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Aditya Nagarajan
Carnegie Mellon University

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The Final Frontier:
The Middle East and the Challenge to American
Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century

By

Aditya Nagarajan

College of Humanities and Social Sciences
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Introduction

In the spring of 1984, an Irish band on the verge of breaking through to superstardom was making its way through America. On the third leg of an international concert tour and not yet able to afford to travel across the country on an airplane, they were relegated to traveling from show to show on a tour bus. Starting from Dallas, Texas, they criss-crossed the continent numerous times as they finally made their way to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. By this time, the band had seen the Southwest, the Deep South, New England, the Midwest, and the West Coast. The trail they followed was unconventional, but still allowed them to see a landscape that few Irish people, let alone most Americans, get to see in a three-month period. The band's lead singer, an ambitious 24-year-old former chess prodigy, decided to try to capture the essence of the country he witnessed as their tour bus rolled from coast to coast and up and down the Mississippi River. The singer strummed along with the band's lead guitarist, a gangly 23-year-old who had a penchant for wearing jeans ripped at the knees, and together they wrote "Heartland" – a song later featured on the album *Rattle and Hum*. This five-minute ode to America attempted to delve beneath the glitz and glamour of New York City and Hollywood. On all future American tours, this band, known as U2 to the world, would fly from city to city, but their epic road trip through rural and urban America had a deep impact on these musicians from a small island. U2's following album, *The Joshua Tree*, would contain numerous references to the underside of America and the rejuvenating and cleansing effect it has on individuals.

U2's feel for America, as outsiders looking in, is not an anomaly. Dinesh D'Souza, an Indian who immigrated to the United States at the age of 17, relates in his

work, What's So Great About America? (2003) that the country's many freedoms are inviting to immigrants and are among the primary reasons that a nation founded by immigrants continued to accept immigrants who played indispensable roles in the growth of the nation. The United States has historically attracted myriad immigrants to its coastal ports, leading towards extensive cultural interaction and to its international reputation as a "melting pot." But why America? What makes the United States such a preeminent destination for many citizens of the world? Although some would point to its more than two centuries of political stability or its continual economic strength, the lure of America reaches further. England's political institutions, for example, have remained relatively consistent for the past two centuries. Moreover, the nineteenth century saw the rise of an immense British Empire, whose size was reminiscent of the Roman Empire. Yet, despite these qualities, the poetical "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" set their sights on the "Land of Opportunity." It would be impossible to pinpoint one quintessential aspect of the American experience, but political theorists have conjoined a range of possibilities into the concept of "American Exceptionalism" – a phrase used in common by those who believe, doubt, celebrate, or deplore the idea behind it.

American Exceptionalism is the belief that the United States was predisposed to power and prosperity, because of its purportedly unique historical origins, national credo, geographic advantages, and/or its political, religious, or economic evolution. A definitive assumption of American Exceptionalism is that the United States – and it alone – exhibits this phenomenon, although other nations may exhibit variants or pieces of it. Recent historical literature emphasizes that American Exceptionalism does not equate to the superiority of the United States *vis-à-vis* other industrialized nations. However, such

nuances did not characterize the earliest scholarly work on which the concept is based. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thinkers did suggest that the relatively young nation was predestined to eventually take its place among the world's great nations and empires.

The historian Dorothy Ross, in her 1991 book The Origins of American Social Science, identified three strains of American Exceptionalism as it has been articulated over three centuries. The first is the providential explanation: God bestowed His divine grace upon the United States from its earliest colonial times. God had chosen the nation to serve as an exemplar of the utopian society for the rest of the world. This is illustrated most clearly in the venerated "City upon a Hill" sermon preached in 1630 by the Puritan leader John Winthrop, who envisioned a new society to purify Christianity and show the Old World how to create a godly and orderly society. The second strain is the genetic interpretation: the United States is said to benefit from a unique diversity of race, ethnicity, and other physical characteristics of the populace. The third strain that Ross finds is the environmental interpretation: the geography, climate, and resources gave the United States all the conditions necessary for its success. All three possess a certain element of truth, yet none encompasses the whole concept of American Exceptionalism.

Indeed, this thesis identifies a fourth major strain which is responsible for the creation of this nation as a whole. This fourth aspect is the cultural interpretation. The empirical evidence in this study will illustrate that one of the defining characteristics of early Americans was their enduring distrust of central and federal government, which became a fundamental feature of society and American culture. This distrust of government was neither providential, genetic, nor environmental; rather, it was cultural –

grounded in beliefs and values born of experience during the formative years of the nation. However, this cultural strain of American Exceptionalism evinced a sudden shift in the middle of the twentieth century. Beginning in the Progressive Era and especially during the Great Depression, Americans began to rely more on the federal government. The shift continued after World War Two, compounded by the effects of a “smaller” (more globally integrated) world and by a geopolitics that seemed to justify policies of promoting American ideals and virtues towards other nations. Whether it be in the form of creating liberal democracies modeled after the United States’ Constitution or the commercial “Coca-Colonization” around the globe, the U.S. has moved away from the traditionally isolationist foreign policies of its first 175 years and towards a more hawkish and pre-emptive approach, supplanting self-defensive (albeit naïve) stances like verbal declarations such as the Monroe Doctrine with self-interested, aggressive interventions.

After World War II, the United States began to increase its global involvement, based on its self-assigned role as international sole guardian of liberalism and democracy – a role predicated on the idea of American Exceptionalism, expanded to include defending the world in the world. Moreover, it was the responsibility of the United States to defend against totalitarian threats like fascism and now communism. Many smaller nations acquiesced to the dominance of the United States under the condition of its protections. Thus, American Exceptionalism remained a prominent aspect of international relations from 1945 till August 2001. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. began interacting with the Middle East on a greater degree. Within a year and a half, engaging in a two-front war to quell against Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, the U.S. undertook the political and economic reconstruction of two different countries.

These two nations are vastly different societies and, as of April 2007, the United States has been fundamentally unable to build coalitions of the factions within either country under a unified leadership. The United States has had a difficult time balancing majority rule and the protection of minority interests in both of these nations, as well as just establishing (much less keeping) the peace. This has opened up the debate to why the West and the Middle East have historically been at odds in the diplomatic process since the end of World War II. For example, while democracies have slowly emerged in many places since 1989, why have nations in the Middle East barely progressed towards liberalizing their policies, economies, and cultures? Are the tenets of Islam diametrically opposed to democracy? Can American-style capitalism thrive in the Middle East without American-style democracy, given that democracy and capitalism are conjoined in the overall theory of Exceptionalism?

Most importantly, what role, if any, has that theory played in the supposed emergence of “two sides” and in the rising hostilities between them? Numerous Muslim writers point to the United States’ presence in the Middle East, arguing that it has further exacerbated anti-Americanism in the region. Contemporary political scientists Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington have offered two conflicting paradigms for framing and answering these questions. Fukuyama famously asserted in The End of History and the Last Man (1992) that the end of the Cold War proved unquestionably that liberal democracy and free market capitalism are the penultimate political and economic institutions of the world that have empirically displayed long-lasting and effective success. Thus, other nations can only prosper if they acknowledge the dominance of the American system and structure their own economic and political systems accordingly. On


the other end of the spectrum, Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations (1996) argues that the West and the Islamic society found in the Middle East and North Africa are of two fundamentally opposed civilizations which are headed towards mass-scale conflict. When examining the actions of the United States in this region within the context of American Exceptionalism, the massive democracy promotion undertaken by numerous administrations has neglected to incorporate in its diplomacy the cultural impact of fundamental Islam on democracy. Many around the world charge the United States with arrogance and chest-thumping and thus with causing the anti-Americanism that is increasingly expressed. However, Fukuyama's and Huntington's viewpoints are mistaken in that both take ideologically extreme views without allowing for the possibility for any reconciliation.


My hypothesis of the cultural strain of American Exceptionalism places strong emphasis on the value of minority opinions and willingness to accept differences. If the United States and the Middle East are going to make any progress in calming tensions and bridging gaps, both sides must recognize that cultural divides are not overwhelming and irresolvable. Rather, every culture is a further showcase of human experience and vibrance that should be celebrated. Cultural pluralism is a positive and possible goal that can be accomplished in the Middle East, but leaders in the region must also acknowledge that they can no longer accept being ostracized from this growing interdependent world. Remaining closed off from their surroundings will only further impede their own economic progress. They must recognize that, for them to succeed in the integrated twenty-first century, their national borders must be porous religiously, politically, economically, and, most importantly, culturally.

This thesis begins with an empirical examination of early conceptions of American Exceptionalism. Analyzing the early roots of the belief in the divine fortune of the United States, the earliest form of distrust in centralized and federalized authority becomes evident in Puritan communities and colonial America. Next, I discuss alternative theories and explanations of American Exceptionalism. Within this discussion, I attempt to show the explanatory power of a cultural interpretation, both in discussing the subject and illuminating the flaws in competing models. From here, the thesis explores the cultural strain of American Exceptionalism: Alexis de Tocqueville's two-volume Democracy in America (1835/1840), an epic analysis of the uniqueness of American culture. Writing primarily for European readers, Tocqueville tried to explain how America's landscape, populace, economy, and political structure differed from the old world. Although he did not use the phrase American Exceptionalism, he argued that these complex but profound differences – rather than the more obvious turn from monarchy and aristocracy -- were creating a remarkable new culture in America quite unlike anything known in Europe.

After introducing Tocqueville, I will backtrack to the early national period that influenced his conclusions. In the last two decades of the eighteenth-century, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates dominated the new country's politics and determined the strength and reach of the federal government. This outcome was the purest expression of the distrust of government, an attitude that fundamentally differentiated American democrats from European aristocrats.

The next section analyzes the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, who at the end of the nineteenth century surveyed the culture Tocqueville had begun to discern more

than fifty years before. Turner's classic (and career-making) essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893) hypothesized that the "closing" of the West marked the beginning of the end of the environmental conditions that had brought forth American Exceptionalism. As if on cue, the western and southern rural ulist movement of the 1890s made a last stand to localize and decentralize power from an ascendant federal bureaucracy back into the hands of individuals and states. But this movement would see a quick demise in the twentieth century, when corporate industrialization, world war, and economic volatility gravitated against a passive approach by the federal government.

Within forty years of Turner's assessment, the Great Depression registered a seismic shift in the groundings of American Exceptionalism. By 1950, the founders' distrust of centralized power had given way to ulatory governance and imperial diplomacy – bent on the international promotion of capitalism and democracy, in that order. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, mastermind of what his biographer and disciple Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., dubbed The Imperial Presidency, combined industrial reform and social welfare to right the economy and address the plight of Americans who were suffering poverty and unemployment. This domestic policy of assertiveness would soon expand into the diplomatic arena, where the Department of State would begin to flex its muscles across the world.

Within this context, I weigh the merits and flaws of Fukuyama's and Huntington's theories. I will use their contrasting perspectives to frame my own central concern: how the assumptions and traditions of American Exceptionalism have affected the ongoing crises in the Middle East. Here, finally, I aim to reveal the analytical (and

perhaps even the diplomatic) usefulness of a cultural interpretation of American Exceptionalism. By interjecting selected voices of Islamic authors from the Middle East and North Africa into this final section of my thesis, I hope to provide a greater understanding of the anti-Americanism which is found in their respective communities. American Exceptionalism may have outlived the Old West, but can it survive this new and final frontier, the Middle East?

The Birth of American Exceptionalism

Shortly after Christopher Columbus had gone back to Spain to regale the Spanish royal court of the wondrous riches that awaited Europeans in the New World, hordes of Europeans came to America. For example, Juan Ponce de León came to Florida in the early 16th century to try and find the fountain of youth. Already, many Europeans began to associate the New World as possessing infinite youth and the secrets to the problems that plagued the Old World. However, though Europeans had landed on the shores of America in the sixteenth century, primarily other Spanish explorations off the coast of Florida, many Americans associate the founding of the country with the landing of colonists in Jamestown, Virginia in 1607 and the Puritans on Plymouth Rock, Massachusetts in 1620. The Puritans believed in predestination, whether an individual was a member of the elite or not, and often looked for signs of God's benevolence in their daily lives as an indication of the future of their immortal souls. After the turbulent voyage to the New World, "The colony at Massachusetts Bay they believed had been singled out by God as an entire community of the saved or the elect; within the terms of salvation-history this community had been charged with a special destiny—to establish

the conditions of a pure and uncorrupted church that would ensure the salvation of all Christians.” (Madsen, 3) Already, at one of the earliest stages of history in America, inhabitants of this frontier colony believed that the land had been endowed with an intrinsic wealth that the Puritans would reap as a result of their chosen status.

This may seem as an affirmation of the providential interpretation that Dorothy Ross suggests, as one of the three fundamental strains of understanding American Exceptionalism. The Puritans did look towards God as giving them the good fortune of a country as full of resources as America. But, this only indicates a very superficial understanding of their origins. In fact, the cultural background of the Puritans is responsible for their providential outlook upon arriving in Massachusetts. During their time in England, they were socially ostracized and viewed as a fringe religious group. But when coming to the United States, the Puritans sought to create a society which would be a reformed community, and their culture greatly influenced the qualities they wanted in this community. These were the humble origins of American Exceptionalism. For example, the Puritans strongly believed in original sin, which was the belief that Eve corrupted Adam in Eden and that human beings afterwards were born punished for this sin. This led to a strong level of subjugation of women within the community, whether it be the manner in which they dressed or the opportunities afforded to even speak in Church. This would heavily influence the treatment of women in the United States for the next four centuries, for women were not given the right to vote until 1920. But most importantly, Puritans stressed an individual relationship with God, meaning that individuals were responsible for themselves to develop a connection and dialogue with God. This was a reaction to the Catholic Church, which insisted on the intermediary of a

priest or other church official for all holy relations, such as the giving of the sacraments. Whereas the Catholic Church insisted on a highly centralized institution based in Rome, the Puritans preferred local parishes that would encourage, and even demand, that individuals reform themselves through constant and deep introspection. This early religious form of decentralization would become the norm in the United States once it was to form its political government.

American Exceptionalism remained dormant during the years that the United States was under colonial rule in the British Empire. However, many American colonists acknowledged that the American colonies were different from their peers in the Commonwealth, and thus this should qualify them special treatment over others. Americans systematically refused to pay increased taxes, even though they were levied for the benefit of the United States. The British would use the revenues for military protection of the colonies, and these taxes were not unusual in comparison to other British colonies in the New World. Also, the basis and justification of the American Revolution was the unhappiness that the Founding Fathers felt that their colonies were being ruled by a distant ruler on the other side of an ocean. The highly concentrated power, which seemed unaccountable to the opinions and interests of the colonists, was a strong objection that many Americans had with the British Empire. Though they benefited from the mercantilist economy that the British Empire afforded them, they could not ignore their ideological protests. Again, the reason for why such a viewpoint even existed in the first place was the culture that was fostered in the United States. The British Empire allowed for a great deal of local decisions to be made within the continental United States. This only further bred a culture of independence and

individuality, while fostering a great disdain for a Parliament where they had no representation to voice their opinions.

The nineteenth century also saw two divergent opinions of the West in the United States. As will be illustrated later by Frederick Jackson Turner, the frontier played an integral role in the minds of Americans, as it was a persistent phenomenon throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. With westward expansion, through the formation of territories and accumulation of states, the United States was growing at an unprecedented rate after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. One of the views that was espoused during the period was that the West was a discontinuous body of the East that needed to be reconnected with its roots. Artwork reflecting this interpretation of the West, such as “The Emigration of Daniel Boone” by Claude Regnier, illustrates the lack of history that the West suffered from. Despite the new elements of the West, these paintings yearned to continue to include the effect God’s graces would have on the settlers. In a very abstract sense, the rationalization was that the Christian light accompanying the settlers would destroy the darkness that previously existed. This thinly veiled exhibition of racism towards Native Americans came in the form of Manifest Destiny and this “... legitimated (or indeed demanded) the destruction of the wilderness as an obstacle to civilisation and with it dependent populations such as the bison but also including Indians. Exceptionalism, in the form of Manifest Destiny, legitimated the destruction of everything that stood in the way of expanding the institutions and culture of American democracy.” (Madsen, 92)

On the other hand, the competing interpretation of the West was one that perceived it as essentially a tabula rasa. According to this view, the West was a

continuous extension of the East and only awaited earnest settlers to bring about the same institutions of democracy. Artists' renderings from the period show an idyllic West, with large expanses of unadulterated land and forests with glimmering sunsets, illustrating the hidden potential of the country. "America defined by the civilisation of the eastern Atlantic seaboard versus the America of the West is interpreted as a struggle that the West cannot win; like the wilderness, the West itself becomes an inevitable sacrifice to the nation's predestined future." (Madsen, 94) However, throughout the discussion, there is no mention of whether or not the United States would be able to ever finish its quest to have a nation from "sea to shining sea." Rather, the collective imagination viewed such expansion as the fulfillment of America's duty. Now where that sense of duty arises from is the root of American Exceptionalism. As Madsen articulates, it was believed that it was the responsibility of Americans to bring about democracy to the rest of the continent, and the only mechanism by which this could be achieved was through the execution of Manifest Destiny. Thus, early on, through paintings, literature, and other works of art, American culture began to idealize the West as a conquest yet to be completed. This would become an essential component of the American psyche, and the high prioritization of expanding America geographically would become the justification for even the killings of an entire people. Either way, the new territories that would join the Union were based off similar origins as that of the Puritan communities. They would initially have their own governments, and only years later would they be finally assimilated into the rest of the country. But during this time that they were still classified as a territory, a localized independence was fostered, and these territories would often times enter the Union with the belief that the federal government in Washington, DC

could not effectively govern the people as well as the state governments. Such was the delicate balance of federalism which was treacherously maintained in the nineteenth century between the federal and states governments.

Alternative Interpretations of American Exceptionalism

The United States is naturally in an exceptional position, as it was the first colony west of Europe to throw off the shackles of European colonialism. Though Haiti would follow soon by declaring independence in 1804, the United States would not possess the same social stigma that Haiti would in diplomacy with Europe. Though viewed as an insubordinate colony that somehow received independence through an overextended British Empire, the wealth of resources and possibilities for future financial stability could not be understated and made it a powerful player in the global market.

Again, the historical origins of the United States was built from a strong sense of individuality. Much of the literature that surrounded the ideological debate supporting an armed resistance to British colonialism stressed the nonsensical aspect of a British monarch with little ties to the American mainland. The non-responsiveness of the British Empire, mainly caused by the inability of information to travel quickly enough from the eastern seaboard to London and then back, necessitated home rule, according to revolutionaries. As a result, one of the fundamental aspects has been that “The emphasis in the American value system, in the American Creed, has been on the individual. Citizens have been expected to demand and protect their rights on a personal basis. The exceptional focus on law here as compared to Europe, derived from the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, has stressed rights against the state and other powers. America began

and continues as the most anti-statist, legalistic, and rights-oriented nation.” (Lipset, 20) Lipset may be somewhat overstating the “anti-statist” aspect of the American, especially in light of the histories of many nations around the world who have been unable to maintain a stable system of administration over centuries. However, the fact that the United States is “the most anti-statist, legalistic, and rights-oriented nation” that still retains a durable government is difficult to ignore. Lipset’s primary methodology of illustrating American Exceptionalism is to utilize Europe as his primary basis for comparison to the United States as he sees the greatest similarities between these two areas. According to Lipset, if the United States can still retain a sense of individuality even amongst seemingly identical matches, then the argument of American Exceptionalism is only further crystallized.

For all intensive purposes, the birth of American Exceptionalism as an actual element of the nation’s history can only begin at the American Revolution. Though the colonies which would eventually develop into the United States possessed a unique identity as one of the most viable colonial experiments, independence finally left the United States unencumbered of direct European influences, allowing it to cultivate its own distinct identity on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. But this sense of displacement cannot be underestimated as well. The United States of America is a country of immigrants which has to continually deal with the estrangement from their homelands. Whereas other countries had the benefit of drawing upon a common and shared experience, the diverse American population was compelled to find another source of commonality of which to base the country. In other words, “In Europe, nationality is related to community, and thus one cannot become un-English or un-Swedish. Being an

American, however, is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American values are un-American.” (Lipset, 31) Here marks an essential aspect of American Exceptionalism. The United States truly marks a distinctive country, with one of the primary characteristics being the combination of three significant races within the country. The U.S. is one of the few countries that had to deal independently with the triad of white Europeans, black Africans, and Native Americans. Other countries in the New World would inevitably tackle such issues, but it would not be until, at the earliest, the middle of the nineteenth century that they would gain their independence and autonomously confront these dilemmas. As Frederick Jackson Turner explicates, the frontier pushed the boundaries of America, as white Americans perpetually interacted with Native Americans. Then, as the land under the domain of the United States grew, the argument for the expansion of slavery and its subsequent approval necessitated a larger framework of compulsory African American labor. But the genetic interpretation falls short when considering the expansion of the United States. Though the issue of expanding slavery into states westward was a very contentious issue in the United States, slaves would only enter territories in a widespread scale after entrance into the Union. Territories were still formed around urban settings that had male dominated gender ratios and were still primarily white. These are the areas of the country that were the most staunch in its defense of its individual and independent status. Also, a cultural interpretation presupposes this for the mindset of the people dictated how to deal with the different races on the continent.

