the Queen Mother by 1976. The chief was also suspended from his office for seven years. Kleinebudde did not explain the troubles or say who acted in the chief’s stead during the suspension. Fortunately, all three leaders came together on the matter of rehabilitating the village’s latrines.\footnote{1313} Peter Langer, writing in 1971, also recorded hostility between the chief and Queen Mother, but alleged that the “village assembly” deposed the “traditionalist” chief and replaced him with the “more progressive” Chief Fisherman.\footnote{1314}

Before the controversy over control of the woodshop, Agou’s greatest challenge to its West German benefactors was the rivalry between its two component villages, Dalavé and Agbétiko, led by Chiefs Pebi and Lélékléle.\footnote{1315} In late 1964 Schnellbach’s team wrote that the “hidden competition” between them had nearly “flared up again,” hindering formation of the cooperative. The Germans put it to rest for the moment by pointing out that future payments would only go to a “juristically unobjectionable” cooperative, and no longer a “provisional entity” \textit{(Provisorium)}.\footnote{1316} In his 1965 article, Zillich ascribed the rivalry to economic differences. One village—he did not say which—contained the owners of plantations, and the other the owners of large areas of savanna. Since each village feared domination by the other, “Again and again parity was required

\footnote{1313}{Activity Report of Walter Kleinebudde, August 16, 1974, BArchiv B 213/4042; Activity Report of Walter Kleinebudde, March 1, 1976, BArchiv B 213/32443.}
\footnote{1314}{Langer, 136.}
\footnote{1315}{Report of Lähne, Kotzurek, Schäfer, January 28, 1971, BArchiv B 213/11895. Dr. Schnellbach put Pebi in Agbétiko instead of Dalavé and identified Pebi’s colleague as Edwin Képéléte, but I trust Lähne’s account, because he spent all his time in Agou and worked with the project for nine years, while Schnellbach divided his time in Togo among all three villages and left the project after about four years. See Report of Dr.-Ing. Otto Schnellbach, August 6, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4112.}
\footnote{1316}{Fifth Report of Hofmeier, Joseph, Kehrein, Lähne, Schnellbach, Zillich, November 14, 1964, BArchiv B 213/4111.}
and again and again we had to intervene to smooth things over [schlichtend eingreifen].”¹³¹⁷ According to Schnellbach, tensions had existed between the two villages for the last one hundred years. Allowing for “exaggeration” on his own part, Schnellbach described Pebi and his people as the “intelligent ones” who would rather talk than work. Edwin (Léléklélé) and his people were “the diligent farmers” who always felt themselves outmaneuvered by other people. Edwin was very mistrustful and spoke little English, so that one could only speak with him via a translator, while Pêbi “spoke very good French,” allowing a “genuine friendship” with him to develop. It made things more difficult for the West Germans that the craftsmen came from Pêbi’s village while the co-op’s land came “almost entirely” from Edwin’s. While the workshops soon made money, agriculture did not. In effect, the shops (Dalavé) were subsidizing those working in cultivation (Agbétiko). The chair, business manager, and storage administrator came from Pêbi’s village, while only the bookkeeper and secretary came from Edwin’s. This situation always led to attempts to create “parity.” “Because you put up the chair, the deputy chair must be put up by us. You the business manager, we the deputy, and so on.” This principle, had Schnellbach failed to resist it (as he claimed he did), would have swelled even further an “already overly large administrative apparatus.”¹³¹⁸ He and Pastor Viering tried to prevent the rivalry from harming the project by putting the workshops and sawmill on a site between the two villages, with both supplying workers. They failed, because the project site actually belonged to Agbétiko, and the owners received no compensation.¹³¹⁹

¹³¹⁹ Heinz Lähne to GAWI, January 5, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
Conflict erupted in August 1968, when people from both villages told Lähne that Agbétiko’s residents were planning to drive Dalavé’s out of the business after the German experts left and staff everything with Agbetikans, since their village owned the land. This would have meant the “annihilating the buildup work of long years with one blow and collapse.” To counteract this emerging danger, Lähne had to create a new compromise, which required putting the new buildings on Dalavé’s land. According to Lähne’s report of more than two years later, that new site, seventy-five by a hundred twenty-five meters in size—a little less than one hectare—consisted of individual possessions (Besitz) that belonged to seven persons from Agbétiko and one person from Dalavé. For that reason, Lähne wanted the profits shared out at seven to one. On the old five-hectare site he would plant permanent crops. The new site also had the advantage of lying directly on the road supposed to be expanded as a connection toward Nuatja. In the immediate vicinity flowed a brook, which settled the project’s water problem. Now began the struggle with Agbétiko, which required more than six palavers. Its residents accused Lähne of wanting to cut the village loose, so that no one from Agbétiko would work on the Dalavé site. The villagers, wrote Lähne, only cared about their prestige. Little by little the protests against him became weaker and now no one had any objections to this solution. He thought it a good “chess move” to begin water provision for Agbétiko. At a favorable spot on the brook bed he had a dam (Barrage) built and four hundred meters of three-inch pipes laid up to the new high cistern, which contained forty thousand liters. Now the project would extend the pipes to

1320 Heinz Lähne to GAWI, January 5, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
1322 Heinz Lähne to GAWI, January 5, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
the road and install a tap. There was anger over this point, because Schnellbach had promised six taps in the village. Lähne replied that financing came entirely out of the carpentry shop’s receipts and so much money was not available now. Adviser Gabriel Y. Ségbé explained this in long palavers without Lähne present.\(^{1324}\) The project manager also received assistance from the district commissioner at Palimé, who forbade Chief Léléklélé to disturb the West German efforts through “stupid expressions.”\(^{1325}\) In July 1969 Lähne reported that Agbétiko’s chief had reconciled himself to the building of the new halls on Dalavé land, since his village had received an eight thousand DM water line. This sum came from earned reserves of the co-op. Lähne expected a water line to go in for Dalavé by the end of this year.\(^{1326}\)

New inter-village friction in late 1972 spoiled a scheme to help the co-op. After learning that the Office de Commercialisation des Produits Agricole Togolaises (OPAT) was prepared to buy agricultural products directly from the co-op, Lähne declared his readiness to carry the costs of purchasing a tarpaulin (Plane), scales and two hundred sacks at a cost of five hundred thousand CFA. On August 21, people from Dalavé (called Nyongbo in Lähne’s report) began work on a hangar under which they could foster ten thousand cocoa plants. Thanks to the water line in Agbétiko, ten thousand plants had been raised there. Pebi had convinced his fellow villagers to work mornings at the site; Lähne—quite skeptical—was eager to see how long that would last. Unfortunately, people from Agbétiko intervened. When the hangar was almost finished, they tore it down during the night of August 25-26. The landowner (presumably from Agbétiko) who had induced the hangar’s destruction suffered no punishment, apparently for lack of

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\(^{1324}\) Heinz Lähne to GAWI, January 5, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.


complaint to a competent court. Contact with the district commissioner and six weeks of negotiations achieved nothing. Lähne asked the people of Agbétiko to rebuild the hangar, after they formally condemned its destruction. In spite of many palavers, they refused. To Lähne this was further proof of the disunity between the villages, and he had them informed that under these circumstances he would no longer be ready to give financial aid for purchasing crops. In the meantime, the people from Dalavé built up a new hangar elsewhere, in the direct vicinity of a brook.  

By far the most serious internal clash took place at Peki, tying inter-village rivalry with arguments over providing land. In many and perhaps most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, access to land has not been a matter of purchasing a clearly defined parcel from a seller able to deliver clear and exclusive title, but one of negotiation and conflict. Access depends on the would-be possessor’s membership in social networks, especially on his relationship with the local chief or other local authority, and on his ability to participate in interpreting and adjudicating his rights. The possessor’s land might also be subject to claims by multiple chiefs to tribute or rent. This latter problem cropped up when demand for land increased, as it did in Ghana during the early twentieth century cocoa boom, which Peki participated in. The whole Peki project depended on making sure the settlers would have secure long-term possession of their lots, giving them incentive to invest time and labor in the settlement, but the fluidity and uncertainty of property relations would threaten to destroy the project at the outset.

At first the Germans did not see anything wrong, because village leaders veiled the potential problems. When Paramount Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI and his Farm

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1328 Berry, 102-07, 110-15.
Committee proposed their model farm in 1966, they claimed to be able to provide ten thousand acres without difficulty.\textsuperscript{1329} He said the same thing to Michael Jeroch the next year. The whole area, never previously used for agriculture (claimed the chief), lay within the realm of one sub-chief and several families. Those families were making the land available without compensation for the time being, but they would receive suitable compensation once the project farm brought yields. There were no cult places or other taboos that would limit full cultivation.\textsuperscript{1330} The land in question was not “stool land” at a chief’s disposal, but owned by eight families.\textsuperscript{1331} Heinz Büchner was somewhat concerned by the intention to give settlers only use rights rather than ownership of their plots. “We can only wish that through a transfer of the soil worked by the settler [that] he and his successors will one day obtain a sufficient and permanent basis of existence.” Yet the Pekians were able to quell his main worry: that settlers might fall into dependence on the landowner.\textsuperscript{1332}

Doubts crept on the West German side before negotiations with the government began. Dr. Theierl wondered whether the government should buy up the land and lease it to the settlers. Success required securing the settlers’ long-term existence and tying them to the farm.\textsuperscript{1333} Dr. Schaad at the embassy rejected state ownership as likely to excite the worst memories from the Nkrumah era. Pekians would become mistrustful if the government got involved in this way. There was no need anyways, because the current

\textsuperscript{1329} Togbe Kwadzo Del XI, Paramount Chief of Peki, Peki-Blengo, Volta Region to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Accra, April 15, 1966, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\textsuperscript{1331} Michael Jeroch, Opinion on Report of Interagro for Peki Project, May 16, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
\textsuperscript{1333} Dr. Theierl, Opinion on Report of Dr. Büchner of Interagro, December 12, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4076.
landowners were ready to provide land through a long-term contract. The rent could be set at ten or twenty percent of net profits, part paid to the owners and part to the municipality of Peki. Schaad suggested the following language for the project agreement: “The Ghanaian government will take care that the legal prerequisite for erecting settler lots through the municipality of Peki will be created.”

Michael Jeroch expected an arrangement that would involve a ninety-nine year lease and profit-sharing with the owners, but in any case, the issue should be settled before the project began. Hansen at the BMZ’s West Africa Referat agreed, and wanted the issue settled even before the opening of official negotiations, if possible.

The land issue was settled neither before nor during negotiations, and there were important changes. The project agreement promised only twenty-five hundred acres, not ten thousand. In his side letter, Ambassador Müller suggested government ownership with later conveyance to the settlers, though ninety-nine year leases would be acceptable. The government must ensure “prior to the implementation of the project” that lots of thirty-one acres were available to the eighty settlers, close enough to a passable road to enable the use of heavy equipment. The lots should also have the “soil quality required for the crops envisaged.” The proposed site also seems to have changed. Hansen wrote that during his own visit to the Peki area, a “far more favorable site, which is reachable from existing laterite streets,” was available. The previous site would have required building a street six or seven hundred meters long and a bridge over a brook. It was also in danger of being flooded or saturated during the rainy season, destroying any

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1334 Dr. Schaad, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, May 20, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
1336 H. Müller, Ambassador to Mr. P.D. Anin, Commissioner for External Affairs, September 12, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4041.
crops thereon. According to Büchner, who participated in negotiations, the Peki Farm Committee proposed and the West Germans accepted a shift of the settlement to a place directly on the northbound road leading to the Peki-Blengo area. At the beginning of 1969, Ambassador Müller wrote that Commissioner for Agriculture Adomakoh believed the best arrangement would be for the property owners to provide the land via long-term leases; representatives of the municipality of Peki would participate in further negotiations for a project agreement. The agreement, signed at the end of March, merely required the government of Ghana to provide at its own cost land for settler lots, and to “create the legal prerequisites” for establishing those same lots. In doing so, it would consult with its own Advisory Committee.

To the surprise of all concerned, the village of Tsibu blockaded the project. At the beginning of August 1969, Ulrich informed GAWI that Tsibu and Adzokde (Peki-Dzake) refused to give up easily cleared land on the main road. Now he would have to carry out clearing work on more difficult land with thicker tree stocks. At the end of the same month he wrote that Tsibu, which held the greatest area, now opposed the project and refused to donate any land even after four weeks of “intensive” and “daylong” negotiations with the intervention of Ambassador Müller and the Ghanaian project initiators. Ulrich called this setback “A temporary victory of backwardness over progress.” The government’s surveyors had to be pulled back twice because Tsibu, hostile to Peki-Wudome for decades, refused to support or work with the team. Some of

1341 F.T. Ulrich to GAWI, August 4, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.
the owners in Wudome also tried to go back on their promises, but they “were however brought back into the line of march.” In a twelve-hour “power session” the Wudome chiefs and landowners, some “fetched out of house and bed” promised a new area of five hundred hectares. Ulrich hoped that Tsibu would change its collective mind once settlement began.¹³⁴² Ambassador Müller blamed the village chief and elders as well as the landowners. Tsibu lay inside the Peki Traditional Area like a sort of pocket, but did not belong to it, so its residents deeply distrusted Peki. Together with Ulrich he had tried to overcome the “deeply rooted mistrust of the Tsibu people against the inhabitants of Peki” in “hours-long palaver,” but without success. The Wudome villagers were thoroughly cooperative, however, because influential people like Dr. Ababio could keep them at it.¹³⁴³ Regierungsrat Hansen was not pleased; since the project initiative had come from Peki’s population and the planned measures discussed with all responsible parties, he and Dr. Theierl had expected clear conditions. That the area was now in a different place did not bother him much, but the fact that property relations could not be properly regulated for the settlers did. Perhaps the population no longer supported the project; he would have “considerable concerns” if something was now imposed upon it.¹³⁴⁴ Müller tried to allay Hansen’s concerns. Apart from “one or two grumblers” no one could say that the project was being forced onto the population.¹³⁴⁵

The conflict with Tsibu was more dangerous than the West Germans understood.

An official at the Dutasor Local Council warned the chief of Wudome against trespass

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¹³⁴² F.T. Ulrich to GAWI, August 31, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
¹³⁴³ Ambassador Helmut Müller, Embassy in Accra to Oberregierungsrat J. Hansen, BMZ, September 1, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
¹³⁴⁴ Regierungsrat J. Hansen, BMZ to Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra, September 11, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4076.
after some of the latter’s “subjects” entered Tsibu territory at “Baga,” within the Council’s jurisdiction, and erected pillars to claim ownership of the land. The Council had also heard that Wudome was claiming some Tsibu land to give it to “German Agronomists for farming.” Tsibu came under the authority of the Council, so any attempt to absorb any of its land into Peki “will mean aggression and provocation on the part of the Pekis.” The official demanded “immediate removal of the pillars” and warned that “illegal entry” by “German Agronomists” would lead to “legal proceedings.”

Worse was to come. According to Birgit Meyer, writing in 1999, Peki and Tsibu, which she calls Tsito, clashed over a piece of land between near Peki-Avetile during the 1970s, leading to “violence and deaths.” The government sent in troops to suppress the violence, but disappointed Pekians by refusing to take sides. The dispute also went to the High Court in Accra, but “remained unsettled.”

Wudome also had more than “one or two grumblers,” and they long hindered West German work at the new five hundred-hectare site. Their motives are invisible in the German records, but perhaps the owners were holding out in hopes of extracting maximum gain from the project, even at the risk of killing it. Perhaps they had a sentimental or spiritual attachment to the land or they simply did not want outsiders telling them what to do with their land. In early December Ulrich informed Hansen that several landowners opposed the project after he had begun clearing some two-hundred eighty hectares. Again Ambassador Müller, Peki’s chiefs, and the project initiators Dr. Ababio, Mr. Djamson, Dr. Amu, and Mr. Adu had to enter strenuous negotiations to put

1347 Meyer, 18-19.
together five hundred hectares. Even that was not the end of it, because a sixty-acre (not hectare) section stuck “like an arrow” into the settler site. At the project inauguration on November 23 the Minister of Agriculture and Ambassador Müller announced that they had secured this section, but it was not true. The Ghanaian government had to threaten the owners with expropriation if they did not make the land available. Barrister Enoch D. Kom, acting on behalf of Togbe Kwadzo Del X, notified the Advisory Committee in February 1970 that forty-four owners had granted the chief a “licence in perpetuity” as a matter of customary law after he had satisfied the formalities of “demarcation of boundary,” “slaughtering of sheep,” and “a token sum of thanksgiving.” Possession would revert to the owners only if the cooperative failed.

Despite these assurances, resolving the land issue took more than a year, perhaps even two and a half years. In October 1970, Dr. Kurt W. Gall, interim project manager, wrote that the government had been able to take over only eight hundred of thirteen hundred fifty-eight acres (that is about three hundred twenty-four out of five hundred fifty hectares). Quartey Papafio told Müller on November 12 that owners had signed lease contracts for three hundred forty-eight acres, bringing the total up to eleven hundred fifty out of twelve hundred fifty needed. Eventually, Ghanaian officials were able to create clarity and give some reassurance to settlers by getting landowners to grant the

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1351 Memorandum of Enoch D. Kom, Barrister at Law, Naoferg Chambers on Land Tenure in Ghana, February 19, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076. Kom actually referred to the project ending, but the Advisory Committee took his phrasing to refer to the co-op, since the project would end with the handover, whereas the co-op would continue. See Dr. Kuhn, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, March 13, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076.
1352 Dr. Kurt W. Gall to GAWI, October 21, 1970, BArchiv B 213/32438.
government thirty-three year leases, far short of the ninety nine years the West Germans had hoped for. Yet the project’s second long-term manager, Thomas Schurig, wrote in May 1971 that six settler lots remained vacant, because the owners refused to lease to the government; if they remained stubborn, the government would expropriate them by the coming fall. That action must not have happened, at least not so quickly, because more than a year later, a BMZ application to the Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid remarked that the owners of one plot cleared by the fall of 1969 had at last entered a thirty-three year lease.

