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Understanding the Behavioral Responses Corresponding with the Emotions Guilt and Shame

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Abstract

Despite the fact that the moral emotions guilt and shame seem similar, research has shown that there are important differences between them. Guilt produces negative feelings about an external event, such as one's actions, whereas shame produces negative internal feelings about oneself (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). This distinction has potentially important behavioral consequences, yet little research has tested how the two emotions influence real behavior. This project addresses this gap by investigating the influences of shame and guilt on behavior of real consequence. Results will give greater insight into the nuances differentiating guilt from shame and the practical consequences of the emotions related to interpersonal decision making.

Understanding Guilt and Shame

Asking a layperson to define guilt and shame will most likely be met with some difficulty. Although these emotions are experienced quite frequently in our everyday lives, defining their nuances, or what makes them different from one another, can be extremely difficult. In certain situations, it may be nearly impossible to determine if one is feeling guilt, shame, or a combination of both (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). Interestingly, the inability to distinguish between the two is not a trait common only to inexperienced people. Even "experts"—trained psychological professionals—use the terms interchangeably and inconsistently (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). This begs the question: Is there a meaningful difference between guilt and shame? If so, what is this difference and how is it relevant to theories of human behavior? Explanations and theories for the differences between guilt and shame have evolved over time and through several areas of social science. Evidence about how the two emotions are different can be found in psychoanalytic discussions, anthropological based research, and more recent experimental studies. I hope to expand upon this existing research by comparing guilt and shame directly and determining the effects they have on real world behavior.

Early psychoanalytic work on guilt and shame was based on Freudian principles. Although Freud himself may have used guilt and shame interchangeably (Dearing & Tangney, 2003) his concept of the id, ego, superego, and even ego ideal have allowed future psychoanalysts to develop his ideas more fully and apply them to guilt and shame. Psychoanalytic theorists Piers and Singer (1953) put forth the idea that guilt was the result of tension between the ego and the superego, while shame resulted from tension between the ego and the ego ideal (Piers & Singer, 1953). Furthermore, Piers and Singer believed that the unconscious, irrational threat implied in guilt anxiety was mutilation (castration) while

abandonment was implied by shame anxiety (Piers & Singer, 1953). Piers and Singer highlight the different dynamics of guilt and shame by demonstrating that they can be antagonistic toward one another. They outline a cycle that occurs due to sexual impulses that mobilize the Oedipal conflict and traverses feelings of guilt and shame before bringing the individual back to the taboo Oedipal idea, arousing guilt (Piers & Singer, 1953). Through this cycle (see Figure 1), it is easy to see how the separate emotions of guilt and shame are inextricably linked, at least from a psychoanalytic perspective.

More modern research has focused on guilt and shame as emotions that result from different situations. That is, the content and structure of a current situation determines whether an individual feels guilt or shame as the result of a negative, self-conscious experience (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). Eventually, a "public" and "private" distinction arose when trying to differentiate between shame and guilt. Gehm and Scherer (1988) determined that guilt and shame are extremely similar because they are both elicited by improper or immoral behaviors that violated one's internal standards. People experiencing guilt showed a greater tendency to "make up for" their actions than did people experiencing shame. They explained this finding in terms of the public/private model of shame and guilt. Because shame was generally regarded as the more public emotion (it relied on the action having been publicly exposed), people were less likely to make up for it because their public image was tarnished and irreparable. With guilt, as a more private emotion, people could make up for their action without having their immoral action exposed (Gehm & Scherer, 1988). Although this public/private model was popular and seemed at the time to explain the distinction between guilt and shame, it was later disproved by much empirical research Tangney, Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, & Wagner (1994) conducted a study in which they asked their audiences to recall events in which they had experienced shame and

guilt. Their results challenged Gehm & Scherer's findings by showing that people experienced both shame and guilt in public settings, with a substantial number of participants reported that shame occurred in a solitary setting. Furthermore, solitary shame was about as prevalent as solitary guilt (Dearing & Tangney, 2003).

A more plausible distinction between guilt and shame is that they differ with respect to the role of the self (Lewis, 1971). For guilt, the focus is on the action performed, whereas for shame, the focus is on the self as having performed a certain action. The impetus for having a guilty emotional experience comes from thoughts of "'What I *did,*'" versus "'Who *I* am.'" for shameful experiences (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). The following study by Tangney shows that Lewis' hypothesis about the role of the self was confirmed through experimental testing.

In 1993, Tangney asked 65 undergraduate college students to write about a personal shame, guilt, pride, and depression experience. They were then asked to rate the experience along 22 dimensions, following a 7 point scale. The results showed that shame and guilt differed in the predicted direction for 17 of the 22 dimensions, and were significant for 11 of the 17 dimensions (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). Shame was more likely to induce a sense of being inferior and physically small, and people believed they had greater control in situations involving guilt (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). Furthermore, Lindsay-Hartz et al. (1995) conducted a study where they interviewed 13 adults extensively about guilt and shame experiences. The participants were then given unlabeled abstract descriptions of various aspects of shame, guilt, anxiety, and depression experiences, where the "situation" for guilt and shame focused on behavior versus the self. The results showed that participants were able to match their own experiences to the abstract descriptions, confirming Lewis' (1971) distinction between shame

and guilt (Dearing & Tangney, 2003). In the current thesis, I rely on these definitions of guilt and shame when forming and testing my hypotheses.

