Self-expression and linguistic variation

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ABSTRACT

This article argues that self-expression is a crucial though heretofore largely overlooked part of the explanation for linguistic variation. Self-expression mediates between linguistic choices and social facts such as gender, occupation, linguistic ideology, and place of origin, as speakers use language not only to express their identification with or rejection of social groupings, but also to express their individuality. All language use is thus essentially idiosyncratic and syncretic. The point is illustrated with reference to case studies of the speech and writing of two Texas women who use language in public contexts. The article further argues for the sociolinguistic study of public modes of discourse in addition to "vernacular" modes, and for the need in sociolinguistic research for rhetorical as well as linguistic analysis. (Variation, self-expression, individuality, case studies, Texas, public speech)∗

Dialectology began as an attempt to link linguistic variation systematically with region, showing how and why speakers from different areas spoke differently. With increasing social and geographical mobility in Europe and North America, region has become less significant than it once was in accounting for variation,1 and sociolinguistics has explored new factors: linguistic differences among speakers have been shown also to correlate with social class, socio-economic status, age, gender, and ethnicity. Recent work on the causes of variation has suggested the need for still further avenues of explanation. Thus Bernstein 1993 shows that ethnicity, age, length of residency, region, education, rurality, income, and sex account for only 9–23% of the variance (depending on the set of phonological variables in question) among Texas speakers studied in a telephone survey. Research that suggests

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what some of the additional reasons for variation may be includes that of Lesley and James Milroy (Milroy 1987), who show that the number and strength of people's social ties correlate with how much they sound like others in their residential communities. More recently, Milroy 1992 has suggested that the interaction of linguistic politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987) with social status may be important. Bell 1984 brings a fundamental insight of rhetoric to bear on variation in reminding us that people's audiences affect how they speak. Guy Bailey and his co-workers (cf. Bailey 1991) have begun to demonstrate that linguistic choices can be linked with how strongly people feel about where they live, and what they buy and read. Work on linguistic ideology has suggested the mediating effects on linguistic choices and language change of a society's conceptualizations of language and its use, and the circulation of and struggles over dominant conceptualizations. This has come from linguistic anthropology (for overviews, see Joseph & Taylor 1990; Kroskrity et al. 1992; and Woolard & Schieffelin 1994), as well as from sociolinguistics, where David Sankoff and his colleagues (Sankoff et al. 1989; Sankoff & Laberge 1978) have explored speakers' "linguistic market index" (how important it is in a person's job to sound correct) and "symbolic index" (people's values, attitudes, tastes and activities, and social milieus).

We suggest that individual choice, based on speakers' particular and idiosyncratic self-images and in the service of self-expression, is another key to why variation exists and how it comes to be. We argue for an approach to variation that acknowledges and explores the role of the individual speaker in selecting and shaping the linguistic resources that are provided in his or her environment by a variety of models for talk and action. We exemplify this approach in this article with studies of the contrasting ways in which two Texas women employ the diversity of linguistic resources available to them. In the process, we provide justification for the following claims (some, though not all, novel) about sociolinguistic variation and its study:

(a) Speakers choose how to sound. Their choices are usually made unconsciously, though they can be the result of conscious adoption of a strategic style. Although social facts bear heavily on linguistic ones, social facts are not determinants of linguistic facts: the relationship between social facts and linguistic facts is not a cause-effect relationship.

(b) Speakers' choices, made from among the sociolinguistic resources available to them, may be ways of speaking associated with large groups (e.g. African-American Vernacular English), or they may be ways of speaking associated with smaller groups or even individuals (e.g. the way one's mother, teacher, or uncle talks).

(c) Linguistic choices are made on all levels, from how to sound to how to tell stories, be polite etc. Thus analysis of linguistic variation must be rhetorical as well as linguistic in the traditional sense.

(d) Speakers' linguistic choices express one or more self-images. (Some people's self-images are relatively consistent from situation to situation, others' are relatively flexible.) Self-images may partly coincide with images of one or more groups, as speakers express identification with others; but self-images also reflect individuals' senses of themselves as different from others.

(e) Relatively public speech -- speech which is relatively planned and self-conscious, and whose audience is not limited to family, peers, and immediate community -- highlights linguistic choices expressive of self-image. If "vernacular" speech is best for showing how people's choices are influenced by social facts, public speech is best for showing the ways in which people's choices are self-expressive.

(f) Case studies -- detailed ethnographic and linguistic analyses of individuals' talk and writing, and how they understand what they are doing with language -- are a good technique for seeing how the individual enters into the set of factors that explain sociolinguistic variation.

In what follows, we discuss the theory that underlies our project, and we sketch our research methodology. We then present two case studies. We end with a discussion of the implications of our approach.

Linguistic Variation in Contemporary Texas

Sociolinguistic research in the US and Great Britain has, until recently, typically been carried out in relatively close-knit communities where everyone is more or less focused on the same models for talk, and makes use of the same sets of linguistic variants. Beginning with the Linguistic Atlas projects, research on language in the American South has likewise sought to describe the speech of fairly isolated, homogeneous populations such as those of small rural towns and urban ghettos. It has been assumed that sociolinguistic models that accounted for the relatively stable patterns of variation found there would also account for patterns of variation in other settings.

Southern states may indeed at one time have consisted of homogeneous speech communities. For most of the region's history, people largely stayed where they were born; they interacted with the same people in their community, and few from outside it, all their lives. Hence they could be said to talk the way they did because of where they came from. But now fewer and fewer Southerners inhabit tightly focused speech communities analogous to those of Harlem, Detroit, or inner-city Belfast. We think it is worth studying those who do not.

