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# **Consumer Decision-making** at an Internet Shopbot

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# **Consumer Decision-making** at an Internet Shopbot

#### **ABSTRACT**

Internet shopbots compare prices and service levels at competing retailers, creating a laboratory for analyzing consumer choice. We analyze 20,268 shopbot consumers who select various books from 33 retailers over 69 days for a total of 1,512,856 observed offers. Although each retailer offers a homogeneous product, we find that brand is an important determinant of consumer choice. Consumers use brand as a proxy for retailer credibility in non-contractible aspects of the product and service bundle, such as shipping reliability. Our results also suggest that consumers are sensitive to how total price is allocated between the item price, shipping price, and tax.

#### I. Introduction

Shopbots are Internet-based services that provide "one-click" access to price and product information from numerous competing retailers. In so doing, they reduce buyer search costs for product and price information by at least 30-fold compared to telephone-based shopping and even more compared to physically visiting the retailers (Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000a]). Shopbots collect and display information on a variety of product characteristics, list summary information for both well- and lesser-known retailers, and typically rank the retailers based on a characteristic of interest to the shopper such as price or shipping time. The resulting comparison tables reveal a great deal of variation across retailers in relative price levels, delivery times, and product availability.

These shopbots provide researchers with an opportunity to observe customer choice behavior as consumers evaluate the listed alternatives and click on a particular product offer. Consumer choice behavior can then be analyzed using econometric models to reveal how consumers respond to different aspects of the product bundle, such as price, brand and shipping time. For example, how important is retailer brand in determining customer choice? Is brand more important for some types of consumers and for some types of decisions than for others? How do consumers react to the allocation of total price to different components such as tax or shipping cost?

We address these questions through panel data gathered from an Internet shopbot in the market for books. We use these data to study how customers responded to the presence of brand both in aggregate and then by analyzing how consumers respond differently to contractible aspects of the product bundle versus non-contractible aspects such as promised delivery times.

Our approach to analyzing electronic markets complements recent empirical studies that examine Internet pricing behavior from the perspective of efficiency (Bailey [1998]; Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000a]; Ellison and Ellison, [2001]), retailer differentiation (Clay,

Krishnan, Wolff [2001]), and price discrimination (Clemons, Hann, and Hitt [1998]). While these studies are able to analyze competitive strategies across retailers and markets, they provide only second-order evidence of consumer behavior in electronic markets. In contrast, the current paper and a companion paper (Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000b]), directly analyze customer behavior by using the shopbot as a laboratory of sorts where consumers respond to heterogeneous offers from a variety of retailers.

Our data show that shopbot customers, who might be considered among the most price sensitive consumers on the Internet, respond very strongly to well-known, heavily branded retailers. While there have been predictions that the Internet would "commodify" many industries and reduce the role of differentiation, our results show that branding can be important even for homogeneous goods such as books. Not all consumers value brands equally, however. We find that that branding is especially important for consumers who care about non-contractible aspects of the product bundle. In particular, consumers who care about shipping times are especially likely to prefer well-known brands, potentially because promised shipping times are difficult to enforce. We also find that customers respond strongly to the ordinal ranking of offers in the price comparison table (as opposed to the absolute price) and that customers appear to be more sensitive to changes in sales tax and shipping cost than they are to changes in item price, even when the total price they must pay is unaffected.

The remainder of this paper is organized in three parts. Section II summarizes the data we collect and the empirical models we use to analyze our data. Section III presents our main results. We summarize our findings in Section IV.

#### II. Data and Methods

Our analysis uses panel data collected from book consumers at EvenBetter, a prominent Internet shopbot.<sup>1</sup> An important advantage of our setting is that consumers using this service first identify the specific book they are interested in purchasing, which narrows their selection to a unique and physically homogeneous product. The physical characteristics of a book from

Amazon are indistinguishable from those of a book sent by A1 books, although other aspects of the overall product bundle, such as shipping times can and do differ.

Once the book is chosen, consumers provides their country and state so that local currency and local taxes can be calculated correctly. After the consumer initiates a search, EvenBetter queries prices for this selection in real time from 33 different book retailers, which collectively account for the vast majority of books sold online. Because this information is queried in real time directly from the retailers, the information displayed by EvenBetter's comparison tables are the same as those obtained by visiting retailers' sites directly.