Even then, though the land problem was now solved so far as the West Germans were concerned, the affair was not quite over. In 1974 Paramount Chief Togbe complained to the project’s Steering Committee that he had to appear repeatedly before the “high court” in the “Letsa land case.” Ambassador Müller had already discussed the case with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Committee asked its chair, a Mr. Ako-Nai to “clear the land case from the Paramount Chief”s shoulder.” Six months later Dr. Ababio told the Committee that “the final draft had been prepared at the Lands Development.” He advised Paramount Chief Togbe to send the papers to the Assistant Director of Agriculture at Ho. The minutes do not describe the draft, but it sounds like a settlement agreement. It is unclear whether this legal dispute is the same one alluded to by Birgit Meyer.

1356 Dr. Neumann, Referat III A 6, BMZ, Application to Interministerial Committee for Technical Aid, August 16, 1972, BArchiv B 213/32439.
1357 S.B. Dankyi, Minutes of the Steering Committee, May 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
1358 S.B. Dankyi, Project Co-Manager, Minutes of the Steering Committee, November 5, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
The long shadow of the land question hung over the handover ceremony, where Colonel Acheampong was quite frank about it. He reminded listeners that acquiring the land “encountered so much opposition that it eventually led to the scaling down of the project to about half of what was initially planned.” He had also heard (wrongly) that delays due to the acquisition forced management to “bring in a foreign land clearing company to do what the citizens of this area could have done properly.” All that was over now, Acheampong assured his audience. The government had now “properly acquired” the land through an “instrument” published the previous January, which he cited as E.I. 12 of 1975. “We now expect maximum co-operation from all, but it is a matter for regret that this simple question of making land available for a project designed to help the people was allowed to do so much havoc to the scheme.”\textsuperscript{1359}

CONCLUSION

West Germany’s four development projects certainly bore out Ferguson’s subsequent warning against aid entrenching “bureaucratic state power.” Through their desire to put local institutions like the Peki settlement and the Agou wood-processing business under government control for the sake of what they saw as competent management and through their willingness to have the government apply coercive pressure in Biriwa to overcome local apathy, the West Germans opened opportunities for the government to expand its presence in the village and acquire new power. Their insistence that only the government be party to project agreements, however necessary for the agreements’ validity under international law, meant that the West Germans could not see the triangular relationship of donor, government, and village. Instead they saw

only a dual relationship between themselves and the government, with the village reduced to a mere object for development.

Yet the projects sometimes suffered from the intrusion of state power rather than enabling it. Governments directly interfered with West German project management, whether by supporting village grievances or by imposing an unprofitable crop plan or by trying to subordinate the project to a domestic agency like SORAD. At other times government policies indirectly hindered West German efforts, especially with irritating delays or blockages at customs; even a generous development aid donor had to appease the “gatekeeper” state while bringing gifts through the gate. On the other hand, the government itself could not always afford or handle a larger presence in and around the village. Togo and Ghana did or could not always provide goods or services promised to the West Germans. In all three countries bureaucratic or political turmoil afflicted or at least inconvenienced project management.

Finally, aid was something that villages asked for and tried to manipulate in their favor, not merely something that governments “did” to them. Peki in particular began as a local initiative, but Agou, Nuatja and Kambolé all volunteered themselves to Dr. Schnellbach as model villages. Villages might lose control of the project to the government, as in Peki or Agou, or see the West Germans abandon the project without fulfilling local hopes, as in Nuatja, but contesting these developments might win concessions in power or property. Agou’s leaders won seats on the post-handover supervisory board. In Nuatja villagers won in a bid to keep West German equipment, thanks to having a home son as Minister of the Interior. Perhaps the projects’ focus on specific villages bestowed on those communities the power to make demands because
they were the centers of attention; their satisfaction had to be a measure of success. Furthermore, villages with populations of hundreds or only a few thousand were small enough to maintain a united front (in some cases) as against the government and/or the West Germans. By contrast, entire regions like Lesotho’s Tsaba-Theka might have been too large and too diffuse to articulate ambitions and grievances in the same way. On the other hand, villages in Agou and in the Peki area lost opportunities to benefit from aid when they fell into factional quarrels. At Peki-Wudome mere individuals held out against chiefly demands to provide land, shrinking and nearly sinking a scheme for the presumed good of the community. A few dozen bold or stubborn men and women constituted a force that “bureaucratic state power” had to reckon with.
Chapter 7

Development Theater in Practice:

Village Projects as an Optical Experience

The handover took place in a celebratory setting, and press, radio and people from television appeared alongside the invited guests. Many onlookers had streamed in and under the assembled loudspeaker system were able to listen to the addresses given and to the musical selections [Einlagen]...After a running time of 6 years, on April 4, 1974, Project FE 1265, known in Togo as “Centre Artisanal d’Agou-Nyongbo,” represented by the chargé d’affaires of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bodo Karkow, was handed over to the government of the Republic of Togo represented by the Minister for Commerce, Industry and Crafts, Jean Têvi...In his address the minister praised the achievements that were performed in his country by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of technical aid and described the craft center as a model example of successful cooperation...Amidst the singing of a choir and the presentation of a dance group, the handover protocols were signed by Jean Têvi and Bodo Karkow. Immediately after that we did a tour of the project. We were able to show the operation in its functioning, since the employees were at their workplaces. In the meantime the cold buffet was set up. We had ordered food for 150 persons at the Hotel 30 août and provided sufficiently for drinks cooled with bar ice.1360

Heinz Lähne, Agou Project Manager, July 1, 1975

The performance went off perfectly. It had everything needed for such an event: audience, speakers, song and dance, and the single symbolic act, followed by an

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appetizing meal. The next day, the *Togo-Presse* printed a long and glowing write-up with a photo of Têvi and Karkow visiting the carpentry shop.\(^{1361}\) It was only one such of many similar performances. In Ghana, Togo and Dahomey, West German officials and project managers cooperated with host governments and sometimes local chiefs to organize and operate a “development theater” that promised better living for the villagers and their compatriots, and then presented finished projects as the fulfillment of that promise. Ceremonies marked the beginning and end of most projects as well as points between, turning each village into a stage on which the “actors” could perform their roles as public benefactors. There were at least two dozen of them. Thanks to media coverage, the show could play to three or four audiences at once: the village itself, the host country public, the community of West German experts and development volunteers, and sometimes the West German public too. Those responsible or otherwise in the know might privately have understood the projects as partial or complete failures, but as playwrights and protagonists they could almost always script themselves a happy end. Through development theater all authorities reaped symbolic benefits from each government’s material and financial investments, and from years of work by bureaucrats, experts, counterparts, volunteers, and villagers.

The benefits were considerable, if intangible. The FRG gained an opportunity to present a likeable face and to win good will from the host country public and government, important at all times, but even more so during the years of the global campaign to deny diplomatic recognition of East Germany. The host government, full partner in production, gained the opportunity to prove yet again to its own people that it was working hard for their material improvement and in that cause would seek outside

\(^{1361}\) “C’est un modele de cooperation reussie,” *Togo-Presse*, April 5, 1974.
help whenever possible. Highly-placed officials, sometimes the head of state himself, ensured by their presence and their speeches at ceremonies that projects received the maximum possible attention in their country. The local chief might also give a short speech thanking each government for their aid to his village, increasing their symbolic gain by feeding the impression of their beneficence. At the same time he accrued gain of his own by emphasizing to fellow villagers his importance as their intermediary in bringing goods to the community.

The projects received much media coverage, mostly in the host country but also sometimes in the FRG. Newspapers like Ghana’s *Daily Graphic* and Togo’s *Togo-Presse* carried stories on each ceremony, and sometimes reported on the projects between ceremonies. Local radio and television also spread the word, though West German files hold no evidence of its content. In West Germany, newspapers reported on the projects rarely, but specialist periodicals of the development industry paid greater attention. The *DED-Briefe* reprinted volunteer reports and the *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit* of the German Institute for Developing Countries wrote its own. The BMZ sponsored a documentary on the Peki project for television broadcast in both the FRG and Ghana. Finally, the FRG always relied on the oldest medium of all, the eyeball.

Development theater was a heavily optical experience whose many images invited the onlooker’s gaze. Attendees to ceremonies could see important dignitaries of donor and host governments and their local community, the latter in traditional costume, they could watch symbolic acts, enjoy dancers, and perhaps marvel at a demonstration of heavy equipment. Newspaper and other periodical readers could see photographs and television audiences could watch images on screen. Passersby and visitors could see up
close the buildings, the crops in the field, and the shops busy with orders. They could read signs and plaques crediting the FRG and local partners for the visible accomplishments. Other senses also benefited from the drama, as ceremony audiences could listen to speeches, the singing of choirs, and in one case the sound of musketry, and then taste food and beverages afterward. “Optical” could further serve actors as a metaphor for deliberately presenting objects or information as a distraction from a less appealing reality. Dr. von der Decken, for example, spoke of continuing the name “cooperative” for Agou’s “purely capitalist” wood-processing business for “optical reasons.”

Dr. Theierl would use “optical” in the same sense about a documentary on the Peki settlement. In mid-January 1970 he had also wanted to avoid, if possible, relieving Ulrich from project management for “optical reasons.”

Control over information was essential to making the best possible impression. The BMZ sought to hide bad news whenever possible and to rein in former project managers, namely Otto Schnellbach and von der Decken, who sought publicity for themselves in ways that might harm the BMZ’s reputation. Of course, the BMZ had to admit some setbacks; audiences might have grown suspicious of never-ending, never-faltering success. The Peki land issue, for example, was too public to suppress. In such cases, the governments and their media helpers cooperated to admit the problems, but then to minimize them or present them as solved. If necessary, they could shift blame to the villains responsible for most failures: the beneficiaries.

Development theater was hard on the villagers, who did much of the work and suffered symbolic reduction rather than enhancement. They often had to appear as

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1362 H.v.d. Decken, Attachment 1 to Decken Plan, August 8, 1866, BArchiv B 213/4112.
1363 MR Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to Referate I B 4, BMZ, January 12, 1970, BArchiv B 213/4076.
needy, ignorant, and unhealthy to justify the projects’ existence and to heighten the goodness of the outsiders who came to help them. This portrayal was fully in line with the “colonial gaze” that appeared in publications by the BMZ, DED and other aid agencies, whose brochures showed Third World peoples as mired in poverty, at least until FRG aid improved their lives and consistently described Europeans rather than beneficiaries doing the talking, at most quoting the latter as evidence of aid’s helpfulness. Photographs of Africans juxtaposed local backwardness, with spears or bows and arrows, against signs of progress, like cars or brick houses. Regarding our village projects, the host country and West German press similarly talked up generous Germans and modernizing host country officials as benefactors of primitive country folks. Villagers who read the local newspaper had the dubious privilege of seeing themselves through the colonial gaze without having an opportunity to correct it. They also served as scapegoats when projects did not go as well as planned; they did not work hard enough, or so newspapers and political leaders said. High officials took some ceremonies as opportunities to berate listeners and remind them who was in charge. They thereby sought to expand their power over local communities verbally and symbolically, the parallel to the administrative penetration that we saw in the first section of Chapter 6.

This chapter will analyze both the format and content of development theater. It will describe the “anatomy” of project ceremonies according to their parts: setting, actors, audiences, symbolic acts, refreshments, speeches, and media coverage, and then it will examine several ceremonies in detail. The chapter will then examine media coverage not

1364 Zurmühl, 97-100.
tied directly to ceremonies, including newspapers in host countries and the FRG, specialist West German periodicals, and a West German documentary. After a brief discussion of the projects’ self-presentation as visual objects, it will end by discussing BMZ efforts to fend off the threat of bad publicity.

**The Anatomy of Development Project Ceremonies**

Ceremonies lay at the core of development theater, plays in which official actors from all sides could enter into their roles physically and in public view. They came in four types. The first were inaugurations, not of the Napoleonic kind, but celebrations of the project, or some aspect of it, having begun. In that sense they were like Louis-Napoleon’s stone-settings, promises of things to come. The second type was rather like the Napoleonic inaugurations; these were the handover ceremonies, in which the West German government transferred project management to the host government, and both praised their combined achievements. Between these two might come the third and fourth types. All four projects received at least one special visit from a high official of either government to tour and take stock of their progress. In three of the projects host governments or local authorities awarded decorations to one or more West German experts or volunteers in gratitude for their service. Although one side transferred the decoration to the other side, the symbolic gain accrued to both by reminding the host country public of bilateral cooperation in the service of development.

There were more than two dozen ceremonies of varying type and complexity. The Biriwa project had handover ceremonies for the nets of Biriwa I and II in January 1963 and August 1965, one inauguration ceremony for Biriwa III in March 1967, a decoration ceremony and a visit by Hans Hermsdorf, Bundestag member in October
1967, inauguration of the aid station in late 1971, a handover ceremony for Biriwa III in May 1973, and another handover in March 1979 for both Biriwa III (again) and IV, eight ceremonies in all.1366 The Peki project generated inaugurations in November 1969, December 1971 and April 1973, a visit by the Minister of Agriculture in October 1971, a poorly-documented “handover” of the settlement in March 1974, and a handover of the project in May 1975, plus a ceremonious signing of the project agreement in March 1969, for a total of seven ceremonies.1367 As one would expect from its size, the Togo model villages produced nine ceremonies, more than any of the other projects: a visit at Agou by more than two dozen attendees from a seminar of the German Institute for Development (DSE) in February 1965, a visit at Nuatja by Togolese President Grunitzky the next month, a decoration ceremony in April 1965, an inauguration ceremony of the wood-processing business at Agou in December 1969, and handovers of the Haho River bridge in February 1967, the cisterns in August 1969, the Nuatja project in September 1968, the Agou project in April 1974, and the Kambolé project in November 1975.1368


had four ceremonies: visits by two different Ministers of Rural Development in September 1966 and July 1971, a decoration ceremony in October 1967, and the handover in March 1973. West German records show no evidence of an inauguration ceremony.

All ceremonies had a design and a setting. Unfortunately, West German files provide no graphic representations or lists of who was to stand or sit in which place. Only in one case do West German records say which officials of which government planned the event. This was the December 1971 ceremony in which Prime Minister Busia laid the first stone for the settlement housing at Peki. According to Ambassador Müller, Ghana’s Office of Minister-President laid down the protocol, and the Germans made the preparations in “exemplary” fashion. Ceremonies usually took place at the project site, but not always. The “handover” of the Togo cisterns took place in the “great hall” of Togo’s Planning Commissariat rather than at one of the cisterns; according to the Togo-Presse, it was in a conference room (salle de conference). Otto Schnellbach received a decoration from President Grunitzky at Togo’s presidential palace rather than in one of the model villages. The official Nuatja handover also apparently took place.

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at the palace, in the office of the Minister of the Presidency. Ambassador Steltzer handed over the nets of Biriwa II, not in Biriwa itself, but in the nearby city of Cape Coast. The project site was the most logical setting, however, because it made the new physical facilities and equipment visible to attendees, reporters and photographers, and still more important, the villagers could appear as beneficiaries and sometimes as actors in their own right. After the Tori Cada handover, for example, the *Daho-Express* enthused, “The facilities left behind are impressive and contrast with the surroundings, and constitute a ‘puff’ of modernism that has reinvigorated Tori Cada and which is on the way to transforming it.”

