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Arguments with Khomeini: Rhetorical situation and persuasive style in cross-cultural perspective

BARBARA JOHNSTONE

Abstract

In 1979, the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci was granted an interview with Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. The interview turned into an abusive argument. Examination of the text of the interview suggests what went wrong. Explanations focus on two levels: the level of strategies of logical argumentation, and the level of choices of overall persuasive style, logical versus analogical. There are cultural reasons for Khomeini's and Fallaci's predisposition to use different rhetorical strategies on both levels; however, rhetorical strategies emerge in particular situations, and interlocutors communicating in good faith can adapt to one another's styles.

1. Introduction

More often than not, studies of cross-cultural communication arise from observations of cross-cultural miscommunication. This study is no exception; it has as its starting point an extreme example of what can go wrong when two people with very different epistemologies and norms for communicative behavior, as well as apparently clashing personalities, attempt to use language to change each other's minds. The result is not the sort of subtle lack of understanding that makes people say 'I'm not sure whether I knew what he was talking about', or 'Somehow I didn't feel as if I was getting my point across'. Rather, the result is crude verbal violence and complete failure to communicate.

One advantage of looking at extreme examples like the one I will discuss is that there is no question that what is going on is problematic, as 'bad' as
a sentence like 'Colorless green ideas sleep furiously' is bad. Another reason for looking at egregious miscommunications is that they are very common, more common than one would like to think. The sorts of problems I will deal with here are the kind which lead people to give up on verbal communication and resort to violence, the problems which can lead to brutality, terrorism, and war. If the two intelligent and, in other contexts, articulate interlocutors I will discuss can so utterly fail to communicate, it is easy to see how little it takes for people who are less intelligent and less articulate to start hitting.

The failed communication I will look at is an interview by a Western journalist, Oriana Fallaci, with the Ayatollah Khomeini, carried out in 1979. After describing the text in detail and showing what goes wrong in it, I will suggest several ways of talking about failures in rhetorical communication, communication which is intended to be persuasive. While the interviewer in the text I will examine is Italian and the interviewee Iranian, this is not a comparison of Italian and Iranian 'rhetorical styles'; I will argue in the final section of the paper that the notion of a direct correlation between 'culture' and 'rhetoric' is a simplistic one which obscures the multitude of factors that are responsible for an individual's choice of persuasive tactics in a particular situation.

2. Anatomy of a communicative collapse

On October 7, 1979, in the middle of the Iran hostage crisis and when U.S. relations with Iran were at their worst, the New York Times Magazine published as its lead article an interview with the Ayatollah Khomeini (Fallaci, 1979). The interviewer, Oriana Fallaci, is an Italian journalist known for interviews which are incisive and revealing, if sometimes uncomfortable for the interviewees. Fallaci's interview with Khomeini was revealing, but not in the usual way. What the text of Fallaci's talks with Khomeini reveals is a quick and total communicative breakdown, a breakdown that can be accounted for in part with reference to the radically different persuasive strategies of the two discussants, and, at a deeper level, to differences in cultural models of what language is and how language is to be used.

The format of the interview is the standard question and answer sequence, but because Fallaci talks almost as much as Khomeini does and expresses opinions which conflict with Khomeini's, the talk is more like a heated
conversation than like a neutral fact-finding session. The interview took place in Qum, the city where Khomeini resides, at a religious school. After waiting ten days for an audience, Fallaci spent two sessions, on successive days, with Khomeini, accompanied by two Iranian translators. During these sessions, Fallaci sat on a carpet facing Khomeini, dressed at least part of the time in a chador, the black covering worn by some Moslem women. The Times article is headed by a description of the setting and a photo of Fallaci with Khomeini.

Fallaci begins the interview by challenging Khomeini, asking whether there is freedom in Iran, whether Khomeini is a dictator, and whether the fanatic Iranian mobs are dangerous. The following excerpt, from the beginning of the text, illustrates her style, as well as Khomeini’s.

*Fallaci:* . . . But you frighten people, as I said. And even this mob which calls your name is frightening. What do you feel — hearing them calling out like this, day and night, knowing that they are there, all of them there sitting for hours, being shoved about, suffering, just to see you for a moment, and to sing your praises?

