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Representing the MSR cryptoprotocol specification language in an extension of rewriting logic with dependent types

Iliano Cervesato · Mark-Oliver Stehr

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Abstract This paper presents a shallow and efficient embedding of the security protocol specification language MSR into an extension of rewriting logic with dependent types. The latter is an instance of the open calculus of constructions which integrates key concepts from equational logic, rewriting logic, and type theory. MSR is based on a form of first-order multiset rewriting extended with existential name generation and a flexible type infrastructure centered on dependent types with subsorting. The encoding presented in this paper has served as the basis for the implementation of an MSR specification and analysis environment using the first-order rewriting engine Maude.

Keywords Security protocol · Multiset rewriting · Specification · Dependent types

1 Introduction

MSR originated as a simple logic-oriented language aimed at investigating the decidability of security protocol analysis under a variety of assumptions [15]. It evolved into a precise, powerful, flexible, and still relatively simple framework for the specification of complex cryptographic protocols, possibly structured as a collection of coordinated subprotocols [9, 11]. It uses strongly-typed multiset rewriting rules over first-order atomic formulas to express protocol actions and relies on a form of existential quantification to symbolically model the generation of nonces and other fresh data. Dependent types are a useful abstraction mechanism not available in other languages. For instance, the dependency of public/private keys

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on their owner can be naturally expressed at the type level. Finally, MSR supports an array of useful static checks that include type-checking [10] and data access verification [12].

The multiset rewriting infrastructure at the core of MSR captures the essence of numerous state-based languages, *à la* abstract chemical machine [4], designed to represent distributed systems. In particular, the majority of the security protocol verification tools implemented in the '80s and early to mid '90s, such as [19, 23, 27, 31] just to cite a few, follow this paradigm. In that sense, core MSR is an abstract representative of this entire class. The typing infrastructure adds optional flexibility, which is often useful when working with cryptographic protocols. It should be noted that, starting from the late '90s, several languages based on the alternative process-based representation paradigm, pioneered by the π -calculus [28] for protocol analysis, have been proposed with good success [2, 22, 38]. The present work does not treat these.

This work outlines an encoding of the core of MSR into rewriting logic (RWL), to be more precise into its extension with dependent types (RWLDT). Rewriting logic [24] draws on the observation that many paradigms can naturally be captured by conditional rewriting modulo an underlying equational theory, the theory of multisets being a particularly important case for the specification of concurrent systems and protocols. Recently a combination of equational logic and rewriting logic with dependent types has been studied in [34–36] under the name *open calculus of constructions* (OCC). In this paper we show that a restricted predicative instance of OCC, that we call rewriting logic with dependent types (RWLDT), can be used to represent typed MSR specifications in a way which preserves all type information. RWLDT does not natively support the expression of existential name generation: our encoding implements it with counters. Moreover, ensuring the executability of the resulting code required some care.

Composing the mapping from MSR into RWLDT with a mapping from RWLDT into RWL, which has already been implemented as part of the OCC prototype [34–36], we obtain an encoding from MSR into RWL, which can serve as the basis of an execution environment for MSR in a RWL-based language such as Maude [17]. This two-level approach, which is summarized in Fig. 1, has some advantages over a direct mapping into RWL. The first is modularity and separation of concerns: the mapping from MSR into RWLDT is only concerned with the dynamics (given by the rules) but preserves the static part (given by declarations, types, and terms). The second advantage is that RWLDT seems to be a better level for user interaction (as opposed to the resulting RWL encoding), because terms and types closely correspond to those of MSR. Finally, the preservation of types and the fact that RWLDT is a sub-logic of OCC provides a suitable level of abstraction for formal reasoning, a possibility that is not the subject of this paper, but that we hope to explore in the future.




Fig. 1 Architecture of the embedding of MSR into rewriting logic

This work serves as the basis for a prototype of MSR, which currently runs on top of Maude. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We introduce MSR and RWLDT in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. We give a preview of the translation using our running example, the Otway-Rees protocol, in Section 5. We define the general mapping from MSR into RWLDT, state its key properties, and outline some simple optimizations in Section 6. We examine related work in Section 7. We conclude this paper with a discussion of the implementation of our ideas in the MSR tool [32] and possible directions for future work. First, some notation.

2 Notation

We use $[]$ to denote the empty list and a comma to denote list concatenation. We write identifiers ranging over lists using a vector notation, and indicate their length with a superscript. Therefore, \mathbf{X}^n denotes a list of n elements. Similarly, we use the notation X^n to denote a set of cardinality n . We will generally omit the length or cardinality information when irrelevant or easily deducible from the context. We write \mathbf{X}_i (or \mathbf{X}_i^n) for the i -th element of \mathbf{X} . We abbreviate constructions over all elements in a list as constructions over the list itself: for example, we may write $(M \mathbf{N}^n)$ for $(M \mathbf{N}_1 \dots \mathbf{N}_n)$, and $\forall \mathbf{X}^n : \mathbf{U}^n$ for $\forall \mathbf{X}_1 : \mathbf{U}_1 \dots \forall \mathbf{X}_n : \mathbf{U}_n$.

3 The MSR cryptoprotocol specification language

The syntax of instances of MSR tailored to specific security protocols has been presented in [9–11]. Here, we will instead concentrate on a more general syntax [13], which allows the user to declare operators such as message concatenation and encryption rather than having them hard-coded in the language. The core of the syntax of MSR is given in the following table:

<i>Terms</i>	M, N	$::=$	$X \mid M N$
<i>Types</i>	T	$::=$	$M \mid \text{state} \mid \text{princ} \mid \text{msg}$ $\mid \{X : T\}T'$
<i>Kinds</i>	K	$::=$	$\text{type} \mid \{X : T\}K$
<i>Contexts</i>	\mathcal{D}	$::=$	$\cdot \mid \mathcal{D}, X : K \mid \mathcal{D}, X : T$
<i>States</i>	S	$::=$	$\cdot \mid S, M$
<i>Rules</i>	ρ	$::=$	$\text{RULE } j : \forall \mathbf{X} : \mathbf{U}. (S \longrightarrow \exists \mathbf{Y} : \mathbf{V}. S')$
<i>Roles</i>	\mathcal{P}	$::=$	$\text{ROLE } i : \forall P : \text{princ}. \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho$ $\mid \text{ROLE } i : \text{FOR } P : \text{princ}. \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho$

MSR is based on first-order terms, that for simplicity we limit to identifiers (X) and application ($M N$). Here, X can be either a bound variable or a previously declared identifier. For conciseness, we describe atomic types (i.e., objects of kind `type`) as if they were terms. Reserved atomic types include the type of *states* (`state`), *principals* (`princ`) and *messages* (`msg`). We write $\{X : T\}T'$ for a dependent type, simplifying this syntax into $T \rightarrow T'$ when X does not occur free in T' . A *context* (called *signature* in [10, 11]), is a list of declarations of term constants and type families. A *state* is a comma-separated multiset of terms (of type

state). We later use the comma for message concatenation¹ as well, an overloading that is disambiguated by the surrounding context. A *rule* relates two states S and S' . The latter can be prefixed by a sequence of existential declarations (e.g., for creating nonces), while other variables in the rule will often be universally quantified at its head. *Roles* are nonempty sequences of rules prefixed by zero or more existential predicate declarations. We assume that MSR specifications satisfy a *restricted format*, where the existential predicates are used to introduce local intermediate states for sequentializing the rules inside a role. A role has a distinguished *owner* P , which can be either an arbitrary principal in *generic roles*, or a fixed principal (e.g., a server) for *anchored roles*, that are introduced by the keyword `FOR` (which is not a binder).

MSR's actual syntax, as described in [10, 11, 13] has other constructions, that we either ignore for simplicity or leave out for future work. In particular, we assume that MSR's native subtyping is emulated by explicit coercions, that MSR's module structure has been expanded into a single sequence of declarations, and that all typing information is explicit, while MSR allows pointwise reconstruction. Simple preprocessing or standard techniques suffice to account for these discrepancies. In this paper, we do not treat other features of MSR, in particular guarded rules, equations, and a syntactic check known as data access specification. It should be noted that the MSR tool that has been developed based on this work goes beyond this paper in several aspects. Among other features, it implements guarded rules, subtyping via coercions, type inference, and a module system. It, however, does not implement the data access specification, which is currently being redesigned.

We will rely on the Otway-Rees authentication protocol [30] to illustrate the use of MSR. In this protocol, an initiator, A , wants to obtain a short-term secret key k_{AB} to communicate securely with a responder B . They rely on a server S , with whom both share long-term secret keys k_{AS} and k_{BS} respectively, to generate this new key. The “usual notation” for this protocol is as follows:

1. $A \rightarrow B : n, A, B, \{n_A, n, A, B\}_{k_{AS}}$
2. $B \rightarrow S : n, A, B, \{n_A, n, A, B\}_{k_{AS}}, \{n_B, n, A, B\}_{k_{BS}}$
3. $S \rightarrow B : n, \{n_A, k_{AB}\}_{k_{AS}}, \{n_B, k_{AB}\}_{k_{BS}}$
4. $B \rightarrow A : n, \{n_A, k_{AB}\}_{k_{AS}}$

Here, A and B range over arbitrary principals, S is a fixed principal, the key server. Moreover, n , n_A and n_B are nonces, freshly generated values aimed at avoiding the replay of old messages.

As mentioned earlier, we assume appropriate declarations of types other than `princ`, `state` and `msg` and their elements. For this example, we rely on the type `nonce`, type families `ltK` and `stK` (for long- and short-term keys, respectively), and concatenation (overloaded as the infix “,”) and encryption (written $\{ _ \}_$) as additional message constructors. Both `ltK` and `stK` are examples of dependent types that naturally arise in strongly-typed specifications of security protocols. Their MSR declarations look as follows:

```
ltK : princ -> princ -> Type
stK : princ -> princ -> Type
```

Although MSR does not enforce the use of dependent types, a specification that uses such types can be much more precise, and as a consequence type checking can reveal many non-trivial specification errors even before performing any form of dynamic analysis.

¹ Different from [9–11] we do not assume associativity in this paper, but it is straightforward to add it as e.g. in the MSR tool [32].