Ceremonies needed officials from both governments, preferably top-level or near-top-level, and probably the local chief as well; these were the actors. On the West German side that meant the ambassador, his chargé d’affaires, or economic attaché. On the host country side that meant the head of state, a cabinet-level minister, or—less often—the head of the region or district. Colonel Dontoh’s appearance at the Biriwa inauguration of March 11, 1967 as the NLC’s Chairman for the Regional Committee of Administration represented the latter case. More typical was the Tori Cada handover, at which Captain Mama Djougou represented the Kérékou regime as its Minister of Rural Development and Cooperation. Ambassador Wand represented the FRG. There was

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1374 “Biriwa Gets 366 Fishing Nets from Germany,” *Ghanaian Times*, August 5, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040. Steltzer’s description of the ceremony has “all the fishermen of Biriwa” in “holiday costumes” attending, which might imply Biriwa as the location, but he forwarded the *Ghanaian Times* article without noting any error. See Ambassador Steltzer, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, August 23, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
one awkward case that showed how important official representation was. In February 1963 Ghanaian Minister of Agriculture Krobo Edusei expressed irritation that no one had invited him to the handover of nets for Biriwa I, first reading about the ceremony in the newspaper. The Minister had missed his chance to act in development theater! Ambassador Lüders explained that he had gone to Biriwa on the occasion of Dr. Hoffmann’s enstoolment as Asafohene. Only once there did he learn that some nets were available immediately; he blamed the newspapers for shifting the focus to the nets and tried to mollify Edusei by inviting the minister to join him for a special celebration after the rest of the nets and some outboard motors arrived. Edusei gave a “sweet-sour” smile and said he did not know whether that corresponded to the intentions of Flagstaff House, i.e. Nkrumah. Lüders concluded that Nkrumah did not want West Germany to receive favorable press coverage.1378

Project ceremonies also required invited guests, usually with larger audiences. Attendance might run to the hundreds or even thousands, at least according to embassy reports. The 1967 Biriwa inauguration, for example, had three hundred guests plus the population of Biriwa itself and arrivals from nearby villages.1379 The Haho River bridge ceremony drew two thousand people, including at least a few Germans not involved with

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1378 Ambassador Dr. C.-H. Lüders, Embassy in Accra to Dr. C.S. Hoffmann, Principal Medical Officer, Ministry of Health, February 11, 1963, PAAA B 34/409. The Asafohene was company captain of the local Fante militia, a force whose history went back centuries before British rule. The company commander was a supi. See Adler and Barnard, 8-9.
1379 Hans-Josef Glinke to GAWI, March 28, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040
the project.\textsuperscript{1380} The Kambolé handover of November 1975 turned into a “folk festival” celebrated by two thousand five hundred.\textsuperscript{1381} At the Agou handover there were a hundred and fifty guests, plus spectators.\textsuperscript{1382} On the other hand, there was no such mass audience for the cistern handover at Togo’s Planning Commissariat, only Henri Dogo, Planning Director, several “high functionaries” of the Planning Service and Ambassador von Wistinghausen.\textsuperscript{1383}

Symbolic acts were essential, though they varied in kind; they might be as simple as the lead officials signing documents, as with the Peki project agreement in March 1969 by Ambassador Müller and Commissioner for Agriculture Albert Adomakoh, the Biriwa III handover of May 1973 co-signed by Ambassador Müller and Central Region Commissioner Commander J.K. Amedume, the handover of Agou in April 1974, with Togolese Minister Jean Têvi for Trade, Industry and Crafts and chargé d’affaires Bodo Karkow, and the Kambolé handover from Ambassador Haferkamp to Minister of Rural Equipment Samon Kortho in November 1975.\textsuperscript{1384} Or they might be more tangible and more memorable, helping participants and onlookers focus on the ceremony’s message through a single dramatic exchange. Such was the transfer of a key from Ambassador Weil to Ghana’s Minister for Labour and Welfare, Kobina Wood, for all eleven buildings

\textsuperscript{1381} Haferkamp, Embassy in Lomé to Referat 313, Foreign Office, November 20, 1975, BArchiv B 213/2182.
\textsuperscript{1382} Final Report of Heinz Lähne, July 1, 1975, BArchiv B 213/4076.
that occupied the Biriwa project site in March 1979.\textsuperscript{1385} There was also—no surprise—the setting of a stone by Prime Minister Busia at the Peki settlement’s 1971 stone-setting ceremony. He also unveiled a memorial plaque.\textsuperscript{1386} At the 1967 Biriwa inauguration, Elsie Dontoh, wife of the colonel, cut a cord to uncover one of the mosaics at the sanitary forum.\textsuperscript{1387} The nets of Biriwa I and II were their own handover symbols.\textsuperscript{1388} Pekians marked the move-in of the first settlers with the slaughter of a sheep, “whose blood was supposed to keep away evil spirits.”\textsuperscript{1389} Decorations ceremonies required, of course, the presentation of a decoration to the recipient. Special visitors, like Dahomeyan Minister of Agricultural Development and Cooperation Moise Mensah at Tori Cada in September 1966, received thorough tours of facilities and opportunities to speak with participants, making the project a symbol of itself.\textsuperscript{1390}

Several ceremonies offered food and/or drink after the main events, giving development a satisfying taste. At Nuatja in late March 1965, President Grunitzky and other guests were served a “drink of welcoming,” juice concocted by the wife of German expert Joseph from Togolese fruits.\textsuperscript{1391} As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, a cold buffet with drinks awaited guests after the Agou handover in 1974.\textsuperscript{1392} The DSE seminar with guests from Cameroon and Togo, but also former ambassador Dr. Kordt and

\textsuperscript{1385} Ambassador Weil, Embassy in Accra to Referat 445, Foreign Office, March 14, 1979, PAAA Zwischenarchiv 127547.
\textsuperscript{1389} Sixth Activity Report of Thomas Schurig, April 14, 1973, BArchiv B 213/32442.
\textsuperscript{1392} Final Report of Heinz Lähne, July 1, 1975, BArchiv B 213/4076.
Ministerialdirigent Süßkind (possibly from the BMZ), joined a lunch for sixty-eight people at Agou in February 1965.\textsuperscript{1393} There were also drinks for the project visit of Ghana’s Minister of Agriculture (unnamed) at Peki’s Yam Festival in October 1971.\textsuperscript{1394}

Speeches necessarily dominated nearly every ceremony. They usually discussed the project’s origin, goals and accomplishments, referred to some larger policy of the host government, and above all voiced expressions of gratitude. In some cases they referred to problems that project personnel had faced and solved. As a matter of course, there was at least one speaker from each government, and often one from the project and/or village as well. Two brief examples will suffice here. At the Biriwa II net handover, Ambassador Steltzer gave a short speech with the aid of a Fante translator explaining the “sense and purpose” of the donation. He listed four goals: “fighting unemployment, improving nutrition, encouraging self-help, and educating [the populace] toward cleanliness and hygiene through erection of sanitary facilities.” He complimented the fishermen on the good use they had made of the Biriwa I nets and establishing sanitary facilities “in the spirit of self-help,” actions that had encouraged the federal government to do more for them. Dr. Hoffmann—project manager and Ghanaian official--added that the federal government now planned to send development helpers and to provide more technical aid. Biriwa’s chief praised West German aid for making his village the center of attention, drawing delegations from elsewhere on the coast and boasting that “the Federal Government has put our village on the map.”\textsuperscript{1395} That was the ambassador’s account. The \textit{Ghanaian Times} omitted his remarks entirely, describing instead the reaction of the chairman of the village’s town development committee, Opanin Kojo.

\textsuperscript{1393}Report of Schnellbach, Lähne, Joseph, Hofmeier, Kehrein, Zillich, April 15, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4111
\textsuperscript{1394}Second Report of Thomas Schurig, October 14, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32439.
\textsuperscript{1395}Ambassador Steltzer, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, August 23, 1965, BArchiv B 213/4040.
Asoku. Asoku took the nets, “thanked the ambassador and assured the Ambassador that
the nets would be put to proper use.” Dr. Hoffmann appealed to Biriwans to “participate
fully in self-help projects and to pay their basic rates regularly to enable their council to
provide them with many modern amenities.” At the August 1969 handover ceremony
for Togo’s cisterns, Ambassador von Wistinghausen explained the project and “pointed
to its usefulness for water provision of the population of the affected regions.” Planning
Director Dogo thanked the West Germans for getting them built. While they
were more modest than other German projects in the country, his government did take the
water issue seriously, and was working on it as part of Togo’s second five-year plan.

Some speeches by host country officials contained a bracing dose of menace, warnings to the population to work hard and make best use of the project or else face the
central government’s displeasure. This task represented an attempt to extend the host government’s control over the local population by verbal means. In the
previous chapter we saw how Colonel Acheampong told Peki settlers at the 1975
handover that the government would not “allow ourselves to be swayed by those who for

1397 Ambassador von Wistinghausen, Embassy in Lomé to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, August 13, 1969,
BArchiv B 213/4110.
purely selfish reasons wish to retard our progress” and that it would expect “maximum cooperation” from them. To be sure, these remarks constituted only a small if disagreeable part of the whole speech, which otherwise harked back to Peki’s long association with German missionaries, cited the Peki Union’s role in launching the project, praised its “first-class facilities,” and thanked German and Ghanaian officials and project workers for their accomplishments. Yet it was the harshest note that the Daily Graphic extracted and emphasized in its headline: “Kutu [i.e. Acheampong] tells reactionaries: WE SHALL NOT BE SWAYED...By your tactics.” The first sentence explained that “Frustrations are sometimes put on the road to progress and improvement by selfish people only to put the clock of progress back.” The article then went on to retell Acheampong’s discussion of the land issue, but never said who the “reactionaries” were. The settlers had already heard such warnings. At the stone-setting ceremony on December 13, 1971, Prime Minister Busia had demanded “hard work” from the settlers so that the project would succeed and prove that the rural population did not have to migrate to cities to find better living conditions. Even at the inauguration in November 1969, as we shall shortly see, Ghana’s Minister of Agriculture had stern words for Pekians. Such language appeared in other projects too. At the Biriwa III inauguration on March 11, 1967, Colonel Dontoh complained that “some Local Councils”—he did not say whether he included Biriwa here—had neglected the provision of “sanitary amenities such as lavatories and incinerators” in favor of “projects of

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doubtful value” and opportunities to get “their percentage of the dubious contract deals.”

At the Biriwa III handover ceremony on May 17, 1973, Commander Amedume “appealed to the people of Biriwa to change their attitude and social pattern of behavior and appreciate the high values and ideas which motivated the establishment of the Biriwa project.” Despite thirty-five thousand Cedis earned by the project, the people were not making any effort to keep the town clean.

Likewise, Minister of Rural Development and Cooperation Mama Chabi told the people of Tori Cada that he expected co-op leaders and members to work with a “minimum of spirit of selflessness and sacrifice.” It was his duty to “shrink from no measure susceptible of permitting the project to attain the set objectives under the best conditions.”

What kinds of measures the minister might resort to, he did not say.

The final element for success was coverage by host-country press, radio and television. A well-scripted and well-run ceremony with high-profile officials, speeches, memorable acts, and a good meal would avail either government little if it reached only those able to watch in person. Newspapers extended the ceremony’s reach to include their subscribers and anyone who else who obtained a paper second-hand, third-hand and so on. Ghana’s Daily Graphic had a circulation of more than a hundred thousand in 1963 and it was still there in 1968, according to a directory of African newspapers. Other Ghanaian newspapers included the Evening News with a circulation of sixty-five thousand, the Ghanaian Times at forty thousand, and the Sunday Mirror at eighty thousand.

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thousand. In 1977 the figures for *Ghanaian Times* and *Sunday Mirror* were a hundred thousand each, and for the *Daily Graphic* a hundred and sixty-five thousand. The weekly *Echo* had a circulation fluctuating between ten and fifteen thousand copies.

The state-controlled *Togo-Presse* was far less significant at a mere six thousand or less in 1965 and ten thousand in 1968 and 1977. The *Daho-Express* (later *Ehuzu*) had a circulation of about four thousand in 1973 and ten thousand in 1977. These bare figures understate each newspaper’s readership. According to a 1968 survey of the Ghanaian press, each copy of the *Daily Graphic* was read by seven people per day, the *Ghanaian Times* and *Sunday Mirror* by five per day, the *Evening News* by two per day, and the *Echo* by three per week.

Radio and television reporters were usually present at ceremonies, as West German ambassadors or project managers were careful to note. For example, Radio Ghana followed up the 1967 Biriwa inauguration with a one-hour broadcast and had a team stay in the village for several days to prepare another broadcast. A “handover” of the Peki settlement, but not the project, by Ambassador Müller to Commissioner for Agriculture Bernasko on December 14, 1973 received publicity on radio and

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1410 Jeafan Limited, 15-16.
television.\textsuperscript{1412} Radio Togo gave a report about the 1969 cistern handover at the Planning Commissariat.\textsuperscript{1413} According to Ambassador von Kameke, Dahomeyan radio as well as the press reported “in unusual detail” about Minister Mensah’s visit to Tori Cada in September 1966. In fact, the radio also broadcast a twenty-five-minute discussion of the project by Minister Mensah, Ambassador von Wistinghausen, Balduin Zimmer, and an editor.\textsuperscript{1414}

Press reports about ceremonies almost always came with photographs for the benefit of those who could not attend or for those who did attend and wanted a memento. In the \textit{Daily Graphic}, Elsie Dontoh cut loose the cover over the Biriwa sanitary forum mosaic with village elders looking on.\textsuperscript{1415} On the same occasion the \textit{Sunday Mirror} printed photos of Dr. Hoffmann, of Colonel Dontoh reading his speech, of Nana Kwa Bonku IV standing proudly with a bright smile, and most important, one of the latrines with its large mosaic in the middle. A headline proclaimed that “The people are very grateful,” and the latrine photo showed what they had to be grateful for.\textsuperscript{1416} At Peki, Prime Minister Busia, wearing sunglasses, prepared to unveil a plaque, with Minister of Agriculture Dr. Safo-Adu, Ambassador Müller, Chief Togbe Kwadjo Dei, and Volta Region Chief Executive A.S. Kpodonu looking on.\textsuperscript{1417} Three and a half years later, Colonel Acheampong received project documents from Müller.\textsuperscript{1418} At the Kambolé

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1412} Seventh Activity Report of Thomas Schurig, March 1, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
\bibitem{1413} Ambassador von Wistinghausen, Embassy in Lomé to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, August 13, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4110.
\end{thebibliography}
handover, Volker Kobelt, Ambassador Haferkamp, and Minister Kortho each spoke in front of the microphone. ¹⁴¹⁹

**Ceremonies: Specific Cases**

Now that I have laid out the components of project ceremonies, I will examine certain cases in detail, showing how the two governments and local authorities operated all the elements of development ceremonies: the design and setting, the officials, the symbolic acts, the speeches, and the media coverage. I have selected the Peki inauguration ceremony of November 23, 1969, the Haho River Bridge handover on February 24, 1967, the Nuatja handover on September 30, 1968, and a ministerial visit to Tori Cada on September 22, 1966 as suitable illustrations. I will also discuss all three decoration ceremonies.

The Peki inauguration ceremony is unique in that West German files have preserved a complete program, which shows a full day of festivities taking place in one location and then another. The event would begin with a church service at the farm at 9:30 a.m., with Reverend J.A.M. Mensah officiating, followed by an apparently non-Christian rite, the pour of a libation by Okyame Togboe and George Addo-Ofori; project manager Ulrich would later mention that the libation consisted of sheep’s blood *(Hammelblut).* ¹⁴²⁰ The secular proceedings would open with a welcome by parliament member T.K. Agadzi for the Volta Region’s Chairman of Administration, A.S Kpodonu and Ghana’s Minister of Agriculture, Dr. K. Safo-Adu, but speeches would have to wait. The next three acts would all be physical: a demonstration of forest clearing by...


Ferrostaal, the planting of a tree by the Minister of Agriculture to represent the “Opening of project,” and the firing of musketry. The ceremony would then move to a playground in nearby Peki-Wudome for the main program, which alternated speeches with music. T.K. Agadzi would introduce the Chairman of Administration again and turn over the proceedings to him. Paramount Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI would give a welcoming address, followed by the playing of “talking drums.” The Chairman of Administration would speak next, followed by the Wudome Middle School Band’s rendition of the “Great Hallelujah Chorus.” Minister Safo-Adu would speak, followed by an “Akpesè” dance by Wudome, presumably the villagers in attendance. After an address by Ministerial Secretary, Ministry of Social and Rural Development, Mr. A.A. Aboagye-da Costa, the audience would listen to a song by the Radio Singers of Mallet & Company. Ambassador Müller would give a speech, followed by another song, this time by the (Peki-) Dzake Choir. The last speech would come from Dr. E. Amu, chairman of the Peki Farm Project Committee, and the last musical performance by “all the bands of the valley.” Refreshments would then be available at the residence of Eric C. Djamson in Peki-Avetile, but by invitation only.¹⁴²¹ Note that the program made tradition the handmaiden of modernization, in contrast to the typical opposition set up by the colonial gaze, by combining libation, musketry exercise, drums, and dance (tradition) with the Ferrostaal demonstration and the tree planting by a minister (modernity). Although the project was supposed to replace “unsustainable” shifting cultivation with mechanized agriculture in a planned settlement, tradition still made good theater.

West German records preserve the content of three speeches, though two of those only in brief summary. Speeches by the Chairman of Administration and the Ministerial Secretary from the Ministry of Social and Rural Development are not preserved. According to Ambassador Müller, the Paramount Chief Togbe Kwadzo Dei XI and Dr. Amu recalled the past one hundred twenty years of German missionary work in the area and appealed to the people not to disappoint the new German readiness to aid them. The address of Minister Dr. K. Safo-Adu is preserved in full, however. He began by listing four reasons he was “happy”: because the project was a dream come true, because the German government had given its approval, because his own predecessors had agreed to give the project financial backing, and because the project had now started in “full swing” only six months after the signing of the agreement. He recalled that three years ago the “people of Peki” had asked for help from the FRG with a settlement—neglecting to mention the original idea of a model farm—and that the FRG had agreed after “careful study of the area” and finding assurance in the “excellent tradition of self-help among the Peki people.” After reciting the contribution of each government, Safo-Adu reminded his listeners that “farming requires continuous hard work to overcome the natural difficulties of climate, weeds, pests and diseases,” and “close co-operation among the

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settlers.” He also chided the “Chiefs and people” for providing only twelve hundred of the twenty-five hundred acres they had promised. He then discussed the functions of Advisory and Management Committees, the government’s interest in increasing Ghana’s production of food and of raw materials, and the project’s importance for the government’s settlement policy. After expressing gratitude to West Germany and to Ambassador Müller personally, Safo-Adu closed with a dire warning to area leaders, project workers (presumably the Ghanaian ones only), and prospective settlers.

To those of you who will be working on this project I hope you will not forget that all eyes are on you. I promise I shall, myself, be very keenly interested in this project. I shall be prepared to back you to the hilt if I see that you are applying yourselves with zeal, hardwork [sic] and intelligence to this task. But should you fail, remember that I am a doctor. I shall find the appropriate cure, however unpleasant it may be to you.\footnote{An Address by the Minister of Agriculture the Hon. Dr. K. Safo-Adu on the Occasion of the Inauguration of Ghana-German Settlement Project at Peki on Sunday, 23rd November, 1969 at 9:30 a.m., BArchiv B 213/32438.}

Ignoring the harsh tone at the end of Safo-Adu’s address, Ambassador Müller was delighted, and project manager Ulrich seemed at least pleased if sceptical about the event. Müller took the presence of several top officials as proof of Prime Minister Busia’s high regard for the project. In addition to Minister Safo-Adu and Ministerial Secretary Kpodonu, the Minister for Lands and Mineral Resources was also there. So were the state secretaries for the Ministries of Agriculture, Social and Rural Development, Finance, Economic Planning, and Information.\footnote{Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, November 28, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.}

The physical acts went off as planned. The “most effective” item was Ferrostaal’s demonstration of clearing equipment, which knocked down trees and swept away thick brush. “The guests showed themselves to be deeply impressed.” Ulrich and his team had
already planted five hectares of maize and beans, which had begun sprouting by the day of the inauguration. He wrote GAWI the day after, calling the inauguration the “ambassador’s favorite baby,” so that “it was lifted out of its baptism with the greatest possible pomp.” Ulrich too saw the clearing demonstration as the most dramatic point. “It took the breath away from the Ghanaians, it was also really a fantastic show.” He also noted details not itemized in the program, the carrying of chiefs on palanquins in review before the grandstands, and dances by women. He did not like the musketry display, calling it “crazy shooting” (*irrsinnige Geballerei*). Ulrich concluded sourly that, “If enthusiasm for work were analogous [for] our black friends to celebrating festivals, I could really hand over the project in three years. But really hard work is a foreign concept for our ‘Pekinese.’”