Another aspect of American Exceptionalism that demands further exploration is the area of economics in the United States, as the sheer massive economic strength of the

United States is staggering. With a Gross Domestic Product that outnumbered the sum of roughly half the world, the United States has achieved a level of financial dominance that the world has rarely seen. Many attribute this to the abundance of natural resources that are found in the United States, particularly its variety which allows for a certain degree of self-sufficiency and eliminating the possibility of a massive trade deficit which ails many countries such as Japan. But even this is much too simplistic of an answer for it fails to account for other empires of past, notably the British Empire, which also held large tracts of land over the world. Thus, there are undoubtedly other lurking variables that would contribute to the phenomenon. One of which is the strong sense of meritocracy that was instilled in the early republic. Alexander de Toqueville himself articulates in Democracy in America that one of the primary preoccupations of the American mindset was the continual accumulation of wealth. However, a stark contrast is that, "...unlike Europe, [America] did not require its lower strata to acknowledge their inferiority, to bow to their superiors." (Lipset, 53) Along with the formal banishment of bequeathing hereditary titles in the Constitution and the informal names granted to the President, the highest office in the land, this ideological statement of social equity gets to the heart of the American ideal, that any individual is capable of succeeding in this country, given that they are willing to put in the effort to pull themselves up by their "bootstraps." However, this would not be possible if the United States does not foster an economic environment that allows for the nurturing of novel ideas in even the poorest of minds. The early American economic model is one that was characterized by Thomas Jefferson's laissez-faire, a financial theory that demanded little to no interference from a government agency in the hopes of allowing the economic framework to operate uninhibitedly. In fact, one

manifestation was that the “Concern for an open and competitive society was reflected in the emergency of the concept of the common school in the nineteenth century.” (Lipset, 54)

A Frenchman in America

Alexis de Tocqueville’s primary objective in his Democracy in America was to translate to his European audience a comprehensive background and historical analysis of the United States in the context of the global community. Throughout his travels, he searched for the definitive quality in the United States that would provide a great deal of insight into what composed the American personality. However, as he attempted to find characteristics that his European peers would understand in their estimation of the intrinsic nature of the United States, Tocqueville found that he was unable to find a common language that adequately described the United States. As he articulated, most countries originated from a shared heritage and culture, which also was tempered by outside influences. This combination and juxtaposition, according to Tocqueville, make it impossible for an accurate prediction of future events. However, “America is the only country in which we can watch the natural quiet growth of society and where it is possible to be exact about the influence of the point of departure on the future of a state.” (Tocqueville, 26) Tocqueville is implicitly invoking Thomas Hobbes’ “state of nature,” which he briefly depicts in Leviathan. Though Hobbes’ and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of the state of nature dramatically differed, Tocqueville references this inherent quality of the United States, to evoke sensations of how the United States was a pure and untainted environment, allowing for the relatively precise forecasts of the future

of the state. Though not explicitly alluding to Rousseau, Tocqueville does describe Rousseau's interpretation of the state of nature, who articulated that individuals in the state of nature were neither good nor bad. In fact, they were completely unaware of either as they had not had any dealings with others. The negative consequences that arose from people's behavior were the direct results of the products of constructs of human interaction. Tocqueville goes so far as to state that "America shows in broad daylight things elsewhere hidden from our gaze by the ignorance or barbarism of the earliest times," in which Tocqueville may be referring to the historical situation of Europe. (Tocqueville, 26)

As the essential thesis of his work, the primary crux of his argument is to explicate the reasoning behind what democracy in the United States was. As a democracy was an emerging form of self-government, it necessitated further scientific and political criticism for the European nations, whose form of government had been dominated by feudalistic and monarchial orders. Tocqueville's objective was to understand the basis and surrounding environment in which this blossoming democracy emerged. He points to two main reasons for this occurrence. First, the formulation of this country by immigrants was a defining characteristic of democracy as "... one may say, speaking generally, that when the immigrants left their motherlands they had no idea of any superiority of some over others." (Tocqueville, 27) Though not applicable as a blanketing generalization, many communities that sprung up in America as a result were composed of recent immigrants who were the lower classes of the hierarchal societies in their expatriated countries. From 1620, immigration into the country always existed and even grew over the long term. The second factor that Tocqueville points to is a definitive rejection of

territorial aristocracy which, in his position, formed the basis of the European system of superiority over others. It was the direct ownership of land that allowed for the suppression of others, as the land, at the time, was the strongest source of employment and income. America's commitment to producing an equitable distribution of land and proper respect of property rights granted opportunities to the rich and the poor to succeed and prosper. Tocqueville repeats numerous times that a proper understanding of how a government is sovereign to the will of the people would require a closer examination of the political environment of the United States of America. Of course, at the time, the United States was the only nation that was experimenting with a full-scale democracy at this large of an extent. In fact, Tocqueville claims that "The people reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe. It is the cause and the end of all things; everything rises out of it and is absorbed back into it." (Tocqueville, 53)

Tocqueville aims to describe that these sources are the point of divergence of what he terms "Anglo-Americans" from their European brethren. One attribute of the American populace that he believes is intrinsically different from its European peers is the "social condition" of the American citizenry, which is eminently democratic. One of the fundamental bases of aristocracy according to Tocqueville is the strong concentration of wealth and its continued possession. After a long discussion of how land ownership is passed through the generations, Tocqueville points to a unique condition in the United States. He finds that "It is not that in the United States, as everywhere, there are no rich; indeed I know no other country where love of money has such a grip on men's hearts of where stronger scorn is expressed for the theory of permanent equality of property. But wealth circulates there with incredible rapidity, and experience shows that two successive

generations seldom enjoy its favors.” (Tocqueville, 47) Though Tocqueville concedes that there is immense wealth in American in sum, there are few and sparse wealthy men, forcing all individuals to take up a profession or occupation for sustenance. Also, America allows for the unique possibility of actual economic mobility through the classes, as the financial and economic infrastructure of the country allows for even the most impoverished, yet industrious, to accumulate wealth throughout the course of their lives.

It would be a strong mischaracterization that Toqueville’s analysis is composed solely of glowing recommendations to his European audience. Though he does extol many virtues in the American experiment in democracy, there are many areas of government in which he feels that the American approach is somewhat misguided. This is most clearly evident in his analysis of the American emphasis on decentralization. Tocqueville subtly denounces France and England for their high levels of centralized power and its inability to be adequately responsive to the needs of the citizenship. By the same token he uses Germany as a key example of what could potentially happen as a result of the failure to centralize power. Germany and its natural and industrial resources would seem as an ideal candidate for success in the global community, economically and militarily. But the inability of Germany to consolidate its power is its main obstacle, according to Tocqueville. Tocqueville may have been proved accurate for it was not until Otto von Bismarck unified all the neighboring principalities in Germany and Prussia under one rule did it truly achieve the status of a world power. In any event, Tocqueville lauds the United States for its efforts towards decentralization. As per his discussion of townships, municipal administration, and state governments, Tocqueville explains that

“... I [Tocqueville] am persuaded that in that case the collective force of the citizens will always be better able to achieve social prosperity than the authority of the government.” (Tocqueville, 81) Despite this, Tocqueville asserts there are many circumstances and situations, particularly those requiring collective actions, which are better suited for a strong centralized government authority, such as the case in the Great Depression which will be discussed in greater detail further in this thesis. Despite this emphasis on decentralization, Tocqueville remarks that he can sincerely appreciate the effects that decentralization has had on the peoples of America. Though it could potentially seem that such decentralization would favor a highly localized interest, prioritized over national concern, Tocqueville finds that “Each man takes pride in the nation; the successes it gains seem his own work, and he becomes elated; he rejoices in the general prosperity from which he profits. He has much the same feeling for his country as one has for one’s family, and a sort of selfishness makes him care for the state.” (Tocqueville, 85)

Tocqueville spends a great deal of time of describing this bottom-up approach that he believes indicative of an overall sentiment he found in the United States. This emphasis on nationalistic projection from local hopes and dreams is a quality that Tocqueville finds admirable and non-existent in Europe. The absence of these feelings in Europe is one of the primary reasons for why Tocqueville spends a great deal of time explicating these emotions. Especially since during Tocqueville’s era, Europe was seeing many different governments being formed as a result of the people overthrowing their unresponsive representatives, most notably in Tocqueville’s home country of France. Though Tocqueville warns of the impending dangers of such a diverse population, he believes that the United States would be immune to these problems as the government on

the national level is involved at such a minimal rate. As a result, "...things and ideas circulate freely throughout the Union as through one and the same people. Nothing restrains the soaring spirit of enterprise. ... The Union is free and happy like a small nation, glorious and strong like a great one." (Tocqueville, 148) However, Tocqueville remains unconvinced of particular elements of the system of the United States. Though Tocqueville is envious of certain aspects of the United States, "I [Tocqueville] refuse to believe that, with equal force on either side, a confederated nation can long fight against a nation with centralized government power." (Tocqueville, 155) When competing against the monarchial nations of Europe, the United States cannot contend on a macro-level.

Tocqueville continues his study into the American politic by delving into the system of representative democracy in the United States. As one of the firsts of its kind, the United States and its unique system of electing officials warranted a special analysis by Tocqueville, especially into what natures the general populace look for in their political officials. Obviously, Tocqueville makes general comparisons to its European counterparts and finds that it is markedly different from the European system of the aristocracy electing from within their own. Innate in this political structure is the quality that Tocqueville finds very enamoring. Tocqueville finds that "There is therefore at the bottom of democratic institutions some hidden tendency which often makes men promote the general prosperity, in spite of their vices and their mistakes, whereas in aristocratic institutions there is sometimes a secret bias which, in spite of talents and virtues, leads men to contribute to the afflictions of their fellows." (Tocqueville, 216) Tocqueville touches on this point briefly numerous times, but he finds consistently that an essential aspect of the United States' political identity hinges on the self-sacrifice of individuals.

Just as their European peers may often times supercede their personal interests, Tocqueville seems impressed that the American representatives seem to subjugate their personal desires in the eventual hopes of pushing forth the common good. This special characteristic of the United States is, in his opinion, one of the defining qualities that will allow the United States to avoid the pitfalls that succumbed many European nations. Tocqueville found that “The common man in the United States has understood the influence of the general prosperity on his own happiness, an idea so simple but nevertheless so little understood by the people. Moreover, he is accustomed to regard that prosperity as his own work.” (Tocqueville, 218) Compound this assertion with the earlier statements made by Tocqueville where he expounds on the virtues of the common man assuming political responsibility in the United States, and it becomes obvious that the American system is fundamentally different from its peers.

In providing a general summary of the reasons for why the United States was able to maintain a democratic republic, Tocqueville points to many different characteristics that are unique to America. Under a very broad and abstract term, Tocqueville asserts that there indeed exists a “... peculiar and accidental situation in which Providence has placed the Americans.” (Tocqueville, 255) He first remarks upon the geographical location of the United States. The very isolated situation of the United States allows it to avoid many of the wars that have constantly plagued Europe throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, with no external threat to their national security to fear, the United States political system can focus completely on sustaining this experimental form of government. In conjunction with the plentiful and abundant natural resources, Tocqueville argues that the United States is in the unique position that it does not have to fend off economic competitors

militarily to the same extent European nations had to. Despite giving many different specific reasons for America's propensity for success, Tocqueville believes that "Among the lucky circumstances that favored the establishment and assured the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States, the most important was the choice of the land itself in which the Americans live. Their fathers gave them a love of equality and liberty, but it was God, by handing a limitless continent over to them, gave them the means of long remaining equal and free." (Tocqueville, 257) Again, this passage exemplifies Tocqueville's repetitive beliefs that the finite nature of Europe puts it at a disadvantage when compared to the seemingly infinite opportunities that America presents to its people. With a passage to the western coast yet to be found, America seemed, the land of renewal and opportunity, appeared never-ending.

Tocqueville continues also to discuss the independent and creative nature of the American populace. By first describing that the primary means by which the United States is expanding is the forward westward movement of immigrants, Tocqueville explains that the American culture cultivates and encourages a free-spirit to follow his dreams and passions, affording the possibilities of greater success upon individual and personal motivation and initiative. To Tocqueville, this gives a very sociological explanation for the low levels of population density found on the eastern seaboard in America, notably Connecticut, as opposed to England which as tripled in a similar timeframe. This is where a cultural interpretation of American Exceptionalism provides the most insight. Tocqueville exclaims in an apparently fervid revelation that "In Europe we habitually regard a restless spirit, immoderate desire for wealth, and an extreme love of independence as great social dangers. But precisely those things assure a long and

peaceful future for the American republics. Without such restless passions the population would be concentrated around a few places and would soon experience, as we do, needs which are hard to satisfy.” (Tocqueville, 262) According to Tocqueville, this difference in interpretation of vice and virtue identify fundamental distinctions in social mores and what each culture values. America values the individual entrepreneur and the political and economic system in the country is built as to facilitate his growth, whereas Europe possesses many social and economic ceilings, reserved for the aristocracy, that make it impossible for individuals to cross.

Tocqueville also spends a great deal of time discussing the philosophical origins of the United States. He articulates numerous times how the country was formulated, not necessarily on concrete resources such as wealth or commerce, but on principles and ideology. He points to the language used in documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution for its flowery and idyllic themes which are reiterated constantly. For Tocqueville, he engages in an intellectual debate as to where this theoretical framework developed from. According to Tocqueville, Europe is involved in a relative marketplace of ideas. Due to the close geographical proximity between nations and empires, these countries are continuously engaging in a back and forth discussion on various political, religious, and social topics. However, because the United States is so isolated from most other likeminded nations, the United States was forced to cultivate its own school of thought. But, despite this, Tocqueville relates that “... it is noticeable that the people of the United States almost all have a uniform method and rules for the conduct of intellectual inquiries. So, though they have not taken the trouble to define the rules, they have a philosophical method shared by all.” (Tocqueville, 393) Tocqueville

credits this “uniform method and rules” for the universal standardization of organizational and industrial norms.

But herein lies also an implicit accusation Tocqueville states against the American way of thinking. Tocqueville still retains an European pride in this respect, for he believes that Europeans still can offer a great deal to their American cousins. Through a growing consolidation of personalities as witnessed by Tocqueville, mindsets can then become exceptionally restrictive in approaching problem-solving. Tocqueville observes that “Seeing that [Americans] are successful in resolving unaided all the little difficulties they encounter in practical affairs, they are easily led to the conclusion that everything in the world can be explained and that nothing passes beyond the limits of intelligence.” (Tocqueville, 394) The impact of such a statement is that Tocqueville is drawing a clear delineation between Europeans and Americans. Whereas Europeans may follow the Romanticism of the eighteenth century, the Americans follow the principles of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason. Such an attitude of the Americans illustrates an unwillingness to place unquestioned faith in fantastical ideas and unfounded claims.

The Federalist and Anti-Federalist Debate: A Case Study of Distrusting Central Power

An examination of early politics in the new republic is essential to understanding the public’s evolving perception of centralized government. The ratification of the Constitution itself proved to be problematic as it was a direct response to the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. As the first document outlining the roles and responsibilities of the federal and state government, the Articles of Confederation were horribly inept in effecting strong cohesive implementation of public policy. The actual

tenets of the Articles of Confederation are illustrative of a distrust of government. Fresh off a costly and bloody revolution that was fought primarily on the grounds of a tyrannical king who ruled his colonies across a vast ocean, the Founding Fathers of the United States yearned to create a new republic that would decentralize power into the hands of the populace. But, as became painfully evident during instances of civil unrest and mere function of government, the Articles of Confederation were ill-equipped to deal with the problems of a large nation. Thus, the modern Constitution was created to combat these shortcomings. This also led to the rise of the debates that occurred between the Anti-Federalists and the Federalists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The Anti-Federalists strongly supported a highly decentralized government, with power focused in state institutions which they felt would be much more responsive to constituent demands and needs. The Federalists, on the other hand, believed that it was necessary for the central federal government to maintain an irrevocable authority of power, which would allow it to handle interstate issues more effectively and cohesively.

Understanding the Anti-Federalists will provide a deeper insight into American Exceptionalism, for the central premises behind the party was essentially an unmovable distrust of government. It is important to carefully define this as not a dislike of government, but rather a continual hesitation of a large concession of power. Lacking any international empirical models to follow, this truly was an experiment of many different sorts, making it much more understandable to comprehend the fears of the Anti-Federalists. Many historical analyses judge the Anti-Federalists under much too rigid of an interpretation. Federalists of the era accused the Anti-Federalists of actually being in conflict with the basic principles of the Revolutionary War. However, Anti-Federalists

replied by stating that the equality of the states should become the preeminent goal of the new government that was being formed. In fact, the political opinion of the time charged it "...to have been demonstrated, historically and theoretically, that free, republican governments could extend only over a relatively small territory with a homogenous population... one problem is that in large, diverse states many significant differences in condition, interest, and habit have to be ignored for the sake of uniform administration." (Storing, Vol. 1, 15) This predominant view of the Anti-Federalists was very case specific. The Anti-Federalists viewed the nation as being a conglomerate of many different public interests. Whether or not this was true is not necessarily as important as the consequences that arose as a result of this mindset. The Anti-Federalists viewed this new country as being fundamentally different from its Western European predecessors, notably England and France. Whereas England and France were believed to be composed of a indistinguishable population with identical interests, the Anti-Federalists believed that the United States possessed a wide spectrum of competing ideals and backgrounds and necessitated individualized policy attention.

The Anti-Federalists demanded that the United States conform to the standards of a "Small Republic," that would be highly responsive to the desires of the individual constituent and one in which all individuals will have a personal role. The ideal goal of the Anti-Federalists would be to have a legislative body that would be very representative of the voting populace. But, intelligently, many of these Anti-Federalists were aware that, anytime that an elected body is formed, more often than not, the elite will compose the small segment of the population that will actually be elected to the positions of representation, thus negating the entire value of a representative government.

Understanding this inevitability, steps must be taken to either rectify the status quo or at the very minimum reduce the possibility of the event alienating the majority of constituents. This, however, was one of the primary complaints Anti-Federalists voiced against the House of Representatives, the chamber of the United States legislative branch that would conceivably speak for the lowest common denominator. The Anti-Federalists took this deficiency as a necessary evil and found “The prudent course was to confine the contradiction to the narrowest possible scope by, on the one hand, making the representation in the first branch of the national legislature as full as circumstances permitted and, on the other hand, leaving as much of the power as possible in the states, where genuine responsibility could exist.” (Storing, Vol. 1, 18) This differs greatly from France and England in that, at the time, these two countries were highly centralized and hardly localized in power. Both empires invested their faith in an imperial king, though France would trade their King Louis XVI in 1797 for another self-appointed totalitarian leader in Napoleon.

Thus, the largest concern that Anti-Federalists had with the Constitution and the early government was the possibility of a creation of an aristocratic elite that will perpetually control the policy making powers of the country. As stated before, the very nature of a representative government creates an aristocratic class if not already present and endows upon them the ability of maintaining their power, under the pretense of continuing stability. Over time, it would only follow that civil service will become more selective. Thus, the Anti-Federalists believed it was the role of the constitutional creators to put in place certain obstacles to this process that will still allow every individual the opportunity to rein in the federal government when necessary. As has been previously

established, the Anti-Federalists disapproved of the House of Representative because of its inherent flaws to actually accomplish its mission of being the forum of the American individual. Given this, the Anti-Federalists reserved their harshest criticism for the Senate, which they felt embodied the elitism that the Constitution propagated. The Anti-Federalists were undoubtedly in favor of a large and elaborate system of checks and balances. This would allow the state governments, the seemingly true consciences of the people, to overrule the federal government. However, the Anti-Federalists "... did object to giving this less popular branch of the legislature most of the critical powers of the government. The mixture of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Senate violated the maxim of separation and seemed designed to lay the foundation for a permanent aristocracy." (Storing, Vol. 1, 48-49)

It would be negligent to think that the political discourse of the Anti-Federalists was occurring in an isolated vacuum. Throughout this entire time, the Anti-Federalists were engaged in a dialogue with the Federalists, debating the tenuous balance of the extent of civil liberties and, most importantly, the roles of state and federal governments. Though President George Washington was not officially affiliated with a political party, he favored a highly powerful federal government, as did his successor John Adams. The Anti-Federalists, as essentially the minority party, would voice their concerns numerous times and, "In reply to all of these objections, the Anti-Federalists complained, they were told, 'trust your rulers; they will be good men.'" (Storing, Vol. 1, 50) The Federalists had a two-fold argument to combat the arguments of the Anti-Federalists. They would initially point out that it was necessary for the American people to trust their elected officials to properly represent them in policymaking. As they did their military leaders in

the Revolutionary War, so should they again when making decisions of policy. The second crux of their argument stated that the Constitution did have implicit mechanisms that would circumvent distrustful leaders, thus the entire system of checks and balances. “Nevertheless the extent to which the Federalists were willing to rely on the virtue and honor of the rulers seemed to the Anti-Federalists foolish or suspicious. A wise people will never place themselves in the hands of arbitrary government in the hopes that it will be virtuous.” (Storing, Vol. 1, 51) Again, this marks a stark departure from the United States’ European counterparts. Whereas Western Europe still possessed vestiges of feudalism and the chivalric code, the Anti-Federalists assumed a much more jaded viewpoint of politics and the inability of elected officials to honestly represent their people. Again, it is important to note that this is not to state that Anti-Federalists believed that every politician was corrupt, but rather that the contemporary organization structure of the government hindered transparency and opportunities for remedial actions by the public. This general caution is emblematic of the overall distrust of the government that the Anti-Federalists possessed. The success of the party and the successive Jeffersonian Republicans in the early nineteenth century only speaks further to its mass appeal.

