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To Protect and Serve:  

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As a leading educational and research institution, Carnegie Mellon University benefits from the numerous rewards that such a position entails—an intelligent and motivated student body, a national reputation for excellence, and innovative ideas often leading to pioneering study. There is more to an institution of higher education than its academic program, though. A university campus as a community within a community is greatly affected by the trends and events of the larger community. As a university located in an urban setting, CMU suffers many problems that are directly related to the surrounding city. These include a high potential for crime, lack of adequate space for parking and facilities, and the difficult situations that arise when private institution is located on seemingly public ground. All three of these problems are encountered on a day-to-day basis by the CMU Campus Police force, whose job it is to provide the basic protective and law enforcement services required to make the campus a place of free inquiry and general security. The nature of security services at CMU and, naturally, all colleges and universities in the country, has changed drastically in the twentieth century. Law enforcement and preventive policing have taken the place of safety monitoring and reactive policing, in reaction to a number of factors that have changed the face of campus life and have forced students and administrators to reconsider the perceived safety of the campus. Among these are rising crime rates, increased student activism and unrest, and new definitions of a university’s liability for the welfare of its students. To study the history of a campus security force, then, is to essentially study the campus community and the larger community in which the college or university is located.

Since its inception as a technical school in 1906, CMU has had some sort of police or security presence. An organized program of security and a substantial security force did not come to the campus for over fifty years, though. The years 1960–1975 not only witnessed the official establishment of the Campus Security Office at CMU, but were also the time of major reorganization, a significant increase in the size of the force, and the foundation of today’s campus law enforcement agency. While several studies have
shown that certain college and university administrators revamped their security forces due to the perceived threat or actual occurrence of violent student protests and demonstrations, I will show that that was not the case at CMU. Evidence indicates that the administration and the security force did not view the students as a major threat to the security and welfare of the campus community, but instead reacted to the disturbing introduction of crime on campus and the subsequent demands of students and faculty that something be done about it. Political activism on campus never truly translated itself into sustained protest or demonstration, and certainly not actions that could be thought of as violent or threatening.

In the autumn of 1960, the Carnegie Institute of Technology was a relatively peaceful and crime-free community. The campus seemed to be viewed and operated as an almost mythical haven from the outside world, a separate community Michael Smith has described as “sedate ivory towers, sanctuaries apart from the larger society and places where crime and criminal justice did not intrude.” Roughly 3,500 students attended class at Carnegie Tech and 1,700 of them lived on campus in dormitory-style residence halls and apartments. There was little indication in the student newspaper, The Tartan, of any security problems that troubled the students, faculty, or staff. Instead, news of sporting and social events filled those pages, leaving little room for articles on the “outside world.” That is not to say, however, that the administration was blind to the security needs of the campus.

Security watchmen, hired from an external detective agency (Allied Detective Agency), were stationed in six of the campus buildings in 1960—the Fine Arts building, Engineering Hall, the Gym, Administration Hall, Machinery Hall, and Margaret Morrison Carnegie College, an affiliated women’s school. The watchmen provided basic security services in their respective buildings and each had a desk or station at which students could generally find him. These hired security guards wore company uniforms which were rather informal, consisting of a jacket or blazer with the agency’s insignia and nondescript pants and shoes. Until the fall of 1961, official campus emergency procedures called for students to contact Pittsburgh Police, showing the level of services on campus. The watchmen were not policemen or even true security guards, but instead seem to resemble the present-day desk attendants, providing door-check, information, and orientation services. Moreover, they were familiar with the students who normally frequented their buildings and could thus effectively monitor any possible intruders. The familiarity between students and the watchmen resembled a mutual friendship rather than a relationship between those watching and those being watched. Anonymity on campus was rare, since each watchman could generally recognize the students that regularly used the facilities in his particular building. The opportunity for non-students to enter buildings unnoticed and commit crimes was thus smaller than it would be years later when rising levels of anonymity would undermine such familiarity between the campus community and the security guards. The watchmen at Carnegie
Tech in 1960 were such a part of the community that students even complained to the administration when one of the best-loved guards was scheduled to be replaced. Though the turnover rate was fairly high for watchmen, with four or five years being an exceptional length of service, they managed to provide adequate security and safety services through their particularized knowledge about the people and places they monitored.\textsuperscript{4}

A striking feature of the student community in the early 1960s was its perception of its own apathy. Numerous letters to the editor appeared in The Tartan complaining about the lack of school spirit or criticizing the turnout at the recent football or basketball game. Others, though, defended the student body as simply focused on their academic studies and future careers and argued that the “apathy” bemoaned by so many was a product of the students having their own interests and not behaving like the “spirited mainstream.”\textsuperscript{5}

One thing should be noted—at this time, when a student spoke of apathy he or she almost always referred to a lack of involvement in extracurricular campus activities, not a lack of interest in national events or political issues. In the first few years of the 1960s, few political issues made it to the pages of the student newspaper, although close advising by the administration may have had something to do with this. An informal poll of students during this time shows that the majority of responding students were pleased with the facilities on campus, such as their dorm rooms and the library, but did not feel that they were properly represented in Student Government and did not feel that some of the administration’s policies, such as scheduling classes on the Friday after Thanksgiving and placing strict curfews on female students, were appropriate.\textsuperscript{6} The poll only generated 719 responses, though, so the overwhelming majority of the campus community did not take part.

