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Global Justice in a Globalizing World

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Global Justice in a Globalizing Worldⁱ

1. Introduction

Almost half of the world's population lives on what two dollars a day buy in the United States.ⁱⁱ This, predictably, results in horrible suffering and death. By some estimates, 18 million people die from easily preventable poverty related causes every year.ⁱⁱⁱ Still, some maintain that no one is obligated to help the global poor. Many of these people are deeply concerned about freedom from coercion. They believe that no one is obligated to sacrifice their freedom for others. This paper argues, however, that it is precisely because no one should be required to sacrifice their freedom for others that there are significant obligations to the global poor. It suggests that the global institutional system -- the set of institutions and rules that together determine individuals' basic life prospects at the global level -- must enable people to avoid severe poverty. More precisely, this paper defends the *Autonomy Argument*:

- 1) Everyone is subject to a coercive, inescapable, global institutional system.
 - 2) This system must be legitimate.
 - 3) For this system to be legitimate it must do what it can to enable its subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.
 - 4) Most people, to secure this autonomy, must be able to secure some minimal amount of food, water, shelter, education, health care, social and emotional goods.^{iv}
- C) So the global institutional system must do what it can to enable these people to secure these things.

This paper does not provide an account of individual responsibility for bringing about the requisite institutional change.^v Nor does it consider tradeoffs between fulfilling the condition for legitimacy it sets out and other things that matter.^{vi} Nevertheless, this paper sketches the broad outline of a new argument for this condition that is intended to appeal to liberals of all sorts as long as they are deeply concerned about coercion.

2. *The First Premise*

Let us say that an *institution* is an entity that creates, enforces, and/or arbitrates between norms, rules, or procedures governing interaction between individuals or groups.^{vii} Treaties, laws, and conventions are paradigmatic examples of institutional norms, rules, and procedures (henceforth *rules*). The British Parliament, US Department of Homeland Security, the World Court, and the World Trade Organization are institutions. The British Parliament creates treaties. The US Department of Homeland Security enforces laws. The World Court arbitrates between conventions.

Institutional systems are composed of legal, political, and economic institutions and the framework of rules supporting and constraining these institutions. Such systems govern the distribution of fundamental duties, rights, advantages, and disadvantages that result from social interaction.^{viii} States are the clearest examples of institutional systems. Their legislatures create rules, their judiciaries arbitrate between rules, and their executives enforce rules. States' rules govern everything from the distribution of food to the organization of the family.

There is also a global institutional system. The international courts (e.g. the World Court), United Nations (UN), international security organizations (e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and international financial institutions (e.g. the WTO and

International Monetary Fund) are part of this system. So are states, some multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many of these organizations (like the UN and the UK) create international rules, others (like the International Courts and some Treaty Organizations) arbitrate between international rules, and yet others (like the US and NATO) enforce international rules.^{ix} Together these institutions govern everything from the international terms of trade to the security of populations.

Organizations like the International Tennis Association are not part of the global institutional system. Though the International Tennis Association creates international rules, norms, and procedures, it does not govern the distribution of fundamental duties, rights, advantages, and disadvantages that result from social interaction.

Most people can accept the claim that there is a global institutional system.^x Many deny that this system is coercive. So this section will focus on making this case. An institution or rule is *coercive* when individuals or groups violating its dictates are likely to face sanctions for the violation.^{xi} A *sanction* is a punishment or penalty. Coercion usually creates conditions under which the coerced have no good alternative except to do what their coercer wants them to do. This is usually explained by the fact that the coerced are threatened by sanctions.^{xii}

Depending on the kind and amount of coercion and so forth, coercion may or may not undermine autonomy. Usually, it engages the will of the coerced. Consider a paradigmatic case of coercion. Suppose a homeless woman threatens a man with a gun saying “your money or your life.” The man does not literally have to give over his money, though he has no good alternative to doing so and will face severe sanctions if he resists. Rather, the man has to choose to hand over the money.

Still, people can be coerced into doing what they would otherwise do freely. Perhaps the man would have charitably donated money to the homeless woman if he had not been coerced into doing so. Furthermore, institutional systems can be coercive even if they do not coerce anyone into doing anything. If, for instance, a state only creates just laws and everyone willingly obeys, it may still be coercive. The state is subjecting people to coercive laws, though it never has to sanction anyone for disobedience.

There is certainly more to say. A lot hangs on what counts as a violation, a punishment or penalty, and a good alternative in this analysis.^{xiii} Many believe, for instance, that only threats can be coercive while some want to say sanctions can include with-holding an offered good.^{xiv} There is also disagreement about the appropriate baseline relative to which something counts as a sanction. It is not clear, for instance, whether one can be sanctioned in ways that do not violate rights.^{xv} It is impossible, however, to resolve all of the debates about coercion here.

This paper will argue that the global institutional system is coercive by relying upon relatively uncontroversial examples of coercion for its audience. Most liberals who are deeply concerned about coercion will agree that taxation and law enforcement, military and economic sanctions are coercive.^{xvi} Furthermore, if law enforcement, for instance, was primarily carried out by volunteer bounty hunters or external armies, these liberals would not think that law enforcement was less coercive.^{xvii} None of this tells us, however, when an institutional system is coercive.

One feature of coercive institutional systems is that they usually do not restrain themselves to only protecting individuals' rights. At least an institutional system that only protects individuals' rights does not exercise the kind of coercion that requires

(additional) legitimation. To use an example from John Simmons, even “the Third Reich was justified in prohibiting rape and punishing rapists.”^{xviii} Some acts are impermissible violations of individual liberty and these acts can be legitimately prevented by any person or institution even if prevention requires coercion. But most coercive institutional systems do more than this. When they create norms, rules, and procedures governing the use of force, for instance, they prevent people from defending their own rights. Even taking this feature of coercive institutional systems into account, however, drawing a bright line between coercive and non-coercive systems may be impossible.