Guilt and Shame as Moral Emotions

Guilt and shame are both widely regarded as being two of the moral emotions. For the purposes of psychological based research, moral emotions can best be defined as emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or of others other than the self (Haidt, 2003). Tangney and Fischer (1995) further state that moral emotions are the result of social relationships and thrive due to continual judgment of the self, of others, and by others.

All emotions, not just moral emotions, are likely to induce some sort of action in response to them. Although the action is not always taken, people find themselves in a motivational and cognitive state that increases their tendency to engage in these responsive actions (Haidt, 2003). Guilt is a moral emotion that is thought to precipitate much prosocial behavior. When people are feeling guilty, they have a tendency to want to make up for their action, causing them to engage in actions that are beneficial to others or to society in general (Haidt, 2003). Haidt proposes that the moral emotions have different prosocial action tendencies given the degree to which an emotion can be elicited by situations that do not directly harm or benefit the self. Generally, the more disinterested the emotion is from the self, the stronger the prosocial action tendency. Guilt and anger are classified as disinterested emotions with a high likelihood of prosocial action tendencies, while emotions like sadness and happiness are extremely self interested and promote almost no prosocial behavior. Shame falls somewhere between a self interested and disinterested emotion with a moderately high prosocial action tendency.

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Empirical Evidence for Moral Emotions as Prosocial Motivators

As early as 1759, Adam Smith believed that moral emotions could motivate cooperation (Smith, 1976). More recently, Frank (1988) incorporated the idea that moral emotions could motive cooperative behavior in his commitment theory. While people's tendency is to be selfish and think more about the immediate personal reward than long term societal benefits, moral emotions may help moderate this effect. They can serve as commitment devices that resolve these social dilemmas and motivate cooperative behaviors by allowing us to opt for the long term group benefiting strategy (Frank, 1988).

In their 2003 study, Ketelaar and Au provided support for the hypothesis that people experiencing guilt would be motivated to act prosocially. They ran two studies testing the idea, beginning both by measuring the general prosocial tendencies of their participants. Ketelaar and Au believed that those who were naturally more proself would be affected by a guilt induction, whereas those who were already prosocial would not be influenced because their prosocial action tendencies would be strong regardless of an emotion induction. In the first study, Ketelaar and Au induced guilt through an autobiographic recall procedure in which they had to write about a time where they felt extremely guilty. Next, they had the participants participate in 40 rounds of a social dilemma game. Their results showed that the proselfs acted more cooperatively after their guilt induction. In a second study, Ketelaar and Au obtained the same results for naturally occurring guilt in a two round ultimatum bargaining game (Ketelaar & Au, 2003).

Motivated by results obtained by Ketelaar and Au and similar ones by Nelissen, Dijker, and De Vries (2007) that demonstrated guilt as means of motivating cooperative, prosocial behavior, De Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Brugelmans (2007) conducted studies to determine whether shame, another moral emotion, would have the same effect on prosocial behavior as

guilt. In both studies, they induced guilt or shame using a similar autobiographic recall

procedure to Ketelaar and Au (2003). In Experiment 1, participants played a social dilemma

game that tested the extent to which they acted cooperatively with another individual.

Experiment 2 assessed cooperation through an "everyday cooperation" scale. Both experiments

yielded similar results: guilt motivated cooperative behavior, while shame had no effect (De

Hooge et al, 2007).

De Hooge et al (2008) later identified two types of shame, endogenous and exogenous.

Endogenous shame occurs when the opportunity to act prosocially is directly related to the

shameful experience that occurred. Exogenous shame occurs when the experience is not relevant

to the decision to act prosocially. De Hooge et al (2008) believed that when shame was

endogenous it would act as a commitment device, motivating the prosocial behavior, while

exogenous shame would not motivate the prosocial behavior. This was an important distinction,

because in their previous study, they studied only what they later classified as exogenous shame.

De Hooge et al (2008) tested their hypothesis by doing four experiments. The results of

all four experiments confirmed the researcher's hypothesis that endogenous shame would cause

proself people to act more socially. Similarly, the researchers believed that exogenous shame

would not have any impact on prosocial nor proself people, nor would prosocial people be

affected significantly by endogenous shame. These hypotheses were also confirmed. Despite

the fact that shame is usually viewed as an ugly emotion, it can also act as a commitment device,

motivating people to act prosocially and thereby committing them to long term strategies. These

experiments demonstrated that shame can have a constructive nature in certain circumstances,

and it is perhaps more of a multi dimensional emotion than traditionally believed. Despite these

findings, De Hooge et al (2008) believe it is important to note that these results cannot be

generalized to every negative affect or mood, and they do not provide any evidence suggesting that shame and guilt are identical emotions.

The Present Research

The primary goal of the present research is to develop and validate behavioral shame and guilt emotion inductions that could effectively elicit the emotions of shame and guilt, and importantly, elicit them as states distinct from each other. The secondary goal was to test how shame versus guilt evokes prosocial behavior. The prosocial behavior measure used was the amount donated to a charity after performing an action would evoke guilt or shame. I predicted that participants feeling guilt or shame would donate more whenever their guilt or shame was endogenous rather than exogenous. Based on de Hooge et al's (2007) definition, endogenous guilt or shame would be felt when the person collecting donations was a person that had been wronged, while exogenous guilt or shame would be evoked when the person collecting donations was unrelated to the guilty or shameful act. When faced with the option to essentially make up for one's wrongdoing, I believed that the moral emotions would take over more strongly and would lead people feeling guilt and shame to better their self and situation with the person they wronged. Furthermore, I believed there would be a main effect for guilt, where both the endogenous and exogenous conditions for that emotion would produce a greater willingness to approach than the endogenous and exogenous conditions for shame.

