GAnGS: Gather, Authenticate ‘n Group Securely

Chia-Hsin Chen, Chung-Wei Chen, Cynthia Kuo, Yan-Hao Lai, Jonathan M. McCune, Ahren Studer, Adrian Perrig, Bo-Yin Yang, Tzong-Chen Wu

April 18, 2008
CMU-CyLab-08-007

CyLab
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Abstract

Mobile users share the same expectations as wired users: they want to communicate with other people, they expect the communication to be secure, and it should all be easy. However, mobility poses many challenges for security. Communication is often ad hoc, and the infrastructure may be untrusted.

Secure communication relies on the distribution of authentic information among the communicating parties' devices. This is a challenging problem because devices generally do not share pre-existing secrets. Current security protocols for distributing initial authentic information fail to consider the human element. Many protocols do not scale beyond a pair of devices, although people often need to communicate with a group. The few existing group protocols assume that users will always count the number of members and verify the list of members correctly. However, as group size increases, implementations of these protocols become more prone to human error.

We present GAnGS, a fully-implemented system for exchanging authentic information between mobile devices when they are physically present in the same location. GAnGS is scalable, appropriate for two or more devices. We implement two user-friendly variants of GAnGS on Nokia N70 camera phones. The first variant, GAnGS-P, is based on an untrusted communication hub. The second variant, GAnGS-T, needs no infrastructure. Both variants use Bluetooth for peer-to-peer wireless communication during the information exchange.

1 Introduction

Humans are social beings. We naturally gravitate towards other people who share similarities or possess complementary interests. Without thinking, we form groups. (In this paper, “group” refers to a collection of two or more individuals.) A group may be a public affiliation, a secret association, or an implicit alliance of acquaintances. Groups may be formed spontaneously. Groups are often exclusionary, and communication between group members is frequently considered confidential.

Today, digital group communication generally involves compiling email addresses and sending unencrypted email. This approach is simple and effective, but it is not secure. Group members may assume that their messages are confidential (to some degree). An attacker could gain access by eavesdropping on unencrypted network traffic or compromising an email server. Group members may also assume that only the intended members are included in a group email list. In larger groups, an attacker could add himself to the list without attracting attention.

Prior attempts to secure group communication, such as those using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), often assume there exists a central, trusted infrastructure. Although this infrastructure may exist within a corporate environment, it is impractical in many real-world settings. For example, group members may be meeting outside of their corporate roles and lack a common trusted infrastructure.

Other methods for group formation rely on end users to count and verify the group list. Counting and verification appear to be simple, but they introduce opportunities for human error at a critical juncture. People may forget to count themselves or double count. In addition, they may carelessly accept the list without careful verification.

We present GAnGS (Gather, Authenticate ’n Group Securely), a system that gathers and distributes authentic information among a group of mobile devices. GAnGS is scalable, secure, and tolerant of human error. Our implementation of GAnGS exchanges group members’ public keys such that each group member obtains the authentic public key of every other member. Knowing every other members’ public key can be used to encrypt messages or distribute group keys among any subset of the group. As a building block for GAnGS, we use the Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) protocol to exchange public keys [19]. The physical actions required by SiB
identify the members of the group to one another. Other secure methods based on physical contact or interaction, such as Near Field Communication (NFC) or USB cable, would also be appropriate.

GAnGS consists of three phases: Collection, Distribution, and Identification. In the Collection Phase, the group gathers a list of potential members and their respective public keys. The complete list is disseminated back to potential members during the Distribution Phase. Finally, the group verifies all of the identities in the list during the Identification Phase, flushing out superfluous identities in the list.

The Identification Phase is a crucial addition in the jump from pairwise key exchange to larger group exchanges. Pairwise key exchange methods implicitly count and authenticate two participants. This must be explicitly performed for larger groups. Thus, it is necessary to introduce some additional work for end users.

**Contribution.** GAnGS is a novel approach for enabling secure group communication. It is scalable, designed to handle groups of two to 50 individuals. We present two different implementations of GAnGS on Bluetooth-enabled Nokia N70 camera phones. We note that this is the first fully-implemented mobile system to bootstrap scalable, secure group communication.

## 2 Problem Definition

### 2.1 Uses for GAnGS

GAnGS is intended for individuals that meet in person and decide that they need secure channels for post-meeting communication. Possible uses for GAnGS include: supporting cross-organizational collaborations after a conference, securing team communications during contract negotiations, and disseminating strategies in a political campaign. The first scenario is a familiar situation for academic researchers. A researcher meets several colleagues with similar interests at a conference. They form a GAnGS group at the conference so that they can exchange data sets in a secure manner.

These scenarios cover only a subset of the potential uses for GAnGS, but they are sufficient to show a variety of practical applications.

### 2.2 Assumptions

We assume that:

- Group members are physically located in the same room during group formation;
- Group members can distinguish legitimate members from non-members;
- Members possess devices that support the same physical method for exchanging information (e.g., our implementation of GAnGS requires Bluetooth support, a camera, and programmable software);
- Members accurately count three to five individuals.

### 2.3 Attacker Model

Attackers may be located inside or outside of the room before, during, and after GAnGS is performed. If attackers are in the same room as group members, information displayed on a screen or written down may be seen by the attackers, and verbal communication may be heard by the attackers. With their devices, attackers can overhear, intercept, and inject any messages into the radio communication channel.

An attacker’s goal is to add unintended members’ information to the group list, remove valid members’ information from the list, and/or contribute multiple identities to the list (a Sybil attack [7]). An attacker can also perform a denial of service (DoS) attack such that GAnGS fails to complete successfully. The impact of a DoS attack is limited, since the attacker would fail to compromise the group’s communication. GAnGS addresses attacks against a group’s list, but not DoS.

### 2.4 Design Requirements

We place the following requirements for scalability, security, and human error resistance on GAnGS:

- **Scalability.** GAnGS must distribute authentic information for groups of two to 50 individuals. (Group dynamics shift as group sizes exceed 50 members, and the vast majority of productive groups have fewer than 50 members [12].)

