Formalizing Forcing Arguments in Subsystems of Second-Order Arithmetic

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Formalizing Forcing Arguments in Subsystems of Second-Order Arithmetic

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Abstract

We show that certain model-theoretic forcing arguments involving subsystems of second-order arithmetic can be formalized in the base theory, thereby converting them to effective proof-theoretic arguments. We use this method to sharpen conservation theorems of Harrington and Brown-Simpson, giving an effective proof that $WKL_0$ is conservative over $RCA_0$ with no significant increase in the lengths of proofs.

1 Introduction

Although forcing is usually considered to be a model-theoretic technique it has a proof-theoretic side as well, in that forcing notions can usually be expressed syntactically in the base theory. One can often use this fact to convert a model-theoretic forcing argument to a proof-theoretic one, and in doing so obtain a sharper and more effective version of the theorem being proven. We'll illustrate this approach by formalizing two conservation results, one due to Harrington and the other due to Brown and Simpson, involving subsystems of second-order arithmetic. These results originally appeared in the author's dissertation [1], where more details can be found.

$RCA_0$ denotes the weak base theory in the language of second-order arithmetic consisting of the quantifier-free defining axioms for the operations $S$, $+$, and $\times$; induction restricted to $\Sigma^0_1$ formulas, possibly with set parameters, and a second-order axiom comprehension scheme

\[(RCA) \quad \forall x(\varphi(x) \leftrightarrow \psi(x)) \rightarrow \exists Y \forall x(x \in Y \leftrightarrow \varphi(x))\]

where $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are $\Sigma^0_1$ and $\Pi^0_1$ formulas, respectively. Intuitively, this axiom asserts the existence of sets that are $\Delta^0_1$-definable, or recursive, in parameters from the model.

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The theory $WKL_0$ adds to this a second-order axiom formalizing a weak version of König’s lemma,

$$(WKL) \quad T \text{ an infinite binary tree } \rightarrow \exists X (X \text{ is a path through } T)$$

stating that there is a path through any infinite binary tree. Here a binary tree $T$ is a set of (codes of) binary sequences that is closed under initial segments, and a path through $T$ is a set $X$ such that every initial segment of the characteristic function of $X$ is in $T$. For more information see, for example, [12, 13, 14].

Both $RCA_0$ and $WKL_0$ were first defined by Harvey Friedman, who gave a model-theoretic proof that in fact $WKL_0$ is conservative over $PRA$ (Primitive Recursive Arithmetic) for $\Pi^0_2$ sentences, in the following sense: if $WKL_0$ proves $\forall x \exists y \varphi(x, y)$ for some quantifier free formula $\varphi$, then in fact $PRA$ proves $\varphi(x, f(x))$ for some term $f$. Using a model-theoretic forcing argument Harrington was able to strengthen Friedman’s result by showing that in fact $WKL_0$ is conservative over $RCA_0$ for $\Pi^1_1$ formulas. ($RCA_0$ is interpretable in the fragment of Peano arithmetic $\Sigma^0_1$, and the conservation of the latter system over $PRA$ for $\Pi^0_2$ sentences has long been known.) Sieg [10, 11] later gave an effective version of Friedman’s result using cut-elimination, a Herbrand analysis, and Howard’s notion of hereditary majorizability for primitive recursive terms.

Because Sieg’s proof uses cut-elimination, it allows for the possibility of a superexponential increase in the lengths of proofs between the two systems. In fact, one can show that though there is no significant increase in the lengths of proofs between $RCA_0$ and $I\Sigma_1$, there is a superexponential increase between $I\Sigma_1$ and $PRA$ [6]. This leaves open the question of whether one can obtain a conservation result for $WKL_0$ over $RCA_0$ with a more restrictive bound on the increase in the lengths of proofs.

Meanwhile, Brown and Simpson [3] used forcing methods again to extend Harrington’s conservation result to the theory $WKL_0$, which adds to $WKL_0$ an additional axiom scheme

$$(BCT) \quad \forall n \forall \sigma \exists \tau \supseteq \sigma, \varphi(n, \tau) \rightarrow \exists f \forall n \exists m \varphi(n, f[m]),$$

where $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are taken to range over binary sequences, $\tau \supseteq \sigma$ means that $\tau$ extends $\sigma$, $f$ is assumed to be a function with range $\{0, 1\}$, and $f[m]$ denotes the sequence consisting of the first $m$ values of $f$. Intuitively, this says that if $\{\varphi_n\}$ defines a sequence of open dense subsets of $2^\omega$, then there is a point lying in their intersection. Brown and Simpson [3] use this axiom to prove a version of the usual Baire Category Theorem which is not derivable in $RCA_0$, as well and the Open Mapping Theorem for separable Banach spaces.

Because the axioms $(BCT)$ deal with formulas of arbitrary complexity, Sieg’s methods cannot be applied, leaving open the question of whether there is an effective proof of their result.

In this paper we give an affirmative answer to both questions, by showing that the Harrington and Brown-Simpson arguments can be formalized within $RCA_0$ to yield the following result:
Theorem 10.1 There is a recursive function \( f \) and a polynomial \( p \) such that the following holds: if \( d \) codes a proof in \( WKL_0 \) of a \( \Pi^1_1 \) formula \( \varphi \), then \( f(d) \) codes a proof of \( \varphi \) in \( RCA_0 \), and the length of \( f(d) \) is less than \( p \) the length of \( d \). Here the “length” of a proof is measured by the number of symbols.

In other words, one can translate \( WKL_0 \) proofs to \( RCA_0 \) proofs without a significant increase in size. The rest of this paper will outline a proof of this theorem. For expository reasons we’ll focus on proving the result for \( WKL_0 \), while Section 9 will discuss the modifications necessary to handle \( WKL_0^+ \).

2 The Model-Theoretic Conservation Result

To our knowledge, an account of Harrington’s argument for the conservation of \( WKL_0 \) over \( RCA_0 \) has never been published, so we’ll describe it here briefly. The result has its origins in the low-basis theorem of [7] (see also [15] or [5]), but it can be phrased as a forcing argument, as is done in [12].

Let \( L_2 \) be the language of second-order arithmetic. An \( L_2 \) structure \( M \) consists of a first-order part, henceforth denoted by \( |M| \), and a second-order part, which we’ll denote by \( S_M \). \( M_1 \) is an \( \omega \)-submodel of \( M_2 \), written \( M_1 \subseteq^\omega M_2 \), if \( |M_1| = |M_2| \) and \( S_{M_1} \subseteq S_{M_2} \); in other words, \( M_2 \) has the same first-order part as \( M_1 \) but possibly more sets. Note that in this latter definition \( |M_1| = |M_2| \) may still be nonstandard. If \( M \) is an \( L_2 \) structure and \( X \) is a subset of \( |M| \), we’ll use \( M \cup \{ X \} \) to denote the structure whose first-order part is \( |M| \) and whose second-order part is \( S_M \cup \{ X \} \).

If \( M \) is a model of \( RCA_0 \) then, following [12], we’ll use \( T_M \) to denote the set of \( T \in S_M \) such that \( M \models \text{"} T \text{ is an infinite binary tree."} \)

We’ll use \( I \Sigma_1 \) to denote the theory based on the axioms and rules of second-order logic that consists of the quantifier-free axioms of arithmetic and induction restricted to \( \Sigma^0_1 \) formulas, possibly involving set parameters.\(^3\) Harrington’s method involves showing that any countable model of \( RCA_0 \) can be expanded to a model of \( WKL_0 \) by adding sets to the second-order part and leaving the first-order part alone. One first proves the following two lemmas:

**Lemma 2.1** Let \( M \) be a countable model of \( I \Sigma_1 \). Then \( M \) can be expanded to a model of \( RCA_0 \) by adding countably many sets to its second-order part.

**Proof.** Define \( M' \) to be the structure whose first-order part is the same as that of \( M \), and whose second-order part consists of all sets \( \Delta^0_1 \)-definable in \( M \) with parameters from \( |M| \cup S_M \). Since \( M' \) has the same first-order part as \( M \) the first-order axioms of \( RCA_0 \) hold, and we’ve added enough sets to handle recursive comprehension. Finally, \( \Sigma^0_1 \)-induction in \( M' \) reduces to \( \Sigma^0_1 \)-induction \( M \) once parameters are replaced by their \( \Delta^0_1 \) definitions. \( \square \)

**Lemma 2.2** Let \( M \) be model of \( RCA_0 \), and let \( T \in T_M \). Then there is a subset \( G \) of \( |M| \) such that

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\(^3\)This is really an abuse of notation since \( I \Sigma_1 \) is generally used to denote the corresponding first-order theory, but this should cause no confusion here.
1. $M \cup \{G\} \models \text{"}G\text{ is a path through } T\text{"}$

2. $M \cup \{G\} \models I\Sigma_1$

This lemma, which says that one can add paths through trees to models of $RCA_0$ and still maintain $\Sigma^0_1$ induction, forms the heart of the argument. Its proof will be discussed below. Putting the two results together, we see that given any countable model $M$ of $RCA_0$ and any $T \in T_M$, we can expand $M$ to another countable model $M'$ of $RCA_0$ such that $M \subseteq \omega M'$ and $M' \models \text{"}there is a path through } T\text{."}$ Iterating this process gives us the main theorem:

**Theorem 2.3** Let $M$ be a countable model of $RCA_0$. Then $M$ can be expanded to a model $M'$ of $WKL_0$ such that $M \subseteq \omega M'$.