Studies 1 and 2: Exploring Techniques for Inducing Guilt and Shame

STUDY 1

This first study was designed to determine an effective method of inducing guilt and shame. Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions. Three of the conditions involved scenario based inductions (guilt, shame, neutral), while the other four involved situation recall induction. Following these inductions, the participants were asked a series of questions to determine if the inductions elicited guilt, shame, both, or neither.

Method

The participants in this study were 152 members of Amazon's MTurk service (50 males, 102 females, M_{age}= 32.55 SD = 10.49) received $ 0.05 and a 1/300 chance at $30 for completing a short online survey. Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a virtual marketplace for work in which people develop and post Human Intelligence Tasks that others complete, for a small fee. The participants were randomized into one of seven conditions. Three of the conditions were scenario based inductions of guilt and shame. The scenarios the participants received were as follows:

Hypothetical Shame Scenario: You are sitting in a class of about 15 students that is taught by a professor you admire more than any other on campus. You really believe that he/she is brilliant. The professor asks a question about one of the readings/assignments and you immediately volunteer the answer with some enthusiasm. But it's the wrong answer, the professor informs you somewhat dryly, and he/she turns to address another student in the class.

Hypothetical Guilt Scenario: You are house-sitting for a friend's parents. It's a pretty easy task, actually. All you have to do is eat their food, collect the mail, and feed their bird. Everything is going just fine until one morning you discover that the bird died during the night. You turned the air conditioning on "high" during the day and forgot to turn it down at night as you had been instructed. The bird died from the excessive cold.

Hypothetical Neutral Scenario: As you walk home for the night you stop to notice what a comfortable evening it is. It is a warm spring evening and the sun is setting behind the clouds. You stop for a minute and breathe deeply, noticing the warm weather, and also thinking about the tasks ahead of you for the evening. When you get to your apartment, you walk inside and begin to plan for your night. You pull out a sheet of paper and begin writing down what you need to accomplish before going to sleep.

The other four conditions first involved a sentence unscrambling task, followed by a writing induction designed to induce self-blame. For the guilt condition, participants unscrambled sentences that were in the third person and then completed their writing task, while the shame condition participants' sentences were in the first person. This was designed to focus the blame outward for guilt and inward for shame, consistent with Lewis' (1971) theory about the origins of guilt and shame. The writing task instructions were as follows:

Self-blame Writing Prompt: Please write about a profoundly emotionally upsetting experience in your life; please focus on an experience that made you feel bad about yourself or that you blame yourself for. It could be an experience such as a difficult romantic relationship, a time when you did not live up to your own or someone else's expectations, or something horrible that you feel personally responsible for. The important thing is that you write about your deepest thoughts and feelings. Ideally, whatever you write about should deal with an event or experience that you have not talked with others about in detail.

Neutral Writing Prompt: Please describe, as best you can, how you typically spend your evenings. You might begin by writing down a detailed description of your activities, and then figure out how much time you devote to each activity.

Participants read one of the three vignettes or did a writing task and then completed a State Shame and Guilt Scale (SGSS). The SGSS is a self rating scale of current feelings of shame, guilt, and pride experiences. Fifteen statements are rated on a 5-point Likert scale with endpoint such as, *X* (1) and *Y* (5), (Dearing & Tangney, 2003).

Results

The results from these inductions were mixed. Participants in the hypothetical guilt condition reported expecting to feel more guilt than did participants in hypothetical shame conditions $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 3.93$, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 2.84$, $t(39) = 4.36$, $p < 0.0005$. However, counter to expectations, participants in the hypothetical guilt condition also reported that they expected to feel more shame than did participants in the hypothetical shame condition, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 3.58$, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 2.81$, $t(40) = 2.52$, $p < 0.0005$.

Consistent with expectations, participants in first-person self-blame (shame) writing induction reported significantly more shame than in those in the third person self-blame (guilt) writing induction $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 2.70$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 1.94$, $t(28) = 2.02$, $p = 0.05$. However, counter to expectations, participants in the first person-self-blame (shame) writing condition also reported (directionally) more guilt than did participants in the third-person self-blame (guilt) writing condition, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 3.0$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 2.57$, $t(28) = 1.06$, $p = 0.29$. Participants in the neutral conditions consistently reported feeling less guilt and less shame than did participants in the guilt and shame conditions, all p's < 0.05.

Discussion

These results were very inconsistent and did not give any clear indication as to what specifically was not working with the inductions. When considering self reported guilt, the scenario based measure worked better than the primed writing induction. However, for self reported shame, the primed writing induction was more successful than the scenario based measure. This was an indication that scenario based measures are successful at inducing emotion, but the particular scenarios did not sufficiently differentiate guilt and shame.

The SGSS is also designed to capture Pride. One of the more alarming aspects of this study was the finding that participants in the first and third person self blame writing tasks reported fairly high levels of pride (means were 3 or above on a 7-point scale). This seemed to be a clear indicator that something was not working correctly with this induction method. A possible explanation could be that people were writing about events that happened too long ago for them to be able to relate them to current tasks. Because they were not imagining themselves in the situation as they were with the scenario based measures, the full effects of what they went through at the time may not have been strong enough to influence their emotions while they were participating in the study.

STUDY 2

Given the results of Study 1, I decided to run another trial of induction methods. This time, I eliminated the writing inductions and focused instead on the hypothetical scenario based measures.