*Khomeini:* I enjoy it. I enjoy hearing and seeing them. Because they are the same ones who rose up to throw out the internal and external enemies. Because their applause is the continuation of the cry with which the usurper was thrown out. It is good that they continue to be agitated, because the enemies have not disappeared. Until the country has settled down, the people must remain fired up, ready to march and attack again. In addition, this is love, an intelligent love. It is impossible not to enjoy it.

There is talk about other general ideas: freedom, democracy, censorship, the political left. In this section of the interview, Fallaci becomes increasingly insistent on definitions. One feels that she is surprised by Khomeini’s responses and needs to make sure that she and he are really talking about the same issues. She begins to ask questions like these:

So, when you speak of ‘the people,’ you refer exclusively to the people connected with the Islamic movement.

At this point, Imam, I must ask you what you mean by freedom.

And by democracy, what do you mean, Imam?

Soon after this question about democracy, the first clear signs of a break-
down in the discussion begin to appear. Fallaci and Khomeini are unable to agree about what ‘democracy’ means, and Khomeini says,

If you foreigners do not understand, too bad for you. It’s none of your business, you have nothing to do with our choices. If some Iranians don’t understand it, too bad for them. It means that they have not understood Islam.

The discussion now shifts into specifics. Fallaci asks about the five hundred executions that took place after the revolution in Iran, about the rebellious Kurds, about the Shah, the Shah’s sister Farah Diba, deposed prime minister Bakhtiar, the Islamic law of the four wives, the music of Bach. The debate becomes more acrimonious and personal. Fallaci lists the ways Iranian women are segregated and the things they may not do, ending with:

... By the way, how do you swim in a chador?

Khomeini answers:

This is none of your business. Our customs are none of your business. If you do not like Islamic dress you are not obliged to wear it. Because Islamic dress is for good and proper women.

Immediately thereafter, Fallaci strips off what she calls ‘this stupid, medieval rag’. Shortly thereafter, Khomeini throws her out:

And now that’s enough. Go away. Go away.

The report in the Times of Fallaci’s interaction with Khomeini does little, in the end, to give readers any clear idea of what Khomeini thinks. While the text has shock and entertainment value, it is far from being what we would think of as a successful interview. Khomeini and Fallaci both come out sounding nasty and vituperative, and appearing to be poor communicators. There is external as well as internal evidence that things did not go as well as at least Khomeini would have liked: Shortly after the interview was published, Khomeini, described in a Time article (1979) as ‘still fuming about his unflattering portrayal’ in it, refused to speak to Western journalists again.

Let us turn now to a more detailed analysis of the interview, to uncover exactly what went wrong.
3. Uses of argument

Khomeini’s and Fallaci’s talk, at least in the first half of the interview, is persuasive in intent (if not in effect). That is, each interlocutor is trying to make the other believe his or her claims: Khomeini’s supporters are fanatics (Fallaci); Iranian leftists did not fight or suffer during the revolution (Khomeini); and so on. One way of examining what goes awry in all of these attempts to persuade is to look at the *argumentation* used by the interlocutors in the interview, that is, at the ways they use propositions to provide support for other propositions.

The model I will use to describe Khomeini’s and Fallaci’s argumentation is one which is based on the Aristotelian notion of the syllogism, the three-part structure in which a major premise (a generally accepted statement, like ‘All men are mortal’) and a minor premise (a true statement about the situation at hand, like ‘Socrates is a man’) are placed together to demonstrate the validity of a conclusion (‘Socrates is mortal’). Specifically, my model is based on that of Toumin (1958), from whom the title of this section is borrowed.\(^2\) The model is illustrated, with an example, in Figure 1.

\[\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Data} & \text{Claim} \\
\hline
\text{It's snowing} & \text{so, our guests will probably arrive late} \\
\hline
\text{since people are often delayed when it snows} & \\
\hline
\text{because snow makes driving difficult} & \\
\hline
\text{because the roads get slippery} & \\
\hline
\text{because snow reduces friction} & \\
\hline
\text{Ground of the argument} & \text{because that's the way the physical universe is}
\end{array}\]

Figure 1: *A model of argumentation*
The way the model works is this: Whenever a person makes a claim of any sort, like ‘Our guests will probably arrive late’, he or she is accountable for producing, if asked to, the data on which the claim is based (‘It’s snowing’). In arguments like this one, a speaker is usually not called on to state exactly what relationship between the data and the claim (or what reason) serves to make the data support the claim. But the proposition which connects the two underlies the argument, and can be made overt if necessary (‘People are often delayed when it snows’).