Outsiders and Texans alike tend to think that there is a single linguistic model toward which all Texans either aim or decide not to aim. But even the most casual observation shows that not all Texans speak alike, nor do all share the same norms for speech. What, then, might it mean to talk about
“Texas speech”? Many very different resources are available in Texas for the creation and display of idiosyncratic ways of being and sounding; and the many Texans who interact with people outside their immediate communities, either privately or in more public media, have access to varying sets of these resources. Texas is a particularly suitable locale for a study of the linguistic effects of multiple cultural models. To varying degrees, people in Texas speak English like Southerners, like Californians, like Midwesterners; they speak Spanish, Tex-Mex, Vietnamese, German, Czech; they use features of African-American English Vernacular and traditions of African-American oratory. They may project colorful, direct Western personalities, or genteel, indirect Southern ones. Texans shape languages to use as they shape individual identities in the “multidimensional social space” (LePage & Tabouret-Keller 1985) suggested by these and other possibilities.

Not all linguistic possibilities are open to all Texans: thus not all speak Spanish equally well, and some are only able to make small symbolic stabs at sounding Southern. Some Texans do continue to live in tightly focused communities in which linguistic resources are limited, and homogeneity is accordingly high. We are not trying to undo the results of dialectology based in such communities, but rather to extend the study of linguistic variation so that it provides a model of the language of people in other, more public contexts as well.

We are interested in a setting where multiple models exist for how to talk; we are interested in educated, mobile, middle-class people (not unlike ourselves and probably most readers of this article). The social ties of these people to one another, and to some of the people they seek to influence, are public rather than private; accordingly, they often employ public modes of discourse such as speech-making, teaching, publishing, and recording. In such settings, linguistic variation may best be understood as the result of individuals’ creation of distinct voices that express changeable, idiosyncratic identities. We think that this process involves individual speakers’ selection and combination of resources provided by the regional and social models available to them. In this, we take an approach modeled by Kroeskrity 1993, who shows how the linguistic choices of the Arizona Tewa “revel their biographies” (6). The Tewa, says Kroeskrity, select from among a variety of identity options – which can, of course, be limited by such things as power relations (not all options are open to everyone, as we have pointed out above). In making choices about what language to speak in a given situation, the Tewa “display a strategy of selection from among a repertoire of culturally available identities” (6). The linguistic models associated with “culturally available identities,” for Tewa or Texans, may in some cases have names (this is apparently true for the Tewa, who can draw on “English,” “Hopi,” or “Tewa” ways of talking). Other models may be referred to in other ways, some involving overt reference to talk (e.g. “sounding ‘country’”) and some not (being “friendly” or “independent,” to cite terms Texans repeatedly use to describe how Texans do or should act). In the study of which we present part here, we are using interviews and more detailed case studies of Texas women to see where their speech models come from and what they consist of.

One thing that many of our research participants have in common is that they overtly and sometimes vociferously resist talking about themselves in terms of gender, ethnicity, or class; they insist that their linguistic behavior is not determined by their membership in one demographic group or another. We think they are right. Still, stereotypes associated with profession, gender, ethnicity, and class are resources on which speakers can selectively draw. For example, an Anglo Texan woman might express one sort of Texas identity by employing linguistic features associated with the old South – including displays of politeness, indirectness, and respect for kin and elders, as well as careful, elocutionary diction. She could express another sort of identity by employing speech features associated with the West Texas pioneer (including the use of Spanish, or the use of nonce epithets or narrative strategies of persuasion). Alternatively, or in addition, a woman might draw on other images, such as the urbanite, or on the traditions of African-American speech performance. These models are fully realized only in parody; they are abstractions available for idiosyncratic realization by individuals. Furthermore, speakers draw on many models at once.

These sources of influence may be generalized (“the way women speak,” or “correct Spanish,” to cite terms our research participants use); but they are, we find, more often very particular (“my mother’s teacher genes” or “the uncle who taught me to give speeches in Spanish”). Speakers may attempt to realize these models in their speech in order to conform to them, or they may speak in ways that display their resistance to them. For example, Johnstone 1995 shows how several of our case-study speakers resist gendered models for action and speech, but are eager to make use of regional models. Another important source of influence on an individual’s speech is the need for self-definition and self-expression: the assertion and display of a unique, autonomous self (Johnstone 1991, 1996). Just as socially constituted groups of speakers differentiate themselves linguistically (as sociolinguistic research has abundantly illustrated), so do individual speakers. This reason for variation has been largely ignored in previous scholarship in sociolinguistics, and it is the focus here.

Our approach to linguistic variation expands on work by such authors as LePage & Tabouret-Keller (1985; cf. LePage 1968, 1980) concerning linguistic “acts of identity.” The work of these scholars has been carried out in the multilingual, multi-ethnic societies of the Caribbean, in what began as an attempt to describe Caribbean varieties of English. Faced with a far more heterogeneous population than were other sociolinguists, LePage & Tabouret-Keller have suggested a different framework for understanding variability
among speakers. Their focus is on the role of linguistic choice in the expression of situated individual identity. They see language as the property of the individual, shaped by speakers and understood by hearers by means of pragmatic strategies, as much as by means of fixed or variable rules. Since we are looking not only at how speakers pronounce and construct words and sentences, but also at how they use them in stories, conversations etc., our work is also part of the small but growing body of research on sociolinguistic variation in pragmatics and discourse structure (Dines 1980, Tannen 1981, Coupland 1983, Johnstone 1990, 1992, 1993).

THE CASE STUDY AS A SOCIOLINGUISTIC TECHNIQUE

Drawing on case-study methodology developed by sociologists (e.g. Bellah et al. 1985), and used fruitfully in sociolinguistics by Macaulay 1991, we are conducting detailed case studies of the language of 10 women. We refer to two of these in this article. The women with whom we are working represent various regions of Texas, and various ethnic groups. Rural women as well as urban women are represented, of various ages.