To get clearer on what makes an institutional system coercive, it will help to examine some of the most clearly coercive institutional systems. Perhaps the least controversial examples of coercive institutional systems are states. Not every rule or institution in the US, Belgium, or Brazil is coercive, but many are. These states often coercively enforce their laws. The US, for instance, indirectly coerces those who violate its rules when it enforces citizen arrests, relies upon bounty hunters, and allows vigilante groups to aid the border patrol. (Although it prohibits people from defending their own rights or the rights of others except in such prescribed ways.) The US exercises direct coercion over individuals when its police officers and military officials enforce its criminal statutes and military rules. Even much weaker states, with poor enforcement mechanisms, are generally characterized as coercive. When people violate state rules they can be, and often are, punished. Coercively collected taxes are also necessary to sustain even non-coercive institutions and rules.^{xix} So, it is reasonable to suppose that other institutional systems are coercive if they contain enough coercive rules and institutions.

On this account, the global institutional system is coercive. Some global rules and institutions are not coercive. Non-binding treaties like the Declaration on the Rights of

Disabled Persons are not in-themselves coercive. Nor are non-governmental organizations that offer only voluntary programs, normally, coercive. There are, however, many coercive global institutions and rules. Many of these rules and institutions do not just aim to protect individuals' liberty.

Consider, for instance, how many of the global rules and institutions governing trade exercise indirect coercion. Institutions like the WTO and the NAFTA impose sanctions on countries that violate property rights or the rules of the market. State institutions and rules enforce these sanctions. The NAFTA sanctioned Mexico for prohibiting Metalclad from operating a toxic waste dump in San Luis Potosi, for instance. Mexico had to pay Metalclad 16 million US dollars in damages.^{xx} The WTO found the US guilty of violating its rules with the Byrd amendment. It allowed prosecuting countries to impose import duties on the US until the US repealed the act.^{xxi} Recently the WTO sanctioned the EU by allowing the US to impose tariffs on EU goods because the EU had used import licensing requirements to support Caribbean banana producers.^{xxii} In many cases, laws passed by states as a result of WTO rulings eventually coerce businesses and individuals into abiding by the rulings.

Or, consider indirect coercion exercised by the UN. The UN Security Council imposes economic sanctions, air traffic controls, and arms embargos on countries and groups within countries that threaten international security. For instance, the UN has sanctioned Rhodesia, Iraq, South Africa, Serbia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Haiti, Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leon, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and groups within Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan.^{xxiii} The UN Security Council also authorizes the use of force against countries threatening international peace. When Iraq invaded Kuwait the

UN authorized the use of force to stop the invasion. The UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force of about 30,000 troops is currently involved in military action in Afghanistan.^{xxiv}

Perhaps what this paper has called *indirect coercion* is not genuine coercion. Consider an analogy. Suppose that a matriarch wants her family to join a club which requires a membership fee. Even if the club refuses to waive the fee, and the matriarch forces her family to join the club, the club does not coerce the family by its rules. Only the matriarch coerces the family.

Although this move may work against some of the examples above, it misses a crucial point. For many countries participation in international trade and organizations is not voluntary in the way that becoming a member of a club is voluntary. Countries often pay significant penalties if they do not abide by WTO, UN, WB, or IMF rules. Sometimes these countries do not have other good options and so are not free to resist these organization's conditions. Highly indebted poor countries facing default, for instance, may have to abide by IMF conditionality. At least in such cases, parts of the global institutional system are indirectly coercing individuals in the way that a man with a gun indirectly coerces someone if he forces another person to threaten the first.^{xxv}

Some might still refuse to grant that indirect coercion is genuine. But, parts of the global institutional system exercise direct coercion as well. UN peacekeeping forces exercise direct coercion by, for instance, taking over territory, patrolling borders, and creating safe havens for refugees. Those who attempt to wrest control from the UN or enter its protectorates or safe zones without permission face sanctions for the violation. Peacekeeping forces have been deployed in places as diverse as Congo, Iran, Lebanon,

Sinai, Yemen, the Golan Heights and Cyprus. Between 1988 and 1999 alone, the UN initiated forty peacekeeping missions.^{xxvi}

Other international institutions also coerce individuals directly. The NATO's role in the Balkans provides an interesting case study. As the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans developed, the UN imposed an arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, a flight ban over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and economic sanctions against Montenegro and Serbia. The NATO enforced these measures. In 1999, when the UN peacekeeping force failed to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, the NATO bombed Bosnia. The NATO then enforced the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement under the auspices of a UN protectorate and brought individuals accused of war crimes to The Hague. It thereby directly coerced, and enabled the court to coerce, individuals. Eventually, the NATO ceded command in Bosnia to the EU, which deployed its own troops.^{xxvii} In restricting the use of force, such international institutions limit others' ability to protect their own rights.

Finally, states exercise a great deal of direct coercion. They collect taxes, punish criminals, and wage wars restricting others' use of force to protect their rights in the process. States, themselves, make up much of the global institutional system.

Furthermore, even parts of the global institutional system that are not in-themselves coercive rely for their existence on coercive rules or institutions. Most of the institutions and rules constituting this system are supported by money raised through coercive taxation. So, it should be clear that the global institutional system is coercive.

Perhaps one could argue that the global institutional system is not coercive because the coercion it exercises and relies upon is not official. After all, coercion by rogue parties or institutions within states (e.g. terrorist organizations) does not make a

state coercive.^{xxviii} And, one could follow Nagel in arguing that, most of the time, parts of the global institutional system do not exercise coercion on behalf of the institutional system or in its name.^{xxix} Rather, there are just a bunch of loosely related institutions exercising coercion willy-nilly in their own best interests.

But coercion need not be exercised on behalf of a coercive institutional system to make the system coercive. To see this, consider what is necessary for a state to be coercive. The coercion the Philippines' local police forces exercises need not aim at maintaining or promoting the Philippines' objectives to contribute to the fact that the Philippines is a coercive state, for instance. The coercion could aim only at promoting a particular local government's aims or at upholding a particular city's rules. So, there is compelling reason to believe that the coercion parts of an institutional system exercise in their official capacity as part of this system contributes to the coerciveness of the institutional system if that coercion contributes to the maintenance of (or at least does not undermine) the system. And much of the coercion parts of the global institutional system exercise is like this. Much of the coercion is exercised in an official capacity and does not undermine but, rather, supports the system. When the UN or NATO use coercion to uphold international law they are (usually) helping to maintain, not undermine, the system. When states use coercion to enforce WTO sanctions or collect money to pay dues to international organizations they are (usually) helping to uphold the global institutional system, not undermine it.