**Proof.** Use the previous two lemmas to form a sequence of models

$$M = M_0 \subseteq \omega M_1 \subseteq \omega M_2 \subseteq \ldots \subseteq \omega M_i \subseteq \ldots$$

where each $M_i$ is a model of $RCA_0$ and for every $T \in T_M$, there is a $j > i$ such that $M_j \models \text{"}there exists a path through } T\text{."}$ If we let $M_\omega = \bigcup M_i$, this $M_\omega$ satisfies the conclusion of the theorem. \hfill \Box

This theorem implies the conservation result:

**Corollary 2.4** $WKL_0$ is conservative over $RCA_0$ for $\Pi^1_1$ sentences.

**Proof.** If $RCA_0$ doesn’t prove $\varphi$ for some $\Pi^1_1$ formula $\varphi$, by completeness there is a model $M$ of $RCA_0 \cup \{\neg \varphi\}$. By the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem we can assume that this model is countable. Expand $M$ to a model $M'$ of $WKL_0$ as in Theorem 2.3. Since $\neg \varphi$ is $\Sigma^1_1$ and $M'$ contains all the sets of $M$, $M'$ models $\neg \varphi$ as well. So $WKL_0$ doesn’t prove $\varphi$ either. \hfill \Box

We now turn to a discussion of the proof of Lemma 2.2. One proves this using forcing, where the forcing conditions are in fact members of $T_M$ ordered under inclusion. The “generic” path $G$ that is then added to $M$ is the intersection of a generic set of members of $T_M$. As usual, a formula $\varphi$ makes reference to the new generic $G$ “forced” by a condition $T$ if $\varphi$ is true whenever $G$ is interpreted as a generic path through $T$. One then shows that if $T \in T_M$ and $G$ is a generic path through $T$, then properties (1) and (2) hold. The first is immediate from the definition of $G$, while the second requires showing that certain references to forcing are expressible in $M$ by first-order formulas of low complexity. Though we omit the details here, the syntactic analog of the lemma can be found in Section 5.

The proof of the Brown-Simpson result is similar, and involves showing that one can also add Cohen reals to expand $M$ to a model of $(BCT)$. Here the forcing conditions are finite binary sequences, where the condition $\sigma$ extends the condition $\tau$ if $\sigma$ extends $\tau$ in the usual sense. A full proof of this result appears in [3] and is discussed in Section 9.
3 An overview of the formalization

The major goal of this paper is to formalize the arguments of Section 2. To do so, we’ll define notions of forcing and generic validity from within $RCA_0$, where “$\varphi$ is generically valid” corresponds roughly to the statement “$\varphi$ is true in the model $M_\omega$.” We’ll show that, with these definitions, $RCA_0$ proves that the axioms of $WKL_0$ are generically valid, and that generic validity is preserved under rules of inference. Furthermore, for arithmetic $\varphi$, $RCA_0$ will prove that $\varphi$ is generically valid if and only if it’s true, and that the sets of $M_\omega$ “contain” the sets of the original universe. With these notions in hand, our proof will run as follows:

Suppose $WKL_0$ proves that some arithmetic $\varphi$ is true of all sets. Then $RCA_0$ proves that $\varphi$ is generically valid. And so $RCA_0$ proves that $\varphi$ is true of all sets in the original universe.

As it turns out, the formalization is not entirely routine. We summarize the main components here.

In Section 4 we present the syntactic definition of a general forcing relation, modulo the specific choice of poset, names, and atomic forcing notions. We need to define both “strong” and “weak” forcing relations: though weak forcing has a clearer semantic interpretation, complexity considerations require us to use strong forcing for the Brown-Simpson result.

In Section 5 we use this framework to define the notions of “1-forcing” and “1-generic validity” to refer to truth in the generic extension $M_1$, in which we’ve added a generic path through some binary tree. In this case the forcing conditions, infinite binary trees, form a definable class in the base model rather than a set, but this does not pose any immediate difficulties. More problematic is the fact that we have to name sets that are $\Delta^0_1$-definable from parameters in the original model and the new generic, where the notion of $\Delta^0_1$-definability depends on the generic itself. As Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 suggest, we need to proceed in two stages: first we define an intermediate “$1^\frac{1}{2}$-forcing” to describe a model with a single new generic, and then add the sets $\Delta^0_1$-definable from that.

Section 6 shows how to iterate the forcing and define “$n$-forcing” and “$n$-generic validity” for each standard natural number $n$. In Section 7 we show that these definitions can be given uniformly, so that $n$ is a parameter. This uniformity doesn’t come cheap: a priori the complexity of the forcing definitions seems to increase with each iteration, and we have to take care to use low-complexity equivalents.

Using the uniform definitions we can finally define “$\omega$-forcing” in Section 8, allowing us to iterate the forcing “generically” and add paths through every infinite binary tree in the final model. The last two sections discuss briefly length-of-proof considerations, as well as the modifications necessary to handle $WKL_{+0}$. 
4 Formalizing forcing arguments

In this section we describe two kinds of forcing relations, namely “strong” and “weak” forcing. In formalizing Harrington’s argument, we will define a number of weak forcing relations; it is only with the Brown-Simpson argument that we have to use strong forcing. In any event, in defining these relations the general pattern will be the same: from within the base theory we’ll first identify the conditions and the names, and give the definition of forcing for atomic formulas. Then we’ll extend the definition to arbitrary formulas by induction on their logical complexity. Although the conditions, names, and atomic clauses will vary, this last part remains the same, and so we give the general framework here. (Much of our approach follows the presentation in [2]; see also [8].)

Before we define any forcing notion we need to have identified from within the base theory what it means for \( P \) to be a condition, which we’ll write \( \text{Condition}(P) \), and what it means for a condition \( P \) to extend a condition \( Q \), which we’ll write \( P \leq Q \). We’ll always choose our conditions so that the base theory proves that they form a partial order with greatest element \( \emptyset \). Note that the conditions can be either first- or second-order objects. In the latter case it makes no sense to talk about “the set of all conditions,” but in neither case do we need to. All we need is that the class of conditions is defined by some formula.

Next, we need names for the first- and second-order objects in our forcing extensions. In our applications the first-order objects will always name themselves, while sets in the forcing extension will be named by other sets in the base model. Whether or not an object is a valid name may depend on an associated condition; so in fact we need to specify what it means for a condition \( P \) to force that an object \( X \) is a valid name, which we’ll denote as \( P \models^s \text{Name}(X) \). In all our applications the second-order universe of the base theory is intended to be a subset of that of the forcing extension, so for each set \( X \) our base theory will have a canonical name for it, \( \hat{X} \), with properties that will be discussed later on.

Finally, we need to define what it means for a condition \( P \) to (strongly) force an atomic formula \( \varphi \), written \( P \models^s \varphi \). The definitions of \( P \models^s \text{Name}(X) \) and \( P \models^s \varphi \) should satisfy some basic requirements.

**Definition 4.1** Assume the notions “\( \text{Condition}(P) \)” and “\( P \leq Q \)” have been defined so that the base theory proves that the class of conditions under \( \leq \) forms a partial order with least element \( \emptyset \). The definition of “\( P \models^s \text{Name}(X) \)” and the association of a formula “\( P \models^s \varphi \)” to every atomic formula \( \varphi \) will be called a good strong forcing notion if the following are satisfied:

1. **The free variables of** \( P \models^s \varphi \) **are the same as those of** \( \varphi \), **plus an additional variable for** \( P \); the free variables of \( P \models^s \text{Name}(X) \) **are** \( P \) **and** \( X \).

2. **Monotonicity:** the base theory proves that if \( P \) and \( Q \) are conditions such that \( P \models^s \varphi \) and \( Q \leq P \), then \( Q \models^s \varphi \) as well; likewise for \( P \models^s \text{Name}(X) \).

\[2\text{In [1] we used } \geq \text{ for this purpose.} \]
3. Substitution: for each term $t$

$$P \models^s (\varphi(x/t)) \iff (P \models^s \varphi)(x/t).$$

Assuming, then, that the above are in place—a partial order and a good strong forcing notion—we now indicate how to extend the forcing definition to arbitrary formulas. We adopt the following convention: variables $P$, $Q$, and $R$ are intended to range over conditions, so quantifiers ranging over these variables should be taken to be so relativized. In other words, a formula written $\forall P \ldots$ should be taken as shorthand for the formula $\forall P(\text{Condition}(P) \rightarrow \ldots)$ and a formula written $\exists P \ldots$ should be taken to mean $\exists P(\text{Condition}(P) \land \ldots)$.