Student leaders criticized a general lack of participation on all levels of extracurricular campus life—social, athletic, and organizational. It appears that the students of Carnegie Tech were simply more interested in their work and their futures than any external issues that may have generated reaction elsewhere. A sophomore math major effectively summed up the situation in a letter to the Tartan:

To quote my roommate, “Nothing ever happens and no one ever hears about it.” This seems to be a common idea around here, but nobody seems to investigate to see whether anything is happening that they might like to be in on. It would seem that we are in college, just moving along with the academic schedule without ever thinking or worrying about school policies or activities and not even thinking too much about outside happenings....I see no decline in this apathy among Tech students.\textsuperscript{7}

Despite the students’ lack of explicit involvement in campus affairs, the relations between the students and the faculty and administration were good. Many students felt that the faculty was, for the most part, easily accessible and helpful and that the administration was making genuine efforts to
communicate with the students. Furthermore, the student body itself appears to have been a fairly close-knit group. While making life on campus more peaceful, the perceived apathy of the student body and the lack of tension between the students and administration also resulted in less confrontations between the security guards and students and later allowed the Campus Security Office to focus on more immediate problems that might detrimentally affect the quality of life on campus.

In October, 1961, the Campus Security Office (CSO) was officially established under the Department of Buildings and Grounds, in the Division of Finance and Business Management. A temporary office was set up in Porter Hall, and a new Supervisor of Security was brought in. William Dwayne Young, the new Supervisor, came from the Mt. Lebanon Police Department, where he had been the operator of the Criminal Identification and Investigation Bureau for six years. Prior to that, he had served thirteen years in the Allegheny County police force and had graduated from Westminster College, the Pennsylvania State Police Academy, and municipal police and fire schools. Recent studies have shown that there is much interchange of personnel between the public police forces and their private counterparts. Although private security often offers a "second career" to municipal police officers, campus security and police departments demand more than ordinary law enforcement experience. In his late forties, Young brought much law enforcement experience to the new position, but questions were raised as to whether or not he had the experience necessary to handle the unique problems of a campus setting. His first interview with the student newspaper, though, seemed to have allayed any fears that Young would approach his force's interaction with students in an adversarial or confrontational way. Young stated

It is my hope that an excellent spirit of cooperation will always prevail between Tech students and their police department.

Several months later, Young supported this statement by stressing that the intent of the CSO was to provide protection for the faculty, staff, and students—not to supervise the students but to be of service to them.

Young was adamant in his opinion that the students at Carnegie Tech did not pose a threat for future problems. Philip Burlingame, in his 1989 doctoral dissertation, has suggested that prior to 1970, most campus security administrators viewed the students as a potentially criminal population that needed to be monitored and controlled. This attitude was due, according to Burlingame, to the administrators' training as municipal law enforcement agents—training which emphasized control and elimination of threatening groups and paid little attention to the public relations qualities needed for campus security planning. Young, though, seems to have had a clear notion that Carnegie Tech did not need such control and surveillance over its students, probably because of Tech's reputation as an all work, no play institution. Furthermore, he stressed that the CSO should become an inte-
grated part of the campus community—one that would be viewed by
students, faculty, and staff as a natural extension of the administration and
not an external agency operating on campus towards its own goals. Young’s
dedication to integrating the security force into the community is important,
for recent work has shown that successful campus security programs balance
the community’s safety with their freedoms of movement and access and
thus become an essential part of the larger community, with similar goals and
methods of operation.13

The responsibilities of the new CSO included campus security, parking
and traffic control, campus safety and emergency service, and security
investigations. The security force was responsible for more aspects of campus
life because of increased awareness of potential for crime and the changing
nature of the University’s responsibilities for the welfare of its students. Prior
to 1961, colleges and universities operated under an in loco parentis rule,
stipulating that the institutions were to act as surrogate parents for students
and thus impose rules and regulations for the students’ own good. The 1961
Supreme Court case Dixon vs. Alabama Board of Education changed this view
of the relationship between students and their university administrations.
Stricter enforcement of the law became the focus of campus security forces as
the legal perception changed from viewing students as wards of the univer­
sities to seeing them as citizens of complex campus communities. The Court’s
ruling stressed that administrations must acknowledge and allow for stu­
dents’ rights and responsibilities and made colleges and universities legally
liable for incidents caused by inadequate security services.14 As a result of this
ruling, campus security departments, like that of Carnegie Tech in the fall of
1961, gained more extensive responsibilities and began to provide more
varied functions, such as the execution of a security and safety program,
parking and traffic control, and crime and accident investigations.