Based on the information returned, EvenBetter provides consumers with a list of product offers. Each offer includes separate fields for the total price, item price, shipping cost, sales tax, delivery time, shipping time, and shipping service (e.g., Figure 1). By default, the table is sorted in ascending order on total price but the consumer can sort the table based on any of the other eight columns if they desire. Consumers view these tables and make an observable choice by clicking on an offer. By clicking on an offer, the consumer is taken directly to the retailers' web site where they can finalize their purchase. Where consumers click on multiple offers in a search (16% of the time), we use the offer they click on last as an indication of their final choice.

#### Figure 1: Sample Screen from EvenBetter.com Insert Figure 1 Approximately Here

Our data include the information shown to the consumer in the offer comparison table, the consumer's cookie number, and the consumer's behavior (whether they sort on a column other than total price and their last click). In addition we derive two other variables of interest to consumers. First, we derive a variable for the time it takes the retailer to get the book from their distributor, which we refer to as the acquisition time. The acquisition time is the difference between the delivery time and the shipping time shown in Figure 1. Second we derive a variable we call weighted sales tax, which takes into account locality taxes in addition to state sales tax. While EvenBetter.com customers are only shown state sales tax, many customers will also have to pay locality taxes on some purchases made over the Internet. To control for the possibility

that customers are taking these locality taxes into account when making their purchases, we multiply the state sales tax shown to the consumers by the relevant locality taxes weighted by Internet population in 1999.<sup>2</sup> The data we gather is described in Table I and summary statistics are presented in Table II.

### Table I: Shopbot Data Collected Insert Table I Approximately Here

We obtained data for the period from August 25 to November 1, 1999. In this paper, we focus on the subset of the sample that 1) includes U.S.-based consumers (75.4% of sessions), 2) lead to at least one click-through by the consumers (26.3% of remaining sessions) and 3) return more than one retailer (99.9% of remaining sessions). The resulting data set reflects searches by 20,268 distinct consumers, including 7,498 repeat visitors. These consumers conducted a total of 39,635 search sessions returning 1,512,856 distinct retailer offerings including multiple offers from some retailers.

#### Table II: Summary Data Statistics Insert Table II Approximately Here

Two important attributes of these data are readily observed. First, there is a high degree of price dispersion across homogeneous books in the offer sets: on average, the lowest priced offer is 33% (\$16.54) less than the mean price in the offer set for a given book title. In a sense, this statistic overestimates dispersion since it includes both shipping price and item price. However, considered alone, item price also exhibits a significant amount of dispersion. The difference between the lowest item price and the mean item price averages 28% (\$11.03). While such a large difference in prices among homogeneous goods may seem surprising, this level of dispersion is comparable to Brynjolfsson and Smith ([2000a] p. 575) who gathered prices directly from a collection of Internet and conventional book retailers between 1998-1999.

Second, a majority of the consumers in our sample do <u>not</u> choose the lowest priced offer.

Among consumers who do not choose the lowest priced offer, the average selected offer is

\$6.79 (20.4%) higher than the lowest priced offer in the session. Certainly part of this difference

is related to differences in shipping time. Consistent with this, we find that 15% of the consumers in our sample select an upgraded shipping method within their retailer selection.<sup>3</sup> However, we also find that 27% of the customers in our sample choose an offer that is strictly dominated in terms of both price and delivery time for a given title. Furthermore, 45% of customers who choose a strictly dominated offer choose an offer from Amazon, Barnes & Noble, or Borders. This compares to 27% of consumers who select these retailers in the entire data sample.

Both the high levels of price dispersion and the willingness of consumers to bypass the lowest cost retailers suggests that customers perceive some differences among retailer branding or service quality that make at least some of them willing to pay a premium for an otherwise homogenous product

We use the multinomial logit and nested logit models to systematically analyze this possibility. These models have gained wide-spread use in a variety of choice settings (e.g., McFadden [1974], Guadagni and Little [1983], Ben-Akiva and Lerman [1985], Bucklin and Gupta [1992], Berry [1994], Fader and Hardie [1996], Guadagni and Little [1998], Fershtman and Gandal [1998]) and make a useful reference model for our analysis given the manner in which shopbot data is shown to consumers. Both models have consumers choosing the offer with the largest latent utility index from a choice set of offers. The latent utility index consists of a systematic ( $\mathbf{x}_{it}'$ ,  $\mathbf{b}$ ) and a stochastic ( $\mathbf{e}_{it}$ ) component:

$$(1) U_{it} = \mathbf{x}'_{it}\mathbf{b} + \mathbf{e}_{it}$$

The systematic component is linear combination of the product's attributes  $(\mathbf{x}'_{it})$  and the consumer's preferences for those attributes  $(\mathbf{b})$  for each offer t in each session i. In our setting, the stochastic component reflects both unobserved taste variation across consumers and measurement error in evaluating offers as is common in the literature.