- **Security.** A group of \( \ell \) physical members \((1, \ldots, \ell)\) is formed successfully when each member possesses a group list \( \Lambda \). \( \Lambda \) contains each user’s authenticated information, where user \( X \) contributes information \( I_X \). A successful authenticated exchange ensures the following properties:

  1. **Consistency.** All group members acquire the same information \( I_X \) from member \( X \).
  2. **Exclusivity.** \( \Lambda \) contains information from the \( \ell \) intended group members, and no other individuals.
  3. **Uniqueness.** Each member \( X \) can only contribute one piece of information to \( \Lambda \).

- **Resistance to Human Error.** As group size increases, the likelihood that a user will make a mis-
take also increases. Groups must be able to exchange authentic information accurately. In the event of user error(s), GAnGS should fail safely.

3 Background

Our implementation of GAnGS leverages two existing authentication methods as building blocks.

3.1 Seeing-Is-Believing for Demonstrative Identification

Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) is an authentication scheme based on two-dimensional barcodes and camera-equipped mobile devices [19]. In SiB, one device displays a barcode encoding a piece of information, and a second device takes a picture of the barcode. The act of bringing the two devices together identifies precisely which two devices should communicate with one another, providing robustness against man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, it demonstrates to users which devices are communicating. This property is known as demonstrative identification. SiB can be used to authenticate any device capable of displaying an appropriate barcode.

Consider Alice and Bob, both equipped with camera phones. Alice’s phone can convey her public key $K_A$ to Bob’s phone by encoding a commitment $h = \text{hash}(K_A)$ to her public key in a barcode, and displaying the barcode on-screen. Bob can then use his phone’s camera to take a photograph of the barcode, obtaining $h$ over the visual channel. We say that Alice is using her device to show her public key, and Bob is using his device to find Alice’s public key.

Alice’s device can send her full public key $K_A$ to Bob’s device via any untrusted medium, e.g., a wireless Bluetooth connection. When Bob’s device receives Alice’s public key $K'_A$ via Bluetooth, it can verify the authenticity of the key using $h = \text{hash}(K'_A)$. To perform mutual authentication with SiB, Alice and Bob switch roles and repeat the protocol. This time Bob shows his public key and Alice finds it.

The SiB protocol requires $\text{hash}()$ to be a cryptographic hash function. To defend against a man-in-the-middle $M$, it must be infeasible for $M$ to find a second pre-image $K_x$ such that $\text{hash}(K_A) = \text{hash}(K_x)$. Given a secure hash function, a successful attack on SiB requires an attacker to interfere with the process of photographing the barcode without being noticed. The security of the SiB protocol is based on the difficulty of stealthily interposing between the two devices while they are taking a picture of each other. Further, Alice and Bob (and their devices) are assumed to be trustworthy.

### Table 1: Notation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Used for all variants of GAnGS</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>Number of identities in pre-authenticated list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
<td>Number of attacker identities in pre-authenticated list, $0 \leq a \leq n$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell$</td>
<td>Number of legitimate group members, $\ell + a = n$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>A potential group member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_A^+$</td>
<td>X’s public key</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>X’s device</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F.N_X$</td>
<td>friendly (human-readable) name for X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_X$</td>
<td>Information of potential group member X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi$</td>
<td>Pre-authenticated list of group members’ information, ${I_1, \ldots, I_n}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda$</td>
<td>Authenticated list of group members’ information, ${I_1, \ldots, I_\ell}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Used for GAnGS-P**

| $B.T_X$ | Bluetooth address of Device X |
| $N_X$   | X’s selected cryptographic nonce |

**Used for GAnGS-T**

| $R$ | Root node |
| $P$ | Parent node |
| $C$ | Child node |
| $\Pi_i$ | Pre-authenticated list of group members’ information for one path through a GAnGS-T tree |

**Used for GAnGS-R**

| $s$ | Configured number of individuals that are assigned to a subgroup |
| $\pi$ | Subgroup members’ information based on $\Pi$ |
| $\hat{\pi}$ | Collected subgroup members’ information |

3.2 Random Art / Hash Visualization

Many authentication schemes require the parties involved to compare hashes, checksums, or other “meaningless” data [9, 17]. However, people are not good at rigorously performing such comparisons. Hash visualization is a technique that creates structured images based on input data [21]. Similar input data outputs dramatically different images; comparing the images greatly reduces the human effort required to verify the equality of input data. GAnGS’ hash visualization algorithm relies on Random Art, an algorithm that creates a structured image based on a pseudorandom bit sequence derived from the input through cryptographic means, ensuring disparate images.
4 GAnGS Protocols

GAnGS provides users with a secure way to exchange authentic information among members of a group. It excludes information from non-group members and limits each group member to a single identity. GAnGS operates in three phases:

1. **Collection.** Information is collected from prospective group members to compose a pre-authenticated\(^2\) list, \(\Pi\). \(\Pi\) may include data from outsiders or Sybil entities.

2. **Distribution.** \(\Pi\) is distributed to all potential group members.

3. **Identification.** The group splits into randomly assigned subgroups to authenticate the information in \(\Pi\). The protocol for dividing the group is described in Section 4.2. Once users gather into their subgroups, they use a scaled-down, Ring-based variant of GAnGS, GAnGS-R, to verify identities in \(\Pi\).

We describe two variants of GAnGS for the Collection and Distribution Phases in Section 4.1. GAnGS-P uses an untrusted Projector to assist in Collection, and GAnGS-T builds an ad hoc Tree without external infrastructure.

The Identification Phase verifies that each subgroup list satisfies the security properties of consistency, exclusivity, and uniqueness (discussed in Section 2.4). If all subgroups succeed, \(\Pi\) becomes an authenticated list, \(\Lambda\).

It is important to note that the security of GAnGS-R assumes there is at least one honest, non-malicious person in each subgroup. There is a small probability that a subgroup of only malicious entities (e.g., multiple Sybil identities) may exist. Under such a scenario, the malicious entities can violate the necessary properties and compromise the security of the group’s list. We analyze this class of attack in Section 5 and describe how to reduce the probability of a successful attack.

### 4.1 Collection of Group Information

Here, we present the GAnGS-P and GAnGS-T protocols for collecting a list of pre-authenticated information.