**Definition 4.2** Given a good strong forcing notion $P \models^s \varphi$ for atomic $\varphi$ we extend the definition to arbitrary formulas inductively as follows:

1. $P \models^s \neg \varphi \equiv_{\text{def}} \forall Q \leq P(Q \not\models^s \varphi)$
2. $P \models^s \varphi \land \psi \equiv_{\text{def}} (P \models^s \varphi) \land (P \models^s \psi)$
3. $P \models^s \varphi \lor \psi \equiv_{\text{def}} (P \models^s \varphi) \lor (P \models^s \psi)$
4. $P \models^s \varphi \rightarrow \psi \equiv_{\text{def}} \forall Q \leq P(Q \models^s \varphi \rightarrow \exists R \leq Q(R \models^s \psi))$
5. $P \models^s \exists x \varphi \equiv_{\text{def}} \exists x(P \models^s \varphi)$
6. $P \models^s \forall x \varphi \equiv_{\text{def}} \forall x \forall Q \leq P \exists R \leq Q(R \models^s \varphi)$
7. $P \models^s \exists X \varphi \equiv_{\text{def}} \exists X(P \models^s \Name(X) \land \varphi)$
8. $P \models^s \forall X \varphi \equiv_{\text{def}} \forall X \forall Q \leq P \exists R \leq Q(R \models^s \Name(X) \rightarrow \varphi)$

If $\emptyset \models^s \varphi$ we’ll write $\models^s \varphi$ and say “$\varphi$ is strongly forced.”

One can check by induction on the complexity of $\varphi$ that the conditions of Definition 4.1 hold for all formulas:

**Lemma 4.3** If one begins with a good strong forcing notion and extends it to all formulas as in the previous definition, the resulting forcing relation satisfies monotonicity and substitution as well.

Strong forcing as we’ve just defined it is necessary in many applications where the complexity of the forcing definition is of key concern, but its semantic interpretation is problematic: for example, the basic axioms of logic are not strongly forced, and it is possible to have $P \models^s \varphi$ without $P \models^s \neg \neg \varphi$ as well. As a result, the notion of weak forcing which we are about to define is the more natural one. The semantic interpretation of “$P$ weakly forces $\varphi$,” which we’ll write $P \models \varphi$, is that $\varphi$ is true in every generic extension containing $P$. 

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Definition 4.4 A good strong forcing notion $\models$ is also a good weak forcing notion if it satisfies

$$P \models \varphi \iff P \models \neg \neg \varphi$$

for all atomic formulas $\varphi$ as well as the predicate $\text{Name}(X)$. In other words, for all such $\varphi$,

$$P \models \varphi \iff \forall Q \leq P \exists R \leq Q (R \models \varphi).$$

As in the case of strong forcing we can extend the definition to arbitrary formulas, using the clauses given in the following definition.

Definition 4.5 Given a good weak forcing notion $P \models \varphi$ for atomic $\varphi$ we extend the definition to arbitrary formulas inductively as follows:

1. $P \models \neg \varphi \equiv \forall Q \leq P (Q \not\models \varphi)$
2. $P \models \varphi \land \psi \equiv (P \models \varphi) \land (P \models \psi)$
3. $P \models \varphi \lor \psi \equiv \forall P \leq Q \exists R \leq Q ((R \models \varphi) \lor (R \models \psi))$
4. $P \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \forall Q \leq P (Q \models \varphi \rightarrow \exists R \leq Q (R \models \psi))$
5. $P \models \exists x \varphi \equiv \forall Q \leq P \exists R \leq Q \exists x (R \models \varphi)$
6. $P \models \forall x \varphi \equiv \forall x (P \models \varphi)$
7. $P \models \exists X \varphi \equiv \forall Q \leq P \exists R \leq Q \exists X (R \models \text{Name}(X) \land \varphi)$
8. $P \models \forall X \varphi \equiv \forall X (P \models \text{Name}(X) \rightarrow \varphi)$

If $\emptyset \models \varphi$ we’ll write $\models \varphi$ and say “$\varphi$ is weakly forced” or “$\varphi$ is generically valid.”

Using induction on formula complexity one can show

Lemma 4.6 If one begins with a good weak forcing notion and extends it to all formulas as in the previous definition, the resulting forcing relation satisfies monotonicity and substitution, as well as

$$P \models \varphi \iff P \models \neg \neg \varphi$$

for all formulas $\varphi$; in other words,

$$P \models \varphi \iff \forall Q \leq P \exists R \leq Q (R \models \varphi).$$

The connection with strong forcing and an explanation of the “strong”/“weak” terminology is given by the following

Proposition 4.7 Suppose $\models^*$ is a good strong forcing notion. Then the relation $\models$ given by

$$P \models \varphi \equiv \text{def} P \models^* \neg \neg \varphi$$

for atomic $\varphi$ and the predicate $\text{Name}(X)$ is a good weak forcing notion, and furthermore, the above equivalence holds for all formulas $\varphi$. 

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So one can define a good strong forcing notion $\models^s \varphi$ and work with that, with the knowledge that $\models^s \neg\neg\varphi$ is a good weak forcing notion which satisfies the clauses of Definition 4.5. Below we’ll drop the adjectives “strong” and “weak” and say “$P$ forces $\varphi$” when it is clear which type of relation we mean.

That weak forcing is a natural concept is guaranteed by the following proposition, which states that the laws and rules of second-order logic are generically valid.

**Proposition 4.8** Let $\varphi$ be an axiom of second-order predicate logic with free set variables $X_1 \ldots X_n$. Then the base theory proves

$$\models \text{Name}(X_1) \land \ldots \land \text{Name}(X_n) \rightarrow \varphi.$$ 

Furthermore if $\varphi$ follows from premises $\psi_1 \ldots \psi_n$ by a logical rule of inference, then the base theory proves

$$(P \models \psi_1) \land \ldots \land (P \models \psi_n) \rightarrow (P \models \varphi).$$

The proof involves picking your favorite set of axioms and rules and unwinding definitions (see [2]).

## 5 Defining 1-forcing

We are now ready apply the tools of the previous section to the task at hand. Working in the base theory $RCA_0$ we want to define a forcing relation that will capture the notion of truth in a model $M_1$ which is again a model of $RCA_0$ and contains a new generic path through some infinite tree. Referring back to Lemma 2.2 we see that in the semantic argument this was done in two steps: first we added a single generic to our base model $M$ to obtain the model $M_1 = M[G]$, and then we expanded $M_1$ to the model $M_2$ by adding all sets $\Delta^0_1$-definable from parameters. Our syntactic development will be clearest if we emulate these two steps. First we’ll define a forcing notion $\models^{1/2}_1$ to describe truth in $M_2$, using names for the sets of the base model plus a name for the new generic. Then we’ll define a forcing notion $\models^{1/2}_1$ to describe truth in the model $M_1$, using names for the sets $\Delta^0_1$-definable with parameters from $M_2$. Both will be weak forcing relations.

$\frac{1}{2}$-conditions are defined to be infinite binary trees. In other words, we define

$$\frac{1}{2}\text{-Condition}(P)$$

to mean

$$P \text{ is a binary tree } \land \forall n \exists \sigma (\sigma \in P \land \text{length}(\sigma) = n).$$

Since there are only $2^n$ binary sequences of length $n$, the length of $\sigma$ can be bounded by a primitive recursive term, and so $RCA_0$ proves that this is equivalent to a $\Pi^0_1$ formula. We then define $P \leq \frac{1}{2} Q$ to mean $P \subseteq Q$.

We’ll have two types of $\frac{1}{2}$-names: names for the sets of base model, say $\hat{X} = \{\langle 0, x \rangle | x \in X \}$, and a name for the new generic, say $\hat{G} = \{\langle 1, 0 \rangle \}$. The
predicate $P \models \frac{1}{2} \text{Name}(X)$ will simply assert that $X$ has one of these forms; note that this assertion doesn’t depend on $P$.

Finally, we have to define $P \models \frac{1}{2} \varphi$ for atomic $\varphi$. We can take $P \models \frac{1}{2} t_1 = t_2$ to be simply $t_1 = t_2$, where $t_1$ and $t_2$ are terms in the language of arithmetic. Similarly, we can take $P \models \frac{1}{2} t \in X$ to mean $t \in X$ for sets $X$ of the base model.

How should we define, then, $P \models \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G}$? Recalling that $G$ is supposed to represent an infinite path through $P$, it makes sense to say that $P$ forces that $t$ is in $\hat{G}$ if and only if every infinite path through $P$ necessarily contains $t$; this will be true if and only if only finitely many nodes of $P$ don’t contain $t$. In other words, we define $P \models \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G}$ to mean

$$\{ \sigma \in P | \sigma_t = 0 \} \text{ is finite}.$$ 

Since $P$ is a tree, note that this is equivalent to a $\Sigma_1^0$ statement, namely

$$\exists n \forall \sigma (\sigma \in P \land \text{length}(\sigma) = n \rightarrow \sigma_t = 1),$$

where we can again bound the universal quantifier over $\sigma$.