As Sheering and Stenning have shown, “the role of any particular
private security organization is usually defined, principally, and sometimes
exclusively, by its “clients” and their needs.”15 What were the security needs
of the Carnegie Tech campus in 1961? Primarily, the administration desired
a larger and more organized security structure that could continue to provide
the campus with protection and safety services. The administration was
obviously interested in crime prevention for the welfare of the campus
community and for sustaining the peaceful reputation of Carnegie Tech. The
CSO was equally as intent on loss prevention as well. Petty theft of library
materials and vandalism of vending machines were an annoyance for the
campus community and a financial drain for the institution itself. The
campus security functions of the CSO thus involved checking buildings for
unlocked doors and windows and guarding the premises against unautho­
rized intruders. This was accomplished by way of a combination of patrols
and stationary, “on-duty” security guards. While foot patrols provided an
effective security presence in areas that had previously been neglected by the
indoor watchmen, the desk guards continued to provide the necessary
services within residence halls. The women’s dorm, for instance, had a nightly security guard at the front desk to register guests and check student IDs. He was in radio contact with the CSO, and could thus call in any emergencies or incidents.

Official campus emergency procedures in 1961 called for the student to contact the Campus Security Office’s dispatchers, who would dispatch officers and contact the Pittsburgh Police if their assistance was necessary. After the full establishment of the security service, the officers were given full authority of constables of the state as outlined in the Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1933. They possessed this power “in and upon, and in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of, the property of the corporation.” What this meant in effect was that the security force had jurisdiction over the entire campus and had emergency powers in areas close to the campus that did not lie on Carnegie Tech’s property. The geographical limitations of the CSO’s authority also meant that students living in off-campus housing not affiliated with Carnegie Tech did not receive security services that their on-campus counterparts did. Until late 1964, agency men were also used in the campus security force. Supervisor Young was quick to state that the agency men were used to supplement, not replace, full-time employees of the CSO. Safety awareness was as important as security services, though, so patrolmen were also on the lookout for safety hazards, such as water and gas leaks, fire hazards, and student recklessness. The CSO purchased extensive radio equipment in early 1964, allowing patrolling officers to radio in any incidents or accidents that required immediate reaction.

Parking and traffic control soon became a matter of some confusion and debate between the security force and the faculty and students. There simply were not enough parking spaces for the number of people who wished to occupy them each day. Ticketing and towing were thus a necessary function of the security force, and the reactions of violators ranged from disgruntled acceptance to angry criticisms. The functions that were entrusted to the security force were daytime monitoring of the lots for security and enforcement of parking regulations. Permits were distributed to faculty and students for official campus lots, and city roads within the campus, such as Margaret Morrison Street, had restrictions as set by the city. In December of 1961, the official list of parking codes and fines was posted in the CSO. It required that all permits were to be obtained through the CSO so that each car could be registered as having a particular permit. Parking for special events was also to be requested through Campus Security. Throughout 1962, students complained of the lack of available parking spaces and the permit system, which, they argued, allowed for only a small number of student-held permits each year.

To further exacerbate things, in March of 1963, the campus lots were equipped with meters. The parking lot in front of Skibo, the student activities center, did not require permits, but instead required money in the meters. When added restrictions and towings were then implemented on Margaret Morrison Street, a number of students believed the administration was trying
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to force students to park in the metered Skibo lot. The Student Congress, though, was quick to defend the CSO. In a statement to the student body, the President of Student Congress stated that the security force had no powers on city streets except in emergencies and had cooperated extensively in the past to facilitate parking problems during large events such as Fall Festival and Spring Carnival. The statement ended with an optimistic description of the security officers:

They are not here to force unwanted restrictions upon us, but to provide service to both Tech students and faculty. A little understanding on the part of the students will greatly help campus security in their efforts to continue to provide us with protection and other necessary services.20

Most students seem to have agreed with this statement, for there were frequent mentions of the trust and amicable relationship between the student body and the security force. The Faculty Parking Committee also applauded the security force for their assistance in trying to ease all parking problems, commending Supervisor Young especially for going out of his way to meet and plan with faculty members.21 The security officers were also seen as competent in their duties, and their control over the campus parking lots was well-respected, though obviously seen as too restrictive by some students. In a 1964 letter to the editor of The Tartan, a student praised the practice of the campus police to delay the towing of a car on Margaret Morrison Street by the city until they could attempt to contact the student. The student wrote,