Method

The participants in this study were 227 members of Amazon's Mturk service (97 males, 130 females, M_{age}= 31.73 SD = 11.03) who received $ 0.05 and a 1/300 chance at $30 for completing a short online survey. The participants were randomized into one of six conditions, two designed to induce guilt, two designed to induce shame, and two designed to induce neutral feelings.

The scenarios the participants received were as follows:

Guilt (Bike): You take your sister's bike for a quick trip to the bakery. You do not ask if you can borrow the bike like you usually do, but you assume that she will not mind that you have taken it. You are in a

rush, and you forget to lock the bike like you normally do. When you return from the shop, 5 minutes later, you realize that your sister's bike has been stolen.

Shame (Bike): You take your bike for a quick trip to the bakery. There are a couple bike racks nearby, and you lock up your bike in one of them. When you return from the shop, 5 minutes later, approach the wrong bike rack and do not see your bike. Assuming it is stolen, you immediately begin yelling and demanding to know from people sitting in the area if they have seen anything. You see a young African American man sitting on a bench nearby and accuse him of knowing or doing something. Despite the man's repeated declarations of innocence, you continue to accuse him. After a few minutes, somebody points out that a bike matching your description is locked up securely in one of the other racks. You quietly thank the person for informing you and leave while the people nearby stare.

Neutral (Bike): You take your bike for a quick trip to the bakery. It is a nice sunny day and you enjoy being outside. When you get to the bakery you lock up your bike in its usual spot. You shop for about 5 minutes and get everything you need. When you return outside, you unlock your bike and ride back home.

Guilt (Bird): You are house-sitting for a friend's parents. It's a pretty easy task, actually. All you have to do is eat their food, collect the mail, and feed their bird. Everything is going just fine until one morning you discover that the bird died during the night. You turned the air conditioning on "high" during the day and forgot to turn it down at night as you had been instructed. The bird died from the excessive cold.

Shame (Bird): You are house-sitting for a friend's parents. It's a pretty easy task, actually. All you have to do is eat their food, collect the mail, and feed their bird. After a few days, you receive an invitation from a friend to go to their beach house for a long weekend. You know you shouldn't go, but the offer is just too tempting. So, you fill up the bird's food and water, leaving enough for the bird to get through several days, and go on vacation. When you return, however, you discover that the bird had knocked over the water early on, never had it replaced, and died of thirst. When your friend's parents arrive home later that same day, you have to explain what happened.

Neutral (Bird): You are house-sitting for a friend's parents. It's a pretty easy task, actually. All you have to do is eat their food, collect the mail, and feed their bird. Everything is going just fine until one morning you

discover that you forgot to latch the cage door and the bird got out of its cage. You spent the morning

trying to put it back in its cage, and were ultimately successful.

The participants read one of the six vignettes and then completed the SGSS scale (Dearing &

Tangney, 2003). Next, participants rated how much they would feel each of sixteen emotions

including shame and guilt, on a 7-point scale with endpoints, X (1) and Y (7).

Results

Overall, the bike scenario induction was much more successful at differentiating guilt and

shame than was the bird scenario. Across both scenarios (bird and bike) and both types of

emotion measures (SGSS and 16 emotion words), participants in the neutral conditions reported

that they would feel significantly less guilt and shame than those in the shame or guilt conditions

(all p's < 0.05).

Bird Scenario

Similar to the inductions in Study 1, the bird scenario failed to differentiate self-reports of

shame and guilt. Participants in the shame condition and guilt condition reported feeling similar

levels of shame as measured by the SGSS scale, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 4.09$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 3.76$, $t(57)$

$= 1.21$, $p > 0.20$ and similar levels of guilt as measured by the SGSS scale $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 4.40$,

$M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 4.32$, $t(56) = 0.34$, $p > 0.70$. Using the emotion word measures, participants

reported significant differences in emotion response between conditions, but not always in the

hypothesized direction. Consistent with hypotheses, participants in the shame condition reported

that they would feel significantly more shame than would participants in the guilt condition, as

measured by the emotion word scale, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 6.15$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 5.33$, $t(58) = 2.39$, $p = $

0.02, however, participants in the shame condition also reported that they would feel

significantly more guilt than did participants in the guilt condition $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 6.52$,

$M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 5.76$, $t(59) = 2.46$, $p < 0.02$.

Bike Scenario

For the first time, we observe successful differentiation of the two emotions. Participants

in the bike scenario shame condition reported that they would feel significantly more shame than

did people in the guilt condition as measured by the SGSS scale, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 4.11$,

$M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 3.62$, $t(76) = 2.40$, $p < 0.02$ and as measured by the emotion word scale

$M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 6.02$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 5.17$, $t(79) = 2.33$, $p = 0.02$. Participants in the guilt

condition reported that they would feel similar levels of guilt as did people in the shame

condition when we look at the SGSS measure, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 4.18$, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 4.40$, $t(82) =$

1.08, $p > 0.20$, however, when we look at the emotion word measure, participants in the guilt

condition report that they would feel marginally significantly more guilt than would participants

in the shame condition, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 6.43$, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 5.95$, $t(80) = 1.77$, $p = 0.08$.

Discussion

The results suggest that the bike scenarios were better able to differentiate guilt and

shame than were the bird scenarios. For the direct reporting of emotions on the Likert scale,

people in both the guilt and shame conditions reading the bike scenarios had stronger feelings of

the intended emotion than did participants in other conditions. This was not the case for the bird

scenario. Although the SGSS results for the Guilt factor were not what would have ideally

occurred across both the bird and the bike scenarios, the Shame factor was captured successfully

in both instances.