But perhaps the largest triumph of the Anti-Federalists is the Bill of Rights. Argued as unnecessary by the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists believed that a Bill of Rights was a critical aspect of any government that intended to protect the rights of the individual. Again, it is important to note that the Anti-Federalists place greater importance in the civil liberties of the individual and its contextual relationship with the greater government as a whole. In fact, the wording of the amendments themselves shows a distrust of the government. For example, the First Amendment states that “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

Rather than stating that the individual has the right to freedom of speech, the press, to assemble and to petition, the Amendment clearly identifies these rights as inalienable and inherent amongst the citizens of the country. Thus, the Amendment bars the legislative branch of the government from passing legislation that will violate these intrinsic rights.

The End of an Era for American Exceptionalism

On a hot and humid day in July of 1893, a young history professor from the University of Wisconsin presented an analytical paper before the annual meeting of the American Historical Association titled “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” This young professor presented what would eventually become the most significant essay discussing American history. This debutante to the intellectual community, Frederick Jackson Turner, argued that the frontier was the fundamental defining characteristic of the United States and was responsible for the contemporary cultural, social, and political development of America. Though initially met with general apathy and disinterest, by 1900, Turner’s “frontier thesis” became the predominant framework of critiquing American history by reorienting the discussion in the context of the role of the frontier in the evolution of American systems. But more importantly, historians began to use Turner as the starting point of defining the American experience and identity and, consequentially, how it differed from its peers in the global community.

Turner begins his analysis on a sorrowful note by reflecting on a passing reference made in the 1890 Census. As a nation of immigrants traveling westward and settling new land to allow for the steady growth and expansion of the Union, "... at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports." (Turner) Turner reflects upon this statement as the closing of an exceptionally influential era in American history as the expansion of the West had arrived at its conclusion. The originally inconceivable thought of conjoining the land from coast to coast under one unified government had finally been achieved with the internal infrastructure to incorporate what would eventually become the continental United States. But with the declaration from the Census that the frontier had officially closed, a new era in America was to begin, one that would include for the first time the ruling of a much more defined nation. However, rather than looking forward to the possibilities of the future, Turner turns to the past and analyzes the origins of American history and the effect it had on cultural, social, and political institutions.

The predominant historical interpretation of American history was one defined as the "germ theory." The primary premise of this theory was that American institutions, constitutionally and intrinsically, were derivative from European institutions, particularly those from early Germanic tribes inhabiting forests. However, Turner posits that "The peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of

the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life.” (Turner, 19) This central thesis of Turner’s is that the American experience is characteristically different from its European counterparts and it was the existence of the frontier with the many different encounters and situations it created. Unlike Europe which was physically bound by geographic limitations, forcing it to grow from a base already founded, the United States and its accompanying frontier line allowed it to perpetually grow from a state of primitiveness which necessitated the creation and facilitating of complex government and social orders. Such a continual clash allowed for the United States to retain the best qualities and features of both, the simplicity of the natural world it was exploring in the West and the established traditions already designed along the eastern seaboard. Turner articulates what while the Atlantic coast was the frontier of Europe as it began to colonize North America, the frontier became more and more inherently American as it moved westward.

Before Turner analyzes the growth of America, Turner once and for all dispels the contemporary interpretation of history, one that relies on Germanic cultures. Turner argues that such a system diminishes the importance of American factors, especially in context of the American condition. Whereas it was indeed European colonists who confronted the frontier, the wilderness would continually overcome the colonists. By dealing with an environment that is completely foreign, the colonist is thrust into situations that require the colonist to strip off his European exteriors. Turner takes great pains to iterate that this is not a case of the establishment of the tabula rasa, but rather that a “stubborn American environment” melded with the personal backgrounds of the colonists and westward settlers to form one immutable American identity that was fully

distinct from the characteristics of any other social culture. (Turner, 36) Again, a cultural interpretation of American Exceptionalism is invoked by Turner. Thus, the more the colonist moves westward, the farther away he or she moves away from Europe, both geographically and culturally. “The advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines. And to study this advance, the men who grew up under these conditions, and the political, economic, and social results of it, is to study the really American part of our history.” In this passage, Turner lays the foundation for his argument of American Exceptionalism. This steady move away from Europe indicates the creation of an American identity, which was distinct from its European peers. The conditions that Americans grew up under were fundamentally different, and this caused a radical departure. Turner recognizes these assets and asserts that scholars can now evaluate the “American part of our history,” which has thrown off the vestiges of European colonialism. The United States is its own entity due to these unique factors, and thus is the basis of American Exceptionalism. The citizens of the country were created and molded by this special environment, and only a cultural interpretation can fully encapsulate this effect of being separate from Europe combined with a underlying confidence of America’s self-worth.

Turner depicts the movement of the frontier line at each stage the Census was taken, to show the steady movement of both “wilderness” and inhabitants moving westward. The initial frontier was defined as the Allegheny Mountains but was pushed to the west as populations expanded. An interesting note is the momentum by which the frontier diminishes, most likely a causal relationship with the vigorous policies of private enterprise backed by political and public endorsement to lay down railroad lines. This

significantly aided passage to the West, making transnational travel rapider and more efficient. However, Turner does fall victim to many Eurocentric paternalistic stereotypes when he describes the interaction between the Native Americans and American frontiersmen. According to Turner, the story of American expansion "...begins with the Indian and the hunter; it goes on to tell of the disintegration of savagery by the entrance of the trader, the pathfinder of civilization..." (Turner, 24) Though perhaps indicative of predominant viewpoints in contemporary historical frameworks, such an interpretation clearly delineates one social group as superior to the other and as responsible for the spread of reasonable, rational civilization.

The frontier also created an urge for independence from Europe. As was the case during early colonization in the United States, the eastern seaboard was heavily dependent on European trade, even for subsistence commodities. But the westward push of the frontier isolated these explorers and settlers, creating a necessity to receive those same items but no means of transporting them across such a vast land rapidly and regularly. This also counters many critics' claims that such an expansion of the frontier does not adequately explain a change in character along states in the eastern seaboard. But it was through the national policy to link up the east and the west did that eventually unified the nation, lending itself one combined identity. This only further internalized the nation, making it more self-sufficient and disbanding its reliance on Europe. Though sectional differences were still present and maintained as evident through coalitional voting, such conflict was turned inward into the country and fused the nation even more. As Turner points out, "nothing works for nationalism like intercourse within the nation. Mobility of population is death to localism, and the western frontier worked irresistibly in

unsettling population. The effects reached back from the frontier and affected profoundly the Atlantic coast and even the Old World.” (Turner, 35)

Frederick Jackson Turner’s strongest argument that lends itself to American Exceptionalism is his empirical analysis of how the frontier is largely responsible for the democratization of the United States. Turner vehemently reiterates that the United States is the paragon of modern western democracy, and there was no foundational or organizational structure that preceded it which was identical to the United States’. Though it cannot be solely delineated towards it, the frontier, according to Turner, played a substantial role in liberalizing American policies. He argues how it was western New York and western Virginia that forced further extensions of standardization of ideals along the eastern coast. Turner traces these origins to the large availability of land that was found on the frontier and the inevitable connecting of the truly distinct concept of economic mobility, allowing for greater politicization amongst the masses. Thus, “So long as free land exists, the opportunity for a competency exists, and economic power secures political power.” (Turner, 36) However, Turner warns against the definition of freedom toward the land as the United States has done. Such an attitude lends itself to many opportunities of corruption and dishonesty in a society that still does not have the adequate means of enforcing behavior. Turner goes so far as to even point to the Populist movement, articulating that many of the states that had disavowed the movement had its primitive foundation based off the primary tenets of Populism itself.

The Populist Movement: A Case Study of Individualism and Independence

After the debate between the Anti-Federalists and the Federalists, the United States of America had survived the initial decades of independence. Whereas France was thrust back into turmoil and an autocracy in Napoleon after their revolution, the United States seemed to avoid the pitfalls and collapse that many European nations envisioned for the first nation in the New World. In fact, a new vivacious form of government was still in its embryonic stage, as was a language to define it. The era saw an increase in the literature of the term “Americanism” and the “American Creed.” It was a paradigm that possessed strong nationalistic tendencies and an emphasis on continued independence.

The entire scope of this message

... was breathtakingly idealistic: in this unique nation, all men were created equal, deserved the same chance to improve their lot, and were citizens of a self-governing republic that enshrined the liberty of the individual. It was also proudly defensive: America was an isolated land of virtue whose people were on constant guard against the depredations of aristocrats, empire builders, and self-aggrandizing officeholders both within and outside its borders. (Kazin, 12)

These years showed a growth in American patriotism, as American opinion was buoyant with the empirical success of the relatively free market economy that formed the basis of the American financial system. In the end, “In terms of the genesis of a populist discourse, the overriding point is that Americanism meant understanding and obeying the will of the people.” (Kazin, 12)

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw a great deal of migration westwards in the United States. With the technological improvements afforded by railroads, Americans were now capable of traversing thousands of miles with relative ease. However, it was not only persons that were now able to be transported over vast distances, but also the movement of capital allowed these new communities west of the

Mississippi to have the necessary initial funds to make the capital investments critical to the growth of industry and commerce. As a result, banks cropped up all over the West with their primary business being a flourishing one of taking the savings of citizens in the East and lending it to borrowers in the West who needed to put down land mortgages. This system of unchecked credit led to unabated speculation in the West and a bubble economy primed for disaster. Unfortunately, a combination of rapid inflation in 1888 and an unusually arid summer yielded an unproductive crop season, which flushed back the tide of settlers. In fact, many new settlers even moved back to the East to the comforts of an environment which they were accustomed to. However, the Populist movement is not one that is born in the exodus of these settlers, but rather the adversity and obstacles faced by those settlers that chose to stay and overcome, forming the central base of the Populism. (Hicks, 35)

To address these concerns, many different state farmers' associations banded together to form the political organization known as the Farmer's Alliance in 1876. They grew in power and popularity in the 1880s as a wave of economic panics brought a volatility to most domestic markets in the United States that frightened most farmers in the western states. Many farmers across the West looked toward the federal government to see what kind of action would be taken. However, in their minds, the federal government was much more concerned with the economic interests of banks and financiers in the East than the concerns of the farmers. The Farmer's Alliance believed that "The proper role of government was, in present-day vernacular, to provide a level playing field, both economically and politically. The Jacksonian slogan of 'equal rights to all, special privilege to none' would appear on the mastheads of Populist newspapers all

over the country.” (McMath, 52) The Populists viewed many different organizations and bodies as possible threats to the realization of their democratic principles and rights. The railroads, which often times committed fraud in transportation costs at the expense of the farmers, were a strong enough coalition to lobby bills and legislation in their favor. Also, the farmers channeled a lot of their discontent towards the financial investors of the East, who they felt controlled most of Washington’s politics yet had no keen understanding of life in the West. This again is emblematic of the distrust of government that is crux of American Exceptionalism. A huge base of the common people felt severely alienated by the politicking of an elite minority that seemed to possess the economic resources to manipulate the balance of power their direction.

To combat this problem, the Populist Party took it upon themselves to start informing the public at greater length of the political options available at their disposal. This grassroots approach was essentially an appeal to the same demographic of the party already, but it had the benefit of spreading a message of equality and equity to a segment of the population that similarly felt disenfranchised. The Populist movement also took careful consideration of the audience that they knew would be most receptive to their principles and platform. In accordance, they then proceeded on a massive marketing plan where “Populism’s campaign of political education employed materials and methods that came readily to hand—newspapers and tracts, neighborhood gatherings, even the archetypal religious institutions of rural America.” (McMath, 151) These campaign tactics are implicit indictments of the organized Washington political machinery. Though the Populist Party did seek to gain control of these institutions, the methods by which they attempted to accomplish this were in tradition with their philosophical aims. Also,

by appealing to the creation of the neighborhood gathering and the religious institutions, the Populist Party successfully creates a definitive demarcation between the people and the self-serving and elitist institutions that they attempt to replace.

The Populist Party was actually a serious political party and is often considered the last great third political party in the United States. It was undoubtedly a major player in both the 1892 and 1896 presidential elections, even winning electoral votes. They were even able to elect six Senators into office. Through these various elected officials, the Populist Party was able to get through many reforms that were indicative of their entire view of the governing process. The Populist Party believed that the relationship between the government and the individual was one where the government worked for the benefit of the individual, and not the other way around. Such a viewpoint illustrates perception of the Populist Party that the government is an implement of the individual and must be kept subservient to individual objectives. Keeping this in mind, “Since government was no more than an instrument to be used for good or ill by the groups which controlled it, then let the farmers and workers organize to secure that control and prevent further encroachments on the general welfare.” (Pollack in Hackney, 100) The Populist Party pursued reforms that “...stemmed from an attitude of healthy skepticism concerning the sacrosanct nature of government.”

This distrust of government is important to note because it illustrates a common thread that runs through the majority of American politics throughout the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century. As the country was growing and new problems arose, it was continually placed within the context of jurisdiction. The century saw this balance of power sway between the federal government, wishing to implement one unifying policy

throughout the nation to improve cohesion and uniformity, and the various state and local actors, wanting to create area-specific legislation that would adequately and properly address the needs that would be distinct to a particular location. The goal remained the same on both sides of the argument. The government, at whatever level, was responsible for the healthy promotion of equality and equity amongst the population. The case of the Populists provides an excellent glimpse into people's perceptions at the turn of America's first full century. There still existed many different divides that needed to be bridged. Political leaders often times capitalized on these differences for their own political gain. For example, "Populist leaders appealed to rural suspicion of the city and were unable to suppress their belief in rural superiority." (Rogin in Hackney, 123) Though seemingly trivial, it bears noting that this was a country that still had more than half of the population residing on farms. This type of sprawl that already existed was fundamentally different from the rest of Western Europe, which due to geographical and national constraints had already urbanized. The system that existed in the United States, which promoted individuals leaving the East and pushing westward to create new communities, was specific to the United States. Up to the turn of the twentieth century, the United States still possessed a "frontier" which needed to be settled. The policy of territory formation and eventual inclusion into the Union gave rise to a sense of self-sufficiency and autonomy that many Americans were very reluctant to surrender upon Union approval.

American Exceptionalism in the Twentieth Century: A New Wave

The twentieth century saw the most drastic change in the manifestations of American Exceptionalism. Though many consider the French Indian War of 1754-1763 as the world's first global war, the twentieth century witnessed two massive international conflicts that irreparably altered the political landscape. The First World War came on the heels of Frederick Jackson Turner's assertion that the frontier was closed. Timed perfectly with the turn of the century, the United States stood on the threshold of greatness. With the Industrial Revolution in full swing in the country, the United States for the first time was realizing its economic potential and was beginning to assert itself in the global marketplace. America was merely following in the footsteps of its European brethren, which utilized massive and far-reaching mercantilist systems around the world for its own benefit. However, the language which is utilized throughout the twentieth century are the root of American Exceptionalism, which often interpreted pedestrian hegemonic actions as unique and freedom-protecting endeavors.

It is important to note that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, there was still rampant distrust of the government. Distrust of central authority was still a very pervasive part of American culture until the middle of the century. However, this new century posed new challenges and a new framework in which this distrust of government would manifest itself. The twentieth century, unlike all others, was the first truly international one. Moreover, the United States was the unquestioned power of the Western hemisphere. British and French colonies were reduced to isolated islands in the Caribbean, but nowhere near the huge centers that they were only a hundred years previous. Also, the United States began to assert its military and political independence in 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine, which claimed that the age of colonialism in the Western

hemisphere concluded. Moreover, the United States would not be fearful of withdrawing its neutral status to enforce freedom and liberty in the Western hemisphere if the United States saw fit. However, the United States' preference to stay neutral is indicative of the peculiar status of the country. This would come to the forefront in the twentieth century as two world wars would beckon the United States to join as well. But, both times, the United States would insist on maintaining its neutrality despite its European allies being engaged in ferocious combat. The geographical proximity from which the United States was isolated from the conflict gave it the curious option of being able to actually avoid the conflict, which European nations did not have the luxury of.

Such a position is what fueled the isolationism that kept the United States out of World War I for the beginning of the conflict. President George Washington, a man whose legend has approached mythic proportions over the centuries, warned the country in his Farewell Address from the office of the Presidency in 1797 to avoid "foreign entanglements." Almost on cue, though exceptionally complex, the causes of World War I exploding to as many nations as it eventually did was because of the intricate system of alliances that many of the empires and nations in Europe had formed in the late nineteenth century. Rather than having any formal declarations of alliance with other nations, the United States stood isolated, geographically and politically. This again sprung from the essential aspect of American Exceptionalism of distrust of government through independence and individuality. As indicated before by Tocqueville and by other authors, the United States is a heavily decentralized system, politically and socially, which allows for individual communities to sustain themselves independently. As a nation that prided itself on its ability to pull itself up on its own bootstraps, World War I

seemed to illustrate more than ever the significant differences that separated the United States from Europe.

This trend of self-sufficiency and independence was only further accentuated after the conclusion of World War I into the 1920s. Unlike Europe, the United States did not have to rebuild a battered infrastructure that was decimated as collateral damage of the war. With a European market that was in dire need of commercial goods, the mass manufacturing prowess of the United States allowed for exports to drive the economy upwards to unprecedented levels. Again, the distrust of government was exhibited during the 1920s, where Calvin Coolidge, under the influence of powerful investors and industrialists, engaged in a very hands-off approach to the national economy, allowing it to follow uninhibitedly its natural course with limited, if any, government involvement. In fact, Coolidge would frequently state that the least government was the best government, and he used this dictum throughout his time in office in 1923 to 1929. However, it might have been such an approach that demanded a radical reformulation of the role of the government quickly after Coolidge left office.

The crash of 1929 that ushered in the Great Depression changed the role of the government forever. Though not immediately, two general camps in the United States quickly began to form in regards to how best to respond to the economic crises brought on by sudden deflation of the dollar and the closure of manufacturing plants across the nation. The rampant unemployment that caused upwards of a fifth of the American labor force looking for work sparked the growth of ghetto communities and mass migration across the country. Such an environment once again put to the test the viability of the basic and fundamental principles of American Exceptionalism. Despite the willingness of

many Americans to work hard and the presence of a driven desire to succeed, the economic situation in the country made it seem impossible for them to prosper. During Herbert Hoover's presidency, the old rules were still in play. Hoover was hesitant to introduce radical social programs throughout the country which would attempt to combat the distress of many Americans, which only further increased the distrust that they had in the government.

In November 1932 however, a leap of faith was made. With the election of charismatic and suave Franklin D. Roosevelt over the stoic and seemingly ambivalent Hoover, this represented a stunning rejection of the previously universally accepted model of self-sufficiency. Roosevelt campaigned heavily on social reform and his election indicated acknowledgement that the United States would need some form of governmental aid if it was going to properly address the economic crisis. Roosevelt's first 100 days were characterized by an aggressive social program, known popularly as the New Deal. Rejecting a Jeffersonian laissez-faire approach to the economy, the New Deal created programs in almost all facets of production to create more jobs and revenues for the government. The name given to the series of legislation already is indicative of this changing attitude. Roosevelt promised a "new deal" to the American public, one that involve greater guarantees and safety nets for people. In return, focus of the government must shift towards Washington for that is the only way that the federal government can effectively operate the labyrinth of alphabet-acronymed social programs. Though this would eventually be struck down by the Supreme Court, with the aid of fireside chats on public radio, Roosevelt was able to convince America that the framework of American Exceptionalism had to be modified. A century and a half of distrusting the government and

relying solely on self-sufficiency had gotten the national economy as far as it would. In the new global world where external factors over which individuals had no control could render an entire economy impotent, Roosevelt justified a greater role of the government in the daily affairs of civilians.

Similar to World War I, the United States was confronted once again in September 1939 whether or not it would honor its long standing friendships with England and France and engage the Axis militarily. However, this would be the last and final vestige of American isolationism. Unlike in the case of World War I, there was a significant portion of the American population who wanted to enter World War II before December 1941, Roosevelt one of them. Roosevelt had reach agreements with England and the other Allies to provide them with supplies which were used extensively. The Pearl Harbor attacks on December 7, 1941 taught the United States a valuable lesson. With the amount of manufacturing and economic capability the United States possessed, even in the doldrums of a decade long depression, their presence and importance in the world could not be understated. In the aftermath of World War II, two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, emerged with conflicting ideologies, beginning a new form of colonialism in the world. No longer was it feasible under the contemporary liberal norms to have colonies, but the superpowers sought to achieve spheres of influence, parts of the world that unquestioningly accepted their respective ideology over the other. Through aggressive plans which were essentially marketing ploys, the United States initiated policies such as the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine which extolled the virtues of free market capitalism and liberal democracy. Over the course of the next fifty years, the United States actively underwent a process of democracy

promotion, where it would attempt through various means, some underhanded and covert, to maintain democratic governments around the world wherever it could.