The multinomial logit model assumes that these errors are independent across offers in a choice set. The nested logit model relaxes this assumption and allows for the specification of similar

5

groups of offers such that error independence is maintained within these nests, but not necessarily across different nests. The independence assumption might be violated in our data when comparing well-known retailers (i.e. Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and Borders) with lesser-known retailers. It could also be violated when comparing shipping options at different retailers. Because of this, we use a nested logit model, shown in Figure 2, with a top-level nest of the choice between well-known and generic retailers, a mid-level nest of the choice between retailers, and a lower level nest of the choice between shipping options for each retailer (e.g., express, priority, and bookrate shipping).

### Figure 2: Nested Logit Decision Model Insert Figure 2 Approximately Here

In interpreting our results from these models, it is important to note that we observe click-throughs and not purchases in our data. Because of this our models reflect those factors that drive traffic to a site, not necessarily those that drive sales. However, in related research (Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000b]) we find that the factors that drive traffic are also relatively unbiased predictors of sales at the retailer level. This finding increases the validity of inferences in this regard. Nonetheless, a conservative interpretation our approach is as a model of click-throughs, not of sales per se.

In addition, our analysis is, by necessity, restricted to consumers who choose to use this particular shopbot. Thus, our logit model predictions are conditioned on a consumer choosing to use EvenBetter.com. While conditioning in this way does not bias the logit results, they should be interpreted as applying to a self-selected set of consumers who are likely to differ systematically from other Internet shoppers. In particular, it seems likely that the customers in our sample are more price sensitive and less brand sensitive than a broader set of Internet consumers (or consumers in general, for that matter).

#### **III.** Empirical Results

#### III(i) Customer Response to Retailer Brand

We first analyze how customers respond to brand at this Internet shopbot. Table III shows our results using a multinomial logit model where customer choice arises from elements of price, elements of delivery time, the position of the offer in the price comparison table, and retailer fixed effects. We include retailer fixed effects in two ways. In specification three we include a single dummy variable ("well-known retailer") for whether the retailer was Amazon, Barnes & Noble, or Borders. In specification four we include separate dummy variables for each of these three retailers. Specification five adds variables for the position of the offer in the table. Specification six adds dummy variables for all retailers with more than 3% of the last click throughs in the sample.

#### Table III: Models of Retailer Brand Choice Insert Table III Approximately Here

These results illustrate several important facts about customer behavior at this Internet shopbot. First, customers are very sensitive to price. This is reflected in the magnitude and significance of the price coefficient in the regression.

Second, and similarly, we note that customers respond very strongly to the position of an offer in a table. This can be seen in specifications five and six. Offers with the first listed price and those that appear in the first screen of offers are strongly preferred to other offers further down the comparison table. This is consistent with the very high sensitivity to the price rank of retailers found by Ellison and Ellison [2001] when they examined the market for commodity memory modules sold via a price search engine.

Third, our results show that customers also strongly prefer offers from well-known retailers (Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and Borders) even after controlling for observable product differences such as price and delivery time. Within these retailers, customers have a strong preference for offers from Amazon over its two closest rivals as reflected in the second

specification of the model. Thus, while it has been widely speculated that the Internet, and comparison-shopping agents in particular, would undermine the role of brands (see e.g. Kuttner [1998]), we find a strong role for brands in our analysis, even for a homogeneous product like a certain book being sold by different retailers.

We can quantify the importance of brand since the coefficients are factor weights in a latent utility index. Thus, using equation (1) one can calculate the decrease in item price that would be required to offset the presence of retailer brand:

(2) 
$$\Delta P_{ITEM} = \frac{\boldsymbol{b}_{BRAND}}{\boldsymbol{b}_{ITEM}}$$

Using this specification, we find that offers from well-known retailers have a \$1.72 price advantage (.332/.193) over generic retailers. Further looking at the individual well-known retailers we find that Amazon has a \$2.49 price advantage over generic retailers and about a \$1.30 price advantage over its two closest rivals, Barnes and Noble and Borders.