So far, the model replicates the three-part syllogism, with ‘data’ as minor premise, ‘claim’ as conclusion, and ‘reason’ as major premise. But, as Toulmin points out (and as anyone with a three-year-old child knows), there is more than one level of reasons for claims. If pressed, an arguer is responsible for stating a whole series of reasons for reasons and reasons for those reasons, to the point at which there simply aren’t, in the arguer’s world, any more reasons. At this point, the arguer has reached his or her ground level, the point at which the only thing to say is ‘Because that’s just the way things are’, ‘Because God made it that way’, or ‘Because I said so’.

There are several ways in which Khomeini’s way of arguing differs from Fallaci’s. The first has to do with what counts as an acceptable relationship between a datum and a claim. Fallaci begins the interview by saying:

Imam Khomeini, the entire country is in your hands. Every decision you make is an order. So there are many in your country who say that in Iran there is no freedom, that the revolution did not bring freedom.

Fallaci’s claim is ‘In Iran there is no freedom’; her datum is ‘The entire country is in your hands’. The relationship, or reason, if made explicit, is ‘If the entire country is in one person’s hands, there is no freedom’. This sounds acceptable to New York Times readers; we are used to this sort of conception of what constitutes freedom.

We do not have the same reaction to Khomeini’s response, however. Khomeini says:

Iran is not in my hands. It is in the hands of the people, because it was the people who handed the country over to the person who is their servant, and who wants only what is good for them.

This argument involves a claim (‘Iran is not in my hands’) and a datum (‘The
people handed the country over to me") which are related through a concept of freedom with which we are not so familiar: 'If people put themselves under someone else's control, they have shown that they are free'. Our difficulty with this notion is what makes it so odd to hear East Bloc officials claiming that their countries are free, and it is at the heart of the debate about religious cults and 'deprogramming'.

There are many examples of this sort of difference in the interview: differences between the two interlocutors' assumptions about what can count as a datum for a given claim. But there is another kind of difference between Fallaci's and Khomeini's arguments, which works on a much deeper level and has more important consequences: Khomeini constantly makes explicit mention of the ground of his arguments, the deepest, most basic presumption on which all others rest. In doing this, he makes use of an argumentative strategy which is very different from that of Fallaci.

For Khomeini, the ultimate reason for everything is Islam. Islam is the ground of every argument, and Khomeini makes this repeatedly clear:

I act for [the people's] good. That is, to apply the Commandments of Islam. Islam is justice. Dictatorship is the greatest sin in the religion of Islam. Fascism and Islam are absolutely incompatible.

For Islam, The people fought for Islam. And Islam means everything, all those things that, in your world, are called freedom, democracy. Yes, Islam contains everything. Islam includes everything. Islam is everything.3

To begin with, the word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word near the word Islam, which is perfect.

It is not surprising that Islam should be the ground of all of Khomeini's arguments. What is surprising, however, is that he continually makes explicit mention of his ground. We would find it very strange if Fallaci were ever to say 'Christianity is justice', or 'Western democracy is perfect', or 'Islam is evil'.4 She does not, and in fact we are never sure just what the grounds of her arguments are.

Each party in an argumentative dialogue would like to be the one to set the ground for the arguments, since the ground determines what kind of arguments can be made. In the course of an argument, each arguer makes attempts, some subtle, some not, to shift the ground to where he or she wants it. One way of establishing the ground is to make explicit mention of the
ground on which one wants the debate to be based. But this is a risky strategy:
If one arguer offers his or her ground in this way and the other arguer refuses
to accept it, the dialogue is stalemated. Once a person has said ‘Islam is
perfect’, or ‘Communism must be wiped out at all cost’, it would be an ad-
mission of defeat to have to say, ‘Well, maybe Islam isn’t perfect’, or ‘Maybe
Communism isn’t all that bad’. For this reason, the strategy of stating one’s
ground is used mainly in situations in which there is little risk of the ground’s
not being accepted. A politician might say ‘Communism must be eradicated’
to a group of conservative Americans, but in a group of third-world leaders,
his attempts to establish this ground for argument would be far more subtle.
The risk of mentioning one’s ground also accounts for the impassioned
quality of arguments in which people do this.

Certainly, Khomeini’s overt statements of his argumentative ground create
a sense of passion. But as steps in a strategy for winning arguments with
Fallaci, they fail. Fallaci clearly does not think Islam is perfect; every time
Khomeini makes overt mention of Islam, Fallaci abruptly changes the subject,
as we see in the following interchange:

*Khomeini:* ... Islam includes everything. Islam is everything.