So far this paper has argued that the global institutional system is coercive.^{xxx} The global institutional system is also inescapable. There may be a few small villages that do not yet feel the impacts of globalization. Nonetheless, their inhabitants are still subject to

the force of the global institutional system. The people in these villages cannot occupy any land they like. They cannot trade in any manner they like. They cannot use any resources they like. There are many ways that they can violate international law. There are many ways they can be forced to obey international regulations. Even those living in the world's most remote villages are subject to externalities created by the global institutional system. They cannot avoid air or water pollution created by economic activity in the global market.^{xxxii} Nor can people exit the system by moving to another planet. Unclaimed regions of space are accessible from privately funded spacecraft. Still, one cannot yet buy sustainable habitation on another planet, even with all the money on earth. There is no exit from the global institutional system.

The first premise of the Autonomy Argument follows as long as people are *subject* to an institutional system when the rules of the system apply to them. We can suppose, for instance, that most rules created by the Thai government apply only (or at least primarily) to those in Thailand.^{xxxiii} Global rules, like the law of the sea, on the other hand, have global application. Everyone is subject to the global institutional system. The first premise of the Autonomy Argument follows: Everyone is subject to a coercive, inescapable, global institutional system.

3. The Second Premise

Let us say that an institutional system is legitimate if and only if the system has the right to use coercive force.^{xxxiv} *Legitimacy*, then, is simply a “justification” right to rule through force.^{xxxv} Having a justification right is having moral permission to make coercive rules and give coercive commands.

Understood in this way, legitimacy is a precondition of justice. Other things may be necessary for an institutional system to be fully just. Nevertheless, an institutional system must at least be justified in exercising coercive force over its subjects.

Legitimacy must be distinguished from justified authority.^{xxxv} An institutional system has justified authority if and only if it is legitimate and individuals have a moral duty to comply with its rules.^{xxxvi} Some rights may carry with them correlative duties.^{xxxvii} This paper will not suppose, however, that coercive institutional system has a right to rule through force, its subjects are obligated to obey its dictates.

Any institutional system that is coercive and inescapable must be legitimate. Although this point is relatively uncontroversial, consider a quick argument in its defense that might appeal to liberals deeply concerned about coercion. Following John Locke, one might argue that each person has a natural right to freedom; hence, sane adults cannot be subject to others' commands without justification.^{xxxviii} A coercive, inescapable institutional system must be justified in using coercive force; it must have the right to use such force.

H.L.A. Hart provides one possible way of defending a natural right to freedom. Hart argues that if there are any natural rights, there is a natural right to freedom.^{xxxix} Alternately, one might try to ground the concern for freedom in a concern for individuals' interests or autonomy. But, since the Autonomy Argument is not intended to address skeptics about the importance of freedom, the paper will not say more about this matter.

It is important to be clear that that this section is not claiming that institutional systems that are coercive and inescapable are illegitimate. For all it has said so far, all existing institutional systems may be perfectly legitimate. Furthermore, one can accept

this section's argument and hold that different entities need to satisfy different conditions for legitimacy. What is required to legitimize a state may be different than what is required to legitimize the global institutional system. This section has only argued that coercive, inescapable institutional systems must be legitimate (whatever that entails).

One might argue that, unlike states, the global institutional system does not need to be legitimate. Some things that fundamentally shape individuals' basic life prospects need not be legitimate. Hurricanes, typhoons, and earthquakes, for instance, can shape the fortunes of individuals and communities but they do not need to be justified. Perhaps the global institutional system is more like a natural disaster than like a state.

Although the impacts of natural disasters are often inescapable and significant, natural disasters are different from institutional systems in some important respects. Natural disasters are not the result of human agency. So they cannot be coercive. The global institutional system, on the other hand, is coercive. That is why the Autonomy Argument applies to the global institutional systems while it does not apply to natural disasters.

Some statist would probably object that the global institutional system is less developed than most states and, so, need not be legitimate.^{x1} The global institutional system does not have well developed enforcement mechanisms. It has few executive and judicial bodies. Perhaps if the global institutional system were the equivalent of a world state, statist would agree that it has to be legitimate. But, they might argue that, as it is, statist might reject this conclusion.

The global institutional system is less developed than many states. It is not clear, however, why the fact that the global institutional system does not constitute a world

state is supposed to show that it need not be legitimate. The objection does not provide a reason to question the argument given for this conclusion. The intuition underlying the second premise of the Autonomy Argument is just this: If all people are free and equal what justifies some in inescapably coercing others? That the coercers' organization does not constitute a state (as statist point out) does not alleviate the need for some justification. Nor will pointing to other features of states that the global institutional system lacks suffice to make this case. One can point out that states exercise coercive force in the name of their subjects in a way the global institutional system does not, for instance.^{xlii} But this fact does not entail that the global institutional system need not be justified in exercising coercion.^{xliii}

4. *The Third Premise*

Many things might be required for legitimacy. A legitimate institutional system might need to treat people equally. It might need to embody a commitment to reciprocity, publicity, free speech, or due process. To be legitimate an institutional system might have to give the disadvantaged a significant stake in the system.^{xliiii} It might even need to give all people equal status, respect, consideration, resources, or opportunity for welfare.^{xliiv}

This section will argue that, to be legitimate, coercive institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Let us call this the *enabling condition*. Consider some of its components.

First, consider what it means to say that institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. What is necessary here is what is realistically achievable.^{xliv} A system does not lose legitimacy if it does not enable someone to secure a basic minimum of autonomy if this person does not have the

potential to secure such autonomy.^{xlvi} When they are very young, children are not capable of securing any autonomy at all. Most children who receive proper care will be able to secure a basic minimum of autonomy as they get older. If no one else does so, a legitimate institutional system must help these children secure such autonomy once they are old enough.

Next, what is necessary to *enable* people to secure a basic minimum of autonomy? Institutional systems must do what they can to ensure that their subjects *become and remain autonomous until and unless they autonomously relinquish their ability to do so*. This account of *enabling* plays a large role in the Autonomy Argument. So it is worth emphasizing that what is necessary for one to secure the relevant components of autonomy will vary with the case. It depends on how close one is to being able to secure such autonomy and what resources one already has. In cold climates, for instance, one may need to be able to secure heat. In the tropics, heat is usually unnecessary. Some will be able to secure a basic minimum of autonomy as long as they are free from interference. Others, however, need assistance to be able to do so. The coercive institutional systems to which these people are subject may have to provide this assistance. If, for instance, one is in a coma from which one could recover with proper medical care and one is not receiving such care from friends, family, or benefactors then the institutional systems to which one is subject must provide it.