Müller was pleased by the radio and television coverage, the latter giving the project two broadcasts, but disappointed with the meager press. Indeed, the *Daily Graphic* merely contented itself with a captioned photo of Minister Dr. Safo-Adu, Ambassador Müller and others merely planting a small palm tree. Yet that photo was still useful in spreading a desirable image of the two governments working together to promote rural growth in Ghana. Ulrich also noticed the presence of a Mr. Weniger from West Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Institute, at Peki to work up a documentary on the project in two to three years’ time. I will return to that documentary later.

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1425 Ibid.
The ceremony that accompanied the handover of the bridge over the Haho River at Nuatja on February 24, 1967 lacked gunfire, but should have otherwise made a good impression with high dignitaries, glowing speeches, and physical acts. For the Togolese side appeared Minister of Public Works, Mines, Transportation, Post and Telecommunications Alex Mivedor and Commandant Assila, whom Ambassador von Wistinghausen called “the second man of the army,” accompanied by the district commissioners of Nuatja and Kloutou, Simon Kéglo and Jacques Bassah, and the head of the Service for Bridges, Roads and Airports, Barnabé Dagazi. Chargé d’affaires Maier Oswald appeared for the FRG. Pastor Erich Viering and project manager Hans von der Decken were also there. The Togo-Presse offered a detailed account of this ceremony, which Kéglo organized.1430

The ceremony’s elements largely paralleled those of the Peki inauguration two and a half years later. In both cases official speeches placed the project within the context of larger government goals, for Ghana the promotion of planned settlements, increased food production and more raw materials, but here, according to Minister Mivedor, the repair and improvement of Togo’s roads.

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Whereas the Peki project would benefit the community with more foodstuffs, the Haho River bridge would improve life at Nuatja in two ways. It would end the village’s isolation by connecting roads across the river, allowing trucks in and village products out, and make possible safe passage by foot to croplands across the river even during rainy season. For Kéglo it was a “grand victory” over the river, which before had made “widows, widowers, orphan,” presumably by drown-ing people who had tried to cross it. This language spoke of not of modernity over tradition but of (modern) man defeating nature. In both cases speeches also highlighted old ties to Germany, in Peki’s case the long presence of the Bremer Mission, but in Togo’s case the supposedly positive days of German colonial rule. Maier Oswald recalled Germany’s pre-WWI role in establishing modern transportation; the railroad built then continued to run today. As in Peki, the ceremony incorporated tradition for show, with folk dances before and after the speeches. Of course the symbolic act differed from Peki. Rather than planting a tree, Mivedor and Maier Oswald joined hands—demonstrating an equal partnership of governments—and together cut a ribbon across the bridge. The front page photo in the Togo Presse showed the two with Commandant Assila leading a crowd across the bridge. In a separate short editorial, the paper reinforced the notion of an equal German-Togolese partnership by using the bridge itself. “This bridge that connects two of our regions is also the image of the friendship that has for long years bound the Togolese people and the German people. Thus this friendship waxes, grows stronger each day, and is translated through a cooperation that grows more and more concrete.”¹⁴³¹ That was indeed the image both governments hoped for, especially the West German. Von Wistinghausen was pleased. He added that Pastor Viering had also given a speech in Ewe. There was also now a

¹⁴³¹ ibid.
commemorative plaque in French that said, “Gift of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Togolese People.”

Far less successful was the handover for ill-starred Nuatja. Although von der Decken warned in March 1967 against an early handover because he had not been able to train any counterparts in cash management, bookkeeping, ordering parts, getting orders, and calculating profitability, it would have to be the one sacrificed to lack of funds. He therefore promised, with equal doses of cynicism and sarcasm, to mount an impressive ceremony.

I will of course arrange the handover with embassy speeches, statement of the value of the machines donated, halls, etc. just as impressively and successfully as the inauguration of the Haho Bridge. One gets a good routine with it. So for the FRG it should become a complete success through celebration and treatment of press, etc. That is self-evident! (internally, that is for specialists it is rather a funeral, even if first-class according to everything).

When the handover actually approached nearly a year and a half later, Dr. Theierl wrote Wolfgang Buch that “we should not make a spectacular event out of it, because this project unfortunately gives no occasion for it.” But he would let the German embassy make the final decision. Dr. Theierl got his wish, though not by design. Gerhard Goronzy and Gerd Hofmeier hoped to celebrate the handover on September 8, 1968, during Nuatja’s Ewe Festival that would draw Ewe from Ghana and Dahomey as well as Togo. The president (by now dictator Gnassingbé Eyadéma) and ministers were supposed to come. But the government changed the date three times less than two days before the ceremony and then postponed it when bad roads kept away the minister.

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1433 Dr. Hans von der Decken to Embassy in Lomé, GAWI, BMZ, March 8, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
1434 MR Dr. Theierl to Dipl. Kaufmann Wolfgang Buch, August 8, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
supposed to assume control of the project. Goronzy and Hofmeier therefore left the village after an impromptu local celebration, about which they gave no details, accompanied by a “tom-tom.”

The official ceremony took place at the office of the Minister of the Presidency of the Republic. What was not said was as significant as what was said. The *Togo-Presse* claimed that “The model village project conceived and in the course of realization since 1963 in the district of Nuatja is achieved.” The “achievements,” included the carpentry shop, the sawmill, the mechanic’s shop, agricultural experiments, livestock raising, and cistern construction. The article only briefly mentioned the cooperative in an aside and said nothing about its profitability or lack thereof. Acting on behalf of Togo was minister-delegate Pierre Adossama for the Ministry of Rural Economy. Experts Goronzy, Hofmeier, Hans Burchard, and a Mr. Ulrich from GAWI (not F.T. Ulrich of the Peki project) were all present, but the top representative was chargé Maier Oswald, as at the Haho River Bridge. Goronzy began with a statement of project assets, and then Maier Oswald remarked “We have come to hand over to the Togolese government all that has been done in Nuatja. In the course of our stay in Togo, we have acquired much experience working with Togolese peasants.” He did not say the experience was positive. After Maier Oswald listed project accomplishments, Goronzy finished his statement. Adossama expressed Togo’s gratitude. “We acknowledge the importance of investments that your country has made in ours. We thank you not only for your care in bringing us material aid, but also for forming the men who will be called to the machines that you furnish us, because without qualified men, no development is possible.” This remark positioned Togo as a supplicant receiving aid rather than an equal partner in its

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own development as in the case of the Haho River bridge, but it was also a sly way of shifting blame for the outcome at Nuatja—this was your project, not ours. Adossama then credited the project as supporting the government’s desire to find work for young people other than in public service, but he did not say how many jobs the project created in Nuatja or of what kind. There was no comment from anyone in the village. The sole photo with the article showed Adossama with Maier Oswald, Goronzy, and Ulrich. The next day the paper ran a photo of the project site itself, showing a field next to walls of a project building. The caption explained that the project was comprised of the carpentry and mechanic’s shops, the saw mill, thirty-five hectares of maize and cotton, and poultry-raising. The ceremony perhaps drew more attention than Theierl would have liked, but less than Goronzy and Hofmeier had hoped for. At least it put the best possible face on the worst of the model villages. By removing the handover from its natural backdrop in the village itself, however, the Togolese government had reduced the ceremony’s dramatic effect. It also excluded the villagers, their chief and co-op officials as participants; perhaps the government feared dissidents upset over the early West German departure would sabotage festivities.

The Tori Cada project received a public boost when Dahomeyan Minister of Rural Development and Cooperation Moise Mensah visited on September 22, 1966, accompanied by Innocent Adotevi, prefect of the Atlantic Department, Ernese McHinto, sub-prefect of Allada, and West German Ambassador Karl August von Kameke. These dignitaries visited fields of maize, cotton, and tobacco, and the carpentry and mechanic

shops. The tour took two hours. Menssah then met with DED development helpers and project manager Balduin Zimmer. Von Kameke remarked in his report a week later that the public had seen little of this project during its first two years, so he took advantage of Menssah’s visit to raise public awareness. Menssah did not disappoint. He spoke to the Daho-Express after the tour and praised the project as “integrated development” that dealt with technical, economic and social domains all at once. He, von Kameke and Zimmer followed up three days later by discussing the project with a news editor for twenty-five minutes on Dahomeyan radio.

Then there were the decoration ceremonies. In April 1965 President Grunutzky bestowed a decoration on Otto Schnellbach. He did so at the presidential palace in Lomé with his entire cabinet present. The decoration was the Officer’s Order of the Mono, the name likely referring to the Mono River. According to the West German embassy, the president said, “These efforts are giving heart to all Togolese. By these new methods that you have introduced among us, we can certainly promote our agricultural development.” Schnellbach replied that he did not receive the decoration for himself so much as for colleagues of both countries. Considering what he had accomplished, the embassy said, the decoration was quite justified. Schnellbach himself wrote contentedly about this “sign of gratitude” for the work of German development aid and German specialists.

The *Togo-Presse* also put the event on its front page, capturing in a photograph the moment of Grunitzky pinning the decoration on Schnellbach’s jacket.\footnote{1444}{“Le Dr Schnellbach Est Eleve A La Dignite D’Officier De L’Ordre Du Mono [sic],” *Togo-Presse*, April 16, 1965. The story bears out the embassy’s version of what Grunitzky said.}

DED volunteers also received decorations for their work in village projects. In October 1967, Nana Kwa Bonku IV bestowed a “miniature state sword” on engineer K.H. Kleinknecht at a farewell party. The other three volunteers present--records officer R. Ameely and masons W. Springer and U. Winkler--received similar gifts. Hans-Josef Glinke was also present.\footnote{1445}{“State Sword,” *Daily Graphic*, October 10, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4040.}

Much more impressive was a decoration awarded by Dahomey to all fifteen volunteers in the country, and both German experts at Tori Cada, on October 5, 1967. The DED’s monthly periodical, the *DED-Briefe*, alleged that the decoration, which recognized the DED’s work at two aid stations as well as in the Tori Cada area, was unusual because the government normally awarded it only to state visitors and diplomats. When Tori Cada’s district commissioner proposed it, the protocol head of Dahomey’s Foreign Ministry came incognito to see whether the project was really so excellent. He decided it was, and returned the next week with other government representatives and the West
German ambassador. The experts who shared the award were Balduin Zimmer and Hans Hansen.\footnote{Rund um die Projekte: Freiwillige erhielten Orden: Dahomey zeichneten 15 Freiwillige aus, DED-Briefe, November 1967, 15.}

Ambassador von Kameke eagerly exploited the DED decoration in an official bulletin. “When one knows that Dahomey is extremely restrained about conferring its decorations on foreigners, these young Germans must have accomplished the extraordinary. And this is actually the case.” He described how the West Germans had understood from the beginning not to bring in tractors and other machines, but to train farmers to improve their current methods. Zimmer received no credit here, but he did for selecting--carefully of course--Tori Cada as especially suitable. Von Kameke said nothing about the government’s political priorities in requiring the project to take place in Dahomey’s south. Development helpers arrived at the end of 1965, built their own housing, and then erected a work hall and silos. They soon saw that the people were wasting labor bringing water to the village, so they set up cisterns. Volunteers showed peasants how to double their harvest, improve their nutrition, and build clay ovens at home. According to von Kameke, the volunteers impressed Dahomeyans with their “cheerful nonchalance” and willingness to work under difficult conditions.\footnote{Karl August von Kameke, Erfolgreiche deutsche technische Hilfe in Dahomey, Bulletin, December 6, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4064.} Von Kameke’s account went into a March 1968 article in the Niedersachsen Zeitung, which further emphasized the DED’s challenges and accomplishments by quoting at length from the report of a twenty-three year-old female development helper, reciting her own scars and foot fungus, the hundreds of patients she had treated, and thousands of
injections she administered and pills she distributed. In all of these stories, then, DED volunteers appear as hard-working, heroic, and self-sacrificing bringers of knowledge, material improvements, and methods for better living.

**Interim Reporting**

Like ceremonial speeches, most interim news reports presented projects as more successful than not, but they emphasized certain themes more strongly. West Germans consistently appeared as selfless, generous, and competent while villagers required considerable reeducation about how to properly grow crops and care for their health and nutrition. When problems occurred, blame belonged to the villagers for refusing to work hard enough. Since these themes mirrored internal West German reports to GAWI or the BMZ, their presence is no surprise. The surprise is that host country newspapers exhibited greater hostility than West German media to the villagers. We have already seen the *Daily Graphic’s* emphasis on Acheampong’s warning to the nameless “reactionaries” at Peki. One can only speculate about underlying motives, but I suspect two of them intermingled. First, press coverage under dictatorial regimes had to favor central government policy, or at least not loudly criticize it. Second, urban reporters might have genuinely looked down on illiterate or poorly educated peasants for not understanding and not sharing the urgent goal of modernization.

In any case, I will begin with the host country papers and then examine the few West German mainstream stories and reports from two specialist West German periodicals. For the host country view I have four samples: a June 1971 *Daily Graphic* story titled “What the Peki Farm Project is about,” an *Echo* story in October 1974, also

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on Peki, titled “Ghana-German Farm – A Venture of Hope,” and a two-part series in the 
*Togo-Presse* covering Kambolé, Agou and other West German projects under the shared 
title of “Beautiful Finial[s] of Togolese-German Cooperation.” It ran at the end of 
September and the beginning of October in 1968.

In these accounts Peki was a great success or ought to be. As of 1971, the maize 
yield of one hundred thirty tons earned a thousand Cedis and showed that the farm might 
provide up to five percent of Ghana’s requirement. The project would also add one 
hundred fifty acres of oil palms. The sixty settlers and their co-op would eventually take 
over production, purchasing, and marketing, but for the next five years German experts 
would “shoulder the task of putting the farm into its planned shape.” The *Daily Graphic* 
said nothing about the Peki Farm Committee, the Peki Union or the project’s difficulties 
getting land.\(^{1449}\) By 1974, the new settlement of Peki-Agbateh was a “well-planned, self-
sufficient settlement co-operative farm” that had its “own pipe-borne water, electricity, 
transportation, spare parts store, motor workshop, modern farming machinery…dams for 
irrigation and fishing, manure et cetera.” The one hundred settlers enjoyed schools, a 
church, a football park, drainage system, clinic, and market. They raised and converted 
maize into chicken feed, partly for sale and partly for the settlement’s own twenty-six 
hundred birds, which—according to project manager Thomas Schurig—earned ten 
thousand Cedis. The reporters spoke with six settlers, who all said they made a good 
living. One of them was Darlington Pusuo, age twenty-seven, who claimed to have

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\(^{1449}\) Hubert S. Aslam, “What the Peki Farm Project is about,” *Daily Graphic*, June 18, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
earned a thousand Cedis during the past year, though he had to beware of fines for breaking bylaws, like having a dirty house.\textsuperscript{1450}

There were problems, of course, but not beyond solution. In 1971 the \textit{Daily Graphic} complained that the first season’s maize crop had required harvesting by hand, laborers had declined in number because of low wages and delays in receiving them, and the project was not close enough to Accra and Tema on the coast. It worried that “The project has all that it takes to make a good state farm but with these problems dragging on, little or no benefits could be derived.” Yet with the government’s attention it would help feed Ghana’s growing population and industries.\textsuperscript{1451} In 1974 the \textit{Echo} harped on the need for labor discipline among the settlers. Without such discipline, said senior agricultural officer Arthur Osei-Kwarteng, the project would collapse. He added that the project had dismissed twelve settlers after three warnings. Schurig told the reporters,

I must confess that we are a little disappointed at the way the settlers work. With all the facilities at their disposal, better results could have been achieved…They have to work harder…Our original plan was to hand over to the settlers…But we have come to realise that they are not yet used to sustained [sic], disciplined and hard work…Perhaps they need time to become also receptive of modern agricultural techniques.

These remarks mirrored what he wrote in reports to the BMZ, but he said nothing about the settlers’ feeling of alienation over work controls, the long wait for housing, or the fact that some settlers held other jobs. Instead he held them up for public scorn for their lack of modernity. Schurig also discussed the land acquisition problem. The government saved the project by paying landowners thirty pesewas per acre for thirty-three years. The reporters added that this setback grew out of “our anachronistic land tenure system,”

\textsuperscript{1450} Gilly Osei and Kodjo Biney, “Ghana-German Farm – A Venture of Hope,” \textit{The Echo}, October 13, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.