---

\(^2\)Balfanz et al. originally used the term *pre-authenticated* to refer to authentic information exchanged via a location-limited channel (e.g., infrared or SIB), as opposed to the wireless channel [3]. Our use differs in that pre-authenticated information has been exchanged but has not yet been verified as authentic.

---

**Figure 1: State Machine for a Member Device in GAnGS-P**

4.1.1 **GAnGS-P: Projector-based Collection and Distribution**

GAnGS-P utilizes a projector\(^3\) to help collect and distribute the list \(\Pi\). The projector (or other display visible to all members) is untrusted but runs a GAnGS application. The projector application simply Collects information from devices and Distributes the compiled list of information to devices. After devices receive the list, the projector and the devices present a random image representing the list. Users’ comparison of images on their devices and the image on the screen helps ensure that each device has the same data. In the event that images are inconsistent across group members, this comparison helps conscientious users abort the protocol immediately, rather than wasting time with the Identification Phase.

The state machines for a device and projector participating in GAnGS-P are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.

**Collection Phase.** When the projector application first starts, it displays a barcode encoding its Bluetooth address. Prospective group members use their devices to photograph the barcode, thereby obtaining the necessary network information to connect to the projector.

Each device \(X\) connects to the projector and performs the following operations:

1. Generate a cryptographic nonce \(N_X\).
2. Transmit \(X\)’s information, \(I_X\), to the projector. \(I_X\) includes \(X\)’s public key \(K^+_X\), her device’s \((X\)’s\) Bluetooth address \(B_T\), nonce \(N_X\), and friendly (human-readable) name \(F_{N_X}\) (e.g., “Alice’s Device”).

When the projector receives information \(I_X\) from a de-
vice $X$, it updates its display to include $X$’s friendly name $F_N X$. This update, combined with a message displayed on $X$, demonstrates to the human user that the projector received her information.

After each member has sent her information to the projector, the projector enters the Distribution Phase. Currently, this transition is initiated by a human who is operating the projector application. (An alternative design is to allow any member of the group to initiate the transition with her mobile device. However, this gives an outsider – who may not be physically present in the room – the opportunity to prevent valid members from submitting their information.)

**Distribution Phase.** The projector application assembles the pre-authenticated list $I$ of all group members’ information and transmits $I$ to each entity in the list. Concurrently, the projector displays a random art image representing $I$. Upon receiving $I$ from the projector, each device verifies that its information is present in the list (i.e., device $X$ verifies $I_X \in I$) and displays a random art image representing $I$. Comparison of random art images allows the humans operating the devices to verify that their $I$ matches the projector’s version of $I$ and – assuming other users compare the random art – any version of $I$ on other devices in the group.

After GAnGS-P, every device has a list $I$ containing information about each prospective group member. The random art comparison ensures $I$ satisfies the property of consistency for the group as defined in Section 2.4. However, $I$ may still contain identities from a malicious projector, outsiders, or Sybil identities of malicious insiders. If a malicious party (including the projector) inserts unwanted identities, more rigorous verification of the received information with GAnGS-R (see Section 4.3) will detect the attack.

### 4.1.2 GAnGS-T: Tree-based Collection and Distribution

There may be cases where a group would like to exchange information, without any supporting infrastructure. Ideally, a group member could act as a hub to pass information between all nodes in the group. However, Bluetooth piconets are limited to seven active slave connections, preventing all group members from connecting simultaneously. In addition, Seeing-is-Believing (or some other demonstrative pairing mechanism) is needed to ensure that only group members are involved in the exchange. Thus, GAnGS-T builds an ad hoc tree structure out of group members to Collect and Distribute a group’s pre-authenticated list $I$. The state machines for devices participating in GAnGS-T are shown in Figures 3 and 4.

**Collection Phase.** To initiate GAnGS-T, the group selects one member to be the root of the tree. The root member indicates to her device that it is the root, $R$. $R$ performs SiB with another member’s device, which becomes the root’s child in the tree. SiB enables $R$ and the child node $C$ to securely exchange information $I_R$ and $I_C$. (Specifically, $R$ and $C$ exchange public keys ($K_R^+$ and $K_C^+$), Bluetooth addresses ($BT_R$ and $BT_C$), friendly names ($F_N R$ and $F_N C$), and randomly generated nonces ($N_R$ and $N_C$)). Once SiB is complete, $R$’s device keeps track of a path in the tree ($I_R || I_C$), and signs the path using $R$’s private key. After generating information about
the path from the root to node $C$ ($I_{\text{Path,}C}$) and $R$’s signature for the path ($\sigma_R(I_{\text{Path,}C})$), the root sends these two values to $C$. The signature ensures that only devices that are in the tree can add new members to the tree. Without signatures in GAnGS-T, outsiders could overhear a path on the tree and append themselves as legitimate members.

The remainder of the group members join the tree in a recursive fashion. New members join the tree and then add their own children to the tree. This joining process is detailed in Figure 5. Note that no device should appear in the tree more than once.

To ensure that tree members only perform SiB with new tree members, GAnGS-T requires that tree members and new tree members perform SiB in a set pattern. During the Collection Phase, devices switch between find mode or show mode. A device in find mode can only take pictures of devices that are showing a barcode (i.e., devices in show mode). This ensures that only a new tree member can initiate SiB with a tree member. Nodes that are already tree members cannot perform SiB with each other, since both devices are showing barcodes. New member nodes cannot perform SiB with each other, since both devices are trying to take pictures.

Once every node has joined the tree, each leaf signs the path in which it appears as the last node ($\sigma_{\text{Leaf}}(\text{Path, Leaf})$), and sends the path and all of the relevant signatures (i.e., the root’s signature, the root’s child’s signature, ..., and the leaf’s signature) to the root as a pre-authenticated path list of the group ($\Pi_i$). Once the root has received path lists from all of the leaves, the root member presses a button on her device to initiate the Distribution Phase.