Next, what is necessary for someone to secure *a basic minimum of autonomy*?^{xlvii} Though the paper will say more about what this requires below, the idea is this: One must be able to reason about, make and carry out some significant plans on the basis of one's desires, beliefs, values, and goals (henceforth *commitments*). To secure a basic minimum

of autonomy one need not be perfectly autonomous. One need only possess a few *reasoning and planning conditions* for autonomy.

Other conditions may be necessary for a fuller conception of autonomy. For, if people are autonomous when they can reason and create some significant plans, I could autonomously endorse a desire to be a slave or to have my left foot burned off.^{xlvi} As Hume said, “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”^{xlix}

Here, however, it is good to appeal only to the reasoning and planning conditions for autonomy for that will allow us to secure broad agreement on the enabling condition of legitimacy. For then, no one can reject the enabling condition for legitimacy because the conditions for autonomy it relies upon are too demanding. Those who accept fuller (e.g. Kantian) conceptions of autonomy might run a similar argument for more significant obligations to the global poor.

There are two parts to the above condition for legitimacy. First, it embodies the claim that coercive institutional systems can only be legitimate if as many of their subjects as possible secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Second, it embodies the claim that such institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure this much autonomy. It is possible to defend the first claim by appeal to the nature of liberalism (leaving the possibility constraint implicit where its importance is minor). The second claim follows from the first and some observations about the nature of enabling and the global institutional system.

Defending the First Part of the Enabling Condition

At the heart of liberalism is the concern for individual freedom. Recently liberals have focused primarily on arguing that coercive institutional systems must be decent, if not fully just.¹ An equally powerful strand in liberal thought, however, expresses the idea that the *actual* relationship between the rulers and *each person* who is ruled must be voluntary in some way.

Liberals deeply concerned about individual freedom disagree about what makes the relationship between the rulers and ruled voluntary, but they all agree that this relationship can only be voluntary if the ruled possess at least some freedom. The kind of freedom at issue here is not overly expansive or limited. This freedom is not constituted by the social order but it is compatible with significant constraints on social life.ⁱⁱ The key idea is that subjects must be free to determine their actions and shape the nature of their relationship with the system to which they are subject.ⁱⁱⁱ Although individuals may not have a choice of whether or not they are subject to a coercive system, they must be able to exercise some control over the way they react to their subjection. Subjects should get to decide whether or not to abide by, dissent from, or consent to coercive systems for themselves.ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Political liberals almost unanimously agree, for instance, that people have a right to dissent from the rule of their institutional systems by conscientious objection, non-violent protest, passive resistance, and so forth.

To consent to or dissent from their institutional systems in these ways, people must be able to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans in light of their beliefs, desires, values, and goals; they must be able to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.^{liv} So liberals implicitly accept the first claim embodied in the enabling condition for legitimacy; those living under coercive institutional systems must be able to

secure a basic minimum of autonomy for their system to be legitimate. William Kymlicka puts the point this way: “liberalism is committed to (and perhaps even defined by) the view that individuals should have the freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their community, should they come to see them as no longer worthy of their allegiance.”^{lv} Further argument is necessary to show that coercive institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure sufficient autonomy.

Defending the Second Part of the Enabling Condition

The previous section argued that when institutional systems subject people who cannot secure a basic minimum of autonomy to coercive rules and do not do what they can to enable their subjects to secure this autonomy, they are illegitimate. This is because such institutional systems are not justified in exercising coercive force over those who could, but have not, secured a basic minimum of autonomy. Yet such institutional systems exercise such force. From here it is a short step to the enabling condition for legitimacy.

If institutional systems continue to exercise coercive force, legitimacy requires that they do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Coercive institutional systems do, necessarily, continue to exercise such force. So, coercive institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.

We might put the point this way. The following claim follows from the previous sub-section’s argument: For coercive institutional systems to be legitimate, they must either 1) stop coercing people or 2) do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a

basic minimum of autonomy. Because coercive institutional systems are *coercive* institutional systems they will not 1) stop coercing their subjects. So, 2) they must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.

One might object that even if institutional systems wrongly subject people to coercive rules, they need not do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Consider an analogy. Suppose someone who is not autonomous, let us call her Tamil, agrees to give me a large sum of money. I do not thereby have a duty to do what I can to enable Tamil to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. I merely fail to have a contract with her. Tamil has not, by agreeing to give me a large sum of money, incurred an enforceable debt to me. If I were to try to enforce the agreement on Tamil, I would act wrongly. But, as long as I do not try to extract any money from her, I have no obligation to her.

This objection does not undercut the argument for the conclusion that coercive institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure such autonomy. Though, the objector may be right about Tamil's case. If I do not try to extract any money from Tamil I may have no obligation to her. Similarly, if an institutional system stopped subjecting people to coercive rules, it might not need to do anything to enable its subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. The problem is that the objection does not appreciate the nature of *coercive* institutional systems. Such systems can be legitimate *only if* they do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Insofar as *coercive* institutional systems continue to exist, they *continue* to subject people to coercive rules. Coercive institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure this autonomy because they will not cease

subjecting people to their rules (if they did, they would cease to be coercive systems). Consider a better analogy to illustrate the import of these observations. Suppose I find out Tamil is incapable of autonomously agreeing to give me her money and do not go elsewhere. Rather, I continue to coerce her. In this case, I act illegitimately unless I get her free consent to give me the money (which, by supposition, requires enabling her to autonomously agree). Similarly, coercive institutional systems, because they continually subject people to coercive rules must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Otherwise, they cannot be legitimate.

One might worry that this response relies on a false premise. According to the response, coercive institutional systems can be legitimate *only if* do what they can to enable their subjects to secure sufficient autonomy. Perhaps relatives or charities can enable these people to secure these components of autonomy. Sticking with the analogy, the objection would be that Tamil may be able to secure sufficient autonomy (and freely consent to the loan) without my enabling her to do so. Perhaps her family or others involved in charitable work can do so instead. I may be able to legitimately enforce the contract without enabling Tamil to secure the relevant components of autonomy.