\textsuperscript{1451} Hubert S. Aslam, “What the Peki Farm Project is about,” \textit{Daily Graphic}, June 18, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
as they called it, which limited the number of settlers to one hundred instead of two hundred. That neither government had ever planned to install so many settlers the reporters left unsaid. They ended with a hope that the Ministry of Agriculture, under the leadership of Colonel F.G. Bernasko would make sure “better settlement farms will spring all over rural Ghana” in the near future. They left readers with no further reason to doubt that with proper discipline among the settlers, the settlement would be profitable and viable.\footnote{Gilly Osei and Kodjo Biney, “Ghana-German Farm – A Venture of Hope,” \textit{The Echo}, October 13, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.}

The \textit{Togo-Presse} was quite certain in 1968 that German aid profited Togo overall despite uneven results. In its highly positive Kambolé story, it praised the “white gold” that Volkmar Kehrein, a “sailor having knocked about all the seas of the globe and former farmer,” had brought the region. Kehrein had overcome all problems, whether peasant reluctance to take his advice or suspicions that the West Germans were enriching themselves at the co-op’s expense. When it was time to leave, the reporter was confident the project would continue to do well, especially with lessons learned in the failure at Nuatja. This last point is very interesting, considering that only a few days hence the \textit{Togo-Presse} would cooperate with the government in putting Nuatja in a positive light. Now “The people of Kambolé, with good reason, regard the future with serenity.”\footnote{Jean Ayi, “Le Plus Beau Fleuron de la Cooperation Germano-Togolaise…N’est peut-être pas Togo-Port Mais le village pilote de Kambole,” \textit{Togo-Presse}, September 28, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.}

Agou did not do nearly as well. Even in the story, it had to share space with other West German projects at Avétonou, Sokodé and Pagouda. There was also mention again of Nuatja in an insert box that admitted some degree of failure while crediting the West Germans for their noble motives. The German “success” had “not been the same
everywhere.” Yet dissatisfaction from “near misses” or “near successes” (rather like calling a hospital death a “near survival”) should not take away from appreciating the Germans’ “spirit of generosity” and “disinterest.” The article concluded that one “must not speak of failure.” There had been no success in agriculture since 1963, but Heinz Lähne had done well with the carpentry shop, which was now taking the majority of bids in the area.1454

Peasants were the main problem, said the *Togo-Presse*. At Agou they were too lazy. After seeing a tractor in action, co-op members no longer wanted to work with the hoe, though the tractor could not replace the hoe at weeding. In fact, why “return to the ancestral methods, to the trivialities of an abhorred existence, when there are some machines to change all that?” So maize sowed “at great expense” was soon overgrown, and the co-op could not harvest even four hundred kilograms per hectare in an area where the average was between a thousand and twelve hundred. At Kambolé, by contrast, Kehrein skillfully avoided such problems. Said the *Togo-Presse*, “At Agou-Nyogbo, we have made a mistake…perfectly reparable…of having treated with too much sweetness the cooperative members already sinking, so at Kambolé M. Volkmar Kehrein has not hesitated to push everyone and earn money for everyone.”1455 When growers asked him for cords to tie their sacks for the first cotton harvest, he turned them down and they solved the problem on their own. According to Kehrein, “Our method consists in making everyone assume his responsibilities. Because we will not be there forever. One day we will leave, and there are growers who will have to run the cooperative.” Another peril was averted thanks to the DED--foolish spending on distractions like Indian hemp

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1455 Ibid.
(perhaps for smoking). Herbert and Stephanie Straehler and Manfred and Louise Dassio gave courses in nutrition, organized the construction of kindergartens, latrines, and wells and taught them how to filter guinea worms out of their drinking water. Mothers who followed their advice had healthier children than those who did not, claimed the reporter. The volunteers were also trying to convince villagers to send their daughters as well as their sons to school.\footnote{Jean Ayi, “Le Plus Beau Fleuron de la Cooperation Germano-Togolaise...N’est peut-être pas Togo-Port Mais le village pilote de Kambole,” Togo-Presse, September 28, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.}

West German press coverage, though meager with only two samples in BMZ files, also played up West German nobility. In 1969 the Bonner Rundschau emphasized DED willingness to self-sacrifice at Tori Cada. For one thing, it exaggerated the difficulty of getting there. To avoid breaking an axle on the bad roads, it said, one had to hire a black chauffeur. Why the chauffeur had to be black it did not make clear. Even peasant homes were hard to find. “The huts of the Africans stand hidden in the impenetrable bush, ordered according to extended families and only reachable by labyrinthine paths.” So that was where the DED worked. When relieving themselves, the volunteers had to “squat down on peels.” Volunteer Kurt Bauer offered that “Whenever someone has held out through two years, he is purified (\textit{geläutert}).” Fortunately, those who endured could expect “middle management positions” in industry.\footnote{“Bei deutschen Entwicklungshelfer im tiefsten Busch von Dahomey,” Bonner Rundschau, April 5, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4014.} In 1964 Stern praised Biriwa I by way of comparison. “Whatever one can blame our aid workers for, they are doing better than other donor nations. They only give out aid for a purpose, not always with political skill, but seldom wasted.\footnote{MinRat Dr. Ehmann, Referat II B 1, BMZ to AL II, State Secretary, BMZ, June 16, 1964.} The
Tagesspiegel properly credited Dr. Hoffmann for discovering Biriwa’s problems and bringing in the West German government and DED to help.1459

In contrast, peasants appeared in the West German newspapers as having backward attitudes that contributed to the peasants’ own poverty. According to the Bonner Rundschau and two informants from the DED, the people of Tori Cada were astonishingly irresponsible, miserable, fatalistic, ignorant, and diseased. Office administrator Christl Bauer claimed that her two African co-workers believed—like all “natives”—that “the Jobos, the whites” had never-ending funds and knew everything, so the whites must help whenever something went wrong because of their (the Africans’) stupidity. She added arrogantly that this attitude was typical for people in most nature religions. “Life is punishment, and death a release. How should the will develop there to move forwards?” She did not explain how she arrived at this dark view of local beliefs. Teacher Angelika Mecklenburg engaged in “village work,” instructing people about hygiene and what the paper called “sexual matters,” both necessary because “young mothers often have no idea about the connections.” About what they did know or believe, Mecklenburg said nothing. The newspaper then reported, without citing any source, that Africans around Tori Cada had a life expectancy of less than forty years, that they suffered from hookworm, amoebas, and weak lungs, and that eighty-percent of adults had congenital sexual diseases—a figure that invited readers to assume unseemly promiscuity among the parents of those adults. Volunteers must therefore “take up the struggle against resignation, helplessness, against a spirit world that almost smothers the blacks and an alarming primitiveness,” plus the ruinous, though unspecified, effects of

French colonialism. The Tagesspiegel, though presenting the Biriwa project’s accomplishments, also described setbacks due to village attitudes. The fish ovens found little use at first because of “Africans” unwillingness to buy fish stuck through the eyes for fear of bringing bad luck. A change in the smoking procedure won Biriwans round, but there was a second problem. Villagers would not use the “decorative public commode” with tiles and mosaics; instead they continued to go “somewhere in the countryside.” The article concluded that the latrine was “considered a monument of well-meant but failed aid.

The projects received greater mention in two specialized periodicals dealing with development aid. One was the DED-Briefe, which published—among other things—some of the same reports—apparently with little or no editing—that volunteers submitted to DED headquarters in Bad Godesberg. The other was Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit or E+Z, the official organ of the German Institute for Developing Countries (DSE), a public-private organization under BMZ oversight. Where the DED-Briefe aimed at volunteers and probably at potential recruits as well as member organizations, E+Z addressed development experts—the sort of people the DSE was in the business of training. Because of their institutional affiliations, both periodicals were committed to development aid as such, even if they admitted the Germans sometimes made mistakes while carrying it out. Relevant articles in DED-Briefe included an October 1967 account by Norbert Matern of his journey with thirty fishermen at Biriwa to purchase a new dugout canoe from an inland village, a letter from Tori Cada
by construction volunteer Horst Hillen, published in February 1967, a very long compilation of statements in the November-December 1966 issue from unnamed development helpers at Tori Cada, and Bärbel Beckmann’s account of how she restored to health an Agou village girl that she named “Ulrike,” very similar to Eva Neugebauer’s story in Chapter 3 of helping “Sabine” (Hounoue) and Jenoukoumé.\textsuperscript{1463} E+Z published an account of the 1965 DSE seminar in Lomé that visited Agou and met with Schnellach’s team. In March 1972 it ran a two-part article that contrasted the failures at Peki with the successes at Biriwa.\textsuperscript{1464}

Success, sometimes against obstacles, was a persistent theme in the two periodicals. Of course Matern and his thirty companions made it back to Biriwa with their canoe, even though they had to haul it back to their truck by hand through two kilometers of jungle, heaving it over fallen tree trunks. The article echoed Dr. Hoffmann and embassy officials in describing a public relations success. The project was small, but “so convincing that whole villages make pilgrimages from the surrounding area to Biriwa, to see it themselves and get suggestions for their own modernization.”\textsuperscript{1465} E+Z relied wholly on Schnellbach for its description of Agou; it took the project as an example of how to develop a village “from the bottom up.” The article asserted that “The administrative principle of model villages meets the African principle of village community halfway; they are led as cooperatives that lie exclusively in the hands of

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\item \textsuperscript{1465} Matern, Norbert, “Rund um die Projekte: Kanus aus dem Urwald,” \textit{DED-Briefe}, October 1967, 14-15.
\end{itemize}
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Africans. The Germans, who were sent by the federal government to Mount Agu, function merely as advisers.  Biriwa had gone well, according to E+Z in 1972. Both repair and carpentry shops were doing good business. New fish-smoking ovens, meant to replace small mud ovens that weakened the fish’s nutritional value, had not found favor because volunteers spit the fish through the eyes, breaking a taboo that required avoiding offense to a great spirit. The project now leased the ovens to Ghanaians who smoked fish in the old way. Fortunately, the project earned enough to carry itself and contribute to village rehabilitation, supporting the construction of a new three-class school. The dressing station had difficulty finding Ghanaian workers, and the German nurse had to begin work alone, but during a 1971 cholera epidemic, the project organized a youth group to register all cases. In short, according to project manager Glinke, Biriwa evolved from one of the poorest fishing villages to one with schools, sanitary facilities, climbing income and full employment. It was also having a “radiating effect” on other villages. No one seems to have mentioned any problem with the latrines at the sanitary forum.

Peki, on the other hand, drew heavy criticism from E+Z’s Inga Krugmann-Randolf. When clearing began, not all landowners had leased their property and some shot at caterpillar drivers, so only five hundred forty acres were cleared. As we saw in Chapter 4, there were some reasons to doubt that vegetables would remain profitable, and a disease attacked the onions. Experts had learned that “communal cultivation does not correspond to the mentality of the Pekians and conditions there,” and that tractors and other machines were too expensive to use profitably. The project would therefore divide the land among the settlers, reserving machines for cooperative use. It had improved the

people’s lives, claimed the article, but it was too expensive to serve as a model for German technical aid or Ghanaian settlements; the FRG had spent DM 7.3 million and Ghana 1.3 million. “It is senseless to set up projects in which it is shown what can be achieved with much money, complicated machinery, and specialist-technical knowledge. With expensive projects any sort of self-help and initiative of the indigenous [people] are stifled, a small group privileged, and the mass of the population left in their bad situation...” For successful models one should look at the Mandi project in India’s Himalaya province, where the Germans offered high-yield seed, fertilizer and counseling.

In development aid one should proceed from conditions and needs of the population (and not according to our measure) and from existing sources of money, knowledge and ability. Only where these are mobilized and promoted, and indigenous [people] fully commit themselves to improving their situation can broad and long-term development be achieved. But not where we plant a foreign body with our norms of diligence and thoroughness, with our opportunities for expensive technology; it will die off or at best be Africanized or Indianized.

The article did not probe into the debacle’s origins, even though it began by recounting the Peki Union’s role in persuading the Ghanaian government to ask for FRG aid. Expert readers would therefore have had no idea why the Peki project’s designers made the choices they did. The author seems to have believed, wrongly, that the experts at Peki were trying to immediately bring the peasants up to a West German standard of living.1468

Her article distinguished itself from conventional press reports by blaming experts more than the villagers for the project’s woes, a deviation that would have aided the periodical’s specialized audience by serving as a cautionary tale, but she still perpetuated the colonial gaze by remarking on “our” (i.e. German) “diligence and thoroughness,” assuming them to be lacking among Pekians.

Unnamed DED volunteers blamed villagers rather than themselves, if something went wrong, though they counterbalanced these remarks with compliments. A carpenter at Tori Cada complained about his trainees. “Conspicuous is their minimal power of imagination. They most prefer working according to very old methods.” He considered as “bad habits” their desire to save as much wood as possible by nailing everything. On the other hand, “our African carpenters are very open-minded and constantly try to learn new things. Their talent for improvisation is often very astonishing.” A farmer wrote that people’s friendliness and trust made his work easier, but he regretted that “Joy in work, however, is not so strong here in the moist-hot south as with the population in northern Dahomey.”

Horst Hillen did not have any criticism at all; he gave due credit to locals. “The indigenous workers help as well as they can and work very properly.”

Volunteers had no doubt that the locals needed to learn proper European housekeeping, agriculture, and nutrition, so DED-Briege readers should not be in doubt either. At Tori Cada one volunteer reported that “after one or two weeks a thousand things occurred to me that absolutely had to be improved: the darkness and the smoke in the huts, the unclean drinking water, the uncounted pots and crucibles on the floor, and the poorly nourished and naked children. Naturally the inhabitants of Tori-Cada knew how uncomfortable it was in their huts, but they did not change it.” The volunteers attacked that supposed resignation by building three model huts with windows, ovens and shelving—the latter two made of stamped earth. This volunteer also gave cooking courses. A farmer insisted that “we must first put an end to migratory cultivation, which pertains to all crops and is the only type of cultivation in Africa—if one looks aside from

plantation farms [emphasis added].” He and colleagues hoped to achieve this goal by encouraging the founding of co-ops, instructing the peasants to use better seeds, to sow in rows, and to time their sowing properly.\textsuperscript{1471} This farmer seems to have been ignorant about the varieties of African cultivation methods and the benefits of intercropping. When Bärbel Beckmann and three other volunteers at Agou took in “Ulrike,” the girl suffered from malnutrition and weight-loss after the death of her mother. With the West Germans, Ulrike thrived and regained her weight. Their housekeeper, Charity, did much of the childcare, but Beckmann credited her own feeding methods. Thanks to this success, mothers who had rejected Beckmann’s nutritional suggestions as dangerous were now impressed. She criticized the “African menu” as neither varied nor vitamin-rich and denounced the practice of immediately switching a child to adult food after the first year as a “horse cure.” Now “The example of Ulrike seems suited to incite the mothers to imitate my methods.”\textsuperscript{1472}

Nearly all these stories came with photographs to help readers visualize the projects they reported. Some showed buildings, equipment or crops in the field as tangible evidence of achievement. In 1971 the\textit{Daily Graphic} displayed a field of maize at Peki.\textsuperscript{1473} Three years later the\textit{Echo} had a settler family and agricultural officer posing in front of a house, a machine for shelling maize, and a school.\textsuperscript{1474} At Tori Cada adults and children waited outside a health care center.\textsuperscript{1475} Other photos showed adult villagers

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\textsuperscript{1473} Hubert S. Aslam, “What the Peki Farm Project is about,” \textit{Daily Graphic}, June 18, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32438.
\textsuperscript{1474} Gilly Osei and Kodjo Biney, “Ghana-German Farm – A Venture of Hope,” \textit{The Echo}, October 13, 1974, BArchiv B 213/32442.
\end{flushleft}
at work, such as settlers picking cotton at Peki. Also at Peki, in the pages of E+Z, Ghanaian workers made and set up building stones. Men worked in a field at Agou. At Kambolé a man carried a backpack Solo sprayer, more peasants picked cotton, co-op members met in assembly with officers at the front table, and a child led what looks like a mule through a field, though the caption says “Give us cows?” Norbert Matern’s companions lifted up one end of their canoe. Children appeared in the DED-Briefe. At the beginning of the long article on Tori Cada, a young boy rested his mouth on his crossed arms. In another photo, an older boy smiled brightly at the camera while rolling or pounding something on a rock. The caption indulged in a piece of development fantasy: “Full of the joy of life and optimism, this boy glances from Tori-Cada into the future.” Ulrike appeared as a vigorous toddler, receiving a vigorous soaping from her Togolese foster mother. White experts or volunteers sometimes appeared as well, giving directions or otherwise working with the people they meant to help. At Kambolé a white man and a black man, both unnamed, examined a plant together. At Tori Cada a white man worked at the carpentry shop. These photos were especially helpful for publicizing projects that had not gone so well; readers who

skipped most of the text might merely look at the pictures and note what seemed to look like progress.

**The Documentary: Peki-Agbateh on Film**

Better than mere text and photographs were moving pictures; West German technical aid received its finest expression in visual media through a documentary on Peki. It began as a project of the Friedrich Ebert Institute, the intellectual arm of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Ulrich noted the presence of its employee, Mr. Weniger, at the project inauguration ceremony in November 1969, but nothing happened for the next four years.\(^\text{1485}\) In March 1973 Ambassador Müller wrote the Federal Press Office and the BMZ’s *Referat* for Publicity of Development Aid Abroad that the Ebert Institute could not finish the film, so he asked the Press Office and the BMZ to finish it, using the Institute’s Reinhold E. Thiel as director. Since the film would show the project from the first land clearances until its conclusion, and the “human and material problems” involved, he was convinced that it would “be of value [in] conveying important experiences for our future development and also for publicity work at home and abroad.”\(^\text{1486}\) *Ministerialrat* Schweiger of the West Africa *Referat* wrote the Publicity Referat that he had no objections to the embassy’s request. “If one applies [anlegt] strict development policy standards, there are certainly projects better suited to demonstrating German aid abroad. For an optical presentation (advertising effect), however, Peki is quite well suited in my opinion.”\(^\text{1487}\) Peki as a visual object therefore trumped Peki as a genuine learning experience.

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\(^{1485}\) F.T. Ulrich to GAWI, November 24, 1969, BArchiv B 213/32438.

\(^{1486}\) Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Press- und Informationsamt, Referat für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit Entwicklungshilfe im Ausland, BMZ, March 5, 1973, BArchiv B 213/32439.