Distribution Phase. The root merges all of the path lists $\Pi_1, \Pi_2, ..., \Pi_n$ to form the larger group list $\Pi$ and begins the distribution phase. Before sending $\Pi$ to its children, the root verifies that no one has changed what should be the root’s own information (i.e., the contact information and nonce at the beginning of each list) and that the signatures and the lists it received are valid. To verify the lists and signatures, the root must check all of the signatures in each $\Pi_i$. Using the notation from Figure 5, the root verifies its own signature in the list for the root and its child:

\begin{equation}
\text{Verify}(\sigma_R(\text{Path, Root's Child}), I_R || I_{R/s' \text{Child}}, K_R').
\end{equation}

If this information is correct, the root has a self-authenticated copy of its child’s public key which it can use to verify a copy of the grand-child’s public key. The root continues to verify information in the list until it reaches the leaf’s signature, which verifies that the leaf was the last node in the list. Once all of the signatures in all of the lists have been verified, the root knows the lists only contain group members (or that group members signed information for outsiders). The root transmits $\Pi$ (the concatenation of the path lists and their signatures) to its children. Each child verifies the signatures and lists using the same approach as the root and retransmits the information to its children.4

At the end of GAnGS-T, each device has a list $\Pi$ that contains a potential collection of the group members’ information. If all of the group members are honest, $\Pi$ will match all of the properties from Section 2.4. Legitimate members will refrain from changing information in $\Pi$ (consistency), only add legitimate members to the tree (exclusivity), and only contribute a single identity (uniqueness). If there are malicious insiders in the group, this list may contain outsiders, a group member may have multiple identities in the list, or the group’s list could be inconsistent (i.e., an attacker could join the original group tree and act as the root for any of his children, removing the children from the larger group).

To detect these attacks, we use the GAnGS-R protocol as a mechanism to verify the information from GAnGS-T is correct. In Section 5, we discuss how GAnGS-R addresses the aforementioned attacks and find that with reasonable parameters over 95% of these attacks are detected.

4 Some nodes may only receive a copy of the root’s key as part of the path lists. These nodes must trust their ancestors and the subsequent GAnGS-R protocol to ensure that their copy of the root’s information is valid.

4.2 Subgroup Formation

To verify that $\Pi$ meets the security properties of consistency, exclusivity, and uniqueness, we assign the members listed in $\Pi$ into subgroups. Each subgroup $i$ possesses a sublist $\pi_i$, which it authenticates using GAnGS-R, which we describe in Section 4.3. Random subgroups and GAnGS-R provides a probabilistic security guarantee, parametrized by the number of devices in each subgroup, the number of honest devices, and the number of attackers. An analysis is presented in Section 5.

A malicious node would like to elude detection by creating a subgroup that is composed solely of attacker-controlled identities. Thus, no device – be it a member device or the projector – should be able to influence subgroup assignments. Nonces alone do not prevent an attacker from controlling the subgroup assignments; the last member to join could eavesdrop on the other members’ transmissions and select a nonce that results in a favorable subgroup assignment. To ensure random assignment, GAnGS-P & GAnGS-T incorporate a commitment scheme: each node commits to a randomly selected
value and only reveals it after all nodes have committed to their values. (We excluded the commitment scheme from the prior subsections to help simplify presentation and focus on the unique aspects of the individual protocols.)

The commitment scheme has two steps: commit and reveal. During the commit step of the protocol, device \( X \) generates a random nonce \( N_X \), but only includes the hash of the nonce (\( h(N_X) \)) in \( X \)'s information (\( I_X \)) as a commitment to \( N_X \). This commit step works in conjunction with the initial collection and distribution of information in GAnGS-P or GAnGS-T. Once a node has received \( \Pi \) – including all other commitments – the node can reveal its original nonce \( N_X \). A node can verify that another node did not change its nonce by checking that the hash of the other node’s nonce matches the value in the group information list. To change a nonce after providing a commitment, the node must find a collision in the hash function (which is computationally infeasible for a secure hash function). The reveal step requires an additional round of wireless communication after distribution of \( \Pi \), but ensures that a malicious party cannot control subgroup assignment.

To direct subgroup formation, we use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) seeded using \( \Pi \) and the revealed nonces. Since every device contributes a nonce, a single well-behaved node that submits a truly random nonce suffices to prevent a malicious insider from creating predictable PRNG output. Figure 6 shows the algorithm we use to split \( \Pi \) into subgroups of size \( s \), where subgroup \( i \) has pre-authenticated sublist \( \pi_i \). Note that the number of identities in \( \Pi \) may not be evenly divisible by \( s \), in which case we merge the undersized group with a group containing \( s \) members (Step 7 in Figure 6). After the algorithm has assigned subgroups, each user’s device indicates the number of the subgroup they should join.

### 4.3 GAnGS-R: Ring-based Verification

After the group uses GAnGS-P or GAnGS-T to collect \( \Pi \), it needs to verify that \( \Pi \) is a valid group list (\( \Lambda \)) that meets the security properties specified in Section 2.4. GAnGS-R provides a simple mechanism to achieve this goal within smaller subgroups. Provided that each subgroup meets the necessary properties, there is a high probability that the group as a whole will attain the same properties. To verify that the information from other members of the subgroup is correct and that each member is present only once, we can use Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) [19] or some other pairing method to securely acquire other subgroup member’s data and detect when we pair with an individual more than once. However, pairing with every other member of a subgroup of size \( n \) requires \( \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \) pairing operations. This approach is inefficient, may confuse users (i.e., “have I already paired with you?”), and take too long. Instead, we propose leveraging other group members to help collect and distribute the subgroup members’ information.

GAnGS-R works in three steps. Users first count the number of members in their subgroup to detect outsiders or identities without corresponding physical bodies (i.e., Sybil identities). This is simple since a subgroup is \( s \) members (where \( s \) is 5 or fewer)\(^5\). Next, each member in the subgroup performs unidirectional SiB to collect, sign, and pass on her neighbor’s subgroup information. After \( n - 1 \) SiB exchanges (Figure 7), the last member of the subgroup has a complete subgroup list and

---

\(^5\)When the group size is not divisible by \( s \) one subgroup may have as many as \( 2s - 1 \) members.
begins a distribution and verification step. During this step, signatures from other subgroup members prove the appropriate members are in the subgroup. If incorrect members are in the subgroup, the signatures will be absent or will not verify when using public keys from Π. After verifying signatures, a comparison of random art in the subgroup ensures that previously acquired group and subgroup information is consistent. This approach assumes that groups are small enough so that users can reliably count how many people are present and compare a final random art image with other members of the group.