Fourth, using a similar calculation to equation (2), we find that customers are approximately twice as sensitive to changes in shipping price and sales tax as they are to changes in item price.<sup>4</sup> The sensitivity of consumers to how total prices is allocated among components is puzzling — one might reasonably expect that a penny labeled "tax" or "shipping" would have the same disutility as a penny allocated to "item price." However, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]) suggests a variety of reasons that consumers might attach significance to the way prices are labeled such as a perception of unfair pricing policies (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986]) or using different reference points to compare shipping and item prices (Thaler [1985]). In addition, there is a growing marketing literature showing that customers may respond differently depending on how prices are allocated among the different elements of a "partitioned price" (e.g., Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson [1998]). As we wrote up these results, we had a discussion with Jeff Wilke, Senior Vice President at Amazon, about this seeming paradox. He told us "It's no anomaly. We've been noticing some of the same things among our customers. Watch our website." One week later, on June 20, 2001, Amazon began

an experiment in which it offered free shipping, raising the item prices of some books to compensate. Shortly thereafter, BarnesAndNoble.com also provided a free shipping option and their President Marie Toulantis was quoted as saying they'd been contemplating the change for several months (Miles [2001]).

The desire of consumers to select retailers who don't charge sales tax has some commonality with Goolsbee [2000] who finds that customers are more likely to make purchases over the Internet if they live in areas with high state and local sales tax rates. However, our result seems to suggest that customers are much more sensitive to \$0.01 of sales tax than they are to \$0.01 of item price even though both values have the same effect on the total price.

While there are theories which might explain this behavior, as noted above, it is also possible that these results are driven by the restrictive elasticity structure imposed by the multinomial logit model (a.k.a. the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption). This could impact our model either on the basis of correlation across similar retailers or correlation across shipping options within a particular retailer. We use the nested logit to address this possibility by nesting on the choice of well-known versus "generic" retailers, the choice of a specific retailer within these nests, and on the choice of shipping options within a particular retailer nest. Our results are shown in Tables IV-VI.

Table IV models a consumer's choice between well-known and generic retailers. In this regression we control for which retailer category has the lowest price ("Min. Total Price by Retailer Category") and which retailer category is able to get the book from their distributor in the shortest amount of time ("Min. Acquisition Time by Retailer Category"). We also include a dummy variable for the retailer category with the best price and a dummy variable for the well-known retailer category.

### Table IV: Nested Logit Level 1 – Choice of Well-Known versus "Generic" Retailers Insert Table IV Approximately Here

Tables V and Table VI model the choice among retailers and the choice of shipping options within retailers respectively. We model the choice of retailers as arising from item price,

acquisition time, delivery N/A, sales tax, position in table for the best offer from the retailer, and retailer dummy variables. As above, we include dummy variables for all retailers with more than a 3% share of choices. Table VI models the choice of shipping options as arising from position in the comparison table and dummy variables for shipping options.<sup>7</sup>

## Table V: Nested Logit Level 2 – Choice of Retailer Insert Table V Approximately Here

Our results with regard to brand, position in table, and sensitivity to tax are consistent with our results above. Customers strongly prefer well-known retailers in the top-level nest and, within the set of well-known retailers, customers prefer offers from Amazon.com to offers from its two closest rivals. We explore this result in more detail in the next section. In the second and third level nests, customers respond strongly to position in the comparison tables. Further, in the second level nests, customers are still approximately twice as sensitive to changes in sales tax as they are to changes in item price, as observed above.

#### Table VI: Nested Logit Level 3 – Choice of Retailer Shipping Options Insert Table VI Approximately Here

However, we are unable to simultaneously control for the IIA problem and analyze shipping price sensitivity. In the lower level nests, it is impossible to include a separate shipping price variable in addition to shipping option dummy variables because shipping prices do not vary within retailers over time or across offers in our sample. It also is impossible to simultaneously include shipping price and shipping time variables in place of the shipping option dummy variables because of collinearity in these variables within retailer offer sets. Lastly, it is impossible to identify shipping sensitivity from the coefficients on the shipping option dummy variables since they are defined with respect to other shipping options within a retailer nest and relative prices for these shipping options tend to co-vary across retailers.

Because of this, our results with regard to shipping price sensitivity should be seen as suggestive only. While the persistence of the sales tax result and the similarity in results between the non-

nested and nested specifications are encouraging for the non-nested results, the question of customer sensitivity to partitioned prices on the Internet warrants further confirmatory study.