The BMZ went ahead with the documentary. After reviewing the script, Schweiger wrote the Publicity Referat that “The problematic of this project is that as a settlement project it is much too expensive and according to this model a development in Ghana as well as in other developing countries might hardly be possible.” Of course, Thomas Schurig carried it out “well and speedily” after “certain initial difficulties.” So “Because of the structural and infrastructural changes of the area it suits itself from the optical [standpoint] for appropriate publicity inclusion [Aufnahme].” As to the documentary itself, Schweiger wrote that it seemed to “It is obviously already considered here that the project in its basic structure cannot be transferred without further [measures]. Partial aspects of the project are obviously emphasized that are of general development policy utility and significance.”¹⁴⁸⁸ In other words, Schweiger convinced himself that the film would honestly reveal the project’s limitations as a model, and still teach watchers something of value about development aid. It would do neither. Filming was finished by the beginning of March 1974, and Schurig expected it to appear on television in both Ghana and Germany.¹⁴⁸⁹

The black and white film, thirty-one minutes and in English, implied that all was well with the project, or would be but for the settlers. The title was “Agbateh: A New Village Arises.” A brightly smiling Roland Ata acted as genial host, alternating with one or perhaps two male German narrators speaking off-screen. After opening credits, Ata greeted settler George Abebrese, greeted the viewer and then (in a separate clip) introduced project manager Schurig. He praised the FRG for providing clearing equipment, passing over Ferrostaal’s role. Here the viewer could see a machine toppling

over a might tree and a bulldozer bushing brush. Then the view changed to the November 1969 inauguration, with chiefs and their ceremonial wands, Christian ministers singing along with a choir, the toppling of a tree amidst musket fire, and an excerpt from the paramount chief’s speech. The narrator properly credited the Pekians and the Peki Union for originating the project and both governments for agreeing to it, but claimed that many early settlers left. Ata affirmed this point with settler Robert Ata Tsigbe, who called the ex-settlers “lazy.” The narrator added, “Of course large-scale farming needs mechanical help, but lazy settlers will not provide the necessary manpower, and though the Ghanaian and German government [sic] will assist during the first years, it is of paramount importance that the settlers understand from the very beginning that this project is in the end their responsibility.” To further emphasize this point, the film featured a scripted interview with a settler-applicant. When asked why she wanted to be a farmer, twenty-year old Georgina Nyarku dutifully replied, obviously aware of the central government’s official policy, that she loved her country and wanted to supply it with more food.\footnote{Peki Ghana, B 120276 1-1, Bundesarchiv-Filmarchiv.}

The rest of the film showed the settlement at work. The narrator discussed whether the co-op should rely on machines or manual labor for maize cultivation and processing. Machines worked well for fertilizing, shelling and drying, but manual labor was more economical for harvesting. Weeding used both. The co-op also grew oil palms and tobacco, which required roasting in smoke-filled barns. After showing off the new houses, the film turned to the importance of profitability. Ata asked rhetorically of Samuel Boateng Dankyi whether government funding of the project could “go on all the time,” Dankyi of course replied “Oh no. This cannot go on forever and it will have to end
“one day.” That was why the project had invested in tobacco barns. Ata and Dankyi then visited the poultry building and talked with a worker. According to the film, settlers Donkor Skallagrim and Pusuo Darlington were in a dispute over labor. The former wanted to get his tobacco into the roasting barns, but the latter wanted him for the communal maize harvest. Field manager John Lamptey Setyi settled it by getting both men’s agreement to hire temporary laborers, but blamed Skallagrim for not having done the tobacco earlier. In the last incident, the film showed the 6:00 a.m. roll call, where—the narrator claimed—the settlement’s long-run destiny would be decided. Ata closed by expressing confidence in management, the settlers and the project’s benefit to Agbateh, Peki and Ghana.1491

The documentary was effective propaganda, if not a masterpiece. The interviews were obvious dramatizations of the most literal sort, but otherwise the viewer saw what both governments wanted them to see: thriving crops, a sensible balance of machine and manual labor, pleasant modern homes, and competent management. Thiel’s script would have acknowledged landowner resistance and the failure of communal production because the peasant lacked “sufficient incentive to work with all [his] energy – if he who worked much would have no larger share than he who worked little,” though it claimed the switch to individual cultivation increased production greatly. It ended by wondering whether Peki-Agbateh would set a precedent.1492 In this version the film would have admitted the project’s character as an experiment, but the released version pushed the notion that all had gone well, except with the settlers.

1491 Ibid.
Viewing the Projects in Person: Seeing was Believing

At all times effective development theater depended upon the optical faculty of onlookers to maintain its power. During the quiet of everyday work between ceremonies, buildings and crops represented the combined effort and good will of two governments and the villagers themselves. Passersby could then visually receive and consume the message of West German benevolence and intergovernmental cooperation. Villagers themselves might value the buildings as symbols of development and power.\textsuperscript{1493} Recall that Goronzy and Hofmeier stressed the importance of leaving buildings in Nuatja that had “great optical use-effect.”\textsuperscript{1494} The West Germans and their hosts did not leave the symbolic effect to chance, however. They made sure that project sites had plaques or signs explaining that they were responsible for whatever the onlooker saw. As we saw earlier, a plaque at the Haho River Bridge credited the FRG for its donation and Prime Minister Busia unveiled a plaque at the December 1971 inauguration of the Peki settlement, though the embassy did not provide the text.\textsuperscript{1495} In 1972 a sign, perhaps temporary, identified Biriwa’s new primary school as a “Self Help Project of the Biriwa Town Development Committee and the Biriwa Project.”\textsuperscript{1496} Nearly five years earlier, Nana Kwa Bonku IV posed for a photo by the magazine \textit{New Ghana} that showed him pointing with a ceremonial wand to a sign that said “Biriwa Project. Village Development Committee in conjunction with volunteers from the West German Development

\textsuperscript{1494} Final Report of Gerhard Goronzy and Gerd Hofmeier, September 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113.
\textsuperscript{1495} Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Referat III B 5, Foreign Office, December 14, 1971, BArchiv B 213/32439.

Such plaques or signs might backfire later; as we saw in Chapter 2, a BMZ photograph showed a sign propped against the pole, the only visible remnant of a vanished Israeli settlement project. In that case the Israelis were fortunate the sign named only the Togolese Young Agricultural Pioneers as the responsible agency.

Rather than passing by chance, onlookers might arrive specifically to visit the project to collect information or ideas, to pay their respects or perhaps simply to gape at it all. Project manager reports often listed visitors by name or by group. In October 1967, for example, Balduin Zimmer recorded the following, compiled since his return on May 1 from a leave of absence:

Dr. Heisch, First Secretary of the German embassy  
Lobtein from the International Labor Organization in Geneva  
Dr. Bachmann from the World Bank, NYC  
Notables from Tori-Bossito and from Allada  
Swiss Peace Corps  
Canadian Peace Corps  
Commissioner of American Peace Corps  
Mr. Bones from USAID  
Togo Model villages team—Dr. von der Decken, Goronzy, Hofmeier  
Dr. Stangen, BMZ  
Pearson, permanent UN representative in Dahomey  
Sub-prefect with deputy prefects and representatives of (Atlantic) Department  
Vieulmieux and Martin, officials of the Swiss consumer co-op in Parakou  
Ambassador Horstmann from the embassy in Lomé  
Dr. Baumann, from Swiss Peace Corps in Bern  
Mr. Varisou, Director of Cooperatives Department in Dahomey’s Ministry of Agriculture

Mr. Morell, regional director of CFDT (a parastatal textile marketing corporation) in Dahomey
Mr. Richard, Director of the ICRT (an agricultural research institute) in Dahomey
Mr. Wolkoff, director of ORSTOM (an international research institute) in Dahomey
Mr. Rentjens, FAO expert for animal traction
Prefect and seven members of Committee of National Renovation
Mr. Prudencio, inspector general of primary schools
Ambassador Horstmann again, with the prefect, the president of chamber of commerce and their escort.1499

The roster here demonstrates that Tori Cada had built up a formidable cachet to attract so many outsiders, especially from abroad, in only a few months. The visits by German experts and embassy officials are not surprising, particularly from Dr. von der Decken, Goronzy and Hofmeier, come to see what a “successful” model village-cooperative project looked like. Nor are visits by leaders of area villages, Dahomeyan officials from the Atlantic Department, or non-German experts working in Dahomey. But the list also shows that Swiss, American and Canadian development agencies had taken an interest; the BMZ had already had dealings in the project’s early stages with the Swiss VSK in Dahomey in the project’s early stages, but none with the US or Canada. At the highest level were observers from international agencies: the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. If these visitors liked what they saw, West Germany’s reputation as aid donor would grow in Dahomey and around the world as they discussed their observations with their organizations. The international web of relationships among development experts connected by word of mouth or correspondence became another medium and an extension of the stage on which development theater played. Visits could also be the occasion for advancing project goals, as at the end of November 1965 when a group of eight canton and village chiefs visited Kambolé and listened to presentations from Volkmar Kehrein and Raphael Sossou Assogbavi, head of

the agricultural district of Sokodé, urging upon them the advantages of agricultural cooperatives.\textsuperscript{1500}

**Bad Publicity, False Publicity, and Self-Publicity**

Although West Germans devoted most of their time and energy to organizing and promoting “development theater,” by creating images and stories in pursuit of good publicity, they also had to fend off the threat of bad publicity. When Ambassador Müller on his own authority terminated F.T. Ulrich’s appointment as project manager for Peki, the fear of Ulrich generating “embarrassing press reports” moved him to this precipitate action. In view of the project’s already high profile after its official inauguration two months earlier, such publicity could endanger the project itself and German-Ghanaian relations with it.\textsuperscript{1501} Likewise Ambassador Horstmann in Dahomey had urged in February 1969 the speedy removal of Johannes Fabricius from Tori Cada. The latter’s tenure had already been “injurious” to “the German reputation in Dahomey,” and he saw a danger that it could expand to a scandal, if a replacement did not arrive soon.\textsuperscript{1502} An economist desiring to investigate the Kambolé project ran into a wall in 1974. West German embassy official Anna-Margareta Heise wrote him with breathtakingly naive honesty that Kambolé was not “suited for academic \[wissenschaftliche\] investigation,” because the project’s “economic and political situation” had made it a “complete failure.” The embassy would not agree to such an investigation and would make no project files available. The decision was in agreement with the BMZ, so neither the FRG nor the


\textsuperscript{1501} Ambassador Müller, Embassy in Accra to Foreign Office, January 23, 1970.

\textsuperscript{1502} Ambassador Horstmann, Embassy in Cotonou to Foreign Office, February 19, 1969, BArchiv B 213/4063.
Togolese government would give him support in anything concerning Kambolé.\(^{1503}\) That academics might learn a lot from a failed project was beside the point; the risk of embarrassment to both governments far outweighed the possible gain from a better understanding of development aid practice. Of course, the West Germans were not always so tight-lipped. As we saw in Chapter 4, embassy officials in Accra were quite forthcoming in 1971 with Peter Langer about the failings of the Peki project.

In the matter of Biriwa a real panic over bad publicity struck the West Germans during 1975-76, as we saw briefly in Chapter 5, over the poor construction of the Biriwa IV buildings. Embassy official Hauptmann alerted the Foreign Office that repairing the buildings was urgent, though he did not want to let the Ghanaian side to know the full extent of the problem or to endanger the West Germans’ development policy reputation.\(^{1504}\) His desire for complete privacy, as it were, turned out to be impractical. Schweiger at the West Africa Referat informed the GTZ that the scope of the damage, as described by an architect’s report, made concealment impossible.\(^{1505}\) More bad news came in November 1975, when manager Frank Neequaye asked both governments to bail out the project with tools, spare parts and working capital to avoid public embarrassment. “The siting of the project is such that many tourist and officials from other foreign embassies stop over to find out what the Federal Republic of Germany had done for the village of Biriwa and for that matter Ghana.” Biriwa’s visibility was now a drawback. He urged his readers to take “a very serious view” so that they might “forestall the already created image of the project and to avoid possible close down and complete

\(^{1503}\) Anna-Margareta Heise, Embassy in Lomé to Heiner Schumacher, Dipl.-Volkswirt, May 6, 1974, BArchiv B 213/21828.

\(^{1504}\) Hauptmann, Embassy in Accra, July 8, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.

\(^{1505}\) Schweiger, Referat 113, BMZ to GTZ, KfW, July 21, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.
failure of the project.” The German project manager, Walter Kleinebudde, supported his plea in early 1976. “The ‘Biriwa Project’ has a degree of publicity like hardly any other German project in Ghana. A bankruptcy, which without help from outside—that is to emphasized again—is hardly to be averted, would decisively damage the high reputation of “German technical aid” in Ghana. Ambassador Motz wrote the Foreign Office that Biriwa III’s “technical mistakes” were now throwing “dark shadows” over the entire project. Ghanaians in “broad circles” saw Biriwa as the “German fishing village,” so the project enjoyed “special publicity.” The village also lay upon a “heavily traveled coastal road.” Just a few days earlier, a high official of Ghana’s Foreign Ministry pointed to Biriwa as an expression of West Germany’s readiness to help villagers at the “grass roots” as well as start big infrastructure projects. Motz therefore recommended rehabilitating Biriwa III. In his October 1976 report on Biriwa III, engineer Joachim Leckscheidt recognized that the FRG’s image had always played a role. The project had a very good reputation in Ghana, so protecting it would justify “intensive aftercare,” though he saw a conflict between caring for image and making the best use of technical aid funds.

A potential threat to the project’s reputation came from the vanity of project managers and other West German development workers who promoted their own stories or viewpoints independent of official publicity. In 1972 Martin Dietz, project manager at Tori Cada, took offense at a Peki story by Günther Paschner in the May/June issue of the [1506 Frank Neequaye, Manager, Biriwa Project to Chairman, Biriwa Project, December 23, 1975, BArchiv B 213/32443.
1508 Ambassador Dr. Motz, Embassy in Accra to Referat 313, Foreign Office, February 19, 1976, BArchiv B 213/32443.
BMZ periodical *Echo des Rundfunks*. Dietz wrote that while he admired Paschner’s zeal for development aid, he wished the latter would have picked a “more suitable project-object.” He could not share Paschner’s wish for “thousands of Pekis,” because the project had spent DM 8.6 million to establish a mere sixty settler families. Such an amount represented a per capita expenditure higher than capital-intensive investments in Germany. As a counter-model, Dietz held out his own project, which had spent only DM 4.2 million to create three dozen co-ops with two thousand members, providing marketing and counseling services to guide the spending of surplus income into “genuine improvement of standard of living.” He urged Paschner to come and see.  

At the same time Dietz sent a copy to the BMZ’s West Africa *Referat* with a cover letter, in which he preemptively excused himself. “You will certainly understand the resentment of thrifty planners and project managers at the waste in many another ‘sister project,’ and not view the criticism uttered externally as ‘sabotage,’ but as a construction contribution to discussion. I surely could have expressed similar criticism even before the beginning of the project—if someone had asked me about it.” The files contain no reply to Dietz or any discussion of his action, but officials were unlikely to welcome one project manager’s interference in publicity work for another project. It was indeed “sabotage” of development theater.

The Togo Model Villages project inspired writings from three experts seeking peer approval: Ehrenfried Zillich, Otto Schnellbach, and Dr. Hans von der Decken. Zillich wrote an article for the German Africa Society’s *Afrika heute* that appeared at the beginning of July 1965. It drew heavily on Schnellbach team reports to explain the

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1510 Martin Dietz to Günter Paschner, Südwestrundfunk, July 8, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4068.

1511 Martin Dietz to West Africa Referat, BMZ, July 8, 1972, BArchiv B 213/4068.
experts’ struggle to secure labor from villagers, including his own impassioned speech to them with Gerd Hofmeier, invoking Togolese patriotism, long-term self-interest, and Christian dominion over the Earth. He flattered himself and his colleagues that their advice, explanations, exhortations, and equipment worked a change in villager attitudes toward punctuality and economic thinking.1512 There is no record of any reaction from the BMZ, whether positive or negative, beyond filing a copy of the article. Dr. Schnellbach demanded greater attention in 1967, because he hoped to have the BMZ publish his experiences and impressions working with “Africans” in Togo. He had already written two interim articles on the project for Die Landtechnik, the first in 1964 under the title “Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe” (Help toward Self-help) and the second in 1965 under the title “Landwirtschaft und Gewerbe ergänzen sich” (Agriculture and Craft Industry Complement Each Other).1513 Now back in West Germany, Schnellbach wanted to rework his extremely long final report into a book describing what he had learned about Togolese society. Dr. Theierl refused to allow the manuscript to appear in the BMZ’s published works. Aside from a shortage of funds, the report contained “quite critical statements about the mentality of the Africans…whose publication could unleash ill will among our African partners.” Schnellbach’s brief criticism of French colonial practice also made publication seem “not opportune.” He might of course write what he liked as a private person, but the federal government had to impose upon itself “certain

restrictions” that were “politically motivated.”

Dr. Schnellbach did not seem much put out; with the help of an editor friend he had improved the manuscript, removed several offending passages and sent it to the DSE. In fact, according to Hubertus Büschel, several development policy periodicals also found the manuscript too offensive to publish, so it finally appeared in *Landtechnische Forschung*, a “right-conservative” periodical for agricultural experts.

Schnellbach’s article recapitulated his paternalistic critique of “African” culture that we saw in Chapters 1 and 2. Attitudes he found unhelpful included insistence on consensus rather than majority vote, their lack of punctuality, an inability to understand that Europeans had to work for generations to reach machine-driven affluence, an aversion to planning and providing ahead (because there was always something to eat), an lack of incentive to accumulate capital, measurement of goods by measure rather than weight, obsession with prestige goods, and peculiar animist beliefs. On the other hand, he admired their ability to find joy in labor, if one allowed them to work according to their norms rather than European. His analysis made no distinctions by class, region, or ethnicity; they were all “Africans.”

Dr. Theierl had good grounds for rejecting the piece as representative of BMZ views.