*Fallaci:* At this point, Imam, I must ask you what you mean by freedom.

Through Fallaci’s rejection of Khomeini’s argumentative ground, Khomeini is
left at the end of his resources, and by never making her argumentative
ground explicit, Fallaci is able to keep the talk going the way she wants it to
go.

The breakdown which results from this clash of argumentative strategies
begins to be evident in the middle of the interview. Khomeini begins to say,
‘Stop talking about these things. I am tired’, and ‘Enough. I have said enough’.
He no longer mentions Islam. From the perspective of a revolutionary Shiite,
perhaps Khomeini has no other choice but to end the discussion; in refusing
to accept what for him is the only ground on which arguments can be built,
Fallaci misses the point of everything Khomeini is trying to say. But from a
Western perspective, Fallaci is the winner. Khomeini’s strategy has failed, and
he appears out of control and foolish.

What accounts for this? Why should a leader of Khomeini’s stature, who
has, after all, lived extensively in the West, seem to be such a poor persuader,
to the extent of choosing an argumentative strategy that is bound to fail in
this context? For one thing, it is in the nature of an interview that the inter-
viewer is in the stronger position from the outset. The interviewer controls the discussion by suggesting topics, and can thus propose or reject argumentative grounds. Fallaci is free to, and does, say things like ‘Let’s talk about freedom and democracy, Imam, and let’s do it like this’, or ‘Let’s consider for a moment the justice administered by the clergy, Imam’. And Fallaci is a skilled interviewer whose fame rests largely on her ability to exploit her subjects’ argumentative weaknesses.

For another thing, as we have seen, the facts and values Khomeini uses in constructing his arguments are very different from those used by Fallaci. He appeals to reasons for his claims which, for a Westerner, do not constitute proof. Moreover, because the ground for all his arguments (Islam is everything) is not shared by his Western audience, the essential agreement on which an argumentative dialogue is built is never established.

There is, however, another explanation for Khomeini’s and Fallaci’s failure to communicate. The foregoing description of the interview, while it explains part of what went wrong, is based on an analysis of logical argumentation, and logical argumentation is only one of the many ways in which people persuade other people of things. In what follows, I turn to an analysis of another strategy of persuasion which is evident in the interview.

4. Analogical persuasion

We have so far proceeded on the tacit assumption that persuasion is entirely the result of argumentation. This assumption underlies a great deal of Western theorizing about persuasion; it has its roots in classical sources like Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, in which rhetorical persuasion is seen as ‘the counterpart of dialectic’, and is described in terms similar to those used to describe demonstrative logical proof. People do, clearly, persuade each other by means of argumentation. However, there are other ways of persuading. Let us now look again at what goes on in the Khomeini-Fallaci interview with an eye to seeing what else, besides argumentation, is happening.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Khomeini’s talk throughout the interview is his frequent and insistent use of parables and analogies. For example, he tells this story about Ali and the Jew:

When Ali [the seventh-century Imam whom Shiite Moslems believe to be the first rightful Moslem leader after Muhammad] succeeded the Prophet, and
became head of the Islamic state — and this consideration had all the power, and his reign extended from Saudi Arabia to Egypt, and included a large part of Asia and also of Europe — he happened to have a dispute with a Jew. And the Jew had him called by the judge, and Ali accepted the summons of the judge, and went to him. And when he entered the room, the judge stood up, but Ali said to him angrily, 'Why do you stand up when I enter the room but not when the Jew entered? Before a judge the two contending parties should be treated the same way.' Afterward, he accepted the sentence, which was unfavorable to him. I ask you, you who know history, can you give me a better example of democracy?

Khomeini also uses elaborate analogies, like the following:

If your finger suffers from gangrene, what do you do? Do you let the whole hand, and then the body, become filled with gangrene, or do you cut the finger off? What brings corruption to an entire country and its people must be pulled up like the weeds that infest a field of wheat.

When we have been bitten by a snake, we are even afraid of a piece of rope which from afar looks like a snake. And you have bitten us too much, and too long.

I shall say this. We are like the child that is only six months old. Our revolution is only six months old. And it is a revolution that took place in a country that was eaten alive like a field of wheat infested with locusts. We are at the beginning of our road. What do you expect of a child that is six months old, born in a field filled with locusts, after 2,500 years of bad harvests and 50 years of poisonous harvests? That past cannot be wiped out in a few months, not even in a few years. We need time.