#### III(ii) Contractible and Non-contractible Product Characteristics

Branding is sometimes considered an aid to consumer search, helping customers find a vendor for a given product. This rationale is largely eliminated in the shopbot setting. Nonetheless, there are a variety of possible reasons why branding would remain important to consumers choices even when better prices and deliver times are plainly listed and just a mouse click away at competing retailers. One candidate possibility is that customers care not only about the product they are buying, in this case the book, but also about service quality. In the shopbot setting, the product is, by construction, entirely homogeneous across retailers — books are uniquely identified by their ISBN, and once delivered, are indistinguishable across retailers. However, the service quality may differ. For instance, some retailers may ship more rapidly and reliably than others, or have a simpler ordering process, or be more willing to accept returns. Consumers might reasonably pay a premium for such services. Furthermore, while retailers may promise high levels of quality, such promises are not easy to enforce. Branding can serve as a signal, or bond, that consumers can use to identify retailers with higher service quality. An implication of this hypothesis is that customers who care more about non-contractible aspects of the product bundle should also put more weight on the brand of the retailer.

Contractible aspects of the product bundle include aspects where consumers have clear avenues of recourse if the retailer does not deliver what they had promised such as the characteristics of the physical product or the product's price. Other aspects of the product bundle, such as delivery time, are non-contractible. It is difficult, if not impossible, to force the retailers to deliver a product within the time frame quoted to the consumer, and if a book arrives too late for a child's birthday party or an important presentation, even a full refund of the purchase price may be little consolation. In the presence of non-contractible product characteristics, economic theory predicts that consumers will use a retailer's brand name as a

proxy for credibility in fulfilling promises on non-contractible aspects of the product bundle (e.g., Wernerfelt [1988]).

To investigate empirically how consumers respond to non-contractible aspects of the product bundle we assume that consumers who sort the offer comparison tables based on elements of shipping time (e.g., shipping service, shipping time, and total delivery time) are more sensitive to accuracy in delivery time than consumers who accept the default sorting (total price). We then compare the responses of these two sets of consumers to relevant aspects of the product bundle (Table VII).

## Table VII: Sorting Based on Shipping versus Price Insert Table VII Approximately Here

The selected comparison variables include the differential response of consumers who sort on shipping columns to the product's item price, shipping price, average delivery time, and a dummy variable identifying whether the product is sold by a well-known retailer. These variables were chosen using a likelihood ratio test to compare the restricted model (in Table VII) to an unrestricted model where all variables are allowed to vary between consumers who sort on shipping and consumers who sort on price. The likelihood ratio test failed to reject (p<.05) the null hypothesis that there is (jointly) no difference in the response of the two groups of consumers to the tax variable and delivery N/A.

Our results show that consumers who care about accuracy in delivery time are, not surprisingly, less sensitive to item price and shipping price and more sensitive to average delivery time. Strikingly, these consumers are also more than four times more sensitive to the presence of brand in an offer than consumers who sort in price. These results confirm the economic intuition above. Consumers who care about non-contractible aspects of the product bundle appear to use retailer brand as a proxy for credibility.

We can also compare additional subsamples of the data to address related questions about the role of brands. Is reliance on brand lower for consumers who use the shopbot heavily? These consumers may be the vanguard of an Internet-savvy generation of shoppers, and presumably

are most knowledgeable of how to find retailers on the Internet. It is also possible that frequent book purchasers are more likely to be sensitive to quality service as a function of their motivation for making the frequent purchases. To analyze this we classify cookie numbers that appear only once in our 69-day sample as representing "infrequent visitors" and cookie numbers that appear multiple times in our sample as representing "frequent visitors." We present multinomial logit model results for these two groups of consumers in Table VIII.

### Table VIII: Comparison of Frequent and Infrequent Visitors Insert Table VIII Approximately Here

Because each model has a unique and unidentified scale parameter we are unable to directly compare coefficients across model specifications (Swait and Louviere [1993]). However, it is possible to compare coefficients across model runs after normalizing to a common variable within each specification. Normalizing in this manner cancels the scale parameter and provides a common basis for comparison. In our case, we normalize each coefficient in Table IX as follows

(3) 
$$\mathbf{b}_{i}' = -\frac{\mathbf{m}_{s} \mathbf{b}_{is}}{\mathbf{m}_{s} \mathbf{b}_{is}} = -\frac{\mathbf{b}_{is}}{\mathbf{b}_{is}}$$

where j is item price and  $s=\{frequent\ visitors,\ infrequent\ visitors\}$ . Thus, as in equation (1) we express each coefficient in terms of its dollar value impact on a consumer's evaluation of the product bundle. Our results from this normalization are shown in Table IX and the resulting standard errors ( $s_f/\sqrt{n_f}$ ) are listed in parentheses.