Dr. von der Decken put the BMZ to a still greater test when he submitted a scathing review of Dr. Gabriele Wülker’s *Togo: Tradition und Entwicklung*, published in 1966 under BMZ auspices. She gave what von der Decken regarded as a far too rosy of the Togo Model Villages project, and indeed her version seems to have depended

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1514 Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to GAWI, April 14, 1967, BAarchiv B 213/4112.
exclusively on the accounts of Schnellbach and his colleagues. While explaining on page 21 that most Togolese must still learn “adjustment toward work,” “time concept,” “discipline,” and “individual responsibility and planning,” she credited “success” in the three model villages to the “pedagogical talent of [those] responsible, whose constant effort it is to leave the task of leadership and initiative to the Togolese themselves, so that they make this project their own.” In her description of the project on pages 144 and 145, she claimed that the villages and their production co-ops were “increasingly gaining in aura.” This “very slowly and carefully developed project” had the Togolese work as “fully responsible entrepreneurs and colleagues” while the Germans functioned merely as advisers. The Togolese received compensation only if their co-op achieved profits, which the co-op distributed according to “precise bookkeeping”; she denied that they were getting advances for work performed. Although outside experts conceived the project, it “has gradually become really Togolese,” and the model villages were beginning to “find imitation” (Schule zu machen). She concluded that “After a three-year starting time villages have already become a solid concept in the thinking of the population. The most-quoted and richly-emphasized formula in development aid of ‘help toward self-help’ is the project’s principle and was able to be achieved.” The only flaw was that “advisory staff must still stand at the side of the Togolese for some years in the future with great patience, much understanding, pedagogical ability and tact.”

Von der Decken’s critique ran to fourteen points on four pages. There could be no talk of any aura now. The co-ops existed in name only, not in money, not “sociologically,” nor as businesses. The production co-ops were a “total fiasco,” a “loss of prestige” for the FRG and created “bad will” instead of “good will.” It was completely

1518 Wülker, 144-45.
“false and wrong” that the Togolese acted as responsible entrepreneurs and workers while the Germans functioned merely as advisers. Wülker was of course flat wrong that the project paid no subsidies; instead the subsidies paid had led to strikes and accusations of “hunger wages.” The co-ops had no profits and no proper bookkeeping, only a “reach into the cashbox” according to “good old African tradition.” The project was not becoming more Togolese, because there was no counterpart, no manager, no “capable and honorable cashier,” and no worker who felt like a member rather than a wage worker. As for imitation elsewhere, it was true that other villages had asked for aid; they too would like machines, cisterns, equipment and tools with no oversight. “Africans” made no decisions and did not want to, except for control of subsidies. Certainly the villages were a “solid concept” in the population’s thinking as Wülker claimed, but a negative one. Then von der Decken came to the point that really bothered him. “It is unbearable that through such books the appearance of steady decline in the last year must be awakened by the appearance of the book, while my men and I have worked to consolidate everything in the German villages.” He asked the BMZ to issue a new edition that would replace the “image of Potemkin ‘model villages’ with a real picture of the problems.”

To Dr. Theierl two days later he complained bitterly that he “felt discriminated against in my work through the latest publication of your ministry.”

Dr. Greiff of the Referat for Important Church Development Projects, Social-Political Education, and Social Structure Aid merely wrote Wülker suggesting that she contact von der Decken.

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1521 Dr. Greiff, Referat II B 5, BMZ to Madam State Secretary out of service Dr. Gabriele Wülker, March 7, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112.
Von der Decken soon moved to protect his public reputation, but GAWI and Dr. Theierl blocked him. Eager to publish the true state of the model villages project upon his arrival as project manager, he submitted an article through GAWI to the BMZ in late June 1967, hoping to get it into the *Zeitschrift für ausländische Wirtschaft* as a contribution to a Festschrift for the sixty-fifth birthday of a Dr. Wilbrandt. It carried the recommendation of Dr. Ruthenberg of the Institute for Foreign Agriculture. GAWI, however, deemed passages in the article as “not very opportune for publication.”¹⁵²² Drs. Ruthenberg and Stangen, the latter of the BMZ, pleaded for the article to appear, but seemingly to no avail.¹⁵²³ Dr. Theierl wrote in the middle of 1968 that “The publication ban cannot be removed, contrary to the ideas of the former project manager, because numerous other agricultural projects of German technical aid, such as, for example, the model villages of Dahomey, are considerably better suited for academic investigation than the Togo model village project.”¹⁵²⁴ Here he provided a prototype for Heise’s refusal to release the Kambolé file in 1974. Yet von der Decken’s article finally hit the pages of the *Zeitschrift für ausländische Landwirtschaft* in 1969, so Theierl must have relented or von der Decken, by now more than a year away from the project, must have ignored the publication ban.

The former project manager’s article began by crisply restating project goals of increase per capita production, allowing villagers to earn their way to a higher standard of

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¹⁵²³ Dr. Stangen, Referat I B 4, BMZ to Dirig I A, Referat I A 6, BMZ, July 4, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4112; Prof. Dr. H. Ruthenberg, Institut für ausländische Landwirtschaft to Regierungsdirektor Dr. Theierl, BMZ, August 3, 1967, BArchiv B 213/4113.
¹⁵²⁴ Dr. Theierl, Referat I A 6, BMZ to BAW, GAWI, June 18, 1968, BArchiv B 213/4113. Theierl did not say which former project manager, but he had already turned down Schnellbach, whose article had already appeared in *Landtechnische Forschung* the previous November, so he must have been referring to von der Decken.
living, and the FRG’s contributions of equipment and personnel. Then he recited the difficulties. The villages were far apart, the roads bad, and the climate unfavorable. Production cooperation failed because members interpreted advance payments against future profits as wages, and “hunger wages” at that. Proper record-keeping proved to be difficult and members stole cloth or cotton while cashiers made “loans” to their friends from the cashbox. High machine maintenance costs made profitability difficult to reach. Fortunately, the project had redirected the co-ops from production to purchasing and sales, eliminating many of these problems. There were also solid accomplishments like experimenting with crop rotation, introducing cash crops and promoting cattle husbandry. Village projects were not as spectacular as big prestige structures and they did not generate a quick profit, but they carried a long-term benefit, even if only specialists could recognize them.\footnote{Hans von der Decken, “Das Entwicklungsprojekt ’Drei Musterdörfer - Togo,’” Zeitschrift für \textit{Ausländische Wirtschaft} 8, no. 1 (1969), 71-77.} At no time did von der Decken mention Schnellbach as the project’s originator or his own separation from the project more than a year before. Unlike most of his reports to Bonn, this article conveyed the impression of problems solved and crises surmounted under his leadership. Perhaps he felt satisfied with restoring his honor without damaging the BMZ’s reputation.

**CONCLUSION**

Appearances mattered. Agou’s carpentry shop, the Haho River Bridge, the cisterns of Togo, the Peki settlement, and Biriwa’s fish ovens carried symbolic weight just as Josef Stalin’s Magnitostroi steel plant or Park Chung Hee’s Gyeongbu Highway did, if not on as grand a scale, and like Louis-Napoleon’s railroads they offered opportunities for public spectacle and performance, using much the same techniques of
speeches, symbolic acts, and news coverage. Development theater was more than “advertising” as Dr. Theierl put it, whether for a single project or for development aid in general; it was an indispensable reason for the entire existence of development aid. When officials agreed to start projects, they knew that sooner or later they would collect the symbolic payoff in ceremonies that allowed them or their successors to act out roles as bringers of higher crop yields, busy shops, better health and a new prosperity. As von der Decken understood for Nuatja, governments expected symbolic compensation even from thoroughly bungled projects. Governments knew in advance that their projects would receive media coverage, usually favorable. This was why heads of state like Prime Minister Busia, Colonel Acheampong, and President Grunitzky, or ministers like Dr. Safo-Adu, Mensah and Têvi were willing to spend time on ceremony in little-known villages.

Development theater was also an assertion of power. By elevating officials, experts and volunteers as helpers above the villagers being helped, it subjected the villagers to a “colonial gaze” that emphasized the virtues of the former against the defects of the latter. By portraying themselves in the public light and in private correspondence as individuals while usually leaving villagers nameless—even notables like Biriwa’s Queen Mother and the Chief Fisherman did not merit names--development actors turned project beneficiaries into a shapeless group that could be viewed and judged as a cultural collective with a single mentality. The colonial gaze intensified when villagers’ unwillingness to labor as instructed by those same officials, experts and volunteers made them handy scapegoats for a project’s failures. Direct contact with villagers gave high officials of the central government an opportunity to bark orders and humiliate them.
Development theater also meant control over information. Former actors like Schnellbach and von der Decken or nosy independent investigators had to be kept at arm’s length and away from audiences, lest they interrupt the show. Despite having to publicly deal with irrepressible failures like land acquisition and high expenses at Peki or the entire Nuatja project, the FRG and their West African colleagues had the power to sustain the illusion of development, and mostly did so. To what extent it was an illusion I will take up in this dissertation’s final section.
Conclusion

Like individual people, governments seek praise and glory. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, development theater served the Federal Republic German and the governments of Ghana, Togo and Dahomey as an important avenue to achieve these things. In cooperation with each other they could—through their officials, experts, counterparts and development helpers--act out roles through ceremonies and media coverage as public benefactors who brought new agricultural techniques and equipment for raising crop or fish yields, who established artisanal shops for carpentry, motor repair, weaving, who dug wells and cisterns, who gave sound advice, who built latrines and silos, who cured the sick and instructed the ignorant, and who set up cooperatives or a development trust to manage and preserve these gains. Development theater aided the West Germans in their quest to “cut a dash” in the world, to outdo the Communist GDR, and to dull memories of the Nazi past. It helped the insecure West African regimes make a case to their peoples that they deserved to remain in power, and with luck to render these peoples “quiescent.”

Development theater needed both development and theater to work well. Without theater, the prospect of spending money and hiring personnel would have had less attraction, and probably none at all for foreign donors like the FRG. Invisible development or anonymous benevolence might be good for the soul, but governments do not have souls; they seek worldly advantage. On the other hand, theater needed development. Because it was an optical experience, audiences had to have something to see, like buildings, vehicles, busy workers and crops. For these tangible gains to remain, the project had to make a profit if neither government wanted to guarantee permanent
funding. If it did not, it would become a “development ruin,” losing both governments
the symbolic blessing it was supposed to bestow. In private correspondence, the West
Germans proved that they were painfully aware that actual failure threatened
embarrassment.

Yet development theater only had to be convincing, not accurate. In the previous
chapters we have seen a gap, sometimes large, between how the projects turned out in
reality (so far as the West Germans could perceive it) and how the governments presented
them to the public. Minister Jean Têvi could reasonably praise the Agou wood-
processing operation as a “model of successful cooperation,” but he said nothing about
the wreck of Schnellbach’s cooperative production on the impracticality of demanding
unpaid labor in exchange for future profits that never arrived, the villagers’
dissatisfaction with the “advances” later paid, the destruction of Schnellbach’s buildings
or the abandonment of the “model village” idea. He said nothing about Agou’s long-
severed connection with Nuatja and Kambolé through the project or about the quarrel
over control between government and village. The same sort of silence fell over
certain problems in other projects. By locating the Nuatja handover ceremony in Lomé,
officials implicitly admitted the project’s failure, but no one openly talked about the
closure of all shops, the lack of any useful enterprise, and the villagers’ disappointment
with the early West German departure. A Daho-Express account of the Tori Cada
handover talked up the buildings left behind as a “puff” of modernism and the sixteen
thousand illnesses treated, but had nothing to say about the West Germans’ internal
doubts about profitability; of course one would not expect the report to uncover or

1526 “C’est un modele de cooperation reussie,” Togo-Presse, April 5, 1974.
broadcast such doubts. Nowhere was there open discussion of interim setbacks, like the managers removed from all four projects, the long funding famine in Togo that so upset Hans von der Decken, the long delay in constructing the Haho River bridge and the cisterns, GAWI’s poor record of delivering equipment on time to Biriwa, or the West Germans’ difficulty with customs. As a matter of timing, the producers of development theater need not deal with post-handover problems like the lack of spare parts in Peki and Biriwa, the uselessness of Biriwa’s latrines, or the eventual collapse of the Peki farm, and they had no reason to draw public attention to them.

On the other hand, the show was not entirely fantasy either. At times officials publicly admitted setbacks to prevent development theater from becoming unbelievable. Colonel Acheampong referred to the struggle for land at Peki even while promising that it was now, at last, ended. According to the newspaper account of the Kambolé handover in November 1975, project manager Kobelt confessed in his ceremonial address to the disastrous failure of cotton and COOPAC’s deficits, though he then talked up the block fields as a success. Furthermore, even mostly unsuccessful projects might leave behind remnants of success, fragments of “development.” The Togo Model Villages project was the best example, with the wood-processing business in Agou, the Haho River bridge, four new buildings and a generator in Nuatja (so popular that the villagers refused to let the West Germans have it back). As inadequate as the cisterns were, Nuatjans and others likely appreciated whatever relief they brought from local water scarcity while waiting for more effective government action. For the peasants in the

UCRT area, the Tori Cada project dug wells, built cisterns, and erected two aid stations. At Kambolé DED volunteers organized the construction of a birthing station. The treatment for illnesses at Tori Cada and Biriwa was real and likely welcome to those who received it. Biriwa received a durable primary school and perhaps the West Germans eventually made its shops and latrines viable as planned. Even the terrible Peki project left behind a municipal building for the whole community and some new houses with electricity and water, however long the settlers may have enjoyed them. On the West German side, the desire of officials, experts and volunteers to make the projects succeed and to help the beneficiaries was real. Their annoyance at setbacks and difficulties had as much to do with the frustration of project goals as with the fear of looking bad. Recall that Hans von der Decken angrily accused the BMZ and GAWI of willingness to let Agou, Nuatja and Kambolé become “Potemkin villages”—false communities set up solely to impress onlookers—rather than genuine model villages. He valued substance over appearance.

Unfortunately for West German ambitions and villagers’ hopes, village development proved to be a dead end. The Germans put great stock in the cooperative idea, but it was their idea and not that of the villagers, not even in Peki, so it was nothing like the cooperative “self-help” rooted in local communities that the Germans dreamed of. The co-ops in Togo and at Peki failed to turn a profit and in some cases their major assets ended up under state control. Cooperative production was deeply unpopular with members, forcing the Germans to drop it sooner or later. Marketing cooperation had better luck in Dahomey, but the disloyalty of some members in selling outside the co-op
weakened it. The “model village” concept also petered out after causing only confusion in Togo, fading away in Dahomey, and having no influence at all in Ghana.

The goal of turning “traditional” subsistence villages into centers of production for the market faltered. For one thing, some of those communities already had connections to various markets, whether local sales of smoked fish in and around Biriwa, wage work for other development projects near Agou, or professional employment among Peki emigrants like Dr. Ababio who remained involved in their home community. For another, German interference in local agricultural production was misconceived. Conditioned by European historical experience to see through a longstanding “colonial gaze” that made Africans and African methods seem inferior, most Germans failed to appreciate that Togolese, Dahomeyan and Ghanaian peasants were already using best practices for their environment and that row planting in combination with artificial fertilizer, pesticides, and mechanization had little or no obvious advantage over mixed cultivation and manual labor. All these outside inputs required cash payment, and mechanical equipment was useless without secure access to foreign-made spare parts. Furthermore, villagers in and around Kambolé who risked taking German advice by growing cotton in large amounts fell into debt to the co-op when drought killed their plants; they rightly responded by pulling back into subsistence production. Consultant Ruthenberg, writing about Peki, was right when he complained that Europans usually underestimated the rationality of preexisting African practices, but he was in the minority. Facing mostly failure across the board at the village level, the West Germans refused to back down from the presumptions of development aid, that Europeans had all the right technical, scientific and cultural solutions to African problems as defined by
Europeans. Instead the Germans elevated their commitment to the regional level, reducing their already poor ability to correctly “see” and understand individual communities.

Efforts to refashion African homes, hygiene and nutrition were unlikely to have accomplished much. Excepting Balduin Zimmer, German project managers took little notice of family life, and no one seems to have consulted villagers in detail about existing practices. Instead DED development helpers, following in the footsteps of missionaries and colonial social workers, often construed Togolese, Dahomeyans and Ghanaians as possessing inferior knowledge or as simply ignorant or even sunk in helpless resignation and therefore needing outsider inspiration to improve their lives. These volunteers were content to record their impressions, their efforts and the results, whether satisfying or not, but their reports show little evidence of interest in finding a deep understanding of the society they aimed to improve. Here the fault was not theirs, but that of the agency that trained and dispatched them.