This objection has some truth in it. Others may be able to enable those subject to a coercive institutional system to secure sufficient autonomy. Others may even have primary responsibility for doing so. Nevertheless, the objection misunderstands the nature of *enabling*. Enabling is like being a lender of last resort. If people secure this autonomy on their own or with the help of friends and/or benefactors their coercive institutional systems can enable them to secure autonomy without doing anything. Institutional systems must step into the breach, however, if help is required. It is only if coercive

institutional systems do this that as many of their subjects as possible will secure sufficient autonomy. Coercive institutional systems must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure this autonomy. This is the only way such institutional systems can be legitimate in our imperfect world.

As noted above, there may be other conditions for institutional legitimacy as well. So, coercive institutional systems may be justified in doing other things before enabling their subjects to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Suppose, for instance, that to be legitimate, institutional systems have to be democratic. In our world, trade-offs between fulfilling this condition for legitimacy and the enabling condition will almost certainly be necessary.^{lvi} For, even standard protections of autonomy are expensive. Suppose that voting booths are essential for maintaining a democracy but not for enabling people to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Suppose that elementary education is essential for individuals to develop the ability to autonomously consent but not for maintaining a democracy (not all people have to be able to participate in a democracy). It might be acceptable to use resources to purchase voting booths before hiring teachers. Nevertheless, standard protections of autonomy should have a good deal of priority. Autonomy is a component of welfare and a precondition for many other things to have value.

Chandran Kukathas might object that a legitimate institutional system must only preserve freedom of conscience for all. Freedom of exit from a coercive institutional system is sufficient to preserve freedom of conscience. People can have freedom of conscience without being able to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.^{lvii} Kukathas

concludes that people need not be able to secure such autonomy for their institutional systems to be legitimate; they need only be free to exit.

Although there may be something to this objection, it is not compelling at the global level. Recall that there is no exit from the global institutional system. So Kukathas' argument must either be rejected or the global institutional system must be eliminated. Freedom of exit might be created by establishing self-sufficient societies subject to no jurisdiction other than their own rules. But it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate the global institutional system and establish self-sufficient societies that do not affect each other. Aspects of the global institutional system might change or go out of existence, but it is hard to imagine its total dissolution.

Furthermore, most of those broadly sympathetic to Kukathas' arguments are libertarians who will not find the idea of dissolving the global institutional system appealing. Libertarians often argue that a global institutional system is desirable.^{lviii} Most want to establish liberal property law internationally. They cite global collective action problems, externalities, and efficiency arguments for global institutions. It requires a less radical revision of the traditional libertarian view to accept the minimal freedom-based requirements for legitimacy defended here than it does to dissolve the global institutional system. And, at least as long as the global institutional system exists, the enabling condition for legitimacy applies to it. The global institutional system must do what it can to enable everyone to secure at least a basic minimum of autonomy.

5. The Fourth Premise

The final premise of the Autonomy Argument is this: Most people must at least be able to secure some minimal amount of food, water, shelter, education, health care, social

and emotional goods to secure a basic minimum of autonomy. Before examining this premise, consider the sort of *autonomy* as a prerequisite for free action at issue.

Recall that, to secure the sort of autonomy at issue, people must at least be able to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans on the basis of their commitments. What does each of these components of autonomy require?

For one to reason on the basis of one's commitments, one just needs some instrumental reasoning ability. Some hold much more demanding conceptions of rationality on which saying that autonomy requires the ability to reason would be controversial. Kant, for instance, thinks that reason requires each of us to acknowledge the categorical imperative as unconditionally required.^{lix} This much is not necessary, however, to secure the basic minimum of autonomy at issue. One only needs the ability to do some instrumental reasoning.^{lx}

To make some significant plans on the basis of one's commitments one need not plan one's whole life or every detail of one's day. Rather, one must be able to navigate through one's day without too much difficulty and make general plans for the future. One must not be, like Joseph Raz's proverbial man in a pit or hounded woman, constrained to making plans only about how to meet one's basic needs.^{lxi} Though one might not choose to exercise this ability, one must have the planning ability necessary to pursue the projects one values, to pursue a good life as one sees it. This ability requires a kind of internal freedom one can have even if subject to external constraint. Internal freedom is roughly the capacity to decide "for oneself what is worth doing," one must be able to make "the decisions of a normative agent"; to recognize and respond to value as one sees it.^{lxii} One must be able to form some significant plans that would work if implemented.

One must be able to make some significant plans that one could carry through if free from external constraint.^{lxiii}

Finally, to carry out some significant plans one must have some external as well as internal freedom.^{lxiv} External freedom is roughly freedom from interference to pursue a “worthwhile life.”^{lxv} One must have enough freedom from coercion and constraint to carry out those actions necessary to bring some significant plans to fruition.

The qualifier *some* is important for this reason: One need not be able to carry out every significant plan that one might want to carry out to have this component of autonomy. Still, the ability to carry out *some significant* plans is a necessary component of the kind of autonomy at issue in the Autonomy Argument.

One might object, however, that this sort of autonomy is a Western ideal. One might argue that it is incompatible with the kind of concern for community and care central to many non-Western countries. So, one might conclude, it is inappropriate for evaluating non-Western institutions.

The conception of autonomy at issue here, however, is not particularly Western. It is compatible with concern for community and care. So there is little reason to suppose it is inappropriate for evaluating non-Western institutions. To see this, suppose Emal is a devout Muslim. He wants to live his whole life according to his faith. Occasionally he wants to drink with the other young men who live in his neighborhood. Fortunately, he is able to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans on the basis of his competing commitments. Emal might autonomously decide, for instance, that his desire to be a good Muslim is much stronger than his desire to drink and, thus, never drink at all. So Emal has the components of autonomy at issue in the Autonomy Argument.^{lxvi}

Although the conditions for autonomy set out above require further defense, the Autonomy Argument should go through as long as one accepts that this much is necessary for autonomy. For, the remainder of this section will argue that people need food, water, shelter, education, health care, social and emotional goods to secure this kind of autonomy.