There may have been such different results for the bird and the bike scenarios due to the

content of the scenarios. The bird scenarios were all based on the same basic concept and

followed a similar story pattern. As a result, there may have been not enough differentiation in

the stories themselves to capture a strong difference between guilt and shame. Elements of guilt or shame may have been included in the wrong condition, causing the participants to be unsure of which emotion they were experiencing more fully.

An element in the bike scenario that may have attributed to the sharper contrast between feelings of guilt and shame occurred in the shame induction. In the shame condition, a racist action was implied. Inducing the thought that one acted in a racist manner may have caused the participants to feel more ashamed than they would have otherwise. Although the bike scenario successfully differentiated emotional responses of shame and guilt, there were several differences between the two conditions. In Study 3, we attempted to minimize unnecessary differences between the conditions while maintaining the differentiation in shameful and guilty responses.

STUDY 3

This study was designed to further refine the emotion inductions, and to capture a behavioral consequence as the result of inducing guilt and shame. De Hooge et al (2008) suggested that behavioral responses from shame are influenced based on whether the shame was endogenous or exogenous. This study examines these findings by looking at a different type of prosocial behavior, charitable giving, and also includes measures of shame and guilt.

Method

Participants

The participants in this study were 209 members of Amazon's Mturk service (77 males, 132 females, M_{age}= 34.31 SD = 12.46) who received $ 0.05 and a 1/300 chance at $30 for completing a short online survey.

Procedure

Participants were first presented with either a guilt inducing, shame inducing, or neutral scenario. Following the emotion inductions, the participants were presented with the same emotion manipulation checks from Study 2 (the SGSS and the 16-word emotion scale). While the shame induction was identical to the one used in the previous study, the guilt and neutral conditions changed. This time, the scenarios used for all three conditions were extremely similar, with subtle differences in them designed to induce guilt or shame. I based the new guilt and neutral scenarios off the previously used shame induction because it was so successful at eliciting the targeted emotion. This change was made because the scenarios in the previous conditions were so different from one another that it called into question the validity of the induction and did not allow me to determine the subtle distinctions required to induce guilt or shame. The scenarios used in this study were as follows:

Guilt: You take your bike for a quick trip to the bakery. There are a couple of bike racks nearby, and you lock up your bike in one of them. When you return from the shop, 5 minutes later, you approach the wrong bike rack and do not see your bike. Assuming it is stolen, you immediately begin yelling and demanding to know from people sitting in the area if they have seen anything. You see a young man sitting on a bench nearby and accuse him of knowing or doing something. Despite the man's repeated declarations of innocence, you continue to accuse him. After a few minutes, somebody points out that a bike matching your description is locked up securely in one of the other racks. You quietly thank the person for informing you and then you get on your bike and leave.

Shame: You take your bike for a quick trip to the bakery. There are a couple of bike racks nearby, and you lock up your bike in one of them. When you return from the shop, 5 minutes later, you approach the wrong bike rack and do not see your bike. Assuming it is stolen, you immediately begin yelling and demanding to know from people sitting in the area if they have seen anything. You see a young African American man sitting on a bench nearby and accuse him of knowing or doing something. Despite the man's repeated declarations of innocence, you continue to accuse him. After a few minutes, somebody points out that a

bike matching your description is locked up securely in one of the other racks. You quietly thank the person for informing you and then get on your bike and leave.

Neutral: You take your bike for a quick trip to the bakery. There are a couple of bike racks nearby, and you lock up your bike in one of them. When you return from the shop, 5 minutes later, you approach the bike rack and unlock your bike. You begin talking to the people in the area and ask them if they have seen anything while they have been sitting there. You see a young man sitting on a bench nearby and ask him if he knows or has done anything interesting today. After a few minutes, somebody points out that it is getting late in the day. You thank the person for informing you and then you get on your bike and leave.

After the emotion induction and manipulation checks, the participants completed a decision task designed to measure the likelihood that they would behave prosocially. They were told that, shortly after leaving the bike rack area, they had the opportunity to donate to a charity via a person soliciting donations. In the endogenous guilt and shame conditions, the person soliciting for the charity was the same person the individual accused of stealing his or her bike. In the exogenous guilt and shame conditions, it was a different, unrelated person soliciting the donations. Participants were asked how likely they would be to donate to that charity, and how much they would be likely to donate if they chose to do so. Based on my predictions, I should expect to see people who are in the guilt condition being more inclined to approach and donate a greater amount of money.

Results

Manipulation Check

The emotion inductions were only moderately successful at differentially inducing shame and guilt. Participants in the shame condition reported that they would feel marginally significantly more shame than did people in the guilt condition as measured by the SGSS scale,

$M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 4.02$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 3.78$, $t(179) = 1.95$, $p = 0.06$ and as measured by the

emotion word scale $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 5.66$, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 5.25$, $t(177) = 1.69$, $p = 0.09$. Contrary

to expectations, participants in the guilt condition reported similar levels of guilt to participants

in the shame condition as measured by the SGSS scale, $M_{\text{GuiltCondition}} = 4.17$, $M_{\text{ShameCondition}} = 4.24$,

$t(175) = 0.57$, $p > 0.50$, and participants in the guilt condition reported that they actually would

feel marginally significantly less guilt than did participants in the shame condition as measured

by the emotion word measure.