In 9 of the 10 cases, we have spontaneous spoken interview data, as well as writing and more planned speech. However, our case-study data consist mostly of speech and writing that is more or less public: relatively elaborated, intended for a non-intimate audience, and relatively self-conscious. We are not seeking to elicit only the most vernacular speech. This is because our research site is not a self-contained neighborhood, and the ways of speaking we want to describe are not those of people who interact with one another in private. We are studying speech community in rather broad terms, in which public networks of influence replace private ones, and private networks can become resources in the creation of public ones. In designing our data-collection techniques, we have aimed to reflect the fact that many Texans do not interact mainly in dense social networks, and to further our goal of finding out what accounts for systematicity in the speech of people who are not using a non-self-conscious vernacular. As William Labov showed (1972:70–109), careful speech elicited in reading and minimal-pair tasks is (at least phonologically) less consistent than is more casual speech. But we are interested precisely in how speakers make use of the range of their linguistic resources. Relatively "performed" speech (Bauman 1977), in which speakers call attention to their linguistic virtuosity, is, we think, more likely to reveal how speakers organize diverse sociolinguistic resources than is relatively "vernacular" speech, which may in fact mask the full scope of a person's competence.

Because phonological variation is relatively easy to describe and quantify, most of the work toward developing models of variation has to date focused on phonology. We include phonological variability as evidence in our study as well. We suspect, for example, based on work by Bailey 1991, that the glide-shortened (more monophthongal) pronunciation of /ai/ will be one indicator of a person's identification with a rural Anglo-Texan image. However, we are also interested in variability of other sorts: morphological, syntactic, and pragmatic. We think, for example, that sounding Southern is a matter not only of pronunciation, but equally of how linguistic politeness is expressed, how assertions are framed, how kin are addressed etc. (Johnstone 1992); that sounding Western can mean telling stories in a certain way; and that a small-town identity may be displayed through the use of private speech genres (such as personal narrative) in public contexts such as newspapers.

Research on choice of language or variety typically begins with options identified by the researcher, often corresponding to the names of languages or varieties. Hence African Americans are said to choose between African-American English Vernacular and Standard English, or Hispanics between Spanish and English. We suspect that these names may not always correspond to the distinctions on which speakers actually base their decisions. For example, features of what linguists call Southern speech (or, in more detail, Lower Southern and South Midland speech) can be heard throughout Texas; but there is little evidence that, when Texans employ these features, they are actually aiming at sounding Southern. Our interviewing suggests that most Texans do not think of "Texas speech" as Southern at all, and those who think of themselves as Southerners think of that as incidental to their being Texans. We need, then, to find a way to let our research participants identify the linguistic models on which they are drawing, rather than identifying them ourselves on the basis of linguistic distinctions that may not be emically relevant. To do this, we take our cues from the work of Preston 1989, 1993 in "folklinguistics,” and from other ethnographic work on "talk about talk” (e.g. Stross 1974). We ask our participants to talk about where they come from, how people act there, and how they learned how to talk and behave; and we ask them to describe their views of the possible ways Texas women can sound and act.

In analyzing this material, we seek to find out how each woman's identity (or identities), as a Texan and as a public speaker or writer, is reflected in the ways she speaks and writes. We look for features of language corresponding to models for speaking that are relatively widespread in Texas; and we look for the more idiosyncratic sources of influence described by our participants, and uncovered by us in our reading about them and in their writing. We try to show how each woman draws on a variety of models for speaking, selecting from and combining aspects of these speech models as she creates an idiosyncratic voice – one which reflects her own sense of personal identity, and also displays her acceptance or rejection of qualities seen as shared by all Texans.
THE TWO WOMEN WHOSE LANGUAGE USE WE DESCRIBE IN WHAT FOLLOWS ARE MOLLY IVINS AND BARBARA JORDAN. JORDAN WAS BORN IN 1937, IVINS IN 1944. BOTH SPENT THEIR CHILDHOODS IN HOUSTON, IVINS IN A WEALTHY WHITE NEIGHBORHOOD AND JORDAN IN A WORKING-CLASS BLACK ONE. BOTH ARE WIDELY KNOWN IN TEXAS AND THROUGHOUT THE US. IVINS IS A SYNDICATED NEWSPAPER COLUMNIST, HUMORIST, AND BEST-SELLING AUTHOR; JORDAN, WHO DIED IN JANUARY 1996, WAS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE 1970S, AND LATER VERY VISIBLE AS AN ELDER STATESWOMAN. BOTH ARE IDENTIFIED WITH POLITICAL LIBERALISM, AMONG MANY OTHER THINGS. AS TEXANS WITH NATIONAL VISIBILITY, BOTH HAD TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO PRESENT THEMSELVES TO AUDIENCES WITH STRONGLY HELD, BUT NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE, NOTIONS OF WHAT TEXANS, SOUTHERN WOMEN, AND (IN JORDAN’S CASE) AFRICAN-AMERICANS ARE LIKE.

DESPITE THESE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IVINS AND JORDAN, THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THE TWO SHOULD SPEAK ALIKE. IVINS IS WHITE, AND JORDAN WAS AFRICAN-AMERICAN; THIS FACT ALONE WOULD LEAD US TO EXPECT VARIATION. WHAT IS INTERESTING ABOUT THESE TWO SPEAKERS IS HOW DISSIMILAR THEIR LANGUAGE IS, THE WAYS IN WHICH IT IS DISSIMILAR, AND THE REASONS. AS OUR ANALYSIS WILL SHOW, JORDAN AND IVINS MAKE VERY DIFFERENT CHOICES ABOUT HOW TO EXPRESS IDENTITIES AS INDIVIDUALS, TEXANS, AND WOMEN. THE TWO VOICES THAT RESULT ARE DIFFERENT IN WAYS THAT CANNOT BE FULLY CAPTURED IN TERMS OF ASCRIBED CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS GENDER AND ETHNICITY.