In our example, we furthermore use the state predicate N for representing messages in transit on the network. The superscripts p , n and k represent coercions from principals, nonces and short-term keys to messages, respectively and 1 denotes the coercion from long-term keys to the shared keys expected by the encryption function (full MSR uses suborting instead). The complete MSR specification can be found in Appendix A and also in [10]. Here we illustrate only the generic role for the responder (B), which is the most complex in the specification:

ROLE 2 : $\forall B : \text{princ} .$

$\exists L : \{B : \text{princ}\} \text{princ} \rightarrow \text{nonce} \rightarrow \text{nonce} \rightarrow$

$(1tK B S) \rightarrow \text{state} .$

RULE 21 : $\left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \forall n : \text{nonce} . \\ \forall k_{BS} : (1tK B S) . \forall X : \text{msg} . \\ N(n^n, A^p, B^p, X) \\ \rightarrow \exists n_B : \text{nonce} . \\ N(n^n, A^p, B^p, X, \{n_B^n, n^n, A^p, B^p\}_{k_{BS}^1}), \\ (L B A n n_B k_{BS}) \end{array} \right)$

RULE 22 : $\left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \forall n, n_A : \text{nonce} . \forall Y : \text{msg} . \\ \forall k_{BS} : (1tK B S) . \forall k_{AB} : (\text{stK } A B) . \\ N(n^n, Y, \{n_B^n, k_{AB}^k\}_{k_{BS}^1}), (L B A n n_B k_{BS}) \\ \rightarrow N(n^n, Y) \end{array} \right)$

This role, which we have called “2”, is generic and its owner is B , as indicated by the header declaration “ $\forall B : \text{princ}$ ” (in contrast, the role for S would be an anchored role, since S is a fixed principal). It has two rules, “21” and “22”, both of which are in the scope of the quantifiers for B and L . The first rule implements B ’s end of messages 1 and 2 in the “usual notation” specification given earlier. Upon seeing the predicate $N(n^n, A^p, B^p, X)$ in the current state, it replaces it with the message $N(n^n, A^p, B^p, X, \{n_B^n, n^n, A^p, B^p\}_{k_{BS}^1})$ and the predicate $(L B A n n_B k_{BS})$ which will be described shortly. The two network predicates correspond to the first two messages in the informal specification, with one exception: the submessage $\{n_A, n, A, B\}_{k_{AS}}$ has been replaced with the generic X since B is unable to examine its structure because he is not in possession of the key k_{AS} . The nonce n_B occurring in the second message is created by the rule using the existential quantifier. The other variables mentioned in this rule are introduced by universal quantifiers (in our implementation, most of them can be omitted and automatically reconstructed). The second rule similarly captures the last two messages of the Otway-Rees protocol, from B ’s perspective. These two rules need to be executed in sequence. This is ensured by having the first introduce the predicate $(L B A n n_B k_{BS})$ in the state and asking the second to retrieve it. This also acts as a local state to the execution of this particular run of the protocol by allowing the first rule to pass relevant parameters (the values B, A, n, n_B and k_{BS}) to the second. The predicate symbol L is created fresh in the header of the role to avoid ambiguities were several sessions of this protocol to be executed concurrently.

The operational semantics of MSR [10, 11] uses transition judgments that transform configurations of the form $[S]_S^R$. Here S is an MSR state, R is an active roles set which collects the active roles, i.e., instantiated and possibly partially executed roles, available at

the next step, and Σ is an MSR dynamic context (called signature in [10, 11]), which accounts for all the dynamically generated fresh constants available to R in state S . Using a slightly richer syntax than [10, 11] we write an active role in the form $\text{ACTROLE } i : \text{FOR } A : \text{princ. WITH } \mathbf{N} : \mathbf{T}. \rho$ (again FOR and WITH are not binders), meaning that it is the instance of either a generic role $\text{ROLE } i : \forall P : \text{princ. } \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho$ with P instantiated by A and \mathbf{L} instantiated by \mathbf{N} , or the instance of an anchored role $\text{ROLE } i : \text{FOR } A : \text{princ. } \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho$ with \mathbf{L} instantiated by \mathbf{N} .

In this paper we initially rely on two judgment forms to describe transitions: Given declarations \mathcal{D} and roles \mathcal{P} , the judgment

$$\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I_i^{A, \mathbf{N}}} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$$

denotes the full instantiation, i.e., instantiation of all outer universal and existential quantifiers, of the role i (A and \mathbf{N} define the particular instantiation). We write

$$\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{E_i^{A, \mathbf{N}}} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$$

to denote a transition resulting in the application of a rule j from the active role i (the instance with A and \mathbf{N}), followed by the removal of the active role i if it has been fully executed. If one of these transitions can be derived we simply write

$$\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I, E} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$$

The rules for a marginally more abstract version of this semantics in SOS-style can be found in [10, 11].

For analysis purposes, the set of roles \mathcal{P} will generally consist of a protocol specification and an attacker model for it. An MSR specification of the Dolev-Yao intruder sufficient to verify the Otway-Rees protocol can be found in Appendix C. The reader interested in a more general and detailed account of how to specify an intruder in MSR is referred to [12, 14, 15].

4 Rewriting logic with dependent types

The *open calculus of constructions* (OCC), from which we derive the rewriting logic with dependent types (RWLDT) by instantiation and restriction, is a family of type theories that are concerned with three classes of terms: *elements*, *types* and *universes*. Types serve as an abstraction for collections of elements, and universes as an abstraction for collections of types. Just like rewriting logic, OCC allows equational and rule-based descriptions with both a model-theoretic and an operational semantics. Before we introduce the language and its constructs we will give two simple examples. The first example will illustrate the use of dependent types and equational specifications, and the second example will demonstrate the use of rules.

As an illustration of a possible use of dependent types, we use the following dependent types pubK and prvK to express the sets of public and private keys, respectively, that are available to a given principal. Note that the set of private keys given by prvK does not only depend on the principal but is also specific to a given public key, whose type again depends on the given principal.

$\text{princ} : \text{Type} .$

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```
pubK : princ -> Type .
prvK : {r : princ} (pubK r) -> Type .
```

This is the way asymmetric cryptography is typically modeled in MSR [11].

To further illustrate how dependent types can be used in OCC specifications, we consider heterogenous association lists that associate private keys with principals. The auxiliary predicate `occ` verifies if a given principal occurs in a given list. It is essential to formulate the correct type of the subsequent functions. The function `private` looks up a given principal in a given list and returns the private key associated with it. Similarly, the function `public` returns the public key. A remarkable point is the two-level structure (reflected by `public` and `private` respectively) and the similarity in the patterns of their specification. It is easy to see that the process of type checking the equations for `private` relies on the equations for `public`.

```
pklist : Type .

nil : pklist .
cons : {r:princ}{k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist} pklist .

occ : {q:princ}{l:pklist} Type .

occ_as_1 : ?? {q,r:princ}{k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist}
  (q = r) -> (occ q (cons r k a l)) .

occ_as_2 : ?? {q,r:princ}{k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist}
  (Not (q = r)) -> (occ q l) -> (occ q (cons r k a l)) .

public : {n:princ}{l:pklist}{p:(occ n l)} (pubK n) .

public_eq_1 : !! {n,r:princ}
  {k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist}{p:(occ n (cons r k a l))}
  (?? (n = r)) -> ((public n (cons r k a l) p) = k) .

public_eq_2 : !! {n,r:princ}
  {k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist}{p:(occ n (cons r k a l))}
  (Not (n = r)) -> (?? (occ n l)) ->
  ((public n (cons r k a l) p) = (public n l ?)) .

private : {n:princ}{l:pklist}{p:(occ n l)} (prvK n (public n l p)) .

private_eq_1 : !! {n,r:princ}
  {k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist}{p:(occ n (cons r k a l))}
  (?? (n = r)) ->
  ((private n (cons r k a l) p) = a) .

private_eq_2 : !! {n,r:princ}
  {k:(pubK r)}{a:(prvK r k)}{l:pklist}{p:(occ n (cons r k a l))}
  (?? (Not (n = r))) -> (?? (occ n l)) ->
  ((private n (cons r k a l) p) = (private n l ?)) .
```

In this specification, the tag `??` equips a proposition with an *assertional* flavor, meaning that operationally it will be interpreted using a semantics based on exhaustive goal-oriented proof search. Likewise, `!!` designates a possibly conditional equation as a *computational* one, meaning that it will be part of the operational semantics of reduction.

Given this specification we have the following sample executions:

```

a : princ . b : princ .

not_eq_a_b : ?? (Not (a = b)) .
not_eq_b_a : ?? (Not (b = a)) .

pubka : (pubK a) . prvka : (prvK a pubka) .
pubka' : (pubK a) . prvka' : (prvK a pubka') .
pubkb : (pubK b) . prvkb : (prvK b pubkb) .

l := (cons a pubka prvka
      (cons a pubka' prvka'
            (cons b pubkb prvkb nil))) .

ver (occ b l) .
verification succeeded

red (public b l ?) .
pubkb

red (private b l ?) .
prvkb
    
```

As a second example, we give the typical representation of a Petri net as a multiset rewrite specification. To this end, consider the Petri net modeling an instance of the well-known banker’s problem depicted in Fig. 2, which models the situation of a bank loaning money to (in this case two) clients.

The type of markings represents multisets axiomatized as a commutative monoid, and the transition rules are formalized as a ternary predicate. The third argument of type act is used to represent the label of the transition.

```

Marking : Type .
empty : Marking .
union : Marking -> Marking -> Marking .

union_comm : || {m,m' : Marking}
             (union m m') = (union m' m) .
    
```




Fig. 2 Banker’s problem with two clients

```

union_assoc : || {m,m',m'' : Marking}
  (union m (union m' m'')) = (union (union m m') m'') .
union_id : || {m : Marking}
  (union m empty) = m .

BANK : Marking .
CREDIT-1 : Marking . CREDIT-2 : Marking .
CLAIM-1 : Marking . CLAIM-2 : Marking .

act : Type .
GRANT-1 : act . RETURN-1 : act .
GRANT-2 : act . RETURN-2 : act .

rule : Marking -> Marking -> act -> Type .
rule_grant_1 : !! (rule
  (union (BANK,CLAIM-1))
  CREDIT-1
  GRANT-1) .
rule_return_1 : !! (rule
  (union (CREDIT-1,CREDIT-1,CREDIT-1))
  (union (BANK,BANK,BANK,CLAIM-1,CLAIM-1,CLAIM-1))
  RETURN-1) .
rule_grant_2 : !! (rule
  (union (BANK,CLAIM-2))
  CREDIT-2
  GRANT-2) .
rule_return_2 : !! (rule
  (union (CREDIT-2,CREDIT-2,CREDIT-2))
  (union (BANK,BANK,BANK,CLAIM-2,CLAIM-2,CLAIM-2))
  RETURN-2) .

```

The operational tag `||` is used above to designate *structural* equations and everything that follows has to be interpreted modulo these equations. Above we have also used some syntactic sugar by writing `(union (M1, M2, M3...))` instead of `(union (union (union M1 M2) M3)...)` for structurally associative operators like `union`.

A sample execution using the default strategy is the following:

```

rew rule (union BANK BANK CLAIM-1 CLAIM-1 CLAIM-1 CLAIM-2 CLAIM-2) .