## Table IX: Comparison of Frequent and Infrequent Visitors, Normalized by Item Price Insert Table IX Approximately Here

In each case, we test the null hypothesis that the normalized coefficients are equal using the standard t-test for  $\mathbf{m}_a = \mathbf{m}_b$  with  $\mathbf{s}_a$  and  $\mathbf{s}_b$  unknown and  $\mathbf{s}_a \neq \mathbf{s}_b$ . Under this test, we reject the null hypothesis for average delivery time and the presence of brand at p=0.05, finding instead that frequent visitors are <u>more</u> sensitive to average delivery time and the presence of brand. We fail to reject the null hypothesis for the normalized coefficients on shipping price, tax,

and delivery "N/A." Consumer response to these coefficients is statistically the same for frequent and infrequent visitors. One possible explanation for this finding is that frequent purchasers are more sensitive to elements of service quality and this is reflected in using brand as a proxy for this non-contractible element of the product. We also note that this finding does not support the conventional wisdom that regular users of shopbots will, over time, rely on brand less in their purchase behavior.

#### IV. Conclusions

Internet shopbots provide a setting for consumer choice that closely resembles the idealized setting commonly assumed in common choice models. By evaluating data from such a setting we are able to assess the importance of pricing and branding strategies in the Internet bookselling market.

We find that shopbot customers in our data care a great deal about the brand of the retailer selling the books and in particular, they strongly prefer offers from well-known retailers — Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and Borders — even though they are fully informed of product prices and characteristics from other competing retailers. Further, customers prefer offers from Amazon to offers from Amazon's two closest rivals, Barnes & Noble and Borders. These results are all the more striking when one considers that shopbot customers are likely to be among the most price sensitive customers on the Internet.

One possible explanation for this result, supported by our data, is that consumers use brand name as a signal of reliability in service quality for non-contractible aspects of the product bundle such as shipping. These results may derive from service quality differentiation, asymmetric market information regarding quality, or cognitive lock-in among consumers. While books are a relatively well-specified, homogeneous commodity, the fact that branding is important even here suggests that the branding will be even more important in Internet markets for less homogeneous goods and services, especially when they have important non-contractible characteristics.

Our results also suggest that customers are more sensitive to price changes in sales tax and shipping price than they are to changes in item price. That customers may respond differently to a marginal increase in the total price of a book depending on how that increase is allocated among the elements of total price is consistent with recent pricing experiments conducted by major online booksellers.

Finally, for academic researchers, our results demonstrate the feasibility of using Internet shopping data to better understand consumer behavior in electronic markets. While earlier work (Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000a]) revealed a surprisingly large amount of price dispersion across Internet retailers of homogeneous goods, the current paper shows how shopbot data enables us to specifically identify the drivers of this dispersion: differentiated branding and service quality. Even as we are able to better understand the high levels of price dispersion, other research questions emerge. Future research in this regard may be able to extend these results to better understand how web site direct and shopbot consumers respond to partitioned prices including shipping, tax and other costs, to evaluate the cognitive processing costs of shopbot consumers, and to empirically analyze the application of personalized pricing strategies to shopbot consumers.

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
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
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Figure 1: Sample Screen from EvenBetter.com







**Table I: Shopbot Data Collected** 

Offer Data				
Total Price	Item Price plus Shipping Cost plus Sales Tax			
Item Price	The price for the item			
Shipping Price	The price for shipping			
State Sales Tax	Sales tax (if applicable)			
Weighted Sales Tax	State sales tax plus city/county taxes weighted by Internet population (1998)			
Retailer	Retailer Name (used to create dummy variables for each retailer)			
Shipping Time	Average of the minimum and maximum shipping range quoted by retailer			
Acquisition Time	Average of the minimum and maximum acquisition range quoted by retailer			
Delivery Time	Shipping Time plus Acquisition Time			
Shipping Method	Dummy variables for shipping alternatives offered by retailer			
Delivery NA	=1 if retailer can't quote an acquisition time (time to get book from distributor)			
First Offer	Dummy variable for the first offer listed in the price comparison table			
First Screen	Dummy variable for whether offer appears in the first screen (10 offers)			
	Session Data			
Date/Time	Date and time search occurred			
ISBN	ISBN number of book searched for (used to calculate book type)			
Sort Column	Identifies which column the consumer sorted on (default is total price)			
Consumer Data				
Cookie Number	Unique identifier for consumers who leave their cookies on			
Cookies On	=1 if the consumer leaves cookies on (97.1% of customers leave cookies on)			
Choice Data				
Last Click-Through	=1 if the consumer's last click through was on this offer			