The entire world was one big battleground where liberal democracy and communism fought for ideological supremacy, and the Middle East was not immune. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would attempt to lure these oil-rich nations into their spheres through enticing offers and, sometimes, brute force. For example, the United States installed a puppet government in Iran, headed by the shah, who was basically on the American payroll and made all policy judgments in accordance with American wishes. His regime was violently put down through a religious coup headed by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Similarly, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 when the Communist Party in the country rose to power. This was met with a great deal of backlash, causing a civil war in the nation that lasted the better part of a decade. America's actions in the Middle East are just a logical extension of a new model of American Exceptionalism. The end of World War II gave the United States both the military and doctrinal power to exert its will across the world. Being the only nation at the time with the atom bomb, its military and technological superiority was unquestioned. Moreover, liberal democracy, with the aid of communism, had just defeated Nazism and fascism in a long and grueling world. Gloating in the victory, many American legislators felt that the victory was an unadulterated confirmation that American-styled democracy was the only form of governance that would effectively represent the views of a nation-state's populace. American Exceptionalism changed from distrust in government to the faith in the undisputed truth that democracy was the only legitimate government acceptable in the twentieth century. Moreover, not only this, but it was the sole

responsibility of the United States to go forth in the world and become active proponents of such a government by encouraging other nations to adopt this standard.

American Exceptionalism Meets the Middle East

The dawning of the twenty-first century was hailed as the beginning of a new era in the history of the United States. Though the country solidified its place in the global community as an international superpower as a result of World War II, the United States spent the latter half of the century jockeying for dominance with the Soviet Union. The twenty-first century opened with loud proclamations from many Americans as a century that would see unbridled success for the United States. With the world's largest economy growing at seemingly impossibly high rates, the future of the United States appeared promising. It was under these circumstances that the United States moved into the new millennium under the leadership of its new president, George W. Bush. Eight months into his presidency, the United States suffered the largest attack on its soil. The September 11th attacks ushered in a new era of foreign policy for the United States and its peers. Whereas before the United States concerned itself with state entities, such as the Soviet Union, it became increasingly evident that the new threat to America's security came in the form of terrorist cells, who were more than willing to sacrifice their own lives to accomplish their goals of attacking the United States. This necessitated the Department of Defense, the newly created Homeland Security, and, most importantly, the State Department to significantly alter their models of geopolitics and the modes by which they would continue to complete American objectives, domestic and abroad.

During the 2000 Presidential election cycle, then Republican nominee Bush routinely stressed the prototypical Republican platform on foreign policy, of strengthening American fleets but sparse utilization of such forces abroad. Often criticizing President's Clinton's excursions into failing nations in the capacity of international peacekeepers, such as the case of the Somalia intervention in 1993, Bush stressed the need for modesty in foreign affairs, though he and his opponent, Vice-President Albert Gore, still emphasized that the United States was indeed the greatest country the world had ever seen. However, two years later, with the September 11th attacks and an invasion of Afghanistan to root out Al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the aforementioned attacks in between, the White House formally published the "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" in September 2002. Based from a speech that President Bush delivered to the graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point on June 2, 2002, the White House expounded upon President Bush's insistence that "Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent." (Bush, 2002, needs more formal citation) The "National Security Strategy of the United States" became the foundational doctrine which would guide the Bush Administration's subsequent foreign policy until at least 2006. This document served as an official codification of American Exceptionalism. By arguing that freedom and democracy are incontrovertibly linked to the theoretical essence of the United States, the Bush Administration attempts to justify

the end goal of American promotion by pointing to the supposed stability and peace that exists in the United States. Also stating that the United States is the ideal paragon of nation building, the “Strategy” begins by asserting that “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.”

After the September 11th attacks, President Bush, in a State of the Union, publicly declared a triad of nations as the “Axis of Evil.” These countries, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, were seen as burgeoning states that would pose innumerable threats to the national security of the nation in the coming years. These nations, whether it be because of structural differences or hardheaded, obstinate leaders, were invariably seen as obstacles for the United States in its effort to spread its form of democracy to the rest of the world. Moreover, these countries seemed perpetually resistant to American overtures of change. North Korea has had economic sanctions placed on it since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s, and, though the majority of the country lives in absolute squalor, the population has been unable to uproot the tyrannical Kim Jong Il from his seat of power. Iran was led by a puppetmaster shah for decades until a vicious revolution in 1979 that saw the mass emigration of many American supporters. The leader of the theocracy, the Ayatollah despised American culture and any influence it could have on the country as a whole. The last of this triumvirate, Iraq, posed the best opportunity for the United States.

The United States actually maintained friendly relations with the nation in the middle of the 1980s as the dictator of the country, Saddam Hussein, engaged in a ferocious war with neighboring Iran. As the Reagan Administration attempted to choose

the better of two evils, Iraq was seen as the better suitor of the two. Moreover, Iraq held deeper symbolic significance as well. During the second Bush's Administration, Iraq would seem an excellent location for a test-run for full-blown implementation of the "Strategy" outlined for successful intervention. Such benefits may be what "...inspired new exceptionalists to focus on Iraq, whereas an attack on North Korea does not have the potential for transforming a whole unstable and dangerous area. Nor does it have oil, certainly a potent factor in the drive to oust Saddam at a time when the Saudi alliance is in trouble." (Hoffman, 236-237)

The United States has indeed become the subject of many terrorist organizations and states across the world, and this has necessitated a modified framework by which the United States will have both ethical and moral grounds by which to wage a War Against Terror. The shift in enemies from state governments to independent terrorist organizations forced the American government to change the justification, for it no longer was logical that these organizations were interested in territorial acquisitions within the United States. The military and political might of the United States is unquestioned, and it would be difficult to convince an entire country that they were literally fighting for their homes, as was the case during World War II. Thus, a new discourse was formed through the course of many different speeches presented by President Bush, where he described how the terrorist organizations were attempting to destroy the "American way of life" and the ensuing war was one where the American people were defending the right to live their lives in accordance to American principles and values. In fact, during the address that President Bush delivered on network television on the night of September 11th, his first words were "Good evening. Today, our

fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.” (Bush, 2001) Such language still continues today where President Bush proclaimed once again on September 6, 2006 that “We're fighting for our way of life and our ability to live in freedom.” (Bush, 2006) Moreover, such an affront would further justify foreign pre-emptive intervention so as to ensure the absence of future attacks by uprooting these terrorist organizations.

Another defining characteristic of this Bush Doctrine is a distinct “us vs. them” mentality that has given rise to a highly dichotomized world. Bush was very clear that the Bush Administration would not make any distinction between the terrorist organization and the states that harbored them passively. Through the surveillance that has been done through the nation’s foreign intelligence agencies, an irreversible fact is that many of these organizations that have been deemed as “terrorists” have based themselves in the Middle East. Not only is this region that was already somewhat hostile to the interests of the United States, but the draconian stance of the Bush Administration only furthered extremist tendencies in the region. The “us vs. them” philosophy assumes that the foreign nation will be receptive to accommodating American desires rather than potentially facing its wrath. In sum, the Bush Doctrine “...amounts to a doctrine of global domination, inspired by the fact of U.S. might, founded on the assumption that America’s values are universally cherished except by nasty tyrants and evil terrorists.” (Hoffman, 234) The final form of the Bush Doctrine exemplifies the most contemporary form of American Exceptionalism. The very nature of stating that the United States, or the West, stands by itself further dichotomizes the rest of the world as different. Not only does this

seem very antagonistic toward possible partners in the Middle East, it virtually eliminates the potential for compromising and finding a middle ground.

A Brief History of the Middle East and American Involvement

In the eyes of Europe, the Middle East in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was nothing more than a passing curiosity as travelers would make their way to the Far East via land. The empires of sheikhs and sultans were fanciful, but the region was only of marginal concern. The leaders of European Empires all too readily assumed that the area would eventually become proprietors of the local nations, but there was no real sense of urgency to do. Granted, there would be a short public outcry when news of a Turkish massacre of Armenians would reach Europe. But, before World War I, sustained interest in the region was limited if existent at all. However, politics in the Middle East in the twentieth century have completely changed how the world views the region. With a world which is run predominantly on oil and reliant on its production by OPEC, a dependence on the region has formed. Moreover, as shown by violent acts of the terrorism that has emanated from the region, there does indeed exist a constant cultural dialogue between the West and the Middle East.

After World War II, most of the world looked to the Soviet Union and the United States to set the global agenda. These two unquestioned superpowers would attempt to persuade the rest of the world to subscribe to their particular ideology and systematically reject the competitor's. The Middle East was not immune to this. The area would become a battleground of sorts as well. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, most of the world has adopted American-styled democracy and free market economy, with the

Middle East being a glaring exception. But this is not indicative of the United States not attempting to promote democracy in the area, but just a resistance on the parts of Islamic leaders. This area is the new frontier for America. The United States' expansion is no longer characterized by prairie homes and wagon trails. American expansion is the deliberate and self-serving attempt to now bring American cultural traditions to the Middle East. But to understand the context of these efforts, a general history of Western involvement in the Middle East is required. Though it would be easy to chronicle events all the way back to the Roman Empire, this thesis will concentrate Western intervention beginning with World War I.

In 1914, the world witnessed a war of such grand proportions that its sheer immensity had never been witnessed before. A string of entangling alliances caught most of Europe in this conflict just because of one shooting incident in Sarajevo, where Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with his pregnant wife, was assassinated in a motorcade by Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip. This one shooting incident, primarily the result of a militant group fighting for political autonomy, sparked World War I. In 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in the war against Britain and France. The British and the Ottomans had numerous battles in the Middle East, the most famous being the failed direct capture of Gallipoli in 1915. Not only did the British conduct numerous military maneuvers in the area, they also tried to generate insurgence from within. Many Arabs in the Middle East had lived under Ottoman rule for more than four centuries. The British formed a welcome partnership with Sherif Hussein ibn Ali, who was a religious leader from southern Saudi Arabia and believed many in his clergy to be a direct descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. Ali

was the primary organizer of an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, under the condition of being granted Arab independence in the Middle East after the war.

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 at the end of World War I, Ali and other Arabs found that they had been betrayed, which would be the first of many times in the future. The British and the French signed an international treaty between themselves, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which had been kept confidential for obvious reasons. The document outlined how the Middle East would be partitioned between these two nations. Moreover, the British had also signed the Balfour Declaration in 1917, another classified internal document, which essentially promised the growing international Zionist a Jewish homeland in Palestine. One of the chief supporters of it was Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who, in 1903, "... had been retained as the British attorney for the Zionist movement and for its founder, Dr Theodore Herzl, in connection with an issue that caused an agonizing split in Zionist ranks: whether a Jewish state necessarily had to be located in Palestine. As one who represented Herzl at the time of decision, he was in a position to understand the movement's dilemmas." (Fromkin, 271) Steps in this direction were made in the methods by which the French and the British had split the region. Syria became a French protectorate, with the western coastal areas which possessed high Christian populations to become Lebanon. The British received the largest land grants, with Iraq and Palestine. The British installed one of Ali's sons as the King of Iraq, this being one of the few concessions made in regards to the earlier promise made to Ali. The contentious area of Palestine was divided into two entities. Transjordan, the eastern half, was given to another son of Ali. The western half was under direct British rule, where they facilitated the already significant Jewish population to grow with loose

immigration. The vast chunk of the Arabian peninsula was given to another British ally who was faithful during the war, Ibn Saud, who was the first king of the nation known as Saudi Arabia today. During this time, the fall of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the war created a momentary disorder within the empire. Kemal Atatürk assumed control of the nation and initiated numerous policies of secularization and modernization. Vastly different from the rest of its peers in the Middle East, Turkey has since consistently asserted that it is more culturally similar to Europe than the Middle East and should be treated accordingly.

In the following decades, many nations made steps towards independence. Over time, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt were given nominal decrees of autonomy. The British and the French only fully relinquished these lands following World War II however. Moreover, the 1920s and 1930s saw the rise of anti-Semitic and fascist governments in Europe. Adolf Hitler's oppressive regime only heightened the strength of the Zionist movement to create that Jewish state in Palestine that was promised in the Balfour Declaration. This was in direct conflict with the also growing Arabic nationalism in the region, a causal result of greater sovereignty. The looming success of the Zionists in their objective only increased hostilities between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. In 1947, the newly formed United Nations created both a Jewish and Arab state in Palestine. Not surprisingly, the Jewish leaders vigorously supported the measure which was met with staunch resistance from Arab leaders. Quickly after Israel's declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, the conflict brewing culminated in a full assault. The 1948 Arab-Israel War involved the military forces of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Lebanon as they attempted to annex Israel. However, the Israelis defended their homeland and

staved off their enemies. However, this war created a huge dispossessed population. In the aftermath of the conflict, roughly 800,000 Palestinians fled the lands that were acquired by Israel as part of the war. Moreover, a little more than 500,000 Jews were either expelled or fled Arabic nations and came to Israel, where they were quickly naturalized as citizens. (Sela) However, the numerous refugee Palestinians that found themselves in these neighboring nations were often fringe communities that were considered as outcasts by the majority population. This issue, commonly referred to as the “Palestinian problem,” lingers till present day.

The actions and role of the United States of America remains conspicuously absent in the aforementioned select history, and this is no accident. This is entirely consistent with the diplomatic and international actions of the United States as described within the context of American Exceptionalism. Emblematic of the isolationist tradition that the United States followed for the previous century and a half, the United States continued this in aftermath of World War I where the Middle East was partitioned between France and Britain. David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson approached the conclusion of the war very differently. In fact,

Lloyd George felt much the same need to reformulate war goals that Wilson did, but arrived at different conclusions. Wilson proclaimed that the enormity of the war required peace without annexations. Lloyd George took the other view: the enormity of the war required indemnities and annexations on an enormous scale. Both Wilson and Lloyd George promised the peoples of the Ottoman Empire a better life, but where Wilson held out the hope of self-government, Lloyd George, while employing the rhetoric of national liberation, proposed to give the Middle East better government than it could give itself. (Fromkin, 263)

This is an example of American Exceptionalism in foreign policy prior to 1945. The United States, under the overly-idealistic Wilson administration, stressed self-

government. Even though the United States possessed colonies at this time, it is important to note that it was American policy to decentralize power into the hands of local leaders. On the other hand, the imperial British wanted to assert its will around the world and impose its style of government in the region. Ironically, in less than thirty years time, the United States would take the lead in foreign affairs of this nature and be the most steadfast advocate of democracy promotion.

As stated before, American involvement in the Middle East became much more active after World War II. In fact, the very first action of intervention in the Middle East for the United States was the result of the war. In the Tehran Conference that saw Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin meet to discuss their alliance in the war, all three gave strong assurances of Iranian sovereignty after the war. However, the Soviet Union never withdrew its forces from Iran after the war, for Stalin felt that the close proximity of Iran to the Soviet Union allowed for greater precautions to be taken to ensure Soviet national security. President Harry S Truman feared for the Turkey's security, for it was underneath the American umbrella at the time. But when Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency, his overarching foreign policy objective was containment, to limit the expansion of the Soviet influence in the world to the areas that it had already acquired. Moreover, the perception of growing Communist sentiments in Iran pushed the United States into acting in August of 1953. The impact of this decision cannot be understated, for "The American intervention of August 1953 was a momentous event in the history of Iranian-American relations. [It] left a running wound that bled for twenty-five years and contaminated relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran following the revolution of 1978-79." (Bill, 32) Operation Ajax was conceived to

fulfill American objectives in Iran, which to was help the shah, the monarchial leader, to eliminate communist elements within the nation and to ensure the shah's choice for Prime Minister would win the election. Interestingly, the shah's choice was General Fazlollah Zahedi who the British had captured and imprisoned during World War II for pro-Nazi activities. (Kwitny, 171) First promising publicly to not intervene in Iran, the Central Intelligence Agency carried out Operation Ajax, which involved mass rioting on the streets of Iran. After the death of 300 Iranians, the shah was installed back into power. The restoration of the shah was met with great deal of hostility from the Iranian people, as the shah would go on to acquire a long record of human rights violations. But, for the United States, the shah agreed to allow American oil companies a great deal of access to the plentiful resources in the country. Moreover, the United States would view Iran as a key ally in their future Middle East endeavors. However, when the shah was overthrown and fled Iran in 1979, the new theocracy that formed was very fundamental in its practicing of Islam. But, of most consequence to the United States, they rejected any claim of allegiance to the U.S., forcing the United States to turn to Israel more often to be a proxy for American interests in the region.

This alliance with Israel had its origins earlier during the Suez Crisis of October 1956. Two potential causes for this crisis emerged. The first was disagreement between Egypt and Israel over the armistice line as adjudicated by international treaty in the wake of the 1948 war. Second, the United States withdrew vocal and monetary support for the High Aswan Dam, which was seen as a source of national pride for the people and for the ruler, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This caused both the British and the World Bank to retract its promises of aid as well. Soon after, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which

had been owned by British and French interests since 1869. Israel also had many different contentions with Egypt, after a series of confrontational moves made by both nations attempting to assert their authority and legitimacy. Israel invaded Egypt with aid from Britain and France, despite requests from the United States to yield. The United States was quick to condemn the actions, but primarily on the basis that President Eisenhower viewed these actions as remnants of old-style imperialism rather than a display of modern foreign policy. The invasion ending quickly, how to parse out the lands became a very contentious issue. Israel was very insistent that Egypt not retain the Gaza Strip which had been acquired during the invasion. By March of 1957, the United States had made assurance that United Nations troops would be present on the Egyptian border to ensure safe passage of Israeli ships in the Strait of Tiran. These guarantees of Israel set a precedent of a longstanding alliance between the United States and Israel, characteristic of America somewhat routinely acquiescing to Israeli demands.

Early in 1957, President Eisenhower declared that the Middle East was vulnerable to communist tendencies, and he proposed the Eisenhower Doctrine. This Doctrine included a program of economic aid, military assistance and cooperation, and the use of American troops when requested and deemed appropriate. The first mass-scale intervention under the Eisenhower Doctrine would be in Lebanon. The large Sunni population was very sympathetic to Arab nationalism, and Camille Chamoun, Lebanon's president and a Catholic, worried that this would upset the stability in the nation. The constitution in Lebanon stated that a president could only have one six-year term, which Chamoun violated by seeking a second. The Central Intelligence Agency sent money covertly to candidates who favored an American alliance. (Lenczowski, 59) On July 15,

1958, the first of 14,357 U.S. soldiers would land in Lebanon to keep the peace. A compromise was eventually made, where General Fuad Chehab, a Christian, would be appointed President. However, this would not work out the way envisioned, as Rashid Karami, a Chamoun opponent, became prime minister and became neutral in the Soviet-American ideological debate. The U.S. withdrew all of its troops by October 25. Though seen initially as a success of the Eisenhower Doctrine, this actually was a very different situation. Whereas the Eisenhower Doctrine attempted to stem the flow of Soviet or communist growth and aggression in the Middle East, the entire opposition was not heavily influenced too much by them.

The Six-Day War of 1967 also highlighted another important case of American intervention in the Middle East. In this very short timeframe in June of 1967, Israel decimated the air and ground forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, while acquiring Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. This war established Israel as one of the primary military powers in the region. The war began on June 5, and Egypt had already lost Sinai to Israel by June 8. Egypt and Sinai accepted the call of the United Nations' for a ceasefire. But Israel continued its offensive attacks, and it was during this time that it captured most of the aforementioned lands. The nuclear capabilities of Israel cannot be understated. Though it is difficult to tell at what stage they were in the process of developing nuclear weapons, it was plainly evident that they were at the very least attempting to create them. Also, Israel received technological aid from the American firm NUMEC, the French, and the United States government through the CIA. (Eveland, 325) President Lyndon Johnson supported Israel throughout the conflict. For example, on May 23, he had issued an embargo on arms to the sea, while he also had secretly authorized

shipments of ammunition, spare parts, bomb fuses, and armored personnel carriers to Israel. Also, after the war had started, the United States vetoed a Security Council resolution which called for Israel to return to its prewar locations. But most importantly, President Johnson never condemned Israel for sparking the war. All of these actions, and others, contributed to a growing sense of a separation between the United States and the Middle East. President Johnson, for example, had assured Arabs that Israel would not initiate conflict in the Middle East and that he was fundamentally opposed to any act of aggression on either side.

Only six years later, Egypt and Syria launched cooperative attacks on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year for Jews. The goal for these two nations was to recapture the lands that they lost so quickly in the Six-Day War. Two different ceasefires were arranged, and each time they were violated by Israel. However, two and a half weeks later, a final ceasefire was arranged which all involved parties agreed to. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State during the Richard Nixon administration, has become somewhat famous in recent times for being somewhat obstructionist to peace agreements during his tenure in foreign affairs. Such was the case during the reconciliation process of the Yom Kippur War, where Kissinger would pit the two competing sides against each other. However, this had many negative effects in the long run in terms of garnering Arabic allies in the Middle East. The 1967 defeat humiliated many Arabs and the Palestinians also learned that certain Arab states were willing to sacrifice the Palestinians. This would strongly excite Arab nationalism and would form a common banner that would eventually band together many different Arab states under a common

cause. The complete support that the United States gave to Israel essentially bankrupted all political capital that America had with Arabs in the Middle East.