(union CREDIT-1 CREDIT-1 CLAIM-1 CLAIM-2 CLAIM-2)

```

OCC is parameterized by OCC signatures defining the universe structure. In this paper we use a fixed signature $\Sigma = (\mathcal{S}, \text{Type}, :, \mathcal{R}, \leq)$ with *predicative* universes $\mathcal{S} = \{\text{Type}, \text{Type}_1, \text{Type}_2, \dots\}$, which form a cumulative predicative hierarchy. This means that we have $\text{Type} : \text{Type}_1 : \text{Type}_2 \dots$, a subtyping relation $\text{Type} \leq \text{Type}_1 \leq \text{Type}_2 \dots$ (also called subuniverse relation), and $(s, s', s \sqcup s') \in \mathcal{R}$ for all $s, s' \in \mathcal{S}$, where \sqcup denotes the least upper bound w.r.t. \leq .²

The formal system of OCC is designed to make sense under the *propositions-as-types interpretation*, where propositions are interpreted as types and proofs are interpreted as

² The effect of this choice of \mathcal{R} , a standard parameter for pure type systems [3], is that for arbitrary types $S : s$ (in a context Γ) and $T : s'$ (in a context $\Gamma, X : S$) with $s, s' \in \mathcal{S}$ we can form the dependent type $\{X : S\}T : s''$ (in Γ) for $s'' = s \sqcup s'$.

elements of these types. Since in OCC there is no a priori distinction between *terms* and *types*, and furthermore between *types* and *propositions*, we use all these notions synonymously.

OCC has the standard constructs known from pure type systems (cf. [3, 34, 37]) and a few additional ones. An *OCC term* can be one of the following: a *universe* s , a *variable* X , a typed λ -*abstraction* $[X : S]M$, a *dependent function type* $\{X : S\}T$, a *type assertion* $M : T$, an ε -*construct* εA to denote an irrelevant proof of a proposition A , a *propositional equality* $M = N$, or one of three flavors of *operational propositions*, written as $\| A$, $!! A$, or $?? A$. Here and in the following we usually write $M, N, P, Q, S, T, U, V, A$, and B to range over OCC terms, and X, Y, Z to range over names. Operational propositions can either be *structural propositions* designated by $\|$, *computational propositions* designated by $!!$, or *assertional propositions* designated by $??$. Subsequently, we use τ to range over these three flavors $\{\|, !!, ??\}$.

OCC contexts are lists of *declarations* of the form $X : S$. The empty context is written as $[]$. Typically, we use Γ to range over OCC contexts.

An *OCC specification* is simply an OCC context Γ in this paper. Such a specification can introduce *rewrite predicates* through declarations of the form

$$R : \{Y : S\}\{Y' : S\} T \rightarrow \text{Type}$$

The idea is that each rewrite predicate can be regarded as a labeled transition system, which can be executed in a way similar to rewriting logic specifications. Note that $R : \{Y : S\}\{Y' : S\} T \rightarrow \text{Type}$ is the declaration of a ternary predicate R where S is a type of states and T is a type of actions, which could range from atomic labels to rewrite proofs, depending on the requirements of the application. In the case where the type T does not depend on Y and Y' , this declaration takes the form $R : S \rightarrow S \rightarrow T \rightarrow \text{Type}$.

Since we are working with a predicative instance of OCC, it is entirely straightforward to define a model-theoretic semantics based on classical set theory with suitable universes [34, 35]. The appropriate level of abstraction for this paper is, however, the operational semantics, which is given by the formal system of OCC. It is a direct generalization of the operational semantics of rewriting logic [24] and its membership-equational sublogic [7], as implemented in Maude [17].

The *formal system of OCC* defines *derivability* of OCC judgments $\Gamma \vdash J$ and has been shown to be sound w.r.t. the set-theoretic semantics [34, 35]. For brevity we only give an informal explanation of all judgments and their intuitive operational meaning.

- The *type inference judgment* $\Gamma \vdash M \rightarrow : S$ asserts that the term M is an *element* of the *inferred type* S in the context Γ . Operationally, Γ and M are given and S is obtained by syntax-directed type inference and possible reduction using computational equations modulo the structural equations of Γ .
- The *typing judgment* $\Gamma \vdash M : S$ asserts that M is an *element* of *type* S in the context Γ . Operationally, Γ, M and S are given and verifying $\Gamma \vdash M : S$ amounts to type checking. Type checking is always reduced to type inference and the verification of an assertional subtyping judgment.
- The *structural equality judgment* $\Gamma \vdash \| (M = N)$ is used to express that M and N are considered to be structurally equal elements in the context Γ . Operationally, structural equality is realized by a suitable term representation so that structurally equal terms cannot be distinguished when they participate in computations.
- The *computational equality judgment* $\Gamma \vdash !! (M = N)$ is the judgment that defines the notion of reduction for the simplification of terms. The judgment states that the element

- M can be reduced to the element N in the context Γ . Operationally, Γ and M are given and N is the result of reducing M using the computational equations in Γ modulo the structural equations in Γ .
- The *assertional judgment* $\Gamma \vdash ?? A$ states that A is provable by means of the operational semantics in the context Γ . Operationally, Γ and A are given and the judgment is verified by a combination of reduction using the computational equations and exhaustive goal-oriented search using the assertional propositions in Γ . Both processes take place modulo the structural equations in Γ .
 - The *assertional equality judgment* $\Gamma \vdash ?? (M = N)$ states that M and N are assertionally equal in Γ , a notion that treats equality as a predicate and subsumes the structural and computational equality judgments. Operationally, Γ , M and N are given and the judgment is verified like other assertional judgments in a goal-oriented fashion.
 - The *assertional subtyping judgment* $\Gamma \vdash ?? (S \leq T)$ subsumes the assertional equality judgment and states that S is a subtype of T in Γ as a consequence of the cumulativity of the universe hierarchy. Operationally, Γ , S and T are given and the judgment is verified like other assertional judgments.
 - The *computational rewrite judgment* $\Gamma \vdash !! (R M M' P)$ expresses that by means of the computational rewrite rules specified in Γ for the rewrite predicate R the element M can be rewritten to the element M' and this rewrite is labeled by the element P . Operationally, Γ and M are given and M' is computed by the application of a computational rewrite rule in Γ modulo the computational and structural equations in Γ . In addition, an abstract witness P for this rewrite is constructed.

By fixing the signature at the beginning of this section, we have introduced a particular instance of OCC. For the purpose of this paper we further restrict this instance by requiring that specifications use a unique fixed rewrite predicate R which is declared as $R : S \rightarrow S \rightarrow T \rightarrow \text{Type}$. The idea is that this ternary rewrite predicate precisely corresponds to the labeled rewrite relation of rewriting logic. To remind us of this correspondence we refer to this restricted sublanguage of OCC in the following as *rewriting logic with dependent types* (RWLDT).³ Since R is unique, we can use the usual notation $[P] : M \Rightarrow N$ instead of the less intuitive $(R M N P)$. Similarly, we use $\Gamma \vdash !! [P] : M \Rightarrow N$ to denote the corresponding computational rewrite judgment.

5 Translation in our example

Before we give the general mapping from MSR into RWLDT, we show how our translation works in the example of the Otway-Rees protocol and its earlier specification in MSR. Specifically, we illustrate how its responder role (role number 2) is translated into RWLDT. The interested reader can find the translation of the remaining rules in Appendix .2. For brevity, we omit all declarations, except the ones for the network predicate, message concatenation (denoted $_ , _$ in MSR), and the encryption function, (which was written as $\{ _ \}_$ in MSR):

```
N : msg -> state
append : msg -> msg -> msg
encrypt : {A,B | princ} (shK A B) -> msg -> msg
```

³ Compared with [34, 35] we have omitted assertional rewrite judgments in our presentation of OCC, because we do not need rewrite conditions in this paper. Such conditions are admitted in RWL and hence in the most general version of RWLDT.

We write $(\text{append } (M_1, \dots, M_n))$ to abbreviate $(\text{append } M_1 (\text{append}(M_2, \dots, M_n)))$. Furthermore, the use of the notation $\{A \mid \text{princ}\}$ instead of $\{A : \text{princ}\}$ allows us to leave the actual parameter implicit (if it can be inferred from the context).

In addition, we have the following coercions (to which we have given longer names here):

```
nonce-msg : nonce -> msg
princ-msg : princ -> msg
ltK-shK : {A,B | princ} (ltK A B) -> (shK A B)
stK-shK : {A,B | princ} (stK A B) -> (shK A B)
```

We also declare the following injections to generate fresh symbols of the target type state:

```
NONCE : nat -> nonce
L2 : nat -> ({B : princ} princ -> nonce -> nonce -> (ltK B S) -> state)
```

Finally, we declare token constructors relevant for the responder role:

```
T21 : princ -> ({B : princ} princ ->
  nonce -> nonce -> (ltK B S) -> state) -> state .
T22 : princ -> ({B : princ} princ ->
  nonce -> nonce -> (ltK B S) -> state) -> state .
```

The translation of the responder role produces four rewrite rules, two of which can be eliminated by means of an optimization discussed later. The remaining two rules are R211 and R222, as shown below. The rule R211 simulates the combined effect of instantiating Role 2 and executing the first one of its two rules. The rule R222 simulates the effect of applying its second rule.

```
R211 : !! {B:princ}
  {L:{B:princ}princ->nonce->nonce->(ltK B S)->state}
  {n:nonce}{A:princ}{X:msg}
  {kBS:ltK B S}{nB:nonce}
  {fresh,fresh':nat}
  (L := (V ({B:princ}princ->nonce->nonce->
    (ltK B S)->state) fresh))->
  (nB := (V nonce (suc fresh)))->
  (fresh' := (suc(suc fresh)))->
  [L211]:
  (union ((F fresh),(E (ltK B S) kBS),
    (N (append ((nonce-msg n),
      (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B),X))))))
=> (union ((F fresh'),(T22 B L),(E (ltK B S) kBS),
  (N (append ((nonce-msg n),
    (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B),X,
    (encrypt (ltK-shK kBS)
      (append ((nonce-msg nB),(nonce-msg n),
        (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B))))))))),
  (L B A n nB kBS)))

R222 : !! {B:princ}
  {L:{B:princ}princ->nonce->nonce->(ltK B S)->state}
  {n:nonce}{A:princ}{Y:msg}
  {kBS:ltK B S}{nB:nonce}{kAB:stK A B}
  {fresh,fresh':nat}
  (fresh' := fresh)->
  [L222]:
```

```

(union ((F fresh),(T22 B L),
  (N (append ((nonce-msg n),Y,
    (encrypt (ltK-shK kBS)
      (append (nonce-msg nB)
        (stK-msg kAB)))))),
    (L B A n nB kBS)))
=> (union ((F fresh'),
  (N (append (nonce-msg n) Y))))

```

The full RWLDT specification successfully passes the OCC type checker, which implies that the original MSR specification is type-correct as well. For the purpose of execution, the OCC/Maude prototype erases all type information in the quantifiers and internally generates a first-order rewrite system capturing the operational semantics. Hence, the OCC prototype can further be used to explore the dynamics of the protocol. For example, to restrict the protocol execution to one instance of each role and to observe termination we add $START_i$ and $TERMINATED_i$ tokens to respectively the first and last rules of each role i .