WORK OF THE KIND WE PRESENT HERE HAS ONE PRACTICAL DRAWBACK: IT IS DIFFICULT TO REPORT IN SUMMARY FORM. THE ONLY WAY TO PRESENT THIS KIND OF PARTICULARISTIC ANALYSIS ADEQUATELY IS TO DO SO SLOWLY, AT LENGTH, AND WITH EXTENDED EXAMPLES, SO THAT READERS COME AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO HEARING THE VOICES IN QUESTION. THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE IN AN ARTICLE OF THE PRESENT FORMAT. THE CASE WE ARE MAKING IN THIS PAPER IS PRIMARILY THEORETICAL, RATHER THAN Empirical; WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO ILLUSTRATE ITS USEFULNESS NONETHLESS, EVEN IF ONLY BRIEFLY. EXPANDED VERSIONS OF BOTH THE ANALYSES PRESENTED HERE CAN BE FOUND ELSEWHERE (BEAN 1993; JOHNSTONE 1996, CH. 5).

MOLLY IVINS: FLEXIBILITY, REBELLION, STRATEGIC TEXANNESST

Molly Ivins was born in California of parents from Illinois. Moving to Texas as a young child, she grew up in an exclusive Houston neighborhood and attended private school. She earned her B.A. at Smith College in Massachusetts, studied political science in Paris, and received an M.A. from Columbia School of Journalism. Ivins worked as a journalist in Austin and Houston, then moved to Minneapolis, Denver, and New York before returning to Texas to write for the Dallas Times Herald and the Fort Worth Star Telegram.

In her writing, syndicated nationally in newspapers and collected in two books (Ivins 1991, 1993), she often plays the role of a “professional Texan”; features of speech associated with the frontier and with cowboy myths are used as linguistic resources, in ironic commentary on Texan and national culture. But Ivins is not simply adopting, for purposes of entertainment, a foreign voice; her stereotypical Texas speech makes fun of stereotypical Texans, but it also identifies her as a Texan. Far more liberal than most Texans, Ivins uses language to position herself as both an insider and an outsider, simultaneously identifying with Texas culture and rebelling against mainstream, conservative Texas. She shifts in and out of her West Texas voice between clauses and within them—sometimes in humor, sometimes for ironic criticism, to express her regional and individual identity. Shifts away from her Texas voice tend to be into very formal, elevated standard language that marks her as educated and cosmopolitan. Ivins also expresses in her speech her rejection of another of the possible models for the action and speech of a White female Texan, that of the Southern belle. Ivins’ discourse allows us to examine the interplay of regional and individual identities and the strategic use of regional identification for rhetorical ends.

Keenly aware of regional stereotypes and role models for the South, West, and Texas, Ivins responds to them in Molly Ivins can’t say that, can she? (1991), in her newspaper columns, and in Nothin’ but good times ahead (1993). She humorously comments on the limited roles available for aspiring Texas women—cheerleader, beauty queen, or traditional Southern lady. She rejects them all, associating herself through speech and dress with the myth of independence and freedom associated with the frontier, the cowboy, and the Western woman. Ivins often makes explicit her identification with the West: “I have spent most of my life in the West... The people I admire most in my history are the hell-raisers and rabble rousers, the apple-cart upsetters and plain old mumpish eccentrics” (1993:114). Four features of Ivins’ discourse can be identified particularly with her expression of her Western regional identity: highly performed narrative involving marked nonstandard forms and comedy; speech play including humorous inventive and poetic turns of phrase; figurative language; and directness, including the swearing and “earthiness” of diction that especially mark Ivins as resisting the model of the Southern belle.

These features help establish Ivins as a Texan familiar with the stereotypical speech ways of the frontier. However, her particular, idiosyncratic use of these features expresses her individual identity. Her fluency in switching in and out of this style displays verbal sophistication and virtuosity. Her writing illustrates what Bell 1984 calls “initiative style shifting,” i.e. unpredictable changes of register which persuade by creating dramatic verisimilitude and humor, and which carry the weight of a speaker’s claim to identity.
strewn in the field where it stood – seemed like the only sensible solution.” The elevated, literary diction and hyperbole in the first part of the statement contrast with the straightforwardness of the second, again displaying Ivins’ multivocal identity.

Other elements of Ivins’ speech play which demonstrate verbal dexterity are poetic turns of phrase and the use of sound patterns such as alliteration. For example, she often employs pairs of words linked by sound, as when she writes that the Texas senate was so “racy and reactionary” that it was enough to make one “despair of democracy,” or when she describes one politician as a “peerless parliamentarian” and another as being “as gantankerous as he was conservative” (Ivins 1991:18, 19).

A third discourse feature associated with the frontier is creative, unconventional figurative language. In particular, Ivins repeatedly coins colorful and humorous similes and metaphors. These incongruous comparisons, often phrased in colloquial diction, frequently contrast with otherwise standard syntax, creating style shifts within sentences. For example, Ivins associates herself with a legendary Dallas Cowboys football player to display both her stances as insider and outsider in Texas (tall, but female and liberal) when she characterizes herself by writing that being six feet tall, she was “the Too Tall Jones of my time.” She describes her liberal political philosophy in a conservative state by writing that she felt the need to explain the “odd hitch in my gaitalong,” softening the offense of exceptionalism by placing it in a framework that evokes Texas mythology – Western eccentricity and individualism.

A fourth element of Ivins’ “frontier talk” is the directness associated with earthy diction and swearing. Thus, in recreating the style of 1970s Texas politicians debating a “Clean Crapper bill,” she directly challenges norms for genteel Southern women’s speech: “the delights of peein’ against the back wall after a good whisky drank were limned with excruciating detail.” Here again we see Ivins’ characteristic style shifting: were limned with excruciating detail creates a contrast with the earthy language of the sentence’s subject noun phrase, and by implication a contrast between two voices. This pattern is repeated often, sometimes accompanied by overt statements of Ivins’ ambivalence toward Texas. Using swearing in her journalism and talk, she draws on a tradition of tough-talking, self-reliant Western women and men, who speak their minds and do not mince words. (See, for example, Saum’s 1990 study of 19th century letters by Westerners.)