The aftermath of the Yom Kippur War created many ambiguous national boundaries between Israel and Egypt. This severely compromised and inflamed many different Palestinians. When Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in 1977, the United States changed their entire foreign policy in the Middle East. For example, in March 1978, when Israel invaded Lebanon with the purpose of establishing a “security zone,” the administration sent a formal request that Israel retreat back to their land. Though Carter was not any less committed to the Israeli alliance than his predecessors, Carter did approach the problem differently by expressing concern for the plight of Palestinians. This however did earn him the criticism of many supporters of Israel. To bridge the gap between Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, Carter invited both individuals to Camp David to personally manage the negotiations. The biggest area of contention between the two sides were how best to address the situation involving the displaced Palestinians in the Middle East. Carter’s intervention induced Sadat and Begin to sign the Camp David Accords, which would eventually earn Begin and Carter Nobel Peace Prizes. The Accords dealt with numerous issues pertaining to the relations between Egypt and Israel, such as control of Sinai and the Suez Canal among other issues. The most important aspect was towards the establishment of autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinians however opposed the Accords because they felt that it only further continued the occupation of the Palestinians, without having any significant or substantial timeline for this transition. This also alienated Sadat as well from his conservative base in

Egypt, as he was assassinated in 1981 by his own military. However, this basically created a precedent where American presidents would intervene in the Middle East peace process. These seemingly benign and sincere efforts were often criticized by Arabs in the Middle East because of the historical support that the United States has shown towards Israel. The question remained to them how exactly the U.S. could remain a neutral and objective mediator in negotiating peace. With the current wars that the country is waging in Afghanistan and Iraq, this has only further complicated that delicate balance.

Francis Fukuyama Meets Samuel Huntington

The role that American Exceptionalism has had on the American people is undeniable. Whether or not the sense of uniqueness and good fortune has conclusively fostered an arrogance in diplomatic relations with foreign nations is debatable. However, the fact that American Exceptionalism has played an integral role in global affairs for the United States is undeniable. It has permeated the relationship that the United States has had with every single other nation in the world. The massive economic wealth and sheer military strength of the United States have been utilized to intimidate, coerce, and dictate politics around the world. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been steadfast in its assertion that democratic principles and liberal ideology are the hallmarks of any malfunctioning government. Moreover, the latter half of the twentieth century was characterized by active and overt democracy promotion throughout the world. Though the United States did focus its efforts around the world, from Vietnam to Nicaragua to Eastern Europe, an area of particular interest, especially in light of recent global events, is the Middle East. This section will attempt to address the relationship between American

Exceptionalism and the current geopolitical situation between the United States and the Middle East, examining two different models of political theory that have both accepted widespread acceptance and criticism in intellectual and academic forums.

First, a contemporary connection will be drawn between American Exceptionalism and the Middle East. Though it would be both negligible and irresponsible to assume that American diplomacy with the Middle East only began during the George W. Bush Administration, both September 11th and the current Iraq War provide an adequate backdrop to examine the aforementioned connection. It will be argued that the Bush Doctrine is a legislative agenda that is essentially a model of American Exceptionalism manifested. The Bush Doctrine can be broadly described as a spectrum of diplomatic measures taken by the United States federal government that places importance on military pre-emption, military strength, and unilateral action if need to, all the while continuing active democracy promotion around the world. Obviously, American intervention of Iraq in March 2003 is perhaps the most obvious example of this Doctrine in action, but other circumstances also exhibit this tendency.

After this, two comparative models for deciphering the interaction between nation-states in the future will be presented and examined. Francis Fukuyama's argument in The End of History and the Last Man will be compared to Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations. Both offer their predictions of how the end of the Cold War will dictate the role of the United States in a new world, but arrive at vastly different conclusions. Broadly, Fukuyama argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth century only firmly entrenched the unquestioned superiority of liberal democracy as the only functioning form of government. With

capitalism assuming the role as the most efficient and profitable means of conducting economies and finances, liberal democracy is the only form of government that can adequately complement this system. According to Fukuyama, all developing nations, that have yet to do so already, will see the potential benefits of liberal democracy and transition towards it. However, Fukuyama, with his numerous references to Hegel, Heidegger, Locke, Hume, and other philosophers, lacks a real practical rooting of his model. Though it is unfair to expect from Fukuyama the benefit of hindsight, seeing as this was originally published in 1989 as an article in a journal which was later expanded to a book in 1992, his model has yet to take a strong hold in the world today, particularly in the Middle East. It will be argued that Fukuyama makes no reservations for the disparate social and community standards that exist in the Middle East. Certain elements of their culture are in direct conflict with many assumptions of liberal democracies.

On the other end of the spectrum, Samuel Huntington offers a radically different model by which to evaluate the relationship between the United States and the Middle East. Huntington, more than Fukuyama, embraces the concept of American Exceptionalism, explaining that there are certain intrinsic characteristics and ideal that are unique to the West and that other civilizations around the world do not possess. Moreover, the growing interdependence of the world only increases the interactions between the various civilizations around the world. The relationship most relevant is the one between the West and Islamic civilizations, one which he feels is destined towards conflict because of the wide disparities in priorities between the two civilizations. However, whereas Fukuyama mistakenly believes that the universality of liberal democracy lends itself to easy adoption throughout the world, Huntington lodges himself

on the other end of the ideological spectrum by believing that there is no commonality whatsoever. Though Turkey is not at all considered to be a paragon of liberal democracy, it at least provides an example of an Islamic state taking steps towards finding the common ground between the two different civilizations, alerting the world that it indeed can be done. Huntington, an advisor to President Kennedy and undoubtedly a product of the black-white dichotomy of the Cold War, mistakenly ignores any redeeming quality in the Middle East.

Huntington proposes many different reasons for why strong commonalities and bonds between civilizations promote alliances while dichotomizing distinctions increases the possibilities for conflict. The first is that there are numerous different cultural identities for each civilization, and there is an internal and continual debate which prioritizes important and negligible ones. The second is that identity is undeniably the most significant factor contributing to cohesion of peoples. According to Huntington, the civilization is the largest subset that is reasonable to assume has the greatest degree of commonalities. Thus, the conflicts that arise between civilizations are of the greatest and gravest consequence. The third, and perhaps most compelling argument that Huntington makes, is that "...identity at any level—personal, tribal, racial, civilizational, can only be defined in relation to an 'other,' a different person, tribe, race, or civilization."

(Huntington, 129) Whether it is the Inquisition or the Holocaust, the concept of the "other" has been a strong motivating factor in global affairs. Obviously, civilizations and societies are going to continually attempt to make their own circumstances better, often accompanied by the dissatisfaction of another. Thus, in this zero-sum world, friction will inevitably result. The fourth explanation is that sustainability depends on resources which

may or may not be available to a civilization, forcing communities to band together or overpower others to attain. Huntington's cynical fifth is what he terms human nature's "ubiquity of conflict." The innate desire in humans to hate will ultimately destroy even the most utopian coexistence.

Both of these concepts will be critiqued within the boundaries of four issues: religious, political, economic, and social. Though all related to each other, these four arenas will allow for useful criticism of both of these models, while at the same time providing the foundation for the argument that a compromising middle ground can be forged between the West, the United States in particular, and the Middle East. But, the actions of the United States, done with the justification of the dominance of American Exceptionalism, have significantly damaged any progress of coalescing the two distinct sides.

Religion in Fukuyama and Huntington

Religion has always played a very important role in the relationship between the Middle East and the United States. An easy way to state this difference would be to say that the Christian West is in conflict with the Muslim Middle East. However, not only does this neglect many important distinctions within Christian denominations, it also does not mention the difference between Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslims, a categorization that has actually resulted in many wars within the Middle East itself. Unfortunately, both Fukuyama and Huntington make this mistake. Fukuyama, as will be further illustrated, believes that no nation, including those in the Middle East, is immune to the supposed advantages of liberal democracy. But, absence of differentiation between the two dominant sects of Islam is conspicuous. For example, Iran and Iraq were engaged in a

monumental war during the mid-1980s, where millions of both Sunnis and Shi'ites lost their lives in the battle. Though there was a superficial geopolitical reason for the beginning of the conflict, a strong underlying factor was the two different Islamic factions.

There exist other problems within Fukuyama's model as well when placed within the concept of religion. One of the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy is religious tolerance. America, for example, has always prided itself on the wide number of religions that can be found within the country. Moreover, the United States has also seen many different denominations and religions itself be created as well. Thus, not only are minority religions tolerated, but one may go so far as to argue that it is encouraged. Many would point to the many different cases of religious discrimination seen in our nation's history, such as the subjugation and oppression of many immigrant Jews and Catholics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. But, this does not eliminate the inalienable rights which are intrinsic to every American, as provided by the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has found in favor of religious equality. However, such is not the case in the Middle East. Many different nations have worked into their founding documents the seeds of religious discrimination. Nations of each sect have interwoven their own interpretations of Islam into their judicial systems, making it very difficult for religious minorities to gain proper legitimacy in society. For example, the ethnic Kurds in Iran are a Sunni minority in a Shi'ite majority population. They have consistently refused the attempts of the government to assimilate, in other words convert, them into the greater culture of the country. Though only comprising 7% of the entire country, they are still a vocal minority in the country. The

Kurds in Iran have attempted to attain regional autonomy if not its own national country if possible.

Fukuyama, however, notes that “The Islamic world differs from other world cultures today in one important respect. In recent years it alone has repeatedly produced significant radical movements that reject not just Western policies but the most basic principle of modernity itself, that of religious tolerance. ... What they hate is that the state in Western societies should be dedicated to religious tolerance and pluralism, rather than to serving religious truth.” (Fukuyama, *Policy*, 5) But, this would seem to run contrary to Fukuyama’s original assertion that every single nation in the world will slowly move towards a liberal democracy. If these countries are not able to uphold even the most basic aspects of democratic values, then the grandiose plans that Fukuyama has are already nullified from the very start. The inability of the Islamic nation to provide for the rights of religious minorities is an essential component in the Middle East, seeing as Islam is such a driving force in the region. Islam plays such a vital role in the everyday parts of so many citizens in the Middle East that it is impossible for Fukuyama’s dream of seeing liberal democracy spread in the region without accounting for the fervor as well. But, Fukuyama still contends that the benefits of liberal democracy will override any other consideration, whether religious or not.

Such an assertion by Fukuyama seems out of place in the twenty-first century, especially with the growth of many different governments in the Middle East. Most of these governments either are direct political manifestations of Islam or at the very least incorporate a substantial portion of Islam into their adjudication. Fukuyama does acknowledge that, in certain parts of the world, Islam has indeed defeated liberal

democracy as a systematic and nationalistic ideology which has proven empirically to attract many new adherents. Fukuyama even feels that the increase of Islam poses a potent threat to the safety of liberal democracy around the world, for, if these nations do feel, would become a paragon of the success that does not uphold the ideals of liberal democracy, namely civil, political, and religious rights. However, he also asserts however that “Despite the power demonstrated by Islam in its current revival, however, it remains the case that this religion has virtually no appeal outside those areas that were culturally Islamic to begin with. The days of Islam’s cultural conquests, it would seem, are over...” (Fukuyama, 46) At this point, the date of Fukuyama’s initial publication, 1992, is most evident. Recent contemporary evidence clearly illustrates that the cultural influence of Islam has undoubtedly spread throughout the world, quite notably in Europe and North America. For example, France, Britain, and Quebec confronted the issues of the veil women wear as part of their burqa, a garb reserved for women with the intention of humility and modesty. Though seemingly insignificant, the fact that the high courts of nations, states, and provinces are all making decisions of legality based off Islamic principles, attempting to balance the religious and secular aspects of the government, indicate that the influence of Islam is undoubtedly a pervasive aspect of our world, and it would be exceptionally foolish and negligent to overlook such a role.

A strong obstacle that Fukuyama cites as being conceivably detrimental to the growth of a liberal democracy is religion. Again, Fukuyama finds no conflict between democracy and religion. The two can undoubtedly coexist. In fact, the empirical example of Christianity is a very apt description for the formation of liberal democracy in Western Europe. The primary tenets of Christianity and Jesus’ message were to treat every single

person with equal respect and dignity while also preserving an overwhelming sense of justice and punishment. Now, to what extent the Western European nations fulfilled this Christian aspect is in dispute. However, what is incontrovertible is the influence that Christianity had on the legal foundation of these nations. Fukuyama also states that it would be a mistake to neglect the fact that religion had to secularize itself for its compatibility in Western Europe. Religion was made into a private matter and the separation of church and state became an essential component of all functional liberal democracies. Fukuyama finds that “Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalist Islam, by contrast, are totalistic religions which seek to regulate every aspect of human life, both public and private, including the realm of politics. These religions may be compatible with democracy...but they are very hard to reconcile with liberalism and the recognition of universal rights, particularly freedom of conscience or religion.” (Fukuyama, 217)

Nations in the Middle East have had a difficult time incorporating other religions into their countries. Sharia, the body of Islamic law derived from Islamic religious texts, plays a fundamental role to a certain degree in all the legal and justice systems in the Middle East. Sharia, as jurisprudence, is not necessarily the most accepting and receptive of alternative religions and ideologies.

Samuel Huntington, however, works to the other extreme. His basic argument is articulated most succinctly by his title, a clash of civilizations. Though Fukuyama provides a comprehensive analysis of the new issues that will confront the world at the beginning of the 1990s, Huntington articulates that a new criterion has developed in this era to define global conflict and differences. With the destruction of the Soviet Union, the primary determinant of struggle would no longer be along the lines of solely nation-states

or ideological dogmas. Rather, in this age of informational and commercial excess, Huntington believes that the fundamental crisis within every society will be a question of self-definition. The cultural groups of tribes, ethnic races, religion, and other aspects are the means by which societies define and associate themselves. In fact, Huntington asserts that “In this new world the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural identities.” (Huntington, 28) This allows for the possibilities for improbably proliferation. Violence that can result from conflicts between peoples of antagonistic civilizations will allow for the entrance of neighboring and alike nations, countries that Huntington terms “kin countries.” With similar interests and objectives, these kin countries will feel their own cultural paradigms at stake, or essentially their own civilization threatened, and this will consequently force them into political involvement into the conflict as well.

In a very broad sense, the crux of Huntington’s argument is that the post-Cold War geopolitical world has created the birth of seven to eight different civilizations, all with varying preferences and priorities. Though the West, with the United States in the forefront, has assumed the greatest power in global affairs, its influence of late has decreased with the growth of other civilizations with potentially adversarial contentions. Huntington notes four basic tenets of his theoretical approach of inter-civilization conflict. The first principle is that there are indeed active forces of integration which are attempting to conglomerate the world. With the increasing levels of economic dependence through complicated and intricate production chains, the necessity of interacting and even relying on other nations has grown. The second principle is a subtle

and distinct assertion that Huntington makes to differentiate from previous arguments in his thesis. Earlier, Huntington critiques the popular model of an “us vs. them” mentality, where the civilized community distinguishes themselves from the barbarian foreigners. Here, as stated above, Huntington believes that there is no question that the West is the dominant civilization in the world today, but the rest of the world is attempting to dethrone the West from this crowned position, upon which they have been perched for centuries. The third principle is that “Nation states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors.” (Huntington, 36) The fourth and final principle is the impact of his thesis. Huntington concedes that the world is anarchical by nature, and, essentially, that is the nature of the beast. Though issues of nation states will inevitably cause diplomatic ruptures sporadically, the greatest threat to the stability of humanity is the conflict between civilizations. Obviously, Huntington is no stranger to hyperbole, but this is the impact that Huntington foresees from the various and differing societies around the world. Huntington notes eight different civilizations around the world: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, and African.

Huntington goes so far as to break down human and civilizational history very briefly. He notes that 1500 AD as a critical point in the progress of humanity. Obviously, anthropological evidence clearly indicates that many different people within the different civilizations interacted quite significantly. However, according to Huntington, before 1500, this interaction was characterized more by an absence of wide transfer of information than actual flow of communication. For example, the civilizations in the Americas were so geographically isolated that contact with Europe, Africa, or Asia was

nominal if at all existent. But, by the early 16th century, the technology, both in terms of telecommunications and transportation, allowed for greater contact. However, Huntington notes that birth of a distinct Western European Christendom in the eighth and ninth centuries, as empires consolidated its power around this common identity. Though national skirmishes would still dominate relations in Western Europe, these empires and dominions would still bond together over this common heritage against the barbarian heathens. With the growth of power, Western Europe, and eventually the United States, would expand its power over other civilizations. In fact, “For four hundred years intercivilizational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilization.” (Huntington, 51) Huntington attributes to this rise in power to many different effects, such as the rise of banking and commerce as well as a growing dichotomy between secular and religious authorities. But the primary factor Huntington sees is the immediate growth of technological and navigational improvements, which allowed the Europeans to explore other civilizations around the world that previously had been inaccessible. Also, the enhanced superiority of organizational discipline and training to its troops afforded more success to Western military forces as well.

Despite providing such a comprehensive, and at times exhausting, description of what qualifies as this clash of civilizations, Huntington also makes no reservation for the differences that exist between Muslims. Huntington would respond to this charge by saying that the distinctions within the Islamic civilization are marginalized by the differences between the civilizations themselves. Moreover, the civilization will put aside its trivial variations when the entire civilization is put at risk. He points to the current situation in the Middle East as such a case, where a strong majority of Muslims band

together under the common cause against Israel. Many of the wars that Israel has waged since it gained independence in 1948 have been against multiple countries at the same time. However, again, Huntington cannot simply classify the Muslims of Morocco as the same as the Muslims of Pakistan or Indonesia. The schisms are so different between them, primarily in culture, that one cannot classify them under one massive category.

Huntington does somewhat knowingly acknowledge that it would be a great error to generalize all Middle Eastern and Islamic states. The relationships that the United States has fostered with these nations vary greatly. For example, the West has always treated Turkey very differently from the rest of the Middle East, regardless of geographic location. The West has welcomed the efforts of Turkey's leadership since the end of World War I to modernize its economy and liberalize its society. Though many nations in Europe, particularly Greece, has attempted to block entry of Turkey into the European Union, it appears as though that such sentiments are reflective more of long standing national enmities than a civilizational antagonism. However, Turkey is more of an exception to the rule. As Huntington notes, "Since the 1970s, however, a fairly consistent anti-Western trend has existed, marked by the rise of fundamentalism, shifts in power within Muslim countries from more pro-Western to more anti-Western governments, the emergence of a quasi war between some Islamic groups and the West, and the weakening of the Cold War security ties that existed between some Muslim states and the United States." (Huntington, 185) The defining trait that underlies the fundamental conflict is what role the West will play in the future development of these Islamist nations. If early twentieth century foreign affairs remain intact, the West will, not only be a strong influencer, but perhaps the sole adjudicator of the future for these nations. But as already

been established, the increasing economic independence and power that these nations have achieved in the global marketplace have given them autonomy to control their own fates, an ability many of these regions in the Islamic civilization have lacked for centuries.

Huntington uses the Islamic civilization as a case study to further explore this phenomenon. He titles the renewed interest in Islam as a socially defining trait to their civilization as the “Islamic Resurgence.” Many scholars in the Muslim community see the Resurgence of fundamentalism Islam as a substitute for the slow installation of Western laws and norms in their own communities. Huntington draws an analogy between the Islamic Resurgence and the Protestant Reformation. With Lutheranism and Calvinism paralleling Shi’ite and Sunni fundamentalism, and John Calvin sharing an affinity for discipline in society with Ayatollah Khomeini, the thesis behind both of them was a fundamental desire to reform community as a whole within the image of a religious paragon. Despite this, Huntington notes one key difference between the two. Whereas the Protestant Reformation was isolated to the Northern Europe, “The Resurgence, in contrast, has touched almost every Muslim society. Beginning in the 1970s, Islamic symbols, beliefs, practices, institutions, policies, and organizations won increasing commitment and support throughout the world of 1 billion Muslims stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and from Nigeria to Kazakhstan.” (Huntington, 111) Huntington finds that, by 1995, every single Islamic nation with the exception of Iran was more conservative and religiously fundamentalist on the whole than they were fifteen years prior. The creation of Islamic schools, the most extreme being the madrasas found in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the United States invasion of Afghanistan, allowed for

Islamic leaders to reinstall fundamental principles of the Islamic faith. Huntington stops just short of saying that these educational programs “indoctrinate” the Muslim youth to continue and perpetuate Islamic ideals and norms.

Moreover, another problem with how Huntington deals with religion is the issue of secularism. Granted, there are no present examples of a secular nation in the Middle East, or any for that matter run in a predominantly Muslim nation. The same may even hold true when examining the past as well. However, the way in which Huntington approaches secularism is characteristic of the most general critique of his model. Huntington is routinely charged as being xenophobic, with a strict Western bias. For example, he finds “The ability of Islamist groups to dominate the opposition was also enhanced by government suppression of secular oppositions. . . . Secular opposition, however, is more vulnerable to repression than religious opposition.” (Huntington, 115) Such a mindset reveals his closed mindedness, in that Huntington feels that a secular political system is impossible to foster in the current Middle East. Huntington asserts that the basic framework present in the West, namely the United States, are conspicuously absent in the Middle East, making certain Western forms incompatible. Such sentiments are the very ones that have opened Huntington to criticism of being intolerant.

In summary, both Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s models possess many flaws when it comes to assessing its viability within the context of religion. Both of them are on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, but both also implicitly assert American Exceptionalism in this case. Fukuyama believes that one of the primary tenets of liberal democracy, with the United States as an adequate case study, is religious tolerance. Huntington asserts that religious tolerance is nonexistent in certain parts of the world,

namely the Middle East, because their societies are so fundamentally different from that of the West to actually realize it. But, Fukuyama's naiveté and Huntington's dismissal make even the possibility of religious tolerance unrecognizable. The true situation lies somewhere in between. Secularism is an important part towards attaining liberal democracy, and countries in the Middle East have made strides in that direction. Turkey, for example, has liberalized many of its religious policies to be more accepting of a strong and vocal Orthodox Christian minority group. Granted, there are still many areas for improvement, but Turkey provides an example of where secularism and Islam are indeed possible. The obstinacy to allow for even the slightest integration of the two is symbolic of the American policies in the region, that have inspired such animosity towards the West.