What Khomeini is doing here and in many other places in the interview is to attempt to persuade Fallaci by making her associate the world they are discussing with another world, having her make a lateral jump from the situation at hand to a set of terms in which it can be seen. The relationship between the two is never explicit, and it is not a 'logical' one: The six-month-old child in the final analogy above has no temporal or causal relationship with Iran; neither is Iran really similar to a child. Rather, the listener is invited to imagine the idea of the child superimposed on the idea of Iran, so that Iran is seen through it. This is the basic principle of metaphor, the kind of horizontal reasoning that G. Bateson calls 'abduction' (1979: 139), a term which contrasts nicely with the vertical 'induction' and 'deduction' which figure so strongly in argumentative modes of persuading.
Americans are familiar with parables and analogies like Khomeini’s from the Bible, which persuades in much the same way as Khomeini tries to persuade. Perhaps this, together with his appearance, is what makes Khomeini remind us of an old-testament prophet. But we are also familiar with the parables and analogies which form a crucial part of our everyday rhetorical environment — except that we do not give them those labels and we do not think of them as persuasive. The stories people tell about ‘When I was your age’ or about stupid things they did can function as parables, providing a moral point in addition to their phatic and entertainment value. The proverbs for which people remember their grandparents are based on analogy: ‘People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones’; ‘The early bird gets the worm’. While argumentation is our canonical model for persuasion, the model we learn in elementary composition and public-speaking classes, analogical persuasion is equally available to us, in certain situations.

The problem in the Khomeini-Fallaci text is that a formal journalistic interview is not one of the situations in which we expect analogical strategies of persuasion to occur. Khomeini’s parables and analogies sound out of place, and, while interpretable, not immediately relevant to the situation at hand. So another part of the explanation for the communicative breakdown in the interview has to do with conflicting notions on the part of the two participants as to how persuasion is best effected, both in general and in the immediate situation.

5. Persuasive style, cultural norms, and rhetorical situation

Western scholars, and Westerners in general, think of language in an objectivist, instrumental way. Both in theorizing about language and in everyday talk about language, our view of what language is, and what we do with it, is instrumental: Language is seen as a tool. This controlling metaphor has given rise to some of linguistic theorists’ key assumptions about language, including the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and other notions about the separate-ness of form and function, deep and surface structure. The meaning, for us, is not in the words, but behind them; the words themselves really don’t matter as long as one can discern the ‘main idea’ or the ‘thesis’ of a person’s argument. As Reddy (1979) points out, language, for us, is a conduit, a way of packaging ideas and sending them to people, who then unwrap them.

This instrumental view of language both creates and is created by our view
of what happens when we use language to persuade. Since classical times, we have had three major categories in which to place uses of language: logic, rhetoric, and poetics. Poetics is mimesis, fiction; aesthetic uses of language are seen as *ipso facto* poetic, and thus unreal. Rhetoric is real, but can easily turn into fakery, as popular uses of the term suggest. Logic, though, is the ideal. Language that is 'logical' can do anything; people who are not 'being logical' are not being persuasive. What was originally proposed as a system of reasoning to be used by philosophers to evaluate the truth value of propositions has become a cultural model of the purpose of natural language. Clearly, people who conceive of language as a tool will try to use it as a tool, and logic is a tool in a way that rhetoric and poetic discourse are not. Conversely, if language is used as a tool, people will conceive of it that way. The process is a dialectic one which extends into the level of linguistic structure as well: Discourse modeled on logic demands complex subordination, and the complex syntax of subordination characteristic of European languages calls forth logic.

In contrast to this instrumental model of language and persuasion is what one might call an aesthetic model. In this model, language is a thing of beauty, and persuasion works aesthetically: If a person can see the beauty of an idea, he or she will appreciate and thus believe it. If the aptness of an idea is dependent on how it sounds, then it absolutely matters which words are used. It matters to Moslems, for example, that the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic; the actual Arabic words are sacred. Words are individually important, not simply tools for expressing meanings. This is why Khomeini has difficulty in defining words:

Freedom; it is not easy to define this concept.

... the word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic ... Islam means everything ...

... democracy ... does not have a precise meaning.