Our first order of business is to verify the following

**Lemma 5.1** The $\frac{1}{2}$-forcing notion just described is a good weak forcing notion.

*Proof.* Monotonicity and substitution are easy to verify. The only part that requires any work is showing that

$$P \models \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G} \iff P \models \frac{1}{2} \neg \neg (t \in \hat{G})$$

for every condition $P$. First note that a condition $Q \models \frac{1}{2} \neg( t \in \hat{G})$ if and only if (by definition) no extension $R \models \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G}$; which is true if and only if every extension $R$ of $Q$ has infinitely many nodes $\sigma$ such that $\sigma_t = 0$; which is true if and only if only finitely many nodes $\sigma$ of $Q$ have $\sigma_t = 1$ (because otherwise $R = Q - \{ \sigma \in Q | \sigma_t = 0 \}$ would be a condition extending $Q$ with only finitely many (in fact zero) nodes $\sigma$ such that $\sigma_t = 0$). In other words, for any condition $Q$, $Q \models \frac{1}{2} \neg(t \in \hat{G})$ if and only if

$$\{ \sigma \in Q | \sigma_t = 1 \} \text{ is finite}.$$ 

Repeating the argument, $P \models \frac{1}{2} \neg \neg (t \in \hat{G})$ if and only if (by definition) no extension $Q \models \frac{1}{2} \neg (t \in \hat{G})$; which is true if and only if every extension $Q$ of $P$ has infinitely many nodes $\sigma$ such that $\sigma_t = 1$; which is true if and only if $P$ has only finitely many nodes $\sigma$ such that $\sigma_t = 0$; which is true, by definition, if and only if $P \models t \in \hat{G}$. □

The next lemma states that an arithmetic formula with parameters from the base model is $\frac{1}{2}$-forced if and only if it’s true in the original model. From the semantic point of view, this should be clear; such a formula makes no reference to the new generic set.

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Lemma 5.2 Let $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ be arithmetic with only the set parameters shown. Then $(\text{RCA}_0)$ proves that for all sets $X_1 \ldots X_n$, the following are equivalent:

1. $\forall P (P \Vdash \frac{1}{2} \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$
2. $\exists P (P \Vdash \frac{1}{2} \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$
3. $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$

Proof. Routine, using induction on the complexity of $\varphi$. □

The next lemma states something that again should seem intuitively clear: a condition $P$ forces that a binary string $\sigma$ codes an initial segment of the characteristic function of the generic if and only if finitely many nodes of $P$ disagree with $\sigma$. We use the notation $\sigma \subset X$ to mean that the binary sequence $\sigma$ is an initial segment of the characteristic function of $X$, and we use the notation $\sigma \perp \tau$ to mean that the binary sequences $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are incompatible, that is, disagree at some position in both their domains.

Lemma 5.3 $\frac{1}{2}$-forces $\sigma \subset \hat{G}$ if and only if

$\{\tau \in P | \tau \perp \sigma\}$

is finite. In particular, if $\frac{1}{2}$-forces $\sigma \in \hat{G}$, then $\sigma \in P$ as well.

Proof. “$\sigma \subset \hat{G}$” is an abbreviation for the assertion

$\forall i < \text{length}(\sigma)(\sigma_i = 0 \to i \notin \hat{G} \wedge \sigma_i = 1 \to i \in \hat{G})$.

Let $S_i = \{\tau \in P | \tau_i \neq \sigma_i\}$, so that $S_i$ represents the nodes of $P$ that disagree with $\sigma$ at the $i^{th}$ place. Then by expanding out the forcing definition one can show the following equivalences:

$P \Vdash \frac{1}{2} \sigma \subset \hat{G} \iff \forall i < \text{length}(\sigma) P \Vdash \frac{1}{2} (\sigma_i = 0 \to i \notin \hat{G} \wedge \sigma_i = 1 \to i \in \hat{G})$

$\iff \forall i < \text{length}(\sigma) (S_i \text{ is finite})$

$\iff \cup_{i < \text{length}(\sigma)} S_i \text{ is finite}$

$\iff \{\tau \in P | \tau \perp \sigma\} \text{ is finite}$. □

The heart of Harrington’s forcing argument involves showing that the statement $P \Vdash \frac{1}{2} \varphi$ for $\Sigma^0_1$ formulas $\varphi$ is equivalent to a $\Sigma^0_1$ assertion. To state this more precisely we need the following well-known fact, which states that a $\Sigma^0_1$ formula involving a set parameter can be put into a nice normal form.

Lemma 5.4 (Normal Form Lemma) Let $\varphi(X)$ be a $\Sigma^0_1$ formula with set parameter $X$. Then there is a $\Delta^0_1$ formula $\theta_\varphi(\sigma)$ such that the quantifier-free axioms of arithmetic prove

$\varphi(X) \iff \exists \sigma \subset X \theta_\varphi(\sigma)$

and furthermore

$\theta(\sigma) \land \tau \supset \sigma \to \theta(\tau)$. 11
Intuitively, this lemma states that a $\Sigma^0_1$ formula in $X$ is true if and only if it is made true by a finite part of $X$. The proof for $\Delta^0_0$ formulas proceeds by induction on their complexity. The claim can then be extended to formulas with an existential quantifier by noting that, if $\alpha(x, X)$ is $\Delta^0_0$, we have

$$\exists x \alpha(x, X) \iff \exists \exists \alpha \subset X \theta_\alpha(x, \sigma)$$

$$\iff \exists \sigma \subset X \exists x < \text{length}(\sigma) \theta_\alpha(x, \sigma)$$

where the last formula in the equivalence has the desired form.

With this behind us, we can now state

**Lemma 5.5** Suppose $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, G)$ is a $\Sigma^0_1$ formula with only the free set variables shown. Then $\text{RCA}_0$ proves the following: For any $X_1, \ldots, X_n$, the statement $P \vDash \varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, G)$ is equivalent to the statement

$$\{ \sigma \in P \mid \neg \theta_\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma) \} \text{ is finite},$$

where $\theta_\varphi$ is as in the statement of the Normal Form Lemma 5.4.

**Proof.** By Lemma 5.2 we know that the quantifier-free axioms of arithmetic are $\frac{1}{2}$-generically valid, so that the formula $P \vDash \varphi$ is equivalent to

$$P \vDash \exists \sigma \subset \hat{G} \theta_\varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n, \sigma)$$

(1)

in $\text{RCA}_0$.$^3$ From here on we argue in $\text{RCA}_0$. Unwinding clauses of the forcing definition, (1) is equivalent to

$$\forall Q \leq \frac{1}{2} P \exists R \leq \frac{1}{2} Q \exists \sigma(Q \vDash \exists \sigma \subset \hat{G} \land \theta_\varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n, \sigma)).$$

Applying Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 this is equivalent to

$$\forall Q \leq \frac{1}{2} P \exists R \leq \frac{1}{2} Q \exists \sigma(\{ \tau \in R \mid \tau \perp \sigma \} \text{ is finite} \land \theta_\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma)).$$

Letting

$$S = \{ \sigma \in P \mid \neg \theta_\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma) \},$$

(2)

we claim (2) is equivalent to the assertion “$S$ is finite,” as required. To show one direction of the equivalence, suppose $S$ is finite and let $Q$ be any condition

$^3$Ulrich Kohlenbach has pointed out that the reduction of $\varphi$ to normal form implicitly requires the fact that

$$\forall x \exists \sigma(\text{length}(\sigma) = x \land \sigma \subset \hat{G}).$$

To see that this is $\frac{1}{2}$-forced, observe that using $\Sigma^0_1$-collection $\text{RCA}_0$ can prove

$$\forall x \forall P \exists Q \leq P(Q \text{ has exactly one sequence } \sigma \text{ of length } x)$$

and such a condition $Q \frac{1}{2}$-forces

$$\text{length}(\sigma) = x \land \sigma \subset \hat{G}.$$
extending $P$. Since $S$ is finite, there is some $n$ so that every sequence of length $n$ in $Q$ satisfies $\theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma)$. Since $Q$ is infinite, by $\Sigma^0_1$ collection (provable from $\Sigma^0_1$ induction in $\text{RCA}_0$, as in [5]) some sequence $\sigma$ of length $n$ has infinitely many descendents. Letting

$$R = \{ \tau \in P | \text{\tau is compatible with } \sigma \}$$

we have

$$\{ \tau \in R | \tau \perp \sigma \} \text{ is finite } \land \theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma).$$

Conversely, suppose $S$ is infinite. Then $S$ itself is a condition extending $P$, and for every $\sigma$ in $S$ we have $-\theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma)$. Then there is no condition $R$ extending $S$ and string $\sigma$ such that

$$\{ \tau \in R | \tau \perp \sigma \} \text{ is finite } \land \theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma)$$

since whenever $\theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n, \sigma)$ holds, $\sigma$ is not in $S$ and hence incompatible with infinitely many elements of $R$. □

**Corollary 5.6** Suppose $\phi$ is a $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) formula. Then $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that the formula $P \models \frac{1}{2} \phi$ is equivalent to another $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) formula.

**Proof.** For $\Sigma^0_1$ formulas this follows immediately from the previous lemma, since saying

$$\{ \sigma \in P | -\theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n) \} \text{ is finite}$$

amounts to saying that there exists an $m$ such that all the sequences of length $m$ in $P$ satisfy $\theta_\phi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$.

The corresponding statement for $\Pi^0_2$ formulas follows by adding a universal quantifier to $\phi$ and applying the appropriate clause of Definition 4.5. □

**Lemma 5.7** $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that $\Sigma^0_1$-induction is $\frac{1}{2}$-generically valid.