Politics in Fukuyama and Huntington

The central thesis that runs as a narrative thread connecting both Fukuyama and Huntington is the unquestioned supremacy of liberal democracy. Fukuyama believes that the latter half of the twentieth century saw competition between communism and capitalist liberal democracy. From the dissolution of the Soviet Union emerged liberal democracy, which he feels will reign supreme in the world. Even socialist governments will not be nearly as desirable as completely free market economies. However, Huntington asserts that the temporary consensus on liberal democracy is only a transient interlude between the ancient civilizational conflicts, which is at the heart of all social interaction. Huntington asserts that whatever form of government is dominant is only the result of a particular civilization assuming enough power to properly dominate the others. With the West being the dominant force for the past five centuries, it is capable of

dictating the terms of normative governing. However, both Fukuyama and Huntington have their fatal flaws in considering the effect of politics in their own models. Fukuyama does not ignore again the effect of culture on forms of government. In the formation of a system of government, the indigenous culture has to play a role in its formation, as was the case when the West “created” liberal democracy. Huntington, on the other hand, assumes an inertia of his clash of civilizations, which is basically his end result for any and all possible obstacles. According to Huntington, there is nothing in humanity’s history or future potential that can slow down this inevitable conflict. This misanthropic viewpoint overlooks positive steps made in the field of expansion of civil liberties and rights over the past few centuries, as they have spread to encompass more and more individuals throughout the world.

Fukuyama begins his analysis of the predominance of liberalized democracy by critiquing the polar opposite system in place in the latter half of the twentieth century, totalitarian governments. Fukuyama attributes the pessimism that he found pervasive in the circles of political theorists in the 1990s to the horrific acts committed by these totalitarian governments. He finds that the two most important examples, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, fell victim to an exceptional misconception about how to rule individuals. Fukuyama uses a simplistic example of how a patronizing and patriarchal man may be able to physically dominate his wife and children. But he would be unable to do so for a greater number, as a government would be unable to do so for a populace in the millions. Thus, to fully explain how Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were so successful in getting the country mobilized, Fukuyama argues that these governments were able to establish a legitimacy that afforded them a certain degree of respect.

However, their basic flaw was that, even though they were able to commandeer respect, “The most fundamental failure of totalitarianism was its failure to control thought.” (Fukuyama, 29) Thus, to create a forum that would openly accept their own views and opinions, citizens would form private and sometimes illegal meetings. Quickly, civilians learned that the government was, in fact, not in control of every aspect of their social lives, as was the primary tenets of both governments. This realization only further encouraged liberalization.

Fukuyama is very insistent of the strength of liberal democracies, and this is not somewhat unexpected considering the age in which he writes his analysis. In 1992, the world had just witnessed the triumph of American styled capitalism, free market economies, and liberal democracy over the beacon of communism, the Soviet Union. The world community lauded the success of liberal democracy and considered the few isolated cases of communism that still remained in the world, such as Cuba, China, and Vietnam, as anomalies which would eventually succumb to the prosperity and greatness of liberal democracies as well. In regards to the Islamic nations that were also holdouts, Fukuyama asserts that “And while nearly a billion people are culturally Islamic—one-fifth of the world’s population—they cannot challenge liberal democracy on its own territory on the level of ideas. Indeed, the Islamic world would seem more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse, since such liberalism has attracted numerous and powerful Muslim adherents over the past century and a half.” (Fukuyama, 46) The optimism that Fukuyama displays unfortunately does not bear out in reality. More than fifteen years later, the Middle East has become much more of a turbulent and unreceptive area for Western ideologies. The “adherents” that Fukuyama believes will be the

intelligentsia in the Middle East, bringing forth the ideals of liberal democracy, have been unabashedly silenced by the clerics and politicians in the Middle East. Many countries in the area still are religious theocracies in different shades, whether or not they are indeed alleged allies of the West.

Fukuyama argues that, at the end of history, liberal democracy is confronted with no serious ideological systems that can logistically and reasonably compete with it. The twentieth century has definitively proven that communism, fascism, and any other form of government are vastly inferior to liberal democracy. Again, he offers that the world has definitively chosen liberal democracy over the other forms of government, except in the Middle East. He states that there are many cultural obstacles that can prohibit the growth of liberal democracies. Though he does not mention the Middle East in particular, each of the cultural obstacles are indeed present in at least certain areas of the Middle East. Fukuyama finds that “the [one] has to do with the degree and character of a country’s national, ethnic, and racial consciousness.” (Fukuyama, 215) Fukuyama does offer the caveat that the two are not mutually exclusive, for it is possible to possess both. But, Fukuyama finds that “...democracy is not likely to emerge in a country where the nationalism or ethnicity of its constituent groups is so highly developed that they do not share a sense of nation or accept one another’s rights.” (Fukuyama, 216) Such is the case in the Middle East in many different nations. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others have a very high sense of their own racial heritage and, consequently, create systems that hamper the rights of others whose only fault is the unfortunate effect of being of a different ethnicity.

Fukuyama places a great deal of significance on the level of legitimacy that a particular government possesses. He finds that legitimacy is the only way a government can govern and rule a society effectively. In times of political distress, legitimacy will allow for a certain level of tolerance from constituents to accept faults made by lawmakers. Since the leaders of the authoritarian political structure are finally held accountable for all of their actions and even unintended and chance consequences, a great deal of responsibility and blame can be afforded onto their shoulders. Fukuyama argues that “On both the communist Left and the authoritarian Right there has been a bankruptcy of serious ideas capable of sustaining the internal political cohesion of strong governments, whether based on ‘monolithic’ parties, military juntas, or personalistic dictatorships.” (Fukuyama, 39) Fukuyama points to the liberalizing trends seen around the world in the major government structures. The Soviet Union broke up into many different republics across Eastern Europe and Asia, many if not all have adopted various forms of democracy. China, though still a communist nation, has indeed liberalized its economy considerably and has also ceded control over the daily lives of the people. In describing this transition, Fukuyama ultimately finds that “The apparent number of choices that countries face in determining how they will organize themselves politically and economically has been *diminishing* over time. Of the different types of regimes that have emerged in the course of human history, from monarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and communist dictatorships of this century, the only form of government that has survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy.” (Fukuyama, 45)

An obstacle in the transition towards a liberal democracy that Fukuyama notes is the existence of a highly unequal society before institutionalization of a liberal democracy. For example, Tocqueville notes that one of the primary strengths of American democracy was the reasonable equity that he viewed across the country. The egalitarian network of governing found in various small communities only furthered the overall strength of the overarching political structure. Many countries, however, that have created liberal democracies which have been ineffective inherited a highly unequal class structure. For example, South America's social structure was largely dominated by the relationship between slave and master, as slavery was still legal in certain parts of the continent in the late nineteenth century. (Fukuyama, 217) In the Middle East, the role of women has been a contentious issue for civil rights activist throughout the world. There has been a systematic and intentional subjugation of women in these Islamic societies for centuries. But one of the primary principles of a liberal democracy is the expansion of equal civil liberties to each and every individual. The Middle East is actively discriminating against half of its population, by limiting education and professional opportunities and the continual denial of the right to political participation. Again, it would be a great mischaracterization to assume that such oppression is standardized throughout the region. But it is undeniable to see the various degrees of discrimination against women.

Throughout his argumentation, Fukuyama neglects to mention arguably one of the most important factors in the creation of a stable and fully functioning government. Any government that attempts to gain legitimacy with its constituents must be reflective of its people. This is where Fukuyama's premise of the uninhibited expansion of liberal

democracy falls apart so clearly. As he states earlier, some of the basic elements of liberal democracy are in such contract with the culture in the Middle East, and it is impossible to ignore or overlook these differences. For example, twentieth century liberal democracy expected that each and every single individual have an equal right to vote, freedom of the press, right to assembly and many others. In fact, in the United States, the biggest expansion of rights occurred in 1920, when women were finally given the right to vote. All of a sudden, half the population that was previously disenfranchised was able to have their voice heard. This was the beginning of the women's rights movement in the West. However, in the Middle East today, many nations consistently deny these rights to women as well as many others, particularly their access to education. Limiting their educational opportunities has many benefits to the continuance of the status quo in the Middle East. Empirically, the intelligentsia are the ones that are responsible to bringing about social change for themselves and for the lower classes. By consciously ensuring that women will not be able to become educated, and presumably more exposed to external thoughts and ideologies, communities and societies in the Middle East can continue their subjugation and oppression of women. Also, this is purely systematic as well, as it is codified into the laws of the nation. Fukuyama does not offer any type of solution as to how liberal democracy will be able to overcome such a staunch opposition, and such a large stumbling block, that will bring about the great emancipation in the Middle East he speaks of.

But, an even more troubling aspect of Fukuyama's thesis is his belief of the universality of liberal democracy. According to him, there is only one type and form of liberal democracy that will indeed subsume the world, and it is the one that has been

perfected over centuries in the Middle East. But, again, Fukuyama is missing the cultural significance of the liberal democracies that formed in the West. For example, many different scholars in the field state that the construction of the Constitution in the United States was the result of the wealthy landowners who also held slaves looking out for their own self interests. Many of the aspects of the Constitution are created to ensure that they stay in power and that their wealth is protected. Whether or not this is true, the influence of the writers and their own personal socio-economic backgrounds did play an indelible role in the formation of the Constitution. The United States is one that was built of central Judeo-Christian values, primarily because of its Protestant roots. Many different norms that are accepted today as custom are rooted in the personal choices of the nation's forefathers. However, Fukuyama does not allow for this same type of consideration in the Middle East. He does not mention at all the influence that Middle Eastern culture should have on their liberal democracy, because obviously this would then create one that was fundamentally different than the liberal democracy that defeated communism in the twentieth century. But, the events of September 11th and the West's interaction with the Middle East have undoubtedly shown that the Middle East will not compromise their own ideals and values completely, unless they are able to retain certain indispensable traits and qualities.

John Gray, in his article "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present," articulates his critical response to the central thesis proposed by Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and the Last Man. Gray does not argue against the virtues of liberal democracy as described by Fukuyama, and most other global promoters of democracy. Rather, he generalizes his argument to state that

any type of government, regardless of form, that is unresponsive to the needs and demands of its people will be deemed illegitimate. He finds that Fukuyama's final assertion that the world will uniformly and universally accept liberal democracy as utopian and a fallacy that is the result of the pride exhibited by the West following their Cold War triumph. Gray finds that "In any future that can be foreseen a diversity of regimes is both inevitable and desirable. Devising terms of productive coexistence for regimes that will remain deeply different from one another is the issue set to dominate the international system in the coming century." (Gray, 150) Gray finds clashes between societies to be the result of the growing scarcity of resources, such as natural energy supplies, as the world industrializes. Assuming that all the countries in the world will adopt liberal democracies, a presupposition that Gray is not willing to make, liberal democracies may still compete with each other in other arenas. Gray asserts that there have been historically many different conflicts that have not been conflict driven, but rather much more practical and pragmatic in its causes and roots.

Huntington offers a different approach to how politics will result in a supposed clash of civilizations. Not only has the West been the strongest force in the world for the past couple of centuries, it has attempted to enforce its will over other civilizations, through colonization, mercantilism, and other forces. A corollary can be drawn from such actions and the current American approach of democracy promotion in the form of American Exceptionalism. Huntington states that such trends of Western dominance continued until the twentieth century. But the twentieth century began a new era in diplomatic and foreign relations. One of the consequences that Huntington notes is that the "expansion of the West" ceased and the "revolt against the West" began. Western

power has definitively diminished in relation to other civilizations in the last century. The second consequence of this interaction was the globalization of an internationally standardized system in largely multicivilizational world. At the close of the twentieth century, Huntington asserts that the Western mode of governance and authority has become the political norm. In fact, Huntington goes so far as to state that “The great political ideologies of the twentieth century include liberalism, socialism, anarchism, corporatism, Marxism, communism, social democracy, conservatism, nationalism, fascism, and Christian democracy. They all share one thing in common: they are products of Western civilization. No other civilization has generated a significant political ideology.” (Huntington, 53-54) Such a framework for analyzing twentieth century politics may be emblematic of the very Western-centric mindset that many criticize Huntington for possessing. Devaluing the political contributions of nation states and empires out of the West certainly does offend many historical liberal tendencies. But he does offer the caveat that the West has never created a major world religion, with the non-West largely responsible for this.

Similar to how Jared Diamond predicts the rapid decline of the United States in his latest work, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Huntington also predicts that the West will lose its dominance eventually as well. However, both Diamond and Huntington differ on two different and important bases, timeframe and cause. Diamond sees American society somewhat quickly “collapsing” in the twenty-first century, whereas Huntington concedes that the West will maintain its political and military dominance well into the twenty-first century. However, Huntington does believe that the seeds that will eventually root out Western dominance have been planted. On the

second issue of contention, Diamond believes that the problem that will plague the United States, as it has empirically to other civilizations and societies, will be the massive mismanagement of resources. Huntington rather contends that the downfall of Western dominance in the world will result from a slow attrition and concession of global influence. By examining territory and population, economic product, and military capabilities, Huntington envisages a slow democratization of power throughout the eight civilizations. Beginning with the expansion of Islam into Northern Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkans, the Islamic civilization are making great upward trends while diminishing the shares of the West. Moreover, with Sinic and Japanese increases in economic product, as particularly seen since the 1980s, the West is realizing that no longer can it compete with the same sense of overpowering dominance economically that it once did. Production and labor costs are significantly lower in these regions of the world, and outsourcing is just a business-model representation of this phenomenon. Finally, the end of the Cold War saw the breakdown of the Soviet military complex as well as a slowdown on defense spending in the United States and other Western European nations. Huntington argues that such a decrease as allowed for other nations, notably in the Middle East, China, and India to increase their own military stockpiles. Moreover, "In the meantime the fading of the West and the rise of other power centers is promoting the global process of indigenization and the resurgence of non-Western cultures." (Huntington, 91)

Huntington also is willing to grant that there are certain pratfalls that have historically resulted from the Western model. One unanticipated consequence has been, as the size and scope of government obligations and responsibilities has increased, the

bureaucracy created to meet the needs of an ever enlarging populace, and even the most accepting apologetic would have to agree even the best of state bureaucracies can leave a vacuum of civilians who are not experiencing the benefits of prosperity. Huntington suggests that the religious resurgence which is seen in many impoverished communities around the world is attempting to fill that void of services. Essentially, “The breakdown of order and of civil society creates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamental, groups.” (Huntington, 98) Hezbollah, for example, has a seemingly substantial amount of seats in Lebanon’s Parliament for an organization that the United States State Department has named a terrorist party. During the recent skirmish that Israel had with Lebanon in the summer of 2006, many Lebanese interviewees state that the reason for why they support and then vote in Hezbollah into leadership positions is the fact that Hezbollah actually undertakes many different social works programs that have significantly aided the community.

Drawing very lightly upon Fukuyama, Huntington points to the fact that events in the last quarter of the twentieth century reveal the effects of an early confrontation between the Islamic and Western civilizations, predating the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. Political theory has arrived at the general consensus that democracy as seen since the end of World War II is a Western invention. With the United States at the forefront, the democratic republic that is seen as the prototypical exemplar for emerging government is a Western creation. In the 1980s, a wave of democratization spread through Southern Europe, Latin America, and selected countries in East Asia, the effect on the Islamic civilization was minimal. The wide-scale support that the United States and its Western European peers afforded to these new nations who were

attempting to incorporate democracy was massive. But simultaneously, Islamist movements were gaining strength in these Muslim countries. Islam was playing the role democracy was expected to, a composite unifying Muslims and Islamic nations around the world.

Moreover, despite constant reassurances from many recent Presidents of the United States that the current conflict is not one of the West vs. Islam, many different fundamental leaders in the region have framed the debate in such a manner that make it impossible for adherents to not feel their faith being attacked. Particularly beginning with the Afghan War in the late 1970s where the Soviet Union was attempting to gain control of Afghanistan, a series of conflicts arose between Western nations and other countries in the Middle East that were construed as civilizational conflicts. In the case of the current Iraq War waged primarily by the United States, many American and Western leaders scoffed with disbelief that were not able to corral more Islamic allies in early 2003, especially a nation like Iran who had fought an extremely violent and ferocious war with Iraq in the 1980s. Even though many nations in the Middle East acknowledged Saddam Hussein as a bloody tyrant, he was “our bloody tyrant,” and the actions of the West to intervene were not but another manifestation of the efforts of the West to subordinate the Middle East and the Islamic civilization as a whole. But, the “Muslim definition of the war as the West vs. Islam facilitated reduction or suspension of antagonisms within the Muslim world. Old differences among Muslims shrank in importance compared to the overriding difference between Islam and the West.” (Huntington, 249) The actions of the West have done an excellent job of collectivizing Muslims and a mutual prioritization of

objectives, where the removal of the West and Western influences trumps all over petty differences between factions.

Huntington notes three different areas politically that will divide the West and other civilizations, especially the Islamist, in the future, all of which are important areas on the international agenda in the world. The first is weapons proliferation. Since the middle of the 1960s, the United States has actively worked to keep weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, or chemical, outside the reach of other nations. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Iraq since 2003 have all been fought on the basis of rejecting the expansion of weapons of mass destruction. But many of the other civilizations see these efforts to contain by the West as an implicit paternalism and just an assertion to maintain their own dominance while keeping other civilizations incapacitated. For example, the detonation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India in the late 1990s were seen as a national triumph that warranted the harsh economic sanctions placed upon them by the West. The second area of conflict is the insistence of the West to push forward with Western values and institutions to protect and observe Western conventions of human rights. Huntington asserts that the fall of the Soviet Union led leaders in the West to believe that a following revolution would occur which would be the liberalization of human rights and democracy across the world. The West invested heavily in promoting these values. However, “As of 1995, European and American efforts to achieve these goals had met with limited success. Almost all non-Western civilizations were resistant to this pressure from the West. ... This resistance was rooted in the broader movements of cultural assertiveness embodied in the Islamic Resurgence...”

(Huntington, 1993) Such conflict arose between the disagreement between the sides on the

universality of human rights and cultural relativism. The third area is the issue of immigration, a subject that the United States for example is in the middle of sorting. The onslaught of immigration in the United States and other Western European nations makes the majority population very defensive about the purity of their own cultures. Such resistance and concern only fuel more antagonistic tension, which may be emblematic of the “ubiquity of conflict” in the modern world where civilizations are interacting on a closer and more intimate basis.

A common problem that Huntington has is the dilemma of the self-fulfilling prophecy. His premise that he states very early in his analysis is that all the different civilizations are headed into a collision and that there are practically no ways to stop it. Such a defeatist and nihilist approach not only diminishes human agency as a whole but is insulting to the progress which has been made in the past few centuries to emancipate and increase the standard of living of billions of people around the world. Also, assuming that there is no stopping this conflict definitely colors his perception. Huntington assumes the worst-case scenario each and every single time, even remarking on the human tendency to hate and the ubiquity of violence and conflict in history. However grim the current outlook, the hope for change can never be extinguished. This does not preclude antagonistic actions taken by the West which spurs animosity. As Richard Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker articulate in their article, “Challenging Huntington,” “... a violent clash of civilizations could well result from our continuing failure to transform the systems of inequality that make social life around the globe a struggle for individual and group survival—systems that feed the illusion that either one civilization or another must be dominant. ... Huntington’s call for the global defense of Western interests against

competing civilizations therefore represents the worst sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.”
(Rubenstein and Crocker, 128)

Economics in Fukuyama and Huntington

Fukuyama also asserts an economical argument of universal standardization, one that is based off the free market economy created by the West. Again, the controlled economies of the Soviet Union and other communist nations suggest a severe misallocation of funds, resources, and labor. Such mismanagement is the result of human error, which is supposedly eliminated in markets that function independent of government control. However, along with market economies, many other aspects commonly associated with capitalism emerge as well, which may run contrary to indigenous cultural norms. An organization of labor is required which may conflict with the social structure of the community, causing unrest. However, Fukuyama does assert that capitalism has shown to be ineffective in particular parts of the world, such as Latin America. He finds that “Indeed, it is safe to say that were it not for the Third World, Marxism would have died a much quicker death in this century. But the continuing poverty of the underdeveloped world breathed new life into the doctrine by permitting the Left to attribute that poverty first to colonialism, and then, when there was no more colonialism, to “neo-colonialism,” and finally to the behavior of multinational corporation.” (Fukuyama, 99) But, as the 1990s clearly illustrated, the vast majority of this world was making a slow yet marked transition to liberalization of economies.

The role of market based capitalistic economies may seem irrelevant to the cause of liberal democracies, but Fukuyama strongly believes that the two are inextricably linked. In fact, he asserts that a high level of industrialization will in fact produce a liberal

democracy. He finds that there are many different theories in the contemporary political science forum to explain this phenomenon. The most persuasive, according to Fukuyama, describes the strength of a burgeoning middle-class society, which consequently will mandate political rights and equality. Even though capitalism will in the beginning create a huge chasm in the wealthy and impoverished, as is the case in Russia where oligarchs formed, Fukuyama believes that wealth will eventually dissipate, because a highly industrialized economy will create the demand for an educated workforce who will want to be very active in agenda-setting and legislating. However, Fukuyama again acknowledges the distinct exception that the Middle East proves, "... which possesses no stable democracies, and yet contains a number of states with per capita incomes on a European or Asian level. ... income from petroleum has permitted [Middle Eastern] states ... to acquire the trappings of modernity... without having had their societies go through the social transformations that come when such wealth is generated by the labor of their populations." (Fukuyama, 112) But Fukuyama does not provide how this will affect the growth of liberal democracy in the region. Wealth has been concentrated in the hands of few in the Middle East for decades, and Fukuyama makes no concession for this.