Khomeini’s goal is to paint a picture, a picture of a world in which Islam is at the center of everything. Just as it is impossible to paint a picture of a still life without having the still life in the picture, it is impossible to paint a verbal picture of Islam in which Islam is not in the picture. Hence, Khomeini’s tendency to state his ground again and again.

There are, then, cultural reasons for Fallaci’s predisposition to insist on
quasi-logical argumentation and redefinitions, and for Khomeini's predisposition to make repeated use of the key word 'Islam' and to paint verbal pictures with analogies. These predispositions are brought into the interaction, and they help to determine the choices that the participants make during it. But while cultural predispositions of this sort explain, in a general way, why people behave the way they do, they do not fully explain what happens in any given interaction. Communicative behavior is the result of people's attempts, some successful and some not, to deal with the specific situations in which they find themselves. To understand the Khomeini-Fallaci text completely, we need to look at how rhetorical choices are determined in particular situations.

It is almost a commonplace in contemporary rhetorical theory that audience and context are, or should be, crucial determinants of rhetorical choices. The point has been made elegantly by communication theorists like Bitzer (1968); it can be exemplified quite simply. Imagine the following three tasks: (a) trying to persuade a three-year-old to lie down for a nap; (b) trying to persuade one's landlord to fix a broken porch step; (c) trying to persuade the trustees of a university to reconsider the university's investments in South Africa. Clearly, the same strategies would not work equally well in each situation. The three-year-old might respond best to a bribe ('If you take a nap now, you can have a treat afterwards') or to a conventional argument from authority ('... because I said so'). The landlord might be swayed by an argument based on contract ('According to the lease you are responsible for repairs like this') or on other kinds of law ('If somebody falls on the steps and breaks his neck, you'll be liable'), or, in the worst case, by purposefully annoying badgering (having each tenant in the house call once a day to remind him of the problem). The university trustees would probably respond best to ethical arguments ('Our institution should be presenting itself as a politically responsible, morally accountable body'), especially if the arguments were made by large numbers of people; they might also be moved by nonverbal means like demonstrations or sit-ins. But not all three-year-olds, landlords, or university trustees are alike, and, in the end, the persuasive strategies people choose in these situations, and the effects of their choices, will depend on the person they are dealing with and the context. People adapt to one another, or they try to and fail, but even the failures are the result of situated action.

The point I have just made is an obvious one, and is not new. There is a reason for belaboring it, though. While it is easy to see that the persuasive
styles people choose within a cultural context depend on a range of factors
particular to the immediate rhetorical situation, it is easy to lose sight of this
fact when talking about cross-cultural communication. It is very tempting to
explain away differences in persuasive style between people from different
places on the basis of a simple notion of cultural determinism, ignoring the
essentially emergent nature of interaction. While the differences in persuasive
style which make the Khomeini-Fallaci interview fall are ultimately traceable
to differences in cultural norms, the problem is not that Khomeini is com-
pelled by his culture to use one set of strategies and Fallaci another, but
rather that each is making different choices from the range of strategies of
persuasion that are available to both. Particular interactions, in conjunction
with cultural predispositions, give rise to persuasive choices.

If interlocutors' initial choices for how to contextualize what they hear
and how to present what they want to say do not jibe, one of two things can
happen. One or both of the interlocutors may adapt to the other's style.
Tannen (1986) provides evidence that this happens in the form of reports
from people who saved their marriages by learning to cope with different
'conversational styles'. Cross-cultural communication does not always fail.
On the other hand, though, differences in style can feed on themselves,
creating the kind of situation G. Bateson (1982) calls 'complementary schis-
mogenesis', in which each interlocutor unknowingly eggs the other on to use
the same style which led to the problem in the first place, only more so. One
clear illustration of this process can be found in Gumperz' (1982) analysis of
the failure of a Black political activist to make any but a very negative impact
on an initially receptive White audience.