```
A:princ . B:princ . kAS:(ltK A S) . kBS:(ltK B S) .
```

```
rew (union ((F O),(E P A),(E P B),
  (E (ltK A S) kAS),(E (ltK B S) kBS),
  (START1 A), (START2 B), (START3 S))) .
```

```
trace:
```

```
A111 A211 A311 A222 A122
```

```
result:
```

```

(union ((F 6),
  (E P A),(E P B),
  (E (ltK A S) kAS),(E (ltK B S) kBS),
  (TERMINATED1 A),
  (TERMINATED2 B),
  (TERMINATED3 S)))

```

After starting the symbolic execution the system performs a series of actions each corresponding to the application of a rule. Finally, the terminating state is reached, the explicit type information is preserved, and six fresh constants have been used. An exploration of the state space using Maude shows that the above execution is the only possible one from the given initial state.

6 Mapping MSR to RWLDT

In this section we give a precise definition of our mapping from MSR into RWLDT. The translations of kinds, types, terms, and states are very direct. The translation of roles and rules may appear somewhat technical, but the underlying idea is simple. To make it more accessible to the reader we introduce the mapping of roles and rules in three steps: In Sections 6.1–6.3, we give an initial mapping that is correct in a rather obvious way, and then we deal with some deficiencies of this mapping in two further steps in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. The result is a mapping which is not only correct but ensures executability of the resulting RWLDT specification (in the sense of ordinary rewrite systems). It furthermore avoids the introduction of any superfluous intermediate states that would lead to unnecessary inefficiencies, especially if we used the result of the translation for symbolic state space exploration. In spite of being non-terminating, the first mapping is the simplest one and simulates the MSR operational semantics in the most direct way. Hence, for a verification of

security properties (e.g. invariants) by logical reasoning, rather than via symbolic execution, this representation is entirely appropriate.

6.1 Initial context

The MSR multiset union constructs will be translated to an ordinary RWLDT function `union`. To this end, we define *initial_context* as an OCC context that contains the following declarations.

There are the structural axioms for multisets:

```
state : Type,
empty : state,
union : state → state → state,
union.comm : || {X, Y : state}(union X Y) = (union Y X),
union.assoc : || {X, Y, Z : state}(union (union X Y)Z) = (union X (union Y Z)),
union.id : || {X : state}(union empty X) = X.
```

The initial context also contains the following declarations, which we describe only intuitively. Their purpose will become clear as we lay out the translation.

- `princ` : Type, `msg` : Type. The types of principals and messages, respectively.
- `Tij` : `princ` → **T** → state. For each role i with existential quantifier types **T** and with a rule j , a token (`Tij A N`) will be used to represent the fact that role i has been instantiated with values A and N .
- `nat` : Type, and `0` : nat and `S` : nat → nat. Natural numbers of this type are *only* used to index fresh symbols, i.e., symbols that have not been used in the past.
- `F` : nat → state. As an invariant of our representation there is a unique (`F N`) that holds the next available fresh index N .
- `V̄` : nat → V . For each type V which can be generated, this function allows us to index (some of) its elements by natural numbers, a way to generate fresh symbols of this type.
- `E` : { T : Type}T → state. The term (`E T M`) expresses the fact that M is an element of type T , as part of the state. We will use this predicate only in Section 6.4.
- `act` : Type, `Ai` : act for each role i , and `Aij` : act for each of its rules j . These constants are used to label the rewrite rules resulting from the translation.

6.2 Translating kinds, types, terms, states, and contexts

For the following we assume that MSR specifications do not use names introduced by *initial_context* other than `state`, `princ` and `msg`. We also assume that all declared and bound variables are distinct. This allows a clear presentation of the main ideas without worrying about renaming and capturing. We then define the translation of MSR kinds, types, states, and contexts as follows:

- `kind(type)` = Type
- `type({X : T}K)` = { X : `type(T)`}`kind(K)`
- `type(X)` = X
- `type(state)` = state
- `type(princ)` = princ
- `type(msg)` = msg

- $$\begin{aligned} & \text{type}(T \ M) = (\text{type}(T) \ \text{term}(M)) \\ & \text{type}(\{X : T\}T') = \{X : \text{type}(T)\}\text{type}(T') \\ - & \text{term}(X) = X \\ & \text{term}(M \ N) = (\text{term}(M) \ \text{term}(N)) \\ - & \text{state}(\cdot) = \text{empty} \\ & \text{state}(S, S') = (\text{union} \ \text{state}(S) \ \text{state}(S')) \\ & \text{state}(M) = \text{term}(M) \\ - & \text{context}(\cdot) = \text{initial_context} \\ & \text{context}(\mathcal{D}, X : K) = \text{context}(\mathcal{D}), X : \text{kind}(K) \\ & \text{context}(\mathcal{D}, X : T) = \text{context}(\mathcal{D}), X : \text{type}(T). \end{aligned}$$

Subsequently, $(\text{union}(S_1, \dots, S_n))$ abbreviates the term $(\text{union} \ S_1 \ (\text{union}(S_2, \dots, S_n)))$, and $(\text{union} \ ())$ abbreviates empty . We also refer to this term as the *formal multiset* of S_1, \dots, S_n .

The adequacy of this translation is expressed by the following theorem:

Theorem 6.1. *If \mathcal{D} is a well-typed MSR context then:*

1. *If K is an MSR kind, then*
 $\mathcal{D} \vdash K \ \text{kind}$ in MSR iff $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}) \vdash \text{kind}(K) : \text{Type}_1$ in RWLDT.
2. *If in addition $\mathcal{D} \vdash K$ kind and T is an MSR type, then*
 $\mathcal{D} \vdash T : K$ in MSR iff $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}) \vdash \text{type}(T) : \text{kind}(K)$ in RWLDT.
3. *If in addition $\mathcal{D} \vdash T : K$ and M is an MSR term, then*
 $\mathcal{D} \vdash M : T$ in MSR iff $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}) \vdash \text{term}(M) : \text{type}(T)$ in RWLDT.
4. *If S is an MSR state, then*
 $\mathcal{D} \vdash S : \text{state}$ in MSR iff $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}) \vdash \text{state}(S) : \text{state}$ in RWLDT.

Furthermore, \mathcal{D} is well-typed iff $\text{context}(\mathcal{D})$ is well-typed.

Proof Sketch: First of all, it is straightforward to verify that each MSR inference rule [13] can be simulated by one or more inference rules of RWLDT [34, 35]. As a consequence, the \Rightarrow direction of the equivalences (1)–(4) holds.

To deal with the more interesting \Leftarrow direction of these equivalences, we first observe that several features of RWLDT are not relevant for the purpose of this proof. Our representation does not exploit higher universes (beyond Type_0) or universe subtyping in any essential way (the only use of Type_1 in our representation is to serve as a type of kinds). Both computational equations and assertional propositions of RWLDT are not used. Structural equations are only used to represent MSR states (multisets) and they are used in such a way that they precisely represent the MSR syntax. The computational rewrite axioms of RWLDT do not have any impact on type checking, so they can be ignored here. Another major simplification is that MSR and hence the representation in RWLDT does not use λ -abstractions, and the type assertions and the ε -operator of RWLDT are not used either. As a consequence, many of the inference rules of RWLDT [34, 35] can be ignored or reduced to trivial cases, because they cannot have been used in the RWLDT derivation or have only been used in a trivial form. For instance, without λ -abstractions and computational equations the computational equality reduces to structural equality. Without assertional propositions, inference rules for assertional propositions other than assertional equality and assertional subtyping are superfluous. Without the use of higher universes, assertional subtyping coincides with assertional equality which reduces to structural equality and α -conversion. Now it is easy to verify the \Leftarrow direction of (1)–(4) by simulating each inference rule of the simplified RWLDT using

inference rules of MSR [13]. A slight remaining difficulty is to overcome the gap between implicit α -conversion in MSR and explicit α -conversion in RWLDT (including its more general notion of context), but the proof techniques for pure type systems used in [37] can be easily adapted to our simple setting.

Finally, the proof that \mathcal{D} is well-typed iff $\text{context}(\mathcal{D})$ is well-typed, can be done by induction over the length of \mathcal{D} using the previous statements. \square

It is important to note that this theorem does not imply that each well-typed RWLDT term in the context $\text{context}(\mathcal{D})$ is a representation of an MSR term, type, or kind. For instance, a counterpart of the RWLDT type $\text{Type} \rightarrow \text{Type} : \text{Type}_1$ does not exist in MSR. Similarly, we could use λ -abstractions and other constructs in RWLDT, but they do not have counterparts in MSR. In fact, the restricted syntax of MSR and our representation carves out a sublanguage of RWLDT, and only terms in this sublanguage are used inside the operational semantics. The specification itself, however, requires constructs such as structural equations and computational rewrite axioms, which are outside of this sublanguage.

6.3 Translating roles and rules

To further simplify the presentation, we assume that the identifier of the i -th role is i and the identifier of its j -th rule is j . We then define the translation of MSR roles and rules as follows (using \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{P}' to range over role sequences):

- $\text{roles}(\cdot) = []$.
- $\text{roles}(\text{ROLE } i \text{ FOR } A : \text{princ. } \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho) = Ri : \text{role}(i, A, \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho)$.
- $\text{roles}(\text{ROLE } i : \forall P : \text{princ. } \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho) = Ri : \{P : \text{princ}\} \text{role}(i, P, \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho)$.
- $\text{roles}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}') = \text{roles}(\mathcal{P}), \text{roles}(\mathcal{P}')$.
- $\text{role}(i, P, \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho^n) =$
 $\{Z, Z' : \text{nat}\} \{ \mathbf{L} : \text{type}(\mathbf{T}) \} \text{fresh}(Z, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, Z') \rightarrow$
 $[Ai] : (\text{F } Z) \Rightarrow (\text{union } ((\text{Ti } 1 \text{ } P \text{ } \mathbf{L}), \dots, (\text{Tin } P \text{ } \mathbf{L}) (\text{F } Z'))),$
 $\text{rule}(i, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, \rho_1^n), \dots, \text{rule}(i, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, \rho_n^n)$.
- $\text{rule}(i, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, \text{RULE } j : \forall \mathbf{X} : \mathbf{U}. M \longrightarrow \exists \mathbf{Y} : \mathbf{V}. N) =$
 $Rij : \{P : \text{princ}\} \{Z, Z' : \text{nat}\} \{ \mathbf{L} : \text{type}(\mathbf{T}) \}$
 $\{ \mathbf{X} : \text{type}(\mathbf{U}) \} \{ \mathbf{Y} : \text{type}(\mathbf{V}) \} \text{fresh}(Z, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{V}, Z') \rightarrow$
 $[Aij] : (\text{union } ((\text{Tij } P \text{ } \mathbf{L}), (\text{F } Z), \text{state}(M))) \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{union } ((\text{state}(N), (\text{F } Z')))).$
- $\text{fresh}(Z, \mathbf{Y}^y, \mathbf{V}^y, Z') = \mathbf{Y}_1^y = \bar{\mathbf{V}}_1^y(Z), \mathbf{Y}_2^y = \bar{\mathbf{V}}_2^y(S(Z)), \dots, \mathbf{Y}_y^y = \bar{\mathbf{V}}_y^y(S^{y-1}(Z)), Z' = S^y(Z)$.

In the last equation we assume that for type V there is an injection with the same name $\bar{V} : \text{nat} \rightarrow V$, a declaration that needs to be included in *initial.context*.

Above we use $A_1, \dots, A_n \rightarrow B$ to abbreviate $A_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow A_n \rightarrow B$, which here means that A_1, \dots, A_n are conditions. It should also be noted, however, that the use of conditions here is not essential, because they are all of the form $Y=Q$ and hence can trivially be eliminated. We only use conditions for better readability and to maintain a more direct correspondence to the MSR syntax.

The idea behind the definition of *role* is that it maps each MSR role i to several RWLDT rewrite axioms: There is one rewrite axiom labeled Ai , representing the instantiation of this role. In addition, there is one rewrite axiom labeled Aij (generated by *rule*) for each of its rules j . The first axiom Ai , apart from the generation of fresh terms needed for the new instance, generates tokens $(\text{Ti } 1 \text{ } P \text{ } \mathbf{L}), \dots, (\text{Tin } P \text{ } \mathbf{L})$, representing the fact that none of the rules of this

role have been executed yet. Each of the remaining axioms A_{ij} simulates the corresponding MSR rule j , so that each application of a rule removes its corresponding token. This realizes the requirement of the operational semantics of MSR that allows rules of active roles to be executed at most once.

The following lemma expresses that the generation of fresh symbols is correctly represented in RWLDT, namely that for the index n maintained by F all future indices $n + k$ are fresh.

Lemma 6.2 (Freshness Invariance). *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification. The representation in RWLDT maintains the following invariant: If there is a term of the form $(F (S^n 0))$ in the RWLDT state and no other occurrence of F then for each k (including 0) the term $(S^{n+k} 0)$, and consequently $V(S^{n+k} 0)$, is fresh, i.e., it does not occur in any other part of the state.*

Proof Sketch: It can be directly verified as an inductive invariant for each of the RWLDT rewrite axioms in our representation, using our earlier assumption on the initial context that 0 and S are not used in the MSR specification. \square

To express the relationship between MSR and its representation we also need a representation of dynamic entities such as active roles:

- $actroles(\cdot) = \text{empty}$.
- $actroles(\text{ACTROLE } i : \text{FOR } A : \text{princ. WITH } \mathbf{N} : \mathbf{T}. \rho) =$
the formal multiset of all $(Tij A \mathbf{N})$ s.t. ρ contains rule j .
- $actroles(R, R') = (\text{union } actroles(R) \ actroles(R'))$,
where R and R' range over active role sets.

Recall that $\text{ACTROLE } i : \text{FOR } A : \text{princ. WITH } \mathbf{N} : \mathbf{T}. \rho$ is the form of an active role, i.e., one that has been (fully) instantiated and possibly partially executed. The fact that the active role set contains an active role of this form corresponds to the fact that for each rule j of the active role (i.e., a rule that has not been executed yet) the term $(Tij A \mathbf{N})$ is part of the distributed state in the representation.

The subsequent theorem justifies the use of representations of MSR configurations of a particular form in all the remaining theorems.

Theorem 6.3 (Representation Invariance). *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification. If $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}), \text{roles}(\mathcal{P}) \vdash !! [P] : M \Rightarrow M'$ and M is a representation of an MSR configuration, i.e., of the form $(\text{union} ((F (S^n 0)), \text{state}(S), \text{actroles}(R)))$ for some n , some MSR state S , and some MSR active role set R , then M' is a representation of an MSR configuration as well.*

Proof Sketch: Again this is an inductive invariant that obviously holds for each of the RWLDT rewrite axioms in our representation. \square

For the proof of the main theorem, we need the following lemma.

Lemma 6.4 (Representation Uniqueness). *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification. Then each MSR active role set R reachable in the operational semantics of MSR can be uniquely reconstructed from its representation $actroles(R)$.*

Proof Sketch: Observe that active role sets can contain only elements that can actually be obtained by (full) instantiation of known roles followed by removal of some of its rules (after they are executed). We need to consider two cases:

1. If there is at least one token (left) that represents the active role, then this token carries the full information, namely i , A , and \mathbf{N} , to determine the initial role instance. Unfortunately, we need to argue that together all tokens of the form $(Tij \ A \ \mathbf{N})$ uniquely determine the rules of this active role, i.e., the rules that still need to be executed. The only potential source of confusion is that the representation may contain several instances of the same active role i executing concurrently with the same values A and \mathbf{N} . Since \mathbf{N} is generated fresh the confusion can only occur if \mathbf{N} is the empty list, i.e., when the role does not have any existential quantifiers. Because of the restricted format of MSR specifications (existential predicates are used to sequentialize the rules inside a role) this means that the role can only have a single rule, and hence it can be in only one state, namely the state after it has been instantiated but not executed.
2. In case there is no token (left) that represents the active role, the role must have been fully executed, and hence by definition of our operational semantics for MSR it cannot be part of the active role set. Hence, again its contribution to the active role set is uniquely determined. \square

Lemma 6.5. *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification, let S, S' be MSR states, and let R, R' be MSR active roles sets. Then for all n, k we have the following equivalences:*