What Ivins calls “speaking Texan” has a more personal function as well: displaying public freedom of expression and forthrightness, which are sometimes denied the traditional Southern woman. Through her linguistic choices, she simultaneously asserts her toughness and her sense of play. Linguistic resources associated with region (the West) and gender (maleness) give Ivins a way of emphasizing her convictions; the resources of class (standard speech) give her a means of grounding her intellectual analysis. Together,
Barbara Jordan was raised in a working-class Houston neighborhood. She was educated in a racially segregated public high school, and at historically Black Texas Southern University, before going to Boston for law school. Like Ivins, Jordan returned to Texas, first to practice law in Houston, and soon to enter state and then national politics. A member of the US House of Representatives for three terms (where she was the first African-American woman from the South), Jordan became well-known for her televised speech as a member of the House Judiciary Committee during deliberations over the possible impeachment of Richard Nixon; rather than taking a partisan stance, she presented a careful analysis of the Constitution. Jordan was keynote speaker at Democratic nominating conventions in 1976 and 1992. After leaving the House, she taught public policy at the University of Texas. Widely regarded as a model of political probity, she was ethics advisor to former Texas Governor Ann Richards, and she was often called upon to comment on ethical issues.

Jordan came to prominence through astute politics, partly conducted through public oratory that seemed to her audiences both inspired and inspiring. Both in public oratory and in face-to-face interviews, she spoke slowly, in a low, intense voice, articulating clearly and making it apparent that she was choosing words carefully. But her fame as a public speaker is not just a result of her delivery. She projected tremendous personal authority in her speaking. She was believable because of the strong, upstanding, powerful character she displayed. To use the terminology of Aristotelian rhetoric, Jordan's appeal was primarily ethical, primarily a result of the compellingly believable persona that she presented.

Like that of IVINS, Jordan's public discourse is framed mostly in a standard, literary variety of English. This is true even in the unplanned, spontaneous talk of our interview with her, which was by far the least conversation-like of all the interviews we have carried out. Even responses of the most mundane sort, such as her answer to a question about whether her high-school debate teams were co-ed, were phrased in strikingly literary syntax: "Certainly in the debates we would have, uh, we, there were boys and girls on a given team, and, both the team of which I would be a part and the opposing team." Unlike IVINS, though, Jordan was not primarily a writer. She did not, in fact, write out even her most formal oratory. Jordan's decision not to prepare speeches completely in advance was evidence of the value she placed on extemporaneous oral articulateness, an attitude that came from the preaching tradition of the Baptist church (her father was a minister), from her high school and college debate training, and from her training as a lawyer. Her presence and that of her audience were, for her, the source of the power of her words: "After a speech is given," she told us, "it's dead." What Jordan valued was not just the ability to think of something to say in any situation, but the ability to think of the one right thing to say and to phrase it accurately, precisely, and with meticulous care. As she put it, "The beauty of expression is finding the, the right word that is really no other word would suffice, for communicating that idea. That's what appeals to me about language." By choosing to speak extemporaneously rather than read from a script, and by choosing to speak on pre-planned occasions the same way she did on unplanned ones, Jordan made displays of easy thoughtfulness and mastery of language.

Jordan's displays of care in the structuring of talk and in lexical choice (she spoke in our interview, for example, of "the violence that school desegregation wrought in Boston") can be connected both to her legal training and to the African-American tradition of speech performance (Abrahams 1962, 1976, Balester 1993) with which she identified. In her words, "there are any number of people who are public speakers who try to reflect what they have heard from their minister ... It is because of that preaching that influences, I think, the way that a person who is Black would deliver an address or a speech." Though she was wary of "preaching" and resisted consciously sounding poetic, Jordan's discourse, in interviews as in her speeches, was characterized by performance features such as dramatization, repeated rhythms, repetitive phonological patterns (such as alliteration and assonance), syntactic parallelism, and deliberate pacing. This is true whether she was delivering a speech or answering interview questions. An example from the former was the beginning of her 1976 keynote address to the Democratic Convention; in switches between conversational talk - "What in the world am I supposed to say?" - and high rhetoric, she created drama which was sustained by patterns of repetition, some of which we have pointed out here:

One hundred and forty-four years ago, members of the Democratic party first met in convention to select a presidential candidate. Since that time, Democrats have continued to conclave once every four years and draft a party platform and nominate a presidential candidate.

And our meeting this week is a continuation of that tradition. But there is something different about tonight. There is something special about tonight. What is different? What is special?
I, Barbara Jordan, am a keynote speaker.
A lot of years have passed since 1832, and during that time it would have been most unusual for any national political party to ask that a Barbara Jordan deliver a keynote address ... but tonight here I am. And I feel that notwithstanding the past that my presence here is one additional bit of evidence that the American Dream need not forever be deferred.

Now that I have this grand distinction what in the world am I supposed to say?

I could easily spend this time praising the accomplishments of this party and attacking the Republicans
   but I don't choose to do that.
I could list the many problems which Americans have.
I could list the problems which cause people to feel cynical, angry, frustrated: problems which include
   lack of integrity in government;
   the feeling that the individual no longer counts;
   the reality of material and spiritual poverty;
   the feeling that the grand American experiment is failing or has failed.
I could recite these problems and then
I could sit down and offer no solutions.
   But I don't choose to do that either.
The citizens of America expect more. They deserve and they want more than a recital of problems.
   We are a people in a quandary about the present.
   We are a people in search of our future.
   We are a people in search of a national community.

Ipetition and constructed dialog (Tannen 1989) create drama in the follow-
ing interview excerpt (Angelo 1991) about political ethics:

It is not right;
it is not correct;
it should not occur.