Communicative patterns, then, are not established a priori. An Iranian
may tend, for cultural reasons, to treat conflicts as competitions which need
to be won (Assadi, 1982) or to see certain kinds of hypocrisy as admirable
(M.C. Bateson, 1979), and a European may tend to try to create harmony out
of conflict, even at the expense of truth (Kochman, 1981), and to conceive of
hypocrisy as an ideally unnecessary evil. But specific communicative patterns
(or the lack of communication) are established in specific interactions.
Khomeini's and Fallaci's failure to communicate is the result of an interactive
process which keeps getting worse and worse. What happens is the second of
the two possibilities I described above, a sort of complementary schismogen-
esis: The more analogies Khomeini uses and the more he talks about the
fundamental perfection of Islam, the more insistent Fallaci gets on definition
and logic. The following interchange, towards the end of the text, illustrates what happens:

**Fallaci:** But you are talking about laws and customs that go back 1,400 years, Imam Khomeini. Doesn’t it seem to you that the world has progressed since then? In observance of those laws, you have even resurrected the prohibition against music and alcohol. Tell me, why is it a sin to drink a glass of wine or beer, when you are thirsty or when you’re eating? And why is listening to music a sin? Our priests drink and sing – even the Pope. Does this mean the Pope is a sinner?

**Khomeini:** The rules of your priests do not interest me. Islam prohibits alcoholic drinks and that’s all.

Fallaci tries, here, to catch Khomeini in a logical trap (if singing and drinking are sins, and if the Pope drinks and sings, then the Pope is a sinner), but Khomeini simply rejects her logic, refusing to play Fallaci’s game and turning once again to a categorical statement of what for him is most important about the world: Islam forbids alcohol and ‘that’s all’.

6. Conclusion

I have tried in this paper to do three things. First, I have pointed out in the Khomeini-Fallaci interview two basically different persuasive styles, one which might be called ‘quasi-logical’ (after Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) which makes use of patterns of argumentation based on Aristotelian formal proof, and one which could be called ‘analogical’; and I have suggested that Khomeini’s misuse of the first of these and his use of the second is part of what accounts for the lack of communication in the interview. Second, I have shown that there are cultural facts which predispose Khomeini and Fallaci to adopt different persuasive strategies. Third, I have suggested that what happened in the interview was not the automatic and unavoidable result of cultural differences in contact; what was, for cultural reasons, likely to be a difficult situation would not have had to be as disastrous as it turned out to be. People’s cultural predispositions color, but do not completely determine, their choices, and adaptation is possible. Miscommunications like the one in the interview are made possible by cultural differences, but they are not made inevitable. What made Fallaci’s and Khomeini’s miscommuni-
cation inevitable was a basic lack of good will, a failure on the parts of two people, both of whom had access to a range of persuasive strategies, to try to figure out what the other was doing. This point is a practical one as well as a theoretical one: Communication between the West and the Middle East could hardly, short of war, be at a lower ebb than it is now, and fatalistic characterizations of culture as completely deterministic of communicative behavior provide excuses for inexcusable nastiness.

Notes

* I would like to thank Pete Becker for encouraging me to write up these ideas, and Deborah Tannen for urging me to take them further. Specific comments by participants in the 1983 International Summer Institute on Structural and Semiotic Studies, as well as the general stimulation of the Institute, were very helpful. Errors and misinterpretations are of course my responsibility. Work on this paper was partially supported by a Faculty Summer Research Grant from Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne, 1983.
1. 'Persuasion' is intended here as the generic term for anything, verbal or nonverbal, that people do in order to get others to agree with them or adopt a particular course of action. The term 'argumentation' is restricted, in the present analysis, to one species in this genus.
2. I have dispensed with some of Toulmin's terminology, which is not relevant for my purposes, and I have made one more substantive change, substituting a chain of 'reasons for reasons' for Toulmin's unitary 'warrant'. It should be stressed that I do not intend to be making any particular claim about the strengths or weaknesses of Toulmin's model, or about the theoretical status of my adaptation of it. I have simply chosen a way of describing arguments that is easy to follow and useful for my purpose here, which, it will be seen, is a limited one.
3. It should be noted that, for a strict Moslem, Islam does 'contain everything', in the sense that the Qur'an is a legal and social code as well as a moral one. In part, our startled response to what Khomeini is saying has to do with ingrained notions about the relationship between church and state. But in larger part, I think, we are startled by the rhetorical fact that Khomeini is saying this at all.
4. The explicit mention of one's argumentative ground seems strange, at least, in formal argumentation like this. Bumper-sticker rhetoric often works, if it does, via explicit statements of argumentative grounds. Two bumper-sticker examples are these: GOD SAID IT/I BELIEVE IT/AND THAT SETTLES IT; and CHRISTIANS ARE PROSPEROUS.
5. This is by no means intended to be a complete typology of persuasive styles. See Koch (1983) for a discussion of a third important way people use language to persuade, one I call 'presentation'.
References


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