Consider, first, how those who lack basic food, water, and health care are likely to suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities. Malnutrition inhibits one's immune system's ability to fight infection and poor nutrition is linked even more directly to many non-infectious illnesses.^{lxvii} Those without basic preventative health care (e.g. immunizations) are at risk for many of these illnesses. And those who cannot secure essential medications (e.g. dehydration salts and antibiotics) are likely to be disabled by these diseases. Often the diseases those who lack basic food, water, and health care acquire result in severe disabilities, sometimes they result in death.^{lxviii} The very sick and dead are obviously incapable of securing a basic minimum of autonomy.^{lxix}

Similarly, if people lack adequate shelter they are likely to suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities. Those without adequate shelter may be exposed to environmental hazards including disasters, pollutants, parasites, and bacteria (e.g. in flood water or unsanitary living conditions).^{lxx} These "hazards are responsible for about a quarter of the total burden of disease worldwide, and nearly 35% in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa."^{lxxi} Bed nets alone could prevent a lot of autonomy undermining illness.^{lxxii}

Less obviously, those without basic education, emotional and social goods may suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities.^{lxxiii} Basic education, emotional, and

social goods are often necessary for securing decent living conditions, health care, livelihood opportunities, and earning power.^{lxxiv} Those who lack (formal or informal) elementary education may not develop or maintain the reasoning and planning skills they need to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.^{lxxv} Those who lack basic emotional and social goods are at high risk for mental and physical illness, suicide, and early death from other causes.^{lxxvi} “Fear, insecurity, dependency, depression, anxiety, intranquility, shame, hopelessness, isolation and powerlessness... such experiential elements of a bad life...[often impact]agency.”^{lxxvii} Most people must be able to secure basic education, emotional, and social goods to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.^{lxxviii}

If one accepts only the conditions for autonomy defended here, most people can secure a basic minimum of autonomy as long as their minds do not become clouded. It is true that some people are able to secure a basic minimum of autonomy without being able to obtain some minimal amount of food, water, shelter, education, health care, social and emotional goods. But, this kind of severe deprivation will undermine most people’s ability to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans on the basis of their commitments. Most people must be able to obtain some minimal amount of food, water, shelter, education, health care, social and emotional goods to secure a basic minimum of autonomy.

6. *Conclusion*

Many people resist the idea that there are any obligations of justice to the global poor. If the Autonomy Argument goes through, these people are mistaken. Legitimacy, a precondition of justice, requires that the global institutional system do what it can to enable those with the potential to secure a basic minimum of autonomy to do so. To

secure such autonomy, most people must be able to secure some minimal amount of food, water, shelter, education, health care, social and emotional goods. So, the global institutional system must enable these people to secure these things. Though much more than this is probably required, this is a significant conclusion in a world where 18 million people die annually of easily preventable poverty-related causes.^{lxxix}

i Acknowledgements with-held to preserve anonymity.

ii World Bank. "2005 World Development Indicators." World Bank: Washington D.C. Available at:

<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section1_1_1.htm>.

iii World Health Organization (WHO). 2004. *The World Health Report 2004*. WHO: Geneva. Available at: <www.who.int/whr/2004>. Annex Table 2

iv For accounts of basic needs see: Gillian Brock. 1998. *Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others' Needs*. Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.: New York. For other cosmopolitan arguments regarding obligations to the poor see: Allen Buchanan. 1990.

"Justice as Reciprocity vs. Subject-Centered Justice." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 19, No. 3: 227-252. Simon Caney. 2002.

"Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples." *The Journal of Political Philosophy*. Volume 10, Number 1: 95-133.

Thomas Pogge. 2005. "Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation." *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?* Thomas Pogge ed. Oxford University Press: Oxford. The Autonomy Argument is most similar to Thomas Pogge's

argument. It does not rely on the contentious premise that the global institutional system is harming the poor, however. Rather, it starts from the premise that the global institutional system is coercive and inescapable. Something liberals, deeply concerned about

individual freedom are likely to accept.

v States might bear primary responsibility for ensuring that their subjects can secure things like food, water, and medical care, while international institutions and individuals only have secondary duties to help states ensure that their subjects can secure these things.

Alternately, individuals and international institutions may have primary responsibility for bringing about the requisite change.

vi I discuss some such tradeoffs elsewhere. See: Reference with-held. Also see discussion that follows.

vii Allen Buchanan. 2004. *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*. Oxford University Press: Oxford. P. 2.

viii Such a system is similar to Rawls' basic structure except that my use of *institution* may be closer to Rawls' use of *association* than his use of *institution*. As this paper uses the term, an *institutional system* does not require cooperation. It merely requires social interaction. For discussion of this change and Rawls' use of *institution* see: Thomas Pogge. 1989. *Realizing Rawls*. Cornell University Press: New York.

ix Parts of the global institutional system have changed or gone out of existence in the past fifty years. The League of Nations has been transformed into the United Nations. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is now the World Trade Organization. Still, the global institutional system has persisted. Eliminating an institution like the World Bank or International Monetary Fund would alter the global institutional system, not abolish it. See: Andrew Hurrell. 2001. "Global Inequality and International Institutions." *Global Justice*. Thomas Pogge ed. Meta-philosophy Series in Philosophy A.T. Maroobian and Brian Huschle eds. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford. P. 36

x See, for instance: Mathias Risse. 2005. "How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?" *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 33. 9-10. One might argue that the global institutional system must be a corporate agent to bear obligations. But this is not clear if the system is a fundamental part of the normative and coercively enforced institutional backdrop against which persons interact. So long as it is an object of moral evaluation we can ask whether it is organized consistent with the demands of the right (whether it is legitimate) just as we can ask whether the rules of a military game backed by coercive force are legitimate. Acknowledgement with-held.

xi For further discussion of coercion and its moral significance see: Gerald Gaus. 2003. "Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle." *Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory*. Steven Wall and George Klosko eds. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: New York.

xii Mathias Risse. 2006. "What to Say about the State." KSG Working Paper No. RWP06-008. Harvard University: Cambridge.

xiii Scott Anderson. 2006. "Coercion." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/>>.

xiv Ibid.

xv Ibid.

xvi Gerald Gaus. 2003. "Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle." *Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory*. Steven Wall and George Klosko eds. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: New York.