**Counting.** Within each subgroup, the users’ devices know how many users should be present based on the subgroup’s list π. Since the subgroup is small, users can count how many subgroup members are present. After the user enters the number of people present in the subgroup, the device verifies that this is the expected number. We discuss the attacks detected when the number of subgroup members is different than expected in the following security analysis. Once users verify that the subgroup contains the appropriate number of physical group members, the collection step of the protocol begins.

**Collection.** During the collection step, the subgroup gathers authentic copies of information from the members of the subgroup into a new subgroup list \( \hat{\pi} \). Once the collection step is complete, subgroup members have \( \hat{\pi} \) from known sources, ensuring that entities from outside of the subgroup have not modified \( \hat{\pi} \).

To start the collection step, a randomly assigned subgroup leader (A in Figure 7) performs a unidirectional SiB (uSiB) with the neighbor on his right (B)⁶ to transfer a fresh copy of A’s authenticated information (i.e., \( I_A \) with a new nonce \( N_A \)) and a signature for that data. In uSiB, only one device takes a picture of the other device, and information only flows securely in one direction (the direction of the arrows in Figure 7). After the uSiB transfer is done, B has an authenticated copy of A’s information and A’s signature for that information. Note that A has not yet learned B’s information. Next, B appends her own information to the information received from A to form \( \hat{\pi} \), signs this new list, and performs uSiB with B’s neighbor C to transfer a copy of the ordered list and the collection of signatures (the barcode shows the hash of \( \hat{\pi} \) so far, not just B’s information). Group members continue to perform uSiB and append their information to \( \hat{\pi} \) and sign the list until the last member of the group (E) has every group member’s information and signature. When the last member of the group (E) performs uSiB with the leader (A), A receives an ordered list (\( \hat{\pi} \)), which includes A’s own information and a set of signatures. The leader’s device receiving its own information signals the end of the collection step and the

---

⁶We could use the left neighbor instead of the right neighbor. The important point is that every member of the subgroup does one find and one show.
beginning of the distribution step of the protocol.

Distribution and Verification. In the distribution and verification step of GAnGS-R, subgroup members’ devices distribute and verify the information in $\hat{\pi}$ and forward a newly signed copy of $\hat{\pi}$ to the device with which they previously performed uSiB. To verify $\hat{\pi}$ contains the right information, every node checks that each entry in $\hat{\pi}$ contains the same public key and Bluetooth address as the entries in the expected list $\pi$.

If $\hat{\pi}$ is correct, the node verifies the different signatures from the subgroup. The signatures allow the receiving device to verify that it received $\hat{\pi}$ from the proper source (i.e., $B$ signs $\hat{\pi}$ so $C$ knows that a malicious outsider $M$ did not inject a modified version of $\hat{\pi}$) and that the owners of the private keys that correspond to the other public keys in $\pi$ are actually present during GAnGS-R (here nodes A, D and E). The original signature from the collection step is insufficient since a malicious party could replay messages from a prior run (i.e., an attacker can reuse $A$’s initial signature from a prior run since $A$ only signs $A$’s own data). Once the node verifies the list and signatures, the node signs $\hat{\pi}$ and transmits the list $\hat{\pi}$, other nodes’ signatures, and its own signature to the next device. Once every node has received $\hat{\pi}$ and verified the signatures, each device presents a random art image based on a combination of $\Pi$, $\hat{\pi}$, and the subgroup’s signatures. At this time, each group member should hold their phones together to allow a simple comparison of the images. This final check ensures the members of the subgroup have the same information.

5 Analysis of GAnGS

In this section, we first analyze GAnGS-R’s effectiveness in authenticating members of small groups. (As group sizes increase, members may count incorrectly.) Next, we quantify and bound the probability that an attack on GAnGS goes undetected, assuming that the subgroup assignment is truly random.

5.1 Security Enforcement via GAnGS-R

Designed for the Identification Phase of GAnGS, GAnGS-R verifies the following properties:

- **Exclusivity**: Only physically present members are in the group;
- **Uniqueness**: Each member has a single identity; and
- **Consistency**: Every member has the same group lists, i.e., $\Pi$ for the whole group, and $\pi$ and $\hat{\pi}$ for subgroups.

Let us recap three key properties of GAnGS-R and how they defend against various attacks.

1. **Continuous physical presence is required.** Subgroup members must be physically proximate while taking pictures of each other’s phones. Within such small groups, legitimate members will prevent outsiders from participating. In addition, they will notice if a single person attempts to participate in two subgroups simultaneously.

2. **Each subgroup is small enough to count accurately, and devices know how many members should be present.** If the number of people gathered in a subgroup is different from the devices’ expected number of individuals, GAnGS-R will fail. This indicates at least one outsider or Sybil identity was injected into the group list.

3. **Subgroups are sequentially numbered, starting with one.** If different people in the room somehow had different group and subgroup lists, there will be multiple subgroup 1’s, multiple subgroup 2’s, etc. Members of duplicated subgroups will find each other and combine groups. There are two possible outcomes. First, a combined group will have the wrong number of members. Alternatively, an attacker injects enough outsider or Sybil identities into both groups so that a combined subgroup contains the exact number of expected members. This inconsistency will be detected by signature verification and random art comparison.

Thus, if a subgroup contains at least one legitimate identity, the subgroup will detect an attack. If every subgroup contains at least one legitimate member, every sublist $\pi$ (and, by extension, $\Pi$) fulfills all of the properties necessary to be a valid group list $\Lambda$. In the next section, we analyze the probability that at least one legitimate member is assigned to each subgroup.

5.2 Probability of Attack Detection

GAnGS provides a probabilistic guarantee that the group will detect an invalid list ($\Pi \neq \Lambda$). With randomly assigned subgroups, there is only a small chance that an attack will go undetected during GAnGS-R. In this section, we analyze the probability of detecting outsiders who add their identities to the list or a malicious insider launching a Sybil attack.