Main Analysis

Despite the lack of consistency with the emotion self-reports, the behavioral study

yielded some interesting results. Participants in the guilt condition reported that they would give

significantly more money to the charity when the person requesting the donation was the person

that the participant had wronged earlier (endogenous condition) compared to when the person

requesting the donation was unrelated to the prior situation (exogenous condition), $M_{\text{Endogenous}} =$

17.94, $M_{\text{Exogenous}} = \$3.72$, $t(87) = 3.34$, $p < 0.01$. Participants in the shame condition also

reported that they would give significantly more money to the charity when the person

requesting the donation was the person that the participant had wronged earlier (endogenous

condition) compared to when the person requesting the donation was unrelated to the prior

situation (exogenous condition), $M_{\text{Endogenous}} = \$15.20$, $M_{\text{Exogenous}} = \$8.80$, $t(89) = 2.19$, $p < 0.05$.

The interaction between emotion condition and exogenous condition was not statistically

significant, $F(3,176) = 1.89$, $p = 0.17$. Participants in the neutral condition consistently reported

feeling less shame and guilt, regardless of measurement method, than did participants in the

shame and guilt conditions, all p's <0.0005.

For both guilt and shame conditions, whether the emotion was endogenous or exogenous had an effect on how likely the participants were to approach the man and donate to his charity. Participants had a higher likelihood of donating if they were feeling endogenous guilt or shame rather than exogenous. (See Figure 2)

In short, participants in the guilt condition were significantly more likely to donate more money to the charity if they were experiencing endogenous guilt rather than exogenous. The amount donated in the shame condition was not as stratified for endogenous versus exogenous guilt, but there was still a difference demonstrated. (See Figure 3)

Discussion

In general, the manipulation check was not quite as strong as one would have hoped. These scenarios combined some of the stronger elements from the scenarios in the first two studies, but failed to capture the nuances between guilt and shame as clearly as the scenarios in Study 2. The scenarios for guilt and shame were extremely similar, with the one difference being that the guilty individual accused a man of stealing his/her bike while the shamed individual accused an African American man of stealing his/her bike. Doing it this way ensured that there was some consistency across the situations, and that one was not in general stronger than the other (as seen with the bird/bike scenarios). Additionally, the element of racism was left in the shame condition because it was so powerful previously, but it did not seem quite as overpowering this time. Despite this, results showed that participants in the shame condition felt as guilty as participants in the guilt condition. This is most likely due to the fact that the action, or the "bad thing done," was essentially the same for both the guilt and shame conditions. Participants in both conditions falsely accused someone of stealing their bike, which could have led to similar feelings of guilt in both conditions. Participants in the shame condition did report feeling more shame than did those in the guilt condition, an effect that was likely due to the

inclusion of the element of racism in the shame condition. This caused the participants in the shame to not only feel bad about the action, but also bad about themselves for displaying this racist behavior.

The results showing the tendency toward prosocial behavior for participants induced with guilt or shame were similar to my predictions, though not completely exact. There was a significant difference between those in the endogenous and exogenous conditions and willingness to approach to donate. The participants in the endogenous conditions donated more, which was in line with my initial hypothesis. Despite this success, I also predicted a similar effect for guilt, which was not supported by the data. I believed initially that those feeling guilty would be more inclined to approach and donate overall, thus there were be less of a difference between the amount donated in the endogenous and exogenous conditions. These were actually the results I obtained for the shame condition. However, due to lack of strength in the inductions themselves, I believe these results need to be further tested to make sure they are accurate and consistent.

General Discussion

Through this series of studies, I have been able to determine both successful and unsuccessful methods of inducing guilt and shame. Furthermore, I have been able to use these inductions to determine the extent to which guilt and shame, both moral emotions, motivate prosocial behavior in the field of charitable giving. This research is significant because it gives insight into what will motivate people to give back to others. Although guilt and shame can sometimes be seen as ugly emotions, it is comforting to know that they can, in turn, motivate

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Comment [MSOffice47]: Again make sure all of this is consistent with the results.

Deleted: I was not only surprised to see that people in the shame conditions did not donate more depending on whether they were feeling endogenous or exogenous shame, but also that people in the shame condition overall donated more. This was not something I expected. Overall, it is important to keep in mind that, while the data shows some interesting trends that both prove and disprove my initial theories, a stronger induction is necessary in order to ensure that guilt and shame are being properly captured and represented in an experiment measuring prosocial behavior tendencies.

Comment [J48]: I know this is a section that is usually included in papers. However, I started writing one before I realized that I was repeating everything I said before because we only had one study that dealt with behavioral measures. Let me know if you agree or disagree with this thought, or if what I'm saying makes sense at all. I tended to carry my analyses over from one discussion section to the next regardless, but if this section is needed I can try to work something in

Comment [MSOffice49]: You should do a brief recap of the studies overall what they mean, and then and the "directions for further research" section can be included under the "general discussion" section.

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behavior that betters others or society. Despite these results, more studies and future research are needed to obtain more definitive conclusions.

There are many options for next steps for this work. One option is to start from the beginning and develop new emotion inductions that are stronger and more consistent. Another option would be to use the bike scenarios that worked so well in Study 2 as the inductions for a second round of the behavioral study. Although there is some concern that there were too many differences between the shame and guilt conditions used in Study 2, it may be best to ensure that we can elicit self-reports of the intended emotion. Regardless, ensuring a stronger emotion induction is necessary in order to be certain that the measure of prosocial behavioral tendencies for endogenous and exogenous guilt and shame is valid.