**Table II: Summary Data Statistics** 

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.*	Min	Max
Total Price**	1,512,856	48.11	10.51	.89	9,483.39
Item Price	1,512,856	38.06	6.29	.50	9,447.25
Shipping Cost	1,512,856	9.81	6.96	0	67.04
State Sales Tax	1,512,856	.24	.44	0	571.59
Weighted Sales Tax	1,512,856	.28	.52	0	630.72
Shipping Time	1,512,856	5.55	6.80	1	56
Acquisition Time	1,512,856	4.29	7.37	0	38.5
Delivery Time	1,512,856	9.85	10.45	1	59
Delivery NA	1,512,856	.34	-	0	1

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Deviation in this table is calculated as the average across all sessions of the standard deviation of the variable within each session.

<sup>\*\*</sup> List prices on books in our sample range in price from 0.99 (June B. Jones and the Stinky Smelly Bus) to 8,800 (The 34 volume Dictionary of Art).

**Table III: Models of Retailer Brand Choice** 

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Item Price	183 (.001)	192 (.001)	193 (.001)	194 (.001)	039 (.001)	043 (.001)
Shipping Price	344 (.002)	363 (.002)	367 (.002)	369 (.002)	089 (.002)	103 (.002)
Weighted Tax	357 (.011)	381 (.012)	361 (.012)	357 (.012)	067 (.010)	060 (.011)
Delivery Time		018 (.001)	018 (.001)	019 (.001)	035 (.001)	027 (.001)
Delivery N/A		449 (.014)	361 (.015)	364 (.015)	394 (.016)	397 (.022)
First Offer					2.25 (.014)	2.21 (.014)
First Screen					2.32 (.022)	2.27 (.023)
"Well-Known"			.332 (.014)			
Amazon				.483 (.020)	1.05 (.022)	.792 (.029)
BarnesandNoble				.193 (.023)	.590 (.025)	.369 (.031)
Borders				.270 (.020)	.403 (.022)	.110 (.029)
A1Books						044 (.030)
Kingbooks						496 (.028)
1Bookstreet						464 (.034)
Alphacraze						.034 (.031)
Alphabetstreet						792 (.038)
Shopping.com						446 (.034)
Fat Brain						438 (.038)
Classbook						.203 (.043)
Books.com						761 (.034)
Other Retailers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Log Likelihood	-98,765	-97,962	-97,821	-97,642	-79,316	-78,529
Adjusted U <sup>2</sup>	.2785	.2842	.2852	.2865	.3832	.3892

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors listed in parenthesis. Italicized results are insignificant at p<.05. Adjusted  $U^2 = 1-(LL(*)\# of variables)/LL(0)$  (Ben-Akiva Lerman 1985, p. 167). N=39,635 sessions.

Table IV: Nested Logit Level 1 – Choice of Well-Known versus "Generic" Retailers

Variable	Coefficient
Min. Total Price by Retailer Category	036 (.003)
Min. Acquisition Time by Retailer Category	007 (.002)
Lowest Priced Retailer Category	1.519 (.030)
Well-Known Retailer	.643 (.048)
"Generic" Retailer	0
Log Likelihood	-8,508
Adjusted U <sup>2</sup>	.2879

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors are listed in parenthesis. All results are significant at p<0.01. n=39,654 sessions.

Table V: Nested Logit Level 2 - Choice of Retailer

	Well-Known	Generic
	Retailers	Retailers
Price		
Item Price	050 (.005)	047 (.002)
Weighted Sales Tax	093 (.029)	082 (.020)
Position in Table		
First Offer	1.859 (.068)	2.233 (.019)
First Screen	1.311 (.079)	2.146 (.043)
Acquisition Time		
Acquisition Time	019 (.002)	019 (.002)
Delivery NA	217 (.073)	261 (.031)
Retailer Brand		
Amazon.com	.755 (.043)	
Barnes & Noble	.335 (.042)	
Borders	0	
A1Books		.778 (.046)
Kingbooks		.068 (.042)
1Bookstreet		.512 (.046)
AlphaCraze		.651 (.041)
AlphabetStreet		-1.440 (.051)
Shopping.com		.196 (.043)
Fat Brain		.453 (.051)
Classbook.com		.776 (.055)
Books.com		659 (.051)
Log Likelihood	-6,353	-27,060
Adjusted U <sup>2</sup>	.1698	.4640

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors are listed in parenthesis. Italicized results are insignificant at p<0.05. (Branded Retailer n=4,023, Unbranded Retailers n=11,480)