When a list of $\ell$ legitimate identities (including potential malicious insiders) and $a$ malicious identities is divided into subgroups of size $s$, each entry in $\Pi$ is randomly assigned into one of $g$ groups where $g = \lfloor \frac{\ell + a}{s} \rfloor$. Subgroup assignment reduces to a set partition problem.

When the number of potential group members is a multiple of subgroup size $(\ell + a \mod s = 0)$, the number
of potential subgroup assignments is

\[
\frac{\ell!}{(s + (\ell + a) \mod s)!} \cdot \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{\ell}{s} \cdot \frac{a}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (1)

When one subgroup contains more members than other subgroups (i.e., \(\ell + a \mod s \neq 0\) and one subgroup has \(s + (\ell + a \mod s)\) members), the number of potential subgroup assignments is

\[
\frac{(\ell + a)!}{\left(\left\lfloor \frac{\ell + a}{s} \right\rfloor - 1\right)!} \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (2)

**Malicious Outsiders.** Outsiders who want to join the group need to form their own subgroup(s) to remain undetected.

When the number of legitimate members is not a multiple of \(s\) and malicious parties fail to contribute a multiple of \(s\) identities, at least one subgroup will contain both malicious and legitimate parties. Legitimate members will always detect this attack.

However, when the number of legitimate members is not a multiple of \(s\) and malicious parties contribute a multiple of \(s\) identities, there is a small probability of a successful attack. The number of potential subgroup assignments which elude detection is

\[
\frac{\ell!}{(s + (\ell + a) \mod s)!} \cdot \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{\ell}{s} \cdot \frac{a}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (3)

Thus, malicious outsiders are detected with probability

\[
1 - \frac{\text{Eq. (3)}}{\text{Eq. (2)}} = 1 - \frac{\ell!}{(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{\ell}{s} \cdot \frac{a}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (4)

When the number of legitimate members and the number of outsiders are both multiples of \(s\), the number of possible subgroup assignments where \(a\) outsiders and \(\ell\) legitimate members do not exist in the same subgroup is

\[
\frac{\ell!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{\ell}{s} \cdot \frac{a}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (5)

Thus, malicious outsiders are detected with probability

\[
1 - \frac{\text{Eq. (5)}}{\text{Eq. (1)}} = 1 - \frac{\ell!}{(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{\ell}{s} \cdot \frac{a}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (6)

When the number of legitimate members is a multiple of \(s\) but the number of outsiders is not a multiple of \(s\), the number of possible subgroup assignments which elude detection is the same as Eq. 4, but with \(\ell\) and \(a\) reversed. Thus, the probability of attack detection is

\[
1 - \frac{\ell!}{(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{a!}{(s!)(\ell + a)!} \cdot \frac{\ell}{s} \cdot \frac{a}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s} \cdot \frac{a/s}{s}.
\] (7)

Comparing Equations 6 and 7, we can evaluate the optimal strategy for outsiders when the number of legitimate identities is fixed. It is best for outsiders to contribute a multiple of \(s\) identities, i.e., \(P(\text{detect } a = 2s) \approx P(\text{detect } a = 2s - 1)\). The reason for this non-intuitive result – that groups are more likely to detect fewer attackers – is that attackers must be in the same subgroup(s).

When \(a \mod s = 0\), the attackers can be part of any subgroup. However, when \(a \mod s \neq 0\), the attackers must be in the one larger subgroup. For subgroups smaller than 4 members, attacks are always more likely to succeed with a multiple of \(s\) attackers. For example, with a subgroup size of 3, an attack is more likely to succeed with 6 outsiders than with 4 or 5 outsiders. With larger subgroups, it is better to have \(s + 1\) than \(2s\) attackers. The probability of 2 subgroups comprised only of attackers is smaller, but the probability of detecting \(s + 2\) attackers is greater than the probability of detecting \(2s\) attackers.

Figure 8 plots the probability of a group of \(\ell\) members detecting \(s\) attackers (same number of attackers as members in each subgroup) for different subgroup sizes. With a subgroup size of 4 or larger, the probability of detecting an attack is greater than 95% for all attacks. As the size of the subgroup or the size of the list increases, the chance of detecting an attack also increases. As the subgroup size increases, more malicious entities must be assigned to the same subgroup for an attack to go undetected, which is less probable. As the total group size increases, there are more subgroups, increasing the chance that the malicious entities will be separated into different subgroups. The sawtooth pattern in Figure 8 is a result of the different scenarios where the number of identities in the list is or is not evenly divisible by the group size. When there is one subgroup with more members \((\ell + a \mod s \neq 0)\), an attack can only succeed
if the $s$ attackers are placed in one of the $g - 1$ subgroups of size $s$. When this is the case, the probability of attack detection is larger than when each subgroup has exactly $s$ members and the attackers could exist in any of the $g$ subgroups.

**Sybil Attacks.** Legitimate members are less likely to detect Sybil attacks because an insider who generates the fake identities can pose as her true identity or any of the Sybil identities. For the group to detect the attack, the subgroup assignments must force the attacker to be in two places simultaneously. If an attacker must pose as a Sybil identity in one group and as her true identity or another Sybil identity in the same or another group, legitimate members will notice the attack.

An attack will go undetected if the attacker is in a subgroup with only Sybil identities and one Sybil identity is assigned to a subgroup with legitimate members. The legitimate members will believe the attacker represents the Sybil identity, and neither the legitimate members or the subgroup of Sybil identities will raise an alert.

The attacker’s added flexibility of posing as any of the Sybil identities or herself increases the number of subgroup assignments that elude detection. When a malicious insider adds $a$ Sybil identities, it is similar to the situation in Equations 5 or 3 with $a$ outsiders. However, since the malicious insider can pose as any of the $a$ Sybil identities, the number of missed configurations increases by a factor of $a + 1$. Thus, the probability of detecting a Sybil attack with $a$ Sybil identities and a multiple of $s$ group members ($\ell \mod s = 0$) where the attacker is one of the $\ell$ members is

$$1 - (a + 1) \cdot \frac{\text{Eq. (5)}}{\text{Eq. (1)}} = 1 - (a + 1) \cdot \frac{\ell!a!(\ell + a)!}{(\ell + a)! \ell! s! s!}$$

(8)

![Figure 9: Probability of Detecting Sybil Nodes](image)

Figure 9 plots the probability of detecting a Sybil attack when one malicious insider generates $s$ additional identities. The plot assumes that there are no other attackers so that $a = s$. The attacker’s ability to assume any of the Sybil identities, in addition to her own identity, makes detection less likely than an outsider attack (shown in Figure 8). However, using a subgroup size of 4 or 5 still provides over 95% probability of detection when the group has 5 or more members. Due to space limitations, we will not analyze the case when there are multiple malicious insiders.