Gray also makes an interesting objection to Fukuyama by disputing the correlation that Fukuyama draws between economics and politics. Fukuyama, as established earlier, states that the two systems are inextricably linked. The only way for a liberal democracy and free market enterprise capitalism can exist is through the success of the other. They facilitate the proper function of each other by allowing for individual and autonomous personal choices, to a certain extent. During the Cold War, many nations

would form liberal democracies in efforts to align themselves with Western nations politically and economically. The shift would expand their financial opportunities and allow for unprecedented growths in income. But, Gray argues that the end of the Cold War "... has removed one of the principal props that had kept them stable during the postwar period. Political settlements established at that time are unraveling in several countries (such as Italy and Japan) in which the links between the political structure and strategic environment of the Cold War were clearest. In many countries opening up to the global markets has evoked a new politics of economic insecurity." (Gray, 154) Gray writes in 1998, a year after the Asian economic crisis, which resulted in an over-inflated market losing consumer confidence. In July of 1997, investors began pulling out of the markets in the South China Sea at first and eventually Japan. Many different economists, such as Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, attributed this to a hypersensitivity exhibited by Asian investors to a minor crisis that would not have otherwise escalated nearly as drastically as it eventually did had the consumers shown greater faith in the strength of their markets. Gray further attacks Fukuyama's model of the role of the government in economics. Fukuyama stated that the government must play a passive role in economics, as the breadth and sheer magnitude of the global market overshadows the government. But, Gray asserts that the government still has to facilitate economic trust and, in the end, a safety net for those who are left behind. The economic security of the citizens of a state has been and will always be one of the primary responsibilities of the governmental body.

Huntington again notes how the West has used its dominance throughout the centuries as a stepping board to enforce its will across the world. Because of its strong economies throughout the world, the West has codified normal business and marketplace

practices. However, recently many different civilizations around the world are succeeding and experiencing “indigenization.” When discussing the “indigenization” of these non-Western civilizations, Huntington is referring to the burgeoning pride of these civilizations at their new and prosperous success. In the early part of the twentieth century, many of these cultures were exceptionally envious of the economic wealth of the West, the United States in particular. The increased standard of living and quality of life were remarkably and undoubtedly higher in the West than in other parts of the world. With the influx of money infused into these other civilizations, such success would seem as a reaffirmation of the Western mode of financial institutions and markets which became the standardized norm in the world. In fact, Huntington states that the other civilizations are willing to work within the Western framework when asserting their own independence from Western dominance, by “[invoking] Western values of self-determination, liberalism, democracy, and independence to justify their opposition to Western domination.” (Huntington, 93) However, Huntington, somewhat paradoxically, insists that East Asians are adamant that their newfound prosperity is not the result of the importation of Western values but rather a strict adherence to their own native and indigenous values and culture. In fact, “Now that they are no longer weak but increasing powerful, they do not hesitate to attack those same values which they previously used to promote their interests. The revolt against the West was originally legitimated by asserting the universality of Western values; it is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values.” (Huntington, 93) Huntington points to the election of many fundamentalist Islamic leaders and their platforms that call for ardent crusades

against the Western educated and oriented elites that were running the country previously.

Huntington also conducts an analysis of the language utilized by Islamic leaders when discussing the relationship their nation states have with the West. Huntington points out a somewhat ironic situation where there exists a dearth of statements made by prominent Islamic businessmen, politicians, celebrities, educators, journalists, and scholars which praise Western ideals and institutions. But, the monetary success of many of Islamic nations are built on the stability and wealth of Western institutions. Organizations such as OPEC rely on the global marketplace for its own sustenance. Granted, the money generated from these organizations are not always trickled down to the lowest common denominator in the community. Huntington spends more time on how Islamic leaders "... instead stress the differences between their civilization and Western civilization, the superiority of their culture, and the need to maintain the integrity of that culture against Western onslaught. Muslims fear and resent Western power and the threat which this poses to their society and beliefs. They see Western culture as materialistic, corrupt, decadent, and immoral." (Huntington, 213)

Unfortunately, Huntington does not provide any actual evidence of this alleged widespread and pervasive opinion. Rather, he also relies on generalizations of a rampant degree, which only further weakens his argument when put in context of the severity and seriousness of the argument he is making. Moreover, growing anti-Westernism is accompanied by a parallel "Islamic threat" of Muslim fundamentalism. This two-way fear and dislike only deepens the cleavage between these two civilizations.

Also, economically speaking, the forms of economies are radically different in the Middle East than in the West. The West has essentially followed the market analysis and system which was described by Adam Smith. Nations and companies are continually attempting to maximize their profits and output. In the West, success is gauged by economic and financial performance. But the system is radically different in the Middle East. Timur Kuran states in his article, “The Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality,” that “Notwithstanding the claim that Islamic economics provides a superior alternative to the secular economic doctrines of our time, its real purpose is to help prevent Muslims from assimilating into the emerging global culture whose core elements have a Western pedigree. ... Its chief instrument for fighting assimilation is the guilt that it fosters by characterizing certain universal economic practices as un-Islamic.” (Kuran, 438) This again shows the flaws of both Fukuyama and Huntington. Fukuyama’s assertion that the transition towards a market based capitalist economy is a huge leap of faith. The Middle East prioritizes their economic goals different from that of the West. Though accumulating wealth is of significant importance, Kuran believes and argues that refusing the infiltration of unwanted Western advances is of a greater necessity. For Huntington, this only further illustrates that the clash of civilizations is not inevitable, but rather the result of an oppressive West trying to force upon “subject” communities and societies its own paradigm and economic framework.

Social Conflict in Fukuyama and Huntington

The final area deserving examination is the issue of social conflict between the West and the Middle East. President Bush has stated numerous times that the war on terrorism is being fought to continue “our way of life.” Similarly, many scholars and

leaders within the Islamic community frame the debate in the same terms. The presence of Western military bases in Saudi Arabia, the holiest nation in the Islamic tradition, and the West's unconditional support of Israel, a nation that the Middle East has often times accused of committing terrorist acts, is seen as an affront to their social culture.

In early 2006, the second paperback publication of The End of History and the Last Man provided Fukuyama an opportunity to counter some of his critics. In his afterword, Fukuyama takes aim at many of the objections against his groundbreaking premise. Citing and generalizing his critics into four different areas, only the first is relevant to the subject at hand. Throughout his initial publication in 1992, Fukuyama articulates the Muslim community as, not an obstacle to liberal democracy, but rather the newest frontier for it. However, fourteen years after this publication, the events that culminated in the September 11th attacks and the ensuing geopolitics of the area have suggested a deeper and underlying conflict between the Middle East and the rest of the world. Fukuyama finds that the problem does not arise with Islam as a religion, as Christianity was used as a justification for some of the cruelest acts of humanity in the past. Islam is vulnerable to the same religious manipulation, as it is currently being done by leaders in the region. Moreover, the successful transition to a liberal democracy in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey clearly illustrate that Islam and liberal democracy are not incompatible. Also, nations with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, Mali, and Senegal, have also displayed this successful transition. However, again, Turkey may not prove to be as useful an example as Fukuyama would prefer. Turkey, previously the Ottoman Empire, have empirically attempted to integrate themselves more with Europe than with the Middle East. Their application for the European Union has been in the

approval process for years, and they have often times taken the world stage to differentiate themselves from their Middle Eastern neighbors.

Fukuyama's most compelling reply is reserved for a subtle distinction he makes, where he states that "...radical Islamism is best understood as a political ideology. ... These doctrines, which are extremely dangerous, do not reflect any core teachings of Islam, but make use of Islam for political purposes." (Fukuyama, 348) Fukuyama asserts that religion is being called upon in the Middle East as a response to the growing modernization and liberalism which is surrounding them geographically. Such growing modernization has successfully alienated this particular community, and they have found solace in their faith. Consequently, the question for Fukuyama remains whether or not such radical Islamism can effectively counter the expansive growth and ideological advantages of liberal democracy. Fukuyama relies on the internal differences within Islam, which he is convinced will create strife within the religious as it attempts to resolve any differences. Again, this is also a questionable assertion, as recent aggression of the West in the Middle East seems to have allowed these nations and countries, with its many differences, to unite under a common effort to combat the West, as Huntington articulates. Though, as Fukuyama states, communism had the double advantage of being appealing ideologically to developing nations and also having a powerful modern state in its center, it still operated under expected Western norms. As Huntington notes, the Islamic community works under a different set of values and ethics, which are no better or worse than Western ones, but are undeniably peculiar to the West. The adjustment process has been a bitter period as the two civilizations have attempted to cope during their interaction. Fukuyama believes that the greater conflict will be how liberal

democracies that already exist will deal internally with Islamic communities. However, this does not preclude a clash of sorts. Rather, it only illustrates how the back and forth is not being waged solely in the Middle East, but in the societal microcosm of neighborhoods all over the world.

Another critique against Fukuyama is laid against one of his earliest contentions, which is that citizens of nations will begin to associate themselves with their form of government. Though he himself does not go this far, many of his critics assume that a final ramification of this new world that Fukuyama has drawn up is either the complete elimination of significant reduction of nationalism. Fukuyama does state that citizens must be proud of their framework of government, for this adds a layer of legitimacy to the entire decision-making process while also solidifying it as the preordained end result. Many critics are making a reasonable and natural assumption when arguing that Fukuyama believes that this pride will eventually supplant nationalism. Presumably, if ethnic and religious communities put aside their differences and work cohesively, the olive branch of peace between the two will be overarching governmental system that protects both groups' rights to freedom and equality. In fact, this is one of the characteristics that Tocqueville notes in America during his travels, that citizens are able to put aside their socioeconomic class differences and are willing to work together towards the betterment of the entire state. Perhaps naïve, but Tocqueville is touching upon one of the fundamental characteristics that he believes makes the United States distinct, in other words, American Exceptionalism. Fukuyama's supposed goal of this being replicated throughout the world is unfortunately not being realized. Only five years after Fukuyama's publication and the fall of the Berlin Wall, John L. Comaroff and Paul

Stern write in their paper, “New Perspectives on Nationalism and War,” that “In short, nationalism, like history, is anything but dead; and this in spite of confident predictions of its demise ever since the dawn of modernity. . . . At present, however, nationalism is very much alive. Transformed, multiple, and fragmentary in the faces it presents to the world, but very much alive.” (Comaroff and Stern, 37) This is the case that is found in the Middle East. Though the State Department assures the world that the terrorists against the United States and the West in their numerous videos are only a small segment of the general Muslim population, they still comprise a real threat to global security. As many of these videos articulate, they employ theological language as a foundation for their justification of their acts. Though this nationalism is not tied to a specific nation state per se, it still strongly resembles a strong devotion to an ideological framework beyond the form of government, their religion.

Many would also charge Fukuyama that his conclusions also endorse an intellectual and social stagnancy implicitly. By publicly acknowledging that liberal democracy is indeed the best form of government possible in the world which will suitably address the needs of all citizens, this poses a fundamental problem of how particular disenfranchised communities can expect remediation for their alienation, in whichever form it may be. The connections between Adam Smith’s economic model and politics, that individuals working within their own self-interest will inevitably end up in the best result for all, is based off profit maximization and not equity. Empirical studies throughout conducted throughout the United States and other nations in Western Europe clearly illustrate that there are certainly particular parts of society whose voice is either not heard or cleanly ignored. In fact, William Katerberg notes that “The postmodern

challenge to liberal democracy is to find room for the political, national, ethnic, moral, and religious boundaries in which identity and community are rooted without giving in to nativism. ... It is particularly postmodern because there is no end just over the horizon, only the promise of continued conflict.” (Katerberg, 514) Katerberg is perhaps relating a worst-case scenario of nativism, but his end result of continued conflict as a result of the numerous boundaries that define identity in our contemporary world cannot be ignored. The end of the Cold War did not magically erase all the different memories of national competitiveness that had accrued over centuries. For example, following the end of World War II, many accused France, a liberal democracy, of purposefully hindering the reconstruction process of Germany due to the centuries of conflict between the two nations.

In the penultimate section of his work, where he actually discusses the “Clash of Civilizations,” Huntington purports that the West, again particularly the United States, has repeatedly attempted to project its own lifestyle and environment onto other civilizations, regardless of degree of acceptance. This is not solely relegated to democracy promotion. Huntington points to a categorical push from the West to imprint onto other civilizations their own normative standards of living and culture. A prerequisite for successful completion of this objective is an unquestioning power to assert one’s will over another. But in today’s political climate, “The central problem in the relations between the West and the rest is, consequently, the discordance between the West’s—particularly America’s—efforts to promote a universal Western culture and its declining ability to do so.” (Huntington, 183) The fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s only reinforced in the minds of the West a false assurance of the

dominance of liberalism and democracy. To Huntington, this position as being the world's only superpower also created expectations that other nation states, and most notably other civilizations, to accept this singular paradigm when creating or altering their own states. Huntington explicitly also critiques the West's language as well. A phrase that the West commonly uses is the "world community," which Huntington contends is a euphemistic and veiled term to actually proffer global legitimacy on their actions and interests by assimilating all preferences under one umbrella.

Huntington also employs a wide data set in criticizing the language used by leaders of the West in regards to its relations to the Islamist nations of the world. Repeatedly, by President William Clinton and President George Bush, the United States has used that it does not have a problem with the religion of Islam, but rather the factions on the extremist end which condone acts of violence and terror. However, Huntington believes that for the past 1400 years, the relationship between Muslims and Christians have been stormy at best. Understandably, one cannot argue when Huntington recounts the Crusades and the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. But Huntington also states that between the years of 1820 and 1929, 50% of all wars that took place between two different nation states with differing religions were between Christians and Muslims. Huntington also states that the reason for why these two religions are constantly in strife stem not from vibrant differences but from far-reaching similarities, such as the fact that "Both are monotheistic religions, which, unlike polytheistic ones cannot easily assimilate additional deities, and which see the world in dualistic us-and-them terms. Both are universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary religions believing that their adherents have an obligation to convert

nonbelievers to that one true faith.” (Huntington, 210-211) He even goes so far as to state that the differences between a “crusade” and “jihad” are minimal.

Huntington also presents a plethora of data that he believes convincingly illustrates that the majority of conflicts in the world have Islamic civilization pitted against other. However, his justification for why Muslims are involved in so many wars around the world has also formed the basis for the criticism of his staunchest detractors. Many charge Huntington with a xenophobia which is expected of a scholar who dealt with the diplomatic relations of the Cold War. According to these critics, his attitude is perhaps even more emblematic of the very same combination of Western arrogance and ignorance that he argues is the crux of the civilizational conflict that the West is having with other civilizations currently. Huntington’s first explanation for this purported high number of Islamic conflicts is the assertion that Islam is a religion of the sword and has characteristically glorified violence and militarism to accomplishing religious goals. He points to the numerous references within the Koran and other Islamic texts to the necessity of war in the world and the conspicuous absence of pacifism or nonviolence. The second explanation is that the success of conversion that Islam experienced early in its history and does still to an extent today has allowed it to reach and encounter many different civilizations over the past millennium and half. The history of constantly interacting with the conquered and converted has left a legacy of strong dislike in the surrounding communities, who often times perceive continued efforts of Islamic expansion. The third aspect is what Huntington terms the “indigestibility” of the religion. The absolutist aspect of the religion makes it very difficult for other religions to flourish

within and for it to assimilate when in others. Such a paradox makes confrontation almost inevitable. (Huntington, 264)

A People Speak

With more than a billion Muslims in the world representing different sects and religious ideologies, the threat of generalizing one perspective onto an entire religion is daunting. However, certain commonalities do exist, as fundamental strains of the Islamic tradition. A vocal minority, and a somewhat recent phenomenon, is the Islamist political movement, whose framework differs from fundamentalists Muslims in that Islamists incorporate geopolitics as a primary crux of their religious development. In fact, “Islamists view the state as the main instrument for implementing their vision of a God-pleasing society under *Sharia*. They concentrate on capturing the state and its centers of power—either legally within the democratic framework, or violently by revolution or coup d’etat.” (Zeidan, 12) Though their minority status may deem them unimportant when analyzing the effects of American behavior on the Middle East, the willingness of the Islamists to exert violent force to exact their goals has immense impacts and consequences for the world at large.

The actions of the Islamists also have reconfigured the public debate on Islamic radical discourse. Their outspoken publications and videos have shifted the boundaries of normally consistent orthodoxy, while also minimizing the threshold for acceptability in the eyes of Western nations. As the victims of terrorists attacks such as the September 11th and 2005 London Underground bombings, the West has significantly heightened their sensitivity to these statements. The Bush Administration has declared numerous times that the War on Terror is one that is between good and evil. Ironically, Islamists

also frame the debate in similar terms, for they "... view history as a cosmic struggle between good and evil. This battle is fought in the realms of personal spiritual and moral development, as well as in the sphere of ideas, worldviews, and ideologies. This battle is seen as part of a great cosmic and spiritual confrontation between God's forces of good (true Islam, i.e., the Islamists), and Satan's forces of evil (Western secularism, Christianity, etc.), which have infiltrated and entirely taken over many countries and cultures." (Zeidan, 12) A constant aggression by Western nations is perceived by these Islamists, which subsequently necessitates constant protection and defense.

This aggression may come in many different forms which Islamists find highly arrogant and offensive to their ways of life. For example, the Ayotollah Ruhollah Khomeini proclaimed in a speech given to the Feyziyeh Theological School in August 1979 that "Our youth should be free to do whatever they want. To be dragged into any form of prostitution they want. This is something dictated by the West. This is something by which they want to emasculate our youth, who could stand up to them. We want to take our youth from the bars to the battlefield." (Khomeini, 33) This statement is very interesting because it is not a physical aggression necessarily which Khomeini finds fault with, but rather an alleged cultural imperialism exhibited by the West. Though every elder generation worries that the younger is losing essential aspects of heritage, Khomeini goes further by charging the West for a willful corruption of the youth of Iran. Moreover, he continues by perhaps even implicitly acknowledging that the ways of Iran may not even be the best suited for the youth. But, that still does not nullify the point that these individuals have the intrinsic choice "To be de dragged into any form of prostitution they want." Thus, this accusation is a distinct and argumentative rejection of any advantages

or benefits proffered by the West, regardless of any inherent gains that could be made over contemporary Islamic systems.

In the post September 11th climate, the United States has been very weary of terrorist organizations in general, particularly of Al-Qaeda. However, it would be remiss to consider Al-Qaeda as the only terrorist organization that the United States has historically been involved with in the past. Though numerous Muslim organizations have all attempted to gain recognition from the State Department, only two have successfully engaged the United States in a protracted dialogue over the past 30 years, Hizballah and Hamas. Though classified as a terrorist organization by the State Department, Hizballah is one of two political parties that represent primarily Shiites in Lebanon. In fact, it holds about 10% of the seats in Parliament in Lebanon and is one of the contributing parties to the Resistance and Development Bloc that controls roughly a quarter of the seats. In its “Program,” which was published in 1985 and outlines its identity, its issues, and future objectives, the primary call is for the destruction of the state of Israel. However, Israel is seen as “vanguard” of the United States as a continued presence in the Middle East. Moreover, Hizballah “... reject[s] both the USSR and the United States, both capitalism and communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society.” (Hizballah, 53) The common criticism of most United States-Middle East dialogues seems most evident here, that the communication seems to be lost in translation. Whereas both sides would have the same goal, to create a just society, the definition of what constitutes a just society and the means by which to accomplish it are in debate. Such lack of definition of terms only further complicates any real progress towards a long-lasting and durable peace.

The United States has always had a more tenuous relationship with Hamas. Because of its seemingly inviolate partnership with Israel, the United States has voluntarily assumed a naturally antagonistic relationship with Hamas, an organization claiming to represent the will of the disenfranchised Palestinian citizenry. In its Charter, Hamas outlines the many different facets of its purpose and future objectives. For example, Article Nine relates Hamas' concern over a waning of the Muslim way of life in Muslim communities, necessitating an infusion of traditional values and beliefs. Article Twelve reinforces their role as Islamists as they "...[regard] nationalism as part and parcel of the religious faith. Nothing is loftier or deeper in nationalism than waging *jihad* against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims." (Hamas, 55) Here, the source of anti-American sentiments arises from the intrusion of the United States into the Middle East.

However, the 1990s presented a different model by which many leaders of the Middle East viewed global politics afterwards. After the end of World War II, it became quite evident immediately that the traditional powers of the previous three centuries, such as Britain and France, were no longer the brokers of world diplomacy. The mantle had been passed to the United States and the Soviet Union, two nations with apparently antithetical models of government and conflicting worldviews. Under the compulsion of an ever-growing interrelated world, third party nations were forced to pick one over the other. However, with the devolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, only the United States emerged as the sole superpower, possessing unprecedented economic and political dominance. Quickly, the United States, according to many scholars from the Middle East, saw the numerous and abundant resources available in the Middle East

under its own proprietary dominion. But, such assertiveness was not well-received, particularly in regards to more ardent signs of support towards America's ally in the region, Israel. For example, a notable Hamas columnist, Atallah Abu Al-Subh, accuses the United States in 1998 of coming "... to us unwelcomed, carrying your shame and blame, armed with the Jews' spearheads, the Jews' reproach, the Jews' vileness. You come to us to wipe your rotten face with our cloak and wash it with the waters of our Gulf that your fire has inflamed around us." (Al-Subh, 130) He continues to articulate how the United States utilizes Israel as a staging point to "loot" the riches of the Middle East, while furthering the rift that existed between Middle Eastern nations.