These things may not be illegal, but it is so important for a public servant to sort out what is legal from what is ethical. I tell appointees, “You must not engage in any fine-line drawing.” Ed Meese as Attorney General did that many times. It is not enough for the Attorney General to say, “I have not violated the law.”

articularly striking about Jordan’s discourse was its consistency. The same six of elevated style and performed drama that characterized her oratory iso characterized her talk in the interviews. (For this reason, she could be an intimidating interlocutor.) As Johnstone has shown elsewhere (1996, Ch. 5), Jordan’s discourse was stylistically consistent across speech tasks; her writing

is speech-like, and her speech writing-like, so that her public voice sounded the same in both media. Linguistic consistency was for Jordan a sign of moral constancy. It was itself consistent with the other ways that Jordan made this point about herself, including her disregard for appearances and her lifelong refusal to adapt to social expectations about how a Southern Black woman should live, behave, and sound.

DISCUSSION

To summarize what have of necessity been summaries themselves: 

Molly Ivins presents a multivoiced linguistic identity. She alternates speech features associated with Western and male ways of talking – which are highly marked in writing – with a standard, eloquent style that draws attention to itself through occasional hyper-elevation. She also makes a point of displaying both her competence at and her rejection of the traditionally female, Southern speech model that she claims Texas women of her generation and background were encouraged to adopt. Barbara Jordan’s speech was characterized by unusual consistency from situation to situation. She drew on some of the traditional characteristics of African-American public speech, such as extreme attention to diction and lexical choice, syntactic parallelism, and formality of style; but she rejected others. She also rejected pressure to adapt her talk to her audience. Jordan’s persuasive power depended on her personal moral authority, which required constancy in image and consistency in talk.

Thus we see Jordan and Ivins as resourceful users of language, with access to many ways of speaking. As each has created a style of her own, each has drawn on some of the same resources – standard usage, elevated diction, marked regional and ethnic features – but each in a different way and to very different effect. We emphasize that what should be surprising about the two linguistic biographies is not the fact that these two voices are different and distinctive. We all know that individuals have individual styles, particularly individuals who think about how they write and sound. What should be surprising is the fact that sociolinguistic theory has so little to say about these voices, and about individuals’ voices in general.

Theories of language use that begin with groups, rather than with individuals – like theories of language that begin with languages and dialects, rather than with speakers – make it difficult to hear particular voices, and harder to take them seriously as part of the explanation for variation. As one textbook on sociolinguistic theory puts it, “truly idiosyncratic speakers have never emerged from our researches ... no sample population to date seems to have included one. For the most part, people sound the way you would expect them to sound given the facts about their class, sex, age, and region” (Chambers 1995:100, 101). The standard approaches to contextual variation, too, are based on abstraction away from individual speakers: the Labov-
in characterization of “style” as resulting from a speaker’s level of self-consciousness (Labov 1972:70-109), or accommodation theory (Giles & Ovesson 1975) with its descriptions of how speakers systematically adapt their interlocutors. In both these models, different speakers in equivalent contexts are ideally expected to behave exactly the same way.

But contexts are never equivalent, because no two speakers could possibly be linguistically identical. In the inevitable sense that no two people share exactly the same linguistic memories, no two people speak alike: every speaker is idiosyncratic. Class, sex, age, region, the nature of the linguistic task, and the makeup of the audience all have an important bearing on how people sound; but they do not determine how people sound. These social facts, along with other factors such as ethnicity, ideology, and identity, provide (or withhold) resources among which individuals choose as they decide how to be and talk. Individuality mediates between social facts and linguistic ones; and though it is the least tractable variable of all (not quantifiable, very hard to describe), it is an essential part of how the details of variation come to be.

Our interest in the role of the individual in linguistic theory harks back to Edward Sapir, who was adamant about the importance of the individual in language and culture. If one looks at culture from the perspective of a child acquiring it, Sapir noted, one sees that culture is not a unitary whole. Each individual’s culture is different (Sapir 1934) 1949:590-97). In Language, he defined his topic as “the collective art of expression, a summary of thousands upon thousands of individual intuitions” (Sapir 1921:231). Sapir pointed out again and again that the abstractions studied by anthropologists and linguists – cultures and languages – should not be taken as real:

In linguistics, abstracted speech sounds, words, and the arrangement of words have come to have so authentic a vitality that one can speak of “regular sound change” and “loss of genders” without knowing or caring who opened their mouths, at what time, to communicate what to whom. ([1939] 1949:579)

Sapir argued for an approach to culture and language that would not take itself too seriously as a science. Here he touched on the problem of scientism in linguistics:

It is not really difficult, then, to see why anyone brought up on the austerity of a well-defined science of man must, if he is to maintain his symbolic self-respect, become more and more estranged from man himself. The laws of syntax acquire a higher reality than the immediate reality of the stammerer who is trying to “get himself across”... ([1939] 1949:580)

Sapir by no means abandoned abstractions such as “the laws of syntax.” He wanted linguists and anthropologists only to be able to think both ways: from the perspectives of the individual and the social. Individual behavior is always socially conditioned, “the complex resultant of an incredibly elaborate cultural history” ([1938] 1949:572); but “conversely, no matter how rigorously necessary in practice the analyzed pattern may seem to be, it is always possible...for the lone individual to effect a transformation of form or meaning which is capable of communication to other individuals” ([72]). As a result, the only way to come to a complete understanding of culture is through “a minute and sympathetic study of individual behavior...in a state of society” (576).