Everyone knows how regularly Carnegie Tech police check the parking areas. No student would take the chance that campus police might miss a day. Many risk parking illegally on city streets, though, and are “outraged” when they’re towed.22

The students thus seemed to have a good understanding of the efficiency and objectives of the campus security force when it came to parking control and they generally did not “take the chance” of violating campus parking regulations. As Egon Bittner has shown, parking and traffic control is often the only contact many people have with police and security officers, and the public relations aspects of such duties are very influential to the way people perceive the police and security forces.23 The CSO thus needed to balance its ticketing and towing activities with positive actions with which students, faculty, and staff could perhaps agree. The Security Office conducted a traffic survey in November 1964 to develop a plan to “stop the dangerous competition between motorists and pedestrians” on streets on and near the campus. While the Pittsburgh Department of Public Safety denied the request for the installation of several pedestrian crossing lights, the city did erect pedestrian crossing signs in the spring of 1965.24 Efforts to make the campus and surrounding areas safer for the campus community, combined with clear and fair execution of parking regulations, resulted in
good relations between the CSO and the students, faculty, and staff in the area of parking and traffic control.

Security investigations were also an important function of the CSO from 1961–1965. As early as October, 1963, when $1200 worth of photographic equipment was stolen from the Thistle yearbook office in Skibo, Young and the security force conducted their own investigations into campus crime. Fingerprinting techniques and general crime scene evidence collection was the main tool used by the CSO to determine the nature of the crimes and the criminals themselves. That is not to say, however, that crime was a problem at Carnegie Tech before 1965. On the contrary, there were only infrequent episodes of crime on campus before the establishment of the CSO in 1961 and fall of 1968. The theft from the Thistle office was the major incident of crime during these years, although unreported scuffles and dorm thefts probably occurred. In reaction to the “Thistle theft,” as it came to be referred to, the security force implemented a major key-control system, hoping to correct the alarmingly large number of master keys that had found their way to the student population through organizations and various extracurricular activities. The major crime complaint during 1961–1964, though, was theft from the library. While the bookstore reported several incidents of theft, the library consistently was the target of petty thieves. Reserve books were such a popular item for student thieves that the library hired an assistant to monitor use of reserve materials in the spring of 1963. Security officers also began checking the belongings of people as they exited the library after 9 PM. One student questioned the practice of checking books only after 9 PM, for, he said, there was little stopping a potential thief at any time earlier in the day. It is important to note that any crime that was occurring on the Carnegie Tech campus during the early 1960s was of a non-violent nature. Theft of property was a problem, but students, faculty, and staff were not being injured because of it and felt more of an anger than a fear about crime on campus. Cases of actual and potential injury did exist, though, and had to be dealt with accordingly.

The majority of incidents that required attention by the security force before 1968 were accidents, fires, and student pranks. In 1964 alone, there was an explosion in the chemistry lab and two significant fires in dormitory and student apartment areas. For each of these incidents, the CSO dispatched officers to the scene and contacted the Pittsburgh Fire Department. The security officers evacuated residents in adjacent areas and conducted investigations, with the help of the Pittsburgh Bomb and Arson Squad, into the cause of the fires. The residential fires were found to have been intentionally set by students who were apparently unaware of the possibility for escalation of the fire to a dangerous extent. A fire in Donner Hall dormitory in the fall of 1967, which was eventually determined to be caused by faulty wiring, caused the CSO to maintain twenty-four-hour hall security monitors until investigations were complete. Medical escorts to local hospitals were also provided for cases in which it wasn’t deemed necessary to call in the police.
or an ambulance. Threats to the safety of the community thus came in the form of accidents, and the major investigations of the security office between 1961 and 1968 were concerned with emergency and safety issues and not the presence of crime on campus. Prank-like events, such as disruptive snowball fights and spring panty raids, occurred frequently and often required security presence to reinstate order, but rarely required serious investigations into causes and culprits. For the most part, the investigations of the CSO in the first half of the 1960s involved examination of fire and accident scenes and inquiries into library theft.

The security office thus performed three essential functions in the first few years of its operation. It provided security and safety services for the faculty, staff, and students through patrols, security desks, and maintenance of the lines of communication between the campus community and the security office. The CSO also provided parking and traffic control through the issuing of parking permits and the patrolling of campus lots for offenders. Finally, the CSO provided investigative services for crimes and incidents which had occurred on campus for a better understanding of how those events had happened and how they could be avoided in the future. If there was a general emphasis on safety and service instead of crime prevention, it was only because crime in any substantial form had not yet been introduced to the Carnegie Tech campus. In each of their tasks, the security officers strove to maintain good relations with the campus community, and it was due to their general helpfulness that people on campus came to see the Security Office as a service organization and not a surveillance arm of the administration. A 1963 student description of the CSO emphasizes the service functions of the officers and does not mention crime or loss prevention or even the aspects safety of patrols and investigations:

A man in a gray uniform directs a visitor on campus to the Fine Arts Theatre. Another finds some books left in a hall of the activities center and takes them to the lost and found department. This is the Tech security force at work.28

The model of security work illustrated by the Carnegie Tech Security Office in the early 1960s is similar to that displayed on a national level. Robert Etheridge has shown that the greatest period of growth of campus security forces followed the increase in student enrollments and increase in number of automobiles after World War II. Thus, many major colleges and universities created internal security departments in the mid and late 1950s to replace the limited and fragmented systems of watchmen that had been the rule since the 1930s. These departments, usually located in the business affairs divisions of the institutions, had diverse functions but displayed a universal concern for parking and traffic control. The average length of previous police experience of the security supervisor was fourteen years, as compared to William Young's nineteen years of prior service. The early development of these departments, Etheridge notes, frequently involved the use of radio equip-
ment (which Carnegie Tech received two years after the establishment of the CSO) and the extension of services to seven-day, twenty-four-hour coverage (which the CSO also adopted within two years of its existence). Etheridge's main recommendations for more effective security programs—frequent and honest communication between the security department and the campus community and the fostering of familiarity between the two—were already aspects of the Carnegie Tech security force by 1965. The paternalism of the security force, viewing the students as children who needed to be protected and told what to do, ended with the replacement of watchmen with patrolling guards and the end of in loco parentis liability concerns. Gayle Clark Olson has observed a transformation from paternalistic officers to more professional and objective officers in the late 1960s at the University of California at Santa Barbara. The paternalistic instincts of the UCSB officers faded when confrontations between the students and officers became frequent and increasingly tense. The Carnegie Tech Security Office, from its inception, did not such paternalistic instincts. Young's early insistence that the students did not need to be monitored and controlled contributed to the security officers' general impression that they were to protect and serve the campus community, not function as surrogate parents for the student body. The earlier watchmen, though, had viewed and even referred to the students as their "kids" and had often treated students in a familiar, parental way. The transformation from paternalism to professionalism did occur, then, but simply earlier than similar changes in the national scene. The Carnegie Tech security force functioned primarily as a service department concerned with the safety and daily operations of the campus and with relatively little attention paid to crime prevention.

A drastic change from this model occurred between 1968 and 1975. While student political involvement increased on campus, it did not lead to violent or disruptive demonstrations that might have forced the administration to reformulate its security policies and organization. Instead, what forced a significant change in the level of security services and crime prevention on campus was the increase in violent and non-violent crime on campus and the subsequent fearful and angry reaction to it by students and faculty. A reorganization of the objectives, practices, training, and tools of the security force on the Carnegie Tech campus in the late 1960s/early 1970s directly resulted from several years of increased crime activity and the community's perception of its own risk. The CSO transformed itself from a reactive security-oriented agency to a proactive agency concerned more with law enforcement and the prevention of crime.

In September, 1968, four fraternity houses were robbed of over $3000 worth of clothing, stereo equipment, and money. Although the security department investigated the crimes and believed that there were the work of a single thief or group of thieves, they never found the culprit(s). Early in 1969, the Morewood Gardens residence complex (the women's dorm on campus) was heavily burglarized for a period of several months. Wallets,
purses, and other valuables were stolen from locked and unlocked rooms, causing the CSO to remind students to lock their doors. The residents of Morewood gardens, though, did not see the problem as a case of unlocked doors. They, instead, complained about the general lack of security in the residence hall and the ineffectiveness of an on-duty security at the main entrance when serious crimes were being committed several floors above. Thieves and vandals also targeted the Morewood Recreational Room, stealing stereo equipment, kitchen utensils, and the entire jukebox. An editorial in *The Tartan* complained about the situation in the women’s residence hall:

This recent occurrence adding to the number of thefts that have occurred in girls’ dorm this academic year, we can only ask whether or not the administration feels the security services provided in Morewood Gardens are adequate.33

Nor did the crime wave stop there. In the last two weeks of February, 1969, a female student was assaulted at night within several feet of the administration building by two unidentified males and an art exhibit in the Fine Arts building was completely destroyed by vandals who slashed the canvases and stole several frames and sculptures. At the time both incidents occurred, patrolmen were patrolling the campus, but happened to be in other areas where they could not detect the criminal activity. When the head of the painting and sculpture department demanded that a security officer be appointed to a permanent “watchman position” in the Fine Arts building at night and during special events (such as the destroyed exhibit), Supervisor Young agreed and stated that the force should be increased by at least two officers.34 Before the end of the 1968–69 academic year, four more students were beaten up on and off campus by gangs of non-students, three thieves were cornered behind Donner Hall by the Pittsburgh police, and two bank robbers were arrested on campus in broad daylight following a chase across the football field and several parking lots. Physical fights, always present to some extent on a campus full of people with diverse backgrounds, were no longer of the prank-like and trivial nature they had once been. Students were not roughed up by a group of upperclassmen or rival fraternity brothers, but were instead preyed upon by non-students intent on theft and harm. The nature of campus incidents had changed drastically in a span of a few years, and the administration and campus community recognized the change. In a statement issued to the *Tartan* on April 30, 1969, Young announced that there had been a one hundred percent increase in dorm thefts from the 1967–68 academic year and that