Table VI: Nested Logit Level 3 – Choice of Retailer Shipping Options

	Amazon	Barnes & Noble	Borders
Position in Table			
First Offer	.946 (.205)	1.129 (.158)	.897 (.103)
First Screen	.827 (.121)	.982 (.143)	.981 (.120)
Shipping Option			
Next Day Delivery	-2.848 (.116)	-2.616 (.119)	-2.187 (.109)
2 Day Delivery	-2.145 (.082)	-1.979 (.086)	-1.774 (.082)
Priority (3-7 day) Delivery	0	0	0
Log Likelihood	-1,280	-1,144	-1,849
Adjusted U <sup>2</sup>	.6312	.5982	.5427

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors are listed in parenthesis. All results are significant at p<0.01. (Amazon n=3,426, Barnes & Noble n=2,942, Borders n=4,321)

Table VII: Sorting Based on Shipping versus Price

	Coefficients
Item Price	194 (.001)
Shipping Price	370 (.002)
Weighted Sales Tax	361 (.012)
Delivery Time	018 (.001)
Delivery N/A	364 (.015)
"Well-Known" Retailers	.321 (.014)
Differential Coefficients for consumers who sort on	shipping
Sort on Shipping * Item Price	.080 (.014)
Sort on Shipping * Shipping Price	.298 (.019)
Sort on Shipping * Delivery Time	054 (.011)
Sort on Shipping * "Well-Known" Retailers	.969 (.222)

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors listed in parenthesis. All results are significant at p<.05. N=39,535 sessions (39,422 sessions sort on total price or item price, 126 sessions sort on shipping time, delivery time, or shipping service).

Table VIII: Comparison of Frequent and Infrequent Visitors

	Frequent Visitors	Infrequent Visitors
Item Price	179 (.002)	228 (.003)
Shipping Price	343 (.003)	423 (.004)
Weighted Tax	422 (.017)	473 (.025)
Average Delivery Time	018 (.001)	019 (.001)
Delivery "N/A"	330 (.018)	448 (.026)
"Big 3" Retailers	.344 (.017)	.260 (.024)

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors listed in parenthesis. All results are significant at p<.01. N=26,390 sessions.

Table IX: Comparison of Frequent and Infrequent Visitors, Normalized by Item Price

	Frequent	Infrequent
	Visitors	Visitors
Shipping Price/Item Price	-1.911 (.024)	-1.853 (.030)
Tax/Item Price	-2.355 (.095)	-2.073 (.111)
Avg. Delivery Time/Item Price	101 (.004)	083 (.005)
Delivery "N/A"/Item Price	-1.840 (.101)	-1.960 (.117)
"Big 3" Retailers/Item Price	1.916 (.097)	1.136 (.108)

<sup>\*</sup> Standard Errors listed in parenthesis. All results are significant at p<.01. N=26,316 for frequent visitors and 13,213 for infrequent visitors.

#### **Endnotes:**

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<sup>1</sup> On May 19, 2000 EvenBetter.com was acquired by DealTime.com and now operates under their domain name.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> We thank Austan Goolsbee for providing these data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> E.g., in our sample, 11% of Amazon.com's customers choose their 1-2 day delivery service (at a higher price) instead of their 3-7 day standard mail service.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> As noted above, EvenBetter customers are shown state sales tax only in the offer comparison tables. To account for the possibility that customers are including locality taxes in their comparison of offers, our sales tax data includes applicable city and locality taxes weighted by the number of Internet users in each city/locality area at the end of 1998. Including state sales tax alone would strengthen our results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Jeff Wilke, personal communication during interview in San Jose California, June 12, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> We use acquisition time instead of delivery time because acquisition time is fixed within retailers and because not all retailers offer express shipping. Including delivery time instead of acquisition time has a very small affect on our coefficients and would not change our major results. As noted in Table 1, acquisition time is the time it will take for the retailer to get the book from their distributor and shipping time is the time to ship the book to the consumer once it has been obtained from the distributor. Delivery time is the sum of acquisition time and shipping time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For simplicity, Table 6 only displays results for the three well-known retailers. Results for other 30 retailers are very similar to those shown.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Across retailers there is enough variation in shipping times and prices to separately identify these variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> We note that few customers take the time to sort of shipping variables. It may be that few customers care about shipping service. It is also possible that some customers who care about shipping leave the table sorted on total price. If this were the case it would mute differences between the two groups and our results would be an underestimate of the true effect.