In February 2006, Muhammad Abu Tir, who was formerly the second in command in Hamas and was running for public office, had a letter of his published in Newsweek International. In the letter, he espouses the same type of rhetoric common to most politicians attempting to capture a seat in public office. But, previous biases aside, the anti-Americanism that Abu Tir proudly proclaims obviously must have struck a chord with his base for he was indeed elected. After first stating that Hamas is not in favor of violence and bloodshed, he states that the crux of Hamas' opposition to the United States and the West is their unquestioned support of Israel, which, in his opinion, defies logic and reason. In his open letter, he tells the West that "You are capable of telling Israel to withdraw. Why is the West concerned about the security of Israel and not concerned about our security? Stop your support for Israel. Stop calling us terrorists. This policy creates a feeling of oppression. The feeling of oppression can lead to disaster. I don't want to reach that stage. If the United States were occupied, would the people put up with such a situation?" (Abu Tir, 2006) This only further expands upon the common theme

that the West's alliance with Israel supposedly shrouds their objectivity in being an impartial broker of peace in the region. Moreover, Abu Tir accuses the West of not properly understanding the plight of the dispossessed in the Middle East. According to many scholars in the Middle East, the West never really understood the feelings of having a sacred homeland taken away from them with seemingly no appropriate justification. Also, Abu Tir concludes his letter with the emphatic statement that "We are not Al Qaeda." (Abu Tir, 2006) This is a result of the dichotomy that President Bush clearly defined after the attacks of September 11th, where organizations and states were given the option of being with the United States or against it.

A great deal of this hostility came to the forefront during America's gravest attack from a foreign organization or state on the continental United States. The September 11th attacks ushered in a new era of relations between the two sides. In the early aftermath of the attacks, many Americans saw on television many citizens of Muslim countries in the Middle East celebrating on streets. The enormous public outcry demanded some attempt at sincere regret for these actions. Though it was indeed misguided of certain circles to hold the entire Middle East responsible for the attacks, the scale of the attacks was astounding to many Americans.

Francis Fukuyama would have seen the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s as the definitive global affirmation that liberal democracy was the unquestioned form of government in the world, with no serious ideological competitor in the world. However, the growing strength of Islamic fundamentalism and the increasing number of adherents to the faith in general, totaling more than a billion, have formed an intelligent and calculated response to the very dogmatic principles of fundamental Western frameworks.

On the other end of the spectrum, Samuel Huntington purports that the two sides are so disparately different that there are no ways of reconciling them, creating the inevitable consequence of massive conflict. However, conspicuously absent are the voices of this Islamic “civilization” regarding their response to the West, and the United States in particular. An honest caveat must be made that the following carefully chosen selections are not at all meant to be understood as representative. For the United States and the West, the element of the Middle East that concerns their primary interests are the perceived national security risks that many associate with the radical elements of Islamic society. The passages below all describe anti-Americanism, and, more importantly, the reasons for such animosity towards the world’s lone superpower.

Turkey has historically been a strong ally of the United States, ever since the end of World War II and the generous monetary contributions the United States made to both Greece and Turkey to revitalize their otherwise devastated economies. Though such allocations may have been done to sway these transitional nations away from the strong allure of Soviet communism, this early on solidified a strong relationship between the United States and Turkey. In fact, it was strongly suspected that the United States housed many of its nuclear weapons that were directed towards the Soviet Union in Turkey. However, even this seems to be somewhat strained of late as well. As the Turkish Daily News reports on September 29, 2006, “Turkey's role as a key U.S. ally in the Middle East is being undermined by growing anti-American sentiment because of the war in Iraq and the Bush administration's failure to take tough measures against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Egemen Bagis, a lawmaker of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), has said.” (Turkish Daily News, 2006) Bagis, a prominent statesman in

Turkey, believes that many of the initial promises and pledges made by the present Bush Administration have been neglected as the United States has pursued an Iraq-centric Middle East policy. He also states that anti-Americanism within the country has also grown in Turkey, as well as Europe, due to their foreign affairs actions. This also contradicts Huntington's assertions on the issue of the cohesiveness of civilizations. Moreover, the animosity in Turkey seems to not be what the United States is doing to it, but rather what it is not doing. The neglect that the United States is showing to some of the internal issues that had already been agreed upon appears to be the primary culprit .

In late 2003, a panel of Islamic scholars was formed which discussed the actions of the United States within the sole purview of the Middle East. During the talks, an issue that was frequently touched upon was the growing anti-Americanism that was increasing in the area. Beginning with repairing the badly destroyed image of America in the area, eliminating anti-Americanism in the area relies solely on the actions of the United States. One member of the panel, Salama Ahmed Salama, a leading editorialist in the government newspaper Al Ahram, "acknowledged that 'it is clear that the image of America in the Arab world is very bad. Unfortunately, the Americans think that launching a campaign aimed at improving their image is sufficient, but they do not ask why they are hated,' he said. He said the Arabs despised US support for Israel, US decisions to launch wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, its "ill treatment" of Arabs and Muslims within the United States, as well as US media "campaigns" against Islam." (Agence France Presse, 2003) Salama is touching upon how the United States is not neglecting its attempts to shape public opinion. In fact, the United States has continually aired radio shows, television programs, published pamphlets, and other forms of

communication to win the “hearts and minds” of peoples in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, the ignorance of how best to address the concerns of the respective populations only further adds fuel to anti-Americanism. Moreover, “...the Saudi Arabian journalist Daoud Shoryan, contacted in Riyadh, said ‘US policy toward Arab and Muslim countries has turned into a policy of imposition and not dialogue.’” (Rehim, 2003) These thoughts were later echoed by Qatari political scientist Mohamed Mesfer when he believed that “‘The United States must also “stop accusing the Arabs and Muslims of terrorism and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Arab and Islamic countries...”’ (Rehim, 2003) Again, the imposition is characterized as the leading the contributor to animosity. Shoryan’s comments are absolutely integral in that it illustrates a willingness to have a “dialogue,” meaning that there is a contingent in the Middle East who are receptive to Western ideas. But the manner in which they are presented, an “imposition,” which is not altered to meet the needs of the Middle East are what raises objections.

Many Islamic scholars also point towards the Iraq as a breaking point for many countries in the Middle East. Up to that point, the context of American interests in the region were prioritized primarily around those of America’s alliance with Israel. However, with the stakes increased now with actual American soldiers on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the presence of Americans in the region was more physically felt, as also the number of interactions increasing as well. Mushahid Hussain, the former Minister of Education and now a member of the Senate in Pakistan, finds three particular problems that arose from the Iraqi invasion.

First, after the Iraq invasion and occupation, a widespread belief that an imperial America is keen to capture oil resources and seek a colonial-style political restructuring of the Middle East. And in this context, Washington is no longer shy of behaving as an arrogant power, flaunting its military

might and acting unabashedly as a 'proud imperialist', something that the US was careful to deny and deride in the past. (Hussain, 2003)

The first criticism is one which is even lodged by many Americans. With so many different defense contractors and energy corporations lodged in Iraq, many with dubious connections to the White House, the complaint is a reasonable criticism. For example, Vice-President Dick Cheney was the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton from 1995 to 2000. In 2000, he was appointed the head of then Governor Bush's vice-president search party. George Bush eventually picked Cheney, who resigned his positions at Halliburton. Halliburton were given numerous defense contracts both in the United States and abroad, particularly in Iraq, which have given rise to speculation to ulterior motives of Vice President Cheney in being so adamant in his support of the Iraq War. In fact, Halliburton is the only private firm mentioned by Osama bin Laden "in an April 2004 tape in which he claims that 'this is a war [in Iraq] that is benefiting major companies with billions of dollars.'" (BBC, 2004) Granted, many private firms in the United States have benefited greatly from the Iraq War, but no connection has ever been established that the primary motive, or any at all, involved the corporate interests of these private industry.

The second objection which is voiced by Hussain, about America's partiality to Israel, also is a common sentiment among many individuals in the Middle East. Numerous videos of bin Laden discuss America's support of Israel since Israel was formed in 1948. For the United States, Israel was always a strong ally in that area of the world. With the high number of Jews in the United States and the indelible influence that they have had on the history of the United States, many Middle Eastern writers have seen Israel as primarily the voicebox and puppet of the interests of the United States

Second, for the first time, the interests of a foreign country (Israel) are now taking precedence over America's own national security interests and image in the Muslim World. Policy towards Palestine is so blatantly one-sided that Muslims have virtually lost hope that Washington is in a position to pressure Israel, more so with a difficult upcoming presidential election, where the Jewish vote would be crucial. (Hussain, 2003)

The Jewish vote has always been considered a critical component of the American electorate. The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee is a very powerful special interest lobby on both the legislative and executive branch of the United States towards passing favorable policies towards Israel and Jewish interests. Even in the most recent conflict involving Israel, with its soldiers being kept by Hamas and the Lebanese government, the United States handling of the situation was critiqued by many individuals in the Middle East for being unabashedly sympathetic towards Israel, despite Lebanon experiencing heavy shelling and significant casualties, many civilian. It is undeniable that the United States has characteristically supported Israel over the years, but many Americans would counter that policies in the Middle East are not zero-sum, in that positive enhancement of Israel does not necessarily signify negation of the Islamic counterparts.

The third objection that Hussein has with the United States is in regards to the general policy with the Middle East. Many critics feel that that there is significant ambiguity in how the United States treats Islamic nations.

Third, US policy towards Muslims is now marked by confusion. Even "moderate" allies like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt are sometimes not sure whether they are friend or foe and elected leaders like Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami are also under pressure, despite the tall talk of promoting democracy in the Muslim World. And no roadmap for democracy in Iraq is in sight." (Hussain, 2003)

There is a certain Machiavellian aspect to how the United States chooses its allies in the Islamic world. Though heavily sanctioning Pakistan in the late 1990s for detonating nuclear weapons underground, the United States sent a great deal of money back into the country at the beginning of the Afghanistan War, seeking to use western Pakistan for military bases which would serve as launching areas into Afghanistan. The objection is also emblematic of the earlier statements made by the Turkish statesman, where he was unsure of the actual standing of Turkey's relationship with the United States. But the constantly changing alliances and shifting preferences maintain a constant unease and distrust of the United States, that the United States could turn against the Islamic country for the slightest indiscretion at a moment's behest.

There are also collateral effects as well to the growing anti-Americanism in the region. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in June 2003. The overarching purpose of the survey was to examine the global reactions to the War in Iraq and the numerous challenges that had been outlined by the West for the coming years, such as the plan to root out terrorism around the world. Moreover, another plank of the survey was to see the reaction also to growing American unilateralism. This study, which was headed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, used a survey administered to 66,000 individuals in 49 nations and the Palestinian Authority. Despite finding that anti-Americanism was on the rise in Islamic countries, "The survey also showed a significant loss of trust in two international institutions, the United Nations and NATO. Majorities in countries that supported the Iraq war as well as in those that opposed it now say that the UN has become less relevant." (Cornwell, 2003) What this illustrates is a mistrust in international organizations, which is perhaps the penultimate framework embodying all

Western ideals. Rejection or distrust in this slows any progress towards the liberal democracy movement that is supposedly sweeping across the world.

What becomes very obvious through only a cursory examination of the scholarly works produced in the Middle East is the curious absence of any mention of how the anti-Americanism is being fought on purely ideological grounds. Where President Bush routinely defends how this war is being fought to defend “our way of life,” no mention is made regarding American traditions, morals, or culture. It is only the manifestation of these traditions, morals, and culture that seems to create the most hostility.

Conclusion

As the United States entered the twenty-first century, many different scholars were curious as to what the future would hold. If the twentieth century was defined as the “American Century,” the elemental question became whether the United States would be able to continue its dominance in this growingly independent and interlocked global community. With the emergence of Europe as a collective entity under the European Union and China and India utilizing its massive labor workforce in various industries, many different intellectuals around the world, such as Jared Diamond in his work *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (2004), predicted that the current mismanagement of resources and incorrect prioritization of objectives of recent Presidential administrations and Congresses put the United States in a very precarious situation, endangered to the advances of other nations. However, on the other side of the spectrum, these naysayers have been countered by the optimists in the nation and abroad. These optimists see an economy that is constantly increasing in size and strength, an expanding gap in military proficiency between America and its enemies, and, in their

minds the most important, unflinching American perseverance. On September twentieth, 2001, President Bush described this quality when he firmly declared in front of a joint session of Congress that “Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom - the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.” (Bush, 9/20/2001) This reservoir of determination and unity that President Bush calls upon is indicative of the changing face of America, and its interpretation of American Exceptionalism.

As the United States has grown over the centuries, it has done so alongside the growth of the world as well. With the first transcontinental telegraph wire, the first flights across oceans, and numerous other innovations, the world has continually become smaller, integrated, and interdependent. Information changes hands faster than ever previously imagined, and future possibilities seem limitless. Previously considered minor effects such as air pollution from the steel mills of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania have shown that it could have a negative effect on global warming, potentially causing the melting of the polar icecaps in the North and South poles which would adversely affect populations from Cape Town, South Africa to Reykjavik, Iceland. Most importantly, the biggest effect of this smaller world is the number of interactions between peoples has greatly increased. An Omaha, Nebraska boy speaks over the phone to a computer help technician from Bangalore, India. All of this has generated a change in how Americans view themselves and their nation in this global context. It would seem logical that Americans, now that they have greater contact with the rest of the world, would witness greater

similarities between peoples and cultures, and that such a realization would seem a decrease in the prevalence of American Exceptionalism.

But the rhetoric of the leaders of the country continuously assert the supposed unquestioned dominance of the U.S. in the world. Strong defiant statements such as how the “advance of freedom” depends solely on the actions of the U.S. only further illustrate how recent administrations have furthered their goals of American hegemony under the guise of American Exceptionalism. Grandiose and sweeping language such as this may work in convincing a particular electorate to vote for one candidate over another in an election year, but it has only adds hollowness to claims of humility in the diplomatic arena. Other nations are not naïve enough to believe these insincere statements of equality, equity, and fair play when American foreign relations clearly indicate selfish and unadulterated ambition.

But, American Exceptionalism was not always like this, for its defining trait has shifted over the course of the nation’s history. Where it was once characterized by an unshakeable distrust of a centralized and federal government, the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War legitimized unquestioned faith in the government, who were expected to carry out and project the virtues of this nation. The “pull yourself up from your own bootstraps” mentality gave way to the implicit acknowledgement that the contemporary economic and political environment does not always make it conducive for the upward mobility of every citizen. Opening the gates towards greater government involvement in the personal lives of Americans ushered in a new era of American Exceptionalism. This transformation of American Exceptionalism cannot be characterized by the three interpretations offered by Dorothy Ross. This is not the

providential form, as first spoken by John Winthrop, for this is rooted in the real-world problems that presented a unique economic environment that Americans had not faced up to that point in their history. Neither does the genetic interpretation does not fit the empirical evidence, for the economic crises that sparked the Great Depression, and the eventual shift in American Exceptionalism, was not the direct result of having various races, ethnicities, or other hereditary factors. Finally, the geographical model also does not apply, for the downturn in the economy had no relation to the particular location of the United States or the resources it had at its disposal.

Only the cultural interpretation as described in this thesis adequately explains the transition in American Exceptionalism. The individualistic and decentralized frontier attitude is eliminated when it becomes evident that it is no longer feasible in the contemporary economic and political climate. Thus, the approach of American citizens undergoes a cultural transformation of trusting the collective and centralized government, assigning it the responsibility of defending the ideals of a free market economy and liberal democracy at home and vigorously promoting them abroad.

Moreover, administrations took advantage of these evolving expectations that citizens had of their leaders and began a much more aggressive foreign policy. The U.S. consistently pursued an isolationist role from its inception in 1789 as a free nation until December 7th, 1941. With the United States federal government granted a greater scope in foreign relations by its constituents, coupled with the presence of increased interaction between nations in the world post-World War II, an active approach of liberal democracy promotion and free market economy assimilation dominated foreign policy. Though done

also as a defense mechanism to the imminent threat of the Soviet Union, the doctrine of American Exceptionalism became exportable.

Thus, in 1893, when Frederick Jackson Turner proclaimed that the United States no longer possessed a frontier, he was only momentarily correct. The United States renewed their expansion to the rest of the world. The U.S. placed the mantle upon themselves for the continued preservation of democracy. Only the United States of America truly understood the intricacies of a proper function democracy as opposed to the aristocratic and elitist British and French, and only the open United States of America, as opposed to the socialist European economies, could successfully recreate a prosperous free market economy which would bring wealth to all. Though some nations eagerly accepted these seemingly unique American institutions, others were much more resistant to modeling themselves after the United States for many reasons. One particular region in the world that seemed to perpetually reject any advances of the West was the Middle East.

Middle Eastern nations, primarily made with arbitrary national boundaries in the decolonization era after World War II, were always an ideological battleground where Western institutions collided with Islamic fundamentalism. Where the rest of the world modernized along a Western paradigm, many parts of the Middle East created an environment that resisted any type of change. The models of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington provide very different views of how to approach the same problem. The problem is that the West must confront Middle Eastern culture, though not in the context prescribed by Huntington. The attacks on September 11th unfairly sparked a discussion under the worst of circumstances on how to reconcile the major differences, or

even whether or not the two systems can coexist. When considering the solutions given by both theorists, the answer lies somewhere in between.

Undeniably, certain considerations and concessions must be made on both sides. By signing the United Nations Charter, all 192 member countries have mutually agreed to uphold those international standards. Undeniably, the Middle East cannot continue to systematically deprive women, minority religious groups, minority political parties, and minority groups in general their rights. It is unconscionable for any surrounding community to accept their neighbors to subjugate women, who comprise more than half of the population. The international community has regularly denounced these policies in the Middle East, but the region has seemed to always find ways to circumvent actual enforcement of these United Nations decrees. The Middle East must move to the center in this debate and accept that it can no longer continue persecuting such a significant part of their society, despite whatever their religious doctrines may indicate. Other communities have made relevant sacrifices as well in integrating themselves into the global community, and the Islamic civilization should be no different. However, this also insinuates that the West must possess a certain level of understanding as well when dealing with the Middle East. The region has been under the influence of Islamic doctrine for the past fourteen centuries and expecting them to convert overnight to Western standards is overzealous. The transition must be slow and steady and the West must make concessions as well. Just as many Western political systems have adopted certain elements of the Judeo-Christian religion into their model, the Islamic faith also has to be incorporated as well into policy. Unfortunately, with the absence of any ideal empirical examples, it is impossible to determine whether or not the two are incompatible.

However, this is much more indicative of the lack of any good-faith efforts made by either side. The all or nothing approach has come with great costs to all involved. The time has come for new policies, new leaders, and a renewed spirit to change.

By 2002, as the international community entered a new millennium, the young Irish rock and roll band that was on the brink of international stardom in 1984 had become world renowned, and some say Nobel Peace Prize-bound. Through talent, charisma, dedication, and sheer luck, these four young men garnered fame and fortune known to few in the world, as they were considered one of the biggest bands to ever grace airwaves and Billboard charts. In interviews and personal reflections, however, U2 has been quick to attribute much of their financial and critical success to the band's early embrace by the United States. At the time of their rise to prominence, Irish bands were not readily accepted by British audiences, biased by simmering cultural hostilities stemming from political tensions between the two nations. The four aspiring rock stars thus journeyed to America, brimming with optimism and lofty ambitions. It was in the small bars and little-known clubs in the cities and small towns of America that U2 found their earliest legion of earnest fans. After being in the business for more than two decades, after witnessing the raw beauty of America in "Heartland," the band commemorated the mass of immigrant groups that left indelible marks on the foundation of America in their single, "The Hands That Built America." Naming the Sioux, Dutch, Italians, Irish, Jews, Hindus, African Americans, Muslims, and many other groups, U2 identifies with the difficult decision of leaving a homeland and coming to the shores of America in search of a new and prosperous start. America, the land of opportunity for so many bright-eyed young immigrants through the centuries, provided a similar start one of

the world's most prosperous and critically-acclaimed musical groups. U2 concludes "The Hands That Built America" with a reference to the September 11th attacks. Even an immigrant musical group was able to acknowledge the enormous impact that it would have on the nation. U2 heralds that "It's early fall/ There's a cloud on the New York skyline/ Innocence dragged across a yellow line." This innocence shattered in the blink of an eye, characterized so poignantly in U2's haunting ballad, has undoubtedly changed the way Americans perceive its role in the world and its relationship with the Middle East. No longer can Americans hide under the misconception that the conflict of ideologies is a faraway and irrelevant battle, and most have realized this. However, if the United States is to continue to be that iconic land that attracts the world's attention, a delicate balance must be reached. Though its naiveté might be gone, it cannot alternatively become jaded and cynical. This is the challenge of the twenty-first century, whether or not the United States of America can continue to possess that charming earnestness and virtue which was the bedrock of a unique nation while understanding the immense responsibility of being the most powerful nation in the world.

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