Another possible direction for continuation of this research would be to run a study that relied on real decisions or behavior. The studies I conducted employed hypothetical manipulations and measures. It would be even more beneficial to try to measure how they actually do act once they are induced with guilt and shame.

Finally, de Hooge et al (2008) suggested that their results and findings on endogenous and exogenous shame could not necessarily be generalized to all moral emotions. My studies, however, showed that guilt can also have endogenous and exogenous components. A future avenue for research may be to identify other moral emotions, such as anger, embarrassment, or gratitude, and see if the pattern holds for them as well. Perhaps all moral emotions are affected by whether they are endogenous or exogenous, or perhaps this distinction is unique to guilt and shame because they are so similar. Running a study such as this could give more insight into all moral emotions and their differing effects on prosocial behavioral tendencies.

Conclusion

It is clear that guilt and shame are separate emotions that motivate different types of behavioral patterns. Despite the fact that most people have trouble differentiating between these moral emotions in day to day situations, empirical studies have shown that while they are similar, they are not the same. The studies I did were successful in expanding upon existing research. Taking the lead from de Hooge et al (2008), I was able to look at both endogenous and exogenous components of guilt, something that has not been studied previously. Furthermore, following Ketelaar and Au (2003) and de Hooge et al (2007), I examined the extent to which moral emotions, guilt and shame specifically, can motivate prosocial behavior. The prosocial behavior I studied, charitable giving, was shown to be enhanced by the induction of guilt and shame. These findings pave the way for future studies designed to further test the prosocial implications of guilt, shame, and other moral emotions.

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
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Figure Captions

Figure 1. Cycle showing how shame and guilt are linked (Piers & Singer, 1953)

Figure 2. Likelihood of participants to approach and donate depending upon condition

Figure 3. Amount participants would be likely to donate

Figure 1.

sexual impulse → guilt → inhibition and/or regression → shame → sexual acting out → guilt

Figure 2.

Figure 3.

Appendix A: State Shame and Guilt Scale (SGSS) [with a sample induction]

INSTRUCTIONS:
Please read the following scenario. When you have finished, please answer how strongly you would relate to the following statements on a scale of 1-5, where 1 means you are not feeling that way at all and 5 means you are feeling that way very strongly:

You take your bike for a quick trip to the bakery. There are a couple of bike racks nearby, and you lock up your bike in one of them. When you return from the shop, 5 minutes later, you approach the wrong bike rack and do not see your bike. Assuming it is stolen, you immediately begin yelling and demanding to know from people sitting in the area if they have seen anything. You see a young African American man sitting on a bench nearby and accuse him of knowing or doing something. Despite the man's repeated declarations of innocence, you continue to accuse him. After a few minutes, somebody points out that a bike matching your description is locked up securely in one of the other racks. You quietly thank the person for informing you and then get on your bike and leave.

1. I would feel good about myself
12345

2. I would want to sink into the floor and disappear.
12345

3. I would feel remorse, regret.
12345

4. I would feel worthwhile, valuable.
12345

5. I would feel small.
12345

6. I would feel tension about something I have done.
12345

7. I would feel capable, useful.
12345

8. I would feel like I am a bad person.
12345

9. I would not stop thinking about something bad I have done.
12345

10. I would feel proud.
12345

11. I would feel humiliated, disgraced.
12345

12. I would feel like apologizing, confessing.
12345

13. I would feel pleased about something I have done.
12345

14. I would feel worthless, powerless.
12345

15. I would feel bad about something I have done.
12345

Each scale consists of 5 items:

- **Shame –** Items 2, 5, 8, 11, 14

- **Guilt –** Items 3, 6, 9, 12, 15

- **Pride –** Items 1, 4, 7, 10, 13

Appendix B: 7 Point Emotion Rating Scale

Please rate the extent to which you would feel each of the following emotions. A "1" rating means that you would not experience that emotion at all. A "7" means that you would experience that emotion more strongly than ever before.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sorry	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Happy	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Sad	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Guilty	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Indifferent	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Neutral	◉	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Unemotional	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Blue	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Disgusted	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Nauseated	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Shameful	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Ashamed	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Fearful	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Afraid	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Angry	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎
Mad	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎

Appendix C: Sample Donation Question

As you are riding around later on your bike, you see the man that you accused of stealing your bike standing behind a table soliciting donations for a local charity. How likely is it that you would approach the man and donate to the charity that he is representing?

Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Likely	Very Likely
◎	◎	◎	◎	◎

How much do you think you would donate? (If you think you would not stop by the donation table at all, please choose $0)

◎ $0

◎ $5

◎ $20

◎ $50

◎ Other

| Page 4: [1] Deleted | Carey Morewedge | 4/29/2009 10:43:00 AM |

Outside the psychoanalytic realm, theorists and researchers have

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the result of certain kinds of situations that lead to experiencing these emotions

| Page 4: [3] Comment [CKM9] | Carey Morewedge | 4/29/2009 10:44:00 AM |

Don't begin a sentence with however.

| Page 7: [4] Deleted | Jackie | 4/29/2009 4:59:00 PM |

| Page 7: [5] Comment [MSOffice19] | | 4/26/2009 11:25:00 AM |

This information under "guilt and shame as moral emotions" is very general – more general than about shame and guilt, and so it probably fits better earlier in the paper. Usually you want the content of your paper to flow like an hourglass shape – start very broad, become more specific down to the detail of your experiments, then become more broad again at the end in your conclusions.