**Proof.** A typical instance of $\Sigma^0_1$-induction is of the form

$$\phi(0) \land \forall x(\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(x + 1)) \rightarrow \forall x\phi(x)$$

where $\phi$ is $\Sigma^0_1$, possibly with set parameters. Suppose $P \models \frac{1}{2} \phi(0)$ and $\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(x + 1)$ for every $x$; we want to show that there is a condition $Q$ extending $P$ such that $Q \models \frac{1}{2} \forall x\phi(x)$. Since by Corollary 5.6 the statement $P \models \frac{1}{2} \phi(x)$ is $\Sigma^0_1$, so we can use the hypotheses and $\Sigma^0_1$-induction in the base model to prove that for every $x$ we have $P \models \frac{1}{2} \phi(x)$. By Definition 4.5 this means that $P$ itself $\frac{1}{2}$-forces $\forall x\phi(x)$ and we’re done. □

So now we’ve got a truth definition for a model $M_\frac{1}{2}$ which satisfies all the axioms of $I\Sigma_1$. We can use this to define a $1$- forcing relation that is very similar to the $\frac{1}{2}$-forcing relation, except that it allows us to name sets that are recursive in parameters from the model $M_\frac{1}{2}$.

$1$-conditions are the same as $\frac{1}{3}$-conditions, namely infinite trees of the base model, and we use the same ordering as before.
We want our 1-names to code sets that are $\Delta^0_1$ in the generic and a parameter from the original model (thanks to pairing, one parameter is enough). So we’ll take our 1-names to be triples $\langle X, \psi, \chi \rangle$ where $\psi(x, X, G)$ and $\chi(x, X, G)$ are (codes of) the $\Sigma^0_1$ and $\Pi^0_1$ formulas that will code the recursive set. Letting $Tr_{\Sigma^0_1}$ and $Tr_{\Pi^0_1}$ be appropriate truth predicates, we define $P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} \text{Name}(\langle X, \psi, \chi \rangle)$ to mean

$$P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} \forall x (Tr_{\Sigma^0_1}(\psi, x, \hat{X}, \hat{G}) \leftrightarrow Tr_{\Pi^0_1}(\chi, x, \hat{X}, \hat{G}));$$

in other words, $P$ forces that the formulas $\psi$ and $\chi$ represent a valid $\Delta^0_1$ definition. Note that by Corollary 5.6 this definition has complexity $\Pi^0_2$.

Finally, the definition of $P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} t \in \langle X, \psi, \chi \rangle$ is given by

$$P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} Tr_{\Sigma^0_1}(\psi, t, \hat{X}, \hat{G}).$$

Of course, if $P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} \text{Name}(\langle X, \psi, \chi \rangle)$ then this is equivalent to

$$P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} Tr_{\Pi^0_1}(\chi, t, \hat{X}, \hat{G}).$$

It isn’t difficult to show that 1-forcing is also good weak forcing notion. We can again define canonical 1-names for sets in the base model and the generic, taking, for example, $\hat{X}$ to be $\langle X, x \in X, x \in X \rangle$ and $\hat{G}$ to be $\langle \emptyset, x \in G, x \in G \rangle$.

With a little bit of work (see [1]), we can show that most of the properties of $\frac{1}{2}$-forcing are true of 1-forcing as well:

**Lemma 5.8** Let $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ be arithmetic with only the set parameters shown. Then $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that for all sets $X_1 \ldots X_n$, the following are equivalent:

1. $\forall P (P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$
2. $\exists P (P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$
3. $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$

**Lemma 5.9** $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that $P$ 1-forces $\sigma \subset \hat{G}$ if and only if $\{ \tau \in P | \tau \perp \sigma \}$ is finite.

**Lemma 5.10** Suppose $\varphi$ is a $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) formula. Then $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that the formula $P \Vdash_{\mathbb{1}} \varphi$ is equivalent to another $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) formula.

**Lemma 5.11** $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that $\Sigma^0_1$-induction is 1-generically valid.

In fact, we can show

**Lemma 5.12** $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that each axiom of $\text{RCA}_0$ is 1-generically valid.
Proof. We’ve already handled the axioms of $I\Sigma_1$, and our naming scheme handles ($RCA$).

We may not seem to have accomplished much so far: we have taken great pains to produce, in $RCA_0$, an interpretation of the phrase “$\varphi$ is true in $M_1$” where $M_1$ is another model of $RCA_0$. Our major gain, though, is represented by the following

**Lemma 5.13** $RCA_0$ proves that if $P$ is a 1-condition then

$$P \vdash_1 \exists X (X \text{ is a path through } \hat{P}).$$

In other words,

$$P \vdash_1 \exists X \forall \sigma (\sigma \subset X \rightarrow \sigma \in \hat{P}).$$

**Proof.** In fact, Lemma 5.9 implies that

$$P \vdash_1 \forall \sigma (\sigma \in \hat{G} \rightarrow \sigma \in \hat{P}).$$

This is a far cry from showing that ($WKL$) is 1-forced: semantically speaking all we can say is that if $P$, an infinite binary tree in the base model, happens to be one of the conditions of the generic, then $M[G]$ has a path through $P$. But as we’ll see we can handle more trees by iterating the forcing, and in fact, if we iterate the forcing “generically” we can get them all.

### 6 Iterating a forcing definition

Suppose we begin with a theory $T$ and define within $T$ a forcing relation in which the axioms of $T$ are again generically valid. Then we can use Proposition 4.8 to iterate the process and show that $T$ proves that it is generically valid that the axioms of $T$ are generically valid. Having added one generic to obtain a model $M[G_1]$ of $T$, we’re essentially adding another generic to obtain $M[G_1][G_2]$. The conditions of the second forcing relation are conditions of $M[G_1]$, sets in $M[G_1][G_2]$ are named by sets of $M[G_1]$, and so on. Iterating the process we obtain the models $M_n$ for each standard $n$.

To carry out the iteration uniformly, however, we need to find, for each $n$, a single forcing relation that will add $n$ generics at once. We present such a relation below. Proposition 6.3 then shows that adding all the generics at once is equivalent to adding them one at a time.

**Definition 6.1** Once $n$-forcing notions have been defined, $n+1$-forcing notions are defined as follows.

1. An $n+1$-condition is defined to be a pair $\langle P, P' \rangle$ such that

   $$n\text{-Condition}(P) \land P \vdash_n (Name(P') \land 1\text{-Condition}(P')).$$

2. If $\langle P, P' \rangle$ and $\langle Q, Q' \rangle$ are $n+1$-conditions, we say $\langle P, P' \rangle \leq_{n+1} \langle Q, Q' \rangle$ if

   $$P \leq_n Q \land P \vdash_n \langle P' \leq_1 Q' \rangle.$$
3. \( \langle P, P' \rangle \models_{n+1} \text{Name}(X) \) is defined to mean
\[
P \models_n (P' \models_1 \text{Name}(X)).
\]

4. If \( \varphi \) is atomic, \( \langle P, P' \rangle \models_{n+1} \varphi \) is defined to mean
\[
P \models_n (P' \models_1 \varphi).
\]

5. Finally, we extend the definition of weak \( n+1 \)-forcing to arbitrary formulas \( \varphi \) using the clauses of Definition 4.5.

Proving the following propositions involves unwinding the forcing definitions. Details can be found in [1].

**Proposition 6.2** Suppose \( T \) proves that 1-forcing is a good weak forcing notion and that the axioms of \( T \) are 1-generically valid. If \( n \)-forcing is a good weak forcing notion for some standard \( n \), then so is \( n+1 \)-forcing.

**Proposition 6.3** Let \( T \) be as above and suppose \( n \)-forcing is a good weak forcing notion. Then for each formula \( \varphi \), \( T \) proves that
\[
\langle (P, P') \models_{n+1} \varphi \rangle \iff (P \models_n (P' \models_1 \varphi)).
\]

**Proposition 6.4** Let \( T \) be as above. Then for each standard \( n \), if \( T \) proves that the axioms of \( T \) are \( n \)-generically valid, then it proves that they’re \( n+1 \)-generically valid as well.

Of course, these propositions imply that for each standard integer \( n \), \( T \) proves that the axioms of \( T \) are \( n \)-generically valid. The reason behind our strange wording will become clear later on.

We now apply these results to the forcing argument at hand. Using \( RCA_0 \) as our base theory and our particular definition of 1-forcing we get

**Lemma 6.5** Given the definition of 1-forcing in Section 5 and the corresponding definitions for weak \( n \)-forcing, if \( RCA_0 \) proves the axioms of \( RCA_0 \) are \( n \)-generically valid for some standard \( n \), then it proves that they’re \( n+1 \)-generically valid.

Again this implies that the axioms of \( RCA_0 \) are \( n \)-generically valid for each standard \( n \). We also have the generalization of Lemma 5.13:

**Lemma 6.6** Suppose \( RCA_0 \) proves that the axioms of \( RCA_0 \) are \( n \)-generically valid. Then it also proves the following: If \( X \) is an \( n \)-name and \( P \) is an \( n \)-condition such that \( P \models_n (X \text{ is an infinite binary tree}) \), then
\[
\langle P, X \rangle \models_{n+1} \exists Y (Y \text{ is a path through } X).
\]
Proof. By Proposition 6.3, $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that

$$\langle P, X \rangle \models_{n+1} \exists Y (\text{Y is a path through X})$$

is equivalent to

$$P \models_n (X \models_1 \exists Y (\text{Y is a path through X})).$$

Since $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that axioms of $\text{RCA}_0$ are $n$-generically valid, it proves this latter formula by Lemma 5.13. □

The final lemma of this section shows that for formulas $\varphi$ of low complexity, the notion $P \models_n \varphi$ remains of low complexity for every standard $n$. Recall that Lemma 5.10 showed that this is true when $n = 1$. Using Proposition 6.3 we get:

**Lemma 6.7** Suppose for some $n \text{RCA}_0$ proves that the axioms of $\text{RCA}_0$ are $n$-generically valid. Then if for every $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) formula $\varphi \text{RCA}_0$ proves that the assertion $P \models_n \varphi$ is again of $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) complexity, then the same holds true when $n$ is replaced by $n + 1$.