Campus Security is faced with a rising crime rate and a corresponding increase in trouble on campus from these outside sources. While troubling, this trend is inevitable for a campus located in close proximity to an urban area with its own crime-generating characteristics.35
Clearly, the intrusion of off-campus problems into the campus setting was a significant problem, and one that was recognized by both the security force and the student body. No longer were the problems of campus minor problems created by the campus community itself. The campus community realized that the external world of crime had come to the previously unaffected realm of academic life, creating what has been called “a community suddenly confronted with the complex and unfamiliar dangers of society at large.”\footnote{Dr. Kilbee of the Faculty Senate noted that the “large increase in the number of items reported from 1967 to 1968” were in the area of thefts and attempted thefts, and the numbers appeared to parallel the general increase in the surrounding community. He concluded that “the campus experience is not a unique one in the context of the total city,” but simply a sudden extension of urban problems to an area that had been isolated from such problems in the past.}

The rise in crime was not the only reason the campus community began to complain about the ineffectiveness of the security force. In November 1968, two officers not in official uniforms entered the snack bar area of the student activities center and questioned several non-students about recent thefts. After several minutes of informal interrogation, the officers left. Several students complained about this action, noting that the officers never produced identification, should not have conducted security functions while out of uniform, and had no right to approach the non-students, who were accompanied by a group of students.\footnote{Students and faculty also debated whether or not the security officers should focus more on problem areas, such as the residence halls and fraternity houses, where the majority of crime incidents occurred. The Faculty Senate suggested that the force be increased in size to allow for more patrol officers and more extensive coverage.} That the campus community perceived a need for a revision of the security practices on campus shows that the system was not working to everyone’s satisfaction. Both students and security officers noticed several characteristics of the campus that could be defined as security problems. Thefts and vandalism were obvious symptoms of security problems, but the recognition of unsafe areas, such as the portion of the campus that bordered Oakland to the west, and the completely open status of the campus caused further concern. As a private institution located on public property, Carnegie Tech had always been essentially open to the public. In 1973, legal advisors would suggest that such an open status could legally be revised to allow for some access restrictions for people not affiliated with the institution.\footnote{In 1968, though, access was not restricted, and the inevitable problems of external presence on campus ensued. The increase in crime and some questionable practices of the campus security force produced a reaction from the campus community that would eventually lead to a major reorganization of the Campus Security Office.}

Coinciding with the increase in campus crime, the rise in fear of crime, and complaints about the inadequacy of the CSO were national events that
brought the use of force by police under question. Demonstrations throughout the country showed that police and security guards at times had trouble controlling their power and weapons. Such violent and confrontational demonstrations did not plague the Carnegie-Mellon campus, though. In 1967, Carnegie Tech was combined with the Mellon Institute to form Carnegie-Mellon University. The student population was still around 3,500, though over 2,000 students now lived on campus. The student body gradually became more active in political affairs on campus during the 1960s, but such interest did not translate into disturbances that the administration or Security Office needed to guard against. While students of the national campus scene would state that tense and violent confrontations between students and campus police and security officers were the expected order of the day in the 1960s, such events did not occur at Carnegie-Mellon.41 Thus, while other campus security agencies were ill-prepared for the national escalation of student protests and demonstrations and consequently suffered property damage and personal injury, the security force at Carnegie-Mellon could afford to focus more on crime prevention and other general safety issues.

A survey of the campus newspaper in the second half of the 1960s shows that a number of Carnegie-Mellon students held strong political views and were willing to work towards national political goals through organizations, publications, and service projects. The 1967 and 1968 Student Congress elections were fiercely fought battles characterized by much public debate and strong campaigning. Almost half of the undergraduate population voted in the two elections, suggesting that a significant portion of the student body was interested in the nature of the student government. A lengthy debate over the appropriateness of ROTC training in the academic setting took place in the fall of 1968. The Student Senate passed a motion urging that no academic credit be given for ROTC courses and no building space be given for ROTC offices.42 In a speech to the student body during the ROTC debate, President Stever indicated that he feared a communication gap between students and the administration that might lead to future “rowdy protests” on campus.