xvii State rules are often enforced indirectly through local police forces, bounty hunters and, at least historically, by the victims of a crime or the victims' agent. In Viking-age Iceland, for instance, tribunals sometimes allowed victims to punish the perpetrators of a crime.

xviii John Simmons. 1999. "Justification and Legitimacy." *Ethics*. Vol. 109, No. 4: 770.

xix Ibid explains in more detail why state governments are coercive. The same reasoning shows that the global institutional system is coercive.

xx Lori Wallach. 2005. "Slow Motion Coup d'Etat: Global Trade Agreements and the Displacement of Democracy." *Multinational Monitor*. Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2. Available online at: <<http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2005/012005/wallach.html>>.

xxi European Union. 2005. "U.S. Congress Repeals Byrd Amendment but Allows for a Transition Period. No. 128/05. Available at: <<http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005128.htm>>.

xxii British Broadcasting Company. 1999. "WTO Approves Banana Sanctions." Available at: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/322938.stm>>.

xxiii Adam Roberts. 2001. "United Nations." *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. Second ed. Edited by Joel Krieger. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

xxiv United Nations. 2003. Press Release SC/7894. "Security Council Seeks Expansion of Role of International Effort in Afghanistan, to Extend Beyond Kabul." Security Council 4840th Meeting (PM) 13/10/2003. Available at: <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7894.doc.htm>>.

xxv Even if individuals' states have other options and are thus partly responsible for coercing their people, the global institutional system may still be acting wrongly. Knowing how states are likely to act, it may not be acceptable for the global institutional system to act in the way that it does. But this paper will set this point aside.

xxvi Adam Roberts. 2001. "United Nations." *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. Second ed. Edited by Joel Krieger. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

xxvii NATO. 2007. "What's on NATO's Agenda?" North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/#>>.

xxviii At least not if the state took reasonable efforts to prevent the coercion.

xxix Thomas Nagel. 2005. "The Problem of Global Justice." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 33, No. 2. 113-147.

xxx Even if this conclusion is incorrect, an analogue to the Autonomy Argument may apply to the coercive institutions (and institutional systems) that are part of the global institutional system.

xxxii Acknowledgement with-held to preserve anonymity.

xxxiii The rules regulating immigration raise questions here. Does a Thai rule prohibiting immigration apply to the same people as a Thai traffic law? For now, suppose that immigration laws only apply to those who are not Thai when they reach or reside within that state's boundaries. Were non-citizens to enter the state's territory they would be ejected. Certainly immigration laws are not enforced upon non-citizens when they reside outside of the state.

xxxiiii Legitimacy, as this paper will use the term, comes in degrees. Some people believe legitimacy is an all or none affair. This is not a substantive disagreement. Those who hold a binary theory of legitimacy can specify that an institutional system is legitimate in the binary sense if it surpasses a threshold of legitimacy in the degree sense. However, the degree conception allows for different thresholds to be specified for different purposes. For the purpose of what follows, one need only suppose that imperfectly legitimate systems must be reformed. Acknowledgement with-held to preserve anonymity.

xxxv Robert Landenson. 1980. "In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 9, No. 2: 134-159.

xxxvi Thomas Christiano. 2004. "Political Authority." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/>>.

xxxvii Allen Buchanan. 2004. *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*. Oxford University Press: Oxford. P. 237.

xxxviii John Simmons. 1979. *Moral Principles and Political Obligations*. Princeton University Press: New Jersey.

xxxix John Locke. 1690. *Second Treatise on Civil Government*. 1990. C.B. MacPherson ed. Hackett: Indianapolis.

xl H.L.A. Hart. 1955. "Are There Any Natural Rights?" *The Philosophical Review*. Vol. 64: 175-191.

xli Thomas Nagel. 2005. "The Problem of Global Justice." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 33, No. 2. 113-147.

xlii Ibid.

xliii The global institutional system is a fundamental part of the normative and coercively enforced institutional backdrop against which persons interact. So, there is reason to believe they it is an inappropriate object of moral evaluation. And, as long as the global

institutional system is an appropriate object of moral evaluation, we can ask whether it is organized consistent with the demands of the right (whether it is legitimate) just as we can ask whether the rules of a military game backed by coercive force are legitimate.

xliii Andrew Hurrell. 2001. "Global Inequality and International Institutions." *Global Justice*. Thomas Pogge ed. Meta-philosophy Series in Philosophy A.T. Maroobian and Brian Huschle eds. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford.

xliv For different accounts of legitimacy: Gillian Brock. 1998. *Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others' Needs*. Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.: New York. Allen Buchanan. 1990. "Justice as Reciprocity vs. Subject-Centered Justice." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Vol. 19, No. 3: 227-252. Simon Caney. 2002. "Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples." *The Journal of Political Philosophy*. Volume 10, Number 1: 95-133. Thomas Pogge. 2005. "Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation." *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?* Thomas Pogge ed. Oxford University Press: Oxford..

xlv As is common in political philosophy, I am interested in policies that could be implemented in the real world for (and by) real people in the foreseeable future.

xlvi If institutional systems simply lack the resources to enable everyone who has the potential to secure a basic minimum of autonomy to do so, then further restrictions will be necessary. I discuss these issues in: Author, 2008a. Reference with-held.

xlvii An exception might be made for those who violate some just laws.

xlviii Acknowledgement with-held to preserve anonymity.

xlix David Hume. 1969. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Penguin Books: New York. p. 463.

l See: John Rawls. 1993. *Political Liberalism*. Columbia University Press: New York. Also see: Thomas Pogge. 1989. *Realizing Rawls*. Cornell University Press: New York.

li Jeremy Waldron. 1987. "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism." *Philosophical Quarterly*. Vol. 37. No. 147: 133.

lii Ibid pp. 132.

liii Ibid pp. 146.

liv This does not mean that freedom cannot be shaped by society in important ways. Society can have a great influence on individuals' preferences, for instance, without undermining individuals' ability to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans. Acknowledgement with-held to preserve anonymity.

lv Will Kymlicka. 1992. "The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas." *Political Theory*. Vol. 20, No. 1: 142

lvi These tradeoffs would be particularly difficult if what fulfills one condition for legitimacy makes it more difficult to fulfill another condition. Before worrying about such tradeoffs, however, it is important to get clear on just what legitimacy requires in the first place. I leave inquiry into such matters for another time. See, however: Author. 2008b. Reference with-held. Also see: Author. Forthcoming. Reference with-held.