Again, this conjoined with Lemma 6.5 implies that the complexity of $P \models_n \varphi$ remains $\Sigma^0_1$ (resp. $\Pi^0_2$) for each standard $n$; and, of course, at the moment these are the only $n$ for which we have a meaningful definition of $n$-forcing. But the reason for our strange phrasing will become clear in the next section when we define $n$-forcing uniformly.

### 7 Defining $n$-forcing uniformly

At this stage we’ve shown how to define $n$-forcing for each standard $n$, but that isn’t quite sufficient for our purposes. What we really want is a uniform definition of $n$-forcing, that is, definitions of the notions “$P$ is an $n$-condition,” “$P \leq_n Q$, “$P \models_n \text{Name}(X)$,” and for each $\varphi$ “$P \models_n \varphi,$” where $n$ is a parameter. Furthermore, we’d like to be able to show within $\text{RCA}_0$ that, with our new definition, for every $n$ the axioms of $\text{RCA}_0$ are $n$-generically valid. This last goal, however, turns out to be a little bit too ambitious, and more than we need. In fact, it will be sufficient to show that our new forcing definition has this property for “enough” $n$, that is, for a set of numbers forming a definable cut.

**Definition 7.1** Let $T$ be a theory in a language that includes the language of arithmetic. Then a definable cut (with respect to $T$) is a formula $J$ such that $T$ proves

$$J(0) \land \forall n(J(n) \rightarrow J(n + 1)).$$

Referring back to the definitions in Section 5 we see that our basic 1-forcing notions are of low complexity. “1-Condition($P$)” is $\Pi^0_1$ in $P$; “$P \leq_1 Q$, “$P \models_1 \text{Name}(X)$” is $\Pi^0_2$ in $P$ and $Q$; “$P \models_1 \text{Name}(X)$” is $\Pi^0_2$ in $P$ and $X$; and finally, the definition
of \( P \vdash t \in X \) is \( \Sigma^0_1 \) in \( P \) and \( X \). Moreover, repeated application of Lemmas 6.5 and 6.7 will reveal that for each standard \( n \), \( \text{RCA}_0 \) proves that the basic \( n \)-forcing notions have the same complexity as their 1-forcing counterparts. Finally, we note that the transformations are uniform; fixing appropriate \( \Pi^0_2 \) truth predicates, there are primitive recursive functions \( \text{Condition}(n) \), \( \text{LessThanEq}(n) \), \( \text{Name}(n) \), and \( \text{ElementOf}(n) \) such that for each standard \( n \), \( \text{RCA}_0 \) proves the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{n-Condition}(P) &\iff \text{Tr}_{\Pi^0_2}(\text{Condition}(n), P), \\
P \leq_n Q &\iff \text{Tr}_{\Pi^0_2}(\text{LessThanEq}(n), P, Q), \\
P \models_n \text{Name}(X) &\iff \text{Tr}_{\Pi^0_2}(\text{Name}(n), P, X),
\end{align*}
\]

and

\[ P \models_n t \in X \iff \text{Tr}_{\Pi^0_2}(\text{ElementOf}(n), t, P, X). \]

It then makes sense to use these functions for our uniform definition of \( n \)-forcing. In other words, we define a new forcing relation \( \models_n \) where \( n \) is now a parameter; \( n \)-conditions, \( \leq_n \), \( n \)-names, and \( n \)-forcing for atomic formulas are now defined using the right-hand side of the above equivalences. The weak forcing is then extended to formulas of arbitrary complexity in the usual way.

Again we’d like to emphasize that rather than using the clauses of Definition 6.1 to define \( n + 1 \)-forcing from \( n \)-forcing, we’re using their low-complexity equivalents guaranteed by Lemma 6.7. If our primitive recursive functions have been reasonably chosen we can prove these these equivalences and show, from within \( \text{RCA}_0 \), that our uniform definition agrees with Definition 6.1:

**Lemma 7.2** \( \text{RCA}_0 \) proves the following: Suppose the axioms of \( \text{RCA}_0 \) are \( n \)-generically valid. Then the following hold:

1. \( n + 1 \)-Condition(\( (P, P') \)) \iff \( n \)-Condition(\( P \)) \land P \models_n (\text{Name}(P') \land 1 \text{-Condition}(P'))
2. \( (P, P') \leq_{n+1} (Q, Q') \iff P \leq_n Q \land P \models_n (P' \leq_1 Q')
3. \( (P, P') \models_{n+1} \text{Name}(X) \iff P \models_n (P' \models_1 \text{Name}(X))
4. \( (P, P') \models_{n+1} t \in X \iff P \models_n (P' \models_1 t \in X)

In the statements above, all the \( n \)- and \( n + 1 \)-notions refer to our new definitions, whereas all mentions of 1-forcing refer to the original definitions given in Section 5.

Let \( J(n) \) say that “all the axioms of \( \text{RCA}_0 \) are \( n \)-forced,” that is,

\[ J(n) \equiv \text{def} \bigwedge \{ \models_n \varphi \mid \varphi \text{ is an axiom of } \text{RCA}_0 \}. \]

Here we’re relying on the fact that \( \text{RCA}_0 \) is finitely axiomatizable using truth predicates. It would be nice if we could prove from within our base theory that \( J(n) \) holds for all \( n \). The bad news is, since the statement \( J(n) \) has second-order
quantifiers, proving this claim requires more induction than is available to us in $\text{RCA}_0$. The good news is that we never really need to know that the predicate $J$ is true of all numbers. In the next section we’ll see that it’s enough to know that

**Lemma 7.3** $J(n)$ is a definable cut, that is, $\text{RCA}_0$ proves that for all $n$, $J(n) \rightarrow J(n + 1)$.

**Proof.** The proof is virtually the same as the proof of Lemma 6.5, except that we use the new $n$-forcing definitions throughout. □

Repeating the proof of Proposition 6.3 with our new definitions we get

**Lemma 7.4** With the new uniform definitions of $n$-forcing, for each formula $\varphi$ $\text{RCA}_0$ proves the following: if $J(n)$ holds then

$$(P, P') \Vdash_n \varphi \leftrightarrow (P \Vdash_n (P' \Vdash_1 \varphi)).$$

Once again, we want to emphasize that they key difference is that now $n$ appears as a parameter in the statement of the lemma. In the same way, we can prove the analog of Lemma 6.6:

**Lemma 7.5** $\text{RCA}_0$ proves the following: Suppose $J(n)$ and

$$P \Vdash_n (X \text{ is an infinite binary tree}).$$

Then

$$(P, X) \Vdash_{n+1} \exists Y (Y \text{ is a path through } X).$$

Now, with these uniform forcing definitions in hand, we’re finally ready to define a forcing relation that will capture the notion of truth in the model $M_\omega$.

### 8 Putting it all together: the general forcing definition

The model $M_\omega$ we describe should first of all be a model in which $\omega$-many generic sets have been added. But we want more than that: the sets should themselves should be added generically, so that whenever an infinite binary tree gets added to the model, a path through it gets added at some later stage. This section will describe forcing notions that do the job. The conditions of our forcing relation will be $n$-conditions for varying $n$. Intuitively, an $n$-condition specifies information about the first $n$-generics, so we’ll say that an $n$-condition $P$ extends and $n'$-condition $Q$ if and only if $n \leq n'$ and $P$ extends $Q$ with respect to the information they both specify. We’ll use such a poset to define a new weak forcing argument $\Vdash_\omega$ and then show that it is sufficient for our purposes.

If $Q$ is an $n$-condition and $m \geq n$ we can identify $Q$ with an $m$-condition

$$(\ldots \langle\langle Q, \hat{0}\rangle, \hat{0}, \ldots\rangle)$$
by padding it with canonical names for the greatest 1-condition. Similarly, if \( X \) is an \( n \)-name and \( m \geq n \) we can identify \( X \) with an \( m \)-name \( X' \) so that
\[
(P \models_n t \in X) \iff (P \models_m t \in X');
\]
for example, if \( m = n + 1 \) we take \( X' = \check{X} \), the canonical name for \( X \), and so on. So in an expression like \( P \models_k \text{Name}(X) \), where \( P \) is an \( n \)-condition and \( X \) is an \( m \)-name and \( k \geq \max(m,n) \), we are implicitly identifying \( P \) and \( X \) with the corresponding \( k \)-condition and \( k \)-name, respectively. With this convention in place, we are ready to define \( \omega \)-forcing.

**Definition 8.1** From within \( \text{RCA}_0 \) we make the following definitions:

1. An \( \omega \)-condition is an \( n \)-condition for some \( n \) such that \( J(n) \). That is, we define \( \omega \)-Condition\( (P) \) to mean \( \exists n (J(n) \land n \text{-Condition}(P)) \).

2. If \( P \) is an \( m \)-condition and \( Q \) is an \( n \)-condition, say \( P \preceq_\omega Q \) if \( m \geq n \) and \( P \preceq_m Q \).