Anthropologists who work with native speakers are regularly faced with individual style and idiosyncrasy, and are led to wonder in what sense an individual speaker can embody a language or represent its other speakers (see Craig 1979, Coultas 1981 for discussions of the concept of the representative native speaker). Dell Hymes, in particular, has taken up and expanded on Sapir’s recurring interest in the linguistic individual. Commenting on Bloomfield’s analysis of Menomini, Hymes (1974:72) remarks on the absurdity of describing most of the remaining speakers of a language as incompetent to speak it, noting that such a case “forces us to face the fact that for both the individual and the community, a language in some sense is what those who have it can do with it—what they have made of it, and do make of it.” Hymes defines linguistic competence as “personal ability (not just grammatical knowledge, systemic potential of a grammar, superorganic property of a society, or, indeed, irrelevant to persons in any other way)” (1974:206). Elsewhere (1979:36), Hymes suggests that individual differences be given “foundational status” as a “vantage point from which to consider questions of method and theory in the study of language in general.”

We stress that by individuality we do not mean individualism. Individualism—the idea that people do or should act in their own interest and/or attempt to express unique selves—is a matter of ideology, linguistic and otherwise. Individualism is a cultural fact which is by no means universal; individuality is a biological and cognitive fact which is. There is no doubt that the American ideology of individualism influences both the speakers we have described; both are fiercely individualistic, seeing their uniqueness as both a precondition for and a perquisite of their success. But ideologies such as individualism are part of one layer in the process by which people create voices, and individuality is another.

Some societies encourage the linguistic expression of individuality and others discourage it, just as some value individual expression in other modes more than do others. There are speech communities in which predictable, formulaic language is valued more often, and others in which it is usually heard as meaningless. In Bali, for example (Geertz 1984), individuals are seen as characters playing parts in a “never-changing pageant” (128). Individuals...
When speakers do new things, they usually suggest what they mean by the newness; but as LePage & Tabouret-Keller point out (1985:12), “[James] Joyce only provides a somewhat extreme example of what we all do with language.” People know each other because each has a unique way of sounding, an individual voice.

The relationship between social facts and facts about how individuals talk may be roughly sketched as follows. In the first layer, biological characteristics like sex and skin color, biographical ones like place of birth, and ascribed ones like gender and ethnicity can be either accepted or resisted. In the second layer, ideologies about what these characteristics entail linguistically (how women sound, or how Texans sound) can be accepted or (sometimes with difficulty) rejected. In the third layer, strategic, individual choices among the resources provided in the second layer create actual utterances. Ideologies—conventionalized links between linguistic forms and social groups—mediate between social facts and the individual speakers who create utterances, not between social facts and the linguistic facts of actual utterances. It remains true, of course, as pointed out by Silverstein 1979, Woolard & Schieffelin 1994, and others, that ideologies can be said to mediate between social facts of the gender/ethnicity sort and linguistic structures such as English, African American Vernacular English, or the ways of speaking of the Kuna (Sherzer 1983). But we are not talking about linguistic structure here: our goal is the more concrete one of sketching the process by which utterances come to be.

We need to stress that this process is not necessarily conscious; in fact, it is probably never completely conscious. (Even the most literate writers of the most edited prose can not identify all the resources on which they draw, or describe all their choices in juxtaposing sounds and words and styles as they do.) Speakers are generally quite unaware of what their speech reveals about them and how. Nor do we claim that people are conscious of the linguistic stereotypes on which they draw. Although it is interesting and revealing to ask people about linguistic stereotypes, we do not take their explanations as definitive explanations for their linguistic choices. This does not mean, however, that speakers are not making choices, or that their choices are not self-expressive. Perhaps it is the often stagey quality of what well educated Americans think of as especially self-expressive—the poetry of Whitman, autobiographical writing, Method acting—that makes this difficult to see.

We see all language use as essentially syncretic, in the sense that Hill & Hill 1986 illustrate: a result of situated choices among and combinations of the possibilities provided by the varieties fully or in part available to speakers. Sometimes the varieties in question are fairly easy to label: Spanish and Nahuatl, for example, in the case of Hill & Hill's Nahuatl speakers. Sometimes they are more idiosyncratic, as when a person finds herself talking “like her mother” or saying “the kind of thing my uncle used to say.” The mod-
els on which speakers draw can come from a variety of sources, including family, vocation, region, ethnicity, and culture; and they can be used in a variety of ways, sometimes adopted in full (in some cases because there is no choice), sometimes drawn from in part. They are not just models for ways of speaking, but for ways of acting and being—providing the metaphors by which an individual connects to her culture(s), and mediating between the individual and society. 19

Our work is in part an attempt to suggest a bridge between sociolinguistic theory and contemporary ethnographic work on language and variety choice in modern or post-modern societies (cf. Woolard 1989, Gal 1993) with its analytical focus on heterogeneity and conflict, ideology and politics, and personal identity. Just as ethnicity is "situated" (Cohen 1978), arising on the spot in interaction as people categorize themselves and others, so are the emergent ways of speaking that we conveniently label varieties, languages, registers, or dialects. We suggest that regional identity is situated in the same way, and hard to separate from other sources of linguistic possibilities. A person who lives in Texas can sound like other Texans or not; sometimes, or sometimes not. People in a mobile, heterogeneous society cannot be said to speak as they do mainly because of where they come from, though where one comes from is, of course, an important source of influence—especially in phonology, perhaps the most robust of linguistic levels (Ash 1988, Macaulay 1991).

Our work argues for rhetorical and stylistic discourse analyses as analytical tools in sociolinguistics. We are not the first to make the point that there is variation beyond the levels of sounds and syntax, and that it should be studied. We underscore the value of illuminating the levels on which people make choices about how to narrate, how to be polite, how to persuade, and how to be indirect— with the same light, and at the same time, as we illuminate the levels on which people make choices about whether to say [rayl] or [ra:ti], or whether to use negative concord. The range of resources available to speakers, and thus the processes by which people choose how to sound, may in some respects be more evident on the higher levels than on the lower.