**6 Implementation and Evaluation**

We have fully implemented GAnGS-P and GAnGS-T for the Collection and Distribution Phases, and GAnGS-R for the Identification Phase. We describe our implementation, present macrobenchmark results from complete runs of our schemes, and include microbenchmark results to better understand the sources of overhead.

**6.1 Implementation Details**

Our implementation is a C++ program for Symbian OS v8.1a running on Nokia N70 smart phones, though it should be compatible with other camera- and Bluetooth-equipped smartphones running the same or a more recent version of Symbian OS. We use the same implementation of Seeing-is-Believing everywhere, and the same implementation of GAnGS-R after both GAnGS-P and GAnGS-T. The Symbian Installation System (SIS) binary for SiB with the necessary cryptographic libraries\(^7\) is 51 KB. The SIS files for GAnGS-P + GAnGS-R and GAnGS-T + GAnGS-R are 64 KB and 79 KB, respectively.

The computer controlling the projector for GAnGS-P is a machine running Windows XP and our projector application, which is written in Java. We use the BlueCove Java library for Bluetooth\(^8\) to enable the same Bluetooth networking code that executes on the mobile phone to work with J2SE on Windows XP.

**6.2 Macrobenchmarks**

The most important performance characteristics of GAnGS are the user-perceived overheads. If GAnGS incurs too much overhead, it may simply go unused. We begin with a discussion of the cost of performing Seeing-is-Believing between two users, and then consider the scalability implications of SiB and how the GAnGS protocols offer a significant improvement.

\(^7\)http://code.google.com/p/bluecove/

\(^8\)http://xyssl.org/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Avg (s)</th>
<th>Stdev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SiB A→B</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode Switch</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Average times for a unidirectional SiB exchange between two Nokia N70s, and for each device to switch modes from display-barcode to camera (and vice versa). The mode switch includes opening a Bluetooth connection between two Nokia N70s and exchanging information. Data from 10 trials.

Seeing-Is-Believing. We performed an experiment where we timed the overhead of a mutual SiB exchange between two people. The results of our experiment are shown in Table 2. We omit data on the second half of the SiB exchange because it is not significantly different from the first half. An interesting result from our experiments is that the user perceives the mode switch as being a more disruptive overhead than the time required to position the phones for barcode recognition. Users are actively engaged in aiming the devices, whereas they are idly waiting during the mode switch. Section 6.3 includes additional details on the mode switch overhead.

Figure 10: Duration of Collection Phase from one run of GAnGS-T with a six-node tree. Shaded gray areas represent users’ waiting time. Black patterns indicate the devices are in show mode; gray patterns indicate find mode.

Overall GAnGS-T + GAnGS-R Performance. Figure 10 shows a breakdown of a GAnGS-T Collection Phase run with six devices. Each half of the SiB sessions between each of the devices is illustrated. The plain gray regions in each device’s bar indicate idle time from the user’s perspective, even though the device may already be in show or find mode. The tree-structure formed by these devices is visible. The SiB exchange between Interior Node 3 and Leaf 2 was unusually long due to glare from a nearby window. We feel it is illustrative to show variance that is typical in real-world scenarios. Further, even the fastest SiB exchanges in Figure 10 are slower than one might expect based on Table 2. This results from the need for users to move around to interact with one another.

The Distribution Phase ran once the tree was constructed (i.e., all devices reached the end of Figure 10), requiring 47 seconds. Finally, the Identification Phase (Figure 7) begins with a run of GAnGS-R. We omit a detailed figure due to space constraints. In the Identification Phase, performing unidirectional SiB in each subgroup concurrently required 87 seconds. Distribution of the collected information required 18 seconds, and the final random art generation required 8 seconds.

Overall GAnGS-P + GAnGS-R Performance. We performed a run of GAnGS-P + GAnGS-R with six devices. The runtime can be broken down based on the three phases of GAnGS: sending data to the projector (Collection), receiving data from the projector (Distribution), and verifying the data with GAnGS-R (Identification). These phases took 75, 99, and 72 seconds, respectively.

Our projector application is currently capable of accepting only one Bluetooth connection at a time. The performance of GAnGS-P suffers from this limitation because devices can only transmit their data to the projector one at a time. For example, each device averaged only 7 seconds to transmit its data to the projector during the Collection Phase. Likewise, the projector can only send the resulting group list Π to the group members one at a time during the Distribution Phase. There is nothing fundamental about this limitation, and we expect to improve our implementation of the projector-controlling software to operate at the Bluetooth limit of seven concurrent connections to a desktop-class device. We also plan to experiment with multiple Bluetooth adapters in the projector-controlling computer simultaneously, perhaps allowing concurrent communication with all group members.

6.3 Microbenchmarks

In this section, we discuss the overhead of Bluetooth communication and standard cryptographic operations.

Table 3 shows experimental results for transmitting 1024 bytes over a Bluetooth connection between two Nokia N70s.

Table 4 shows the overhead experienced on the Nokia N70 for each of several cryptographic operations that are commonly used in all of our protocols. The large stan-
Table 3: Time to open a Bluetooth socket between two Nokia N70s, transmit 1024 bytes, and receive an acknowledgment. Phone 1 and Phone 2 connected to a third phone for these experiments. Data from 10 trials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Phone 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Phone 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg (s)</td>
<td>Stdev</td>
<td>Avg (s)</td>
<td>Stdev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connect</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send 1024B</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Overhead of RSA cryptographic primitives and Random Art generator used by our implementation on the Nokia N70. RSA operations were performed using 1024-bit keys. Data from 45 trials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Avg (s)</th>
<th>Stdev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSA KeyGen</td>
<td>9.81</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Sign</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Verify</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Art</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard deviations in the RSA key generation and Random Art image generation are inline with expectation, since the operations are non-deterministic based on random input.