3. If \( P \) is an \( n \)-condition and \( X \) is an \( m \)-name such that \( J(m) \), we'll say that \( P \models_\omega \text{Name}(X) \) if \( P \models_k \text{Name}(X) \) where \( k = \max(m,n) \).

4. Similarly, if \( P \) is an \( n \)-condition and \( X \) is a \( m \)-name, define \( P \models_\omega t \in X \) to mean \( P \models_k t \in X \) where \( k = \max(m,n) \).

5. Finally, we extend the definition to arbitrary formulas \( \varphi \) using the clauses of Definition 4.5

It is straightforward to check that \( \omega \)-forcing is a good weak forcing notion. If \( P \) is an \( n \)-condition and \( m < n \), we define \( P \upharpoonright m \) (“\( P \) restricted to \( m \)”) to be the \( m \)-condition corresponding to an initial segment of \( P \).

We now have a tentative truth definition for the model \( M_\omega \). We can think of the models \( M_n \) as being the \( \omega \)-submodels of \( M_\omega \) containing only the first \( n \)-generics (and sets recursive in them). Now consider an arithmetic formula \( \varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_j) \) with only the set parameters shown, and suppose \( X_1, \ldots, X_j \) are all \( n \)-names for some \( n \). Then the truth of \( \varphi \) in \( M_\omega \) should be equivalent to its truth in \( M_n \), since \( \varphi \) makes no reference to anything outside the \( M_n \)'s universe. The following lemma, the statement of which relies heavily on our uniform definition of \( n \)-forcing, makes this precise. It is very much analogous to Lemma 5.8.

**Lemma 8.2** For any arithmetic \( \varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_j) \) with only the set parameters shown, \( \text{RCA}_0 \) proves the following: Suppose \( X_1, \ldots, X_j \) are \( n \)-names and \( P \) is an \( \omega \)-condition. Then

\[
(P \models_\omega \varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_j)) \iff (P \upharpoonright n \models_n \varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_j)).
\]
Proof. An easy induction on the logical complexity of $\varphi$. □

Using this lemma to reduce $\omega$-forcing to $n$-forcing for appropriate $n$, we can show

Lemma 8.3 $RCA_0$ proves that each basic axiom of $RCA_0$ is $\omega$-generically valid.

Finally, we come to the point of the whole affair:

Lemma 8.4 $RCA_0$ proves that $(WKL)$ is $\omega$-generically valid.

Proof. Argue in $RCA_0$. Suppose $P$ is an $\omega$-condition and $X$ is an $\omega$-name such that

$$P \models \omega \text{Name}(X) \land (X \text{ is an infinite tree}).$$

We need to show that there is an $\omega$-condition $Q$ extending $P$ such that

$$Q \models \exists Y (Y \text{ is a path through } X).$$

Since $P$ is an $\omega$-condition and $P \models \omega \text{Name}(X)$ there is an $n$ such that: $J(n)$ holds, $P$ can be identified with an $n$-condition, and $X$ can be identified with an $n$-name such that $P \models n \text{Name}(X)$. Hence by Lemma 8.2 we have that

$$P \models n (X \text{ is an infinite tree}).$$

Then $⟨P, X⟩$ is an $n + 1$-condition and by Lemma 7.5 we have that

$$⟨P, X⟩ \models_{n + 1} \exists Y (Y \text{ is a path through } X).$$

But $J(n)$ implies $J(n + 1)$, so $⟨P, X⟩$ is the desired $\omega$-condition. □

This yields our main result:

Theorem 8.5 $WKL_0$ is conservative over $RCA_0$ for $\Pi^1_1$ sentences.

Proof. Suppose $WKL_0$ proves $\forall X \varphi(X)$ for some arithmetic $\varphi$. Since $RCA_0$ proves that each axiom of $WKL_0$ is $\omega$-generically valid and that $\omega$-generic validity is maintained under rules of inference, it also proves that $\forall X \varphi(X)$ is $\omega$-generically valid, and hence

$$\forall X \models \omega (\text{Name}(X) \rightarrow \varphi(X)).$$

Now, arguing in $RCA_0$, let $X$ be any set and let $\hat{X}$ be its canonical 1-name. Then $\models \omega \text{Name}(\hat{X})$ and so $\models \omega \varphi(\hat{X})$. By Lemma 8.2 we have $\models_1 \varphi(\hat{X})$, and hence by Lemma 5.8 we can conclude $\varphi(X)$. □

In the next section we’ll discuss what is necessary to extend this result to $WKL^+_0$, and after that we’ll explore briefly what happens to the lengths of the proofs in the translation.
9 Handling $WKL_0$

We will now consider what is needed to modify the whole argument to handle the scheme ($BCT$) given in Section 1, namely

$$\forall n \forall \sigma \exists \tau \supseteq \sigma \varphi(n, \tau) \to \exists f \forall n \exists m \varphi(n, f[m]).$$

Suppose for the moment we want to prove a conservation result for $RCA_0 + 0$, that is, $RCA_0$ conjoined with the axiom schema ($BCT$). The semantic forcing argument, which appears in [3], is a simple instance of Cohen forcing in which the conditions are finite segments of 0’s and 1’s representing initial segments of the characteristic function of the generic set being added. Translating the argument to an effective one using the methods described here poses little difficulty. As in Section 5 we start by defining a “$\frac{1}{2}$-forcing” relation. They key difference is that due to complexity considerations we have to work with the strong version of the forcing relation as well.

**Definition 9.1** Within $RCA_0$, we define new notions of $\frac{1}{2}$-forcing as follows.

1. A $\frac{1}{2}$-condition $p$ is (a code for) a finite sequence of 0’s and 1’s.

2. If $p$ and $q$ are $\frac{1}{2}$-conditions, $p \leq^* \frac{1}{2} q$ if $p$ extends $q$ in the usual sense.

3. $p \models^* \frac{1}{2} \text{Name}(X)$ if $X$ is a canonical name for a set in the base model or the new generic, as in Section 5.

4. Define $p \models^* \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G}$ to mean $p_t = 1$.

5. We extend the relation $p \models^* \frac{1}{2} \varphi$ to arbitrary formulas $\varphi$ and define the corresponding weak forcing notions as described in Section 5.

Note that $p \models^* \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G}$ will hold if and only if $p \models^* \frac{1}{2} t \in \hat{G}$, so for atomic formulas the strong and weak forcing notions agree. For arbitrary formulas the two notions diverge, though they’re related by Proposition 4.7.

It is easy to check that Lemma 5.2, which states that arithmetic formulas are forced if and only if they’re true, still holds:

**Lemma 9.2** Let $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ be arithmetic with only the set parameters shown. Then $RCA_0$ proves that for all sets $X_1 \ldots X_n$, the following are equivalent:

1. $\forall p (p \models^* \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$

2. $\exists p (p \models^* \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$

3. $\forall p (p \models^* \frac{1}{2} \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$

4. $\exists p (p \models^* \frac{1}{2} \varphi(\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_n))$

5. $\varphi(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$
Furthermore, we have the following analog of Lemma 5.3:

**Lemma 9.3** RCA\(_0\) proves that the following are equivalent

1. \( p \models^* \sigma \subset \hat{G} \)
2. \( p \models \sigma \subset \hat{G} \)
3. \( \sigma \subset p \)

Unfortunately, Corollary 5.6 is somewhat weakened, in that we can no longer make the same claim about \( \Sigma^0_1 \) formulas.

**Lemma 9.4** Suppose \( \varphi \) is a \( \Pi^0_2 \) formula. Then RCA\(_0\) proves that the formula

\[ P \models \frac{1}{2} \varphi \]

is equivalent to another \( \Pi^0_2 \) formula.

**Proof.** This is easy to check using the clauses of Definition 4.5 and noting that \( \frac{1}{2} \)-forcing for atomic formulas is \( \Delta^0_1 \). □

Because forcing for \( \Sigma^0_1 \) formulas is no longer \( \Sigma^0_1 \) we can’t use the same proof we did in Section 5 to show that \( \Sigma^0_1 \) induction is 1-generically valid. However, strong forcing for \( \Sigma^0_1 \) formulas does remain \( \Sigma^0_1 \), and we can use that fact to push the proof through. Because strong forcing doesn’t have the nice semantic properties that weak forcing does, it is harder to understand what exactly is going on in the following proof. But in both instances handling induction amounts to showing that certain forcing notions are of sufficiently low complexity to use induction in the base theory.

**Lemma 9.5** RCA\(_0\) proves that \( \Sigma^0_1 \) induction is \( \frac{1}{2} \)-generically valid.

**Proof.** Suppose \( \varphi \) is \( \Sigma^0_1 \). We need to show that

\[ \varphi(0) \land \forall x (\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x+1)) \rightarrow \forall x \varphi(x) \]

is \( \frac{1}{2} \)-generically valid. In fact, we claim that it’s strongly \( \frac{1}{2} \)-forced by the empty condition. Suppose \( p \) strongly \( \frac{1}{2} \)-forces the inductive hypothesis, so that

\[ p \models \frac{*}{\frac{1}{2}} \varphi(0) \]

and,

\[ \forall x \forall q \leq \frac{1}{2} p \exists r \leq \frac{1}{2} q(r \models \frac{*}{\frac{1}{2}} \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x+1)) \].

