A Variant of the Double-Negation Translation

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Abstract

An efficient variant of the double-negation translation explains the relationship between Shoenfield’s and Gödel’s versions of the Dialectica interpretation.

Fix a classical first-order language, based on the connectives $\lor$, $\land$, $\neg$, and $\forall$. We will define a translation to intuitionistic (even minimal) logic, based on the usual connectives. The translation maps each formula $\varphi$ to the formula $\varphi^*=\neg\varphi^*$, so $\varphi^*$ is supposed to represent an intuitionistic version of the negation of $\varphi$. The map from $\varphi$ to $\varphi^*$ is defined recursively, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\varphi^* &= \neg\varphi, \text{ when } \varphi \text{ is atomic} \\
(\neg\varphi)^* &= \neg\varphi^* \\
(\varphi \lor \psi)^* &= \varphi^* \land \psi^* \\
(\varphi \land \psi)^* &= \varphi^* \lor \psi^* \\
(\forall x \varphi)^* &= \exists x \varphi^*
\end{align*}
\]

Note that we can eliminate either $\lor$ or $\land$ and retain a complete set of connectives. If $\Gamma$ is the set of classical formulas $\{\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k\}$, let $\Gamma^*$ denote the set of formulas $\{\varphi_1^*, \ldots, \varphi_k^*\}$. The main theorem of this note is the following:

**Theorem 0.1**

1. Classical logic proves $\varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi^*$.

2. If $\varphi$ is provable from $\Gamma$ in classical logic, then $\varphi^*$ is provable from $\Gamma^*$ in minimal logic.
Note that both these claims hold for the usual Gödel-Gentzen translation \( \varphi \mapsto \varphi^N \). Thus the theorem is a consequence of the following lemma:

**Lemma 0.2** For every \( \varphi \), minimal logic proves \( \varphi^* \mapsto \varphi^N \).

**Proof.** By induction on \( \varphi \). The cases where \( \varphi \) is atomic or a negation are immediate. For \( \lor \), we have

\[
(\varphi \lor \psi)^* = \neg(\varphi_\ast \land \psi_\ast) \equiv \neg(\neg\neg\varphi_\ast \land \neg\neg\psi_\ast) \equiv (\neg\varphi^N \land \neg\psi^N) = (\varphi \lor \psi)^N.
\]

For \( \land \), we have

\[
(\varphi \land \psi)^* = \neg(\varphi_\ast \lor \psi_\ast) \equiv \neg\varphi_\ast \lor \neg\psi_\ast \equiv \varphi^N \land \psi^N = (\varphi \land \psi)^N.
\]

For \( \forall \), we have

\[
(\forall x \varphi)^* = \neg\exists x \varphi_\ast \equiv \forall x \neg\varphi_\ast \equiv \forall x \varphi^N = (\forall x \varphi)^N.
\]

This concludes the proof. \( \square \)

In his textbook [4], Shoenfield defines a version of the Dialectica translation for the language of arithmetic based on the connectives \( \lor, \neg, \land, \forall \). Each formula \( \varphi \) is mapped to a formula \( \varphi^S \) of the form \( \forall a \exists b \varphi_S(a, b) \), where \( a \) and \( b \) are sequences of variables. Assuming \( \varphi^S \) is as above and \( \psi^S \) is \( \forall c \exists d \psi_S(c, d) \), the translation is defined recursively, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta^S &= \theta, \text{ when } \theta \text{ is atomic} \\
(\neg\varphi)^S &= \forall a \exists b \varphi_S(a, B(a)) \\
(\varphi \lor \psi)^S &= \forall a, c \exists b, d (\varphi_S(a, b) \lor \psi_S(c, d)) \\
(\forall x \varphi)^S &= \forall a \exists b \varphi_S(a, b)
\end{align*}
\]

Shoenfield’s main result is this:

**Theorem 0.3** If \( \varphi \) is provable in classical arithmetic, there are terms \( B \) such that \( \varphi^S(a, B(a)) \) is provable in Gödel’s theory \( T \).

If \( \eta \) is a formula in the language of intuitionistic logic, let \( \eta^D \) denote the usual Dialectica translation. It is straightforward to verify the following by recursion on formulas:

**Proposition 0.4** Suppose \( \varphi^S \) is \( \forall a \exists b \varphi_S(a, b) \). Then \( (\varphi^*)^D \) is of the form \( \exists B \forall a \hat{\varphi}(a, B(a)) \), where \( \hat{\varphi} \) is intuitionistically equivalent to \( \varphi_S \).

Thus Shoenfield’s result is just a corollary of Gödel’s, together with the \( \ast \) mapping of classical to intuitionistic arithmetic.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Streicher and Kohlenbach point out that Theorem 0.3 still holds if one defines \( (\varphi \land \psi)^S \) to be \( \forall a, c \exists b, d (\varphi_S(a, b) \land \psi_S(c, d)) \). But if one wants Proposition 0.4 to hold as stated, one has to define \( (\varphi \land \psi)^S \) to be the intuitionistically equivalent formula \( \forall z, a, c \exists b, d ((z = 0 \rightarrow \varphi_S(a, b) \land (z \neq 0 \rightarrow \psi_S(c, d))) \).
As I have presented it, the * translation is remarkably parsimonious in adding negations to a formula. It fares slightly worse on the connectives → and ∀:

\[(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)_* = \neg\varphi_* \land \psi_*\]
\[(\exists x \varphi)_* = \forall x \neg\neg\varphi_*\]

Thus it adds a negation for each →, and two negations for each ∃. This is reminiscent of the Kuroda translation, which adds two negations after each universal quantifier, and two at the beginning of the formula. (Note, however, that verifying the Kuroda translation of a classical theorem requires intuitionistic logic, not just minimal logic.)

The nice thing is that when translating formulas from classical to intuitionistic logic, one can use the Kuroda and the * translations interchangeably, since the resulting formulas are equivalent. When carrying out the Dialectica interpretation of a classical theorem, the *-based Shoenfield translation is often more convenient.

References