Protests and demonstration had long been talked about on campus, but very few had actually occurred. In the 1967–68 and 1968–69 academic years, four public demonstrations of note occurred on campus, each of a peaceful tone. On November 9, 1967, the student American Foreign Policy Forum held an anti-napalm dance and rally in the student center. The event was essentially a social gathering, though, prompting a Post-Gazette reporter to ask when the protest was going to begin.43 On November 4, 1968, over five hundred students and faculty members attended an on-campus peace vigil organized to make the campus community aware that it was a part of a larger community and should thus be active in off-campus affairs. Later that month, a handful of students protested at a ROTC awards ceremony and afterwards invaded ROTC offices, causing some damage to files and office equipment. The students stayed behind, though, to repair the damage they had caused,
and no actions were taken by the administration or Campus Security Office. Finally, in April 1969, several fraternities staged a three-day sit-in on the fraternity lawns to protest the administration’s delays of the construction of additional fraternity houses. Witnesses observed a lot of singing and game-playing, but couldn’t see much organized protest.

The nature of student activism at Carnegie-Mellon before 1969, then, was peaceful and often social and didn’t cause disruptions of University business or threaten physical violence against the campus community, administration, or security force. While other universities suffered anti-ROTC protests and anti-administration protests that frequently turned violent, Carnegie-Mellon did not witness a similar pattern. Furthermore, massive demonstrations against the war in Vietnam began in such schools as Berkeley and the University of Michigan in 1965, but never surfaced at Carnegie-Mellon in the 1960s. The “crises of violence and understanding” that the 1970 President’s Commission on Campus Unrest noticed in many of the nation’s colleges and universities were not recognized by the Carnegie-Mellon campus community or the administration. The unresponsiveness and repressive actions of many administrations throughout the country were not mirrored by President Stever and the many people who made genuine efforts to communicate with the student body. Furthermore, the lack of security presence at the few demonstrations that had occurred on campus failed to attract more students to protest activity. The President’s Commission noted that the ranks of student protesters increased heavily when campus security and police agencies were called in to calm potential unrest. The presence of armed guards and subsequent incidents of brutality unified the student front at many universities to fight for causes that did not initially attract so many supporters. At Carnegie-Mellon, though, the administration was hesitant to deploy security personnel to on-campus protests and vigils, even when the ROTC offices were invaded by a group of students with unknown objectives. The great majority of students did not participate in violent and disruptive protest, and the campus was thus not the center of activism and unrest that it could have been. The Security Office could thus focus on the external threats of crime and violence on campus without being greatly distracted by disruptive student unrest.

The situation in the spring of 1969 was such that Carnegie-Mellon students were being assaulted and robbed at the same time that the faculty and other students were calling for the administration to disarm the security officers. The Tartan declared that mace should be enough for a majority of the security officers’ functions except, perhaps, night patrol in the more dangerous areas of campus. The Faculty Senate, in the fall of 1968, created a subcommittee to discuss and develop plans for a weapons policy for campus security guards. The committee’s proposal advised the administration that guns should not be carried by any security officer, but should be available in the CSO in case of an extreme emergency. Supervisor Young supported such a policy, stressing that firearms were necessary in some situations, such
as the transportation of large sums of money from the cashier's office, but weren't needed in routine patrols and crowd-control functions. Young's opinion on this matter is in great contrast to the opinions expressed in a national poll of campus chiefs of police in 1970. The results of the poll indicate that the great majority of campus security and police agency supervisors believed patrol officers should carry a firearm in addition to either a club or mace.50 Young's understanding of the campus environment made him a rather unique individual in campus security and policing in the 1960s. His perception of the qualities needed for an effective campus security department facilitated the numerous changes that were about to be implemented by the University's President.

In February of 1969, President Stever issued a statement concerning five new policies for campus security. It was the first major revision of security policy since the establishment of the CSO in 1961, and it was one of the first instances in which students took an active part in policy-making. Stever took into account a petition of 262 students against disarming the officers, the opinions of administrators, the Faculty Planning Council's report, the complaints of concerned students about the increase in crime, several editorials in The Tartan, and an open forum held on the campus radio station. The changes implemented in the security force were as follows:

1) The establishment of a course of instruction for security personnel that is immediately relevant to campus security problems.
2) A rewritten campus security force manual that updates and clarifies procedures and methods and allows for the input of interested parties.
3) The establishment of a security review board to hear the complaints of members of the campus community concerning security matters and procedures.
4) A change of security personnel uniforms that makes them more informal and approachable, but at the same time distinguishable from other police forces and identifiable for those who need services.
5) Security officers will carry firearms only during night patrol duties in those places where the greatest chance of the violent intruder exists.51