In the end, then, development projects and development theater did more for the donor and recipient governments than they did for the beneficiaries. At the expense of taxpayers in both donor and recipient countries, governments basked in the limelight as bringers of prosperity and better living, and officials, experts and counterparts received salaries for their time. Even the minimally paid development helpers earned work experience that might turn into valuable employment elsewhere. Villagers, however, received three blows as well as buildings, goods and service. They had a real need for the improvements and services that official aid brought, but along with it they received the unflattering inferior classification as people to be “developed,” as objects in the
“colonial gaze.” That was the first blow. The second blow was the frequent failure of projects to better their lives as promised, crushing their hopes, wasting their time with unpaid labor or low-paid labor as in Agou, Nuatja, and Peki, stirring up community dissension as at Agou and Peki, and even—at Kambolé—burdening them with debt. The third blow was to be held up to public scorn in newspapers and film as villains responsible for project failure, too primitive in mentality and too lazy to work for their own future. Project celebrations became occasions for leaders of their own governments to bark orders at them. The symbolic gain to governments was their symbolic loss. Villagers fought for tangible gains from development by initiating projects, answering surveys, taking jobs, attending meetings, asserting themselves in complaints and protests and calling on personal connections with either donor or host government, and sometimes they won. In some cases, as in Biriwa for a time, they may even have received some symbolic enrichment from new facilities that put their village “on the map,” but too often they had to pay a price in collective public humiliation.
# Appendix A - Guide to Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>German/French Name</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARAC</td>
<td>Direction Régionale de l’Animation Rurale et de l’action Coopérative</td>
<td>Regional Directorate for Rural Extension and Cooperative Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAW</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Wirtschaft</td>
<td>Federal Office for the Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BfE</td>
<td>Bundesstelle für Entwicklungshilfe</td>
<td>Federal Office for Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BML</td>
<td>Originally, Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten; now Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL)</td>
<td>Originally, Federal Ministry for Nutrition, Agriculture and Forests; now Federal Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMWi</td>
<td>Originally, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft; now Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie</td>
<td>Originally, Federal Ministry for the Economy; now Federal Ministry for Economy and Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Originally, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit; now Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</td>
<td>Originally, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation; now Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOPAC</td>
<td>Coopérative des Agriculteurs de Cambolé</td>
<td>Kambolé Growers’ Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst</td>
<td>German Development Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSE</td>
<td>Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer</td>
<td>German Institute for Developing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Original Name</td>
<td>Current Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAWI</td>
<td>Originally, Garantie- und Abwicklungsgesellschaft; later Deutsche Förderungsgesellschaft für Entwicklungsländer</td>
<td>Originally, Guarantee and Transactional Corporation; later German Promotional Corporation for Developing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
<td>German Corporation for International Cooperation (successor to GTZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
<td>Corporation for Technical Cooperation (successor to GAWI, predecessor to GIZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAT</td>
<td>Office de Commercialisation des Produits Agricole Togolaises</td>
<td>Office for Marketing Togolese Agriculture Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORPV</td>
<td>Organisme Régional pour la Promotion de la Production Vivrière</td>
<td>Regional Organization for Promoting Food Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORAD</td>
<td>Société Régionale d’Aménagement et de Développement</td>
<td>Regional Corporation for Management and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCRT</td>
<td>Union des Coopératives de la Région de Tori</td>
<td>Union of Cooperatives of Tori Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSK</td>
<td>Verband der schweizerischen Konsumvereine</td>
<td>League of Swiss Consumer Associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: SIGNIFICANT PEOPLE IN THE VILLAGE PROJECTS

West Afrika Referat, West German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ)

Adam, first name unknown  Regierungsdirektor
Hansen, Josef  Regierungsrat
Krumpholz, first name unknown  Ministerialrat
Schweiger, first name unknown  Ministerialrat, head of West Africa Referat
Theierl, first name unknown  Oberregierungsrat, later Ministerialrat, head of West Africa Referat

Other BMZ Officials

Börnstein, first name unknown  Ministerialdirektor
Greiff, first name unknown  Referat for Important Church Development Projects, Social-Political Education, and Social Structure Aid
Neumann-Damerau, first name unknown  Agriculture Referat
Ruhenerstroth, first name unknown  Regierungsdirektor, Agriculture Referat
Scheel, Walter  Minister (1961-66)
Schurig, Thomas  Oberregierungsrat, Agriculture Referat

West German Federal Ministry of Forests, Agriculture and Nutrition (BML)

Hoffmann, Inge  Regierungsdirektor
Magura, first name unknown  Ministerialdirigent
Pirkmayr, first name unknown  Ministerialdirigent
Theiss, first name unknown  Ministerialdirigent

West German Embassy Officials

Armbruster, O.  Economic attaché, Accra, Ghana
Haferkamp, Hans Hermann  Ambassador, Lomé, Togo (1974-76)
Hauptmann, first name unknown  Accra, Ghana
Heise, Anna-Margareta  Lomé, Togo
Horstmann, Udo  Ambassador, Cotonou, Dahomey (1967-71)
Karkow, Bodo  Chargé d’affaires, Cotonou, Dahomey
Lüders, Carl-Heinz  Ambassador, Accra, Ghana (1961-63)
Maier Oswald, first name unknown  Chargé d’affaires, Lomé, Togo

1529 Unless otherwise described, all persons without known first names are male. In many cases I have relied on Wikipedia to determine an official’s first name and the dates he held the relevant position.
Motz, Günther
Müller, Helmut
Schaad, first name unknown
Seeliger, Karl Gerhard
Söhneke, Gerhard
Steltzer, Hans-Georg
Von Kameke, Karl August
Von Wistinghausen, Rudolf
Wand, Karl
Weil, Herbert

Ambassador, Accra, Ghana (1977)
Ambassador, Accra, Ghana (1968-74)
Chargé d’affaires, Accra, Ghana
Ambassador, Lomé, Togo (1963-67)
Ambassador, Lomé, Togo (1970-74)
Ambassador, Accra, Ghana (1964-68)
Ambassador, Cotonou, Dahomey (1962-67)
Ambassador, Lomé, Togo (1967-70)
Ambassador, Cotonou, Dahomey (1971-75)
Ambassador, Accra, Ghana (1977-80)

Officials of GAWI, BfE and GTZ

Clemens, first name unknown
Flachs, H.
Kobelt, Volker
Kohout, first name unknown
Müller, first name unknown
Sartorius, first name unknown
Schladitz, first name unknown
Zinkernagel, first name unknown

BfE
GAWI, Agricultural Department
BfE
GAWI
BfE
BfE
BfE
GAWI, Auditor

DED Officials

Dietz, Martin
Reuke, first name unknown
Wöllk, Günter
Zimmerman, first name unknown

Country commissioner for Dahomey
Country commissioner for Dahomey
Country commissioner for Ghana
Country commissioner for Ghana

Consultants

Bodenstedt, Andreas
Büchner, Heinz
Buch, Wolfgang
Friedrichsen, J.
Gall, Kurt W.
Herrentey, Grosse
Jeroch, Michael
Leckscheidt, Joachim
Meschkat, Arno
Rawyler, Frank
Ruthenberg, H.
Simbriger, Fritz
Stangen, Fritz
Thiel, Reinhold E.

Research Office for International Agrarian Development
Interagro
Africa Association
BMZ
BMZ
-
Africa Association
Engineer
FAO
League of Swiss Consumer Associations
-
BMZ
Friedrich Ebert Institute
### Togolese Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adossama, Pierre</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahyi, first name unknown</td>
<td>Director of National Rural Development Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assila, first name unknown</td>
<td>Colonel, Minister of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awutse, first name unknown</td>
<td>Adjutant to District Commissioner of Palimé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagna, Ogama</td>
<td>Minister of Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassah, Jacques</td>
<td>District Commissioner for Kloutou/Palimé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creppy, first name unknown</td>
<td>Cabinet Director for Ministry of Public Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagazi, Barnabé</td>
<td>Head of Service for Bridges, Roads and Airports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djomedea, first name unknown</td>
<td>Director of Industry and Artisanate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogo, Henri</td>
<td>Planning Director, later Minister for Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eklou, first name unknown</td>
<td>Planning Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyadéma, Gnassingbé</td>
<td>President (1967-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grunitzky, Nicholas</td>
<td>President (1963-67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadzı, first name unknown</td>
<td>Head of Artisanate Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kéglo, Simon</td>
<td>District commissioner for Nuatja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kortho, Samon</td>
<td>Minister of Rural Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwadzo, first name unknown</td>
<td>Head of Agou-Gare Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meatchi, Antoine</td>
<td>Vice-President (1963-67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mivedor, Alex</td>
<td>Minister for Public Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympio, Sylvanus</td>
<td>President (1960-63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seddo, first name unknown</td>
<td>Cabinet Director for Ministry of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Têvi, Jean</td>
<td>Minister for Trade, Industry and Crafts</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Dahomeyan Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adotevi, Innocent</td>
<td>Prefect of Atlantic Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djoungou, Mama</td>
<td>Captain, Minister of Rural Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mama, Chabi</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mensah, Moise</td>
<td>Minister of Agricultural Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHinto, Ernese</td>
<td>Sub-prefect of Allada</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Ghanaian Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aboagye-da Costa, A.A.</td>
<td>Ministerial Secretary, Ministry of Social and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acheampong, Ignatius Kutu</td>
<td>Colonel, Ghanaian Head of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adomakoh, Albert</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amedume Joy Kobla</td>
<td>Commander, Central Region Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asante, Kwame</td>
<td>Major, Commissioner for Labor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bernasko, Frank G. Colonel, Minister of Agriculture
Busia, Kofi Abrefa Prime Minister (1969-72)
De Graft-Johnson, Joseph General Manager of Ghana Railways and Harbours
Dontoh, D.J.G. Colonel, Head of Central Region
Dontoh, Elsie Wife of D.J.G. Dontoh
Edusei, Krobo Minister of Agriculture (1963-65)
Hoffmann, Carl S. Senior (later Principal) Medical Officer, Ministry of Health
Kabore, J.A. Colonel, Volta Region Commissioner
Kpodonu, A.S. Volta Region Chief Executive
Okoh, E.K. Secretary to Presidential Cabinet
Quartey-Papafio, first name unknown Chief Settlement Officer
unknown
Safo-Adu, Kwame Minister of Agriculture
Sraha, first name unknown Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture
Wood, Kobina Minister for Labour and Welfare

Notables of Agou, Togo

Agbahay, Dominique Teacher, Chair of Agou cooperative administrative council
Fiatuwo, Michel Member of post-handover project supervisory board
Galevo, Théophile Vice-president of Agou cooperative
Klu, David Member of Agou cooperative
Kodjo, Felix Co-director of Agou cooperative
Kplako, Georges Member of Agou cooperative
Kutowogbe, Gerson Secretary of Agou cooperative
Léléklélé, Edwin Chief of Agou-Agbétiko
Pebi IV Chief of Agou-Dalavé/Nyongbo
Segbé, Gabriel Y. Adviser to cooperative, Ministry of Agriculture
Segbename, Jonathan Treasurer of Agou cooperative
Tsogbe, Josephe Member of post-handover project supervisory board
Viering, Erich Pastor, Bremer Mission
Xodanu, Constantin Member of Agou cooperative

Notables of Kambolé, Togo

Komlan, Robert Farmer, merchant, hauler, chairman of cooperative
Sebastian, first name unknown Director of cooperative

Notables of Tori Cada, Dahomey

Comlan, Paul Chairman of UCRT administrative council
Gbessiho, Dossou Honorary President of UCRT administrative council
Kindonou, Dossou Tcholinou First Vice-President of UCRT administrative council
Hounso, Ignace  
Second Vice-President of UCRT administrative council

Lima, Lucien  
First Secretary of UCRT administrative council

Zinsou, Isidore  
Second Secretary of UCRT administrative council

**Notables of Biriwa, Ghana**

Asoku, Opanin Kojo  
Chairman of Town Development Committee, a/k/a Biriwa Development Association

Dodoo, Kate  
Nurse, Dressing Station

Kwa Bonku IV  
Chief (Nana)

Neequaye, Frank K.  
Manager, Biriwa Project (from 1973), member of Biriwa Development Association

Neiza, Faustina  
Social worker

Unknown name  
Chief Fisherman

Unknown name (female)  
Queen Mother

**Notables of Peki, Ghana**

Ababio, Alexander R.  
Physician, member of Peki Union

Ako-Nai, first name unknown  
Chairman of Peki Project Steering Committee

Akudeka, Victor K.  
General secretary of Peki Union

Amu, E.A.  
Professor at Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, member of Peki Union

Ata, Roland  
Teacher, project co-manager

Ayers, V.K.  
Settler representative, Peki Project Advisory Board

Djamson, Eric C.  
Barrister, secretary to Ghana Commercial Bank, member of Peki Union

Kom, Enoch D.  
Barrister, member of Peki Union

Kwadzo Dei XI  
Paramount Chief (Togbe)

Mensah, J.A.M.  
Reverend

Ocloo, Ester  
Industrialist, member of Peki Union

**Togo Model Villages Project Managers**

Kehrein, Volkmar  
Shipbuilding Engineer, Project Manager in Kambolé (1968-71)

Kobelt, Volker  
Project Manager in Kambolé (1974-76)

Lähne, Heinz  
Carpenter, Project Manager in Agou (1968-74)

Schnellbach, Otto  
Land Machines Engineer, Project Manager (1962-65)

Von der Decken, Hans  
Project Manager (1966-68)

Von der Lühe, Reinhard  
Project Manager in Kambolé (1972-74)
Togo Model Villages Project Workers*

Ammerlahn, Jörg  
Arndt, Peter  
Beckmann, Bärbel  
Burchard, Hans U.  
Clement, Barbara  
Dassio, Luise  
Dassio, Manfred  
Dietsche, Rita  
Erzig (later Hoffmann), Käthe  
Geisberger, Hans-Joachim  
Goronzy, Gerhard  
Hoffmann, Gerd  
Hofmeier, Gerd  
Kotzurek, Rolf  
Kremer, Siegfried  
Metzger, Max  
Posselt, Ulrich  
Strähler, Stefanie  
Weischedel, Detlev  
Zillich, Ehrenfried

DED mason in Kambolé  
DED farmer in Kambolé  
DED worker in Agou  
Engineer for cistern project  
DED teacher in Kambolé  
DED worker in Kambolé  
DED home economics instructor in Nuatja  
DED development helper in Nuatja  
DED merchant/bookkeeper in Kambolé  
Temporary project manager in Nuatja  
DED decorator in Nuatja  
Worker in Nuatja  
DED mechanic in Agou  
Agricultural expert in Kambolé  
DED farmer in Agou  
DED agricultural engineer in Kambolé  
DED instructor in Kambolé  
DED mechanic in Kambolé  
Tropical Agriculture Expert

*This and other project worker lists do not include all workers, only those mentioned in the text of this dissertation.

Tori Cada Project Managers

Dietz, Martin  
Fabricius, Johannes  
Zimmer, Balduin

1969-73, former DED country commissioner for Dahomey  
1968-69  
1963-1968

Tori Cada Village Project Workers

Atakin, Antoine  
Baumann, Bernd  
Bovis, Léopold  
Fassasi, first name unknown  
Chablis, Léopold  
Hansen, Hans  
Heck, Lothar  
Koussanou, Placide  
Malehossou, Jean-Claude  
Mecklenburg, Angela  
N’Djigio, Victor

Dahomeyan agricultural counselor  
DED farmer  
Dahomeyan agricultural counselor  
Counterpart for project manager  
Dahomeyan agricultural counselor  
Cooperative expert  
Cooperative expert  
Dahomeyan agricultural counselor  
Dahomeyan agricultural counselor  
DED home economics teacher  
Dahomeyan agricultural counselor
Neugebauer, Evamaria  DED physician’s assistant  
Ogoundélé, David  Dahomeyan agricultural instructor  
Rebholz, Angelika  DED agricultural assistant  
Richter, Immo  Agricultural engineer, DED volunteer  
Zanouvi, Gratien  Dahomeyan co-manager designate  

**Peki Settlement Project Managers**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boguslawski, Michael</td>
<td>Interim Project Manager (1970)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gall, Kurt W.</td>
<td>Interim Project Manager (1970)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schurig, Thomas</td>
<td>Project Manager (1971-75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulrich, Franz Theodor</td>
<td>Project Manager (1969-70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peki Settlement Project Workers**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dankyi, Samuel Boateng</td>
<td>Ghanaian co-op specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klindworth, Hans-Karl</td>
<td>Cooperative expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luthardt, Hans Jürgen</td>
<td>Mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osei Kwartty (or Kwarteng), Arthur</td>
<td>Agricultural officer counterpart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Biriwa Project Managers**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glinke Hans-Josef</td>
<td>Project Manager (1967-1974)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoffmann, Carl S.</td>
<td>Project Manager (1962-66)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinebudde, Walter</td>
<td>Project Manager (1974-1977+)</td>
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**Biriwa Project Workers**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adu, James K.</td>
<td>Senior clerk to Carl S. Hoffmann, Ghanaian project co-manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameely, R.</td>
<td>DED records officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleinknecht, K.H.</td>
<td>DED engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matern, Norbert</td>
<td>DED mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neequaye, Frank</td>
<td>Ghanaian project co-manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springer, W.</td>
<td>DED mason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winkler, U.</td>
<td>DED mason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Villagers of Agou, Togo**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agbeno, Samuel</td>
<td>Apprentice weaver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent, Koffi</td>
<td>Apprentice mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wéti, Simon</td>
<td>Apprentice farmer, bookkeeper for cooperative administrative council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Villagers of Peki

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abrese, George</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addo-Ofori, George</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlington, Pusuo</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyarku, Georgina</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setyi, John Lamptey</td>
<td>Settler and field manager, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skallagrim, Donkor</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togboe, Okyame</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsigbe, Robert Ata</td>
<td>Settler, Peki-Agbateh</td>
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### Villagers of Biriwa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atta, Kobina</td>
<td>Surfboat worker</td>
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Appendix C
FRG MINISTERIAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
(DED and Host Country Appropriations Not Included)

Togo Model Villages Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount (DM)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Volume $^{1530}$</th>
<th>DM to $^{1531}$</th>
<th>Contemporary $$$</th>
<th>2014 $^{1532}$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>May 30, 1962</td>
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<td>$203,768.84</td>
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<td>$80,402.01</td>
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<td>4.000</td>
<td>$23,750.00</td>
<td>$162,359.91</td>
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<td>636,000</td>
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<td>2,700,000</td>
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<td>21827</td>
<td>3.268</td>
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<td>$520,792.18</td>
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<td>11897</td>
<td>2.700</td>
<td>$29,629.63</td>
<td>$158,758.76</td>
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</table>

9,962,000  Total of Appropriations
Official Total 11,557,000

$^{1530}$ BArchiv B 213
### Tori Cada Project

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Amount (DM)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>DM to $</th>
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<th>2014 $</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>$628,930.81</td>
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<td>92,500(^{1533})</td>
<td>November 30, 1966</td>
<td>4067</td>
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<td>$123,929.00</td>
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**5,577,500 Total of Appropriations**  
**Official Total 4,273,000**  

### Peki Settlement Project

<table>
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<th>Amount (DM)</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>DM to $</th>
<th>Contemporary $</th>
<th>2014 $</th>
</tr>
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<td>32439</td>
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<td>$ 3,590,444.34</td>
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**8,704,000 Total of Appropriations**  
**Official Total 8,704,000**  

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\(^{1533}\) Assigned to Project Number FE 1144 rather than FE 666.
### Biriwa Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount (DM)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>DM to $</th>
<th>Contemporary $$</th>
<th>2014 $$</th>
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<tr>
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1,553,000 Total of Appropriations  
Official Total 1,553,000

25,796,500 Grand Total of Appropriations  
$46,344,066.39
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4067, 4068, 4076, 4078, 4110, 4111, 4112, 4113, 4120, 8910, 11894, 11895,
11897, 20024, 21827, 21828, 32438, 32439, 32442, 32443, 32444, 32445, 32447

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