There are MSR contexts Σ^n, Σ^{n+k} s.t. $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I_i^{A, \mathbf{N}}} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ iff
context(\mathcal{D}), roles(\mathcal{P}) \vdash

!! $[Ai] : (\text{union}((F(S^n \ 0)), \text{state}(S), \text{actroles}(R))) \Rightarrow$
(union((F($S^{n+k} \ 0$)), $\text{state}(S)$, $\text{actroles}(R')$)),

There are MSR contexts Σ^n, Σ^{n+k} s.t. $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{E_{i,j}^{A, \mathbf{N}}} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ iff
context(\mathcal{D}), roles(\mathcal{P}) \vdash

!! $[Aij] : (\text{union}((F(S^n \ 0)), \text{state}(S), \text{actroles}(R))) \Rightarrow$
(union((F($S^{n+k} \ 0$)), $\text{state}(S')$, $\text{actroles}(R')$)).

Above we identify terms that are structurally equal in context(\mathcal{D}).

Proof Sketch: First, an observation that simplifies the proof of both statements of the lemma: We can verify using the previous lemma that

$$(\text{union}((F(S^n \ 0)), \text{state}(S), \text{actroles}(R)))$$

can only represent the MSR state S , the MSR active role set R , and hence only an MSR configuration $[S]_{\Sigma}^R$ for some dynamic context Σ . Similarly,

$$(\text{union}((F(S^{n+k} \ 0)), \text{state}(S'), \text{actroles}(R')))$$

can only represent a configuration $[S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$, again for some dynamic context Σ' .

To prove the first equivalence of the lemma, note that the left-hand side expresses that role i is instantiated for some principal A (if it is generic, otherwise A is already fixed), the existential quantifiers are instantiated with fresh symbols, and the corresponding role instance is added to the active role set. According to the change in the MSR dynamic context on the left-hand side (Σ^n becomes Σ^{n+k}) k fresh symbols are generated, which means that the role has k existential quantifiers. We need to verify that this step in the operational semantics of MSR is equivalent to the right-hand side, i.e., to the application of the rewrite

axiom labeled A_i (see definition of *role*) in RWLDT. Using the freshness invariance lemma it is easy to see that the existential quantifiers of role i are correctly instantiated using k fresh terms \mathbf{N} which are generated in this process. Apart from maintaining the freshness information, the only effect of the rule is that the terms $(Ti1 A \mathbf{N}), \dots, (Tin A \mathbf{N})$ are added to the RWLDT state. This can only correspond to the addition of a new instance of role i to the active role set.

For the second equivalence of the lemma, note that the left-hand side expresses that an instance of role i is selected from the active role set and its rule j , which is of the form $\text{RULE } j : \forall \mathbf{X} : \mathbf{U}. M \longrightarrow \exists \mathbf{Y} : \mathbf{V}. N$, is executed. According to the change in the dynamic MSR context on the left-hand side (Σ^n becomes Σ^{n+k}) k fresh symbols are generated, which means that the rule has k existential quantifiers. We again need to verify that this step in the operational semantics of MSR is equivalent to the right-hand side, i.e., the application of the rewrite axiom labeled A_{ij} (see definition of *rule*) in RWLDT. Using the freshness lemma it is easy to see that the existential quantifiers of rule j are correctly instantiated using k fresh terms. Apart from maintaining the freshness information, the rule has two effects: It replaces the term $\text{state}(M')$ by $\text{state}(N')$ (the terms M' and N' are instances of M and N , respectively), a step precisely corresponding to the execution of the MSR rule, and it removes the token $(Tij A \mathbf{N})$, which can only correspond to the fact that the rule is removed from the active role, because it has been executed.

Obviously, for both equivalences the detailed proof would establish a bijection between the fresh symbols generated by MSR and the fresh terms generated in RWLDT. \square

The following theorem summarizes the statements of the previous lemma:

Theorem 6.6 (Soundness and Completeness). *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification, let S, S' be MSR states, and let R, R' be MSR active roles sets. Then for all n, k we have the following equivalence:*

There are MSR contexts Σ^n, Σ^{n+k} s.t. $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I,E} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ iff there exists P s.t. $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}), \text{roles}(\mathcal{P}) \vdash$

!! $[P] : (\text{union}((F(S^n 0)), \text{state}(S), \text{actroles}(R))) \Rightarrow$

($\text{union}((F(S^{n+k} 0)), \text{state}(S'), \text{actroles}(R')))$,

where we identify terms that are structurally equal in $\text{context}(\mathcal{D})$.

6.4 Achieving executability

Unfortunately, the resulting RWLDT specification is not necessarily executable in the ordinary sense of rewriting, since there may be rules with variables in the right-hand side that do not appear in the left-hand side and hence cannot be bound by matching. The universally quantified variable k_{BS} in $\text{RULE } 21$ of the Otway-Rees protocol specification is a typical example of this situation. Therefore, we apply another simple transformation which makes certain types and their elements explicit in the state by making use of the predicate $\mathbf{E} : \{\mathbf{T} : \text{Type}\} \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \text{state}$. This leads to the following modifications:

– $\text{role}(i, P, \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho^n) =$
 $\{Z, Z' : \text{nat}\} \{\mathbf{L} : \text{type}(\mathbf{T})\} \text{fresh}(Z, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, Z') \rightarrow$
 $[A_i] : (\text{union}((\mathbf{E} \text{ princ } P), (F Z)) \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{union}((\mathbf{E} \text{ princ } P), (Ti1 P \mathbf{L}), \dots, (Tin P \mathbf{L}), (F Z')))$
 $\text{rule}(i, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, \rho_1^n), \dots, \text{rule}(i, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, \rho_n^n).$

– $rule(i, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, \text{RULE } j : \forall \mathbf{X} : \mathbf{U}. M \longrightarrow \exists \mathbf{Y} : \mathbf{V}. N) =$
 $R_{ij} : \{P : \text{princ}\}\{Z, Z' : \text{nat}\}\{\mathbf{L} : \text{type}(\mathbf{T}ij)\}$
 $\{\mathbf{X} : \text{type}(\mathbf{U})\}\{\mathbf{Y} : \text{type}(\mathbf{V})\}\text{fresh}(Z, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{V}, Z') \rightarrow$
 $[A_{ij}] : (\text{union}(ES, (\mathbf{T}ij P \mathbf{L}), (\mathbf{F} Z), \text{state}(M))) \Rightarrow ,$
 $(\text{union}(ES, \text{state}(N), (\mathbf{F} Z')))$

where ES is a formal multiset containing $(\mathbf{E} U_1^x \mathbf{X}_1^x), \dots, (\mathbf{E} U_x^x \mathbf{X}_x^x)$.

The theorem is as before except that we have to provide a sufficient amount of explicit typing information (see ES below) to perform a simulation step:

Theorem 6.7 (Soundness and Completeness). *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification, let S, S' be MSR states, and let R, R' be MSR active roles sets. Then for all n, k we have the following equivalence:*

There are MSR contexts Σ^n, Σ^{n+k} s.t. $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I,E} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ iff

there exists P, ES s.t. $\text{context}(\mathcal{D}), \text{roles}(\mathcal{P}) \vdash$

!! $[P] : (\text{union}(ES, (\mathbf{F}(S^n 0))), \text{state}(S), \text{actroles}(R))) \Rightarrow$

$(\text{union}(ES, (\mathbf{F}(S^{n+k} 0))), \text{state}(S'), \text{actroles}(R'))$

where we identify terms that are structurally equal in $\text{context}(\mathcal{D})$, and ES is a formal multiset containing $(\mathbf{E} U Q)$ only for terms Q of type U .

Proof Sketch: The only modification to our previous representation (Section 6.3) is that we have added terms of the form $(\mathbf{E} U Q)$ to the rewrite axioms, such that as an obvious invariant these terms are preserved by applications of rewrite axioms. These terms cannot be confused or interact with any of the terms representing the MSR configuration, so that the original behavior is preserved (disregarding the newly introduced terms), assuming that the applicability of rewrite axioms is not compromised. To guarantee the latter, the theorem has been relaxed w.r.t. the previous one (Section 6.3) by adding the formal multiset ES to the state in the left-hand side of the rewrite judgment (and since ES is preserved it is added to the right-hand side as well). Since ES is existentially quantified it can be instantiated by a sufficiently large multiset of terms that provides all the terms $(\mathbf{E} U Q)$ that are now required to apply the rewrite axioms. □

As a slight optimization, the term $(\mathbf{E} \text{ princ } A)$ in the translation above can be dropped in the rewrite axiom A_i if it is the translation of an anchored rule, because in this case A is a constant declared in \mathcal{D} and not a variable that needs to be determined by matching. Furthermore, $(\mathbf{E} U_j^x \mathbf{X}_j^x)$ can be dropped from ES in the translation if \mathbf{X}_j^x occurs in M , because in this case it can be bound by matching.

6.5 Eliminating intermediate states

A drawback of the operational semantics of MSR defined in terms of the transition judgment $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I,E} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ and our representation above is that role instantiation can occur anytime and arbitrarily often even if there is no subsequent use of the role. This is an unnecessary source of nondeterminism and nontermination and without any other means to control the execution it would prevent symbolic execution and analysis.

By considering a slightly more abstract semantics that composes role instantiation with the execution of a rule of this role, we can eliminate such superfluous intermediate states. For the modified operational semantics of MSR we write $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{(I)E} [S'']_{\Sigma''}^{R''}$ iff there exists a role i with a rule j (and A, \mathbf{N}) s.t.

- $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I_i^{A,N}} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ and $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'} \longrightarrow_{E_{i,j}^{A,N}} [S'']_{\Sigma''}^{R''}$ or
- $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{E_{i,j}^{A,N}} [S'']_{\Sigma''}^{R''}$.

Our representation will be modified correspondingly as follows:

- $role(i, P, \exists \mathbf{L} : \mathbf{T}. \rho^n) =$
 $rule_1(i, n, P, \mathbf{L}, \rho_1^n), rule_2(i, n, P, \mathbf{L}, \rho_n^n), \dots,$
 $rule_1(i, n, P, \mathbf{L}, \rho_n^n), rule_2(i, n, P, \mathbf{L}, \rho_n^n).$
- $rule_1(i, n, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, RULE\ j : \forall \mathbf{X} : \mathbf{U}. M \longrightarrow \exists \mathbf{Y} : \mathbf{V}. N) =$
 $Rij1 : \{P : princ\}\{Z, Z', Z'' : nat\}\{\mathbf{L} : type(\mathbf{T})\}$
 $\{\mathbf{X} : type(\mathbf{U})\}\{\mathbf{Y} : type(\mathbf{V})\}$
 $fresh(Z, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, Z'), fresh(Z', \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{V}, Z'') \rightarrow$
 $[Aij1] : (union((E\ princ\ P), ES, (F\ Z), state(M))) \Rightarrow$
 $(union((E\ princ\ P), ES, state(N), TS, (F\ Z'')))$
 where TS is the formal multiset containing
 $(Ti1\ P\ \mathbf{L}) \dots (Tin\ P\ \mathbf{L})$ with $(Tij\ P\ \mathbf{L})$ removed,
- $rule_2(i, n, P, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{T}, RULE\ j : \forall \mathbf{X} : \mathbf{U}. M \longrightarrow \exists \mathbf{Y} : \mathbf{V}. N) =$
 $Rij2 : \{P : princ\}\{Z, Z', Z'' : nat\}\{\mathbf{L} : type(\mathbf{T})\}$
 $\{\mathbf{X} : type(\mathbf{U})\}\{\mathbf{Y} : type(\mathbf{V})\}fresh(Z, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{V}, Z') \rightarrow$
 $[Aij2] : union(ES, (Tij\ P\ \mathbf{L}), (F\ Z), state(M)) \Rightarrow$
 $union(ES, state(N), (F\ Z')).$

The idea behind these definitions is that the rewrite axiom labeled $Rij1$ generated by $rule_1$ simulates the effect of instantiating role i immediately followed by the execution of one of its rules, which is j in this case. As a consequence it generates the formal multiset of tokens $(Ti1\ P\ \mathbf{L}) \dots (Tin\ P\ \mathbf{L})$ with $(Tij\ P\ \mathbf{L})$ removed, because the corresponding rule has already been executed. The rewrite axiom labeled $Rij2$ generated by $rule_2$ takes care of the execution of the remaining rules, and hence is left unchanged when compared with the previous section.

Now we obtain a result entirely analogous to the previous theorem:

Theorem 6.8 (Soundness and Completeness). *Let $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P})$ be an MSR specification, let S, S' be MSR states, and let R, R' be MSR active roles sets. Then for all n, k we have the following equivalence:*

There are MSR contexts Σ^n, Σ^{n+k} s.t. $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{(I)E} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'}$ iff there exists P, EM s.t. $context(\mathcal{D}), roles(\mathcal{P}) \vdash$
 $!! [P] : (union(ES, (F(S^n\ 0)), state(S), actroles(R))) \Rightarrow$
 $(union(ES, (F(S^{n+k}\ 0)), state(S'), actroles(R'))),$

where we identify terms that are structurally equal in $context(\mathcal{D})$, and EM is a formal multiset containing $(E\ U\ Q)$ only for terms Q of type U .

Proof Sketch: The only difference w.r.t. the previous theorem is that we use the new judgment $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{(I)E} [S'']_{\Sigma''}^{R''}$ as the operational semantics of MSR. By definition there are two cases to consider:

1. There is a role i with a rule j such that

$$\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{I_i^{A,N}} [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S']_{\Sigma'}^{R'} \longrightarrow_{E_{i,j}^{A,N}} [S'']_{\Sigma''}^{R''}.$$

Observe that we are concerned with a sequential composition of the judgments that we represented in our previous representation (Section 6.4). Omitting quantifiers and conditions for clarity, the first judgment was represented by the rewrite axiom

$$[Ai] : (\text{union}(\text{E princ } P), (\text{F } Z)) \Rightarrow (\text{union}(\text{E princ } P), (\text{Ti } 1 \text{ P } \mathbf{L}), \dots, (\text{Ti } n \text{ P } \mathbf{L}), (\text{F } Z')),$$

and the second judgment was represented by the rewrite axiom

$$[Aij] : (\text{union}(ES, (\text{Tij } P \mathbf{L}), (\text{F } Z'), \text{state}(M))) \Rightarrow (\text{union}(ES, \text{state}(N), (\text{F } Z''))).$$

Consequently, our new representation (see definition of $rule_1$) uses the sequential composition of these two:

$$[Aij1] : (\text{union}((\text{E princ } P), (\text{F } Z), ES, \text{state}(M))) \Rightarrow (\text{union}((\text{E princ } P), TS, ES, \text{state}(N), TS, (\text{F } Z''))),$$

where TS is the formal multiset containing $(\text{Ti } 1 \text{ P } \mathbf{L}) \dots (\text{Ti } n \text{ P } \mathbf{L})$ with $(\text{Tij } P \mathbf{L})$ removed.

- There is a role i with a rule j such that $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{P} \vdash [S]_{\Sigma}^R \longrightarrow_{E_{i,j}^{A,N}} [S'']_{\Sigma''}^{R''}$.

For this case, we just need to simulate the execution of a rule. Hence, the rewrite axiom (see definition of $rule_2$) is as in the previous representation:

$$[Aij2] : \text{union}(ES, (\text{Tij } P \mathbf{L}), (\text{F } Z), \text{state}(M)) \Rightarrow \text{union}(ES, \text{state}(N), (\text{F } Z')). \quad \square$$

As an optimization, the rewrite axiom $Rij1$ can be omitted if M contains any of the variables in \mathbf{L} . The reason is that we have the invariant (for the reachable states we are concerned with in the theorem) that the variables \mathbf{L} are instantiated by objects which do not exist in the state, so that this axiom could never be applied.

Another obvious optimization is to omit the rewrite axiom Rij when the role i contains only a single rule. This optimization relies on the fact that in this case Tij can never appear in the state, an invariant that holds for the reachable states we are concerned with in the theorem. More generally, we drop any rule that depends on a Tij that is never generated. This can happen, whenever the only rule that generates Tij has been eliminated by previous optimizations.

Returning to our example of Section 5, the justification for eliminating $R221$ is that it contains (L B A n nB kB S) with L fresh on its left-hand side. Since $R212$ depends on (T21 B L) , which could only be generated by $R221$, this rule can be dropped as well.

7 Related work

The mapping defined in this paper is intended to serve two purposes. First, it provides a simple and direct formalization of the MSR semantics in RWLDT and hence in OCC. This can be used in an interactive theorem prover, e.g. as implemented in the OCC prototype, to establish security properties such as authentication or secrecy goals. Second, the formalization is refined so that the symbolic execution capabilities of OCC and its underlying Maude implementation can be applied to MSR specifications. Although the second purpose could be also accomplished by mapping MSR into a conventional programming language such as Promela, C, Java, or ML, the use of a target language based on a logic allows us to provide a *uniform* solution for both purposes and also makes it easier to establish the correctness of the mapping.

The particular choice of OCC/Maude as a target language is directly motivated by the features of MSR, namely the unique combination of dependent types and rewriting, which

as far as we know is not available in any other language. Promela, the language of the very popular Spin model checker [21], for instance, follows a different paradigm (closer to a concurrent imperative programming language) and provides neither a suitable type system nor multiset rewriting. Of course, a conventional programming language, such as C, Java, or ML, could be used to develop an implementation of MSR, but the efficient reimplementations of rewriting and the built-in search and model-checking support provided by Maude would be tedious and error-prone, ill-suited for an experimental prototype. An additional advantage of our choice of a general logical framework such as OCC is that it naturally leads to several extensions that are briefly discussed in the next section.

In addition to the use of general-purpose tools such as model checkers, e.g. [22, 29], and theorem provers, e.g. [31], quite a variety of analysis tools that are specific to security protocols have been developed. Being far from exhaustive, we briefly touch upon a few of the most closely related approaches, which at the same time provide interesting directions for future work.

The NRL protocol analyzer [23] is a Prolog-based tool which integrates model-checking and theorem proving techniques in the specific domain of security protocols analysis. It has been successfully used in the detection of flaws as well as in the formal specification and verification of several real-world protocols such as IKE and SET. The protocol specification consists of a set of rules expressing all possible protocol state changes and additional symbolic reductions to characterize the cryptographic operators. To prove that a given insecure state is not reachable the protocol analyzer performs a backward search and uses automatically generated grammars, symbolically representing possibly infinite sets of unreachable states, to prune the search space. A formalization of the grammar generation phase can be found in [20]. State changes in the NRL protocol analyzer are a specialized form of (untyped) multiset rewriting and therefore are closely related to MSR rules. The main difference with respect to MSR is that the NRL protocol analyzer allows certain forms of equations, and associated with this the more general narrowing-style analysis. Extending MSR and its implementation with general equations is not difficult within our OCC/Maude prototype, but the efficient use of general narrowing techniques for cryptoprotocol analysis is an open research topic.

The CAPSL Intermediate Language, CIL [19], was designed as a neutral intermediate language for the exchange of specifications written for diverse verification tools [8, 18, 25]. Numerous “connectors” translated CIL specifications to and from these other languages and tools. It emerged as a byproduct of yet another tool, the Common Authentication Protocol Specification Language, CAPSL [26], which coupled a simple and easy-to-understand syntax close to the standard informal protocol notation as a sequence of message exchanges with a powerful model checker. CIL shares with MSR the basic multiset rewriting approach to specification, as well as the use of existentials to abstractly deal with freshness. It does not provide the flexible definitional framework of MSR, and in particular its rich typing infrastructure.

A transformation of CAPSL into the strand space formalism [38] is possible as well. Strands can be roughly seen as (possibly parameterized) unfoldings of protocol roles. In [27] an analyzer for bounded-process protocols is presented. It can verify authentication and confidentiality properties by means of composition with suitable test strands. To verify if composition of strands is realizable, a special purpose constraint solver has been implemented in Prolog. Disregarding the type system, a close relation between multiset-rewriting-based specifications and the strands space formalism exists [14] and could be used to establish bridges for a constraint-based analysis of MSR specifications under a bounded process assumption.

Another difference between MSR and the above languages is that, due to its grounding in linear logic, roles can have local symbols (existentially quantified variables) which can be used to enforce sequential execution of rules. Local symbols and sequential composition are also available in languages based on π -calculus [28] such as the extension of π -calculus used in the ProVerif tool [5, 6]. In fact, a language which unifies features of MSR and the π -calculus is under investigation by the first author [16]. ProVerif can deal with an unbounded number of processes, but due to its approximation technique it may report false attacks. More interestingly, ProVerif supports verification of special classes of weak and strong secrecy, authentication, and correspondence properties, and can also perform reasoning based on observational equivalence to verify non-interference properties. The advantage is that all forms of verification are entirely automatic.

A close correspondence between a type-checking-based information-flow analysis and a particular Prolog-style logic-programming-based analysis of the attacker's knowledge has been established in [1]. It would be interesting if this correspondence could be adapted to deal with MSR specifications which use multiset rewriting instead of π -calculus style communication. Furthermore, a relation seems to exist between the type-based analysis of ProVerif and the data access specification of MSR [12], which is static check on MSR specifications restricting the accessibility of certain pieces of information, a topic that needs to be further investigated.

8 Final remarks

In this paper we have presented a shallow and hence efficient embedding from MSR into rewriting logic with dependent types (RWLDT), which has been introduced as a restricted instance of the open calculus of constructions (OCC). This mapping forms the basis for the implementation of an MSR execution and analysis environment [32], which has recently been completed by Stefan Reich under the guidance of the second author. The MSR tool also makes use of the mapping from RWLDT into RWL that has already been implemented as part of the OCC prototype in Maude. This allows us to perform symbolic execution of the translated MSR specification as illustrated by our example. The user interaction takes place at the level of RWLDT terms, which directly correspond to MSR terms, and hence the user does not need to be concerned with the resulting translation into RWL. The MSR tool implements not only symbolic execution at the MSR language level but also symbolic search, both with several options similar to those available in Maude. To facilitate the interactive analysis of security protocols, the tool also supports interactive state space navigation, where symbolic executions and searches can be composed in an interactive session to explore the protocol state space. A similar MSR interface to Maude's model checker is left for future work. At the moment, we can instead export the RWL translation of the RWLDT specification and perform model checking at the level of Maude.

For the sake of clarity we made a number of simplifying assumptions in this paper. We have not treated modular MSR specifications and we decoupled the issue of inferring implicit parts of an MSR specification from the actual translation phase, which is exactly the way we have organized the architecture of the translator. The MSR tool implements an MSR module system and furthermore allows bindings between MSR and OCC entities. It also implements quite powerful type inference heuristics, which in practice allow us to omit most quantifiers and type declarations, and hence enhance readability of MSR specifications considerably. In this paper, we also assumed the absence of name clashes, an assumption that is not needed

in the implementation because it uses the CINNI explicit substitution calculus [33, 34] and its term representation.

An additional feature of MSR that required a generalization of our representation are constraints, i.e., conditions attached to MSR rules. Constraints do not appear in [10, 11], but have proved useful, for instance, in the Kerberos analysis [9]. Among the options are the direct translation into conditional rules of RWLDT, the extension of the linear state by a non-linear counterpart (as in standard sequent presentations of linear logic) and its use to verify the constraints. For the sake of generality, the MSR tool implements a combination of these two possibilities, depending on whether the type of the condition indicates a propositional or a state-like nature.

Equations are a recent addition to MSR, inspired by this collaboration. They can be directly mapped to the computational equations of RWLDT, and hence incorporating them into the MSR tool seems to be a relatively easy task. Further extensions of MSR, such as moving to richer executable fragments of linear logic in the style of CLF [39], a direction currently investigated by the first author, seem to require deeper embedding of MSR into RWLDT, an interesting topic that we leave for future research.

Most systems designed for the verification of security protocols operated under the unproved assumption that an attack can only result from the combination of a fixed number of message transformations, which altogether constitute the capabilities of the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder. In [12], it has been proved that the Dolev-Yao intruder can indeed emulate the actions of an arbitrary adversary. In order to do so, MSR has been extended by a so-called data access specification which can limit the capabilities of principals, e.g. to use a key that the principal is not entitled to access. Now the assumption of an arbitrary intruder can be replaced by a concrete Dolev-Yao intruder specified in MSR. In principle, the MSR tool is capable to analyze such specifications. A well-known problem, however, is that even for very simple protocols like the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol, the state space explodes after only a few number of protocol steps, so that in practice the following two approaches or a combination of both will be needed: (1) steer the protocol into potentially critical regions of the state space using interactive state space navigation as implemented in the MSR tool (2) use a more constrained and even possibly incomplete attacker specification in MSR for search for certain forms of attacks.

Clearly, automatic or interactive symbolic state space exploration is a useful tool to discover the violations of security properties, but since the state space is usually infinite, the verification is a more difficult matter. In the absence of any other constraints, we would resort to standard verification techniques, e.g. inductive verification of invariants. Rather than using a concrete intruder, it is often easier to perform the proof under the assumption of an arbitrary adversary. The good news is that in addition to the automatic symbolic analysis techniques mentioned above, our two-level architecture opens the door to performing formal reasoning at the level of RWLDT, which contains all the type information of the original MSR specification and uses practically the same term syntax. Indeed, interactive theorem proving is supported by OCC [34–36], but to make use of it our translation needs to be enriched to make explicit the inductive nature of MSR, which can be achieved essentially by adding suitable elimination/induction principles. For classical reasoning using higher-order logic, e.g. in the style of [31], RWLDT would be considered as a sublanguage of OCC with a classical propositional universe. Formal reasoning would ultimately rely on the model-theoretic semantics of OCC, but it can use its operational semantics to enhance the expressivity of types and to provide partial automation in proofs.

The abovementioned data access specification [12] has not been treated in this paper, because a sufficiently generic and concise formulation is still subject of ongoing work. Our

most recent idea to formalize the data access specification is to use predicates inside the type theory to express the accessibility of information relative to principals. In combination with the assertional propositions of RWLDT this may simplify the representation of data access rules significantly and would provide a great deal of flexibility. Furthermore, the proof that the data access specification is satisfied would become an object inside the type theory. In fact, the logical nature of RWLDT is far from being fully exploited so far, which leads us to the last point of the conclusion.

See <http://formal.cs.uiuc.edu/stehr/msr.html> for the MSR tool, documentation, and several examples including the complete specification of the Otway-Rees example and a simplified version of Kerberos. An extended specification of Kerberos, which includes the option of cross-realm authentication is under development.

Appendix A: MSR specification of the Otway-Rees protocol

This appendix lists the specification of all three roles of the Otway-Rees protocol [30], whose responder was introduced as a case-study in Section 3. The declaration of the symbols occurring in these role definitions can be found in the body of this document.

A.1 Context