We claim that \( p \) strongly \( \frac{1}{2} \)-forces the conclusion \( \forall x \varphi(x) \); i.e.

\[ \forall x \forall q \leq \frac{1}{2} p \exists r \leq \frac{1}{2} q(q \models \frac{*}{\frac{1}{2}} \varphi(x)) \].

Switching the first two quantifiers to get

\[ \forall q \leq \frac{1}{2} p \forall x \exists r \leq \frac{1}{2} q(q \models \frac{*}{\frac{1}{2}} \varphi(x)) \]
we now fix $q \leq \frac{1}{2} p$ and use induction on $x$ in the formula
\[
\exists r \leq \frac{1}{2} q (r \models \frac{1}{2} \varphi(x)).
\]
The fact that $p \models \varphi(0)$ gives the base case, and the fact that for every $x$ and $q \leq \frac{1}{2} p$ there is $r \leq \frac{1}{2} q$ such $r \models \frac{1}{2} (\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(x + 1))$ yields the induction hypothesis. So by $\Sigma^0_1$-induction in our base theory we’re done.

Now we can go on to develop the corresponding 1-forcing notions as was done in Section 5. As before, then, we can show that $\Sigma^0_1$-induction and recursive comprehension, and hence all the axioms of $\text{RCA}_0$, are 1-generically valid. Our gain is then represented by the following

**Lemma 9.6** Let $\varphi(n, \sigma, X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ be arithmetic with the set parameters shown. Then $\text{RCA}_0$ proves the following: for any sets $X_1, \ldots, X_n$
\[
\forall n \forall \sigma \exists \tau \supset \sigma \varphi(n, \tau, X_1, \ldots, X_n) \rightarrow \exists f \forall n \exists m \varphi(n, f[m], X_1, \ldots, X_n)
\]
is 1-generically valid.

**Proof.** Argue in $\text{RCA}_0$. Suppose a condition $p$ forces the left hand side. Then by Lemma 9.2 we have that
\[
\forall n \forall \sigma \exists \tau \supset \sigma \varphi(n, \tau, X_1, \ldots, X_n)
\]
is true. We claim that this implies that
\[
\models \frac{1}{2} \forall n \exists m \varphi(n, \hat{G}[m], X_1, \ldots, X_n),
\]
which suffices to prove the lemma. Working backwards, this latter formula is equivalent to
\[
\models \frac{1}{2} \forall n \exists m, \tau(\tau = \hat{G}[m] \land \varphi(n, \sigma, X_1, \ldots, X_n)).
\]
Using the clauses of Definition 4.5 we see that this is equivalent to
\[
\forall n \forall p \exists q \supset p \exists m (q \models \frac{1}{2} (\tau = \hat{G}[m] \land \varphi(n, \sigma, X_1, \ldots, X_n))).
\]
But it isn’t hard to show that $q \models \frac{1}{2} \tau = \hat{G}[m]$ is true if and only if $\tau = q[m]$, and so again by Lemma 9.2 we get
\[
\forall n \forall p \exists q \supset p \exists \tau, m(\tau = q[m] \land \varphi(n, \sigma, X_1, \ldots, X_n)),
\]
which is equivalent to
\[
\forall n \forall p \exists q \supset p \exists m(\varphi(n, q[m], X_1, \ldots, X_n)).
\]
But it is easy to see that this is implied by
\[
\forall n \forall \sigma \exists \tau \supset \sigma \varphi(n, \tau, X_1, \ldots, X_n)
\]
as desired.

This lemma falls short of \((BCT)\), since only parameters from the base model are allowed. However, when we iterate the forcing, we'll have that if \(\varphi\) satisfies the hypothesis of \((BCT)\) with \(n\)-names as parameters, then the \(n + 1\)st generic will verify the conclusion. All our forcing notions are of low complexity: 1-Condition(\(p\)) is \(\Delta^0_1\), as is \(p \leq_1 q; p \vdash_1 \text{Name}(X)\) and \(p \vdash_1 t \in X\) are both \(\Pi^0_2\), and Lemma 9.4 guarantees that this complexity is maintained when the forcing is iterated. So, repeating the constructions of Sections 6, 7, and 8 yields the desired conservation result.

Finally, to handle both \((WKL)\) and \((BCT)\) at the same time, one has to define an \(n\)-forcing that alternates between the two forcing types, for example, using Harrington forcing at the odd stages and Brown-Simpson forcing at the even stages. Though the details may be tedious they present no conceptual difficulties, yielding:

**Theorem 9.7** \(WKL_+^0\) is conservative over \(RCA_0\) for \(\Pi^1_1\) sentences.

### 10 The lengths of the proofs

Theorem 9.7 is not new, though the effective proof presented here is. We now take advantage of this effective proof to show that \(WKL_+^0\) doesn’t have any significant speedup over \(RCA_0\). That is, we show that when a proof in \(WKL_+^0\) is translated to one in \(RCA_0\), there is at most a polynomial increase in length.

We’ll assume that our proof systems are standard Hilbert-style proof systems. For the “length of a proof” we employ the measure used in [9] which counts the number of symbols involved.

Suppose one has proven a \(\Pi^1_1\) sentence \(\forall X \varphi(X)\) in \(WKL_+^0\) (we’ll assume for simplicity that there is only one universal second-order quantifier). We’ll examine the steps necessary to translating the proof \(p\) to one in \(RCA_0\). The proof \(p\) is of the form

\[
\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_n (= \forall X \varphi(X))
\]

where each \(\varphi_i\) (1) is a logical axiom, (2) is an axiom of \(RCA_0\), or (3) follows from previous \(\varphi_j\) by a deduction rule. The proof \(p\) will be replaced by a proof in \(RCA_0\) having the following general form:

“\(\varphi_1\) is \(\omega\)-generically valid,” “\(\varphi_2\) is \(\omega\)-generically valid,” \ldots ,

“\(\varphi_n\) is \(\omega\)-generically valid.”

This last line translates to

\(\forall X(\vdash_\omega \text{Name}(X) \rightarrow \varphi(X))\).

Now, arguing in \(RCA_0\) let \(X\) be any set, and let \(\hat{X}\) be its canonical name. Then we have

\(\vdash_\omega \varphi(\hat{X})\)
followed by the conclusion

\[ \forall X \varphi(X) \text{ is true.} \]

That the logical axioms are \( \omega \)-generically valid and that \( \omega \)-generic validity is maintained by deductive inferences is guaranteed by Proposition 4.8, and the lengths of the proofs described there are polynomially related to the lengths of the relevant formulas. We can take \( RCA_0 \) (and hence \( WKL_0 \)) to be finitely axiomatized (with only a polynomial increase in the length of proof over the more standard axiomatization); so proving that the axioms of \( WKL_0 \) are \( \omega \)-generically valid can be done with a constant length of proof. Each instance of the Baire Category Theorem used in \( p \) also has to be shown to be \( \omega \)-generically valid. It is straightforward to check that the lengths proofs obtained from Lemma 5.8 (which states that an arithmetic formula is \( 1 \)-forced if and only if it’s true) and Lemma 8.2 (which states that an arithmetic formula involving only \( n \)-names if \( \omega \)-forced if and only if it’s \( n \)-forced) are polynomially bounded in the lengths of the formulas involved, as is then verifying that the length of the proof that an instance of (BCT) is \( \omega \)-generically valid is also bounded by a polynomial in the length of the original axiom.

So, with a length of proof polynomial in the original, we can show that \( \forall X \varphi(X) \) is \( \omega \)-generically valid. Letting \( X \) be any set, \( RCA_0 \) can show that its canonical name \( \hat{X} \) satisfies \( \Vdash \omega \text{Name}(X) \) in a constant length proof, and hence conclude \( \Vdash \omega \varphi(\hat{X}) \). Once again the application of Lemmas 5.8 and 8.2, which allow us to conclude that \( \varphi(X) \) is true, can by done with a length of proof polynomial in the length of \( \varphi \).

This gives us the main result of this paper:

**Theorem 10.1** There is a recursive function \( f \) and a polynomial \( p \) such that the following holds: if \( d \) codes a proof in \( WKL_0^+ \) of a \( \Pi_1^1 \) formula \( \varphi \), then \( f(d) \) codes a proof of \( \varphi \) in \( RCA_0 \), and the length of \( f(d) \) is less than \( p(\text{the length of } d) \).

### 11 Final comments and acknowledgments

The work here was done independently of [4], in which P. Hájek shows that \( WKL_0 \) has no significant speedup over \( I\Sigma_1 \) in proving arithmetic sentences. Working with the language of recursion theory, he shows that one is able to abandon much of the forcing formalism and simply define an interpretation for the second-order sets of \( WKL_0 \) within \( I\Sigma_1 \). Though his arguments are streamlined and elegant, the methods here have some advantages:

1. The sets of our “model” \( M_\omega \) include the sets of the base model, thus answering one of the questions posed at the end of [4].
2. These methods work for the \( WKL_0^+ \) as well; until this point, there was no way of proving the conservation result for the Baire Category Theorem effectively, even allowing for a nonpolynomial speedup.
3. They can perhaps be adapted to other forcing arguments as well.
With regard to this last item, we remark that the methods of this paper can be applied to any argument involving iterated forcing over models of second-order arithmetic in which the basic forcing notions are of a complexity that don’t grow in the iteration.

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References