7 Related Work

This work is preceded by protocols that establish authentic information between two devices. Proposed strategies include: password entry on one or both device(s) [17,18]; string comparison that uses the human as a channel to ensure authentic exchange of information [15,17,18,28]; audio-based comparison where the human user compares the strings via audio representation [10]; visual-based comparison of graphics that encode data [8,21]; shaking devices to create shared entropy pools [11,16]; common properties of the wireless channel to establish authentic or secret information [5,6]; and location-limited channels [3,20,22,23].

Researchers have also proposed numerous key agreement protocols for groups, which rely on a PKI that issues certificates to each user [2,4,13,14,24–26]. These protocols all assume a common trusted certification authority (CA); the CA is needed so that group members can authenticate other members’ certificates. Unfortunately, this assumption is invalid in many settings. Different organizations may not have any trusted authorities in common, or group members may lack certificates entirely. GAnGS is complementary to PKI-based schemes, as it can be used to establish the authenticated certificates needed to set up the group key.

The most closely related work to GAnGS is research on establishing keys for groups [1,2,27]. In contrast to GAnGS, all of these schemes rely on the end users to provide an accurate count and verify the members of the group. Also, prior work does not implement their schemes in a real-world system, which would raise numerous practical issues.

Finally, there is research using location-limited channels to exchange keys [3,22,23]. With Talking to Strangers, Balfanz et al. [3] use demonstrative identification over a location-limited channel (e.g., infrared) to exchange authenticated public keys. Talking to Strangers may be used for groups, but it lacks a step for member verification. Thus, the scheme is vulnerable to malicious members who mount Sybil attacks; the multiple identities of one member would go undetected. The Resurrecting Duckling protocol [22,23], proposed by Stajano and Anderson, leverages a direct physical connection between devices for key setup. In the protocol, a mother duck (i.e., the group leader) defines and distributes a key to the ducklings (i.e., the other members of the group). During setup, a policy is uploaded. The policy specifies what actions a duckling will take. Thus, the mother duck’s policy can direct the ducklings to support group communication. Unfortunately, this requires that the mother duck is completely trusted. In addition, there several practical issues with using Resurrecting Duckling for groups. First, imprinting ducklings is a sequential operation. Every duckling needs to touch the mother duck, and she becomes a choke point in the group formation process. Second, the scheme requires a special interface that supports physical contact. Finally, like most other group schemes, Resurrecting Duckling has not been implemented in a real-world system to the best of our knowledge.

8 Discussion

8.1 Scalability

We consider the scalability of using pairwise SiB for the entire group, versus GAnGS-T + GAnGS-R and GAnGS-P + GAnGS-R. Pairwise SiB scales with the square of the number of people in the group, whereas both GAnGS schemes scale linearly. All three mechanisms benefit from the ability for one-on-one human exchanges to take place in parallel. Thus, the expected runtime for pairwise SiB is actually linear in the number of people in the group, whereas both GAnGS schemes are logarithmic in the number of people in the group.

GAnGS-T requires a mutual SiB exchange for each
prospective group member plus a unidirectional SiB exchange for each member during GAnGS-R. GAnGS-P requires a single, concurrent unidirectional SiB operation by all prospective group members (to capture the barcode displayed by the projector), plus a unidirectional SiB exchange for each member during GAnGS-R. Thus, we expect GAnGS-P + GAnGS-R to be approximately twice as fast as GAnGS-T + GAnGS-R.

8.2 Group Management
Members of ad hoc groups often join or leave after group formation. A successful run of GAnGS distributes a set of authentic public keys; nodes can use the public keys to establish a group key. If members want to remove one member from the group, the group can exclude the undesired member from the group key establishment protocol. If members want to add a new member to the group, the new member can perform pairwise exchanges with other group members to securely exchange public keys. Once group members have the new member's key, the group can run a group key establishment protocol to generate a new key.

8.3 Small Groups
When a group is small enough such that its members can count each other accurately, the group can use GAnGS-R directly, skipping GAnGS-P and GAnGS-T.

8.4 Objections
GAnGS is too complicated for the user. We are accustomed to pairwise key exchange protocols; in comparison, GAnGS is complicated. It is, however, an unfair comparison. The process of pairwise key exchange implicitly verifies and authenticates the two participants. These operations need to be explicitly performed in a group keying scheme.

Other group key protocols may be simpler, but they are vulnerable to counting errors and careless comparisons. In addition, they require communication mechanisms (e.g., broadcast) that are often unavailable on commodity mobile devices. GAnGS automates the counting and verification of group members, reducing the opportunity for errors in a practical manner.

GAnGS is slow. A large fraction of the overhead in GAnGS is a result of the SiB protocol. More powerful devices will reduce this time. Alternatively, a faster pairwise scheme could easily replace SiB.

Also, the projector is single threaded in our current implementation, supporting only one Bluetooth connection at a time. The projector application could be extended to support up to seven Bluetooth devices simultaneously.

A Sybil attack is not important. A Sybil attack has significant implications on some group-based protocols. For example, an attacker could sway the outcome of a voting protocol by adding bogus members and voting multiple times.

9 Conclusion
The distribution of authentic information among a group of devices that share no prior association is an important research challenge. A solution to this problem forms the foundation for secure group communication: distributing authentic information enables the secure establishment of a group key, which is a well understood problem [2, 4, 13, 14, 24–26].

GAnGS distributes authentic public keys among group members in a scalable, user-friendly fashion. Prior work on the establishment of secure group communication assumes that group members — no matter how large the group — will always count the number of group members and compare a checksum correctly. GAnGS is designed to scale more gracefully, because we only assume that small groups (always fewer than 10 people, almost always fewer than 5) must count and compare correctly.

We present our design, analysis, and implementation of two collection/distribution protocols and an identification protocol on mobile devices. Our future work will focus on further efficiency improvements.

References