lvii Chandran Kukathas. 2003. *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

lviii Loren Lomasky. 2007. "Liberalism Beyond Borders." *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*. Vol. 44, No. 3. P. 206.

lix See: Thomas E. Hill Jr. 1989. "The Kantian Conception of Autonomy." *The Inner Citadel: Essays on Autonomy*. John Christman Ed. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Also

see: Onora O'Neill. 1986. *Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development*. Allen and Unwin: London.

lx If, however, one also accepts a more robust conception of (e.g. Kantian) autonomy, the argument below should still go through.

lxi See: Joseph Raz. 1998. *The Morality of Freedom*. Clarendon Press: Oxford.

lxii James Griffin. 2006. *Human Rights: The Incomplete Idea* (Working Draft). Oxford, Corpus Christi College: Ch. 7.

lxiii There are many ways of starting to make sense of this idea. One might, for instance, analyze the ability to make some significant plans on the basis of one's commitments in terms of the ability to make one's motivating commitments generally coherent. Alternately, one might give a decision-theoretic analysis of planning in terms of a consistent preference ordering. Yet another option is to cash out the ability to make some significant plans on the basis of one's commitments in terms of ordering one's ends perhaps by drawing on John Rawls' work on plans of life. See, for instance: John Rawls. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Belknap Press: Massachusetts. Also see:

Michael Bratman. 2005. "Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency." *New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy*. James Stacy Taylor ed.

Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Acknowledgement with-held to preserve anonymity.

lxiv James Griffin. 2006. *Human Rights: The Incomplete Idea* (Working Draft). Oxford, Corpus Christi College: Ch. 7.

lxv Ibid.

lxvi The conditions for autonomy I have set out do not prevent one from acting from poor reasons (e.g., wishful thinking). If one thinks this is not compatible with autonomy, additional criteria for autonomy will be necessary to rule out this possibility.

Ixvii Scurvy results from a lack of vitamin C, beri-beri from a lack of thiamine, pellagra from niacin deficiency, and macrocytic and microcytic anemia from folic acid and iron deficiencies, for instance. There is also a lot of evidence that decent nourishment is important for good cognitive functioning. Children's mental functioning can even be impaired if their mothers do not receive proper nourishment during pregnancy. Keratomalacia which results from vitamin A deficiency, kwashiorkor which results from protein deficiency, and iodine deficiencies can all lead to severe disabilities and death. See: Howard Leathers and Phillips Foster. 2004. *The World Food Problem: Tackling the Causes of Undernutrition in the Third World*. Lynne. Rienner Publisher: Colorado.

Ixviii Ibid.

Ixix The feedback loop between malnutrition and illness also goes in the other direction – illness can promote dietary deficiencies just as dietary deficiencies can promote illness.

Ibid.

Ixx Those who must live in unsanitary conditions are likely to contract diseases like dysentery, tetanus, typhoid, cholera, or hepatitis. Red Cross, 2007. "American Red Cross Urges Public Health Precautions." Red Cross: Washington D.C. Available at: <http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/0,1077,0_172_4554,00.htm>.

Ixxi World Health Organization, 2007. "10 Facts on Preventing Disease Through Healthy Environments." World Health Organization: Geneva. Available at: <http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/environmental_health/en/index.html>.

Ixxii Bed nets can prevent many cases of dengue fever and malaria, for instance. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007. "Vector Control." Center for Disease Control and Prevention: Atlanta. Available at: <http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/control_prevention/vector_control.htm>.

Ixxiii See: Michael Woolcock. 2001. "The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes." *Isuma*. Vol. 2, No. 1. Available at: <http://www.isuma.net/v02n01/woolcock/woolcock_e.shtml>. Also see: Rodger Doyle. 2002. "Calculus of Happiness: Assessing Subjective Well-being Across Societies." *By the Numbers*. Scientific American. November.

Ixxiv Michael Marmot. 2004. *Status Syndrome: How your Social Standing Directly Affects your Health and Life Expectancy*. Bloomsbury: London.

Ixxv Stress may contribute to a host of autonomy-undermining mental disorders. Stress can, for instance, cause panic attacks and depression. Psychological disorders can reduce the ability of one's immune system to fight infection. See: David B. Beaton. 2003. "Effects of Stress and Psychological Disorders on the Immune System." Rochester Institute of Technology Working Paper. Rochester

Institute of Technology: New York. The causal evidence suggests that perception of low social standing may increase stress which reduces immune functioning and can harm health in other ways as well. Also see: *Ibid*.

Ixxvi See: Michelle Cullen and Harvey Whiteford. 2001. "Inter-relations of Social Capital with Health and Mental Health." *Mental Health and Special Programs Branch Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care Discussion Paper*. Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care: Canberra. See also: Michael Woolcock. 2001. "The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes." *Isuma*. Vol. 2, No. 1. Available at: <http://www.isuma.net/v02n01/woolcock/woolcock_e.shtml>. Finally, see: Christopher G. Hudson. 2005. "Socioeconomic Status and Mental Illness: Tests of the Social Causation and Selection Hypotheses." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. Vol. 75, No. 1: 3–18.

Ixxvii Those who lack self-esteem are more likely to develop some devastating psychological problems. Karen Brock. 1999. "It's Not Only Wealth that Matters it's Peace of Mind Too': Review of Participatory Work on Poverty and Illbeing." Institute of Development Studies: Birmingham.

Ixxviii It is worth noting that the global institutional system might not need to enable some people to obtain an education sufficient to secure a decent job if they provide these people with other things that enable them to secure a basic minimum of autonomy e.g. food stamps and free health care. In our world, however, most people will have to secure this much education to secure this much autonomy.

Ixxix World Health Organization. (2004). "WHO 'Preparing for Treatment' Programme." Call for Tenders to WHO. Annex Table 2. World Health Organization: Geneva. Available at: <<http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/arv/en/index.html>>. Although I will not argue for this conclusion here, institutional systems must also allow individuals to meet their basic needs in a decent, legitimate way. No one should have to scavenge under burning heaps of garbage to survive.