```

nonce : Type.
shK   : princ -> princ -> Type.
ltK   : princ -> princ -> Type.
stK   : princ -> princ -> Type.
.P    : princ -> msg.
.n    : nonce -> msg.
.k    : {A, B : princ}stK A B -> msg.
.l    : {A, B : princ}ltK A B -> shK A B.
-, -  : msg -> msg -> msg.
{-}_  : {A, B : princ}shK A B -> msg -> msg.
N     : msg -> state.
S     : princ.
    
```

A.2 Initiator

```

ROLE 1 : ∀A : princ .
        ∃L : {A : princ}princ → nonce → nonce → state .

RULE 11 : (
    (
        ∀B : princ . ∀kAS : (ltK A S) .
        . → ∃n, nA : nonce .
        N (nn, AP, BP, {nAn, nn, AP, BP}kAS1),
        (L A B n nA kAS)
    )
)

RULE 12 : (
    (
        ∀B : princ . ∀n, nA : nonce .
        ∀kAS : (ltK A S) . ∀kAB : (stK A B) .
        N (nn, {nAn, kABk}kAS1), (L A B n nA kAS)
        → .
    )
)
    
```

.1 Responder

ROLE 2 : $\forall B : \text{princ} .$

$\exists L : \{B : \text{princ}\} \text{princ} \rightarrow \text{nonce} \rightarrow \text{nonce} \rightarrow$
 $(\text{ltK } B \text{ S}) \rightarrow \text{state} .$

$$\text{RULE 21 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \forall n : \text{nonce} . \\ \forall k_{BS} : (\text{ltK } B \text{ S}) . \forall X : \text{msg} . \\ N(n^n, A^P, B^P, X) \\ \rightarrow \exists n_B : \text{nonce} . \\ N(n^n, A^P, B^P, X, \{n_B^n, n^n, A^P, B^P\}_{k_{BS}^1}), \\ (L \ B \ A \ n \ n_B \ k_{BS}) \end{array} \right)$$

$$\text{RULE 22 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \forall n, n_A : \text{nonce} . \forall Y : \text{msg} . \\ \forall k_{BS} : (\text{ltK } B \text{ S}) . \forall k_{AB} : (\text{stK } A \ B) . \\ N(n^n, Y, \{n_B^n, k_{AB}^k\}_{k_{BS}^1}), (L \ B \ A \ n \ n_B \ k_{BS}) \\ \rightarrow N(n^n, Y) \end{array} \right)$$

.2 Server

ROLE 3 : FOR $S : \text{princ} .$

$$\text{RULE 31 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A, B : \text{princ} . \forall k_{AS} : (\text{ltK } A \ S) . \forall k_{BS} : (\text{ltK } B \ S) . \\ \forall n, n_A, n_B : \text{nonce} . \\ N(n^n, A^P, B^P, \{n_A^n, n^n, A^P, B^P\}_{k_{AS}^1}, \{n_B^n, n^n, A^P, B^P\}_{k_{BS}^1}) \\ \rightarrow \exists k_{AB} : \text{stK } A \ B . \\ N(n^n, \{n_A^n, k_{AB}^k\}_{k_{AS}^1} \{n_B^n, k_{AB}^k\}_{k_{BS}^1}) \end{array} \right)$$

Appendix B Optimized RWLDT translation of the Otway-Rees protocol

This appendix lists the optimized translation of the Otway-Rees protocol. We already displayed the result for the responder role in Section 5.

B.1 Context

```

princ : Type . msg : Type .

state : Type .
empty : state . union : state -> state -> state .
union_comm : ||{i,j : state} ((union i j)=(union j i)) .
union_assoc : ||{i,j,k : state} ((union i (union j k)) = (union (union i j) k)).

nat : Type . 0 : nat . S : nat -> nat .
F : nat -> state .
V : {T : Type} nat -> T .
E : {T : Type}T -> state .
    
```

```

act : Type .

nonce : Type .
shK : princ -> princ -> Type .
ltK : princ -> princ -> Type .
stK : princ -> princ -> Type .
nonce-msg : nonce -> msg .
princ-msg : princ -> msg .
stK-msg : {A,B | princ}(stK A B)-> msg .
ltK-shK : {A,B | princ}(ltK A B)->(shK A B) .
append : msg -> msg -> msg .
encrypt : {A,B | princ}(shK A B)-> msg -> msg .
N : msg -> state .
S : princ .

```

B.2 Initiator

```

L111 : act . L122 : act .
T12 : princ->(princ->princ->nonce->nonce->state)->state .

```

```

R111 : !! {A:princ}
  {L:princ->princ->nonce->nonce->state}
  {B:princ}{kAS:ltK A S}{n:nonce}{nA:nonce}
  {fresh,fresh':nat}
  (L := (V (princ->princ->
            nonce->nonce->state) fresh))->
  (n := (V nonce (S fresh))) ->
  (nA := (V nonce (S(S fresh)))) ->
  (fresh' := (S(S(S fresh)))) ->
  [L111] :
    (union((F fresh),(E (ltK A S) kAS)))
=> (union((F fresh'),(T12 A L),(E (ltK A S) kAS),
          (N (append((nonce-msg n),
                    (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B),
                    (encrypt (ltK-shK kAS)
                              (append((nonce-msg nA),(nonce-msg n),
                                       (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B))))))),
          (L A B n nA)))

```

```

R122 : !! {A:princ}
  {L:princ->princ->nonce->nonce->state}
  {B:princ}{kAS:ltK A S}{n:nonce}{nA:nonce}
  {kAB:stK A B}
  {fresh,fresh':nat}
  (fresh' := fresh)->
  [L122]:
    (union ((F fresh),(T12 A L),
            (N (append ((nonce-msg n),
                      (encrypt (ltK-shK kAS)
                                (append (nonce-msg nA)
                                         (stK-msg kAB))))))),
          (L A B n nA)))
=> (F fresh')

```

B.3 Responder

L211 : act . L222 : act .
 T22 : princ->({B:princ}princ->nonce->nonce->(ltK B S)->state)->state .

R211 : !! {B:princ}
 {L:{B:princ}princ->
 nonce->nonce->(ltK B S)->state}
 {n:nonce}{A:princ}{X:msg}
 {kBS:ltK B S}{nB:nonce}
 {fresh,fresh':nat}
 (L := (V ({B:princ}princ->nonce->nonce->
 (ltK B S)->state) fresh))->
 (nB := (V nonce (S fresh)))->
 (fresh' := (S(S fresh)))->
 [L211]:
 (union ((F fresh),(E (ltK B S) kBS),
 (N (append ((nonce-msg n),
 (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B),X))))))
 => (union ((F fresh'),(T22 B L),(E (ltK B S) kBS),
 (N (append ((nonce-msg n),
 (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B),X,
 (encrypt (ltK-shK kBS)
 (append ((nonce-msg nB),(nonce-msg n),
 (princ-msg A),(princ-msg B))))))))),
 (L B A n nB kBS)))

R222 : !! {B:princ}
 {L:{B:princ}princ->nonce->nonce->(ltK B S)->state}
 {n:nonce}{A:princ}{Y:msg}
 {kBS:ltK B S}{nB:nonce}{kAB:stK A B}
 {fresh,fresh':nat}
 (fresh' := fresh)->
 [L222]:
 (union ((F fresh),(T22 B L),
 (N (append ((nonce-msg n),Y,
 (encrypt (ltK-shK kBS)
 (append (nonce-msg nB)
 (stK-msg kAB))))))),
 (L B A n nB kBS)))
 => (union ((F fresh'),
 (N (append (nonce-msg n) Y))))

B.4 Server

L311 : act .

R311 : !! {n:nonce}{A:princ}
 {kAS:ltK A S}{B:princ}{kBS:ltK B S}
 {nA:nonce}{nB:nonce}{kAB:stK A B}
 {fresh,fresh':nat}
 (kAB := (V (stK A B) fresh))->
 (fresh' := (S fresh))->
 [L311]:
 (union ((F fresh),(START-3 S),
 (N (append ((nonce-msg n),

```

(princ-msg A), (princ-msg B),
(encrypt (ltK-shK kAS)
  (append ((nonce-msg nA), (nonce-msg n),
    (princ-msg A), (princ-msg B))))),
(encrypt (ltK-shK kBS)
  (append ((nonce-msg nB), (nonce-msg n),
    (princ-msg A), (princ-msg B)))))))))
=> (union ((F fresh'),
  (N (append ((nonce-msg n),
    (encrypt (ltK-shK kAS)
      (append (nonce-msg nA)
        (stK-msg kAB))),
    (encrypt (ltK-shK kBS)
      (append (nonce-msg nB)
        (stK-msg kAB)))))))))

```

Appendix C MSR specification of the Dolev-Yao intruder

This appendix shows the MSR representation of the aspects of the Dolev-Yao Intruder that are relevant for the Otway-Rees Protocol. Further discussion on the MSR specification of the Dolev-Yao intruder can be found in [12, 14, 15].

Network interception (INT):

$$\text{ROLE INT : FOR } I : \text{princ.}$$

$$\text{RULE INT1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m : \text{msg.} \\ N(m) \longrightarrow I(m) \end{array} \right)$$

Network transmission (TRN):

$$\text{ROLE TRN : FOR } I : \text{princ.}$$

$$\text{RULE TRN1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m : \text{msg.} \\ I(m) \longrightarrow N(m) \end{array} \right)$$

Pair decomposition (DCM):

$$\text{ROLE DCM : FOR } I : \text{princ.}$$

$$\text{RULE DCM1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m_1, m_2 : \text{msg.} \\ I(m_1, m_2) \longrightarrow I(m_1), I(m_2) \end{array} \right)$$

Pair composition (CMP):

$$\text{ROLE CMP : FOR } I : \text{princ.}$$

$$\text{RULE CMP1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m_1, m_2 : \text{msg.} \\ I(m_1), I(m_2) \longrightarrow I(m_1, m_2) \end{array} \right)$$

Decryption with long-term key (LDC):

ROLE LDC : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE LDC1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m : \text{msg} . \forall A, B : \text{princ} . \forall k : (\text{ltK } A \ B) . \\ I (\{m\}_{k^{\text{lt}}}) , I (k^{\text{ltk}}) \longrightarrow I (m) , I (k^{\text{ltk}}) \end{array} \right)$$

Encryption with long-term key (LEC):

ROLE LEC : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE LEC1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m : \text{msg} . \forall A, B : \text{princ} . \forall k : (\text{ltK } A \ B) . \\ I (m) , I (k^{\text{ltk}}) \longrightarrow I (\{m\}_{k^{\text{lt}}}) , I (k^{\text{ltk}}) \end{array} \right)$$

Decryption and encryption with short-term key are not needed since these operations are not used in the Otway-Rees protocol.

Nonce generation (NNG)

ROLE NNG : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE NNG1 : } \left(\cdot \longrightarrow \exists n : \text{nonce} . I (n^{\text{n}}) \right)$$

Short-term key generation (SKG)

ROLE SKG : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE SKG1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A, B : \text{princ} . \\ \cdot \longrightarrow \exists k : \text{stK } A \ B . I (k^{\text{k}}) \end{array} \right)$$

Name lookup (PLU):

ROLE PLU : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE PLU1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \\ \cdot \longrightarrow I (A^{\text{p}}) \end{array} \right)$$

Shared-key lookup (KLU):

ROLE KLU : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE KLU1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \forall k : (\text{ltK } I \ A) . \\ \cdot \longrightarrow I (k^{\text{ltk}}) \end{array} \right)$$

$$\text{RULE KLU2 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall A : \text{princ} . \forall k : (\text{ltK } A \ I) . \\ \cdot \longrightarrow I (k^{\text{ltk}}) \end{array} \right)$$

Duplication (DUP):

ROLE DUP : FOR I : princ .

$$\text{RULE DUP1 : } \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall m : \text{msg} . \\ I (m) \longrightarrow I (m) , I (m) \end{array} \right)$$

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