It is helpful to compare President Stever's revision of campus security services with the recommendations made by the President's Commission on Campus Unrest for the nation's colleges and universities a year later. Although the revisions at Carnegie-Mellon were implemented in response to increased crime, and not student unrest, they are very similar to the President's Commission's recommendations. The President's Commission first stressed the need for better, more extensive training for campus security officers. While the type of training referred to dealt with methods to calm unrest, the training program initiated at Carnegie-Mellon focused on crime prevention and security techniques for a private university on a semi-urban campus. President Stever believed the new training program to be the key to better security services in the near future, since officers extensively trained to work
in the particular environment would presumably provide the most effective protection and crime prevention.\textsuperscript{52} The national President's Commission also recommended that shoulder weapons be carried and used only in official emergency situations and not as daily routine. Stever, in response to many concerned groups on campus, restricted the use of firearms to more dangerous night patrols in high-risk areas. Stever hoped that this measure would help avoid unfortunate situations of accidental injuries from security officer firearms and would further integrate the security force into the campus community. Finally, the President's Commission recommended that security measures and methods be made explicit to the student body and that the students should have the opportunity to report questionable practices to the administration. President Stever made similar revisions to the Carnegie-Mellon security force in the spring of 1969. By initiating the revision and clarification of the official campus security manual and establishing a security review board (later to become the Security Policy Advisory Board), Stever further allowed for close communication between the campus community and the security force. Student and faculty input thus played a significant role in security policy for the next few years, as complaints were registered through the review board, which implemented further changes accordingly. Stever's final revision, the introduction of more informal uniforms for the security officers, was also meant to make the security force more a part of the campus community. The changes were to be implemented within a few months time. As it turned out, all but the revised manual were completed before the end of the 1970–71 academic year.

The theme underlying Stever's five points of reorganization was the notion that a security force more in touch with the people it protects and serves is a more effective security force. This notion is in accord with more recent assessments of campus security, which stress the visibility, familiarity, and accessibility of security officers as an essential part in the development of a secure campus.\textsuperscript{53} Wesley Willard has found that greater communication efforts between security agencies and campus communities have a strong correlation with decreased crime indices.\textsuperscript{54} The Carnegie-Mellon Security Office's frequent attempts to communicate and cooperate with the faculty and students and the increased opportunity to do so with the new revisions meant that the force should have been able to more effectively combat campus crime in the following years. Evidence indicates that crime on campus did decrease greatly from 1970–1975. In 1971, the Security Review Board became the Security Policy Advisory Board. Comprised of members of the faculty and administration, the Board was established to advise the President of security issues and formulate specific policy. The members of the Board noted a sharp decrease in crime incidents on campus from the levels they had reached in 1968 and 1969. By 1973, President Cyert could discuss with the Board the significant reduction in security and crime problems that had reached a dangerous magnitude "a few years ago."\textsuperscript{55} President Cyert and
the Security Policy Advisory Board thus believed that a definite problem had been encountered and, to some degree, solved. A gradual increase in the size of the security force certainly contributed to the decrease in campus crime as well. The administration, following requests from the student body and Young himself, added two officers to the force in the spring of 1968 and several more in 1969 and 1970, bringing the total size of the security department to sixteen in 1971. A larger force was certainly better able to provide the security services necessary for the campus.

The major revisions of February 1969, and a substantial increase in the size of the force in the early 1970s, curbed the initial outbreak of crime on campus and improved relations between the force and the campus community. The good relations that had been characteristic of the campus since the establishment of the Campus Security Office in 1961 were further strengthened by an opened lines of communication and an integration of the security force into the campus community. The CSO was established to officially organize the security force on campus that had previously been decentralized and rented from external agencies. For the first several years of the CSO's operations, there were not major crime problems to deal with, and the force thus had the opportunity to provide services to the campus community which fostered a close and amicable relationship between the two. When crime did become a problem on campus, the campus community, as well as the Supervisor of Security, William Dwayne Young and, later, the administration, realized that the present security force was inadequate to deal with the problems of a campus beset by the crime problems of an urban area in the late 1960s. Revisions were made that would increase the effectiveness of the force and make clear the objectives and methods of the force. The revisions also made the force a part of the campus scene instead of an agency that operated within it. Informal uniforms, the use of firearms only in emergency situations and night patrols, and better training on campus security issues gave the security officers a greater chance to be accepted by the students, faculty, and staff as protectors of the campus instead of hired guns. National trends which show that campus security forces adapted to meet the challenges of student demonstrations do not apply to the case of the Carnegie Tech/Carnegie-Mellon security force in the 1960s, for the threat of crime on campus by outsiders, not the threat of student unrest, primarily influenced policy and departmental changes.

Notes

3. Smith, p. 3.
17. Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Act, 1933.
33. *The Tartan*, February 9, 1969
37. Faculty Senate Minutes, March 11, 1969.
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39. Faculty Senate Minutes, March 11, 1969.
42. Student Senate Minutes, November 24, 1968.
43. The Tartan, November 14, 1967.
44. The Tartan, November 20, 1968.
45. The Tartan, April 22, 1969.
49. Faculty Senate, Minutes, March 11, 1969.
52. Ibid., p. 2.

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