**Jackie: I definitely agree with this comment, however I'm worried it would mess up the structure of the paper. The section on moral emotions leads into the empirical research that precedes my research – I'm not sure how it would work if we switched the order. Any thoughts? (either Cindy or Carey)

| Page 7: [6] Comment [CKM22] | Carey Morewedge | 4/29/2009 11:17:00 AM |

It's not helpful to the reader to just list ciations. Explain in clear language the other finding that motivated the subsequent work.

| Page 8: [7] Deleted | Jackie | 4/29/2009 6:03:00 PM |

 In all four experiments, the researchers had to assess whether the participants were

prosocial or proself by nature. They did this by using the Triple Dominance Measure of

Social Value Orientations. [CKM1] Anybody who was not classified into one of the two categories had their results dropped from the analysis. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were run identically, with their only difference being the method of emotion induction. Participants were first induced with shame, either imagined shame (Experiment 1), recalled shame (Experiment 2), or experienced shame (Experiment 3). Following this emotion induction, the participants continued with a 10-coin give-some dilemma game. In this game, the participants had 10 coins and were instructed to split them between themselves and another individual[CKM2]. In order to create the exogenous vs. endogenous conditions, the participants were coupled with different interaction partners. In the exogenous condition, the interaction partner was unaware of and unrelated to the shame event, while in the endogenous condition, the interaction partner was related to and aware of the shame event. In the fourth experiment, the participants were given the induction used in experiment 1, but then they measured prosocial tendencies in everyday behavior using a nine item Prosocial Tendencies Scale.[CKM3]

T

Page 9: [8] Comment [MSOffice28]			4/23/2009 7:07:00 PM

I would put the table in the spot where you have it, and add a paragraph right here that introduces and summarizes the table.

Page 9: [9] Comment [CKM29]	Carey Morewedge		4/29/2009 11:29:00 AM

Again, you need to summarize this rather than pilfering others' work.

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The table below, taken from De Hooge et al's 2008, shows the differences between guilt and shame

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according to emotion literature

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. It breaks down the two emotions into their separate components and highlights how they differ from one another. The most recent research has shown that guilt and shame are both elicited by moral transgressions or incompetence, in the instance of shame. However, guilty people feel they are bad people who have caused damage, while ashamed people believe they are weak and are the center of attention because of their weakness. Most of the empirical research thus far has generally shown that someone experiencing guilt tends to make up for their wrongdoing, while someone experiencing shame tends to hide or withdraw from the situation and others (this table does not include the findings of De Hooge et al's 2008 study regarding endogenous and exogenous shame[CKM4]).

Page 9: [13] Comment [J30]	Jackie	4/23/2009 7:07:00 PM

Really like this table, I think it summarizes the last 7 pages or so pretty effectively…it comes from the De Hooge, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans 2008 paper. Just wanted some input on where/how to include it, so for now I just stuck it here

Page 9: [14] Deleted	Jackie	4/29/2009 7:20:00 PM

TABLE 1
Differences between guilt and shame according to emotion literature

	Emotion		
	Guilt	Shame	Reference
Eliciting event	Moral transgression	Moral transgression or incompetence	Baumeister et al., 1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1996
Appraisal	Done damage	Centre of attention	Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991
Self-experience	Bad person	Weak person	Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Fischer, 1995
Action tendency	Make up for wrongdoing	Hide/withdraw	Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney et al., 1996

Page 9: [15] Comment [CKM31]	Carey Morewedge	4/29/2009 11:30:00 AM

What do you mean here?

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As researchers have come to gain

To gain a better understanding of the

qualities[CKM5] separating guilt and shame,

been able to design and execute

conducted studies that look past the emotions themselves and into the behavioral

consequences of experiencing guilt and shame. As shown in Ketelaar and Au (2003), De

Hooge et al (2007), and De Hooge et al (2008), guilt and shame have been tested on

behavior together and separately using various inductions and measures. The inductions

have included

hypothetical scenarios that elicited guilt and shame, scenarios that required recal

 of past guilty or shameful experiences, and real-time emotion inductions that

e participants false feedback on an ''intelligence test''

to make them feel guilty or ashamed. Assessments of guilt and shame on behavior were

seen through cooperation games and cooperation scales. (Ketelaar & Au, 2003, De

Hooge et al, 2007, De Hooge et al, 2008)

Danish

Guilt and shame have been studied to a great extent separately.

A possible explanation for this is the fact that, for many years, people were unsure of

how to separate guilt from shame.

there are few experiments that test them together. A possible explanation for this is the

fact that, for many years, people were unsure of how to separate guilt from shame.

Thus, testing one of those emotions seemed to capture enough of a result. However, as

we learn more about guilt and shame as independent emotions, it is

Testing them simultaneously not only

allows a direct behavioral comparison, but it allows for people to learn more about the

nuances between guilt and shame and what is required to elicit one rather than the other.

The research I have done first studied different scenario based inductions of guilt

and shame.

primary

is

thesis

wa

I was trying to determine what types of inductions

would best

 these emotions with as little guilt felt in the shame condition as possible, and vice versa.

Once I identified a successful induction, and after modifying that even more

, I tested participants to see

act based on feelings of

In this

study, my

to determine whether people would

 doing something

that might cause them to feel

In line with previous results,

hypothesized

those

Didn't we predict that shame would work exogeneously?

money [MSOffice7]

[MSOffice8]

Dis