The study of individuals’ linguistic voices is most often employed as a critical tool in the study of particular individuals and particular texts. Thus students of the style of Flannery O’Conn or of William Faulkner’s As I lay dying are typically interested in what O’Conn was like, and what she might have meant by her writing— or in how Faulkner’s novel might most rewarding be read. Studies of individuals’ styles also contribute to practical knowledge about the possibilities for style: people read the orations of Gorgias and Cicero to learn about the language of classical oratory, and fiction by Joyce Carol Oates to find out how contemporary English can be crafted. Stylistics, as the term is used by rhetoricians and literary critics, usually means the study of individual voices for critical purposes such as these.

Our purpose in writing about individual voices is linguistic, not critical. We are not primarily interested in how paying attention to individual voice helps us understand how particular individuals talk and write; or in how it helps in the analysis of stylistic possibilities of a language, genre, or literary period. Instead, our purpose is to show how paying attention to individual voice helps in understanding language. But although the goal of this study is not critical, its methodology borrows from literary criticism. This is because the linguistically attuned close-reading techniques of discourse analysis provide the best way of seeing what is individual about language.

Finally, we suggest that a full understanding of variation needs to be based on an understanding of public, relatively self-conscious speech, as well as more private, vernacular forms. Interestingly, historical scholarship about the “public sphere” in Western culture in the tradition of Habermas 1989 suggests that public discourse is essentially understood as anonymous and disinterested; these characteristics are what enable the public media to define a sphere of influence separate from the state and from society. (Warner 1990 shows, for example, how the abstraction of an “American public” that could critique the colonial administration developed as the discourse of the increasingly influential public print media came to be understood as transcending individual voices and opinions.) Our work has not been designed to engage with that of Habermas, 20 but the juxtaposition of the two approaches raises some potentially interesting questions. Why, for example, in talk that is meant both to reflect and to argue for widely shared political and ethical values (Barbara Jordan’s famous 1974 speech to the House Judiciary Committee, or Molly Ivins’ political commentary) do the particular, idiosyncratic voices of the two speakers come through so clearly?

It is by no means the case that the processes we have examined apply only to public discourse. Speakers make use of available resources whenever they speak or write; they can do nothing else. But speech addressed to a wider audience than one’s friends and intimates, speech that is at least in part “performance” (Bauman 1977), speech that is often relatively planned and relatively self-conscious provides, we claim, the best source of evidence about the full range of a speaker’s linguistic competence. To understand what makes people speak as they do, we need to look not just at the situations that are most likely to display the shared langue which has been the major focus of linguistics (and the shared speech community norms for using it, which have been the focus of much linguistic anthropology); we need also to look at more heterogeneous linguistic situations.

NOTES

* We developed the theoretical framework of this study jointly; it is largely based on Johnson’s previous work. Bean is responsible for the work on Molly Ivins; Johnstone is responsi-
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14 Our plan eventually is to produce a book in which each case study gets a chapter. This might begin to do justice to the detail in which each voice could and should be described.
15 This material about Sapir is slightly adapted from Johnstone 1996:20-21.
16 See Johnstone 1996, Ch. 4 et passim, for more detailed discussion of the issues touched on in this paragraph.
17 It should be noted that not all of our research participants are equally individualistic. As students of linguistic ideology point out, ideologies and societies are not necessarily co-extensive; ideologies can compete with each other, as individuality and the ethic of "family values" do in Texas. Furthermore, our participants vary among themselves, in the same way societies have been shown to vary, in how homogeneous the individual is expected to be. For some of the Texans we are studying (such as Barbara Jordan), personality is expected to be consistent. For others, personality expresses itself in flexibility of identity.
18 Claims for conceptions of person like the Balinese have also been made by Read 1955 for the Gahuku-Gama (New Guinea) and by Dumont 1970 for India. Shweder & Bourne 1984 report on a questionnaire study of conceptions of person in India.
19 The work of Bakhtin 1980 provides another metaphor for the linguistic process we describe here. As people talk, they appropriate and juxtapose various "voices," either by direct quotation or in more indirect ways. J. Hill 1985 illustrates the usefulness of Bakhtin's model in describing the uses of Spanish in Mexican (Nahuatl), and of Mexican in Spanish, by Malinche, the Volcano princess in Mexico.
20 See Gal & Wodak 1995 for recent work in linguistic anthropology that is designed to explore the sociolinguistic implications of Habermas' ideas.

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Honorific possession:
Power and language in Pohnpeian, Micronesia
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ABSTRACT

Mental categorization schemes, such as noun classification systems, can be productive sites for examining how experience is meaningfully and culturally structured through metaphorical and metonymic associations. Pohnpeian possessive classifiers not only constitute cultural categories of rank and power relations, but dynamically re-sort or re-classify these categories through honorific speech. Linguistic and interactional data are here combined with ethnographic data about Pohnpeian society and cultural beliefs, particularly notions about the meaning and construction of ranked social relationships, to show how micro-interactions which index status are linked both to larger cultural ideologies about power and, metaphorically, to the experiential domain. (Pohnpeian, Micronesia, honorifics, status, metaphor, possessive constructions)

Speakers of Pohnpeian – Pohnpei is an island nation of Micronesia, formerly written Ponape – organize relationships of possession into different categories using an elaborate system of noun classifiers. This overt arrangement of entities into classes, expressed by what are called “possessive classifiers,” affords us a view of how Pohnpeians constitute their world – which properties of entities, and which relations between them, are constituted as meaningful. In classifying, some features are noted for similarities and differences, while others are ignored. I argue that these classifiers provide data for understanding the importance of rank to schemes of cognitive organization in Pohnpeian, as well as cultural ideologies of the interdependent relationship between low and high status. When speakers shift into honorific or status-indexing speech, different possessive classifiers are used than in common speech; the categories expressed by the possessive classifiers are then re-shaped, including the usual part/whole relationships for the body. I discuss differences between common speech and honorific speech here, and between the two levels of honorific speech, e.g. how Pohnpeians constitute the two status levels not only as being asymmetrical, but as having different prop-

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